CONCERNING THE DUTIES OF THEM WHO BEAR RULE.
1. The right of supreme authority is distinguished from its
exercise. 2. The safety of the people is the supreme law. 3. It
behoves princes to regard the common benefit of many, not the
peculiar interest of this or that man. 4. That by safety is
understood all manner of conveniences. 5. A query, whether it be
the duty of kings to provide for the salvation of their
subjects’ souls, as they shall judge best according to their own
consciences. 6. Wherein the safety of the people consists. 7.
That discoverers are necessary for the defence of the people. 8.
That to have soldiers, arms, garrisons, and moneys in readiness,
in time of peace, is also necessary for the defence of the
people. 9. A right instruction of subjects in civil doctrines,
is necessary for the preserving of peace. 10. Equal
distributions of public offices conduces much to the
preservation of peace. 11. It is natural equity, that monies be
taxed according to what every man spends, not what he possesses.
12. It conduceth to the preservation of peace, to keep down
ambitious men. 13. And to break factions. 14. Laws whereby
thriving arts are cherished and great costs restrained, conduce
to the enriching of the subject. 15. That more ought not to be
defined by the laws, than the benefit of the prince and his
subjects requires. 16. That greater punishments must not be
inflicted, than are prescribed by the laws. 13. Subjects must
have right done them against corrupt judges.
[Sidenote: The right of supreme authority is distinguished from its
exercise.]
1. By what hath hitherto been said, the _duties_ of citizens and
subjects in any kind of government whatsoever, and the _power_ of
the supreme ruler over them are apparent. But we have as yet said
nothing of the _duties_ of rulers, and how they ought to behave
themselves towards their subjects. We must then distinguish between
the _right_ and the _exercise_ of supreme authority; for they can be
divided. As for example, when he who hath the _right_, either cannot
or will not be present in judging trespasses, or deliberating of
affairs. For kings sometimes by reason of their age cannot order
their affairs; sometimes also, though they can do it themselves, yet
they judge it fitter, being satisfied in the choice of their
officers and counsellors, to exercise their power by them. Now where
the _right_ and _exercise_ are severed, there the government of the
commonweal is like the ordinary government of the world; in which
God, the mover of all things, produceth natural effects by the means
of secondary causes. But where he to whom the right of ruling doth
belong, is himself present in all judicatures, consultations, and
public actions, there the administration is such, as if God, beyond
the ordinary course of nature, should immediately apply himself unto
all matters. We will therefore in this chapter summarily and briefly
speak somewhat concerning their _duties_, who exercise authority,
whether by their own or other’s right. Nor is it my purpose to
descend into those things, which being diverse from others, some
princes may do, for this is to be left to the political practices of
each commonweal.
[Sidenote: The safety of the people is the supreme law.]
2. Now all the duties of rulers are contained in this one sentence,
_the safety of the people is the supreme law_. For although they who
among men obtain the chiefest dominion, cannot be subject to laws
properly so called, that is to say, to the will of men, because to
be chief and subject, are contradictories; yet is it their _duty_ in
all things, as much as possibly they can, to yield obedience unto
right reason, which is the natural, moral, and divine law. But
because dominions were constituted for peace’s sake, and peace was
sought after for safety’s sake; he, who being placed in authority,
shall use his power otherwise than to the safety of the people, will
act against the reasons of peace, that is to say, against the laws
of nature. Now as the safety of the people dictates a law by which
princes know their _duty_, so doth it also teach them an art how to
procure themselves a benefit; for the power of the citizens is the
power of the city, that is to say, his that bears the chief rule in
any state.
[Sidenote: It is the duty of princes to respect the common benefit
of many, not the peculiar interest of this or that man.]
3. By the people in this place we understand, not one civil person,
namely, the city itself which governs, but the multitude of subjects
which are governed. For the city was not instituted for its own, but
for the subjects’ sake: and yet a particular care is not required of
_this_ or _that_ man. For the ruler (as such) provides no otherwise
for the safety of his people, than by his laws, which are universal;
and therefore he hath fully _discharged_ himself, if he have
thoroughly endeavoured by wholesome constitutions to establish the
welfare of the most part, and made it as lasting as may be; and that
no man suffer ill, but by his own default, or by some chance which
could not be prevented. But it sometimes conduces to the safety of
the most part, that wicked men do suffer.
[Sidenote: By safety is understood all manner of benefits.]
4. But by _safety_ must be understood, not the sole preservation of
life in what condition soever, but in order to its happiness. For to
this end did men freely assemble themselves and _institute_ a
government, that they might, as much as their human condition would
afford, live delightfully. They therefore who had undertaken the
administration of power in such a kind of government, would sin
against the law of nature, (because against their trust, who had
committed that power unto them), if they should not study, as much
as by good laws could be effected, to furnish their subjects
abundantly, not only with the good things belonging to life, but
also with those which advance to delectation. They who have acquired
dominion by arms, do all desire that their subjects may be strong in
body and mind, that they may serve them the better. Wherefore if
they should not endeavour to provide them, not only with such things
whereby they may live, but also with such whereby they may grow
strong and lusty, they would act against their own scope and end.
[Sidenote: Query, whether it be the duty of kings to provide for the
salvation of their subjects’ souls, as they shall judge
best in their own consciences.]
5. And first of all, princes do believe that it mainly concerns
_eternal salvation_, what opinions are held of the Deity, and what
manner of worship he is to be adored with. Which being supposed, it
may be demanded whether chief rulers, and whosoever they be, whether
one or more, who exercise supreme authority, sin not against the law
of nature, if they cause not such a doctrine and worship to be
taught and practised, or permit a contrary to be taught and
practised, as they believe necessarily conduceth to the _eternal
salvation_ of their subjects. It is manifest that they act against
their conscience; and that they will, as much as in them lies, the
eternal perdition of their subjects. For if they willed it not, I
see no reason why they should suffer (when being supreme they cannot
be compelled) such things to be taught and done, for which they
believe them to be in a damnable state. But we will leave this
difficulty in suspense.
[Sidenote: Wherein the safety of the people consists.]
6. The benefits of subjects, respecting this life only, may be
distributed into four kinds. 1. That they be defended against
foreign enemies. 2. That peace be preserved at home. 3. That they be
enriched, as much as may consist with public security. 4. That they
enjoy a harmless liberty. For supreme commanders can confer no more
to their civil happiness, than that being preserved from foreign and
civil wars, they may quietly enjoy that wealth which they have
purchased by their own industry.
[Sidenote: That discoverers are necessary for the defence of the
people.]
7. There are two things necessary for the people’s defence; _to be
warned and to be forearmed_. For the state of commonwealths
considered in themselves, is natural, that is to say, hostile.
Neither if they cease from fighting, is it therefore to be called
peace; but rather a breathing time, in which one enemy observing the
motion and countenance of the other, values his security not
according to the pacts, but the forces and counsels of his
adversary. And this by natural right, as hath been showed in chap.
II. art. 11, from this, that contracts are invalid in the state of
nature, as oft as any just fear doth intervene. It is therefore
necessary to the defence of the city, first, that there be some who
may, as near as may be, _search into_ and _discover_ the counsels
and motions of all those who may prejudice it. For _discoverers_ to
ministers of state, are like the beams of the sun to the human soul.
And we may more truly say in vision political, than natural, that
the sensible and intelligible species of outward things, not well
considered by others, are by the air transported to the soul; that
is to say, to them who have the supreme authority: and therefore are
they no less necessary to the preservation of the state, than the
rays of the light are to the conservation of man. Or if they be
compared to spider’s webs, which, extended on all sides by the
finest threads, do warn them, keeping in their small holes, of all
outward motions; they who bear rule, can no more know what is
necessary to be commanded for the defence of their subjects without
_spies_, than those spiders can, when they shall go forth, and
whither they shall repair, without the motion of those threads.
[Sidenote: To have soldiers, arms, garrisons, and money in readiness
in time of peace, is necessary for the people’s defence.]
8. Furthermore, it is necessarily requisite to the people’s defence,
that they be _forearmed_. Now to be forearmed is to be furnished
with soldiers, arms, ships, forts, and monies, before the danger be
instant; for the lifting of soldiers and taking up of arms after a
blow is given, is too late at least, if not impossible. In like
manner, not to raise forts and appoint garrisons in convenient
places before the frontiers are invaded, is to be like those country
swains, (as Demosthenes said), who ignorant of the art of fencing,
with their bucklers guarded those parts of the body where they first
felt the smart of the strokes. But they who think it then seasonable
enough to raise monies for the maintenance of soldiers and other
charges of war, when the danger begins to show itself, they consider
not, surely, how difficult a matter it is to wring suddenly out of
close-fisted men so vast a proportion of monies. For almost all men,
what they once reckon in the number of their goods, do judge
themselves to have such a right and propriety in it, as they
conceive themselves to be injured whensoever they are forced to
employ but the least part of it for the public good. Now a
sufficient stock of monies to defend the country with arms, will not
soon be raised out of the treasure of imposts and customs. We must
therefore, for fear of war, in time of peace hoard up good sums, if
we intend the safety of the commonweal. Since therefore it
necessarily belongs to rulers, for the subjects’ safety to discover
the enemy’s counsel, to keep garrisons, and to have money in
continual readiness; and that princes are, by the law of nature,
bound to use their whole endeavour in procuring the welfare of their
subjects: it follows, that it is not only lawful for them to send
out spies, to maintain soldiers, to build forts, and to require
monies for these purposes; but also not to do thus is unlawful. To
which also may be added, whatsoever shall seem to conduce to the
lessening of the power of foreigners whom they suspect, whether by
slight or force. For rulers are bound according to their power to
prevent the evils they suspect; lest peradventure they may happen
through their negligence.
[Sidenote: A right instruction of subjects in civil doctrines, is
necessary for the preserving of peace.]
9. But many things are required to the conservation of inward
peace; because many things concur (as hath been showed in the
foregoing chapter) to its perturbation. We have there showed, that
some things there are, which dispose the minds of men to sedition,
others which move and quicken them so disposed. Among those which
dispose them, we have reckoned in the first place certain perverse
doctrines. It is therefore the duty of those who have the chief
authority, to root those out of the minds of men, not by
commanding, but by teaching; not by the terror of penalties, but
by the perspicuity of reasons. The laws whereby this evil may be
withstood, are not to be made against the persons erring, but
against the errors themselves. Those errors which, in the
foregoing chapter, we affirmed were inconsistent with the quiet of
the commonweal, have crept into the minds of ignorant men, partly
from the pulpit, partly from the daily discourses of men, who, by
reason of little employment otherwise, do find leisure enough to
study; and they got into these men’s minds by the teachers of
their youth in public schools. Wherefore also, on the other side,
if any man would introduce sound doctrine, he must begin from the
_academies_. There the true and truly demonstrated foundations of
civil doctrine are to be laid; wherewith young men, being once
endued, they may afterward, both in private and public, instruct
the vulgar. And this they will do so much the more cheerfully and
powerfully, by how much themselves shall be more certainly
convinced of the truth of those things they profess and teach. For
seeing at this day men receive propositions, though false, and no
more intelligible than if a man should join together a company of
terms drawn by chance out of an urn, by reason of the frequent use
of hearing them; how much more would they for the same reason
entertain true doctrines, suitable to their own understandings and
the nature of things? I therefore conceive it to be the duty of
supreme officers, to cause the true elements of civil doctrine to
be written, and to command them to be taught in all the colleges
of their several dominions.
[Sidenote: Equal distribution of public burthens conduceth much to
the preservation of peace.]
10. In the next place we showed, that grief of mind arising from
_want_ did dispose the subjects to sedition; which want, although
derived from their own luxury and sloth, yet they impute it to those
who govern the realm, as though they were drained and oppressed by
public pensions. Notwithstanding, it may sometimes happen that this
complaint may be just; namely, when the burthens of the realm are
unequally imposed on the subjects; for that which to all together is
but a light weight, if many withdraw themselves it will be very
heavy, nay, even intolerable to the rest: neither are men wont so
much to grieve at the burthen itself, as at the inequality. With
much earnestness therefore men strive to be freed from taxes; and in
this conflict the less happy, as being overcome, do envy the more
fortunate. To remove therefore all just complaint, it is the
interest of the public quiet, and by consequence it concerns the
duty of the magistrate, to see that the public burthens be equally
borne. Furthermore, since what is brought by the subjects to public
use, is nothing else but the price of their bought peace, it is good
reason that they who equally share in the peace, should also pay an
equal part, either by contributing their monies or their labours to
the commonweal. Now it is the law of nature, (by art. 15, chap.
III), that every man in distributing right to others, do carry
himself equal to all. Wherefore rulers are, by the natural law,
obliged to lay the burthens of the commonweal equally on their
subjects.
[Sidenote: It is natural equity, that monies be taxed according to
what every man spends, not to what he possesseth.]
11. Now in this place we understand an equality, not of money, but
of burthen; that is to say, an equality of reason between the
burthens and the benefits. For although all equally enjoy peace, yet
the benefits springing from thence are not equal to all; for some
get greater possessions, others less; and again, some consume less,
others more. It may therefore be demanded, whether subjects ought to
contribute to the public according to the rate of what they gain, or
of what they spend: that is to say, whether the persons must be
taxed, so as to pay contribution according to their wealth; or the
goods themselves, that every man contribute according to what he
spends. But if we consider, where monies are raised according to
wealth, there they who have made equal gain, have not equal
possessions, because that one preserves what he hath got by
frugality, another wastes it by luxury, and therefore equally
rejoicing in the benefit of peace, they do not equally sustain the
burthens of the commonweal: and on the other side, where the goods
themselves are taxed, there every man, while he spends his private
goods, in the very act of consuming them he undiscernably pays part
due to the commonweal, according to, not what he hath, but what by
the benefit of the realm he hath had: it is no more to be doubted,
but that the former way of commanding monies is against equity, and
therefore against the duty of rulers; the latter is agreeable to
reason, and the exercise of their authority.
[Sidenote: It conduces to the preservation of peace, to depress the
ambitious.]
12. In the third place we said, that that trouble of mind which
riseth from _ambition_, was offensive to public peace. For there are
some, who seeming to themselves to be wiser than others, and more
sufficient for the managing of affairs than they who at present do
govern, when they can no otherwise declare how profitable their
virtue would prove to the commonweal, they show it by harming it.
But because ambition and greediness of honours cannot be rooted out
of the minds of men, it is not the duty of rulers to endeavour it;
but by constant application of rewards and punishments they may so
order it, that men may know that the way to honour is not by
contempt of the present government, nor by factions and the popular
air, but by the contraries. They are good men who observe the
decrees, the laws, and rights of their fathers. If with a constant
order we saw these adorned with honours, but the factious punished
and had in contempt by those who bear command, there would be more
ambition to obey than withstand. Notwithstanding, it so happens
sometimes, that as we must stroke a horse by reason of his too much
fierceness, so a stiff-necked subject must be flattered for fear of
his power; but as that happens when the rider, so this when the
commander is in danger of falling. But we speak here of those whose
authority and power is entire. Their duty, I say, it is to cherish
obedient subjects, and to depress the factious all they can; nor can
the public power be otherwise preserved, nor the subjects’ quiet
without it.
[Sidenote: And to dissolve factions.]
13. But if it be the duty of princes to restrain the factious, much
more does it concern them to dissolve and dissipate the factions
themselves. Now I call a _faction_, a multitude of subjects gathered
together either by mutual _contracts_ among themselves, or by the
power of some one, without his or their authority who bear the
supreme rule. A _faction_, therefore, is as it were a city in a
city: for as by an union of men in the state of nature, a city
receives its being, so by a new union of subjects there ariseth a
_faction_. According to this definition, a multitude of subjects who
have bound themselves simply to obey any foreign prince or subject,
or have made any pacts or leagues of mutual defence between
themselves against all men, not excepting those who have the supreme
power in the city, is a _faction_. Also favour with the vulgar, if
it be so great that by it an army may be raised, except public
caution be given either by hostages or some other pledges, contains
_faction_ in it. The same may be said of private wealth, if it
exceed; because all things obey money. Forasmuch therefore as it is
true, that the state of cities among themselves is natural and
hostile, those princes who permit factions, do as much as if they
received an enemy within their walls: which is contrary to the
subjects’ safety, and therefore also against the law of nature.
[Sidenote: Laws whereby gaining arts are cherished and great
expenses restrained, do conduce much to the enriching of
the subject.]
14. There are two things necessary to the enriching of the subjects,
_labour_ and _thrift_; there is also a third which helps, to wit,
the _natural increase of the earth and water_; and there is a fourth
too, namely, _the militia_, which sometimes augments, but more
frequently lessens the subjects’ stock. The two first only are
necessary. For a city constituted in an island of the sea, no
greater than will serve for dwelling, may grow rich without sowing
or fishing, by merchandize and handicrafts only; but there is no
doubt, if they have a territory, that they may be richer with the
same number, or equally rich being a greater number. But the fourth,
namely, _the militia_, was of old reckoned in the number of the
gaining arts, under the notion of _booting_ or _taking prey_; and it
was by mankind, dispersed by families before the constitution of
civil societies, accounted just and honourable. For preying is
nothing else but a war waged with small forces. And great
commonweals, namely, that of Rome and Athens, by the spoils of war,
foreign tribute, and the territories they have purchased by their
arms, have sometimes so improved the commonwealth, that they have
not only not required any public monies from the poorer sort of
subjects, but have also divided to each of them both monies and
lands. But this kind of increase of riches is not to be brought into
rule and fashion. For the militia, in order to profit, is like a
die; wherewith many lose their estates, but few improve them. Since
therefore there are three things only, _the fruits of the earth and
water_, _labour_, and _thrift_, which are expedient for the
enriching of subjects, the duty of commanders in chief shall be
conversant only about those three. For the first those laws will be
useful, which countenance the arts that improve the increase of the
earth and water; such as are _husbandry_ and _fishing_. For the
second all laws against idleness, and such as quicken industry, are
profitable; as such whereby the _art of navigation_, by help whereof
the commodities of the whole world, bought almost by labour only,
are brought into one city; and the _mechanics_, under which I
comprehend all the arts of the most excellent workmen; and the
_mathematical sciences_, the fountains of navigatory and mechanic
employments, are held in due esteem and honour. For the third those
laws are useful, whereby all inordinate expense, as well in meats as
in clothes, and universally in all things which are consumed with
usage, is forbidden. Now because such laws are beneficial to the
ends above specified, it belongs also to the office of supreme
magistrates to establish them.
[Sidenote: That more ought not to be determined by the laws, than
the benefit of prince and subjects require.]
15. The liberty of subjects consists not in being exempt from the
laws of the city, or that they who have the supreme power cannot
make what laws they have a mind to. But because all the motions and
actions of subjects are never circumscribed by laws, nor can be, by
reason of their variety; it is necessary that there be infinite
cases which are neither commanded nor prohibited, but every man may
either do or not do them as he lists himself. In these, each man is
said to enjoy his liberty; and in this sense liberty is to be
understood in this place, namely, for that part of natural right
which is granted and left to subjects by the civil laws. As water
inclosed on all hands with banks, stands still and corrupts; having
no bounds, it spreads too largely, and the more passages it finds
the more freely it takes its current; so subjects, if they might do
nothing without the commands of the law, would grow dull and
unwieldy; if all, they would be dispersed; and the more is left
undetermined by the laws, the more liberty they enjoy. Both extremes
are faulty; for laws were not invented to take away, but to direct
men’s actions; even as nature ordained the banks, not to stay, but
to guide the course of the stream. The measure of this liberty is to
be taken from the subjects’ and the city’s good. Wherefore, in the
first place, it is against the charge of those who command and have
the authority of making laws, that there should be more laws than
necessarily serve for good of the magistrate and his subjects. For
since men are wont commonly to debate what to do or not to do, by
natural reason rather than any knowledge of the laws, where there
are more laws than can easily be remembered, and whereby such things
are forbidden as reason of itself prohibits not of necessity, they
must through ignorance, without the least evil intention, fall
within the compass of laws, as gins laid to entrap their harmless
liberty; which supreme commanders are bound to preserve for their
subjects by the laws of nature.
[Sidenote: That greater punishments must not be inflicted, than are
prescribed by the laws.]
16. It is a great part of that _liberty_, which is harmless to civil
government and necessary for each subject to live happily, that
there be no penalties dreaded but what they may both foresee and
look for; and this is done, where there are either no punishments at
all defined by the laws, or greater not required than are defined.
Where there are none defined, there he that hath first broken the
law, expects an indefinite or arbitrary punishment; and his fear is
supposed boundless, because it relates to an unbounded evil. Now the
law of nature commands them who are not subject to any civil laws,
by what we have said in chap. III. art. 11, and therefore supreme
commanders, that in taking revenge and punishing they must not so
much regard the past evil as the future good; and they sin, if they
entertain any other measure in arbitrary punishment than the public
benefit. But where the punishment is defined; either by a law
prescribed, as when it is set down in plain words that _he that
shall do thus or thus, shall suffer so and so_; or by practice, as
when the penalty, not by any law prescribed, but arbitrary from the
beginning, is afterward determined by the punishment of the first
delinquent; (for natural equity commands that equal transgressors be
equally punished); there to impose a greater penalty than is defined
by the law, is against the law of nature. For the end of punishment
is not to compel the will of man, but to fashion it, and to make it
such as he would have it who hath set the penalty. And deliberation
is nothing else but a weighing, as it were in scales, the
conveniences and inconveniences of the fact we are attempting; where
that which is more weighty, doth necessarily according to its
inclination prevail with us. If therefore the legislator doth set a
less penalty on a crime, than will make our fear more considerable
with us than our lust, that excess of lust above the fear of
punishment, whereby sin is committed, is to be attributed to the
legislator, that is to say, to the supreme; and therefore if he
inflict a greater punishment than himself hath determined in his
laws, he punisheth that in another in which he sinned himself.
[Sidenote: Subjects must have right restored to them against corrupt
judges.]
17. It pertains therefore to the harmless and necessary _liberty_ of
subjects, that every man may without fear enjoy the rights which are
allowed him by the laws. For it is in vain to have _our own_
distinguished by the laws from _another’s_, if by wrong judgment,
robbery, or theft, they may be again confounded. But it falls out
so, that these do happen where judges are corrupted. For the fear
whereby men are deterred from doing evil, ariseth not from hence,
namely, because penalties are set, but because they are executed.
For we esteem the future by what is past, seldom expecting what
seldom happens. If therefore judges corrupted either by gifts,
favour, or even by pity itself, do often forbear the execution of
the penalties due by the law, and by that means put wicked men in
hope to pass unpunished: honest subjects encompassed with murderers,
thieves, and knaves, will not have the liberty to converse freely
with each other, nor scarce to stir abroad without hazard; nay, the
_city_ itself is dissolved, and every man’s right of protecting
himself at his own will returns to him. The law of nature therefore
gives this precept to supreme commanders, that they not only do
righteousness themselves, but that they also by penalties cause the
judges, by them appointed, to do the same; that is to say, that they
hearken to the complaints of their subjects; and as oft as need
requires, make choice of some extraordinary judges, who may hear the
matter debated concerning the ordinary ones.
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