COMPARISON BETWEEN THREE KINDS OF GOVERNMENT
ACCORDING TO THEIR SEVERAL INCONVENIENCES.
1. A comparison of the natural state with the civil. 2. The
conveniences and inconveniences of the ruler and his subjects
are alike. 3. The praise of monarchy. 4. The government under
one, cannot be said to be unreasonable in this respect, namely,
because one hath more power than all the rest. 5. A rejection of
their opinion, who say, that a lord with his servants cannot
make a city. 6. Exactions are more grievous under a popular
state, than a monarchy. 7. Innocent subjects are less exposed to
penalties under a monarch, than under the people. 8. The liberty
of single subjects is not less under a monarch, than under a
people. 9. It is no disadvantage to the subjects, that they are
not all admitted to public deliberations. 10. Civil
deliberations are unadvisedly committed to great assemblies, by
reason of the unskilfulness of the most part of men: 11. In
regard of eloquence: 12. In regard of faction: 13. In regard of
the unstableness of the laws: 14. In regard of the want of
secrecy. 15. That these inconveniences adhere to democracy,
forasmuch as men are naturally delighted with the esteem of wit.
16. The inconveniences of a city arising from a king that is a
child. 17. The power of generals is an evident sign of the
excellence of monarchy. 18. The best state of a city is that,
where the subjects are the ruler’s inheritance. 19. The nearer
aristocracy draws to monarchy, the better it is; the further it
keeps from it, the worse.
[Sidenote: A comparing the state of nature with the civil.]
1. What _democracy_, _aristocracy_, and _monarchy_ are, hath already
been spoken; but which of them tends most to the preservation of the
subjects’ peace and procuring their advantages, we must see by
comparing them together. But first let us set forth the advantages
and disadvantages of a city in general; lest some perhaps should
think it better, that every man be left to live at his own will,
than to constitute any society at all. Every man indeed out of the
state of civil government hath a most entire, but unfruitful
liberty; because that he who by reason of his own liberty acts all
at his own will, must also by reason of the same liberty in others
suffer all at another’s will. But in a constituted city, every
subject retains to himself as much freedom as suffices him to live
well and quietly; and there is so much taken away from others, as
may make them not to be feared. Out of this state, every man hath
such a right to all, as yet he can enjoy nothing; in it, each one
securely enjoys his limited right. Out of it, any man may rightly
spoil or kill another; in it, none but one. Out of it, we are
protected by our own forces; in it, by the power of all. Out of it,
no man is sure of the fruit of his labours; in it, all men are.
Lastly, out of it, there is a dominion of passions, war, fear,
poverty, slovenliness, solitude, barbarism, ignorance, cruelty; in
it, the dominion of reason, peace, security, riches, decency,
society, elegancy, sciences, and benevolence.
[Sidenote: The gains and losses of the ruler and his subjects are
alike.]
2. Aristotle, in his seventh book and fourteenth chapter of his
_Politics_, saith, that there are two sorts of governments;
whereof the one relates to the benefit of the _ruler_, the other
to that of the _subjects_. As if where _subjects_ are severely
dealt with, there were one, and where more mildly, there were
another form of government. Which opinion may by no means be
subscribed to; for all the profits and disprofits arising from
government are the same, and common both to the _ruler_ and the
_subject_. The damages which befall some particular subjects
through misfortune, folly, negligence, sloth, or his own luxury,
may very well be severed from those which concern the ruler. But
those relate not to the government itself, being such as may
happen in any form of government whatsoever. If these same happen
from the first institution of the city, they will then be truly
called the inconveniences of government; but they will be common
to the ruler with his subjects, as their benefits are common. But
the first and greatest benefit, peace and defence, is to both; for
both he that commands, and he who is commanded, to the end that he
may defend his life makes use at once of all the forces of his
fellow-subjects. And in the greatest inconvenience that can befall
a city, namely, the slaughter of subjects arising from anarchy,
both the commander and the parties commanded are equally
concerned. Next, if the ruler levy such a sum of vast moneys from
his subjects, as they are not able to maintain themselves and
their families, nor conserve their bodily strength and vigor, the
disadvantage is as much his as theirs, who, with never so great a
stock or measure of riches, is not able to keep his authority or
his riches without the bodies of his subjects. But if he raise no
more than is sufficient for the due administration of his power,
that is a benefit equally to himself and his subjects, tending to
a common peace and defence. Nor is it imaginable which way
_public_ treasures can be a grievance to _private_ subjects, if
they be not so exhausted as to be wholly deprived from all
possibility to acquire, even by their industry, necessaries to
sustain the strength of their bodies and minds. For even thus the
grievance would concern the ruler; nor would it arise from the
ill-institution or ordination of the government, because in all
manner of governments subjects may be oppressed; but from the
ill-administration of a well-established government.
[Sidenote: The praise of monarchy.]
3. Now that _monarchy_, of the foresaid forms of _democracy_,
_aristocracy_, and _monarchy_, hath the pre-eminence, will best
appear by comparing the conveniences and inconveniences arising in
each one of them. Those arguments therefore, that the _whole_
universe is governed by _one_ God; that the ancients preferred the
monarchical state before all others, ascribing the rule of the gods
to one Jupiter; that in the beginning of affairs and of nations, the
decrees of princes were held for laws; that paternal government,
instituted by God himself in the creation, was monarchical; that
other governments were compacted by the artifice of men[15] out of
the ashes of monarchy, after it had been ruined with seditions; and
that the people of God were under the jurisdiction of kings:
although, I say, these do hold forth _monarchy_ as the more eminent
to us, yet because they do it by examples and testimonies, and not
by solid reason, we will pass them over.
Footnote 15:
_Compacted by the artifice of men, &c._] It seems the ancients who
made that same fable of Prometheus, pointed at this. They say that
Prometheus, having stolen fire from the sun, formed a man out of
clay, and that for this deed he was tortured by Jupiter with a
perpetual gnawing in his liver. Which is, that by human invention,
which is signified by Prometheus, laws and justice were by
imitation taken from monarchy; by virtue whereof, as by fire
removed from its natural orb, the multitude, as the dirt and dregs
of men, was as it were quickened and formed into a civil person;
which is termed aristocracy or democracy. But the author and
abettors being found, who might securely and quietly have lived
under the natural jurisdiction of kings, do thus smart for it;
that being exposed still to alteration, they are tormented with
perpetual cares, suspicions, and dissensions.
[Sidenote: The government of one cannot be said to be evil in this
respect, namely, because one hath more power than all the
rest.]
4. Some there are, who are discontented with the government under
_one_, for no other reason but because it is under _one_; as if it
were an unreasonable thing, that _one_ man among so many should so
far excel in power, as to be able at his own pleasure to dispose of
all the rest. These men, sure, if they could, would withdraw
themselves from under the dominion of _one_ God. But this exception
against _one_ is suggested by envy, while they see one man in
possession of what all desire. For the same cause, they would judge
it to be as unreasonable if a _few_ commanded, unless they
themselves either were, or hoped to be of the number. For if it be
an unreasonable thing that all men have not an equal right, surely
an aristocracy must be unreasonable also. But because we have showed
that the state of equality is the state of war, and that therefore
inequality was introduced by a general consent; this inequality,
whereby he whom we have voluntarily given more to, enjoys more, is
no longer to be accounted an unreasonable thing. The inconveniences
therefore which attend the dominion of _one_ man, attend his
_person_, not his _unity_. Let us therefore see whether brings with
it the greater grievances to the subject, the command of _one_ man,
or of _many_.
[Sidenote: Rejection of their opinion, who say that a lord with his
servants cannot make a city.]
5. But first we must remove their opinion, who deny that to be any
city at all, which is compacted of never so great a number of
servants under a common lord. In the ninth article of the fifth
chapter, a city is defined to be _one person_ made out of _many
men_, whose will by their own contracts is to be esteemed as the
wills of them all; insomuch as he may use the strength and faculties
of each single person for the public peace and safety. And by the
same article of the same chapter, _one person_ is that, when the
wills of many are contained in the will of one. But the will of each
servant is contained in the will of his lord; as hath been declared
in the fifth article of the eighth chapter; so as he may employ all
their forces and faculties according to his own will and pleasure.
It follows therefore that that must needs be a city, which is
constituted by _a lord and many servants_. Neither can any reason be
brought to contradict this, which doth not equally combat against a
city constituted by _a father and his sons_. For to a lord who hath
no children, _servants_ are in the nature of _sons_; for they are
both his honour and safeguard; neither are _servants_ more subject
to their _lords_, then _children_ to their _parents_, as hath been
manifested above in the fifth article of the eighth chapter.
[Sidenote: The exactions are more grievous under command of the
people, than under the monarch.]
6. Among other grievances of supreme authority one is, that the
ruler, beside those monies necessary for public charges, as the
maintaining of public ministers, building, and defending of castles,
waging wars, honourably sustaining his own household, may also, if
he will, exact others through his lust, whereby to enrich his sons,
kindred, favourites, and flatterers too. I confess this is a
grievance, but of the number of those which accompany all kinds of
government, but are more tolerable in a _monarchy_ than in a
_democracy_. For though the monarch would enrich them, they cannot
be many, because belonging but to one. But in a _democracy_, look
how many demagogues, that is, how many powerful orators there are
with the people, (which ever are many, and daily new ones growing),
so many children, kinsmen, friends, and flatterers are to be
rewarded. For every of them desire not only to make their families
as potent, as illustrious in wealth, as may be, but also to oblige
others to them by benefits, for the better strengthening of
themselves. A _monarch_ may in great part satisfy his officers and
friends, because they are not many, without any cost to his
subjects; I mean without robbing them of any of those treasures
given in for the maintenance of war and peace. In a _democracy_,
where many are to be satisfied, and always new ones, this cannot be
done without the subject’s oppression. Though a _monarch_ may
promote unworthy persons, yet oft times he will not do it; but in a
_democracy_, all the popular men are therefore supposed to do it,
because it is necessary; for else the power of them who did it,
would so increase, as it would not only become dreadful to those
others, but even to the whole city also.
[Sidenote: Innocent subjects are less obnoxious to punishment under
a monarch, than under the people.]
7. Another grievance is, that same perpetual fear of death, which
every man must necessarily be in while he considers with himself,
that the ruler hath power not only to appoint what punishments he
lists on any transgressions, but that he may also in his wrath and
sensuality slaughter his innocent subjects, and those who never
offended against the laws. And truly this is a very great grievance
in any form of government, wheresoever it happens; for it is
therefore a grievance, because it is, not because it may be done.
But it is the fault of the ruler, not of the government. For all the
acts of Nero are not essential to monarchy; yet subjects are less
often undeservedly condemned under _one ruler_, than under the
_people_. For kings are only severe against those who either trouble
them with impertinent counsels, or oppose them with reproachful
words, or control their wills; but they are the cause that that
excess of power which one subject might have above another, becomes
harmless. Wherefore some Nero or Caligula reigning, no men can
undeservedly suffer but such as are known to him, namely, courtiers,
and such as are remarkable for some eminent charge; and not all
neither, but they only who are possessed of what he desires to
enjoy. For they that are offensive and contumelious, are deservedly
punished. Whosoever therefore in a _monarchy_ will lead a retired
life, let him be what he will that reigns, he is out of danger. For
the ambitious only suffer; the rest are protected from the injuries
of the more potent. But in a popular dominion, there may be as many
Neros as there are orators who soothe the _people_. For each one of
them can do as much as the _people_, and they mutually give way to
each other’s appetite, as it were by this secret pact, _spare me
to-day and I’ll spare thee to-morrow_, while they exempt those from
punishment, who to satisfy their lust and private hatred have
undeservedly slain their fellow-subjects. Furthermore, there is a
certain limit in private power, which if it exceed, it may prove
pernicious to the realm; and by reason whereof it is necessary
sometimes for _monarchs_ to have a care, that the common weal do
thence receive no prejudice. When therefore this power consisted in
the multitude of riches, they lessened it by diminishing their
heaps; but if it were in popular applause, the powerful party,
without any other crime laid to his charge, was taken from among
them. The same was usually practised in _democracies_. For the
Athenians inflicted a punishment of ten years’ banishment on those
that were powerful, merely because of their powers, without the
guilt of any other crime. And those who by liberal gifts did seek
the favour of the common people, were put to death at Rome, as men
ambitious of a kingdom. In this _democracy_ and _monarchy_ were
even; yet differed they much in fame. Because fame derives from the
people; and what is done by many, is commended by many. And
therefore what the _monarch_ does, is said to be done out of envy to
their virtues; which if it were done by the _people_, would be
accounted policy.
[Sidenote: Single persons have no less liberty under a monarch, than
under the people.]
8. There are some, who therefore imagine _monarchy_ to be more
grievous then _democracy_, because there is less liberty in that,
than in this. If by liberty they mean an exemption from that
subjection which is due to the laws, that is, the commands of the
_people_; neither in _democracy_, nor in any other state of
government whatsoever, is there any such kind of liberty. If they
suppose liberty to consist in this, that there be few laws, few
prohibitions, and those too such, that except they were forbidden,
there could be no peace; then I deny that there is more liberty in
_democracy_ than _monarchy_; for the one as truly consisteth with
such a liberty, as the other. For although the word _liberty_ may in
large and ample letters be written over the gates of any city
whatsoever, yet is it not meant the _subject’s_, but the _city’s_
liberty; neither can that word with better right be inscribed on a
city which is governed by the _people_, than that which is ruled by
a _monarch_. But when private men or subjects demand liberty, under
the name of liberty they ask not for liberty, but _dominion_; which
yet for want of understanding they little consider. For if every man
would grant the same liberty to another, which he desires for
himself, as is commanded by the law of nature; that same natural
state would return again, in which all men may by right do all
things; which if they knew, they would abhor, as being worse than
all kinds of civil subjection whatsoever. But if any man desire to
have his single freedom, the rest being bound, what does he else
demand but to have the _dominion_? For whoso is freed from all
bonds, is lord over all those that still continue bound. Subjects
therefore have no greater liberty in a _popular_, than in a
_monarchical_ state. That which deceives them, is the equal
participation of command and public places. For where the authority
is in the people, single subjects do so far forth share in it, as
they are parts of the people ruling; and they equally partake in
public offices, so far forth as they have equal voices in choosing
magistrates and public ministers. And this is that which Aristotle
aimed at, himself also through the custom of that time miscalling
dominion liberty. (_Polit._ lib. vi. cap. 2.) _In a popular state
there is liberty by supposition; which is a speech of the vulgar, as
if no man were free out of this state._ From whence, by the way, we
may collect, that those subjects who in a _monarchy_ deplore their
lost liberty, do only stomach this, that they are not received to
the steerage of the commonweal.
[Sidenote: It is no disadvantage to the subjects, that they are not
all admitted to the public deliberations.]
9. But perhaps for this very reason, some will say that a _popular_
state is much to be preferred before a _monarchical_; because that
where all men have a hand in public businesses, there all have an
opportunity to shew their wisdom, knowledge, and eloquence, in
deliberating matters of the greatest difficulty and moment; which by
reason of that desire of praise which is bred in human nature, is to
them who excel in such-like faculties, and seem to themselves to
exceed others, the most delightful of all things. But in a monarchy,
this same way to obtain praise and honour is shut up to the greatest
part of subjects; and what is a grievance if this be none? I will
tell you: to see his opinion, whom we scorn, preferred before ours;
to have our wisdom undervalued before our own faces; by an uncertain
trial of a little vain glory, to undergo most certain enmities (for
this cannot be avoided, whether we have the better or the worse); to
hate and to be hated, by reason of the disagreement of opinions; to
lay open our secret councils and advices to all, to no purpose and
without any benefit; to neglect the affairs of our own family:
these, I say, are grievances. But to be absent from a trial of wits,
although those trials are pleasant to the eloquent, is not therefore
a grievance to them; unless we will say, that it is a grievance to
valiant men to be restrained from fighting, because they delight in
it.
[Sidenote: Civil deliberations are unadvisedly committed to many, by
reason of the unskilfulness of most men:]
10. Besides, there are many reasons, why deliberations are less
successful in great assemblies than in lesser councils. Whereof one
is, that to advise rightly of all things conducing to the
preservation of a commonweal, we must not only understand matters at
home, but foreign affairs too. At home, by what goods the country is
nourished and defended, and whence they are fetched; what places are
fit to make garrisons of; by what means soldiers are best to be
raised and maintained; what manner of affections the subjects bear
towards their prince or governors of their country; and many the
like. Abroad, what the power of each neighbouring country is, and
wherein it consists; what advantage or disadvantage we may receive
from them; what their dispositions are both to us-ward, and how
affected to each other among themselves; and what counsel daily
passeth among them. Now, because very few in a great assembly of men
understand these things, being for the most part unskilful, that I
say not incapable of them, what can that same number of advisers
with their impertinent opinions contribute to good counsels, other
than mere lets and impediments?
[Sidenote: By reason of their eloquence:]
11. Another reason why a great assembly is not so fit for
consultation is, because every one who delivers his opinion holds it
necessary to make a long-continued speech; and to gain the more
esteem from his auditors, he polishes and adorns it with the best
and smoothest language. Now the nature of eloquence is to make
_good_ and _evil_, _profitable_ and _unprofitable_, _honest_ and
_dishonest_, appear to be more or less than indeed they are; and to
make that seem _just_ which is _unjust_, according as it shall best
suit with his end that speaketh: for this is to persuade. And though
they reason, yet take they not their rise from true principles, but
from vulgar received opinions, which for the most part are
erroneous. Neither endeavour they so much to fit their speech to the
nature of the things they speak of, as to the passions of their
minds to whom they speak; whence it happens, that opinions are
delivered not by right reason, but by a certain violence of mind.
Nor is this fault in the _man_, but in the nature itself of
_eloquence_, whose end, as all the masters of rhetoric teach us, is
not truth (except by chance), but victory; and whose property is not
to inform, but to allure.
[Sidenote: By reason of faction:]
12. The third reason why men advise less successfully in a great
convent is, because that thence arise _factions_ in a commonweal;
and out of _factions_, seditions and civil war. For when equal
orators do combat with contrary opinions and speeches, the conquered
hates the conqueror and all those that were of his side, as holding
his council and wisdom in scorn, and studies all means to make the
advice of his adversaries prejudicial to the state: for thus he
hopes to see the glory taken from him, and restored unto himself.
Furthermore, where the votes are not so unequal, but that the
conquered have hopes, by the accession of some few of their own
opinion, at another sitting to make the stronger party, the chief
heads do call the rest together; they advise a part how they may
abrogate the former judgment given; they appoint to be the first and
earliest at the next convent; they determine what, and in what order
each man shall speak, that the same business may again be brought to
agitation; that so what was confirmed before by the number of their
then present adversaries, the same may now in some measure become of
no effect to them, being negligently absent. And this same kind of
industry and diligence which they use to _make_ a people, is
commonly called a _faction_. But when a _faction_ is inferior in
votes, and superior, or not much inferior in power, then what they
cannot obtain by craft and language, they attempt by force of arms;
and so it comes to a civil war. But some will say, these things do
not necessarily, nor often happen. He may as well say, that the
chief parties are not necessarily desirous of vain glory, and that
the greatest of them seldom disagree in great matters.
[Sidenote: By reason of the unsettledness of the laws:]
13. It follows hence, that when the legislative power resides in
such convents as these, the laws must needs be inconstant; and
change, not according to the alteration of the state of affairs, nor
according to the changeableness of men’s minds, but as the major
part, now of this, then of that _faction_, do convene. Insomuch as
the laws do float here and there, as it were upon the waters.
[Sidenote: For want of secrecy.]
14. In the fourth place, the counsels of great assemblies have this
inconvenience; that whereas it is oft of great consequence that they
should be kept secret, they are for the most part discovered to the
enemy before they can be brought to any effect; and their power and
will is as soon known abroad, as to the _people_ itself commanding
at home.
[Sidenote: These inconveniences do adhere to democracy, forasmuch as
men are naturally delighted with an opinion of wit.]
15. These inconveniences, which are found in the deliberations of
great assemblies, do so far forth evince _monarchy_ to be better
than _democracy_, as in _democracy_ affairs of great consequence are
oftener trusted to be discussed by such like committees, than in a
_monarchy_. Neither can it easily be done otherwise. For there is no
reason why every man should not naturally mind his _own private_,
than the _public_ business, but that here he sees a means to declare
his eloquence, whereby he may gain the reputation of being ingenious
and wise, and returning home to his friends, to his parents, to his
wife and children, rejoice and triumph in the applause of his
dexterous behaviour. As of old, all the delight Marcus Coriolanus
had in his warlike actions, was to see his praises so well pleasing
to his mother. But if the _people_ in a democracy would bestow the
power of deliberating in matters of war and peace, either on one, or
some very few, being content with the nomination of magistrates and
public ministers, that is to say, with the authority without the
ministration; then it must be confessed, that in this particular
_democracy_ and _monarchy_ would be equal.
[Sidenote: The inconveniences of government proceeding from a king
who is a child.]
16. Neither do the conveniences or inconveniences which are found to
be more in one kind of government than another, arise from hence,
namely, because the government itself, or the administration of its
affairs, are better committed to one than many; or on the other
side, to many than to some few. For government is the _power_, the
administration of it is the _act_. Now the _power_ in all kinds of
government is equal; the _acts_ only differ, that is to say, the
_actions_ and _motions_ of a commonweal, as they flow from the
deliberations of many or few, of skilful or impertinent men. Whence
we understand, that the conveniences or inconveniences of any
government depend not on him in whom the authority resides, but on
his officers; and therefore nothing hinders but that the commonweal
may be well governed, although the _monarch_ be a woman, or youth,
or infant, provided that they be fit for affairs who are endued with
the public offices and charges. And that which is said, _woe to the
land whose king is a child_, doth not signify the condition of a
monarchy to be inferior to a popular state; but contrariwise, that
by accident it is the grievance of a kingdom, that the _king being a
child_, it often happens, that many by ambition and power intruding
themselves into public councils, the government comes to be
administered in a _democratical_ manner; and that thence arise those
infelicities, which for the most part accompany the _dominion of the
people_.
[Sidenote: The power of generals is an argument of the excellency of
monarchy.]
17. But it is a manifest sign that the most absolute _monarchy_ is
the best state of government, that not only kings, but even those
cities which are subject to the _people_ or to _nobles_, give the
whole command of war to one only; and that so absolute, as nothing
can be more. Wherein, by the way, this must be noted also; that no
king can give a general greater authority over his army, than he
himself by right may exercise over all his subjects. _Monarchy_
therefore is the best of all governments in the camps. But what else
are many commonwealths, than so many camps strengthened with arms
and men against each other; whose state, because not restrained by
any common power, howsoever an uncertain peace, like a short truce,
may pass between them, is to be accounted for the state of nature;
which is the state of war.
[Sidenote: The best state of a commonweal, is that where the
subjects are the ruler’s inheritance.]
18. Lastly, since it was necessary for the preservation of ourselves
to be subject to some _man_ or _council_, we cannot on better
condition be subject to any, than one whose interest depends upon
our safety and welfare; and this then comes to pass, when we are the
inheritance of the ruler. For every man of his own accord endeavours
the preservation of his inheritance. But the lands and monies of the
subjects are not only the prince’s treasure, but their bodies and
wildy minds. Which will be easily granted by those, who consider at
how great rates the dominion of lesser countries is valued; and how
much easier it is for men to procure money, than money men. Nor do
we readily meet with any example that shows us when any subject,
without any default of his own, hath by his prince been despoiled of
his life or goods, through the sole licentiousness of his authority.
[Sidenote: Aristocracy is so much better, by how much it approaches
nearer to monarchy; the worse, by how much it is more
distant from it.]
19. Hitherto we have compared a _monarchical_ with a _popular_
state; we have said nothing of _aristocracy_. We may conclude of
this, by what hath been said of those, that that which is
hereditary, and content with the election of magistrates; which
transmits its deliberations to some few, and those most able; which
simply imitates the government of _monarchs_ most, and the _people_
least of all; is for the subjects both better and more lasting than
the rest.
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