CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG
I.
ADVANCE OF GENERAL HOOKER.
Lee remained throughout the winter at his headquarters in the woods
south of Fredericksburg, watching the Northern army, which continued
to occupy the country north of the city, with the Potomac River as
their base of supplies.
With the coming of spring, it was obviously the intention of the
Federal authorities to again essay the crossing of the Rappahannock at
some point either above or below Fredericksburg; and as the movement
above was less difficult, and promised more decisive results, it was
seen by General Lee that this would probably be the quarter from
which he might expect an attack. General Stuart, a soldier of sound
judgment, said, during the winter, "The next battle will take place at
Chancellorsville," and the position of Lee's troops seemed to indicate
that this was also his own opinion. His right remained still "opposite
Fredericksburg," barring the direct approach to Richmond, but his left
extended up the Rappahannock beyond Chancellorsville, and all the
fords were vigilantly guarded to prevent a sudden flank movement by
the enemy in that direction. As will be seen, the anticipations of Lee
were to be fully realized. The heavy blow aimed at him, in the first
days of spring, was to come from the quarter in which he had expected
it.
The Federal army was now under command of General Joseph Hooker, an
officer of dash, energy, excellent administrative capacity, and,
Northern writers add, extremely prone to "self-assertion." General
Hooker had harshly criticised the military operations both of
General McClellan on the Chickahominy, and of General Burnside at
Fredericksburg, and so strong an impression had these strictures made
upon the minds of the authorities, that they came to the determination
of intrusting the command of the army to the officer who made them,
doubtless concluding that his own success would prove greater than
that of his predecessors. This opinion seemed borne out by the first
proceedings of General Hooker. He set to work energetically to
reorganize and increase the efficiency of the army, did away
with General Burnside's defective "grand division" arrangement,
consolidated the cavalry into an effective corps, enforced strict
discipline among officers and men alike, and at the beginning of
spring had brought his army to a high state of efficiency. His
confident tone inspired the men; the depression resulting from the
great disaster at Fredericksburg was succeeded by a spirit of buoyant
hope, and the army was once more that great war-engine, ready for any
undertaking, which it had been under McClellan.
It numbered, according to one Federal statement, one hundred and
fifty-nine thousand three hundred men; but according to another, which
appears more reliable, one hundred and twenty thousand infantry and
artillery, and twelve thousand cavalry; in all, one hundred and
thirty-two thousand troops. The army of General Lee was considerably
smaller. Two divisions of Longstreet's corps had been sent to Suffolk,
south of James River, to obtain supplies in that region, and this
force was not present at the battle of Chancellorsville. The actual
numbers under Lee's command will appear from the following statement
of Colonel Walter H. Taylor, assistant adjutant-general of the army:
Our strength at Chancellorsville:
Anderson and McLaws........................... 13,000
Jackson (Hill, Rodes, and Trimble)............ 21,000
Early (Fredericksburg)........................ 6,000
_______
40,000
Cavalry and artillery......................... 7,000
_______
Total of all arms............................. 47,000
As the Federal infantry numbered one hundred and twenty thousand,
according to the smallest estimate of Federal authorities, and Lee's
infantry forty thousand, the Northern force was precisely three times
as large as the Southern.
[Illustration: Map--Battle of Chancellorsville.]
General Hooker had already proved himself an excellent administrative
officer, and his plan of campaign against Lee seemed to show that he
also possessed generalship of a high order. He had determined to pass
the Rappahannock above Fredericksburg, turn Lee's flank, and thus
force him to deliver battle under this disadvantage, or retire upon
Richmond. The safe passage of the stream was the first great object,
and General Hooker's dispositions to effect this were highly
judicious. A force of about twenty thousand men was to pass the
Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, and thus produce upon Lee the
impression that the Federal army was about to renew the attempt in
which they had failed under General Burnside. While General Lee's
attention was engaged by the force thus threatening his right, the
main body of the Northern army was to cross the Rappahannock and
Rapidan above Chancellorsville, and, sweeping down rapidly upon
the Confederate left flank, take up a strong position between
Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg. The column which had crossed at
the latter point to engage the attention of the Confederate commander,
was then to recross to the northern bank, move rapidly to the upper
fords, which the advance of the main body would by that time have
uncovered; and, a second time crossing to the southern bank, unite
with the rest. Thus the whole Federal army would be concentrated
on the southern bank of the Rappahannock, and General Lee would be
compelled to leave his camps on the hills of the Massaponnax, and
fight upon ground dictated by his adversary. If he did not thus accept
battle, but one other course was left. He must fall back in the
direction of Richmond, to prevent his adversary from attacking his
rear, and capturing or destroying his army.
In order to insure the success of this promising plan of attack, a
strong column of well-mounted cavalry was to cross in advance of the
army and strike for the railroads in Lee's rear, connecting him with
Richmond and the Southwest. Thus flanked or cut off, and with all his
communications destroyed, it seemed probable that General Lee would
suffer decisive defeat, and that the Federal army would march in
triumph to the capture of the Confederate capital.
This plan was certainly excellent, and seemed sure to succeed. It was,
however, open to some criticism, as the event showed. General Hooker
was detaching, in the beginning of the movement, his whole cavalry
force for a distant operation, and dividing his army by the _ruse_
at Fredericksburg, in face of an adversary not likely to permit that
great error to escape him. While advancing thus, apparently to the
certain destruction of Lee, General Hooker was leaving a vulnerable
point in his own armor. Lee would probably discover that point, and
aim to pierce his opponent there. At most, General Hooker was wrapping
in huge folds the sword of Lee, not remembering that there was danger
to the _cordon_ as well as to the weapon.
Such was the plan which General Hooker had devised to bring back that
success of the Federal arms in the spring of 1863 which had attended
them in the early spring of 1862. At this latter period a heavy cloud
rested upon the Confederate cause. Donaldson and Roanoke Island, Fort
Macon, and the city of New Orleans, had then fallen; at Elkhorn,
Kernstown, Newbern, and other places, the Federal forces had achieved
important successes. These had been followed, however, by the Southern
victories on the Chickahominy, at Manassas, and at Fredericksburg.
Near this last-named spot now, where the year had wound up with so
mortifying a Federal failure, General Hooker hoped to reverse events,
and recover the Federal glories of the preceding spring.
Operations began as early as the middle of March, when General
Averill, with about three thousand cavalry, crossed the Rappahannock
at Kelly's Ford, above its junction with the Rapidan, and made a
determined attack upon nearly eight hundred horsemen there, under
General Fitz Lee, with the view of passing through Culpepper, crossing
the Rapidan, and cutting Lee's communications in the direction of
Gordonsville. The obstinate stand of General Fitz Lee's small force,
however, defeated this object, and General Averill was forced to
retreat beyond the Rappahannock again with considerable loss, and
abandon his expedition. In this engagement fell Major John Pelham, who
had been styled in Lee's first report of the battle of Fredericksburg
"the gallant Pelham," and whose brave stand on the Port Royal road had
drawn from Lee the exclamation, "It is glorious to see such courage in
one so young." Pelham was, in spite of his youth, an artillerist of
the first order of excellence, and his loss was a serious one, in
spite of his inferior rank.
After this action every thing remained quiet until toward the end of
April--General Lee continuing to hold the same position with his right
at Fredericksburg, his left at the fords near Chancellorsville, and
his cavalry, under Stuart, guarding the banks of the Rappahannock in
Culpepper. On the 27th of April, General Hooker began his forward
movement, by advancing three corps of his army--the Fifth, Eleventh,
and Twelfth--to the banks of the river, near Kelly's Ford; and, on the
next day, this force was joined by three additional corps--the First,
Third, and Sixth--and the whole, on Wednesday (the 29th), crossed the
river without difficulty. That this movement was a surprise to Lee,
as has been supposed by some persons, is a mistake. Stuart was an
extremely vigilant picket-officer, and both he and General Lee were in
the habit of sending accomplished scouts to watch any movements in the
Federal camps. As soon as these movements--which, in a large army,
cannot be concealed--took place, information was always promptly
brought, and it was not possible that General Hooker could move three
large army corps toward the Rappahannock, as he did on April 27th,
without early knowledge on the part of his adversary of so important a
circumstance.
As the Federal infantry thus advanced, the large cavalry force began
also to move through Culpepper toward the Central Railroad in Lee's
rear. This column was commanded by General Stoneman, formerly a
subordinate officer in Lee's old cavalry regiment in the United States
Army; and, as General Stoneman's operations were entirely separate
from those of the infantry, and not of much importance, we shall here
dismiss them in a few words. He proceeded rapidly across Culpepper,
harassed in his march by a small body of horse, under General William
H.F. Lee; reached the Central Railroad at Trevillian's, below
Gordonsville, and tore up a portion of it; passed on to James River,
ravaging the country, and attempted the destruction of the Columbia
Aqueduct, but did not succeed in so doing; when, hearing probably of
the unforeseen result at Chancellorsville, he hastened back to the
Rapidan, pursued and harassed as in his advance, and, crossing,
regained the Federal lines beyond the Rappahannock.
To return to the movements of the main Federal force, under the
personal command of General Hooker. This advanced rapidly across the
angle between the two rivers, with no obstruction but that offered by
the cavalry under Stuart, and on Thursday, April 30th, had crossed the
Rapidan at Germanna and Ely's Fords, and was steadily concentrating
around Chancellorsville. At the same time the Second Corps, under
General Couch, was preparing to cross at United States Ford, a few
miles distant; and General Sedgwick, commanding the detached force at
Fredericksburg, having crossed and threatened Lee, in obedience to
orders, now began passing back to the northern bank again, in order to
march up and join the main body. Thus all things seemed in train to
succeed on the side of the Federal army. General Hooker was over with
about one hundred thousand men--twenty thousand additional troops
would soon join him. Lee's army seemed scattered, and not "in hand"
to oppose him; and there was some ground for the ebullition of joy
attributed to General Hooker, as he saw his great force massing
steadily in the vicinity of Chancellorsville. To those around him he
exclaimed: "The rebel army is now the legitimate property of the Army
of the Potomac. They may as well pack up their haversacks and make for
Richmond, and I shall be after them!"
In a congratulatory order to his troops, he declared that they
occupied now a position so strong that "the enemy must either
ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defences and give us
battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him."
Such were the joyful anticipations of General Hooker, who seems to
have regarded the campaign as virtually ended by the successful
passage of the river. His expressions and his general order would seem
to indicate an irrepressible joy, but it is doubtful if the skilful
soldiers under him shared this somewhat juvenile enthusiasm. The gray
cavalier at Fredericksburg was not reported to be retiring, as was
expected. On the contrary, the Southern troops seemed to be moving
forward with the design of accepting battle.
Lee had determined promptly upon that course as soon as Stuart sent
him information of the enemy's movements. Chancellorsville was at once
seen to be the point for which General Hooker was aiming, and Lee's
dispositions were made for confronting him there and fighting a
pitched battle. The brigades of Posey and Mahone, of Anderson's
Division, had been in front of Banks's and Ely's Fords, and this force
of about eight thousand men was promptly ordered to fall back on
Chancellorsville. At the same time Wright's brigade was sent up to
reënforce this column; but the enemy continuing to advance in great
force, General Anderson, commanding the whole, fell back from
Chancellorsville to Tabernacle Church, on the road to Fredericksburg,
where he was joined on the next day by Jackson, whom Lee had sent
forward to his assistance.
The _ruse_ at Fredericksburg had not long deceived the Confederate
commander. General Sedgwick, with three corps, in all about twenty-two
thousand men, had crossed just below Fredericksburg on the 29th, and
Lee had promptly directed General Jackson to oppose him there. Line of
battle was accordingly formed in the enemy's front beyond Hamilton's
Crossing; but as, neither on that day nor the next, any further
advance was made by General Sedgwick, the whole movement was seen to
be a feint to cover the real operations above. Lee accordingly turned
his attention in the direction of Chancellorsville. Jackson, as we
have related, was sent up to reënforce General Anderson, and Lee
followed with the rest of the army, with the exception of about six
thousand men, under General Early, whom he left to defend the crossing
at Fredericksburg.
Such were the positions of the opposing forces on the 1st day of May.
Each commander had displayed excellent generalship in the preliminary
movements preceding the actual fighting. At last, however, the
opposing lines were facing each other, and the real struggle was about
to begin.
II.
THE WILDERNESS.
The "Wilderness," as the region around Chancellorsville is called, is
so strange a country, and the character of the ground had so important
a bearing upon the result of the great battle fought there, that a
brief description of the locality will be here presented.
The region is a nearly unbroken expanse of dense thicket pierced only
by narrow and winding roads, over which the traveller rides, mile
after mile, without seeing a single human habitation. It would seem,
indeed, that the whole barren and melancholy tract had been given up
to the owl, the whippoorwill, and the moccasin, its original tenants.
The plaintive cries of the night-birds alone break the gloomy silence
of the desolate region, and the shadowy thicket stretching in
every direction produces a depressing effect upon the feelings.
Chancellorsville is in the centre of this singular territory, on
the main road, or rather roads, running from Orange Court-House to
Fredericksburg, from which latter place it is distant about ten miles.
In spite of its imposing name, Chancellorsville was simply a large
country-house, originally inhabited by a private family, but afterward
used as a roadside inn. A little to the westward the "Old Turnpike"
and Orange Plank-road unite as they approach the spot, where they
again divide, to unite a second time a few miles to the east, where
they form the main highway to Fredericksburg. From the north come in
roads from United States and Ely's Fords; Germanna Ford is northwest;
from the south runs the "Brock Road" in the direction of the Rapidan,
passing a mile or two west of the place.
The whole country, the roads, the chance houses, the silence, the
unending thicket, in this dreary wilderness, produce a sombre effect.
A writer, familiar with it, says: "There all is wild, desolate, and
lugubrious. Thicket, undergrowth, and jungle, stretch for miles,
impenetrable and untouched. Narrow roads wind on forever between
melancholy masses of stunted and gnarled oak. Little sunlight shines
there. The face of Nature is dreary and sad. It was so before the
battle; it is not more cheerful to-day, when, as you ride along, you
see fragments of shell, rotting knapsacks, rusty gun-barrels, bleached
bones, and grinning skulls.... Into this jungle," continues the same
writer, "General Hooker penetrated. It was the wolf in his den, ready
to tear any one who approached. A battle there seemed impossible.
Neither side could see its antagonist. Artillery could not move;
cavalry could not operate; the very infantry had to flatten their
bodies to glide between the stunted trees. That an army of one hundred
and twenty thousand men should have chosen that spot to fight forty
thousand, and not only chosen it, but made it a hundred times more
impenetrable by felling trees, erecting breastworks, disposing
artillery _en masse_ to sweep every road and bridle-path which led to
Chancellorsville--this fact seemed incredible."
It was no part of the original plan of the Federal commander to permit
himself to be cooped up in this difficult and embarrassing region,
where it was impossible to manoeuvre his large army. The selection of
the Wilderness around Chancellorsville, as the ground of battle, was
dictated by Lee. General Hooker, it seems, endeavored to avoid being
thus shut up in the thicket, and hampered in his movements. Finding
that the Confederate force, retiring from in front of Ely's and United
States Fords, had, on reaching Chancellorsville, continued to fall
back in the direction of Fredericksburg, he followed them steadily,
passed through the Wilderness, and, emerging into the open country
beyond, rapidly began forming line of battle on ground highly
favorable to the manoeuvring of his large force in action. A glance at
the map will indicate the importance of this movement, and the great
advantages secured by it. The left of General Hooker's line, nearest
the river, was at least five miles in advance of Chancellorsville, and
commanded Banks's Ford, thereby shortening fully one-half the distance
of General Sedgwick's march from Fredericksburg, by enabling him to
use the ford in question as a place of crossing to the south bank, and
uniting his column with the main body. The centre and right of the
Federal army had in like manner emerged from the thickets of the
Wilderness, and occupied cleared ground, sufficiently elevated to
afford them great advantages.
This was in the forenoon of the 1st of May, when there was no force in
General Hooker's front, except the eight thousand men of Anderson
at Tabernacle Church. Jackson had marched at midnight from the
Massaponnax Hills, with a general order from Lee to "attack and
repulse the enemy," but had not yet arrived. There was thus no serious
obstacle in the path of the Federal commander, who had it in his
power, it would seem, to mass his entire army on the commanding ground
which his vanguard already occupied. Lee was aware of the importance
of the position, and, had he not been delayed by the feint of General
Sedgwick, would himself have seized upon it. As it was, General Hooker
seemed to have won the prize in the race, and Lee would, apparently,
be forced to assail him on his strong ground, or retire in the
direction of Richmond.
The movements of the enemy had, however, been so rapid that Lee's
dispositions seem to have been made before they were fully developed
and accurately known to him. He had sent forward Jackson, and now
proceeded to follow in person, leaving only a force of about six
thousand men, under Early, to defend the crossing at Fredericksburg.
The promptness of these movements of the Confederate commander is
noticed by Northern writers. "Lee, with instant perception of the
situation," says an able historian, "now seized the masses of his
force, and, with the grasp of a Titan, swung them into position, as
a giant might fling a mighty stone from a sling." [Footnote: Mr.
Swinton, in "Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac." Whether the force
under Lee could be justly described as "mighty," however, the reader
will form his own opinion.]
Such were the relative positions of the two armies on the 1st of May:
General Hooker's forces well in advance of Chancellorsville, and
rapidly forming line of battle on a ridge in open country; General
Lee's, stretching along the whole distance, from Fredericksburg to
Tabernacle Church, and certainly not in any condition to deliver
or accept battle. The Federal commander seemed to have clearly
outgeneralled his adversary, and, humanly speaking, the movements of
the two armies, up to this time, seemed to point to a decisive Federal
success.
General Hooker's own act reversed all this brilliant promise. At the
very moment when his army was steadily concentrating on the favorable
ground in advance of Chancellorsville, the Federal commander, for some
reason which has never been divulged, sent a peremptory order that
the entire force should fall back into the Wilderness. This order,
reversing every thing, is said to have been received "with mingled
amazement and incredulity" by his officers, two of whom sent him word
that, from the great advantages of the position, it should be "held at
all hazards." General Hooker's reply was, "Return at once." The army
accordingly fell back to Chancellorsville.
This movement undoubtedly lost General Hooker all the advantages which
up to that moment he had secured. What his motive for the order in
question was, it is impossible for the present writer to understand,
unless the approach of Lee powerfully affected his imagination, and he
supposed the thicket around Chancellorsville to be the best ground to
receive that assault which the bold advance of his opponent appeared
to foretell. Whatever his motive, General Hooker withdrew his lines
from the open country, fell back to the vicinity of Chancellorsville,
and began to erect elaborate defences, behind which to receive Lee's
attack.
In this backward movement he was followed and harassed by the forces
of Jackson, the command of Anderson being in front. Jackson's maxim
was to always press an enemy when he was retiring; and no sooner had
the Federal forces begun to move, than he made a prompt attack. He
continued to follow them up toward Chancellorsville until nightfall,
when the fighting ceased, the Confederate advance having been pushed
to Alrich's house, within about two miles of Chancellorsville. Here
the outer line of the Federal works was found, and Jackson paused. He
was unwilling at so late an hour to attempt an assault upon them with
his small force, and, directing further movements to cease, awaited
the arrival of the commander-in-chief.
Lee arrived, and a consultation was held. The question now was, the
best manner, with a force of about thirty-five thousand, to drive the
Federal army, of about one hundred thousand, beyond the Rappahannock.
III.
LEE'S DETERMINATION.
On this night, of the 1st of May, the situation of affairs was strange
indeed.
General Hooker had crossed the Rappahannock with a force of one
hundred and twenty thousand infantry, and had, without obstruction,
secured a position so strong, he declared, that Lee must either
"ingloriously fly," or fight a battle in which "certain destruction
awaited him." So absolutely convinced, indeed, was the Federal
commander, of the result of the coming encounter, that he had
jubilantly described the Southern army as "the legitimate property of
the Army of the Potomac," which, in the event of the retreat of the
Confederates, would "be after them." There seemed just grounds for
this declaration, whatever question may have arisen of the good taste
displayed by General Hooker in making it. The force opposed to him was
in all about forty-seven thousand men, but, as cavalry take small
part in pitched battles, Lee's fighting force was only about forty
thousand. To drive back forty thousand with one hundred and twenty
thousand would not apparently prove difficult, and it was no doubt
this conviction which had occasioned the joyous exclamation of General
Hooker.
But his own act, and the nerve of his adversary, had defeated every
thing. Instead of retreating with his small force upon Richmond, Lee
had advanced to accept or deliver battle. This bold movement, which
General Hooker does not seem to have anticipated, paralyzed his
energies. He had not only crossed the two rivers without loss, but
had taken up a strong position, where he could manoeuvre his army
perfectly, when, in consequence of Lee's approach with the evident
intent of fighting, he had ceased to advance, hesitated, and ended by
retiring. This is a fair summary of events up to the night of the 1st
of May. General Hooker had advanced boldly; he was now falling back.
He had foretold that his adversary would "ingloriously fly;" and that
adversary was pressing him closely. The Army of the Potomac, he had
declared, would soon be "after" the Army of Northern Virginia; but,
from the appearance of things at the moment, the Army of Northern
Virginia seemed "after" the Army of the Potomac. We use General
Hooker's own phrases--they are expressive, if not dignified. They
are indeed suited to the subject, which contains no little of the
grotesque. That anticipations and expressions so confident should have
been met with a "commentary of events" so damaging, was sufficient,
had the occasion not been so tragic, to cause laughter in the gravest
of human beings.
Lee's intent was now unmistakable. Instead of falling back from the
Rappahannock to some line of defence nearer Richmond, where the force
under Longstreet, at Suffolk, might have rejoined him, with other
reënforcements, he had plainly resolved, with the forty or fifty
thousand men of his command, to meet General Hooker in open battle,
and leave the event to Providence. A design so bold would seem to
indicate in Lee a quality which at that time he was not thought to
possess--the willingness to risk decisive defeat by military movements
depending for their success upon good fortune alone. Such seemed now
the only _deus ex machina_ that could extricate the Southern army from
disaster; and a crushing defeat at that time would have had terrible
results. There was no other force, save the small body under
Longstreet and a few local troops, to protect Richmond. Had Lee been
disabled and afterward pressed by General Hooker, it is impossible to
see that any thing but the fall of the Confederate capital could have
been the result.
From these speculations and comments we pass to the narrative of
actual events. General Hooker had abandoned the strong position in
advance of Chancellorsville, and retired to the fastnesses around
that place, to receive the Southern attack. His further proceedings
indicated that he anticipated an assault from Lee. The Federal troops
had no sooner regained the thicket from which they had advanced in
the morning, than they were ordered to erect elaborate works for the
protection of infantry and artillery. This was promptly begun, and by
the next morning heavy defences had sprung up as if by magic. Trees
had been felled, and the trunks interwoven so as to present a
formidable obstacle to the Southern attack. In front of these works
the forest had been levelled, and the fallen trunks were left lying
where they fell, forming thus an _abatis_ sufficient to seriously
delay an assaulting force, which would thus be, at every step of
the necessarily slow advance, under fire. On the roads piercing the
thicket in the direction of the Confederates, cannon were posted, to
rake the approaches to the Federal position. Having thus made his
preparations to receive Lee's attack, General Hooker awaited that
attack, no doubt confident of his ability to repulse it.
His line resembled in some degree the two sides of an oblong
square--the longer side extending east and west in front, that is to
say, south of Chancellorsville, and the shorter side north and south
nearly, east of the place. His right, in the direction of Wilderness
Tavern, was comparatively undefended, as it was not expected that Lee
would venture upon a movement against that remote point. This line,
it would appear, was formed with a view to the possible necessity of
falling back toward the Rappahannock. A commander determined to risk
everything would, it seems, have fronted Lee boldly, with a line
running north and south, east of Chancellorsville. General Hooker's
main front was nearly east and west, whatever may have been his object
in so establishing it.
On the night of the 1st of May, as we have said, Lee and Jackson held
a consultation to determine the best method of attacking the Federal
forces on the next day. All the information which they had been able
to obtain of the Federal positions east and south of Chancellorsville,
indicated that the defences in both these quarters were such as
to render an assault injudicious. Jackson had found his advance
obstructed by strong works near Alrich's house, on the road running
eastward from the enemy's camps; and General Stuart and General
Wright, who had moved to the left, and advanced upon the enemy's front
near the point called "The Furnace," had discovered the existence of
powerful defences in that quarter also. They had been met by a fierce
and sudden artillery-fire from Federal epaulements; and here, as to
the east of Chancellorsville, the enemy had evidently fortified their
position.
Under these circumstances, it was necessary to discover, if possible,
some more favorable opening for an attack. There remained but one
other--General Hooker's right, west of Chancellorsville; but to divide
the army, as would be necessary in order to attack in that quarter,
seemed an undertaking too hazardous to be thought of. To execute such
a plan of assault with any thing like a hope of success, General Lee
would be compelled to detach considerably more than half of his entire
force. This would leave in General Hooker's front a body of troops too
inconsiderable to make any resistance if he advanced his lines, and
thus the movement promised to result in the certain destruction of
one portion of the army, to be followed by a triumphant march of the
Federal forces upon Richmond. In the council of war between Lee and
Jackson, on the night of the 1st of May, these considerations were
duly weighed, and the whole situation discussed. In the end,
the hazardous movement against General Hooker's right, beyond
Chancellorsville, was determined upon. This was first suggested, it is
said, by Jackson--others have attributed the suggestion to Lee. The
point is not material. The plan was adopted, and Lee determined to
detach a column of about twenty-one thousand men, under Jackson, to
make the attack on the next day. His plan was to await the arrival
of Jackson at the point selected for attack, meanwhile engaging the
enemy's attention by demonstrations in their front. When Jackson's
guns gave the signal that he was engaged, the force in front of the
enemy was to advance and participate in the assault; and thus, struck
in front and flank at once. General Hooker, it was hoped, would be
defeated and driven back across the Rappahannock.
There was another possible result, the defeat of Lee and Jackson by
General Hooker. But the desperate character of the situation rendered
it necessary to disregard this risk.
By midnight this plan had been determined upon, and at dawn Jackson
began to move.
JACKSON'S ATTACK AND FALL.
On the morning of the 2d of May, General Lee was early in the saddle,
and rode to the front, where he remained in personal command of the
force facing the enemy's main line of battle throughout the day.
This force consisted of the divisions of Anderson and McLaws, and
amounted to thirteen thousand men. That left at Fredericksburg, as we
have said, under General Early, numbered six thousand men; and the
twenty-one thousand which Jackson had taken with him, to strike at the
enemy's right, made up the full body of troops under Lee, that is to
say, a little over forty thousand, artillerymen included. The cavalry,
numbering four or five thousand, were, like the absent Federal
cavalry, not actually engaged.
In accordance with the plan agreed upon between Lee and Jackson, the
force left in the enemy's front proceeded to engage their attention,
and desultory fighting continued throughout the day. General
Lee meanwhile awaited the sound of Jackson's guns west of
Chancellorsville, and must have experienced great anxiety at this
trying moment, although, with his accustomed self-control, he
displayed little or none. We shall now leave this comparatively
interesting portion of the field, and invite the attention of the
reader to the movements of General Jackson, who was about to strike
his last great blow, and lose his own life in the moment of victory.
Jackson set out at early dawn, having under him three divisions,
commanded by Rhodes and Trimble, in all about twenty-one thousand men,
and directed his march over the Old Mine road toward "The Furnace,"
about a mile or so from and in front of the enemy's main line. Stuart
moved with his cavalry on the flank of the column, with the view of
masking it from observation; and it reached and passed "The Furnace,"
where a regiment with artillery was left to guard the road leading
thence to Chancellorsville, and repel any attack which might be made
upon the rear of the column. Just as the rear-guard passed on, the
anticipated attack took place, and the regiment thus left, the
Twenty-third Georgia, was suddenly surrounded and the whole force
captured. The Confederate artillery, however, opened promptly upon the
assailing force, drove it back toward Chancellorsville, and Jackson
proceeded on his march without further interruption. He had thus been
seen, but it seems that the whole movement was regarded by General
Hooker as a retreat of the Confederates southward, a bend in the road
at this point toward the south leading to that supposition.
"We know the enemy is flying," General Hooker wrote, on the afternoon
of this day, to General Sedgwick, "trying to save his trains; two of
Sickles's divisions are among them."
Soon after leaving "The Furnace," however, Jackson, following the same
wood-road, turned westward, and, marching rapidly between the walls of
thicket, struck into the Brock road, which runs in a direction nearly
northwest toward Germanna and Ely's Fords. This would enable him to
reach, without discovery, the Orange Plank-road, or Old Turnpike, west
of Chancellorsville, as the woods through which the narrow highway
ran completely barred him from observation. Unless Federal spies were
lurking in the covert, or their scouting-parties of cavalry came in
sight of the column, it would move as secure from discovery as though
it were a hundred miles distant from the enemy; and against the
latter danger of cavalry-scouts, Stuart's presence with his horsemen
provided. The movement was thus made without alarming the enemy, and
the head of Jackson's column reached the Orange Plank-road, near
which point General Fitz Lee invited Jackson to ride up to a slight
elevation, from which the defences of the enemy were visible. Jackson
did so, and a glance showed him that he was not yet sufficiently upon
the enemy's flank. He accordingly turned to an aide and said, pointing
to the Orange Plank-road: "Tell my column to cross that road."
The column did so, continuing to advance toward the Rapidan until it
reached the Old Turnpike running from the "Old Wilderness Tavern"
toward Chancellorsville. At this point, Jackson found himself full on
the right flank of General Hooker, and, halting his troops, proceeded
promptly to form line of battle for the attack. It was now past four
in the afternoon, and the declining sun warned the Confederates to
lose no time. The character of the ground was, however, such as to
dismay any but the most resolute, and it seemed impossible to execute
the intended movement with any thing like rapidity in such a jungle.
On both sides of the Old Turnpike rose a wall of thicket, through
which it was impossible to move a regular line of battle. All the
rules of war must be reversed in face of this obstacle, and the
assault on General Hooker's works seemed destined to be made in column
of infantry companies, and with the artillery moving in column of
pieces.
Despite these serious obstacles, Jackson hastened to form such order
of battle as was possible, and with Rodes's division in front,
followed by Colston (Trimble) and Hill, advanced steadily down the
Old Turnpike, toward Chancellorsville. He had determined, not only to
strike the enemy's right flank, but to execute, if possible, a still
more important movement. This was, to extend his lines steadily to
the left, swing round his left wing, and so interpose himself between
General Hooker and the Rapidan. This design of unsurpassed boldness
continued to burn in Jackson's brain until he fell, and almost his
last words were an allusion to it.
The Federal line of works, which the Confederates thus advanced to
assault, extended across the Old Turnpike near the house of Melzi
Chancellor, and behind was a second line, which was covered by the
Federal artillery in the earthworks near Chancellorsville. The
Eleventh Corps, under General Howard, was that destined to receive
Jackson's assault. This was made at a few minutes past five in the
evening, and proved decisive. The Federal troops were surprised at
their suppers, and were wholly unprepared. They had scarcely time to
run to their muskets, which were stacked[1] near at hand, when Rodes
burst upon them, stormed their works, over which the troops marched
almost unresisted, and in a few minutes the entire corps holding the
Federal right was in hopeless disorder. Rodes pressed on, followed by
the division in his rear, and the affair became rather a hunt than a
battle. The Confederates pursued with yells, killing or capturing all
with whom they could come up; the Federal artillery rushed off at a
gallop, striking against tree-trunks and overturning, and the army
of General Hooker seemed about to be hopelessly routed. This is
the account given by Northern writers, who represent the effect of
Jackson's sudden attack as indescribable. It had a serious effect, as
will be subsequently shown, on the _morale_ both of General Hooker and
his army. While opposing the heavy demonstrations of General Lee's
forces on their left and in front, this storm had burst upon them from
a quarter in which no one expected it; they were thus caught between
two fires, and, ignorant as they were of the small number of the
Confederates, must have regarded the army as seriously imperilled.
[Footnote 1: "Their arms were stacked, and the men were away from
them and scattered about for the purpose of cooking their
suppers."--_General Hooker_.]
Jackson continued to pursue the enemy on the road to Chancellorsville,
intent now upon making his blow decisive by swinging round his left
and cutting off the Federal army from the Rappahannock. It was
impossible, however, to execute so important a movement until his
troops were well in hand, and the two divisions which had made the
attack had become mixed up in a very confused manner. They were
accordingly directed to halt, and General A.P. Hill, whose division
had not been engaged, was sent for and ordered to advance to the
front, thus affording the disordered divisions an opportunity to
reform their broken lines.
Soon after dispatching this order, Jackson rode out in front of his
line, on the Chancellorsville road, in order to reconnoitre in person,
and ascertain, if possible, the position and movements of the enemy,
then within a few hundred yards of him. It was now between nine and
ten o'clock at night. The fighting had temporarily ceased, and the
moon, half-seen through misty clouds, lit up the dreary thickets, in
which no sound was heard but the incessant and melancholy cries of the
whippoorwills. Jackson had ridden forward about a hundred yards in
advance of his line, on the turnpike, accompanied by a few officers,
and had checked his horse to listen for any sound coming from the
direction of Chancellorsville, when suddenly a volley was fired by his
own infantry on the right of the road, apparently directed at him
and his companions, under the impression that they were a Federal
reconnoitring-party. Several of the party fell from their horses,
and, wheeling to the left, Jackson galloped into the wood to escape a
renewal of the fire. The result was melancholy. He passed directly in
front of his men, who had been warned to guard against an attack of
cavalry. In their excited state, so near the enemy, and surrounded by
darkness, Jackson was supposed to be a Federal cavalryman. The men
accordingly fired upon him, at not more than twenty paces, and wounded
him in three places--twice in the left arm, and once in the right
hand. At the instant when he was struck he was holding his bridle with
his left hand, and had his right hand raised, either to protect his
face from boughs, or in the strange gesture habitual to him in battle.
As the bullets passed through his arm he dropped the bridle of his
horse from his left hand, but seized it again with the bleeding
fingers of his right hand, when the animal, wheeling suddenly, darted
toward Chancellorsville. In doing so he passed beneath the limb of a
pine-tree, which struck the wounded man in the face, tore off his cap,
and threw him back on his horse, nearly dismounting him. He succeeded,
however, in retaining his seat, and regained the road, where he was
received in the arms of Captain Wilbourn, one of his staff-officers,
and laid at the foot of a tree.
The fire had suddenly ceased, and all was again still. Only Captain
Wilbourn and a courier were with Jackson, but a shadowy figure
on horseback was seen in the edge of the wood near, silent and
motionless. When Captain Wilbourn called to this person, and directed
him to ride back and see what troops had thus fired upon them, the
silent figure disappeared, and did not return. Who this could have
been was long a mystery, but it appears, from a recent statement of
General Revere, of the Federal army, that it was himself. He had
advanced to the front to reconnoitre, had come on the group at the
foot of the tree, and, receiving the order above mentioned, had
thought it prudent not to reveal his real character. He accordingly
rode into the wood, and regained his own lines.
A few words will terminate our account of this melancholy event in the
history of the war--the fall of Jackson. He was supported to the rear
by his officers, and during this painful progress gave his last order.
General Pender recognized him, and stated that he feared he could
not hold his position. Jackson's eye flashed, and he replied with
animation, "You must hold your ground, General Pender! You must hold
your ground, sir!"
He was now so weak as to be unable to walk, even leaning on the
shoulders of his officers. He was accordingly placed on a litter,
and borne toward the rear. Before the litter had gone far a furious
artillery-fire swept the road from the direction of Chancellorsville,
and the bearers lowered it to the earth and lay down beside it. The
fire relaxing, they again moved, but one of the bearers stumbled over
a root and let the litter fall. Jackson groaned, and as the moonlight
fell upon his face it was seen to be so pale that he appeared to be
about to die. When asked if he was much hurt, he opened his eyes,
however, and said, "No, my friend, don't trouble yourself about me."
He was then borne to the rear, placed in an ambulance, and carried to
the hospital at the Old Wilderness Tavern, where he remained until he
was taken to Guinea's station, where he died.
Such was the fate of Lee's great lieutenant--the man whom he spoke of
as his "right arm"--whose death struck a chill to the hearts of the
Southern people from which they never recovered.
V.
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.
General Lee was not informed of the misfortune which had befallen his
great lieutenant until toward daybreak on the next morning.
This fact was doubtless attributable to the difficult character of
the country; the interposition of the Federal army between the two
Confederate wings, which rendered a long détour necessary in reaching
Lee; and the general confusion and dismay attending Jackson's fall.
It would be difficult, indeed, to form an exaggerated estimate of the
condition of Jackson's corps at this time. The troops had been thrown
into what seemed inextricable disorder, in consequence of the darkness
and the headlong advance of the Second (Calston's) Division upon the
heels of Rhodes, which had resulted in a complete intermingling of
the two commands; and, to make matters worse, General A.P. Hill, the
second in command, had been wounded and disabled, nearly at the
same moment with Jackson, by the artillery-fire of the enemy. This
transferred the command, of military right, to the brave and skilful
General Rhodes, the ranking officer after Hill; but Rhodes was only a
brigadier-general, and had, for that reason, never come into personal
contact with the whole corps, who knew little of him, and was not
aware of Jackson's plans, and distrusted, under these circumstances,
his ability to conduct to a successful issue so vitally important an
operation as that intrusted to this great wing of the Southern army.
Stuart, who had gone with his cavalry toward Ely's Ford to make a
demonstration on the Federal rear, was therefore sent for, and rode
as rapidly as possible to the scene of action, and the command was
formally relinquished to him by General Rhodes. Jackson sent Stuart
word from Wilderness Tavern to "act upon his own judgment, and do
what he thought best, as he had implicit confidence in him;" but,
in consequence of the darkness and confusion, it was impossible for
Stuart to promptly reform the lines, and thus all things remained
entangled and confused.
It was essential, however, to inform General Lee of the state of
affairs, and Jackson's chief-of-staff, Colonel Pendleton, requested
Captain Wilbourn, who had witnessed all the details of the painful
scene in the wood, to go to General Lee and acquaint him with what
had taken place, and receive his orders. From a MS. statement of this
meritorious officer, we take these brief details of the interview:
Lee was found lying asleep in a little clump of pines near his front,
covered with an oil-cloth to protect him from the dews of the night,
and surrounded by the officers of his staff, also asleep. It was
not yet daybreak, and the darkness prevented the messenger from
distinguishing the commander-in-chief from the rest. He accordingly
called for Major Taylor, Lee's adjutant-general, and that officer
promptly awoke when he was informed of what had taken place. As the
conversation continued, the sound awoke General Lee, who asked, "Who
is there?" Major Taylor informed him, and, rising upon his elbow, Lee
pointed to his blankets, and said: "Sit down here by me, captain, and
tell me all about the fight last evening."
He listened without comment during the recital, but, when it was
finished, said with great feeling: "Ah! captain, any victory is dearly
bought which deprives us of the services of General Jackson, even for
a short time."
From this reply it was evident that he did not regard the wounds
received by Jackson as of a serious character--as was natural, from
the fact that they were only flesh-wounds in the arm and hand--and
believed that the only result would be a temporary absence of his
lieutenant from command. As Captain Wilbourn continued to speak of the
incident, Lee added with greater emotion than at first: "Ah! don't
talk about it; thank God it is no worse!"
He then remained silent, but seeing Captain Wilbourn rise, as if to
go, he requested him to remain, as he wished to "talk with him some
more," and proceeded to ask a number of questions in reference to the
position of the troops, who was in command, etc. When informed that
Rhodes was in temporary command, but that Stuart had been sent for, he
exclaimed: "Rhodes is a gallant, courageous, and energetic officer;"
and asked where Jackson and Stuart could be found, calling for paper
and pencil to write to them. Captain Wilbourn added that, from what he
had heard Jackson say, he thought he intended to get possession, if
possible, of the road to United States Ford in the Federal rear, and
so cut them off from the river that night, or early in the morning. At
these words, Lee rose quickly and said with animation, "These people
must be pressed to-day."
It would seem that at this moment a messenger--probably Captain
Hotchkiss, Jackson's skilful engineer--arrived from Wilderness Tavern,
bringing a note from the wounded general. Lee read it with much
feeling, and dictated the following reply:
GENERAL: I have just received your note informing me that you were
wounded. I cannot express my regret at the occurrence. Could I
have directed events, I should have chosen, for the good of the
country, to have been disabled in your stead.
I congratulate you upon the victory, which is due to your skill
and energy. R.E. LEE, _General_.
This was dispatched with a second note to Stuart, directing him to
assume command, and press the enemy at dawn. Lee then mounted his
horse, and, just as the day began to break, formed line of battle
opposite the enemy's front, his line extending on the right to
the plank-road running from Chancellorsville in the direction of
Fredericksburg. This force, under the personal command of Lee,
amounted, as we have said, originally to about thirteen thousand men;
and, as their loss had not been very severe in the demonstrations made
against the enemy on the preceding days, they were in good condition.
The obvious course now was to place the troops in a position which
would enable them, in the event of Stuart's success in driving the
Federal right, to unite the left of Lee's line with the right of
Stuart, and so press the Federal army back on Chancellorsville and the
river. We shall now return to the left wing of the army, which, in
spite of the absence of the commanding general, was the column of
attack, which was looked to for the most important results.
In response to the summons of the preceding night, Stuart had come
back from the direction of Ely's Ford, at a swift gallop, burning with
ardor at the thought of leading Jackson's great corps into battle. The
military ambition of this distinguished commander of Lee's horse was
great, and he had often chafed at the jests directed at the cavalry
arm, and at himself as "only a cavalry-officer." He had now presented
to him an opportunity of showing that he was a trained soldier,
competent by his nerve and military ability to lead any arm of the
service, and greeted the occasion with delight. The men of Jackson had
been accustomed to see that commander pass slowly along their lines
on a horse as sedate-looking as himself, a slow-moving figure, with
little of the "poetry of war" in his appearance. They now found
themselves commanded by a youthful and daring cavalier on a spirited
animal, with floating plume, silken sash, and a sabre which gleamed in
the moonlight, as its owner galloped to and fro cheering the men and
marshalling them for the coming assault As he led the lines afterward
with joyous vivacity, his sabre drawn, his plume floating proudly, one
of the men compared him to Henry of Navarre at the battle of Ivry. But
Stuart's spirit of wild gayety destroyed the romantic dignity of the
scene. He led the men of Jackson against General Hooker's breastworks
bristling with cannon, singing "Old Joe Hooker, will you come out of
the Wilderness!"
This sketch will convey a correct idea of the officer who had now
grasped the bâton falling from the hand of the great marshal of
Lee. It was probable that the advance of the infantry under such a
commander would partake of the rush and rapidity of a cavalry-charge;
and the sequel justified this view.
At early dawn the Southern lines began to move. Either in consequence
of orders from Lee, or following his own conception, Stuart reversed
the movement of Jackson, who had aimed to swing round his left and cut
off the enemy. He seemed to have determined to extend his right, with
the view of uniting with the left of Anderson's division under Lee,
and enclosing the enemy in the angle near Chancellorsville. Lee had
moved at the same moment on their front, advancing steadily over all
obstacles, and a Northern writer, who witnessed the combined attack,
speaks of it in enthusiastic terms: "From the large brick house
which gives the name to this vicinity," says the writer, speaking
of Chancellorsville, "the enemy could be seen, sweeping slowly but
confidently, determinedly and surely, through the clearings which
extended in front. Nothing could excite more admiration for the
qualities of the veteran soldiers than the manner in which the enemy
swept out, as they moved steadily onward, the forces which were
opposed to them. We say it reluctantly, and for the first time, that
the enemy have shown the finest qualities, and we acknowledge on this
occasion their superiority in the open field to our own men. They
delivered their fire with precision, and were apparently inflexible
and immovable under the storm of bullets and shell which they were
constantly receiving. Coming to a piece of timber, which was occupied
by a division of our own men, half the number were detailed to clear
the woods. It seemed certain that here they would be repulsed, but
they marched right through the wood, driving our own soldiers out, who
delivered their fire and fell back, halted again, fired, and fell back
as before, seeming to concede to the enemy, as a matter of course, the
superiority which they evidently felt themselves. Our own men fought
well. There was no lack of courage, but an evident feeling that they
were destined to be beaten, and the only thing for them to do was to
fire and retreat."
This description of the steady advance of the Southern line applies
rather to the first portion of the attack, which compelled the front
line of the Federal army to retire to the stronger ground in rear.
When this was reached, and the troops of Lee saw before them the last
citadel, the steady advance became a rush. The divisions of Anderson
and McLaws, on the right, made a determined charge upon the great
force under Generals Hancock, Slocum, and others, in that quarter, and
Stuart closed in on the Federal right, steadily extending his line to
join on to Anderson.
The spectacle here was superb. As the troops rushed on, Stuart
shouted, "Charge! and remember Jackson!" and this watchword seemed to
drive the line forward. With Stuart leading them, and singing, in
his joyous voice, "Old Joe Hooker, will you come out of the
Wilderness!"--for courage, poetry, and seeming frivolity, were
strangely mingled in this great soldier--the troops went headlong
at the Federal works, and in a few moments the real struggle of the
battle of Chancellorsville had begun.
From this instant, when the lines, respectively commanded in person
by Lee and by Stuart, closed in with the enemy, there was little
manoeuvring of any description. It was an open attempt of Lee, by hard
fighting, to crush in the enemy's front, and force them back upon the
river. In this arduous struggle it is due to Stuart to say that his
generalship largely decided the event, and the high commendation which
he afterward received from General Lee justifies the statement. As his
lines went to the attack, his quick military eye discerned an elevated
point on his right, from which it appeared an artillery-fire woulden
filade the Federal line. About thirty pieces of cannon were at once
hastened to this point, and a destructive fire opened on the lines
of General Slocum, which threw his troops into great confusion. So
serious was this fire that General Slocum sent word to General Hooker
that his front was being swept away by it, to which the sullen
response was, "I cannot make soldiers or ammunition!"
General Hooker was indeed, it seems, at this moment in no mood to take
a hopeful view of affairs. The heavy assault of Jackson appears to
have as much demoralized the Federal commander as his troops. During
the night he had erected a semicircular line of works, in the form of
a redan, in his rear toward the river, behind which new works he no
doubt contemplated falling back. He now awaited the result of the
Southern attack, leaning against a pillar of the porch at the
Chancellorsville House, when a cannon-ball struck the pillar, throwing
it down, and so stunning the general as to prevent him from retaining
the command, which was delegated to General Couch.
[Illustration: Chancellorsville]
The fate of the day had now been decided. The right wing of the
Southern army, under Lee, had gradually extended its left to meet the
extension of Stuart's right; and this junction of the two wings having
been effected, Lee took personal command of all, and advanced his
whole front in a decisive assault. Before this the Federal front gave
way, and the disordered troops were huddled back--now only a confused
and disorganized mass--upon Chancellorsville. The Southern troops
pursued with yells, leaping over the earthworks, and driving all
before them. A scene of singular horror ensued. The Chancellorsville
House, which had been set on fire by shell, was seen to spout flame
from every window, and the adjoining woods had, in like manner, caught
fire, and were heard roaring over the dead and wounded of both sides
alike. The thicket had become the scene of the cruellest of all
agonies for the unfortunates unable to extricate themselves. The whole
spectacle in the vicinity of the Chancellorsville House, now in Lee's
possession, was frightful. Fire, smoke, blood, confused yells, and
dying groans, mingled to form the dark picture.
Lee had ridden to the front of his line, following up the enemy, and
as he passed before the troops they greeted him with one prolonged,
unbroken cheer, in which those wounded and lying upon the ground
united. In that cheer spoke the fierce joy of men whom the hard combat
had turned into blood-hounds, arousing all the ferocious instincts
of the human soul. Lee sat on his horse, motionless, near the
Chancellorsville House, his face and figure lit up by the glare of the
burning woods, and gave his first attention, even at this exciting
moment, to the unfortunates of both sides, wounded, and in danger of
being burned to death. While issuing his orders on this subject, a
note was brought to him from Jackson, congratulating him upon his
victory. After reading it, with evidences of much emotion, he turned
to the officer who had brought it and said: "Say to General Jackson
that the victory is his, and that the congratulation is due to him."
The Federal army had fallen back in disorder, by this time, toward
their second line. It was about ten o'clock in the morning, and
Chancellorsville was in Lee's possession.
FLANK MOVEMENT OF GENERAL SEDGWICK.
Lee hastened to bring the Southern troops into order again, and
succeeded in promptly reforming his line of battle, his front
extending, unbroken, along the Old Turnpike, facing the river.
His design was to press General Hooker, and reap those rich rewards of
victory to which the hard fighting of the men had entitled them. Of
the demoralized condition of the Federal forces there can be no doubt,
and the obvious course now was to follow up their retreat and endeavor
to drive them in disorder beyond the Rappahannock.
The order to advance upon the enemy was about to be given, when a
messenger from Fredericksburg arrived at full gallop, and communicated
intelligence which arrested the order just as it was on Lee's lips.
A considerable force of the enemy was advancing up the turnpike from
Fredericksburg, to fall upon his right flank, and upon his rear in
case he moved beyond Chancellorsville. The column was that of General
Sedgwick. This officer, it will be remembered, had been detached to
make a heavy demonstration at Fredericksburg, and was still at that
point, with his troops drawn up on the southern bank, three miles
below the city, on Saturday night, while Jackson was fighting. On that
morning General Hooker had sent for Reynolds's corps, but, even in
the absence of this force, General Sedgwick retained under him about
twenty-two thousand men; and this column was now ordered to storm the
heights at Fredericksburg, march up the turnpike, and attack Lee in
flank.
General Sedgwick received the order at eleven o'clock on Saturday
night, about the time when Jackson was carried wounded to the rear. He
immediately made his preparations to obey, and at daylight moved up
from below the city to storm the ridge at Marye's, and march straight
upon Chancellorsville. In the first assaults he failed, suffering
considerable loss from the fire of the Southern troops under General
Barksdale, commanding the line at that point; but, subsequently
forming an assaulting column for a straight rush at the hill, he went
forward with impetuosity; drove the Southern advanced line from behind
the "stone wall," which Generals Sumner and Hooker had failed in
reaching, and, about eleven in the morning, stormed Marye's Hill, and
killed, captured, or dispersed, the entire Southern force there. The
Confederates fought hand to hand over their guns with the enemy for
the possession of the crest, but their numbers were inadequate; the
entire surviving force fell back over the Telegraph road southward,
and General Sedgwick promptly advanced up the turnpike leading from
Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville, to assail General Lee.
It was the intelligence of this threatening movement which now reached
Lee, and induced him to defer further attack at the moment upon
General Hooker. He determined promptly to send a force against General
Sedgwick, and this resolution seems to have been based upon sound
military judgment. There was little to be feared now from General
Hooker, large as the force still was under that officer. He was
paralyzed for the time, and would not probably venture upon any
attempt to regain possession of Chancellorsville. With General
Sedgwick it was different. His column was comparatively fresh, was
flushed with victory, and numbered, even after his loss of one
thousand, more than twenty thousand men. Compared with the entire
Federal army, this force was merely a detachment, it was true, but it
was a detachment numbering as many men, probably, as the effective of
Lee's entire army at Chancellorsville. He had carried into that fight
about thirty-four thousand men. His losses had been heavy, and the
commands were much shaken. To have advanced under these circumstances
upon General Hooker, without regard to General Sedgwick's twenty
thousand troops, inspired by recent victory, would have resulted
probably in disaster.
These comments may detract from that praise of audacity accorded to
Lee in making this movement. It seems rather to have been the dictate
of common-sense; to have advanced upon General Hooker would have been
the audacity.
It was thus necessary to defer the final blow at the main Federal army
in his front, and General Lee promptly detached a force of about five
brigades to meet General Sedgwick, which, with Early's command, now in
rear of the Federal column, would, it was supposed, suffice.
This body moved speedily down the turnpike to check the enemy, and
encountered the head of his column about half-way, near Salem Church.
General Wilcox, who had been sent by Lee to watch Banks's Ford, had
already moved to bar the Federal advance. When the brigades sent by
Lee joined him, the whole force formed line of battle: a brisk action
ensued, continuing from about four in the afternoon until nightfall,
when the fighting ceased, and General Sedgwick made no further attempt
to advance on that day.
These events took place, as we have said, on Sunday afternoon, the
day of the Federal defeat at Chancellorsville. On Monday morning (May
4th), the theatre of action on the southern bank of the Rappahannock
presented a very remarkable complication. General Early had been
driven from the ridge at Fredericksburg; but no sooner had General
Sedgwick marched toward Chancellorsville, than Early returned and
seized upon Marye's Heights again. He was thus in General Sedgwick's
rear, and ready to prevent him from recrossing the Rappahannock at
Fredericksburg. Sedgwick meanwhile was moving to assail Lee's flank
and rear, and Lee was ready to attack General Hooker in front. Such
was the singular entanglement of the Northern and Southern forces on
Monday morning after the battle of Chancellorsville. What the result
was to be the hours of that day were now to decide.
Lee resolved first, if possible, to crush General Sedgwick, when it
was his design to return and make a decisive assault upon General
Hooker. In accordance with this plan, he on Monday morning went in
personal command of three brigades of Anderson's division, reached the
vicinity of Salem Church, and proceeded to form line of battle with
the whole force there. Owing to unforeseen delays, the attack was not
begun until late in the afternoon, when the whole line advanced upon
General Sedgwick, Lee's aim being to cut him off from the river. In
this he failed, the stubborn resistance of the Federal forces enabling
them to hold their ground until night. At that time, however, they
seemed to waver and lose heart, whether from receiving intelligence of
General Hooker's mishap, or from other causes, is not known. They were
now pressed by the Southern troops, and finally gave way. General
Sedgwick retreated rapidly but in good order to Banks's Ford, where a
pontoon had been fortunately laid, and this enabled him to cross his
men. The passage was effected under cover of darkness, the Southern
cannon firing upon the retreating column; and, with this, ended the
movement of General Sedgwick.
On Tuesday morning Lee returned with his men toward Chancellorsville,
and during the whole day was busily engaged in preparation for a
decisive attack upon General Hooker on the next morning.
When, however, the Southern sharp-shooters felt their way, at
daylight, toward the Federal position, it was found that the works
were entirely deserted.
General Hooker had recrossed the river, spreading pine-boughs on the
pontoon bridge to muffle the sound of his artillery-wheels.
So the great advance ended.
VII.
LEE'S GENERALSHIP AND PERSONAL DEMEANOR DURING THE CAMPAIGN.
The movements of the two armies in the Chancellorsville campaign, as
it is generally styled, have been so fully described in the foregoing
pages, that little comment upon them is here necessary. The main
feature which attracts attention, in surveying the whole series of
operations, is the boldness, amounting to apparent recklessness, of
Lee; and, first, the excellent generalship, and then the extraordinary
tissue of military errors, of General Hooker.
Up to the 1st of May, when he emerged from the Chancellorsville
thicket, every thing had succeeded with the Federal commander, and
deserved to succeed. He had successfully brought over his great force,
which he himself described as the "finest army on the planet," and
occupied strong ground east of Chancellorsville, on the road to
Fredericksburg. General Sedgwick was absent at the latter place with a
strong detachment of the army, but the main body covered Banks's Ford,
but twelve miles from the city, and by the afternoon of this day the
whole army might have been concentrated. Then the fate of Lee would
seem to have been decided. He had not only a very small army, but
that army was scattered, and liable to be cut off in detail. General
Sedgwick menaced his right at Fredericksburg--General Hooker was in
front of his left near Chancellorsville--and to crush one of these
wings before the other could come to its assistance seemed a work of
no very great difficulty. General Hooker appears, however, to have
distrusted his ability to effect this result, and, finding that
General Lee was advancing with his main body to attack him, retired,
from his strong position in the open country, to the dense thicket
around Chancellorsville. That this was a grave military error there
can be no doubt, as, by this retrograde movement, General Hooker not
only discouraged his troops, who had been elated by his confident and
inspiring general orders, but lost the great advantage of the open
country, where his large force could be successfully manoeuvred.
Lee took instant advantage of this fault in his adversary, and boldly
pressed the force retiring into the Wilderness, where, on the night
of the 1st of May, General Hooker was shut up with his army. This
unforeseen result presented the adversaries now in an entirely new
light. The Federal army, which had been promised by its commander
a speedy march upon Richmond in pursuit of Lee, had, instead of
advancing, made a backward movement; and Lee, who it had been supposed
would retreat, was now following and offering them battle.
The daring resolution of Lee, to divide his army and attack the
Federal right, followed. It would seem unjust to General Hooker
greatly to blame him for the success of that blow, which could not
have been reasonably anticipated. In determining upon this, one of
the most extraordinary movements of the war, General Lee proceeded in
defiance of military rules, and was only justified in his course by
the desperate character of the situation of affairs. It was impossible
to make any impression upon General Hooker's front or left, owing to
the elaborate defences in both quarters; it was, therefore, necessary
either to retire, or attack in a different direction. As a retreat,
however, upon Richmond would have surrendered to the enemy a large and
fertile tract of country, it was desirable, if possible, to avoid that
alternative; and the attack on the Federal right followed. The results
of this were truly extraordinary. The force routed and driven back in
disorder by General Jackson was but a single corps, and that corps, it
is said, not a legitimate part of the old Army of the Potomac; but the
disorder seems to have communicated itself to the whole army, and to
have especially discouraged General Hooker. In describing the scene
in question, we refrained from dwelling upon the full extent of the
confusion into which the Federal forces were thrown: some sentences,
taken from Northern accounts, may lead to a better understanding of
the result. After Jackson's assault, a Northern historian says: "The
open plain around Chancellorsville presented such a spectacle as
a simoom sweeping over the desert might make. Through the dusk of
nightfall a rushing whirlwind of men and artillery and wagons swept
down the road, past headquarters, and on toward the fords of the
Rappahannock; and it was in vain that the staff opposed their persons
and drawn sabres to the panic-stricken fugitives." Another writer, an
eye-witness, says the spectacle presented was that of "solid columns
of infantry retreating at double-quick; a dense mass of beings flying;
hundreds of cavalry-horses, left riderless at the first discharge from
the rebels, dashing frantically about in all directions; scores of
batteries flying from the field; battery-wagons, ambulances, horses,
men, cannon, caissons, all jumbled and tumbled together in one
inextricable mass--the stampede universal, the disgrace general."
After all, however, it was but one corps of the Federal army which
had been thus thrown into disorder, and General Hooker had no valid
grounds for distrusting his ability to defeat Lee in a more decisive
action. There are many reasons for coming to the conclusion that he
did from that moment distrust his powers. He had courageously hastened
to the assailed point, ordering the men to "throw themselves into the
breach," and receive Jackson's troops "on the bayonet;" but, after
this display of soldierly resolution, General Hooker appears to have
lost some of that nerve which should never desert a soldier, and on
the same night sent engineers to trace out a new line of defences in
his rear, to which, it seems, he already contemplated the probability
of being forced to retire. Why he came to take this depressed view
of the situation of affairs, it is difficult to say. One of General
Sedgwick's corps reached him on this night, and his force at
Chancellorsville still amounted to between ninety and one hundred
thousand men, about thrice that of Lee. No decisive trial of strength
had yet taken place between the two armies; and yet the larger force
was constructing defences in rear to protect them from the smaller--a
circumstance not tending, it would seem, to greatly encourage the
troops whose commander was thus providing for a safe retreat.
The subsequent order to General Sedgwick to march up from
Fredericksburg and assail Lee's right was judicious, and really
saved the army from a great disaster. Lee was about to follow up the
discouraged forces of General Hooker as they fell back toward the
river; and, as the Southern army was flushed with victory, the
surrender of the great body might have ensued. This possible result
was prevented by the flank movement of General Sedgwick, and some
gratitude for assistance so important from his able lieutenant would
have seemed natural and graceful in General Hooker. This view of the
subject does not seem, however, to have been taken by the Federal
commander. He subsequently charged the defeat of Chancellorsville upon
General Sedgwick, who he declared had "failed in a prompt compliance
with his orders."[1] The facts do not bear out this charge, as the
reader has seen. General Sedgwick received the order toward midnight
on Saturday, and, at eleven o'clock on Sunday morning, had passed
over that stubborn "stone wall" which, in the battle of the preceding
December, General Hooker's column had not even been able to reach;
had stormed Marye's Hill, which General Hooker had described, in
vindication of his own failure to carry the position, as "masonry," "a
fortification," and "a mountain of rock;" and had marched thereafter
so promptly as to force Lee, in his own defence, to arrest the second
advance upon the Federal main body, and divert a considerable force to
meet the attack on his flank.
[Footnote 1: General Hooker in Report of the Committee on the Conduct
of the War, Part I., page 130. This great collection is a valuable
repository of historic details, and contains the explanation of many
interesting questions.]
After the repulse of General Sedgwick, and his retreat across
the Rappahannock, General Hooker seems to have been completely
discouraged, and hastened to put the river between himself and Lee.
His losses in the battles of Saturday and Sunday had amounted to
seventeen thousand one hundred and ninety-seven killed and wounded and
missing, fourteen pieces of artillery, and twenty thousand stand
of arms. The Confederate loss was ten thousand two hundred and
eighty-one. Contrary to the ordinary course of things the assailing
force had lost a less number of men than that assailed.
The foregoing reflections, which necessarily involve a criticism of
General Hooker, arise naturally from a review of the events of the
campaign, and seem justified by the circumstances. There can be no
inducement for the present writer to underrate the military ability of
the Federal commander, as that want of ability rather detracts from
than adds to the merit of General Lee in defeating him. It may be
said, indeed, that without these errors and shortcomings of General
Hooker, Lee, humanly speaking, must have been either defeated or
forced to retire upon Richmond.
After giving full weight, however, to all the advantages derived from
the extraordinary Federal oversights and mistakes, General Lee's merit
in this campaign was greater, perhaps, than in any other during his
entire career. Had he left behind him no other record than this, it
alone would have been sufficient to have conferred upon him the first
glories of arms, and handed his name down to posterity as that of one
of the greatest soldiers of history. It is difficult to discover a
single error committed by him, in the whole series of movements, from
the moment when General Sedgwick crossed at Fredericksburg, to the
time of General Hooker's retreat beyond the Rappahannock. It may
appear that there was unnecessary delay in permitting Tuesday to pass
without a final advance upon General Hooker, in his second line of
intrenchments; but, no doubt, many circumstances induced Lee to defer
this attack--the fatigue of his troops, consequent upon the fighting
of the four preceding days, Friday, Saturday, Sunday, and Monday; the
necessity of reforming his battalions for the final blow; and the
anticipation that General Hooker, who still had at his command a
force of more than one hundred thousand men, would not so promptly
relinquish his campaign, and retire.
With the exception of this error, if it be such, Lee had made no
single false step in the whole of his movements. The campaign was
round, perfect, and complete--such as a student of the art of war
might pore over, and analyze as an instance of the greatest principles
of military science "clothed in act." The most striking features of
Lee's movements were their rapidity and audacity. It had been the
fashion with some persons to speak of Lee as slow and cautious in his
operations, and this criticism had not been completely silenced even
in the winter of 1862, when his failure to crush General Burnside
afforded his detractors another opportunity of repeating the old
charge. After the Chancellorsville campaign these fault-finders were
silenced--no one could be found to listen to them. The whole
Southern movement completely contradicted their theory. At the first
intelligence of the advance of General Hooker's main body across the
upper Rappahannock, Lee rode rapidly in that direction, and ordered
his troops at the fords of the river to fall back to Chancellorsville.
He then returned, and, finding that General Sedgwick had crossed at
Fredericksburg, held a prompt consultation with Jackson, when it was
decided at once to concentrate the main body of the army in front of
General Hooker's column. At the word, Jackson moved; Lee followed. On
the 1st of May, the enemy were pressed back upon Chancellorsville; on
the 2d, his right was crushed, and his army thrown into confusion; on
the 3d, he was driven from Chancellorsville, and, but for the flank
movement of General Sedgwick, which Lee was not in sufficient force to
prevent, General Hooker would, upon that same day, Sunday, have in all
probability suffered a decisive defeat.
In the course of four days Lee had thus advanced, and checked, and
then attacked and repulsed with heavy slaughter, an army thrice
as large as his own. On the last day of April he had been nearly
enveloped by a host of about one hundred and twenty thousand men. On
the 3d day of May their main body was in disorderly retreat; and at
daylight on the morning of the 6th there was not a Federal soldier,
with the exception of the prisoners taken, on the southern bank of the
Rappahannock.
During all these critical scenes, when the fate of the Confederate
capital, and possibly of the Southern cause, hung suspended in the
balance, General Lee preserved, as thousands of persons can testify,
the most admirable serenity and composure, without that jubilant
confidence displayed by General Hooker in his address to the troops,
and the exclamations to his officers. Lee was equally free from gloom
or any species of depression. His spirits seemed to rise under the
pressure upon him, and at times he was almost gay. When one of General
Jackson's aides hastened into his tent near Fredericksburg, and with
great animation informed him that the enemy were crossing the
river, in heavy force in his front, he seemed to be amused by that
circumstance, and said, smiling: "Well, I _heard_ firing, and I was
beginning to think it was time some of you lazy young fellows were
coming to tell me what it was all about. Say to General Jackson that
he knows just as well what to do with the enemy as I do."
The commander-in-chief who could find time at such a moment to
indulge in _badinage_, must have possessed excellent nerve; and this
composure, mingled with a certain buoyant hopefulness, as of one sure
of the event, remained with Lee throughout the whole great wrestle
with General Hooker. He retained to the end his simple and quiet
manner, divested of every thing like excitement. In the consultation
with Jackson, on the night of the 1st of May, when the crisis was so
critical, his demeanor indicated no anxiety; and when, as we have
said, the news came of Jackson's wound, he said simply, "Sit
down here, by me, captain, and tell me all about the fight last
evening"--adding, "Ah! captain, any victory is dearly bought which
deprives us of the services of General Jackson even for a short
time. Don't talk about it--thank God, it is no worse!" The turns of
expression here are those of a person who permits nothing to disturb
his serenity, and indulges his gentler and tenderer feelings even
in the hot atmosphere of a great conflict. The picture presented is
surely an interesting and beautiful one. The human being who uttered
the good-natured criticism at the expense of the "lazy young fellows,"
and who greeted the news of Jackson's misfortune with a sigh as tender
as that of a woman, was the soldier who had "seized the masses of his
force with the grasp of a Titan, and swung them into position as a
giant might fling a mighty stone." To General Hooker's threat to crush
him, he had responded by crushing General Hooker; nearly surrounded by
the huge cordon of the Federal army, he had cut the cordon and emerged
in safety. General Hooker with his one hundred thousand men had
retreated to the north bank of the Rappahannock, and, on the south
bank, Lee with his thirty thousand remained erect, threatening, and
triumphant.
We have not presented in these pages the orders of Lee, on various
occasions, as these papers are for the most part of an "official"
character, and not of great interest to the general reader. We shall,
however, occasionally present these documents, and here lay before the
reader the orders of both General Hooker and General Lee, after the
battle of Chancellorsville, giving precedence to the former. The order
of the Federal commander was as follows:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, _May_ 6,1863.
The major-general commanding tenders to this army his
congratulations on its achievements of the last seven days. If it
has not accomplished all that was expected, the reasons are
well known to the army. It is sufficient to say, they were of a
character not to be foreseen or prevented by human sagacity or
resources.
In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock, before
delivering a general battle to our adversaries, the army has given
renewed evidence in its confidence in itself, and its fidelity to
the principles it represents.
By fighting at a disadvantage, we would have been recreant to our
trust, to ourselves, to our cause, and to our country. Profoundly
loyal, and conscious of its strength, the Army of the Potomac will
give or decline battle whenever its interests or honor may command
it.
By the celerity and secrecy of our movements, our advance and
passage of the river were undisputed, and on our withdrawal not
a rebel dared to follow us. The events of the last week may well
cause the heart of every officer and soldier of the army to swell
with pride.
We have added new laurels to our former renown. We have made long
marches, crossed rivers, surprised the enemy in his intrenchments,
and, whenever we have fought, we have inflicted heavier blows than
those we have received.
We have taken from the enemy five thousand prisoners, and fifteen
colors, captured seven pieces of artillery, and placed _hors de
combat_ eighteen thousand of our foe's chosen troops.
We have destroyed his depots filled with vast amounts of stores,
damaged his communications, captured prisoners within the
fortifications of his capital, and filled his country with fear
and consternation.
We have no other regret than that caused by the loss of our brave
companions, and in this we are consoled by the conviction that
they have fallen in the holiest cause ever submitted to the
arbitration of battle.
By command of Major-General HOOKER:
S. WILLIAMS, _Assistant Adjutant-General_
General Lee's order was as follows:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
_May_ 7,1863.
With heart-felt gratification, the general commanding expresses to
the army his sense of the heroic conduct displayed by officers and
men during the arduous operations in which they have just been
engaged.
Under trying vicissitudes of heat and storm you attacked the
enemy, strongly intrenched in the depths of a tangled wilderness,
and again on the hills of Fredericksburg, fifteen miles distant,
and by the valor that has triumphed on so many fields forced him
once more to seek safety beyond the Rappahannock. While this
glorious victory entitles you to the praise and gratitude of the
nation, we are especially called upon to return our grateful
thanks to the only Giver of victory, for the signal deliverances
He has wrought.
It is therefore earnestly recommended that the troops unite on
Sunday next in ascribing unto the Lord of hosts the glory due unto
His name.
Let us not forget, in our rejoicing, the brave soldiers who have
fallen in defence of their country; and, while we mourn their
loss, let us resolve to emulate their noble example.
The army and the country alike lament the absence for a time of
one to whose bravery, energy, and skill, they are so much indebted
for success.
The following letter from the President of the Confederate States
is communicated to the army, as an expression of his appreciation
of their success:
"I have received your dispatch, and reverently unite with you in
giving praise to God for the success with which He has crowned our
arms. In the name of the people I offer my cordial thanks, and the
troops under your command, for this addition to the unprecedented
series of great victories which our army has achieved. The
universal rejoicing produced by this happy result will be mingled
with a general regret for the good and the brave who are numbered
among the killed and the wounded."
R.E. LEE, _General_.
VIII.
PERSONAL RELATIONS OF LEE AND JACKSON.
The most important incident of the great battle of Chancellorsville
was the fall of Jackson. The services of this illustrious soldier had
now become almost indispensable to General Lee, who spoke of him
as his "right arm;" and the commander-in-chief had so long been
accustomed to lean upon the strong shoulder of his lieutenant, that
now, when this support was withdrawn, he seems to have felt the loss
of it profoundly.
In the war, indeed, there had arisen no soldier who so powerfully drew
the public eye as Jackson. In the opinion of many persons, he was a
greater and abler commander than Lee himself; and, although such
an opinion will not be found to stand after a full review of the
characters and careers of the two leaders, there was sufficient ground
for it to induce many fair and intelligent persons to adopt it.
Jackson had been almost uniformly successful. He had conducted to a
triumphant issue the arduous campaign of the Valley, where he was
opposed in nearly every battle by a force much larger than his own;
and these victories, in a quarter so important, and at a moment so
critical, had come, borne on the wind of the mountain, to electrify
and inspire the hearts of the people of Richmond and the entire
Confederacy. Jackson's rapid march and assault on General McClellan's
right on the Chickahominy had followed; he then advanced northward,
defeated the vanguard of the enemy at Cedar Mountain, led the great
column of Lee against the rear of General Pope, destroyed Manassas,
held his ground until Lee arrived, and bore an important part in the
battle which ensued. Thence he had passed to Maryland, fallen upon
Harper's Ferry and captured it, returned to fight with Lee at
Sharpsburg, and in that battle had borne the brunt of the enemy's main
assault with an unbroken front. That the result was a drawn battle,
and not a Southern defeat, was due to Lee's generalship and Jackson's
fighting. The retrograde movement to the lowland followed, and Jackson
was left in the Valley to embarrass McClellan's advance. In this he
perfectly succeeded, and then suddenly reappeared at Fredericksburg,
where he received and repulsed one of the two great assaults of the
enemy. The battle of Chancellorsville followed, and Lee's statement
of the part borne in this hard combat by Jackson has been given. The
result was due, he said, not to his own generalship, but to the skill
and energy of his lieutenant, whose congratulations he refused to
receive, declaring that the victory was Jackson's.
Here had at last ended the long series of nearly unbroken victories.
Jackson had become the _alter ego_ of Lee, and it is not difficult
to understand the sense of loss felt by the commander-in-chief. In
addition to this natural sentiment, was deep regret at the death of
one personally dear to him, and to whom he was himself an object of
almost reverent love. The personal relations of Lee and Jackson had,
from first to last, remained the same--not the slightest cloud had
ever arisen to disturb the perfect union in each of admiration and
affection for the other. It had never occurred to these two great
soldiers to ask what their relative position was in the public
eye--which was most spoken of and commended or admired. Human nature
is weak at best, and the fame of Jackson, mounting to its dazzling
zenith, might have disturbed a less magnanimous soul than Lee's. There
is not, however, the slightest reason to believe that Lee ever gave
the subject a thought. Entirely free from that vulgar species of
ambition which looks with cold eyes upon the success of others, as
offensive to its own _amour-propre_ Lee never seems to have instituted
any comparison between himself and Jackson--greeted praise of his
famous lieutenant with sincere pleasure--and was the first upon
every occasion, not only to express the fullest sense of Jackson's
assistance, and the warmest admiration of his genius as a soldier, but
to attribute to him, as after the battle of Chancellorsville, _all_
the merit of every description.
It is not possible to contemplate this august affection and admiration
of the two soldiers for each other, without regarding it as a greater
glory to them than all their successes in arms. Lee's opinion of
Jackson, and personal sentiment toward him, have been set forth in the
above sentences. The sentiment of Jackson for Lee was as strong or
stronger. He regarded him with mingled love and admiration. To excite
such feelings in a man like Jackson, it was necessary that Lee should
be not only a soldier of the first order of genius, but also a good
and pious man. It was in these lights that Jackson regarded his
commander, and from first to last his confidence in and admiration for
him never wavered. He had defended Lee from the criticism of unskilled
or ignorant persons, from the time when he assumed command of the
army, in the summer of 1862. At that time some one spoke of Lee, in
Jackson's presence, as "slow." The criticism aroused the indignation
of the silent soldier, and he exclaimed: "General Lee is _not_ 'slow.'
No one knows the weight upon his heart--his great responsibilities.
He is commander-in-chief, and he knows that, if an army is lost, it
cannot be replaced. No! there may be some persons whose good opinion
of me may make them attach some weight to my views, and, if you ever
hear that said of General Lee, I beg you will contradict it in my
name. I have known General Lee for five-and-twenty years. He is
cautious. He ought to be. But he is _not_ 'slow.' Lee is a phenomenon.
He is the only man whom I would follow blindfold!"
The abrupt and energetic expressions of Jackson on this occasion
indicate his profound sense of the injustice done Lee by these
criticisms; and it would be difficult to imagine a stronger statement
than that here made by him. It will be conceded that he himself was
competent to estimate soldiership, and in Jackson's eyes Lee was
"a phenomenon--the only man whom he would follow blindfold." The
subsequent career of Lee seems to have strengthened and intensified
this extreme admiration. What Lee advised or did was always in
Jackson's eyes the very best that could be suggested or performed. He
yielded his own opinions, upon every occasion, with perfect readiness
and cheerfulness to those of Lee, as to the master-mind; loved him,
revered him, looked up to him, and never seems to have found fault
with him but upon one occasion--when he received Lee's note of
congratulation after Chancellorsville. He then said: "General Lee is
very kind; but he should give the glory to God."
This affection and admiration were fully returned by General Lee, who
consulted Jackson upon every occasion, and confided in him as his
personal friend. There was seldom any question between them of
superior and subordinate--never, except when the exigency required
that the decision should be made by Lee as commander-in-chief.
Jackson's supreme genius, indeed, made this course natural, and no
further praise is due Lee in this particular, save that of modesty and
good sense; but these qualities are commendable and not universal.
He committed the greatest undertakings to Jackson with the utmost
confidence, certain that he would do all that could be done; and some
words of his quoted above express this entire confidence. "Say
to General Jackson," he replied to the young staff-officer at
Fredericksburg, "that he knows just as well what to do with the enemy
as I do."
Lee's personal affection was strikingly displayed after the battle
of Chancellorsville, when Jackson lay painfully, but no one supposed
mortally, wounded, first at Wilderness Tavern, and then at Ginney's.
Prevented from visiting the wounded man, by the responsibilities of
command, now all the greater from Jackson's absence, and not regarding
his hurt as serious, as indeed it did not appear to be until toward
the last, Lee sent him continual messages containing good wishes
and inquiries after his health. The tone of these messages is very
familiar and affectionate, and leaves no doubt of the character of the
relations between the two men.
"Give him my affectionate regards," he said to one officer, "and tell
him to make haste and get well, and come back to me as soon as he can.
He has lost his left arm, but I have lost my right."
When the wound of the great soldier took a bad turn, and it began to
be whispered about that the hurt might prove fatal, Lee was strongly
moved, and said with deep feeling: "Surely General Jackson must
recover! God will not take him from us, now that we need him so much.
Surely he will be spared to us, in answer to the many prayers which
are offered for him!"
He paused after uttering these words, laboring evidently under very
deep and painful emotion. After remaining silent for some moments,
he added: "When you return I trust you will find him better. When
a suitable occasion offers, give him my love, and tell him that I
wrestled in prayer for him last night, as I never prayed, I believe,
for myself."
The tone of these messages is, as we have said, that of familiar
affection, as from one valued friend to another. The expression, "Give
him my love," is a Virginianism, which is used only when two persons
are closely and firmly bound by long association and friendship. Such
had been the case with Lee and Jackson, and in the annals of the war
there is no other instance of a friendship so close, affectionate, and
unalloyed.
Jackson died on the 10th of May, and the unexpected intelligence
shocked Lee profoundly. He mourned the death of the illustrious
soldier with a sorrow too deep almost to find relief in tears; and
issued a general order to the troops, which was in the following
words:
With deep grief the commanding general announces to the army the
death of Lieutenant-General T.J. Jackson, who expired on the 10th
inst., at quarter-past three P.M. The daring, skill, and energy
of this great and good soldier, by the decree of an All-wise
Providence, are now lost to us. But, while we mourn his death, we
feel that his spirit still lives, and will inspire the whole army
with his indomitable courage and unshaken confidence in God, as
our hope and strength. Let his name be a watchword to his corps,
who have followed him to victory on so many fields. Let his
officers and soldiers emulate his invincible determination to
do every thing in defence of our beloved country. R.E. LEE,
_General_.
It is probable that the composition of this order cost General Lee one
of the severest pangs he ever experienced.
IX.
CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA.
The defeat of General Hooker at Chancellorsville was the turning-point
of the war, and for the first time there was apparently a possibility
of inducing the Federal Government to relinquish its opposition to the
establishment of a separate authority in the South. The idea of the
formation of a Southern Confederacy, distinct from the old Union, had,
up to this time, been repudiated by the authorities at Washington as a
thing utterly out of the question; but the defeat of the Federal arms
in the two great battles of the Rappahannock had caused the most
determined opponents of separation to doubt whether the South could
be coerced to return to the Union; and, what was equally or more
important, the proclamations of President Lincoln, declaring the
slaves of the South free, and placing the United States virtually
under martial law, aroused a violent clamor from the great Democratic
party of the North, who loudly asserted that all constitutional
liberty was disappearing.
This combination of non-success in military affairs and usurpation by
the Government emboldened the advocates of peace to speak out plainly,
and utter their protest against the continuance of the struggle,
which they declared had only resulted in the prostration of all
the liberties of the country. Journals and periodicals, violently
denunciatory of the course pursued by the Government, all at once made
their appearance in New York and elsewhere. A peace convention was
called to meet in Philadelphia. Mr. Vallandigham, nominee of the
Democratic party for Governor of Ohio, eloquently denounced the whole
policy of endeavoring to subjugate the sovereign States of the South;
and Judge Curtis, of Boston, formerly Associate Judge of the Supreme
Court of the United States, published a pamphlet in which the Federal
President was stigmatized as a usurper and tyrant. "I do not see,"
wrote Judge Curtis, "that it depends upon the Executive decree whether
a servile war shall be invoked to help twenty millions of the white
race to assert the rightful authority of the Constitution and laws of
their country over those who refuse to obey them. But I do see that
this proclamation" (emancipating the Southern slaves) "asserts the
power of the Executive to make such a decree! I do not perceive how it
is that my neighbors and myself, residing remote from armies and their
operations, and where all the laws of the land may be enforced by
constitutional means, should be subjected to the possibility of
arrest and imprisonment and trial before a military commission, and
punishment at its discretion, for offences unknown to the law--a
possibility to be converted into a fact at the mere will of the
President, or of some subordinate officer, clothed by him with this
power. But I do perceive that this Executive power is asserted.... It
must be obvious to the meanest capacity that, if the President of
the United States has an _implied_ constitutional right, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, in time of war, to disregard
any one positive prohibition of the Constitution, or to exercise any
one power not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
because in his judgment he may thereby 'best subdue the enemy,' he
has the same right, for the same reason, to disregard each and every
provision of the Constitution, and to exercise all power _needful in
his opinion_ to enable him 'best to subdue the enemy.' ... The time
has certainly come when the people of the United States _must_
understand and _must_ apply those great rules of civil liberty which
have been arrived at by the self-devoted efforts of thought and action
of their ancestors during seven hundred years of struggle against
arbitrary power."
So far had reached the thunder of Lee's guns at Chancellorsville.
Their roar seemed to have awakened throughout the entire North the
great party hitherto lulled to slumber by the plea of "military
necessity," or paralyzed by the very extent of the Executive
usurpation which they saw, but had not had heart to oppose. On all
sides the advocates of peace on the basis of separation were heard
raising their importunate voices; and in the North the hearts of the
people began to thrill with the anticipation of a speedy termination
of the bloody and exhausting struggle. The occasion was embraced by
Mr. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederate States, to propose
negotiations. This able gentleman wrote from Georgia on the 12th of
June to President Davis, offering to go to Washington and sound the
authorities there on the subject of peace. He believed that the moment
was propitious, and wished to act before further military movements
were undertaken--especially before any further projects of invasion by
Lee--which would tend, he thought, to silence the peace party at the
North, and again arouse the war spirit. The letter of Mr. Stephens
was written on the 12th of June, and President Davis responded by
telegraph a few days afterward, requesting Mr. Stephens to come to
Richmond. He reached that city on the 22d or 23d of June, but by that
time Lee's vanguard was entering Maryland, and Gettysburg speedily
followed, which terminated all hopes of peace.
The plan of moving the Southern army northward, with the view of
invading the Federal territory, seems to have been the result of many
circumstances. The country was elated with the two great victories of
Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and the people were clamorous for
active operations against an enemy who seemed powerless to stand the
pressure of Southern steel. The army, which had been largely augmented
by the return of absentees to its ranks, new levies, and the recall
of Longstreet's two divisions from Suffolk, shared the general
enthusiasm; and thus a very heavy pressure was brought to bear upon
the authorities and on General Lee, in favor of a forward movement,
which, it was supposed, would terminate in a signal victory and a
treaty of peace.
Lee yielded to this view of things rather than urged it. He was not
opposed to an offensive policy, and seems, indeed, to have shared the
opinion of Jackson that "the Scipio Africanus policy" was the best for
the South. His theory from the beginning of the war had been, that the
true policy of the South was to keep the enemy as far as possible
from the interior, fighting on the frontier or on Federal soil, if
possible. That of the South would there thus be protected from the
ravages of the enemy, and the further advantage would accrue, that the
Confederate capital, Richmond, would at all times be safe from danger.
This was an important consideration, as events subsequently showed.
As long as the enemy were held at arm's-length, north of the
Rappahannock, Richmond, with her net-work of railroads connecting with
every part of the South, was safe, and the Government, undisturbed in
their capital, remained a power in the eyes of the world. But, with an
enemy enveloping the city, and threatening her lines of communication,
the tenure of the place by the Government was uncertain. When General
Grant finally thus enveloped the city, and laid hold upon the
railroads, Lee's army was defeated, and the Government became
fugitive, which alone would have struck a mortal blow to its prestige
and authority.
It was to arrive at these results, which his sagacity discerned, that
Lee always advocated such movements as would throw back the enemy, and
drive him, if possible, from the soil of Virginia. Another important
consideration was the question of supplies. These were at all times
deficient in the Confederate armies, and it was obviously the best
policy to protect as much territory, from which supplies might be
drawn, as possible. More than ever before, these supplies were now
needed; and when General Lee sent, in May or June, a requisition for
rations to Richmond, the commissary-general is said to have endorsed
upon the paper, "If General Lee wishes rations, let him seek them in
Pennsylvania."
The considerations here stated were the main inducements for
that great movement northward which followed the battle of
Chancellorsville. The army and country were enthusiastic; the
Government rather followed than led; and, throughout the month of May,
Lee was busily engaged in organizing and equipping his forces for the
decisive advance. Experience had now dictated many alterations and
improvements in the army. It was divided into three _corps d'armée_,
each consisting of three divisions, and commanded by an officer with
the rank of lieutenant-general. Longstreet remained at the head of his
former corps, Ewell succeeded Jackson in command of "Jackson's old
corps," and A.P. Hill was assigned to a third corps made up of
portions of the two others. The infantry was thus rearranged in a
manner to increase greatly its efficiency, and the artillery arm
was entirely reorganized. The old system of assigning one or more
batteries or battalions to each division or corps was done away with,
and the artillery of the army was made a distinct command, and placed
under General W.N. Pendleton, a brave and energetic officer, who was
thenceforward Lee's "chief of artillery." The last arm, the cavalry,
was also increased in efficiency; and, on the last day of May,
General Lee had the satisfaction of finding himself in command of a
well-equipped and admirably-officered army of sixty-eight thousand
three hundred and fifty-two bayonets, and nearly ten thousand cavalry
and artillery--in all, about eighty thousand men. Never before had
the Southern army had present for duty, as fighting men, so large a
number, except just before the battles on the Chickahominy. There was,
however, this great difference between the army then and at this time:
in those first months of 1862, it was made up largely of raw troops
who had never heard the discharge of a musket in their lives: while
now, in May, 1863 the bulk of the army consisted of Lee's veterans,
men who had followed him through the fire of Manassas, Sharpsburg,
Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville, and could be counted on
to effect any thing not absolutely beyond human power. General
Longstreet, conversing after the war with a gentleman of the North,
declared as much. The army at that time, he said, was in a condition
to undertake _any thing_.
X.
LEE'S PLANS AND OBJECTS.
The great game of chess was now about to commence, and, taking an
illustration from that game, General Lee is reported to have said that
he believed he would "swap queens," that is, advance and attempt to
capture the city of Washington, leaving General Hooker at liberty, if
he chose so to do, to seize in turn upon Richmond. What the result of
so singular a manoeuvre would have been, it is impossible to say; it
would certainly have proved one of the strangest incidents of a war
fruitful in varied and shifting events.