1751-1752. ÆT. 40-41.
Sir Gilbert Elliot--Hume's intimacy with him--Their
Philosophical Correspondence--Dialogues on Natural Religion--
Residence in Edinburgh--Jack's Land--Publication of the
"Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals"--The Utilitarian
Theory--Attempt to obtain the Chair of Moral Philosophy in
Glasgow--Competition with Burke--Publication of the "Political
Discourses"--The foundation of Political Economy--French
Translations.
Foremost in that body of accomplished gentlemen, whose friendship and
companionship afforded to Hume so much pleasure and instruction, was
Mr. afterwards Sir Gilbert Elliot of Minto. A small portion of the
letters, of which their correspondence consists, has already been
embodied in philosophical literature;[320:1] and I have now, through the
favour of the noble descendant of the person to whom they were
addressed, an opportunity of presenting the reader with all those
portions of Hume's letters to Sir Gilbert Elliot, now existing, which
have any claim on public attention, whether as containing valuable
philosophical speculations, or throwing light on the social habits and
intercourse of the two distinguished correspondents.[320:2]
Sir Gilbert Elliot was the third baronet of the family of Minto, who
bore the same Christian name.[320:3] He joined the Scottish bar, though
he does not seem to have sought professional practice.
He was, for a considerable period, a member of Parliament, and among
other offices held that of treasurer of the navy.[321:1] In lighter
literature he is known as the author of some pretty pieces of poetry,
among which, the popular song of "My Sheep I neglected," is well
esteemed by the admirers of pastoral lyrics. His acquirements as a
scholar and philosopher are amply attested by his correspondence with
Hume.
HUME _to_ GILBERT ELLIOT _of Minto_.
"_Ninewells, near Berwick, 10th February, 1751._
"DEAR SIR,--About six weeks ago, I gave our friend, Jack Stuart, the
trouble of delivering you a letter, and some papers enclosed, which I
was desirous to submit to your criticism and examination. I say not this
by way of compliment and ceremonial, but seriously and in good earnest:
it is pretty usual for people to be pleased with their own performance,
especially in the heat of composition; but I have scarcely wrote any
thing more whimsical, or whose merit I am more diffident of.
"But, in sending in these papers, I am afraid that I have not taken the
best step towards conveying them to your hand. I should also have wrote
you to ask for them, otherwise, perhaps, our friend may wear them out in
his pocket, and forget the delivery of them: be so good, therefore, as
to desire them from him, and having read them at your leisure, return
them to him in a packet, and he will send them to me by the carrier. You
would easily observe what I mentioned to you, that they had a reference
to some other work, and were not complete in themselves: but, with this
allowance, are they tolerable?"[322:1]
The paper to which the following letter refers, was published as an
appendix to the "Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals," to be
shortly noticed, and was simply termed, "A Dialogue." It is, perhaps,
more imaginative than any other of Hume's works, "The Epicurean" not
excepted. It draws startling contrasts, by taking from ancient and
modern times, two communities of men strikingly opposed to each other in
habits, and describing those of the one in the social language of the
other. In this manner, it gives an account of the vices of the Greeks,
in the manner in which they would be described by a modern fashionable
Englishman, seeking pleasure and companionship in Greece, as it was in
the days of Alcibiades. This method of exhibiting national manners
through the magnifying glass of national prejudices, has, in later
times, been frequently adopted,[322:2] and, perhaps, owes its popularity
to the success with which it was exhibited in Montesquieu's "Lettres
Persanes," and Goldsmith's "Citizen of the World."
GILBERT ELLIOT _of Minto, to_ HUME.
_February, 1751._
DEAR SIR,--I have read over your Dialogue, with all the
application I am master of. Though I have never looked into
any thing of your writing, which did not either entertain or
instruct me; yet, I must freely own to you, that I have
received from this last piece an additional satisfaction, and
what indeed I have a thousand times wished for in some of your
other performances. In the first part of this work, you have
given full scope to the native bent of your genius. The
ancients and moderns, how opposite soever in other respects,
equally combine in favour of the most unbounded scepticism.
Principles, customs, and manners, the most contradictory, all
seemingly lead to the same end; and agreeably to your laudable
practice, the poor reader is left in the most disconsolate
state of doubt and uncertainty. When I had got thus far, what
do you think were my sentiments? I will not be so candid as to
tell you; but how agreeable was my surprise, when I found you
had led me into this maze, with no other view, than to point
out to me more clearly the direct road. Why can't you always
write in this manner? Indulge yourself as much as you will in
starting difficulties, and perplexing received opinions: but
let us be convinced at length, that you have not less ability
to establish true principles, than subtlety to detect false
ones. This unphilosophical, or, if you will, this lazy
disposition of mine, you are at liberty to treat as you think
proper; yet am I no enemy to free inquiry, and I would gladly
flatter myself, no slave to prejudice or authority. I admit
also that there is no writing or talking of any subject that
is of importance enough to become the object of reasoning,
without having recourse to some degree of subtlety or
refinement. The only question is, where to stop,--how far we
can go, and why no farther. To this question I should be
extremely happy to receive a satisfactory answer. I can't tell
if I shall rightly express what I have just now in my mind:
but I often imagine to myself, that I perceive within me a
certain instinctive feeling, which shoves away at once all
subtle refinements, and tells me with authority, that these
air-built notions are inconsistent with life and experience,
and, by consequence cannot be true or solid. From this I am
led to think, that the speculative principles of our nature
ought to go hand in hand with the practical ones; and, for my
own part, when the former are so far pushed, as to leave the
latter quite out of sight, I am always apt to suspect that we
have transgressed our limits. If it should be asked--how far
will these practical principles go? I can only answer, that
the former difficulty will recur, unless it be found that
there is something in the intellectual part of our nature,
resembling the moral sentiment in the moral part of our
nature, which determines this, as it were, instinctively. Very
possibly I have wrote nonsense. However, this notion first
occurred to me at London, in conversation with a man of some
depth of thinking; and talking of it since to your friend H.
Home, he seems to entertain some notions nearly of the same
kind, and to have pushed them much farther.
This is but an idle digression, so I return to the Dialogue.
With regard to the composition in general, I have nothing to
observe, as it appears to me to be conducted with the greatest
propriety, and the artifice in the beginning occasions, I
think, a very agreeable surprise. I don't know, if, in the
account of the modern manners, you [had] an eye to Bruyere's
introduction to his translation of Theophrastes.[324:1] If you
had not, as he has a thought handled pretty much in that
manner, perhaps looking into it might furnish some farther
hints to embellish that part of your work.[324:2]
HUME _to_ GILBERT ELLIOT _of Minto_.
"_Ninewells, 19th February, 1751._
"DEAR SIR,--Your notion of correcting subtlety of sentiment, is
certainly very just with regard to morals, which depend upon sentiment;
and in politics and natural philosophy, whatever conclusion is contrary
to certain matters of fact, must certainly be wrong, and there must
some error lie somewhere in the argument, whether we be able to show it
or not. But in metaphysics or theology, I cannot see how either of these
plain and obvious standards of truth can have place. Nothing there can
correct bad reasoning but good reasoning, and sophistry must be opposed
by syllogisms. About seventy or eighty years ago, I observe, a principle
like that which you advance prevailed very much in France among some
philosophers and _beaux esprits_. The occasion of it was this: The
famous Mons. Nicole of the Port Royal, in his _Perpétuité de la
Foi_,[325:1] pushed the Protestants very hard upon the impossibility of
the people's reaching a conviction of their religion by the way of
private judgment; which required so many disquisitions, reasonings,
researches, eruditions, impartiality, and penetration, as not one in a
hundred even among men of education, is capable of. Mons. Claude and the
Protestants answered him, not by solving his difficulties, (which seems
impossible,) but by retorting them, (which is very easy.) They showed
that to reach the way of authority which the Catholics insist on, as
long a train of acute reasoning, and as great erudition, was requisite,
as would be sufficient for a Protestant. We must first prove all the
truths of natural religion, the foundation of morals, the divine
authority of the Scripture, the deference which it commands to the
church, the tradition of the church, &c. The comparison of these
controversial writings begot an idea in some, that it was neither by
reasoning nor authority we learn our religion, but by sentiment: and
certainly this were a very convenient way, and what a philosopher would
be very well pleased to comply with, if he could distinguish sentiment
from education. But to all appearance the sentiment of Stockholm,
Geneva, Rome ancient and modern, Athens and Memphis, have the same
characters; and no sensible man can implicitly assent to any of them,
but from the general principle, that as the truth in these subjects is
beyond human capacity, and that as for one's own ease he must adopt some
tenets, there is most satisfaction and convenience in holding to the
Catholicism we have been first taught. Now this I have nothing to say
against. I have only to observe, that such a conduct is founded on the
most universal and determined scepticism, joined to a little indolence;
for more curiosity and research gives a direct opposite turn from the
same principles.
"I have amused myself lately with an essay or dissertation on the
populousness of antiquity, which led me into many disquisitions
concerning both the public and domestic life of the ancients. Having
read over almost all the classics both Greek and Latin, since I formed
that plan, I have extracted what served most to my purpose. But I have
not a Strabo, and know not where to get one in this neighbourhood. He is
an author I never read. I know your library--I mean the Advocates'--is
scrupulous of lending classics; but perhaps that difficulty may be got
over. I should be much obliged to you, if you could procure me the loan
of a copy, either in the original language or even in a good
translation.
"The Greeks had military dances, particularly the Pyrrhicha; but these
were not practised in their festivals nor amidst their jollity. Their
way of dancing was very good for an indolent fellow; for commonly they
rose not from their seats, but moved their arms and head in cadence.
'Tis difficult to imagine there could be much grace in that kind of
dancing.
"I send you enclosed a little endeavour at drollery, against some people
who care not much to be joked upon.[327:1] I have frequently had it in
my intentions to write a supplement to Gulliver, containing the ridicule
of priests. 'Twas certainly a pity that Swift was a parson; had he been
a lawyer or physician, we had nevertheless been entertained at the
expense of these professions: but priests are so jealous, that they
cannot bear to be touched on that head, and for a plain reason, because
they are conscious they are really ridiculous. That part of the Doctor's
subject is so fertile, that a much inferior genius I am confident might
succeed in it.
"Tell Jack Stuart, as soon as you see him, that I have sent you the
copy, if he can make any thing of it. I intended to have had it printed,
but I know not how--I find it will not do. If you like the thing, I wish
you would contrive together some way of getting over the difficulties
that have arisen, the most strangely in the world. I am, &c."[327:2]
Among the papers submitted to the inspection of Mr. Elliot, were the
"Dialogues concerning Natural Religion," which were not published until
after their author's death, but which the following letter shows to have
been written before the year 1751. The manuscript of this work[328:1] is
full of emendations and corrections; and while the sentiments appear to
be substantially the same as when they were first set down, the
alterations in the method of announcing them are a register of the
improvements in their author's style, for a period apparently of
twenty-seven years. Here at least he could not plead the excuse of youth
and indiscretion. The work, penned in the full vigour of his faculties,
comes to us with the sanction of his mature years, and his approval when
he was within sight of the grave. Whatever sentiments, therefore, in
this work, may be justly found to excite censure, carry with them a
reproach from which their author's name cannot escape.
The Dialogues are written with a solemn simplicity of tone worthy of the
character of the subject. The structure is in a great measure that of
Cicero, though there appears not, as there generally does in the
conversations professed to be recorded by the Roman moralist, any one
mind completely predominating over the others. Of the interlocutors,
Philo presents himself, at first as a materialist of the Spinoza school,
who finds that the material world has within itself the principles of
its own motion and development--the operating causes that produce its
phenomena; while he denies that these phenomena exhibit an all perfect
structure. He is not, however, a man of settled opinions, but rather a
sceptical demolisher of other people's views; and we find him saying, "I
must confess that I am less cautious on the subject of natural religion
than on any other; both because I know that I can never, on that head,
corrupt the principles of any man of common sense; and because no one, I
am confident, in whose eyes I appear a man of common sense, will ever
mistake my intentions. You in particular, Cleanthes, with whom I live in
unreserved intimacy, you are sensible, that notwithstanding the freedom
of my conversation, and my love of singular arguments, no one has a
deeper sense of religion impressed on his mind, or pays more profound
adoration to the Divine Being, as he discovers himself to reason, in the
inexplicable contrivance and artifice of nature."
Cleanthes, another speaker, has created a natural religion of his own--a
system of Theism, in which, by induction from the beautiful order and
mechanism of the world, he has reasoned himself into the belief of an
all-wise and all-powerful Supreme Being. He holds, that "the most
agreeable reflection which it is possible for human imagination to
suggest, is that of genuine Theism, which represents us as the
workmanship of a being perfectly good, wise, and powerful, who created
us for happiness; and who, having implanted in us immeasurable desires
of good, will prolong our existence to all eternity, and will transfer
us into an infinite variety of scenes, in order to satisfy those
desires, and render our felicity complete and durable." And, strangely
enough, it is with this one that the author shows most sympathy, very
nearly professing that the doctrine announced by Cleanthes is his own;
while it will be found in his correspondence, that he admits his having
designedly endeavoured to make the argument of that speaker the most
attractive. This is another illustration of the inapplicability of
perfectly abstract metaphysical disquisitions to religious faith; for,
if there is any system of religion that is incompatible with Hume's
metaphysical opinions on ideas and impressions, it is a system that is,
like this of Cleanthes, the workmanship of human reason. The third
speaker, Demea, is a devoutly religious man, who, not venturing to
create a system of belief for himself, sees in the order of the world
such a merciful and wise dispensation of Divine Providence, as induces
him to receive the whole revealed scheme of religion without questioning
those parts of it which are beyond his comprehension, any more than he
questions those of which the wisdom and goodness are immediately
apparent.
The general scope and purport of the Dialogues are not unlike those of
Voltaire's Jenni. In both, the argument on natural theology,
illustrating the existence of a ruling mind from the general order and
harmony of created things, is adduced, and is measured with its
counterpart, the argument from the imperfection of earthly things, and
the calamities and unhappiness of the beings standing at the head of the
whole social order, mankind. But in the mere similarity of the argument
the resemblance stops; no two performances can be more unlike each other
in tone and spirit than the English sceptic's honest search after truth,
and the French infidel's ribald sport with all that men love and revere.
The contrast may be found not only in these individual men, but in the
two classes of thinkers at the head of which they respectively stood.
Hume represented the cautious conscientious inquiry, which has
established many truths and gradually ameliorated social evils; the
Frenchman directed that scornful, careless, and cruel sport with
whatever is dear and important to humanity, which one day bowed to
absolute despotism, and the next destroyed the whole fabric of social
order.[331:1]
HUME _to_ GILBERT ELLIOT _of Minto_.
"_Ninewells, near Berwick, March 10, 1751._
"DEAR SIR,--You would perceive by the sample I have given you, that I
make Cleanthes the hero of the dialogue: whatever you can think of, to
strengthen that side of the argument, will be most acceptable to me.
Any propensity you imagine I have to the other side, crept in upon me
against my will; and 'tis not long ago that I burned an old manuscript
book, wrote before I was twenty, which contained, page after page, the
gradual progress of my thoughts on that head. It began with an anxious
search after arguments, to confirm the common opinion; doubts stole in,
dissipated, returned; were again dissipated, returned again; and it was
a perpetual struggle of a restless imagination against inclination,
perhaps against reason.
"I have often thought, that the best way of composing a dialogue, would
be for two persons that are of different opinions about any question of
importance, to write alternately the different parts of the discourse,
and reply to each other: by this means, that vulgar error would be
avoided, of putting nothing but nonsense into the mouth of the
adversary; and at the same time, a variety of character and genius being
upheld, would make the whole look more natural and unaffected. Had it
been my good fortune to live near you, I should have taken on me the
character of Philo, in the dialogue, which you'll own I could have
supported naturally enough; and you would not have been averse to that
of Cleanthes. I believe, too, we could both of us have kept our tempers
very well; only, you have not reached an absolute philosophical
indifference on these points. What danger can ever come from ingenious
reasoning and inquiry? The worst speculative sceptic ever I knew, was a
much better man than the best superstitious devotee and bigot. I must
inform you, too, that this was the way of thinking of the ancients on
this subject. If a man made a profession of philosophy, whatever his
sect was, they always expected to find more regularity in his life and
manners, than in those of the ignorant and illiterate. There is a
remarkable passage of Appian to this purpose. That historian observes,
that notwithstanding the established prepossession in favour of
learning, yet some philosophers, who have been trusted with absolute
power, have very much abused it; and he instances Critias, the most
violent of the thirty, and Ariston, who governed Athens in the time of
Sylla: but I find, upon inquiry, that Critias was a professed Atheist,
and Ariston an Epicurean, which is little or nothing different. And yet
Appian wonders at their corruption, as much as if they had been Stoics
or Platonists. A modern zealot would have thought that corruption
unavoidable.
"I could wish Cleanthes' argument could be so analyzed, as to be
rendered quite formal and regular. The propensity of the mind towards
it,--unless that propensity were as strong and universal as that to
believe in our senses and experience,--will still, I am afraid, be
esteemed a suspicious foundation. 'Tis here I wish for your assistance;
we must endeavour to prove that this propensity is somewhat different
from our inclination to find our own figures in the clouds, our faces in
the moon, our passions and sentiments even in inanimate matter. Such an
inclination may, and ought to be controlled, and can never be a
legitimate ground of assent.
"The instances I have chosen for Cleanthes are, I hope, tolerably happy,
and the confusion in which I represent the sceptic seems natural,
but--si quid novisti rectius, &c.
"You ask me, '_If the idea of cause and effect is nothing but
vicinity_,' (you should have said constant vicinity, or, regular
conjunction,) I should be glad to know _whence is that farther idea of
causation against which you argue_? This question is pertinent, but I
hope I have answered it; we feel, after the constant conjunction, an
easy transition from one idea to the other, or a connexion in the
imagination; and as it is usual for us to transfer our own feelings to
the objects on which they are dependent, we attach the internal
sentiment to the external objects. If no single instances of cause and
effect appear to have any connexion, but only repeated similar ones, you
will find yourself obliged to have recourse to this theory.
"I am sorry our correspondence should lead us into these abstract
speculations. I have thought, and read, and composed very little on such
questions of late. Morals, Politics, and Literature have employed all my
time; but still the other topics I must think more curious, important,
entertaining, and useful, than any geometry that is deeper than Euclid.
If in order to answer the doubts started, new principles of philosophy
must be laid, are not these doubts themselves very useful? Are they not
preferable to blind, and ignorant assent? I hope I can answer my own
doubts; but if I could not, is it to be wondered at? To give myself
airs, and speak magnificently, might I not observe, that Columbus did
not conquer empires and plant colonies?
"If I have not unravelled the knot so well, in those last papers I sent
you, as perhaps I did in the former, it has not, I assure you, proceeded
from want of good will; but some subjects are easier than others: at
some times one is happier in his researches and inquiries than at
others. Still I have recourse to the _si quid novisti rectius_; not in
order to pay you a compliment, but from a real philosophical doubt and
curiosity.[334:1]
"I do not pay compliments, because I do not desire them. For this
reason, I am very well pleased you speak so coldly of my petition. I
had, however, given orders to have it printed, which perhaps may be
executed, though I believe I had better have let it alone; not because
it will give you offence, but because it will give no entertainment; not
because it may be called profane, but because it may perhaps be
deservedly called dull. To tell the truth, I was always so indifferent
about fortune, and especially now, that I am more advanced in life, and
am a little more at my ease, suited to my extreme frugality, that I
neither fear nor hope any thing from man; and am very indifferent either
about offence or favour. Not only, I would not sacrifice truth and
reason to political views, but scarce even a jest. You may tell me, I
ought to have reversed the order of these points, and put the jest
first: as it is usual for people to be the fondest of their performances
on subjects on which they are least made to excel, and that,
consequently, I would give more to be thought a good droll, than to have
the praises of erudition, and subtilty, and invention.--This malicious
insinuation, I will give no answer to, but proceed with my subject.
"I find, however, I have no more to say on it, but to thank you for
_Strabo_. If the carrier who will deliver this to you do not find you at
home, you will please send the book to his quarters; his name is Thomas
Henderson, the Berwick carrier; he leaves town on the Thursdays, about
the middle of the day; he puts up at James Henderson, stabler, betwixt
the foot of Cant's Close and Blackfriar's Wynd. After you have done with
these papers, please return them by the same carrier; but there is no
hurry; on the contrary the longer you keep them, I shall still believe
you are thinking the more seriously to execute what I desire of you. I
am, dear Sir,
"Yours most sincerely."
"P.S.--If you'll be persuaded to assist me with Cleanthes, I fancy you
need not take matters any higher than part 3d. He allows, indeed, in
part 2d, that all our inference is founded on the similitude of the
works of nature to the usual effects of mind, otherwise they must appear
a mere chaos. The only difficulty is, why the other assimilations do not
weaken the argument; and indeed it would seem from experience and
feeling, that they do not weaken it so much as we might naturally
expect. A theory to solve this would be very acceptable."[336:1]
HUME _to_ GILBERT ELLIOT _of Minto_.
1751.
"DEAR SIR,--I am sorry your keeping these papers has proceeded from
business and avocations, and not from your endeavours to clear up so
difficult an argument. I despair not, however, of getting some
assistance from you; the subject is surely of the greatest importance,
and the views of it so new as to challenge some attention.
"I believe the Philosophical Essays contain every thing of consequence
relating to the understanding, which you would meet with in the
Treatise; and I give you my advice against reading the latter. By
shortening and simplifying the questions, I really render them much more
complete. _Addo dum minuo._ The philosophical principles are the same in
both; but I was carried away by the heat of youth and invention to
publish too precipitately.--So vast an undertaking, planned before I was
one-and-twenty, and composed before twenty-five, must necessarily be
very defective. I have repented my haste a hundred, and a hundred times.
"I return Strabo, whom I have found very judicious and useful. I give
you a great many thanks for your trouble. I am," &c.
Hume's elder brother, John, the laird of Ninewells, was married in 1751;
and the following letter, enlivened by touches of light and even elegant
raillery, scarcely excelled in the writings of Addison, evidently refers
to that event. The plan of life which he sets forth was afterwards
altered, at least in so far as he had then in view a place of residence.
HUME _to_ MRS. DYSART.[337:1]
"_Ninewells, March 19th, 1751._
"DEAR MADAM,--Our friend at last plucked up a resolution, and has
ventured on that dangerous encounter. He went off on Monday morning; and
this is the first action of his life wherein he has engaged himself,
without being able to compute exactly the consequences. But what
arithmetic will serve to fix the proportion between good and bad wives,
and rate the different classes of each? Sir Isaac Newton himself, who
could measure the course of the planets, and weigh the earth as in a
pair of scales,--even he had not algebra enough to reduce that amiable
part of our species to a just equation; and they are the only heavenly
bodies whose orbits are as yet uncertain.
"If you think yourself too grave a matron to have this florid part of
the speech addressed to you, pray lend it to the Collector, and he will
send it to Miss Nancy.
"Since my brother's departure, Katty and I have been computing in our
turn, and the result of our deliberation is, that we are to take up
house in Berwick; where, if arithmetic and frugality don't deceive us,
(and they are pretty certain arts) we shall be able, after providing for
hunger, warmth, and cleanliness, to keep a stock in reserve, which we
may afterwards turn either to the purposes of hoarding, luxury, or
charity. But I have declared beforehand against the first; I can easily
guess which of the other two you and Mr. Dysart will be most favourable
to. But we reject your judgment; for nothing blinds one so much as
inveterate habits.
"My compliments to his Solicitorship.[338:1] Unfortunately I have not a
horse at present to carry my fat carcass, to pay its respects to his
superior obesity. But if he finds travelling requisite either for his
health or the captain's, we shall be glad to entertain him here, as long
as we can do it at another's expense; in hopes we shall soon be able to
do it at our own.
"Pray tell the Solicitor that I have been reading lately, in an old
author called _Strabo_, that in some cities of ancient Gaul, there was a
fixed legal standard established for corpulency; and that the senate
kept a measure, beyond which, if any belly presumed to increase, the
proprietor of that belly was obliged to pay a fine to the public,
proportionable to its rotundity. Ill would it fare with his worship and
I,[339:1] if such a law should pass our parliament; for I am afraid we
are already got beyond the statute.
"I wonder, indeed, no harpy of the treasury has ever thought of this
method of raising money. Taxes on luxury are always most approved of;
and no one will say, that the carrying about a portly belly is of any
use or necessity. 'Tis a mere superfluous ornament; and is a proof, too,
that its proprietor enjoys greater plenty than he puts to a good use;
and, therefore, 'tis fit to reduce him to a level with his
fellow-subjects, by taxes and impositions.
"As the lean people are the most active, unquiet, and ambitious, they
every where govern the world, and may certainly oppress their
antagonists whenever they please. Heaven forbid that Whig and Tory
should ever be abolished; for then the nation might be split into fat
and lean; and our faction, I am afraid, would be in piteous taking. The
only comfort is, if they oppressed us very much, we should at last
change sides with them.
"Besides, who knows if a tax were imposed on fatness, but some jealous
divine might pretend that the church was in danger.
"I cannot but bless the memory of Julius Cæsar, for the great esteem he
expressed for fat men, and his aversion to lean ones. All the world
allows, that that emperor was the greatest genius that ever was, and
the greatest judge of mankind.
"But I should ask your pardon, dear madam, for this long dissertation on
fatness and leanness, in which you are no way concerned; for you are
neither fat nor lean, and may indeed be denominated an arrant trimmer.
But this letter may all be read to the Solicitor; for it contains
nothing that need be a secret to him. On the contrary, I hope he will
profit by the example; and, were I near him, I should endeavour to prove
as good an encourager as in this other instance. What can the man be
afraid of? The Mayor of London had more courage, who defied the
hare.[340:1]
"But I am resolved some time to conclude, by putting a grave epilogue to
a farce, and telling you a real serious truth, that I am, with great
esteem, dear madam, your most obedient humble servant.[340:2]
"P.S. Pray let the Solicitor tell Frank, that he is a bad
correspondent--the only way in which he can be a bad one, by his
silence."
We find, through the whole of his acts and written thoughts before his
return from the embassy to Turin, the indications of an earnest wish to
possess the means of independent livelihood, suitable to one belonging
to the middle classes of life. Great wealth or ornamental rank he seems
never to have desired: but the circumstance of his having, in the year
1748, achieved the means of independence through his official
emoluments, seems to have taken so strong a hold of his mind, that
nearly thirty years afterwards, in writing his autobiography, he speaks
with exultation of his having been then in possession of £1000. The
position of the man in comfortable circumstances, equally removed from
the dread of want, and the uneasy pressure of superfluous wealth,
appears always to have presented itself as the most desirable fate
which, in mere pecuniary matters, fortune could have in store for him;
and no commentary on the sacred text has perhaps better illustrated its
application to the conduct and feelings of mankind, than his adaptation
of Agur's prayer to the middle station in life, at a time when he was
far from having realized that happy mediocrity of fortune, of which he
gives so pleasing a picture.
Agur's prayer is sufficiently noted--"Two things have I
required of thee; deny me them not before I die: remove far
from me vanity and lies; give me neither poverty nor riches;
feed me with food convenient for me, lest I be full and deny
thee, and say, who is the Lord? or lest I be poor, and steal,
and take the name of my God in vain."--The middle station is
here justly recommended, as affording the fullest security for
virtue; and I may also add, that it gives opportunity for the
most ample exercise of it, and furnishes employment for every
good quality which we can possibly be possessed of. Those who
are placed among the lower ranks of men, have little
opportunity of exerting any other virtue besides those of
patience, resignation, industry, and integrity. Those who are
advanced into the higher stations, have full employment for
their generosity, humanity, affability, and charity. When a
man lies betwixt these two extremes, he can exert the former
virtues towards his superiors, and the latter towards his
inferiors. Every moral quality which the human soul is
susceptible of, may have its turn, and be called up to action;
and a man may, after this manner, be much more certain of his
progress in virtue, than where his good qualities lie dormant,
and without employment.[341:1]
The following letter, of a somewhat later date, gives a view of his
definitive intentions.
HUME _to_ MICHAEL RAMSAY.
"_Ninewells, 22d June, 1751._
"DEAR MICHAEL,--I cannot sufficiently express my sense of your kind
letter. The concern you take in your friends is so warm, even after so
long absence, and such frequent interruptions as our commerce has
unhappily met with of late years, that the most recent familiarity of
others can seldom equal it. I might perhaps pretend, as well as others,
to complain of fortune; but I do not, and should condemn myself as
unreasonable if I did. While interest remains as at present, I have £50
a-year, a hundred pounds worth of books, great store of linens and fine
clothes, and near £100 in my pocket; along with order, frugality, a
strong spirit of independency, good health, a contented humour, and an
unabating love of study. In these circumstances I must esteem myself one
of the happy and fortunate; and so far from being willing to draw my
ticket over again in the lottery of life, there are very few prizes with
which I would make an exchange. After some deliberation, I am resolved
to settle in Edinburgh, and hope I shall be able with these revenues to
say with Horace--
Est bona librorum et provisae frugis in annum
Copia.
Besides other reasons which determine me to this resolution, I would not
go too far away from my sister, who thinks she will soon follow me; and
in that case, we shall probably take up house either in Edinburgh, or
the neighbourhood. Our sister-in-law behaves well, and seems very
desirous we should both stay. . . . . . . And as she (my sister) can
join £30 a-year to my stock, and brings an equal love of order and
frugality, we doubt not to make our revenues answer. Dr. Clephane, who
has taken up house, is so kind as to offer me a room in it; and two
friends in Edinburgh have made me the same offer. But having nothing to
ask or solicit at London, I would not remove to so expensive a place;
and am resolved to keep clear of all obligations and dependencies, even
on those I love the most."[343:1]
In fulfilment of the design thus announced, he tells us, in his "own
life," "In 1751, I removed from the country to the town, the true scene
for a man of letters." We find, from the dating of his letters, that
Hume's residence in Edinburgh was for a year or two in "Riddell's Land,"
and that it was afterwards in "Jack's Land." Since the plan of numbering
the houses in each street extended to the Scottish capital, these names
have no longer been in general use; but I find that the former applied
to an edifice in the Lawnmarket, near the head of the West Bow, and that
the latter was a tenement in the Canongate, right opposite to a house in
which Smollet occasionally resided with his sister. The term "Land"
applied to one of those edifices--some of them ten or twelve stories
high,--in which the citizens of Edinburgh, pressed upwards as it were by
the increase of the population within a narrow circuit of walls, made
stair-cases supply the place of streets, and erected perpendicular
thoroughfares. A single floor of one of these edifices was, a century
ago, sufficient to accommodate the family of a Scottish nobleman; and
we may be certain, that a very small "Flat" would suit the economical
establishment of Hume.
In 1751, appeared the "Inquiry concerning the Principles of
Morals,"[344:1] the full development, so far as it was made by Hume, of
the utilitarian system. The leading principle kept in view throughout
this work, is, that its tendency to be useful to mankind at large, is
the proper criterion of the propriety of any action, or the justness of
any ethical opinion. In this spirit he examines many of the social
virtues, and shows that it is their usefulness to mankind that gives
them a claim to sympathy, and a title to be included in the list of
virtues. The defects of this exposition of the utilitarian system, are
marked by the manner in which it was critically attacked. In 1753 a
controversial examination of it was made, with temper and ability, by
James Balfour of Pilrig,[344:2] who in 1754 succeeded to the chair, in
the university of Edinburgh, which Hume had been desirous of
filling.[345:1] Mr. Balfour's great argument is the universality of the
admission by mankind, in some shape or other, of the leading cardinal
virtues, and the unhesitating adoption and practice of them by men on
whom the utilitarian theory never dawned, and who are unconscious that
their isolated acts are the fulfilment of any general or uniform law.
Mr. Balfour argued that we must thus look to something else than
utility, as the criterion of moral right and wrong. But a supporter of
the utilitarian system, as it has been more fully developed in later
days, would probably only take from Mr. Balfour's argument a hint to
enlarge the scope of Hume's investigations. To the inquiry, how far
utility is the proper end of human conduct, he would add the inquiry,
how far the theory has been practically adopted by mankind at large.
Though Bacon first laid down the broad rule of unvarying induction from
experiment, many experiments were made, and many inductions derived from
them, before he saw the light; and so before the utilitarian theory was
first formally suggested--as it appears to have been by Aristotle in his
Nicomachean Ethics--utility may frequently have been a rule of action.
It does not necessarily follow, that because a practice is universal,
because it is adopted "by saint, by savage, and by sage," it is
therefore not the dictate of utility, provided it be admitted that
utility was an influencing motive with men before the days of Hume. The
followers of established customs may often be blind; but if we hunt back
a practice to its first institution, we may find that the leaders were
quick-sighted, and kept utility in view, so far as the state of things
they had to deal with permitted. A minute inquiry into national
prejudices and customs frequently surprises the speculative philosopher,
by developing these practices and opinions of the vulgar and illiterate,
as the fruit of great knowledge and forethought. Exhibiting, in their
full extravagance, the contrasts between different codes of morality,
was one of Hume's literary recreations; and it might have been worth his
while to have inquired, had it occurred to him, how much of his own
favourite utilitarian principle is common to all, or at least to many,
of the systems he has thus contrasted with each other.
It was a consequence, perhaps, of the limited extent to which he had
carried the utilitarian theory, that Hume was charged with having left
no distinct line between talent and virtue. By making it seem as if he
held that each man was virtuous according as he did good to mankind at
large, and vicious in as far as he failed in accomplishing this end, he
made way for the argument, that no man can rise high in virtue, unless
he also rise high in intellectual gifts; since, without possessing the
latter, he is not capable of deciding what actions are, and what are
not, conducive to the good of the human race. Many sentiments expressed
in the Inquiry appeared to justify this charge.[347:1] There was thus no
merit assigned to what is called good intention; and no ground for
extending the just approbation of mankind to those who have never
attempted to frame a code of morality to themselves, but who, following
the track of established opinions, or the rules laid down by some of the
many leaders of the human race, believe that, by a steadfast and
disinterested pursuit of their adopted course, they are doing that which
is right in the eye of God and man. It is certain, however, that in this
way many a man may be pursuing a line of conduct conducive to the good
of his fellow-creatures, without knowing that his actions have that
ultimate end. While he follows the rules that have been laid down for
him, his code of morality may be as far superior to that of his clever
and aspiring neighbour, who has fabricated a system for himself, as the
intelligence of the leader, followed by the one, is greater than the
self-sufficient wisdom of the other. Hence multitudes in the humblest
classes of society, in any well regulated community of modern Europe,
will be found, almost blindly, following a code of morality as much
above what the genius either of Socrates or Cicero could devise, as the
order of the universe is superior to the greatest efforts of man's
artificial skill.
"Yon cottager, who weaves at her own door,
Pillow and bobbins all her little store;--
Content though mean, and cheerful if not gay,
Shuffling her threads about the livelong day,
Just earns a scanty pittance; and at night
Lies down secure,--her heart and pocket light.
She, for her humble sphere by nature fit,
Has little understanding, and no wit;
Receives no praise--but, though her lot be such,
Toilsome and indigent, she renders much;
Just knows, and knows no more, her Bible true--
A truth the brilliant Frenchman never knew;
And in that charter reads, with sparkling eyes,
Her title to a treasure in the skies.
Oh, happy peasant! oh, unhappy bard!
His the mere tinsel, hers the rich reward;
He, praised, perhaps, for ages yet to come;
She never heard of half a mile from home;
He, lost in errors his vain heart prefers,
_She, safe in the simplicity of hers_."
It was, perhaps, from a like want of inquiry into the full extent of the
system, that his theory of utility encountered the charge of being a
mere system of "expediency," which estimated actions according as they
accomplished what appeared at the moment to be good or evil, without any
regard to their ultimate consequences. He certainly left for Bentham the
task of making a material addition to the utilitarian theory, by
applying it to the secondary effects of actions. Thus, according to
Bentham's view, when a successful highway robbery is committed, the
direct evil done to the victim is but a part of the mischief
accomplished. The secondary effects have an operation, if not so deep,
yet very widely spread, in creating terror, anxiety, and distrust on the
part of honest people, and emboldening the wicked to the perpetration of
crimes. On the same principle a good measure must not be carried through
the legislature by corrupt means; because the example so set, will, in
the end, though not perhaps till the generation benefited by the measure
has passed away, produce more bad measures than good, by lowering the
tone of political morality. Had Hume kept in view these secondary
effects, he never would have vindicated suicide, thought sudden death an
occurrence rather fortunate than otherwise, or used expressions from
which an opponent could with any plausibility infer, that, under any
circumstances, he held strict female chastity in light esteem. But he
was always careless about the offensive application of his principles;
forgetting that if there be any thing in a set of opinions calculated
deeply and permanently to outrage the feelings of mankind, the
probability at least is, that they have something about them
unsound,--that the mass of the public are right, and the solitary
philosopher wrong.
Hume's account, in his "own life," of this period of his literary
history, is contained in the following paragraph, in which, as in some
other instances, it will be seen that his memory has not accurately
retained the chronological sequence of his works.
"In 1752, were published at Edinburgh, where I then lived, my 'Political
Discourses,' the only work of mine that was successful on the first
publication. It was well received abroad and at home. In the same year
was published at London, my 'Inquiry concerning the Principles of
Morals;' which, in my own opinion, (who ought not to judge on that
subject,) is of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary,
incomparably the best. It came unnoticed and unobserved into the world."
Before noticing the "Political Discourses," it is necessary to state,
that during this winter of 1751, we find Hume again attempting to obtain
an academic chair, and again disappointed. Adam Smith, having been
Professor of Logic in the university of Glasgow, succeeded to the chair
of Moral Philosophy in November 1751, on the death of Professor Craigie,
its former occupant. That Hume used considerable exertions to be
appointed Smith's successor, is attested by some incidental passages in
his correspondence, and particularly by the following letter to Dr.
Cullen.
"_Edinburgh, 21st January, 1752._
"SIR,--The part which you have acted in the late project for my election
into your college, gave me so much pleasure, that I would do myself the
greatest violence did I not take every opportunity of expressing my most
lively sense of it. We have failed, and are thereby deprived of great
opportunities of cultivating that friendship, which had so happily
commenced by your zeal for my interests. But I hope other opportunities
will offer; and I assure you, that nothing will give me greater pleasure
than an intimacy with a person of your merit. You must even allow me to
count upon the same privilege of friendship, as if I had enjoyed the
happiness of a longer correspondence and familiarity with you; for as it
is a common observation, that the conferring favours on another is the
surest method of attaching us to him, I must, by this rule, consider you
as a person to whom my interests can never be altogether indifferent.
Whatever the reverend gentlemen may say of my religion, I hope I have as
much morality as to retain a grateful sentiment of your favours, and as
much sense as to know whose friendship will give greatest honour and
advantage to me. I am," &c.
The distinguished scientific man, in the course of whose researches this
curious literary incident was divulged, informs us that Burke was also a
candidate for this chair,[351:1] and that the successful competitor was
a Mr. Clow. Concerning this fortunate person literary history is silent;
but he has acquired a curious title to fame, from the greatness of the
man to whom he succeeded, and of those over whom he was triumphant.
It is not, perhaps, to be regretted, that Hume failed in both his
attempts to obtain a professor's chair. He was not of the stuff that
satisfactory teachers of youth are made of. Although he was beyond all
doubt an able man of business, in matters sufficiently important to
command his earnest attention, yet it is pretty clear that he had
acquired the outward manner of an absent, good-natured man, unconscious
of much that was going on around him; and that he would have thus
afforded a butt to the mischief and raillery of his pupils, from which
all the lustre of his philosophical reputation would not have protected
him.
Discoverers do not make, in ordinary circumstances, the best instructors
of youth, because their minds are often too full of the fermentation of
their own original ideas and partly developed systems, to possess the
coolness and clearness necessary for conveying a distinct view of the
laws and elements of an established system. But if this may be an
incidental inconvenience in one whose discoveries are but extensions of
admitted doctrines, the revolutionist who is endeavouring to pull to
pieces what has been taught for ages within the same walls, and to erect
a new system in its stead, can scarcely ever be a satisfactory
instructor of any considerable number of young men. The teacher of the
moral department of science especially must be, to a certain extent, a
conformist; if he be not, what is taught in the class-room will be
forgotten or contradicted in the closet. The teachers of youth are
themselves not less irascible and sometimes not less prejudiced than
other mortals. They have their hatreds and partisanships, often
productive of acrimonious controversy; but when there is something like
a unity of opinion in the systems of those who teach the same, or like
subjects, these superficial discussions produce no evil fruit. Hume
would have been at peace with all who would have let his unobtrusive
spirit alone; but he would probably have quietly proceeded to inculcate
doctrines to which most of his fellow-labourers were strongly averse;
and that, perhaps, without knowing or feeling that he was in any way
departing from the simple routine of duties which the public expected of
him. And thus he would probably have created in the midst of the rising
youth of the day, an isolated circle of disciples, taught to despise the
acquirements and opinions of their contemporaries, as these
contemporaries held theirs in abhorrence.[353:1]
This was an important epoch in Hume's literary history; in 1751, he
produced the work which he himself considered the most meritorious of
all his efforts; in 1752, he published that which obtained the largest
amount of contemporary popularity, the "Political Discourses."[354:1]
After a series of literary disappointments, borne with the spirit of one
who felt within him the real powers of an original thinker and an
agreeable writer, and the assurance that the world would some day
acknowledge the sterling greatness of his qualifications, he now at last
presented them in a form, in which they received the ready homage of the
public. These Discourses are in truth the cradle of political economy;
and, much as that science has been investigated and expounded in later
times, these earliest, shortest, and simplest developments of its
principles are still read with delight even by those who are masters of
all the literature of this great subject.[354:2] But they possess a
quality which more elaborate economists have striven after in vain, in
being a pleasing object of study not only to the initiated but to the
ordinary popular reader, and of being admitted as just and true by many
who cannot or who will not understand the views of later writers on
political economy.[355:1] They have thus the rarely conjoined merit,
that, as they were the first to direct the way to the true sources of
this department of knowledge, those who have gone farther, instead of
superseding them, have in the general case confirmed their accuracy.
Political economy is a science of which the advanced extremities are the
subject of debate and doubt, while the older doctrines are admitted by
all as firm and established truths. It may be slippery ground, but it is
not a tread-mill, and no step taken has ever to be entirely retraced. It
is owing to this characteristic of the science that those who oppose the
doctrines of modern economists do not think of denying those of David
Hume; and thus, while in these essays the economist finds some of the
most important doctrines of his peculiar subject set forth with a
clearness and elegance with which he dare not attempt to compete, the
ordinary reader, who has a distaste of new doctrines and innovating
theories, awards them the respect due to old established opinion.
That they should have been, with all their innovation on received
opinions, and their startling novelty, so popular in their own age, is
also a matter which has its peculiar explanation. The dread of
innovation, simply as change, and without reference to the interests it
may affect, sprung up in later times, a child of the French revolution.
Before that event some men were republican or constitutional in their
views, and declared war against all changes which tended to throw power
into the hands of the monarch. Others were monarchical, and opposed to
the extension of popular rights. But if an alteration were suggested
which did not affect these fundamental principles and opinions, it was
welcomed with liberal courtesy, examined, and adopted or rejected on its
own merits. Hence both Hume and Smith, writing in bold denunciation of
all the old cherished prejudices in matters of commerce, instead of
being met with a storm of reproach, as any one who should publish so
many original views in the present day would be, at once received a fair
hearing and a just appreciation.[356:1]
Thus there was a period during which innovations, however bold or
extensive, received a favourable hearing, and in which the literature
both of England and of France was daily giving publicity to new theories
embodying sweeping alterations of social systems. In this work the two
countries presented their national characteristics. The English writers
kept always in view the question how far there would be a vital
principle remaining in society after the diseased part was removed; how
far there was reason to suppose that the small quantity of good done to
the public by any irrational system, which at the same time did much
evil, might be accomplished after its abolition. The French were
indiscriminate in their war against old received opinions, and offered
nothing to fill their place when they were gone; and hence in some
measure followed results which have made change and innovation words of
dread throughout a great part of society.
Of the inquiries through which Hume brought together the materials for
these essays, the reader will have found a specimen in the notes, or
_adversaria_ quoted above.[357:1] A comparison of these fragments of the
raw material, with the finished result, develops this marked feature in
Hume's method of working, that in the way to a short proposition, he has
often read and thought at great length. The simplicity and unity of his
writings were of more importance to him than the appearance of
elaboration; and where others would be scattering multitudinous
statements and authorities, he is content with the simple embodiment of
results, conscious that inquiry will confirm in the reader's mind the
justness of what he lays down. In some respects we can watch the
progress of Hume's mind in connexion with these subjects; for in his
allusions to commercial matters in his earlier works, he uses the common
phraseology, such as "balance of trade," in a manner indicating an
adherence to those ordinary fallacies of the day, which, when he came to
examine them in his essays on "commerce," "money," "interest," "the
balance of trade," "taxes," and "public credit," he extensively
repudiated. His examination of the nature and value of money as a medium
of exchange, is probably the best and simplest that, even down to this
day, can be found. His theory, so far as it goes, has hardly ever been
questioned; and indeed at present it may be said, that beyond it we know
little with certainty, and that its author had at once discovered the
limits at which full and satisfactory knowledge was, for nearly a
century, to rest.[358:1] He shows that money is not in itself property
or value; that it is a mere representative, which, if cheap or dear in
its material, is just, in the same ratio, a cheap or a dear method of
accomplishing a purpose. That if a community could conduct its
transactions with a small quantity of money as well as with a large, it
would, so far from being poorer, be the richer by so much as the
superabundant money had cost. He examines those simple laws which, when
there is no disturbing influence, have a tendency to equalize the
distribution of the precious metals, through the cheapness of labour and
commodities where they are scarce, the nominal enhancement where they
are abundant. He notices with great clearness and precision the
respective effects upon the community of a state of increase, and of a
state of diminution of the available currency of a country. But he
enters on few of those intricate monetary questions which are now so
frequently the subject of discussion. Of inquiries into the causes which
affect the quantity of money in a country, the moving influences from
which arise gluts, drains, stagnations, and all the mysteries of
finance, he shows us that he felt diffident; and on these matters, how
little is the quantity of full satisfactory undisputed knowledge which
we yet possess!
Indeed, one of the great merits of Hume's Essays on Political Economy
is, that he knows when he is getting out of his depth, and does not
conceal his position. With many writers on this subject, the point where
clear and satisfactory inquiry ends, is that where dogmatism begins; but
Hume stops at that point, sees and admits the difficulty, and
acknowledges that he can go no farther with safety.
Among these essays there is one which, like the Oceana of Harrington,
though on a smaller scale, is an attempt to construct a system of
polity. It is called "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth." The system so put
together is liable to practical objections at every step, and is utterly
destitute of that sagacious applicability to the transactions of real
business, for which the efforts in hypothetical legislation by Bentham
are distinguished.[361:1]
Another essay of a different character is conspicuous for the vast
extent of the learning and research which must have been expended in
bringing together its crowd of apt illustrations,--that on "The
Populousness of Ancient Nations." To afford a choice of so many
applicable facts, directly bearing on the point, how wide must have been
the research, how extensive the rejection of such fruit of that
research, as did not answer his purpose! In the perusal of this essay
one is inclined to regret that Hume afterwards made a portion of modern
Europe the object of his historical labours, instead of taking up some
department of the history of classical antiquity. The full blown lustre
of Greek and Roman greatness had far more of his sympathy than the
history of his own countrymen, and their slow progress from barbarism to
civilisation. The materials were nearly all confined to the great
spirits of antiquity, with whom he delighted to hold converse, instead
of involving that heap of documentary matter with which the historian of
Britain must grapple; acts of parliament, journals, writs, legal
documents, &c.--all things which his soul abhorred. In such a field he
might have escaped the imputation of not being a full and fair
investigator; and he would, at all events, have avoided the reproach
thrown on him by the prying antiquary, who, by the light of newly
discovered documents, could charge him with having neglected that of
which he did not, and could not, know the existence.[364:1]
In a letter to Henry Home in 1748, we find Hume mentioning an essay on
the Protestant Succession, as one which he was to include in the edition
of his "Essays Moral and Political," then preparing for the
press.[365:1] He speaks of people having endeavoured to divert him from
this publication, as one likely to be injurious to him as an official
man. Perhaps he was prevailed on to adopt the view of his prudent
friends, for this essay is not among the "Essays Moral and Political,"
but forms one of the volume of Discourses, among which it is somewhat
inharmoniously placed, as it is the only one which bears a reference to
the current internal party politics of the day.
The "Political Discourses" introduced Hume to the literature of the
continent. The works of Quesnay, Rivière, Mirabeau, Raynal, and Turgot,
had not yet appeared, but the public mind of France had been opened for
novel doctrines by the bold appeal of Vauban,[365:2] and by the curious
and original inquiries of Montesquieu. The Discourses appear to have
been first translated by Eléazer Mauvillon, a native of Provence, and
private secretary to Frederic Augustus, King of Poland, who published
his translation in 1753.[365:3] Another, and better known translation,
by the Abbé Le Blanc, was published in 1754.[365:4] This Abbé had spent
some time in England, and wrote a work on his experiences in Britain,
called "Lettres sur les Anglois." He was the author also of a tragedy
called Aben Säid, which seems to have now lost any fame it ever
acquired. His translations from Hume were, however, highly popular, that
of the Discourses passing through several editions; and we shall find
that they obtained the approbation of Hume himself. The Abbé, in a
letter to the author, gives an account of the reception of the
translation,[366:1] the colour of which he may be supposed to have
enriched, as regarding a matter in which he felt himself to be _pars
magna_. He prophesies that it will produce a like sensation to that
caused by the Esprit des Loix, and he finds his prophecy fulfilled. He
states, that it is not only read with avidity, but that it has given
rise to a multitude of other works. There can be no doubt, indeed, that
as no Frenchman had previously approached the subject of political
economy with a philosophical pen, this little book was a main
instrument, either by causing assent or provoking controversy, in
producing the host of French works on political economy, published
between the time of its translation, and the publication of Smith's
"Wealth of Nations," in 1776.[366:2] The work of the elder Mirabeau in
particular--L'Ami des Hommes, was in a great measure a controversial
examination of Hume's opinions on population.
FOOTNOTES:
[320:1] Stewart's Philosophy of the Human Mind, and Preliminary
Dissertation to the Encyclopædia Britannica.
[320:2] In the following pages these papers will be cited as the Minto
MSS.
[320:3] His grandfather distinguished himself by his resolute and
skilful defence of William Veitch, one of the nonconforming clergy, who
suffered in the persecutions of the reign of Charles II. Elliot acting
as the persecuted man's agent, made an appeal to the feelings of the
English statesmen, on the barbarity of the measures of their Scots
colleagues; and was so far successful, that the sentence of death
pronounced against Veitch, was commuted to banishment. He thenceforth
became, of course, a marked man, and an act of forfeiture passed against
him in 1685, as an accessory in Argyle's rising. He afterwards obtained
a remission of his sentence, and on 22d November, 1688, he was received
as a member of the faculty of advocates. He was created a baronet in
1700, and on 25th July, 1705, was raised to the bench. (_Brunton and
Haig's account of the Senators of the College of Justice._) In Dr.
M'Crie's curious "Memoirs of Mr. William Veitch," (p. 99) it is stated,
that when the evil days were passed, and the condemned nonconformist was
parish minister of Dumfries, he was occasionally visited by the judge,
when the following conversation passed between them,--"Ah Willie,
Willie, had it no' been for me, the pyets had been pyken your pate on
the Nether-bow Port;" to which the retort was, "Ah Gibbie, Gibbie, had
it no' been for me, ye would ha'e been yet writing papers for a plack
the page."
This Sir Gilbert's son, and the father of Hume's correspondent, was
raised to the bench on 4th June, 1726, and became Lord Justice Clerk on
3d May, 1703. He died on 16th April, 1766.
[321:1] He was chosen member for the county of Selkirk in 1754, and
1762, and for Roxburghshire in 1765, 1768, and 1774. He succeeded to the
baronetcy on his father's death in 1766. He was made a lord of the
admiralty in 1756, treasurer of the chamber in 1762, keeper of the
signet in Scotland in 1767, and treasurer of the navy in 1770. He died
in 1777. _Collins' Peerage. Beatson's Parliamentary Register._
[322:1] Minto MS.
[322:2] See as instances, Washington Irving's "Salmagundi," and Morier's
"Hajji Baba."
[324:1] Discours sur Théophraste, where there are some bitter and just
remarks on the Parisian manners of La Bruyere's day, as an appropriate
introduction to the exhibition of the follies of the Athenians.
[324:2] Scroll, Minto MSS.
[325:1] "La Perpétuité de la Foi, de l'Eglise Catholique touchant
L'Eucharistie," 3 vols. 4to, 1669-1676. A smaller work published by the
same author in 1664, was called "La Petite Perpétuité." Its author,
Pierre Nicole, one of the illustrious recluses of the Port Royal, was
more efficient as a polemical supporter of the principles of his church,
than as a practical administrator of its authority. An amusing story is
told of his unguarded habits and absence of mind. A lady had brought
under his notice, as her spiritual adviser, a matter of extreme
delicacy, with which he felt it difficult to deal. Seeing approach at
the moment Father Fouquet, whom he knew to have much judgment and
experience in such matters, he cried out--"Ah, here comes a man who can
solve the difficulty," and, running to meet him, told the whole case,
loudly and energetically. The feelings of the fair penitent may be
imagined.
[327:1] Probably "The Bellman's Petition," mentioned above.
[327:2] Minto MSS.
[328:1] In the MSS. R.S.E.
[331:1] The late Rev. Dr. Morehead of St. Paul's Chapel in Edinburgh,
who was revered as a minister, and respected as a scholar and
philosopher, published in 1830, "Dialogues on Natural and Revealed
Religion," a pleasing continuation of the work we have just been
considering, in which the speakers are made to approach a conclusion
nearer to the reverend author's own opinions, than he found them to be
when he had read to the end of Hume's little book. From a note by Dr.
Morehead, I am tempted to extract the following passage: "Mr. Hume was
conscious of his own power, probably while his countrymen were making
him a theme of their uncouth derision; and he seems to have had a
prescience that he had not yet gathered all his fame. . . . . . . I am
much mistaken if the name of this profound thinker does not yet receive
the encomiastic epithets of a _grateful_ posterity; and if, when his
errors have passed away, he does not yet come to be regarded as the
philosopher who has made the most penetrating and successful researches
in the intricate science of human nature. He is a cool anatomist, who
has dissected it throughout every fibre and nerve; and he may be partly
pardoned, perhaps, if, in this sort of remorseless operation, he has too
much lost sight of the principle of its moral and intellectual life."
The Dialogues on Natural Religion seem to have taken a firm hold of Dr.
Morehead's mind. He left behind him a farther continuation, called
"Philosophical Dialogues," in which he beautifully represented the Philo
of the original, revising his old opinions amidst such a serene old age,
as the writer was then himself enjoying. This little work was published
after its author's death, by a distinguished surviving friend, who has
probably done more towards the propagation of Christian philosophy, than
any other living writer of the English language.
[334:1] Down to this point, the letter is printed in Dugald Stewart's
Preliminary Dissertation to The Encyclopædia Britannica, Note ccc.
[336:1] Minto MSS. In this collection there is a scroll of a letter
written by Mr. Elliot to Hume, returning the manuscripts to which the
correspondence refers. It has been published in the notes (ccc,) to
Dugald Stewart's Preliminary Dissertation. It is not only a criticism of
the Dialogues on Natural Religion, but an examination of Hume's general
theory of impressions and ideas, worthy of the perusal of all who take
interest in these inquiries. It is of considerable length, and the
temptation to print it along with Hume's letter, was only overcome by
the circumstance that it is to be found in a work widely circulated, and
that the disposable space in this book may be more economically devoted
to some letters of Sir Gilbert Elliot which are not to be found
elsewhere.
[337:1] Mrs. Dysart of Eccles, "a much valued relation of Hume,"
according to Mackenzie's Account of the Life of Home, p. 104.
[338:1] Alexander Home, Solicitor-general for Scotland.--_Mackenzie._
[339:1] Sic.
[340:1] In allusion to that mayor who, on his first introduction to
field sports, hearing a cry that the hare was coming, exclaimed, in a
fit of magnanimous courage, "Let him come, in God's name; I fear him
not!"
[340:2] Mackenzie's Home, p. 104. The original is in the MSS. R.S.E.
[341:1] Essays Moral and Political, published in 1741.
[343:1] From a copy transmitted by Ramsay's nephew to Baron Hume, in the
MSS. R.S.E. The blank denoted above is in the copy.
[344:1] London: 8vo, printed for A. Millar. It is in the book list of
the _Gentleman's Magazine_, for December.
[344:2] "A Delineation of the Nature and Obligation of Morality, with
Reflections upon Mr. Hume's book, entitled an 'Inquiry concerning the
Principles of Morals.'"
On the publication of this book, Hume wrote the following letter,
addressed "To the Author of the Delineation of the Nature and
Obligations of Morality," and left it with the bookseller.
"SIR,--When I write you, I know not to whom I am addressing myself: I
only know he is one who has done me a great deal of honour, and to whose
civilities I am obliged. If we be strangers, I beg we may be acquainted,
as soon as you think proper to discover yourself: if we be acquainted
already, I beg we may be friends: if friends, I beg we may be more so.
Our connexion with each other as men of letters, is greater than our
difference as adhering to different sects or systems. Let us revive the
happy times, when Atticus and Cassius the epicureans, Cicero the
academic, and Brutus the stoic, could all of them live in unreserved
friendship together, and were insensible to all those distinctions,
except so far as they furnished agreeable matter to discourse and
conversation. Perhaps you are a young man, and being full of those
sublime ideas, which you have so well expressed, think there can be no
virtue upon a more confined system. I am not an old one; but, being of a
cool temperament, have always found, that more simple views were
sufficient to make me act in a reasonable manner; νηθε, και μἑμνησο
ἀπιστειν; in this faith have I lived, and hope to die.
"Your civilities to me so much overbalance your severities, that I
should be ungrateful to take notice of some expressions which, in the
heat of composition, have dropped from your pen. I must only complain of
you a little for ascribing to me the sentiments, which I have put into
the mouth of the Sceptic in the "Dialogue." I have surely endeavoured to
refute the sceptic, with all the force of which I am master; and my
refutation must be allowed sincere, because drawn from the capital
principles of my system. But you impute to me both the sentiments of the
sceptic, and the sentiments of his antagonist, which I can never admit
of. In every dialogue no more than one person can be supposed to
represent the author.
"Your severity on one head, that of chastity, is so great, and I am so
little conscious of having given any just occasion to it, that it has
afforded me a hint to form a conjecture, perhaps ill-grounded,
concerning your person.
"I hope to steal a little leisure from my other occupations, in order to
defend my philosophy against your attacks. If I have occasion to give a
new edition of the work, which you have honoured with an answer, I shall
make great advantage of your remarks, and hope to obviate some of your
criticisms.
"Your style is elegant, and full of agreeable imagery. In some few
places it does not fully come up to my ideas of purity and correctness.
I suppose mine falls still further short of your ideas. In this respect,
we may certainly be of use to each other. With regard to our
philosophical systems, I suppose we are both so fixed, that there is no
hope of any conversions betwixt us; and for my part, I doubt not but we
shall both do as well to remain as we are.
"I am, &c.
"_Edinburgh, March 15, 1753._"
[345:1] It is stated in Ritchie's "Account of the Life and Writings of
Hume," from which the above letter is taken, and in some works of
reference, which appear to have depended on the authority of that book,
that Hume was a competitor with Balfour for the chair. This statement
has probably arisen out of some misapprehension as to his previous
competition for the chair.
[347:1] See the dawning of this view in his correspondence with
Hutcheson, _supra_, p. 112. An essay, entitled "Of some Verbal
Disputes," published in the later editions of the work now under
consideration, contains some curious elucidations of it.
[351:1] Thomson--Life of Cullen, 72-73--where the above letter is first
printed. Dr. Thomson tells me, that the evidence of Burke having been a
candidate is merely traditional, but that it was enough to satisfy his
own mind. In the "Outlines of Philosophical Education," by Professor
Jardine, who afterwards filled the same chair, there is this passage,
(p. 21:) "Burke, whose genius led him afterwards to shine in a more
exalted sphere, was thought of by some of the electors as a proper
person to fill it. He did not, however, actually come forward as a
candidate."
[353:1] Dr. Thomson says, "It might afford curious matter of speculation
to conjecture what effect the appointment of Mr. Hume, or of Mr. Burke,
to the chair of logic in Glasgow, would have had upon the character of
that university, or upon the metaphysical, moral, and political
inquiries of the age in which they lived; and what consequences were
likely to have resulted from the influence which the peculiar genius and
talents of either of these great men, had they been exerted in that
sphere, must necessarily have had in forming the minds of such of their
pupils as were to be afterwards employed in the pursuits of science, or
the conduct and regulation of human affairs. It seems difficult to
conceive how, as instructors of youth, they could either of them,
without a considerable modification of their opinions, have taught
philosophy upon the sceptical or the Berkeleian systems which they had
respectively adopted; while the strict purity of their moral characters,
and the great reverence which they both entertained for established
institutions, give the fullest assurance, that, had either of them been
appointed to the chair of logic, their academical duties would have been
executed with an unceasing regard to the improvement of their pupils,
and to the reputation of the society into which they had been admitted."
Life of Cullen, p. 73.
Smith, in a letter to Dr. Cullen, says, "I should prefer David Hume to
any man for a colleague; but I am afraid the public would not be of my
opinion; and the interest of the society will oblige us to have some
regard to the opinion of the public. If the event, however, we are
afraid of should happen, we can see how the public receives it. From the
particular knowledge I have of Mr. Elliot's sentiments, I am pretty
certain Mr. Lindsay must have proposed it to him, not he to Mr.
Lindsay." Ib. p. 606.
[354:1] Edinburgh, 1752, 8vo. Printed for Kincaid and Donaldson. It is
in the _Gentleman's Magazine_ list of books for February.
[354:2] Lord Brougham says, "Of the 'Political Discourses' it would be
difficult to speak in terms of too great commendation. They combine
almost every excellence which can belong to such a performance. The
reasoning is clear, and unencumbered with more words or more
illustrations than are necessary for bringing out the doctrine. The
learning is extensive, accurate, and profound, not only as to systems of
philosophy, but as to history, whether modern or ancient. The subjects
are most happily chosen; the language is elegant, precise, and vigorous;
and so admirably are the topics selected, that there is as little of
dryness in these fine essays as if the subject were not scientific; and
we rise from their perusal scarce able to believe that it is a work of
philosophy we have been reading, having all the while thought it a book
of curiosity and entertainment. The great merit, however, of these
Discourses, is their originality, and the new system of politics and
political economy which they unfold. Mr. Hume is, beyond all doubt, the
author of the modern doctrines which now rule the world of science,
which are to a great extent the guide of practical statesmen, and are
only prevented from being applied in their fullest extent to the affairs
of nations, by the clashing interests and the ignorant prejudices of
certain powerful classes." Lives of Men of Letters, p. 204.
[355:1] Perhaps a portion of the pleasure with which these essays are
read by those who are not partial to the study of political economy, may
be attributed to their having been written before that science was in
possession of a nomenclature, and thus appearing clothed in the ordinary
language of literature.
[356:1] It was in the most aristocratic quarters that these innovating
doctrines were best received; for in them was the greatest amount of
education, and its influence was not at that time paralyzed by general
prejudices against innovation. They were more in favour with the Tories
than with the Whigs. Indeed, Archdeacon Tucker, one of the boldest
speculators on the economy of trade, was in state politics one of the
most uncompromising Tories of his age. Fox, on the other hand, said of
the "Wealth of Nations," that "there was something in all these subjects
which passed his comprehension, something so wide that he could never
embrace them himself, or find any one who did." But in the French
treaty, and in other measures regarding trade, Pitt was in the fair way
of putting them into legislative practice, when, being arrested by the
French revolution, he entertained thenceforward a bitter enmity of
innovation; an enmity to which, in the department of political economy,
his party became the heirs, preserving the succession down nearly to the
present day, when, at least by their leader, old prejudices have been
already in a great measure, and are likely soon to be altogether
repudiated.
[357:1] P. 126.
[358:1] It is not intended to be maintained that Hume's Political
Economy is immaculate, but merely that in the majority of instances he
has fixed certain truths which later inquiries have not shaken. The
following passage, along with much that is received as true doctrine,
contains some observations, such as those on the tax on German linen,
and on brandy, which modern economists would pronounce to be heterodox.
The question of a gold or a paper currency was one which Hume did not
profess to decide. He described with considerable impartiality the
advantages and the disadvantages of both mediums of exchange.
"From these principles we may learn what judgment we ought to form of
those numberless bars, obstructions, and imposts, which all nations of
Europe, and none more than England, have put upon trade, from an
exorbitant desire of amassing money, which never will heap up beyond its
level, while it circulates; or from an ill-grounded apprehension of
losing their specie, which never will sink below it. Could any thing
scatter our riches, it would be such impolitic contrivances. But this
general ill effect, however, results from them, that they deprive
neighbouring nations of that free communication and exchange which the
Author of the world has intended, by giving them soils, climates, and
geniuses, so different from each other.
"Our modern politics embrace the only method of banishing money, the
using of paper credit; they reject the only method of amassing it, the
practice of hoarding; and they adopt a hundred contrivances, which serve
to no purpose but to check industry, and rob ourselves and our
neighbours of the common benefits of art and nature.
"All taxes, however, upon foreign commodities, are not to be regarded as
prejudicial or useless, but those only which are founded on the jealousy
above mentioned. A tax on German linen encourages home manufactures, and
thereby multiplies our people and industry. A tax on brandy increases
the sale of rum, and supports our southern colonies. And as it is
necessary that imposts should be levied for the support of government,
it may be thought more convenient to lay them on foreign commodities,
which can easily be intercepted at the port, and subjected to the
impost. We ought, however, always to remember the maxim of Dr. Swift,
that, in the arithmetic of the customs, two and two make not four, but
often make only one. It can scarcely be doubted, but if the duties on
wine were lowered to a third, they would yield much more to the
government than at present: our people might thereby afford to drink
commonly a better and more wholesome liquor; and no prejudice would
ensue to the balance of trade, of which we are so jealous. The
manufacture of ale beyond the agriculture is but inconsiderable, and
gives employment to few hands. The transport of wine and corn would not
be much inferior."
The following account of a banking practice still in lively operation in
Scotland, affords a specimen of Hume's capacity to grapple with
practical details.
"There was an invention which was fallen upon some years ago by the
banks of Edinburgh, and which, as it was one of the most ingenious ideas
that has been executed in commerce, has also been thought advantageous
to Scotland. It is there called a Bank-Credit, and is of this nature:--A
man goes to the bank, and finds surety to the amount, we shall suppose,
of a thousand pounds. This money, or any part of it, he has the liberty
of drawing out whenever he pleases, and he pays only the ordinary
interest for it while it is in his hands. He may, when he pleases, repay
any sum so small as twenty pounds, and the interest is discounted from
the very day of the repayment. The advantages resulting from this
contrivance are manifold. As a man may find surety nearly to the amount
of his substance, and his bank-credit is equivalent to ready money, a
merchant does hereby in a manner coin his houses, his household
furniture, the goods in his warehouse, the foreign debts due to him, his
ships at sea; and can, upon occasion, employ them in all payments, as if
they were the current money of the country. If a man borrow a thousand
pounds from a private hand, besides that it is not always to be found
when required, he pays interest for it whether he be using it or not:
his bank-credit costs him nothing except during the very moment in which
it is of service to him: and this circumstance is of equal advantage as
if he had borrowed money at much lower interest. Merchants likewise,
from this invention, acquire a great facility in supporting each other's
credit, which is a considerable security against bankruptcies. A man,
when his own bank-credit is exhausted, goes to any of his neighbours who
is not in the same condition, and he gets the money, which he replaces
at his convenience."
[361:1] Indeed, in all respects, Hume's political economy is rather
analytical of the effect of existing institutions and establishments,
than suggestive of any views on the practicability of any great
amelioration of mankind by positive regulations founded on principles of
political economy. Adam Smith pursued the same method. The mission of
that school was indeed rather to break down than to build up--to find
out and eradicate the mischief that had been done by empiric
legislation; not to attempt new arrangements. While so much mischievous
matter remained to be got rid of, the field was not clear for any
attempts to try the effect of plans of social organization. It is
perhaps only now when the doctrines of the political economists, after
having stood out against neglect and hostility, have been nearly brought
into practice by the successive abolition of the regulations most
objectionable in their eyes, that room has been made for the suggestion
of plans of internal social organization, founded on inquiries both
extensive and minute. In the present position of measures for the
physical and moral purification, and the social organization of this
densely peopled empire,--in the approach to an adjustment of the poor
law,--the reform of the criminal code,--the prison discipline, and the
sanatory suggestions; and still more, in these not being the mere dreams
of utopian theorists, but receiving the countenance and support of
practical statesmen, we appear to have witnessed the dawn of a new era
in political economy.
Hume seems so far from having himself contemplated the application of
philosophical skill to the organization of large masses of human beings,
that we frequently find in his writings and in his letters, remarks on
the growth of cities, sometimes speaking of certain limits which they
cannot pass, at other times noticing, in a tone of despondency, the
rapid progress of London, as if it were exceeding those bounds within
which mankind can be kept under the dominion of law and order. In the
essay on the Populousness of Ancient Nations, he says, "London, by
uniting extensive commerce and middling empire, has perhaps arrived at a
greatness, which no city will perhaps be able to exceed;" and he fixes
this number at 700,000 inhabitants,--saying farther, "from the
experience of past and present ages, one might conjecture that there is
a kind of impossibility that any city could ever rise much beyond this
proportion." London must then have been considerably under the
population he thus assigns to it, and it had not probably reached that
number of inhabitants twenty-four years later, when we find him,
oppressed by the disease of which he died, saying in a letter to Smith,
"should London fall as much in its size as I have done, it will be the
better. It is nothing but a hulk of bad and unclean humours."
During Hume's lifetime, the metropolis had been frequently outraged and
intimidated--on some occasions almost desolated, by mobs of city
savages; beings far more formidable and brutal than the savages of the
wilderness. At the time when he published his Political Discourses, it
contained bands of robbers, who followed their trade as openly as the
brigands of the Abruzzi, committing robberies and murders in the middle
of the city, in open day. Those who saw the city increasing in size,
while it retained these evil characteristics, naturally looked upon it
as a cancer, near the most vital part of the empire, and lamented
accordingly its waxing prosperity and bulk. But its size was not the
cause of the evil. It is now three times as populous as when Hume wrote,
yet, with much poverty, much vice, and much ignorance, it is not the
same diseased and dangerous mass it then was. The comparative sober
quietness of the streets,--the well ordered police,--the facilities for
discovering persons who are sought after, without their being subjected
in their movements to any control, inconsistent with British
liberty,--are all, when practised on so large a scale, indications that
human genius has great capacities for organization; and they may be, for
aught that can be seen to the contrary, only the initial movements,
which future generations will carry to far more wonderful results.
[364:1] Dr. Robert Wallace, a distinguished clergyman of the Church of
Scotland, had prepared for the Philosophical Society, of which he was a
member, an essay, which he enlarged and published in 1752, with the
title, "Dissertations on the Numbers of Mankind in Ancient and Modern
Times;" adding a supplement, in which he examined Hume's discourse on
the Populousness of Ancient Nations. Malthus admitted that Dr. Wallace
was the first to point distinctly to the rule, that to find the limits
of the populousness of any given community, we must look at the quantity
of food at its disposal. But he was not successful in the controversial
application of his principle. Hume's method of inquiry is a double
comparison. The statements of numbers in ancient authors being compared
with the numbers in existing communities, the relative organization for
the supply of food in the two cases is examined, and the author finds
reason to believe that the statements of numbers are greatly exaggerated
by ancient authors, as the state of commerce and transit, and the amount
of stock or capital available for the concentration and distribution of
food, are not such as would enable such multitudes to be supported. Dr.
Wallace, laying down, that where there is the most food there will be
the greatest number of inhabitants, maintains, that as a much greater
proportion of the people were employed in agriculture among the ancients
than the moderns, there must have been more food and consequently more
human beings. It is almost needless, after so much has been written on
this matter, to explain at length the fallacy of this reasoning. The
richest and most populous states are those of which the smallest
proportion of the people are employed in agriculture. A decrease of the
comparative number employed in procuring the necessaries of life is the
mark of increase in wealth and abundance of all things, and is
necessarily accompanied either by a proportionally improved agriculture,
or the purchase of food from poorer communities.
In the subsequent editions of the "Discourses," Hume acknowledges the
merit of Wallace's book, saying, "So learned a refutation would have
made the author suspect that his reasonings were entirely overthrown,
had he not used the precaution, from the beginning, to keep himself on
the sceptical side; and, having taken this advantage of the ground, he
was enabled, though with much inferior forces, to preserve himself from
a total defeat."
[365:1] See above, p. 239.
[365:2] Projet d'un Dime Royale, 4to, 1707--a project for abolishing the
feudal imposts and exemptions, tithes, and internal transit duties, and
levying a general revenue. "Projet," says the Dictionnaire Historique,
"digne d'un bon patriote, mais dont l'exécution est très-difficile." In
Hume's notes of his early reading, we find him referring to Vauban, see
p. 131.
[365:3] Discours Politiques traduits de L'Anglais, par M. D' M***
Amsterdam, 1753. Querard--_La France Litteraire_.
[365:4] With the same title as the above. It was reprinted at Berlin in
1775.
[366:1] See the letter in the Appendix.
[366:2] There is evidence of the lasting hold which the Discourses had
taken on the minds of the French, in the appearance of a new translation
so late as 1766, with the title, "Essais sur le Commerce; le Luxe;
l'argent; l'intérêt de l'argent; les impots; le crédit public, et la
balance du commerce; par M. David Hume," published at Amsterdam in 1766,
and Paris in 1767. Querard attributes this translation to a Mademoiselle
de la Chaux. So far as we are entitled to judge of a translation into a
foreign language, this one seems to be very spirited, speaking through
French idioms and ideas, and ingeniously overcoming the very few
conventionalisms which could not have been avoided by a native of
Britain, speaking of British trade and finance.