1739-1741. ÆT. 27-29.
Letters to his friends after the publication of the first and
second volume of the Treatise--Returns to Scotland--Reception
of his Book--Criticism in "The Works of the Learned"--Charge
against Hume of assaulting the publisher--Correspondence with
Francis Hutcheson--Seeks a situation--Connexion with Adam
Smith--Publication of the third volume of the Treatise--Account
of it--Hume's notes of his reading--Extracts from his Note
books.
Immediately after the publication of his work we find Hume thus writing
to Henry Home:--
"_London, February 13, 1739._
"SIR,--I thought to have wrote this from a place nearer you than London,
but have been detained here by contrary winds, which have kept all
Berwick ships from sailing. 'Tis now a fortnight since my book was
published; and, besides many other considerations, I thought it would
contribute very much to my tranquillity, and might spare me many
mortifications, to be in the country while the success of the work was
doubtful. I am afraid 'twill remain so very long. Those who are
accustomed to reflect on such abstract subjects, are commonly full of
prejudices; and those who are unprejudiced are unacquainted with
metaphysical reasonings. My principles are also so remote from all the
vulgar sentiments on the subject, that were they to take place, they
would produce almost a total alteration in philosophy; and you know,
revolutions of this kind are not easily brought about. I am young enough
to see what will become of the matter; but am apprehensive lest the
chief reward I shall have for some time will be the pleasure of studying
on such important subjects, and the approbation of a few judges. Among
the rest, you may believe I aspire to your approbation; and next to
that, to your free censure and criticism. I shall present you with a
copy as soon as I come to Scotland; and hope your curiosity, as well as
friendship, will make you take the pains of perusing it.
"If you know any body that is a judge, you would do me a sensible
pleasure in engaging him to a serious perusal of the book. 'Tis so rare
to meet with one that will take pains on a book, that does not come
recommended by some great name or authority, that I must confess I am as
fond of meeting with such a one as if I were sure of his approbation. I
am, however, so doubtful in that particular, that I have endeavoured all
I could to conceal my name; though I believe I have not been so cautious
in this respect as I ought to have been.
"I have sent the Bishop of Bristol[106:1] a copy, but could not wait on
him with your letter after he had arrived at that dignity. At least I
thought it would be to no purpose after I began the printing. You'll
excuse the frailty of an author in writing so long a letter about
nothing but his own performances. Authors have this privilege in common
with lovers; and founded on the same reason, that they are both besotted
with a blind fondness of their object. I have been upon my guard against
this frailty; but perhaps this has rather turned to my prejudice. The
reflection on our caution is apt to give us a more implicit confidence
afterwards, when we come to form a judgment. I am," &c.[107:1]
To the same year we must attribute a letter from Hume to Michael Ramsay,
bearing no more precise date than 27th February. He says:--"As to
myself, no alteration has happened to my fortune: nor have I taken the
least step towards it. I hope things will be riper next winter; and I
would not aim at any thing till I could judge of my success in my grand
undertaking, and see upon what footing I shall stand in the world. I am
afraid, however, that I shall not have any great success of a sudden.
Such performances make their way very heavily at first, when they are
not recommended by any great name or authority."
In the same letter he speaks of Ramsay as being then a tutor in the
Marchmont family, and offers him this sage and business-like
advice:--"Should a living fall to the gift of the Duchess of
Marlborough, or any other of your friends and patrons, 'twould have but
an ill air to say that the gentleman was in the South of France, and
that he should be informed of the matter. Besides, you know how
necessary a man's presence is to quicken his friends, to make them unite
their interests, and to save them the trouble of contriving and thinking
about his affairs. Many a one may endeavour to serve you when you point
out the service you desire of them, who would not take the pains to find
it out themselves."[107:2]
Early in the year 1739, desiring apparently to await in retirement the
effect of his work on the mind of the public, he proceeded to Scotland,
and took up his residence at Ninewells, whence we find him writing to
Henry Home on 1st June.
"DEAR SIR,--You see I am better than my word, having sent you two papers
instead of one. I have hints for two or three more, which I shall
execute at my leisure. I am not much in the humour of such compositions
at present, having received news from London of the success of my
Philosophy, which is but indifferent, if I may judge by the sale of the
book, and if I may believe my bookseller. I am now out of humour with
myself; but doubt not, in a little time, to be only out of humour with
the world, like other unsuccessful authors. After all, I am sensible of
my folly in entertaining any discontent, much more despair, upon this
account, since I could not expect any better from such abstract
reasoning; nor, indeed, did I promise myself much better. My fondness
for what I imagined new discoveries, made me overlook all common rules
of prudence; and, having enjoyed the usual satisfaction of projectors,
'tis but just I should meet with their disappointments. However, as 'tis
observed with such sort of people, one project generally succeeds
another, I doubt not but in a day or two I shall be as easy as ever, in
hopes that truth will prevail at last over the indifference and
opposition of the world.
"You see I might at present subscribe myself your most _humble_ servant
with great propriety: but, notwithstanding, shall presume to call myself
your most affectionate friend as well as humble servant."[108:1]
His account of the success of his work in his "own life," is contained
in these well-known sentences: "Never literary attempt was more
unfortunate than my 'Treatise of Human Nature.' It fell _dead born from
the press_, without reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur
among the zealots." But he was never easily satisfied with the success
of his works; and we know that this one was not so entirely unnoticed by
the periodical press, such as it then was, but that it called forth a
long review in the number for November, 1739, of _The History of the
Works of the Learned_, a periodical which may be said to have set the
example in England, of systematic reviews of new books. This review is
written with considerable spirit, and has a few pretty powerful strokes
of sarcasm--as where, in relation to Hume's sceptical examination of the
results of the demonstrations of the geometricians, the writer says, "I
will have nothing to do in the quarrel; if they cannot maintain their
demonstrations against his attacks, they may even perish." The paper is
of considerable length, and it has throughout a tone of clamorous
jeering and vulgar raillery that forcibly reminds one of the writings of
Warburton. But it is the work of one who respects the adversary he has
taken arms against; and, before leaving the subject, the writer makes a
manly atonement for his wrath, saying of the Treatise,--"It bears,
indeed, incontestable marks of a great capacity, of a soaring genius,
but young and not yet thoroughly practised. The subject is vast and
noble as any that can exercise the understanding; but it requires a very
mature judgment to handle it as becomes its dignity and importance: the
utmost prudence, tenderness, and delicacy are requisite to this
desirable issue. Time and use may ripen these qualities in our author;
and we shall probably have reason to consider this, compared with his
later productions, in the same light as we view the juvenile works of
Milton, or the first manner of a Raphael or other celebrated painter."
Immediately after Hume's death, there appeared in _The London Review_,
the following account of the manner in which he had acknowledged the
article in _The Works of the Learned_: "It does not appear our author
had acquired, at this period of his life, that command over his passions
of which he afterwards makes his boast. His disappointment at the public
reception of his 'Essay on Human Nature,' had, indeed, a violent effect
on his passions in a particular instance; it not having dropped so dead
born from the press but that it was severely handled by the reviewers of
those times, in a publication entitled _The Works of the Learned_. A
circumstance this which so highly provoked our young philosopher, that
he flew in a violent rage to demand satisfaction of Jacob Robinson, the
publisher, whom he kept, during the paroxysm of his anger, at his
sword's point, trembling behind the counter lest a period should be put
to the life of a sober critic by a raving philosopher."[110:1]
This statement is in a note to a Review of Hume's "own life," and it has
after it the letters "Rev." which serve to give it the attestation of
William Shakespeare Kenrick, the editor of _The London Review_, and a
man whose sole title to literary remembrance rests on the hardy
effrontery and deadly spite of his falsehoods. There is nothing in the
story to make it in itself incredible--for Hume was far from being that
docile mass of imperturbability, which so large a portion of the world
have taken him for. But the anecdote requires authentication; and has it
not. Moreover, there are circumstances strongly against its truth. Hume
was in Scotland at the time when the criticism on his work was
published: he did not visit London for some years afterwards; and, to
believe the story, we must look upon it not as a momentary ebullition of
passion, but as a manifestation of long-treasured resentment,--a
circumstance inconsistent with his character, inconsistent with human
nature in general, and not in keeping with the modified tone of
dissatisfaction with the criticism, evinced in his correspondence.
While Hume was preparing for the press the third part of his "Treatise
of Human Nature,"--on the subject of Morals, Francis Hutcheson, then
professor of moral philosophy in the university of Glasgow, was enjoying
a reputation in the philosophical world scarcely inferior to that of
either of his great contemporaries, Berkeley and Wolff. From the
following correspondence it will be seen that Hume submitted the
manuscript of his forthcoming volume to Hutcheson's inspection; and he
shows more inclination to receive with deference the suggestions of that
distinguished man, than to allow himself to be influenced from any other
quarter. But still, it will be observed that it is only in details that
he receives instruction, and that he vigorously supports the fundamental
principles of his system. The correspondence illustrates the method in
which he held himself as working with human nature--not as an artist,
but an anatomist, whose minute critical examinations might be injured by
any bursts of feeling or eloquence.[111:1] The letters show how far he
saw into the depths of the utilitarian system; and prove that it was
more completely formed in his mind than it appeared in his book.
Notions of prudence appear to have restrained him, at that time, from
issuing so full a development of the system as that which he afterwards
published; but he soon discovered that it was not in that department of
his works that he stood on the most dangerous ground.
HUME _to_ FRANCIS HUTCHESON.
"_Ninewells, 17th Sept. 1739._
"SIR,--I am much obliged to you for your reflections on my papers. I
have perused them with care, and find they will be of use to me. You
have mistaken my meaning in some passages, which, upon examination, I
have found to proceed from some ambiguity or defect in my expression.
"What affected me most in your remarks, is your observing that there
wants a certain warmth in the cause of virtue, which you think all good
men would relish, and could not displease amidst abstract inquiries. I
must own this has not happened by chance, but is the effect of a
reasoning either good or bad. There are different ways of examining the
mind, as well as the body. One may consider it either as an anatomist or
as a painter: either to discover its most secret springs and principles,
or to describe the grace and beauty of its actions. I imagine it
impossible to conjoin these two views. Where you pull off the skin, and
display all the minute parts, there appears something trivial, even in
the noblest attitudes and most vigorous actions; nor can you ever render
the object graceful or engaging, but by clothing the parts again with
skin and flesh, and presenting only their bare outside. An anatomist,
however, can give very good advice to a painter or statuary. And, in
like manner, I am persuaded that a metaphysician may be very helpful to
a moralist, though I cannot easily conceive these two characters united
in the same work. Any warm sentiment of morals, I am afraid, would have
the air of declamation amidst abstract reasonings, and would be esteemed
contrary to good taste. And though I am much more ambitious of being
esteemed a friend to virtue than a writer of taste, yet I must always
carry the latter in my eye, otherwise I must despair of ever being
serviceable to virtue. I hope these reasons will satisfy you; though at
the same time I intend to make a new trial, if it be possible to make
the moralist and metaphysician agree a little better.
"I cannot agree to your sense of _natural_. 'Tis founded on final
causes, which is a consideration that appears to me pretty uncertain and
unphilosophical. For, pray, what is the end of man? Is he created for
happiness, or for virtue? for this life, or for the next? for himself,
or for his Maker? Your definition of _natural_ depends upon solving
these questions, which are endless, and quite wide of my purpose. I have
never called justice unnatural, but only artificial. '_Atque ipsa
utilitas, justi prope mater et æqui_,'[113:1] says one of the best
moralists of antiquity. Grotius and Puffendorf, to be consistent, must
assert the same.
"Whether natural abilities be virtue, is a dispute of words. I think I
follow the common use of language; _virtus_ signified chiefly courage
among the Romans. I was just now reading this character of Alexander VI.
in Guicciardin. 'In Alessandro sesto fu solertia et sagacità singulare:
consiglio eccellente, efficacia a persuadere maravigliosa, et a tutte
le faccende gravi, sollicitudine, et destrezza incredibile. Ma erano
queste virtù avanzate di grande intervallo da vitii.'[114:1] Were
benevolence the only virtue, no characters could be mixed, but would
depend entirely on their degrees of benevolence. Upon the whole, I
desire to take my catalogue of virtues from 'Cicero's Offices,' not from
'The Whole Duty of Man.' I had indeed the former book in my eye in all
my reasonings.
"I have many other reflections to communicate to you; but it would be
troublesome. I shall therefore conclude with telling you, that I intend
to follow your advice in altering most of those passages you have
remarked as defective in point of prudence; though, I must own, I think
you a little too delicate. Except a man be in orders, or be immediately
concerned in the instruction of youth, I do not think his character
depends upon his philosophical speculations, as the world is now
modelled; and a little liberty seems requisite to bring into the public
notice a book that is calculated for few readers. I hope you will allow
me the freedom of consulting you when I am in any difficulty, and
believe me," &c.
"P.S.--I cannot forbear recommending another thing to your
consideration. Actions are not virtuous nor vicious, but only so far as
they are proofs of certain qualities or durable principles in the mind.
This is a point I should have established more expressly than I have
done. Now, I desire you to consider if there be any quality that is
virtuous, without having a tendency either to the public good or to the
good of the person who possesses it. If there be none without these
tendencies, we may conclude that their merit is derived from sympathy. I
desire you would only consider the _tendencies_ of qualities, not their
actual operations, which depend on chance. _Brutus_ riveted the chains
of _Rome_ faster by his opposition; but the natural tendency of his
noble dispositions--his public spirit and magnanimity--was to establish
her liberty.
"You are a great admirer of _Cicero_ as well as I am. Please to review
the fourth book _De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum_: where you find him
prove against the _Stoics_, that if there be no other goods but virtue,
'tis impossible there can be any virtue, because the mind would then
want all motives to begin its actions upon; and 'tis on the goodness or
badness of the motives that the virtue of the action depends. This
proves, that to every virtuous action there must be a motive or
impelling passion distinct from the virtue, and that virtue can never be
the sole motive to any action. You do not assent to this: though I think
there is no proposition more certain or important. I must own my proofs
were not distinct enough and must be altered. You see with what
reluctance I part with you, though I believe it is time I should ask
your pardon for so much trouble."
In the mean time we find Hume anxious to be employed in the capacity of
a travelling governor or tutor, and writing to Mr. George Carre of
Nisbet, intimating his readiness to officiate to that gentleman's
cousins, Lord Haddington and Mr. Baillie, if there are no favoured
candidates for the situation. There is nothing in the letter to excite
much interest.[116:1] He says, he hears the young gentlemen are
proposing to travel; observes that he has the honour to be their
relation, "which gives a governor a better air in attending his pupils,"
and that he has some leisure time. In his letter to a physician, in the
preceding chapter, we find him mentioning this office as one of the few
to which his prospects were limited, and, at the same time, as one for
which his knowledge of the world scarcely fitted him. His six years'
farther experience of life had perhaps in his own opinion provided him
with opportunities of better qualifying himself for the duties of this
office. It was held by many able and accomplished men at that time, and
appears to have been the profession of his friend Michael Ramsay. There
are no traces of the manner in which his application was received.
From such matters as these, one readily turns with interest to the most
trifling notices connected with his literary history. On 4th March,
1740, we find him thus writing to Hutcheson.
"My bookseller has sent to Mr. Smith a copy of my book, which I hope he
has received, as well as your letter. I have not yet heard what he has
done with the abstract; perhaps you have. I have got it printed in
London, but not in _The Works of the Learned_, there having been an
article with regard to my book, somewhat abusive, printed in that work,
before I sent up the abstract."[116:2]
The "Smith" here mentioned as receiving a copy of the Treatise, we may
fairly conclude, notwithstanding the universality of the name, to be
Adam Smith, who was then a student in the university of Glasgow, and
not quite seventeen years old.[117:1] It may be inferred from Hume's
letter, that Hutcheson had mentioned Smith as a person on whom it would
serve some good purpose to bestow a copy of the Treatise: and we have
here, evidently, the first introduction to each other's notice, of two
friends, of whom it can be said, that there was no third person writing
the English language during the same period, who has had so much
influence upon the opinions of mankind as either of these two men.
The correspondence with Hutcheson is continued as follows:
HUME _to_ FRANCIS HUTCHESON.
"_16th March,1740._
"DEAR SIR,--I must trouble you to write that letter you was so kind as
to offer to Longman the bookseller. I concluded somewhat of a hasty
bargain with my bookseller, from indolence and an aversion to
bargaining: as also because I was told that few or no bookseller would
engage for one edition with a new author. I was also determined to keep
my name a secret for some time, though I find I have failed in that
point. I sold one edition of these two volumes for fifty guineas, and
also engaged myself heedlessly in a clause, which may prove troublesome,
viz. that upon printing a second edition I shall take all the copies
remaining upon hand at the bookseller's price at the time. 'Tis in order
to have some check upon my bookseller, that I would willingly engage
with another: and I doubt not but your recommendation would be very
serviceable to me, even though you be not personally acquainted with
him.
"I wait with some impatience for a second edition, principally on
account of alterations I intend to make in my performance. This is an
advantage that we authors possess since the invention of printing, and
renders the _nonum prematur in annum_ not so necessary to us as to the
ancients. Without it I should have been guilty of a very great temerity,
to publish at my years so many novelties in so delicate a part of
philosophy; and at any rate, I am afraid that I must plead as my excuse
that very circumstance of youth which may be urged against me. I assure
you, that without running any of the heights of scepticism, I am apt in
a cool hour to suspect, in general, that most of my reasonings will be
more useful by furnishing hints and exciting people's curiosity, than as
containing any principles that will augment the stock of knowledge, that
must pass to future ages.[118:1] I wish I could discover more fully the
particulars wherein I have failed. I admire so much the candour I have
observed in Mr. Locke, yourself, and a very few more, that I would be
extremely ambitious of imitating it, by frankly confessing my errors. If
I do not imitate it, it must proceed neither from my being free from
errors nor want of inclination, but from my real unaffected ignorance. I
shall consider more carefully all the particulars you mention to me:
though with regard to _abstract ideas_, 'tis with difficulty I can
entertain a doubt on that head, notwithstanding your authority. Our
conversation together has furnished me a hint, with which I shall
augment the second edition. 'Tis this--the word _simple idea_ is an
abstract term, comprehending different individuals that are similar. Yet
the point of their similarity, from the very nature of such ideas, is
not distinct nor separable from the rest. Is not this a proof, among
many others, that there may be a similarity without any possible
separation even in thought.
"I must consult you in a point of prudence. I have concluded a reasoning
with these two sentences: 'When you pronounce any action or character to
be vicious, you mean nothing but that, from the particular constitution
of your nature, you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the
contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared to
sounds, colours, heat, and cold, which, according to modern philosophy,
are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind. And this
discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be regarded as a
mighty advancement of the speculative sciences, though like that too it
has little or no influence on practice.'[119:1]
"Is not this laid a little too strong? I desire your opinion of it,
though I cannot entirely promise to conform myself to it. I wish from my
heart I could avoid concluding, that since morality, according to your
opinion, as well as mine, is determined merely by sentiment, it regards
only human nature and human life. This has been often urged against you,
and the consequences are very momentous. If you make any alterations in
your performances, I can assure you, there are many who desire you would
more fully consider this point, if you think that the truth lies on the
popular side. Otherwise common prudence, your character, and situation,
forbid you [to] touch upon it. If morality were determined by reason,
that is the same to all rational beings; but nothing but experience can
assure us that the sentiments are the same. What experience have we with
regard to superior beings? How can we ascribe to them any sentiments at
all? They have implanted those sentiments in us for the conduct of life
like our bodily sensations, which they possess not themselves. I expect
no answer to these difficulties in the compass of a letter. 'Tis enough
if you have patience to read so long a letter as this.--I am." &c.
The third volume of the "Treatise of Human Nature" being the part
relating to morals, was published by Thomas Longman in 1740. It is not
so original as the metaphysical part of the work, nor are its principles
so clearly and decidedly laid down. Its author's metaphysical theories
were rather modified than confirmed in his subsequent works. But his
opinions on ethical subjects, only indistinctly shadowed forth in his
early work, were afterwards reduced to a more compact system, and were
more clearly and fully set forth.
The metaphysical department of the Treatise is a system with a great
leading principle throughout, of which its author intended that all the
details should be but the individual applications. If his reasoning in
that department of his work be accurate, he sweeps away all other
systems of the foundation of knowledge, and substitutes another in their
stead. But the third book, "on Morals," like the second, on "the
Passions," has no such pretension. The leading principles of the
metaphysical department are certainly kept in view, but the details are
not necessarily parts of it. They have a separate existence of their
own: they are an analysis of phenomena which we witness in our daily
life; and the reader assents or dissents as the several opinions
expressed correspond with or diverge from his own observation of what he
sees passing in the world around him, without, in that mental operation,
either receiving or rejecting any general theory. In short, it is to a
considerable extent a series of observations of human conduct and
character; and as such they are admitted or denied, are sympathized with
or contemned, according to the previous feelings and opinions of the
reader. Among the prominent features of the theoretical part of this
book, is the admission of a moral sense,[121:1] but the negation of an
abstract code of morality, separately existing, and independent of the
position of the persons who are applying this sense. The work in some
measure foreshadows the systems which have been respectively called the
utilitarian and the selfish; the former applying as the scale of moral
excellence the extent to which an action is beneficial or hurtful to the
human race; the latter referring the actions of mankind, whether good or
bad, interested or disinterested, to self, and to impulses which are
always connected with the individual in whom they act, and his passions
or desires.
In this respect it had its influence, when joined to other hints thrown
out by philosophers, in supplying the texts on which Helvetius,
Beccaria, and Bentham discoursed at greater length and with a clearer
application to definite systems. The utilitarian principle Hume
afterwards extended and rendered systematic, in pursuance of the views
announced in his correspondence with Hutcheson. In connexion with what
is called the "selfish system" of morals, he went no farther than to
point out that the source of every impulse must have its relation to the
individual person on whom that impulse acts. If it be the sordid impulse
of the miser, it must be because the man who feels it loves gold; if it
be the profuse impulse of the spendthrift, it must be because the
individual who spends has a corresponding desire within himself; if it
be the charitable impulse of the person who feeds the poor, it must be
because that person is under the influence of inducements which incline
him rather to do so than not do so. If the principle be applied to a
martyr suffering for conscience sake, or to a soldier who prefers death
to submission, it is still because the person who acts fulfils impulses
acting on himself. But this is a subject from which Hume appears to have
shrunk in his subsequent works. He seems to have disliked the character
of being connected with "the selfish school;" and he thus failed to
revert to a subject on which his rigid and clear examination would have
been a matter of greater interest, than his merely arguing against
self-interest being the proper rule of action--an argument that with him
amounts to nothing more than a protest against that vulgarization of the
system, which charges it with such a doctrine for the purpose of
rendering it odious. We shall afterwards find that he had a
correspondence on this subject with Helvetius, who wished to bring him
over to the admission of his own opinions.
In this department of the Treatise there are some inquiries into the
first principles of law and government. Here, if any where, he shows the
influence over his mind of his reading in the works of the civilians.
His own utilitarian principle, when carried out on these subjects, shows
that the best government is that which is most conducive to the welfare
of the community. But he occasionally mixes up this principle with
elements totally heterogeneous to it--as in those instances where he
considers the privilege of governing as held by the same tenure with the
right of property, and views the question whether any particular
government is good or bad, in its effect upon the persons governed, as
secondary to the question whether it is or is not held by a good tenure
when it is considered as if it were a matter of private property. But,
notwithstanding these inconsistencies, which he afterwards amended when
he had more fully investigated the principles of politics, the general
aim of his observations on the sources of government is to show that
they are to be found in reason, and to dispel the various irrational and
superstitious notions of political authority, which are comprehended in
the use of the term Divine Right. Indeed, the observations which he
makes with a practical application to governments, are a partial
anticipation of the clear good sense which distinguished his subsequent
political essays. In connexion with the motives of that insurrection
which occurred within eight years after the publication of the Treatise,
and with the partiality for high monarchical principles with which
Hume's name is so much associated, the following remarks are interesting
and instructive.
Whoever considers the history of the several nations of the
world, their revolutions, conquests, increase and diminution,
the manner in which their particular governments are
established, and the successive right transmitted from one
person to another, will soon learn to treat very lightly all
disputes concerning the rights of princes, and will be
convinced that a strict adherence to any general rules, and
the rigid loyalty to particular persons and families, on
which some people set so high a value, are virtues that hold
less of reason than of bigotry and superstition. In this
particular, the study of history confirms the reasonings of
true philosophy, which, showing us the original qualities of
human nature, teaches us to regard the controversies in
politics as incapable of any decision in most cases, and as
entirely subordinate to the interests of peace and liberty.
Where the public good does not evidently demand a change, 'tis
certain that the concurrence of all those titles, _original
contract_, _long possession_, _present possession_,
_succession_, and _positive laws_, forms the strongest title
to sovereignty, and is justly regarded as sacred and
inviolable. But when these titles are mingled and opposed in
different degrees, they often occasion perplexity, and are
less capable of solution from the arguments of lawyers and
philosophers, than from the swords of the soldiery. Who shall
tell me, for instance, whether Germanicus or Drusus ought to
have succeeded Tiberius, had he died while they were both
alive, without naming any of them for his successor? Ought the
right of adoption to be received as equivalent to that of
blood, in a nation where it had the same effect in private
families, and had already, in two instances, taken place in
the public? Ought Germanicus to be esteemed the eldest son,
because he was born before Drusus; or the younger, because he
was adopted after the birth of his brother? Ought the right of
the elder to be regarded in a nation, where the eldest brother
had no advantage in the succession to private families? Ought
the Roman empire at that time to be esteemed hereditary,
because of two examples; or ought it, even so early, to be
regarded as belonging to the stronger, or the present
possessor, as being founded on so recent an usurpation? Upon
whatever principles we may pretend to answer these and
such-like questions, I am afraid we shall never be able to
satisfy an impartial inquirer, who adopts no party in
political controversies, and will be satisfied with nothing
but sound reason and philosophy.[124:1]
Some of Hume's notes, of matters which have occurred to him in the
course of his reading as worthy of observation, or of remarkable
thoughts passing through his mind, have been preserved.[125:1] They
appear to be merely a few stray leaves, which have accidentally survived
the loss of many others, as the number of subjects to which they refer
is limited in comparison with the wide compass of knowledge embraced in
Hume's various works. The specimens so preserved, appear generally to
have been written at this period of his life, with the exception,
perhaps, of those which are printed above, and which have reference to
physical science.[125:2] They are set down with clearness and precision,
as if by one who knew both the step in a series of reasoning to which
each of them belongs, and the form in which it should be expressed. They
are written on long sheets of paper; and unless the few that appear
under the head "Natural Philosophy," and some which have the general
heading "Philosophy," they appear to have been subjected to no system of
pre-arrangement, such as that which Locke suggested, but to have been
set down according as the fruits of the annotator's reading or thought
presented themselves to him. A few specimens are here given: they will
be found to have been chiefly made use of in the "Natural History of
Religion," and in the "Essay on the Populousness of Ancient Nations,"
while a few of them--as for instance that relating to Gustavus
Vasa--make their appearance in the little volume of "Essays, Moral and
Political," published in 1741.[125:3] A considerable proportion of them
have not been made use of in Hume's printed works, and some of them
contain information which is embodied in Smith's "Wealth of Nations."
It is an occurrence quite characteristic of the friendship of these two
great men, that either of them should have supplied the other with facts
or ideas applicable to the subjects on which he might be engaged.
EXTRACTS FROM A COLLECTION OF MEMORANDUMS.
Perhaps the custom of allowing parents to murder their infant children,
though barbarous, tends to render a state more populous, as in China.
Many marry by that inducement; and such is the force of natural
affection, that none make use of that privilege but in extreme
necessity.
A pound of steel, when manufactured, may become of £10,000 value.
No hospitals in Holland have any land or settled revenue, and yet the
poor better provided for than any where else in the world.
The Romans had two ways chiefly of levying their taxes,--by public
lands, which were all dissipated by popular tribunes about the end of
the republic; or by customs upon importation, which were different in
different places; in some the fortieth part of the value; in Sicily the
twentieth.
They had also a kind of excise, which began with the emperors, and was
the two-hundredth or one-hundredth part of the value of all goods sold,
the fiftieth of slaves.
Beside this, they had pretty early, even in the time of the republic,
duties upon mines and salt; and in order to levy the former more easily,
they forbid all mines in Italy. Their mines near Carthagena yielded
them 25,000 drachms a-day. _Burman de Vict. Rom._
In the time of the monarchy, the kings had the sole power of imposing
taxes. In the time of the republic, 'tis strange to see this power
belonging sometimes to the magistrates, sometimes to the senate, or to
the people. We learn from Livy, in the second Punic War, that the senate
could contract debt alone. Polybius says, that all money matters
belonged to the senate. The censors levied all the taxes, and farmed
them out to the Roman knights. The Romans could be no great politicians;
since the senate could not gain the sovereignty, nor the censors the
supreme magistracy, notwithstanding these advantages.
All French projectors take it for granted that 'tis equally dangerous to
make the people too easy as to oppress them too much. _Comte de
Boulainvilliers._
The charter governments in America, almost entirely independent of
England.
Those north of Virginia interfere most with us in manufactures, which
proceeds from the resemblance of soil and climate.
Gustavus Vasa is perhaps the only instance of a prince who humbled the
clergy while he aspired to arbitrary power.
From 1729 to 1730, imported of corn into Ireland to the value of
£274,000,--ascribed to the want of a drawback by the Irish House of
Commons.
The exchange to Holland always against us. _Craftsman._ Not true.
Our exports no rule to judge of our trade: masters enter more than they
export, to persuade others that their ship is near full.
The East India Company have offered to pay all the duties upon tea,
provided it may be sold duty free. The interest the crown has in
seizures thought to be the cause why they were refused.--Never asked;
because afterwards they cannot expect the execution of the laws against
foreign tea.
The government of England perhaps the only one, except Holland, wherein
the legislature has not force enough to execute the laws without the
good-will of the people. This is an irregular kind of check upon the
legislature.
Men have much oftener erred from too great respect to government than
from too little.
The French sugar colonies supplied entirely with provisions from our
northern colonies.
15000-20000 Hogsheads of tobacco exported to France at £20 a hogshead;
at £5.
The gross produce of the English customs £3,000,000 a-year; the neat
produce £1,800,000.
In all the British Leeward Islands, the muster-roll exceeded not two
thousand five hundred men a few years ago, and yet there are twenty
thousand blacks in Antigua alone.
The French fish on the coasts of Newfoundland in the winter, which gives
them an advantage above us.
Our bustle about the Ostend company, the cause of the great progress of
the French company.
The East India Company have desired to have China raw silk put upon the
same footing as to duty with the Italian, but have been refused.
The reason why the court has a greater superiority among the Lords than
Commons, beside the bishops, is that the court gives places to the
Lords, chiefly for their interest among the Commons.
Eighteen hundred children put upon the parishes at Dublin in five years,
of which, upon inquiry, there remained only twenty-eight.
Ninety-five thousand seamen computed to be in France; only sixty
thousand in England.
Ships formerly lasted twenty-seven years in the English navy; now only
thirteen.
Within the last two thousand years, almost all the despotic governments
of the world have been improving, and the free ones degenerating; so
that now they are pretty near a par.
There must be a balance in all governments; and the inconvenience of
allowing a single person to have any share is, that what may be too
little for a balance in one hand will be too much in another.
The fiars of wheat, in 1400, were fixed at Edinburgh, 6 sh. 7 p. Scots
money.
Banks first invented in Sweden on account of their copper money.
There is not a word of trade in all Machiavel, which is strange,
considering that Florence rose only by trade.
About twenty thousand tun of wine imported into England about the time
of the first Dutch war.--_Sir Josiah Child._
One per cent. in interest, worse than two per cent. in customs; because
ships pay the interest, not the customs.
Eight hundred thousand Jews chased from Spain by Ferdinand the
Catholic.--_Geddes._[129:1]
About 100,000 Moors condemned for apostacy, by the Inquisition, in forty
years. 4000 burned.--_Id._
Near a million of Moors expelled Spain.--_Id._
The Commons of Castile, in taking arms against Charles the Fifth, among
other things petition, that no sheep nor wool shall be allowed to go out
of the kingdom.--_Id._
The interest in Rome reduced to six per cent. under Tiberius.--_Tacit._
The laws of Arragon required a public trial for the subjects: but
allowed the king a kind of despotic power over his servants and
ministers, in order to render the great men less fond of court
preferment.--_Geddes._
'Twould be more easy for the English liberties to recover themselves
than the Roman, because of the mixed government. The transition is not
so violent.
The farms were large among the ancients. The Leontine farms in Sicily
contained 130,000 acres, and were farmed to eighty-three
farmers.--_Cicero in Verrem._
After the conquest of Egypt by Augustus, the prices of every thing
doubled in Rome.
The Roman colonies, in the time of Augustus, voted in their colonies,
and sent their votes to Rome.
The Romans very exact in their book-keeping; in so much, that a crime,
such as bribery or poisoning, could be proved or refuted from their
books.--_Cic. pro Cluentio._
They also kept commentaries or ephemerides, wherein every action or word
was wrote down; at least Augustus practised this with his daughters and
nieces.--_Sueton._
In Nero's time, 30,000 buried in one autumn, while there was a plague.
Machiavel makes it a question, whether absolute power is best founded on
the nobility or the people. In my opinion, a subject who usurps upon a
free state, cannot trust the nobles, and must caress the people. This
was the case with the Roman emperors. But an established monarchy is
better founded on the nobles.
When the Lex Licinia was promulgated, the senate voted that it should be
binding from that moment, as if it had been voted by the people.
In 1721, the English and Dutch drew more money from Spain than France
did.--_Dict. de Com._
There is computed to be 3000 tun of gold in the bank of Amsterdam, at
100,000 florins a tun.--_Id._
A ship of 50 or 60 tun has commonly seven hands, and increases a man
every 10 tun.--_Id._
The French commerce sunk much about the middle of the seventeenth
century, by reason of their infidelity in their goods.--_Id._
There seems to have been a very bad police in Rome; for Cicero says,
that if Milo had waylaid Clodius, he would have waited for him in the
neighbourhood, where his death might have been attributed to robbers, by
reason of the commonness of the accident; and yet Clodius had above
sixty servants with him, all armed.
Thirty-eight holidays in the year in France.--_Vauban._ One hundred and
eighty working days at a medium.--_Id._
The people commonly live poorest in countries which have the richest
natural soil.
600 slaves, working in the silver mines of Athens, yielded a mina a-day
to their master Xenophon. He computes that 10,000 slaves would produce a
revenue of 100 talents a-year.
The holidays in Athens made two months in the year.--_Salmasius._
The public in Athens paid 20 per cent. for money.--_Xenophon._
Many of the chief officers of the army were named by the people in old
Rome.--_Liv._ lib. ix. and lib. vii.
The Roman senate were obliged by law to give their authority to the
Comitia Centuriata before the suffrages were called.--_Id._ lib. viii.
cap. 12.
The Pontifices of old Rome suppressed the records of their religion on
purpose, as well as those of new Rome.--_Id._ lib. ix.
Every part of the office of the senate could be brought before the
people; even the distribution of provinces. An evident part of the
executive.--_Id._ lib. x. cap. 24.
£60,000 sterling amassed beforehand for building the Capitol.--_Id._
lib. i.
Plays, a part of religious service for a pestilence.--_Id._ lib. vii.
The senators were forbid trade among the Romans.--_Id._ lib. viii. cap.
63.
In the Roman government, there was a great restraint on liberty, since a
man could not leave his colony, or live where he pleased.--_Id._ lib.
xxxix. cap. 3.
External superstition punished by the Romans.--_Id._ lib. xxxix. cap.
16.
They were very jealous of the established religion.--_Id._ lib. xl. cap.
29.
Robbers established in legal companies in Egypt; and such captains as
Jonathan Wyld established.--_Diodorus Siculus._
Whoever consecrated the tenth of their goods to Hercules, was esteemed
sure of happiness by the Romans.--_Id._
Jupiter, according to the Cretan tradition, was a pious worshipper of
the gods; a clear proof that those people had a preceding
religion.--_Id._ lib. v.
Gradenigo's change of the Venetian republic was made in 1280.--_St.
Didier._
The clergy are chosen by a popular call.--_Id._
Vossius says he saw in Rome, that, digging forty foot underground, they
found the tops of columns buried.
Horses were very rare among the ancients, (before the Romans,) and not
employed in any thing but war. 1st, In the retreat of the ten thousand,
'twould have been easy to have mounted the whole army, if horses had
been as common as at present. 2d, They had about fifty horses, which,
instead of increasing, diminished during the road, though very useful.
3d, In the spoils of villages, Xenophon frequently mentions sheep and
oxen; never horses. 4th, Cleombrotus' army, in lib. v. Hist. made use of
asses for the carriages.
Demosthenes tells the Athenians, that a very honest man of Macedonia,
who would not lie, told him such and such things of Philip's situation:
a kind of style that marks but bad intelligence, and little
communication among the different states.--_Olynth._ 2.
The 30 tyrants killed about 1500 citizens untried.--_Æschines._
Thrasybulus restoring the people, and Cæsar's conquest, the only
instances in ancient history of revolutions without barbarous cruelty.
There seems to be a natural course of things which brings on the
destruction of great empires. They push their conquests till they come
to barbarous nations, which stop their progress by the difficulty of
subsisting great armies. After that, the nobility and considerable men
of the conquering nation and best provinces withdraw gradually from the
frontier army, by reason of its distance from the capital, and barbarity
of the country in which they quarter. They forget the use of war. Their
barbarous soldiers become their masters. These have no law but their
sword, both from their bad education, and from their distance from the
sovereign to whom they bear no affection. Hence disorder, violence,
anarchy, tyranny, and a dissolution of empire.
Perseus's ambassadors to the Rhodians spoke a style like the modern,
with regard to the balance of power, but are condemned by Livy.--Lib.
xlii. cap. 46.
Herodotus makes a scruple of so much as delivering an account of the
difference of religion among foreigners, lest he should give
offence.--Lib. ii.
The Egyptians more careful of preserving their cats than their houses in
time of fire.--_Id._
Plutarch says, that the effect of the naval power of Athens, established
by Themistocles, was to render their government more popular: and that
husbandmen and labourers are more friends to nobility than merchants and
seamen are.--_In Vita Themist._
Solon is the first person mentioned in history to have raised the value
of money, which, says Plutarch, was a benefit to the poor in paying
their debts, and no loss to the rich.--_In Vita Solon._
PHILOSOPHY.
Men love pleasure more than they hate pain.--_Bayle._
Men are vicious, but hate a religion that authorizes vice.--_Id._
The accounts we have of the sentiments of the ancient philosophers not
very distinct nor consistent. Cicero contradicts himself in two
sentences: in saying that Thales allowed the ordering of the world by a
mind, and in saying that Anaxagoras was the first.
Strato's atheism the most dangerous of the ancient--holding the origin
of the world from nature, or a matter endued with activity. Bayle thinks
there are none but the Cartesians can refute this atheism.
A Stratonician could retort the arguments of all the sects of
philosophy. Of the Stoics, who maintained their God to be fiery and
compound; and of the Platonicians, who asserted the ideas to be distinct
from the Deity. The same question,--Why the parts or ideas of God had
that particular arrangement?--is as difficult as why the world had.
Some pretend that there can be no necessity, according to the system of
atheism, "because even matter cannot be determined without something
superior to determine it."--_Fenelon._
Three proofs of the existence of a God: 1st, Some thing necessarily
existent, and what is so is infinitely perfect. 2d, The idea of infinite
must come from an infinite being. 3d, The idea of infinite perfection
implies that of actual existence.
There is a remarkable story to confirm the Cartesian philosophy of the
brain. A man hurt by the fall of a horse, forgot about twenty years of
his life, and remembered what went before in a much more lively manner
than usual.
FOOTNOTES:
[106:1] Dr. Butler was consecrated bishop, 3d December, 1739, and was
afterwards translated to the see of Durham, 16th October, 1750. He died
16th June, 1752, in the 60th year of his age.
[107:1] Tytler's Life of Kames, i. 90.
[107:2] MS. R.S.E.
[108:1] Tytler's Life of Kames, i. 93.
[110:1] London Review, v. 200.
[111:1] See above, p. 91.
[113:1] Horat. Lib. i. Sat. iii. l. 98.
[114:1] Edit. 1636, p. 5. "Alexander the Sixth was endowed with
wonderful cunning and extraordinary sagacity; had a surprising genius in
suggesting expedients in the cabinet, and uncommon efficacy in
persuading; and in all matters of consequence an incredible earnestness
and dexterity."--Goddard's Translation.
[116:1] Dated, 12th November, 1739. MS. R.S.E.
[116:2] MS. R.S.E.
[117:1] He was born on 5th June, 1723.
[118:1] See above, p. 78.
[119:1] See this passage in the "Treatise of Human Nature," Book iii.
part i. sect. 1. where it appears with no other variation than the
substitution of the word "considerable," for mighty. It thus appears
that whatever remarks Hutcheson made on the passage, they were not such
as to induce the author materially to alter it.
[121:1] It may be questioned if any reader of Hume's works has been able
to reconcile this admission of the existence of a moral sense, which,
according to his own account of it is an intuition, with his
metaphysical theory of impressions and ideas, notwithstanding his
ingenuity in ranking it among the impressions.
[124:1] Book iii. part ii. sect. 10.
[125:1] In the MSS. R.S.E.
[125:2] See p. 95.
[125:3] This circumstance, showing that a portion of the manuscript has
been written before the publication of these essays, points to the
present as the period to which a collection of extracts from the notes
will most aptly apply, although some of them may have been made at a
later date.
[129:1] Miscellaneous Tracts, by Michael Geddes. 1730.