Massachusetts, who had ended his sea days many years before, and had
settled with a Georgia wife in the Pea Vine Valley. The old gentleman
was filled with enthusiasm to see the regiment, when he learned it
was from Massachusetts, and had a company from old Newburyport.
Unfortunately Company A had been left in Chickamauga as a camp
guard. After the camp was established, the Colonel called to pay his
respects. The excitement of the day had been too much for the old
gentleman, and he was found stricken with apoplexy.
The neighbors were too busy watching their property to render
assistance, and a detail from the regiment cared for the old
gentleman until he died that night.
As the day wore on and no raids were made by the Northern troops upon
barns or hen houses, the farmers allowed their curiosity to overcome
their fears, and visited camp. They were soon selling peaches, butter
milk and sweet potato pies to the troops. These pies were christened
"rubbernecks" by the men, and were held in light esteem, although
heavy as lead.
On July 23rd all the state knapsacks were condemned. They were little
box affairs, covered with enamel leather, and had seen service at
many a Framingham muster. They were piled at the head of each company
street and burned. Blanket bags were later issued and were more
acceptable. The tents brought from Massachusetts had been earlier
condemned as unserviceable, and were replaced by a new issue.
August 1st, Lieutenant George N. Jewett of Company H resigned.
On August 9th the regiment was presented with a new set of colors.
During its term of service it had three sets, two furnished by
Massachusetts, and one drawn from the Government Quartermaster's
department. The Regimental flag furnished by the Quartermaster's
department, bore the coat of arms of the United States upon a blue
field. This flag was rarely carried, and is the only one of its
kind in the collection of flags carried by Massachusetts regiments,
preserved at the State House.
By the middle of August the camp in the woods was water logged.
Continual rain had saturated the soil. The drains took care of
surface water, but as there was no seepage through the clay the
drains were powerless to carry off the mass of water imprisoned in
the soil, and for which evaporation was the only escape. Rain and
evaporation were in equilibrium. The mud on the legs of the men
like mercury in a thermometer, registered the fluctuation from this
equilibrium. Ordinary rubbers were useless, and sometimes rubber
boots were inundated.
Although the Government had furnished no lumber for tent floors,
the men had quite generally appropriated means to raise their beds
above the ground. The larceny of boards was encouraged as a sanitary
virtue. A few buildings which the Park authorities cherished as
ancient landmarks, about which the tide of the great battle ebbed and
flowed in 1863, has entirely disappeared. The companies of the Third
Battalion had purchased lumber at Chattanooga and constructed tent
floors. The quarters of the enlisted men were on the highest ridge
and were less exposed. The quarters of the Colonel and Staff were
approachable only through a sea of liquid mud, and were shifted onto
higher ground.
Application was repeatedly made for permission to change the camp.
The order for a change came just before the regiment moved to
Lexington. The First Battalion was the only unit to occupy the new
camp, which was located in an open field on the eastern side of the
Alexander Bridge road.
On August 19th Lieutenant Roland H. Sherman of Company L, resigned
and was discharged.
In order to fill the vacancies in the line officers of the regiment,
the following promotions were made while at Chickamauga: Second
Lieutenant Augustus G. Reynolds was promoted to first lieutenant in
Company H, and First Sergeant Thomas O. H. Pineau of that company was
commissioned second lieutenant. First Sergeant Eugene Larrivee, of
Company L, was commissioned second lieutenant in that company.
On August 21st orders were received to furlough all sick men, as
the regiment was to leave Chickamauga. Some two hundred furloughs
were issued. On the night of August 22nd a huge bonfire in camp
celebrated the last night at Chickamauga. Early the next morning camp
was broken, and the regiment marched to Rossville, Georgia, where
it entrained early in the morning and was enroute to the blue grass
region of Kentucky. Chickamauga was left with no regrets.
_Sickness at Chickamauga_
The prevailing sickness at Chickamauga was diarrhœa, dysentery and
typhoid. During the spring and summer about 80,000 men passed through
the park, but there were probably never over 50,000 encamped there at
any one time. The board which investigated the sanitary conditions
of 44,803 men at Camp Thomas, reported 9,960 probable cases of
typhoid, and 713 fatal results from this disease. One man in every
five suffered from this fever, and almost every man was afflicted
with some intestinal disorder. Much has been said as to whether this
suffering was preventable, and was due to ignorance and neglect, or
was paid as the necessary price of war.
In the first call for troops the War Department expressed a desire
that the States should give preference among volunteers to National
Guard organizations, in the expectation that they were equipped and
had been prepared for war by a previous training.
Massachusetts perhaps, satisfied this expectation as fully as any
state. Her regiments were at least uniformed, armed, and equipped
with means for preparing food, but they had no experience in caring
for themselves in the field. The Government ration consisted of
bread, coffee, potatoes, onions, canned tomatoes, fresh beef seven
days, and bacon three days out of ten. One hundred rations were
sufficient in quantity to feed one hundred men one day, but this
required careful management on the part of company commanders, and
proper preparation by company cooks. Any system of training men for
the field should make provision for accustoming men to live, and live
comfortably upon this ration.
It is not an answer to say that the United States Army in time
of peace, does not live upon this ration, but supplements it by
purchases from their company funds. A volunteer regiment going into
the United States service, will have no company funds, and must live
on the ration until companies accumulate funds, which ordinarily
would be impossible in the field. Any system of training which fails
to recognize this fact is false in theory and practice.
Previous to the Spanish War, the Massachusetts Militia were fed by
caterers at their summer outings. There was a Commissary Department,
but its officers were appointed for other reasons than efficiency
and experience in handling supplies. Some states had commissary
departments which furnished rations, and required the companies to
prepare the food, but there was no where any systematic attempt to
train men to manage and support life upon the Government ration.
Resulting from a lack of previous experience, the Massachusetts
regiments suffered during the first six months of their field
service. Men were starving in the regiments, because unable to
assimilate the Government ration, which, through a lack of experience
in handling and preparing, was served to them in a form which did
not properly nourish, and aggravated and perpetuated the ordinary
intestinal troubles which recruits usually experience when first
taking the field. Many men were improperly nourished, their vitality
lowered, and their power of resisting disease impaired. So far as
this resulted from a defect in their militia training, the State of
Massachusetts was responsible.
For a number of years the Massachusetts Militia had been equipped for
eye service. The men were supplied with the equipments they could
carry on their person, and which contributed to the success of a
parade, by giving it a ready-for-war appearance. Not much attention
was paid to other equipments.
There was a limited supply of blankets, ponchos, buzzacotts and
tentage, but not enough for all the troops. These were held at the
Framingham Arsenal, and did duty for a mysterious field equipment,
ready for instant use. There were no shelter tents or wagons. Some of
the supplies were of a stage property kind. The shovels carried by an
improvised pioneer corps in one of the Boston street parades, lasted
two hours when used for digging by a detachment of the Eighth. The
Militia of Massachusetts had never been properly equipped for field
service.
The appropriation of $500,000 by the Legislature in April, enabled
them to take the field better supplied than the Guard Regiments from
many states, but they were never fully equipped by the State, or
instructed in the A B C of a soldier's duty.
They had been assembled for years in brigade camps, and taught
ceremonies and parades, but no attempt had been made to teach company
commanders the important lesson of how to meet the requirements of
the field, and care for their men under service conditions. The
increasing sick list reported in all the camps, accentuated this
absence of individual experience and trained company officers.
The War Department was as unprepared as the Militia of Massachusetts.
The machinery for handling an army of 26,000 men in peace, was called
upon to mobilize 275,000 men of war. It was altogether inadequate
to meet the emergency. There were practically no reserve supplies.
On April 23rd the Government had enough Springfield rifles to equip
the volunteers, but that was all. The cloth of the uniforms first
issued to some regiments at Chickamauga, was not manufactured when
the regiments were mustered into service.
Large quantities of commissary supplies were purchased in the market,
and rushed to the large camps for concentration. These supplies were
uniformly of standard quality, and were accumulated in sufficient
quantities at the depots, but were often delayed in distribution to
the troops. Volunteer officers were at first unacquainted with the
use of requisition blanks, and the red tape of Government issue, and
the Commissary Department lacked facilities to make prompt and full
deliveries. This was the earliest department, however, to get into
working order, and subsequent complaints at Chickamauga were due to
the inexperience of officers and men in handling the rations.
The Quartermaster's Department also made large purchases in the
market, but were handicapped by having to wait for articles to be
manufactured to fill orders. This department at Chickamauga was
further handicapped by inefficiency and failure to appreciate the
situation, and the necessary requirements of the troops.
As soon as wagon transportation was issued to the Eighth, they began
to bring the water from the Blue Spring. This was a long haul, and
required many barrels for transportation and storage in camp. The
supply of barrels issued by the Quartermaster's Department to the
regiment was inadequate. The Chief Quartermaster was repeatedly
requested to furnish sufficient barrels for this purpose, and
refused. The regiment subsequently purchased, at its own expense, at
Chattanooga, sufficient receptacles.
The refusal of the Chief Quartermaster was reported to the Inspector
General's Department, and was thus commented upon:--
"One of the principal appeals made to me during the many
inspections that I made was for water barrels and boilers,
so that the strict order to boil all drinking water might be
complied with. I made several trips to the office of the chief
quartermaster in behalf of the command on this matter, but
without success. I finally went to the corps commander, and he
told me to go again to the chief quartermaster, who told me that
the regiments had as many as 15 water barrels to each regiment
(twelve companies), and the water being hauled from four to seven
miles. This reply convinced me at once of a total failure to
appreciate the condition of affairs, what was required, and what
should be done. Owing to a failure of this department to provide
the proper shelter, supplies, and clothing, I am satisfied that
much of the sickness was caused.
The whole matter sums itself up in this, that the regulations
necessary for the conduct of a small army during a period of
thirty-five years of peace, when built upon and expanded into
those required for an army ten times as large in time of war,
failed absolutely and went to pieces."
The Regimental Commander repeatedly asked the Quartermaster's
Department for disinfectants and lumber; these requisitions were
disallowed. Whatever supplies of this nature the regiment had, were
purchased by private contribution, until the spread of disease
excited public indignation and demanded liberal issues. After
official investigation began, a change was noticed in the policy
of the department. By the end of the summer it is probable that
porcelain lined bath tubs would have been issued for the mere asking.
During the hot summer months, 75 per cent. of the men at Chickamauga
were forced to wear heavy woolen clothing. The Eighth was the only
regiment fully equipped with canvas suits. These had been purchased
by the State of Massachusetts. If sufficient energy had been
displayed by the Quartermaster's Department, the same clothing would
have been purchased and issued to all the regiments. What supplies
were on hand were held in small storehouses, and their issues blocked
by lack of system and necessary labor to handle the goods.
The Medical Department at Chickamauga was inefficient and displayed
lack of both professional and executive ability. There was an
unnecessary shortage of medical supplies and hospital attendants.
No provision was at first made for general hospitals. The sick
were cared for in regimental hospitals, and later when these were
abolished, in Division Hospitals. Division hospitals are organized
to accompany troops in the field, and serve as a collecting station,
where the injured receive temporary treatment and are transferred as
soon as practicable to general hospitals.
The field hospitals at Chickamauga were swarmed with the sick, and
were forced to become general hospitals, as no other provision
had been made. The accommodations were inadequate. Hospital tents
were insufficient in number, and were not supplied with proper
furnishings. There was a lack of medicine and nourishing food. The
nurses were enlisted men detailed from the various regiments, and
were ignorant of their duties, and without experience.
The quarters and grounds were dirty, and the service was
undisciplined, disorganized and demoralized. Until taken firmly in
hand by General Sanger and reorganized, the Third Division Hospital
was a monument to the ignorance and incapacity of the Medical
Department.
This Department was thus described in an inspection report:--
"I found quite a number of sick in each regiment, and was
informed by the regimental surgeons that they could not get from
the medical depot those medicines and other supplies needed
for the sick, and was also informed that, in reply to their
request, they were told that no issue of medicine or medical
supplies could be had from the depot until the field cases were
filled; that, although the medicines were on hand, it was not
the intention to make issues until everything could be done
in the order required by the Army Regulations, resulting in
unnecessary discomfort and suffering to the sick. The different
aid societies did a great deal toward helping out the unfortunate
conditions, but on the whole, the administration of the affairs
of this department was a dismal failure. Those regimental medical
officers bought a great deal of medicine with their own funds
and from funds furnished them by their friends at home. There
were no cots, blankets, pillows, nor sheets. The medicine and
medical supplies were entirely inadequate for many days after my
reporting for duty. There were no floors in the tents where the
sick were. They were crowded together in dangerous proximity to
each other, and those gentlemen of the medical profession of the
volunteer service were very bitter in their denunciations of our
miserable system."
The medical officers of the Eighth were at all times zealous and
efficient in instructing officers how to combat disease, and the
regimental officers were intelligent and active in carrying out these
instructions.
Before typhoid became epidemic, Colonel Pew assembled officers and
men after evening parade, and explained to them the nature and cause
of this fever. He said this disease had already broken out, and he
anticipated it would become a scourge to the troops, because of the
unsanitary condition of the various camps. That it was caused by
microscopic germs found in the discharges of the sick. That these
germs were very tenacious of life, and increased and multiplied
rapidly in filth. That when dry they would drift about in the air and
lodge on food, clothing or the person. That they were harmless unless
taken into the mouth, but as they were too small to be seen, there
was always danger of contagion. That they were killed by boiling,
and for that reason the men would be required to drink only boiled
water, and keep their food protected against dust. That all human
excreta must be deposited in the proper place, and covered with a
paddle, as Moses taught the children of Israel to care for themselves
in the Wilderness. That police regulations would be enforced, and
camp conditions made as unfavorable as possible for the growth and
development of these germs. He urged the men to appreciate the danger
to which they were exposed, and to avoid it by complying strictly
with all sanitary regulations.
The Medical Board appointed to examine into the causes of the
existence and spread of typhoid in the national camp of 1898,
reported that this fever was brought to Camp Thomas by the
volunteers, and spread by the neglect of the rules of sanitation and
military hygiene. Out of forty-eight regiments whose medical records
were examined, nine regiments reached Chickamauga with developed
cases of typhoid, twenty-five regiments developed cases within two
weeks, and at the expiration of one month only two regiments of the
forty-eight were free from this disease. The first case of typhoid
in the Eighth Regiment was reported July 13.
The average volunteer at Chickamauga had little discipline, and a
slight knowledge of sanitation. He was willing to fight, as he had
enlisted for that purpose, but he rather resented as an invasion of
personal rights, any attempt to dictate what he should eat or drink.
He did not accept in full faith the germ theory of disease, and was
skeptical about the existence of bugs he could not see.
If water looked clear and was cool, he was unwilling to believe it
was unwholesome, especially when it tasted sweet and satisfied his
cravings. He was willing to believe that any water in which fish
could swim, was good to drink, or to accept any other absurd test
which was current.
The experience of an outpost from the regiment illustrates the
chances intelligent college men would take, when it became a question
of satisfying the appetite. This outpost was established on the banks
of Chickamauga Creek, below the inflow of camp sewerage, and obtained
their drinking water from a spring bubbling up in the slope of the
bank. A sudden rain caused the creek to rise and submerge the spring.
After the water subsided, the outpost discovered the surface of the
spring covered with slime.
Someone suggested bad germs floated, and acting upon this theory,
they plunged a canteen to the bottom of the spring, with the opening
stopped by the thumb against the entrance of bacteria. When the
canteen was on the bottom, the thumb was removed until the canteen
was filled, the opening was then again plugged with the thumb, and
the supply brought to the surface. Every member of this outpost was
stricken with typhoid as a result of this experiment.
Although orders had been issued to drink only boiled water, most men
in the corps drank what they pleased. Unsatisfactory rations led many
men to patronize the various food venders. Near the railroad station
a swarm of booths sprung up, where all kinds of food were dispensed.
These stands were not subject to medical inspection, and later were
denounced by the Medical Department as sources of contagion.
The chief sources of contagion were company sinks. Digging and caring
for sinks did not appeal to the men as heroic soldiering. They hated
and shirked this duty and as a result the sinks of many regiments
were so repulsive that the men refused to use them, and polluted
territory surrounding the camp.
The care of the sinks was always a matter of great solicitude to the
officers of the Eighth. Their cleanliness was insisted upon at all
times with martinet rigidity, and men were punished for not using
them, after the formality of a trial and conviction before a summary
court.
It was recognized that these pest holes might become breeding grounds
of flies which would infest the camp and carry contagion. The
following extract from a circular shows to what extent this danger
was appreciated.
"No doubt typhoid fever, camp diarrhœa, and probably yellow fever
are frequently communicated to soldiers in camp through the
agency of flies, which swarm about fecal matter and filth of all
kinds deposited upon the ground or in shallow pits and directly
convey infectious material, attached to their feet or contained
in their excreta, to the food which is exposed while being
prepared at the company kitchens or while being served in the
mess tent. It is for this reason that a strict sanitary police
is so important."
Although the Eighth prevented flies breeding in its own camp, it
could not prevent them swarming from other camps and spreading
contagion. Flies increased and multiplied. A roast of beef exposed
for a few minutes looked as black as a mass of charcoal, so dense was
its surface packed with flies. Netting was purchased, and an attempt
was made to keep all food covered. Some of the officers constructed
mess quarters of scantlings covered with fly screens.
For two months the Eighth Regiment, fully realizing the danger to
which it was exposed, fought against typhoid and combated it with
intelligence and energy. During the last two months of its stay at
Chickamauga, it was smitten with a heavy hand, and became the victims
of a system which failed to furnish sanitary safeguards against the
spread of communicable disease.
Digging was at all times difficult in the territory of the Eighth,
as the soil was a hard clay and the outcropping ledges caused the
abandonment of many sink holes when half dug. When the rainy season
began a new danger threatened the regiment. The sinks would fill with
water and stay full. Refilling the holes with lumps of clay that had
been taken out, would cause an overflow and pollute the surrounding
ground. Sinks had to be abandoned after every heavy rain, and new
holes dug.
The ground in the rear of the camp was filled with open pits in
which polluted water stagnated. It was noticed that this stagnant
water became the breeding ground for insects. The ingenuity of the
officers was taxed to invent a method of sealing these sinks. A happy
suggestion occurred to a group of officers who had been in the
habit of dining at an Italian Restaurant in Boston. They had seen
flasks of Chianti sealed with a few spoonfuls of olive oil, and the
analogy suggested oil to seal the sinks against insect life. A can of
kerosene was secured, and the experiment tried.