Traveling around Britain during the weeks prior to the 1955 election,

I was struck by the number of people of both parties prepared to

accept the Conservatives' contention that their party was, by some

mysterious dispensation, uniquely suited to the business of conducting

the nation's foreign policy. In some areas, notably in the North and

the Midlands, this seemed to spring from Eden's long and, on the whole,

successful record in international affairs. In others I encountered a

feeling that the withdrawals from India and Egypt and such blunders as

the loss of the Abadan oil refinery had lowered the prestige of the

country. Certainly the Tories were not guiltless. Nonetheless, there

was a persistent conviction that the Tories handled foreign affairs

best. Occasionally--this was at the nadir of Socialist fortunes--I met

Labor supporters who subscribed to this view.

The first public reaction to British intervention in Egypt in 1956 was

a triumph for organized public opinion as directed by the Labor Party.

From the resolutions that flooded into London from factory and local

unions, one would have concluded that the whole of the British working

class was violently opposed to governmental policy. Actually, a number

of public-opinion polls showed that the country was pretty evenly

divided. My own experience, traveling around Britain in January and

February of 1957, convinced me that, on the whole, the working-class

support for the Suez adventure was slightly stronger than that of the

professional classes. Of course, as in most situations of this kind,

the supporters did not bother to send telegrams of support.

The Labor Party in the House of Commons made a great offensive against

the Conservative position on Egypt. This played a part, but not the

dominant part, in the cabinet's decision to accept a cease-fire. The

paramount factor was the indication from Washington that unless Britain

agreed to a cease-fire, the administration would not help Britain with

oil supplies and would not act to support the pound sterling, whose

good health is the basis of Britain's position as an international

banker.

The Socialists' attack did result in the emergence of Aneurin Bevan as

the party's principal spokesman, and a most effective one, on foreign

affairs. This is an area where the Labor Party has been weak in recent

years. Death removed Ernest Bevin, a great Foreign Secretary, and

Hector McNeil, the brightest of the party's younger experts on foreign

affairs.

Moderation, a national rather than a class approach, the middle

way--all these sufficed for the Tories in 1955. Two years later

there are abundant signs that a sharper policy will be necessary to

meet international and internal situations vastly more difficult.

Drastic policies invite harsh argument in their formulation. Can the

Conservatives continue to settle their differences in the Carlton Club

or will these spill out onto the front pages of the newspapers?

The primary political problem the Conservative government faced before

Suez was whether it could continue its policies, especially where they

related to defense and taxation, and retain the support of a large

and influential group of Conservative voters. This group is offended

and rebellious because, although the Conservatives have now been in

office for over five years, it still finds its real income shrinking,

its social standards reduced, and its future uncertain. It regards the

moderate Conservatives' economic policy and attitude toward social

changes as akin to those of the Labor Party. By the middle of 1956 its

resentment was being reflected by the reduction of the Conservative

vote in the elections.

The group can be defined as the old middle class. During the last

century it has been one of the most important and often the most

dominant of classes in Britain. Its fight to maintain its position

against the challenge of the new middle class and the inexorable march

of social and economic changes is one of the most interesting and most

pathetic parts of Britain's modern revolution.

The leaders of the old middle class represented a combination of

influence and wealth in the professions, medicine, the church, the

law, education, and the armed forces. The members of these professions

and their immediate lieutenants administered the great institutions

that had established Britain in the Victorian twilight as the world's

greatest power. They were responsible for the great public schools, the

Church of England, the Royal Navy, the banks, the largest industries,

the shipping lines, the universities.

They were not the aristocracy. The decline of the aristocracy, with

its ancient titles, its huge estates, and its huge debts, began over

a century ago. The old middle class began life as the aristocracy's

executors and ended as its heirs.

The pattern of life in the old middle class was shaken by World War

I, but it existed relatively unchanged in 1939. The class was the

butt of the bright young playwrights of the twenties and has received

the acid attentions of Mr. Somerset Maugham. It supported Munich and

Chamberlain, and it sent its sons away to die in 1939.

As a group, the class was well educated. The majority of the men had

been to a public school and a university. Both men and women bought and

read books and responsible newspapers. They traveled abroad, they knew

something about the world. Some had inherited wealth. Others invested

their savings.

Beneath this upper stratum of the old middle class was a lower middle

class that sought to rise into it. This was made up of shopkeepers,

small manufacturers, the more prosperous farmers, the black-coat

workers in business, and the industrial technicians.

The future welfare of these two groups is the political problem that

the Conservative Party must face. Since the decline of the Liberal

Party, the Tories have counted upon the support of this class. There

were many defections in the election of 1945, but it is probable that

a more important reason for the Tory defeat that year was the party's

failure to win the support of a new middle class that was then arising

as a factor in British politics.

The chief reason why the old middle class is defecting from the Tory

standard is that it believes that the Conservative governments since

1945 have not done enough to halt the drain on its incomes. Prices

have risen sharply in the years since Chamberlain went to Munich. One

estimate is that the 1938 income of £1,000 a year for a married man

with two children would have to be raised to £4,000 to provide the same

net income today. But in this class the number of men whose incomes

have quadrupled or even doubled since 1938 is small.

What do the figures mean in terms of a family's life? They mean that

to send the children to a public school, which the majority of this

class regards as indispensable from a social and even occasionally

from an educational standpoint, the father and mother must do without

new clothes, books, the occasional visit to the theater. Instead of

two regular servants, the family must "make do" with a daily cleaning

woman. The family vacations in some quiet French or Italian seaside

resort must be abandoned. The father and mother are unable to save and

are increasingly worried about their future. They see a future decline

in the family's social standards and economic health.

All this is aggravated in their minds by the appearance of a new middle

class arising from a different background and doing new and different

jobs. Its income, its expense accounts, its occasional lack of taste

stir the envy and anger of the old middle class.

What the old middle class asks from the government--and, through the

government, from the big trade unions and the big industrialists--is an

end to the rise in the cost of living which it, subsisting chiefly on

incomes that have not risen sharply, cannot meet. Directly it asks the

government for an end to punishing taxation and to "coddling" of both

the unions and the manufacturers.

The dilemma of the Conservative Party and its government is a serious

one. To lose the support of the old middle class will be dangerous,

even disastrous. For although the Tories have attracted thousands

of former Socialist votes in the last two elections, these do not

represent the solid electoral support that the old middle class has

offered.

Perhaps in time the government may be able to reduce taxation.

Before this can be done, it must halt inflation, expand constructive

investment in industry, and increase the gold and dollar reserves. Each

of these depends to a great degree on economic factors with world-wide

ramifications. The old middle class understands this and is justifiably

suspicious of "pie in the sky" promises.

Such suspicion is increased by the understanding of the other serious

long-term problems that British society faces. We need mention only

one in this context: how is Britain to maintain its present standards

of life and the present levels of government expenditure when it is

faced with the coming change in the age distribution of the population?

The steady fall in death rates and the low birth rates of the years

between the two world wars are beginning to increase the proportion

of elderly people, and thus to reduce the proportion of the working

population to the total population. The size of the age groups reaching

retirement age increases yearly. It is predicted, on the basis of

present population trends, that over the next fifteen years the

population of the working-age group will remain about the same but that

the number of old people, persons over sixty-five, will rise over the

next thirty years by about three million. At the same time the number

of children of school age is expected to increase.

Britain thus is faced with a steady increase in the number of the aged

who need pensions and medical care and the young who need medical care

and education. This charge will be added to the burdens already borne

by the working-age group.

The country needs more hospitals and more schools. It needs new

highways. It has to continue slum-clearance and the building of homes.

Yet Britain has been spending $7,000,000,000 a year on social services

and $4,200,000,000 on defense. Under existing circumstances, and in

view of present Conservative policies, can the old middle class look

forward to an important reduction in taxation under any government?

Reduction of taxation was one of the goals sought by Conservative

government when it planned a revision of Britain's defense program.

This revision, first planned by the ministry of Sir Anthony Eden and

given new impetus by the Macmillan government, has other objectives,

including the diversion of young men, capital, and productive capacity

from defense to industrial production for export. But an easing of

the defense burden would create conditions for tax relief in the

Conservative circles that need it most.

The reduction of defense expenditures places any Conservative

government in a dilemma. The party expects the government to maintain

Britain's position as a nuclear power--that is, as a major power.

The political repercussions of the Suez crisis showed the depth of

nationalism within the party, and, indeed, within the country. Yet

it seems plainly impossible for the Tories to reduce taxation of the

middle class drastically without cutting the defense expenditure that

has maintained Britain, somewhat precariously, in the front rank of

world powers.

Of course, tax relief will not fully answer the difficulties of the old

middle class. Its incomes, ranging from the pensions of ex-officers

to the profits of small businessmen, have lagged behind prices.

Stabilization of prices is essential if this class is to maintain its

standards.

The rebellion of the old middle class against Tory policy and

leadership, if carried to the limit, might result in the creation of an

extreme right-wing party. Such a party would be brought into being more

easily if the sort of inflation which helped wreck the German democracy

after World War I were to appear in Britain. Would the political good

sense of the British enable them to reject the vendors of extreme

political panaceas who would appear at such a juncture?

The old middle class contains today, as it has since 1945, persons

and organizations fanatically opposed to the unions and to labor in

general. Extremist organizations, some of them modeled on the Poujadist

movement in France, have appeared. In many cases the opposition to

labor policies and personalities has been expanded in these groups to

include the "traitors" at the head of the present Tory government, who

are considered betrayers of their party and their class.

There is a reasonable expectation that Britain will continue to

encounter economic problems whose solution will involve economic

sacrifices by all classes in the future. The old middle class feels

that it has sacrificed more than any other group. There is thus a

potential of serious trouble within the Conservative party. The most

probable development, it seems to me, is an attempt by the right

wing of the party to win and hold power. But a rapid deterioration of

the economic situation under a moderate Tory government followed by

the return to power of a Labor government might well encourage the

transformation of the Tories into a radical right-wing party.

At the moment the right wing of the Conservative Party wants too much.

It asks for an uncontrolled economy and is restless under the measures

imposed to defeat inflation. But it also wants a stabilization of

prices. It wants a "tough" foreign policy, but it opposes the taxation

necessary to make the arms on which such a policy must rest. It has an

almost reckless desire to curb the trade unions without reckoning the

effect on industrial relations.

The moderates who fashioned the present Conservative Party and who now

lead its government appear to understand their country and its position

better than their critics on the right wing. In addition, their

programs have attracted the attention and support of young people to a

degree unknown on the right wing.

In the late thirties, when I first was indoctrinated in British

politics, it was smart to be on the left. The young people before the

war were very certain of the stupidity of the Conservative government

policies, at home as well as abroad, and their political convictions

ranged from communism to the socialism of the Labor Party. "All the

young people are Bolshies," a manufacturer told me in 1939. "If we do

have a war, this country will go communist."

A good proportion of young people still are on the left. But they do

not seem to hold their convictions as strongly as those I knew in the

pre-war years. On the other side of the fence there has been a movement

toward an intellectual adoption of conservative principles. In some

cases this verges on radicalism, in a few almost to nihilism: the

"nothing's any good in either party, let's get rid of them both" idea.

There is always a danger to democracy in such attitudes. They are

encouraged in Britain by a tendency in some circles to adopt an

arrogant, patrician distaste for all democratic politics. This is

understandable. The revolution that began with the war has weakened

the economic and political power of a once dominant class. But that

does not excuse those who seek to destroy faith in democratic processes.

The position of the Conservative Party is both stronger and weaker than

it appears. There are reasons for believing that by the next general

election, probably in 1959 or 1960, the policies of the government

will have relieved the more immediate problems such as inflation

and the need for increased exports. This success will not change

Britain's position as a comparatively small power competing militarily,

politically, and economically with the larger established powers, such

as the Soviet Union and the United States, and the reviving powers,

Germany and Japan.

The dominant group in the Conservative Party and government has,

however, a considerable degree of competence and experience in

government. It has an effective parliamentary majority during the

present administration. Against these positive factors we must place

the probability that some of its policies will continue to alienate an

important group of its supporters; the result may be a rebellion within

the party or worse.

The Tories are not politically dogmatic. Like the people, the whole

people, they claim to represent, they are flexible in their approach

to policies and programs. They change to suit economic conditions and

political attitudes. In Britain's present position, the appeal of a

party that contends it is working for the nation rather than a class or

a section should not be minimized.

But it is precisely Britain's position in the modern world that

forces upon the Conservatives today, and would force upon Labor if it

came to power tomorrow, certain policies that are at odds with the

principles of each faction. The Tories, for instance, must manipulate

the economy. The idea of "getting government out of business" may be

attractive to some industrialists, but in the nation's situation it

is impractical and dangerous. Similarly, the Labor Party, despite its

anti-colonialism, must follow policies that will enable Britain to

keep her investments in Malaya's tin and rubber and in the oil of the

Middle East.

We see the two great parties meeting on such common ground. Perhaps

because they are less restricted by dogma and can boast greater talents

at the moment, the Tories appear slightly more confident of their

ability to meet the challenges of Britain's position.

[Illustration]

V. _The Labor Party_

POLITICAL MACHINE OR MORAL CRUSADE?

_The idea of Socialism is grand and noble; and it is, I am convinced,

possible of realization; but such a state of society cannot be

manufactured--it must grow. Society is an organism, not a machine._

HENRY GEORGE

_We are all Socialists nowadays._

EDWARD VII WHEN PRINCE OF WALES

[Illustration]

"The Tories won the election because they understood the changes that

had taken place since 1945," said a Labor politician in 1955. "We

misunderstood them and we lost. Yet we call ourselves 'the party of the

people.'"

This assessment, made on the morning of defeat, explains to some degree

the Labor Party's defeat in the general election of 1955. It raises

the question of whether the party, as now constituted, is in fact a

working-class party. The growth of the Labor Party, the emergence of

its saints and sinners, the triumph of 1945, the disaster of 1955 make

up one of the truly significant political stories of the century.

For Americans it is especially important. The British Labor Party

is the strongest non-communist left-wing party in any of the great

democracies of the West. Granted the normal shifts in political

support, it will be back in power sometime within the next ten years.

The government and people of the United States must regard it as

a permanent part of British political life, and they will have to

understand it better than they have in the past if the alliance between

the United States and the United Kingdom is to prosper.

The British Labor Party is the political arm of what the old-timers

like to call "the movement." And it is as well to remember that not

so very long ago--Winston Churchill was a young politician then and

Anthony Eden was at Eton--it was a "movement" with all the emotional

fervor the word implies. The men who made the Labor Party a power in

the land were not cool, reasoning intellectuals (although, inevitably,

these assisted) but hot-eyed radicals who combined a fierce intolerance

with a willingness to suffer for their beliefs.

The movement includes the Labor Party itself; the Trades Union

Congress, known universally in Britain as the TUC; the Co-Operative

Societies; and some minor socialist groups.

The Trades Union Congress is one of the centers of power in modern

Britain. We will encounter it often in this book. Here we are concerned

with its old position as the starting-point for British working-class

power. The first Labor Party representatives who went to the House of

Commons in 1906 were supported almost entirely by members of unions.

The Parliamentary Labor Party came into being as an association of the

Labor members of the House of Commons. Today it includes members of

the House of Lords. There was originally a much closer co-ordination

between the unions and the Labor MP's than exists now.

Today the TUC, although it exerts great political power both directly

and indirectly, is important principally as the national focus of the

trade-union movement. All the unions of any size or importance except

the National Union of Teachers, the National Association of Local

Government Officers, and some civil-service staff associations, are

affiliated with it.

Its membership is impressive. The unions have a total membership of

9,461,000, of which 8,088,000 are affiliated with the TUC--this in

a population of just over 50,000,000. The TUC's power is equally

impressive. It is recognized by the government as the principal channel

for consultation between the ministries and organized labor on matters

affecting the interests of employees generally.

This power is not unchallenged. One of the disruptive situations in the

Labor movement today is the restlessness of a number of constituency

labor parties under the authority of the TUC. The constituency labor

parties are the local organizations in the parliamentary constituencies

or divisions. A number of them are and have been well to the left of

the official leadership of the party. In them Aneurin Bevan finds his

chief support for the rebellion he has waged intermittently against the

leadership during the last five years.

Another source of anxiety to the TUC is the unwillingness of some

unions--mostly those infiltrated by the Communists--to follow its

instructions in industrial disputes. The TUC leaders with whom I have

talked regard the strike weapon as the hydrogen bomb in labor's armory.

They oppose its indiscriminate use. But in a large number of cases they

have been unable to prevent its use.

The labor movement represents generally the industrial urban working

class in Britain. But it is no longer an industrial urban working-class

party. The modern movement relies on other sections of the population

for both leaders and votes. Just as there are working-class districts

that vote Tory in election after election, so are there middle-class

groups who vote Labor.

Horny-handed sons of toil still rank among the party's leading

politicians, but the post-war years have seen a steady increase in

two other types. One is the union officer, whose acquaintance with

physical labor is often somewhat limited. The other is the product of

a middle-class home, a public-school education, and an important job

in the wartime civil service. Hugh Gaitskell, the present leader of the

Parliamentary Labor Party, is a notable example of this second group.

The party still includes intellectuals treading circumspectly in

the footprints left by the sainted Sydney and Beatrice Webb. The

intellectuals, perhaps in search of protective coloring, often assume

a manner more rough-hewn than the latest recruit from the coal face.

Incidentally, it was my impression that the defeat of 1955 shook the

intellectuals a good deal more than the practical politicians. They

departed, as is their custom, into long, gloomy analyses of the reasons

for the defeat. They, too, may have been out of touch with the people.

Of course the defeat of 1955 did not finish the Labor movement in

Britain any more than its victory in 1945 doomed the Conservative

Party. True, the Labor vote dropped from 13,949,000 in 1951 to

13,405,000 in 1955 and the party's strength in the House of Commons

fell from 295 to 277 seats. But the prophets of gloom overlooked the

movement's immense vitality, which comes in part from its connection

with certain emotions and ideals well established in modern Britain.

Within the movement the accepted reason for the defeat was the

interparty feud among the Bevanites on the left and the moderate

and right-wing groups. The moderates, representing the TUC and the

moderate elements of the Parliamentary Labor Party, provided most of

the party leaders in the election campaign. But in the year before the

election the squabbling within the party in the House of Commons and

on the hustings created a poor impression. One leader went into the

campaign certain that the party had not convinced the electorate that,

if elected, it could provide a competent, united government. These

bickerings thus were a serious factor in the Socialist catastrophe.

These are the British · 第 5 / 24 段