THE FRENCH TANK CORPS--AMERICAN TANKS AND BRITISH TANKS IN EGYPT
It is said that there is something in the Anglo-Saxon mind which has a
special affinity for committees.
“Enough,” said the logical Asiatic when the doctrine of the Trinity was
being explained to him by the English missionary, “I understand you
perfectly. It is a Committee of three.”
At least, there is no doubt that the British Tank sprang from
committees, and was matured and licked into shape entirely by a large
assortment of these excellent bodies.
So with the American Tank Corps. Three or four names are equally
illustrious in its early annals.
But with the French, one man, and one man only, stands out as the
Father and Mother of Tanks. He was the General Swinton, the Sir Albert
Stern, and the General Elles of the French Tanks. That is to say, he
was first the principal independent inventor, deriving his inspiration
(in early 1915) from Holt Tractors which he saw at work with the
British. Then he was for long the principal “propellant” of the Tank
idea in official quarters, and was the Commander-in-Chief’s delegate to
the Ministry of Munitions in the matter of Tanks. Finally, on September
30, 1916, he was gazetted “Commandant de l’Artillerie d’Assaut[49] aux
Armées.”
So much did the personality of this remarkable man permeate and
vitalise the French Tank Corps that we offer no apology to the
reader in setting forth the following delightful miniature biography
of General Estienne by the hand of Major Robert Spencer, the British
Liaison Officer to the French Tank Corps:
“Jean Baptiste Eugène Estienne was born at Condé en Barrois
(Lorraine) on November 7, 1860. Owing to the trend of events during
the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 his school, the Lycée of Bar le
Duc, was forced to shut, and it was whilst enjoying an enforced
holiday at the age of ten years at Condé with his parents that
his idea of embracing a military career was born. He was one day
an interested spectator of the passage of a column of Prussian
artillery through the paved streets of his native town, and was
lost in youthful admiration of this display of military power. He
hastened back to tell his parents of his decision one day to enter
as a conqueror into a town with his guns clattering behind him.
“From this hour he became wedded to an artillery-man’s life, and
in due course passed in and out of the famous École Polytechnique,
where his mathematical ability enjoyed full scope.
“In due course, too, he passed through the artillery school of
Fontainebleau, and in 1884 entered the garrison town of Vannes as a
Second Lieutenant.
“Promoted Captain in 1891, he completed his studies in the use
of the _collimateur_[50] and became the apostle of the use of
direct fire for field artillery, which he eventually succeeded
in introducing in the French Army. In 1909 he was summoned to
Vincennes with a view to determining if any use could be made of
aeroplanes in conjunction with field artillery, and succeeded in
establishing a part for F.A. aircraft service. This, however, was
transferred to the R.E. and Lieut.-Colonel Estienne consequently
asked to be returned to regimental duty.
“In 1913 he was again summoned to Vincennes to continue his
research, and was here at the outbreak of war, when he obtained
command of the 22nd Regiment of Artillery. This he commanded in
Belgium and throughout the retreat from Charleroi to the Seine.
He had with him his two experimental aeroplanes, which rendered
invaluable service during the Battle of the Marne, where he served
under General Pétain.
“It was during the retreat that Colonel Estienne first spoke to
members of his Staff of the future which would attend a machine
capable of crossing ploughed fields and trenches, transporting arms
and men. With this thought in his mind he was wont to invite his
casual visitors and members of his Staff to assume all manner of
peculiar attitudes under tables, etc., with a view to determining
how many human beings could conveniently be crammed in a certain
cubic area.
“His last command before being selected to father the future _Chars
d’Assaut_ was at Verdun, when he did not hesitate to employ a
barrage of his heavy guns to break up a threatening German attack.
“As a man he appears to enjoy perpetual youth. He is short of
stature, with no neck and a large round head. His hair is white,
plentiful and worn _en brosse_, and he appears to be clean-shaven,
so short is his clipped white moustache.
“Two things strike one immediately, the charm of his perennial
smile and the quick brilliance of his brown eyes.
“As a raconteur he is inimitable, whilst as a lecturer his
marvellous power of expression, his command of vocabulary and his
convincing use of simile make it possible for him to communicate to
his less erudite audiences a certain measure of his vast knowledge.
This is by no means confined to military subjects, and his power of
quotation from the classics is marked, whilst he has at least once
published a lengthy poem in a volume dealing with the mathematics
of gunnery.
“As an ardent philologist, he bristles all over at the sound of
the word ‘Tancque’ from French lips, and opens a violent crusade
against the use of foreign words as a substitute for good French
equivalents.
“His voice is loud and resonant and his speech accompanied by
frequent gestures, his favourite being the placing of his left hand
flat upon his chest as if he implies that his utterances emanate
from his heart.
“He possesses many characteristic attitudes, and when in
conversation is often to be seen tossing his _képi_ from one side
of his head to the other. In fact it is scarcely ever to be seen
except jauntily tilted over one ear.
“His admiration for the cavalryman at the head of a triumphal entry
into a town is reduced to nothingness by his conviction that he is
useless in modern war. He would prefer to see a victorious General
enter a town on foot, escorted by a section of _Chars d’Assaut_, as
being more typical of the present-day battlefield.
“He is himself a great walker, and may frequently be seen alone,
wearing, as is his wont, a pair of pale blue spats or gaiters, a
relic of the Empire uniform, and in summer no socks.
“This latter habit was recommended to him by a friend, and its
adoption by him is typical of the man in that he is always prepared
to give careful thought and personal trial to any scheme laid
before him.
“To this quality, added to his immense personal charm and vast
experience, is due his undoubted right to rank amongst the big men
of this war, a successful issue to which has ever been the dream of
his life.”
On December 1, 1915, Colonel Estienne wrote an official letter to the
Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies in which he outlined the idea
of a new engine of war exactly as Colonel Swinton had done earlier
in the year to our own War Office. A few days later he was given an
interview at French General Headquarters, when he was able to enlarge
upon his theories as to the new arm. Here he must, one conjectures,
have received some encouragement, for about a week afterwards he
visited the Schneider Engineering Works in Paris and discussed
mechanical details with the management.
But the good seed which Colonel Estienne had sown at Headquarters
would, he knew, take some time to germinate. He returned to his
command, now the artillery of the 3rd Corps, at that time before
Verdun. All the while he kept unofficially in touch with the Schneider
Works.
At last, about February 25, 1916, he learned that the Under-Secretary’s
Department for Artillery had decided to place an order for 400 armoured
vehicles with Schneider’s.
But about two months later, at the end of April, he heard a more
surprising piece of news.
The Under-Secretary’s Department had, without the approval of the
Commander-in-Chief or any notice to him, Estienne, placed an order for
a further 400 vehicles of a different and heavier type, driven by a
petrol-electric motor.
Curious as was their parentage, these 400 machines were actually made
and were known as the St. Chamond Tanks. It is said to have been upon
stolen drawings of this type that the Germans afterwards based their
still heavier, “Hagens” and “Schultzes.”
In the course of the summer, the new French Ministry of Munitions
formed an experimental and instructional area at Marly-le-Roi, and in
the early autumn, Colonel Estienne was gazetted to the command of the
French Tanks, and, as we have said, to be delegate, as far as this arm
was concerned, from the Commander-in-Chief to the Ministry of Munitions.
Like the British, the French were beginning to need a name for their
new engine of war.
But more logical than we, instead of an absurd, if pleasant, nickname,
they chose “Artillerie d’Assaut,” which they contracted into the
letters “A.S.,” as being more agreeable to the ear than “A.A.”
Apparently Colonel Estienne had no preliminary inkling of what our
activities had been in the “Land Cruiser” direction.
It is interesting to conjecture how eagerly he must have read of what
was happening on the Somme during the fortnight before he was finally
gazetted to his new post. His “heart” must, indeed, have been “at our
festival” when the British Tanks were everywhere acclaimed by the
public, and when even the most conservative soldiers had to admit that
the new weapon had at least earned a right to further trial.
In October 1916 a training centre for personnel was established at
Champlieu, on the southern edge of the Forest of Compiègne, and here in
December the first lot of sixteen Schneider Tanks were delivered, other
batches both of Schneiders and St. Chamonds following them during the
succeeding months, until, in April 1917, nine Schneider Companies and
one St. Chamond Company and their crews were ready for action.
On April 16, 1917, French Tanks took part in their first battle,
fighting with the 5th French Army in the attempted penetration of the
Chemin des Dames.
Of the eight Schneider Companies employed, five succeeded in reaching
their third and final objectives, but owing to lack of previous
training with the infantry, the attack as a whole was not very
successful, and the Tanks, though they played an exceedingly gallant
part, suffered severely.
A week or two later, one St. Chamond and two Schneider Companies took
part in a hurriedly prepared operation with the 6th Army.
The Schneiders did extremely well, but of sixteen St. Chamond machines,
only one managed to cross the German trenches. All through the summer
months, the 6th French Army was preparing another attack on the west
of the Chemin des Dames, and for this battle, warned by their previous
experiences, infantry and Tanks trained diligently together, special
detachments known as _troupes d’accompagnement_ being taught how to
help the Tanks over trenches.
But the agile mind of Colonel Estienne was not content. He had had
another idea. This time his mind had worked at the idea of the armoured
attacking force from a slightly different standpoint.
He envisaged waves of armoured skirmishers attacking in open order,
each man possessing besides his armour a quick-firing weapon with which
he could shoot as he advanced.
Now, armour which will protect from machine-gun and rifle fire is too
heavy for human legs. The armour must be independently propelled. More,
if its occupant is to fire as he advances, it must carry him as well
as itself. This postulates an engine, and if there is an engine, there
must be a second man to look after it. This set of propositions he laid
before the Rénault firm in July 1916, and the design of the famous
Rénault Tank was evolved.
But the Ministry would have none of it.
However, the designs were worked out in greater detail, and at the end
of November 1916 Colonel Estienne proposed to the Commander-in-Chief
that a number of such machines should be constructed. A few, he
explained, had already been ordered to act as “Command” Tanks for the
heavy Battalions. The Commander-in-Chief consented to a trial.
This, however, was not held until March 1917, and when it had been
held, the Ministry were still not convinced.
Therefore, still further demonstrations were arranged in May, when at
last they ceased to doubt, and finally, in June 1917, ordered 3500 of
the new machines.
In October the five Companies of heavy Tanks, which had been in
training all summer, were launched when the 6th Army delivered its blow
at Malmaison.
As before, the Schneider Companies were successful, and again the St.
Chamond Tanks were nearly all unable so much as to get into action.
Still, at the end of October the general verdict was that the French
heavies had justified themselves, though many soldiers of the old
school still doubted their utility.
But in November the British Tanks fought the Battle of Cambrai, and all
doubts were finally dispelled from the French mind.
It is to be imagined that Colonel Estienne did not fail to rub in the
facts proved by that engagement.
They were facts which it was impossible to deny or to overlook. The
Ministry removed its hold from the brakes, and from that moment life
behind the scenes of the French Tank Corps became happy. It was decided
to form thirty light Tank Battalions, each Battalion to consist of
seventy-five machines, and the firms of Schneider, Rénault and Berliet
were all set to work upon their manufacture, while over a thousand
machines were ordered in America.
All the winter of 1917–18, the French Tank Corps, like the British,
continued to train and to organise.
For the future of the French Tanks was to be a brilliant one.
Those matchless givers of “unsolicited testimonials,” the German
General Staff, attributed the great victories which the late summer of
1918 brought to the French arms, chiefly to the employment of “masses
of Tanks.”
Naturally the annals of the French Tank Corps are full of stories of
individual deeds of gallantry.
_Chevrel, R. C., Brigadier, 505th Regt., Chars Légers._
“In the course of an attack he refused to abandon his Tank, which
remained isolated in the German lines. Protected by his turret, he
ceaselessly opened machine-gun fire on the surrounding enemy, and
shot down with his revolver those who succeeded in approaching the
Tank and who called upon him to surrender. For thirty-six hours
he never slackened. Finally rescued by our advancing troops, he
immediately undertook the unditching of his Tank and volunteered to
support the further advance of the infantry, and then brought his
Tank to the rallying point.
Médaille militaire and Croix de Guerre with Palm.”--Official
Gazette, dated October 26, 1918.
_Cellier, Pierre, Brigadier in 35th Co., 11th Heavy Battery._
“This soldier, on July 18, when his Tank had been hit by a shell,
placed himself at the head of fifteen American soldiers and stalked
a position whence the Germans were using many machine-guns to
resist the attack. These he engaged with an automatic rifle and
forced the Germans to surrender after an hour’s struggle. This act
resulted in the capture of fifteen officers, including one Colonel,
guns and numerous machine-guns.
Chevalier de la Légion d’Honneur and Croix de Guerre with
Palm.”--Official Gazette.
_Dr. Gilles, Raoul Jules Gustave, Cte. in the 506th Regt., Chars
Légers._
“Although blinded by wounds, brought his Tank back into French
lines guided (by signals tapped on his shoulders) by the Tank
Commander Maréchal de logis Joseph, who was himself wounded in the
stomach.
Médaille militaire and Croix de Guerre with Palm.”--Official
Gazette, No. 2127 “D,” July 26, 1918.
Colonel Estienne was promoted to the rank of General of Division and
received the Cravat de la Légion d’Honneur, and the Commander-in-Chief
of the French Armies issued the following special Order of the Day to
the French Tank Corps:
“Vous avez bien mérite (de) la Patrie.”
AMERICAN TANKS
By the time the United States of America declared War (April 1917) the
value of Tanks had already been demonstrated in battle by the British
in the Somme Offensive, and by the end of October 1916 the French were
already training with their first machines. It is not, therefore,
surprising that the Americans, with their great experience of Tractors
(it was, the reader will remember, an American Tractor that was the
chief ingredient in the make-up of the Mark I.) had a strong desire to
include this new arm in their Expeditionary Force.
Colonel Rockenbach, who was later to command the American Tank Corps in
the field, was detailed to initiate preliminaries. He arrived in France
in June 1917, and followed General Pershing to Chaumont, the United
States General Headquarters, where he immediately occupied himself with
the future organisation of the Corps.
By September 23, 1917, the provisional American Tank Corps
establishment had been approved. It was to be of a size to match
the original Expeditionary Force, which was to be limited to twenty
Divisions and ten replacement Divisions--that is to say, to one Army.
The American Tank Corps in France was to consist of five Heavy and
twenty Light Battalions, with the usual complement of Headquarters
Units, Depot Companies, instructors and Workshops; and, in the United
States, a Training Centre, accommodating two Heavy and two Light
Battalions, was to be maintained. When the American Expeditionary Force
was increased to three Armies, a new Tank Establishment was authorised
to match it. There were to be five Brigades per Army. These Brigades
were to consist of one Heavy and two Light Battalions. The Light Tanks
were to be of the French Rénault type, and the Heavy were to be of the
British pattern. The first Tanks with which the Americans were equipped
were, in fact, actually of French or British manufacture, but as soon
as an establishment was sanctioned, Tank manufacture was pushed forward
in America, and by the time the Armistice was signed, there were
several thousand American-made machines ready for shipment.
So keen on the Tanks were Americans, that private enterprise was not
idle, and early in October 1918 a three-and-a-half-ton Ford Tank
arrived in France. This tank, indeed, had the honour to be the first
American-made Tank to appear in France. But though it was extremely
agile and handy, its designers had not quite succeeded in producing a
genuine fighting machine. It could, however, be turned out quickly and
in great quantities, and in spite of its defects, it was thought in
America that it would be worth while to continue its construction, and
tradition has it that no less than 10,000 of these little Ford Tanks
were ordered.
In the autumn of 1917, a number of American officers who were later on
to have charge of the organising and training of the new Tank Corps
were sent on visits to the British and French Brigades, to learn as
much as they could, both from the mistakes and successes of the two
older Corps. By February 1918, there were a large number of volunteers
for the American Tank Corps, some in England at Wool, who were to form
the American Heavy Section, and others (about 500) at Burg in France,
where a Training Centre was being formed for instruction in the Light
French Rénault machines. At Burg were ten French Tanks which were
used for training purposes, and in the course of the summer, as the
personnel to be trained increased, this number was added to, and at the
end of August 124 Rénault Tanks were delivered to the Training Centre
for impending operations.
Two Light Battalions were formed into a Brigade under Colonel G. S.
Patton, Junr., and they proceeded to the St. Mihiel Salient. Here they
went into action with the First American Army on September 12, the
first occasion on which United States Forces fought independently.
But, alas, it was our First Battle of the Somme over again! Nobody
quite understood the habits of the new beasts, and unfortunately
both Battalions were called upon to trek over twenty kilometres to
their lying-up places from the railhead, and, the ground in the back
area being very difficult, they did not succeed in catching up the
infantry at all on the first day. The enemy resistance was, however,
very feeble, as they had already decided to give up the Salient, but
misfortune still dogged the unhappy Tanks. They had run out of petrol,
and no supplies being immediately available, they were not able to get
into action on the second day.
On the third day, however, they did get into the fight, but by this
time the enemy had been thoroughly demoralised by the American
infantry, and there was little more for them to do than to receive the
surrender of a number of prisoners. The two Battalions suffered hardly
at all in casualties and were withdrawn practically intact.
The American Light Tanks next appeared at the beginning of October in
the Argonne, in operations where they fought side by side with French
Tank Units. This time the two Battalions had much better luck, and
though they must have been a good deal handicapped by the fact that
they and the infantry with whom they were to co-operate had had no
opportunity of training together, the Tanks rendered good service. All
the machines were launched on the first day, although in the original
plan of the battle, it had been proposed to hold back a reserve for the
second day; but the infantry had been held up, and the reserve Tanks
had, instead, to go to the rescue in the afternoon of the first day.
From this time to October 13 these two Battalions were continuously
at the disposal of the infantry. But, as with us in the early days,
the infantry do not seem to have had a very clear idea of the uses
and limitations of the Tanks, and the Battalions were frequently
called upon to traverse many weary miles--much to the detriment of
their machines--without finally being ordered into action. On one or
two occasions they were used for independent reconnaissance and for
unsupported assaults upon positions which the infantry had failed
to capture. By the middle of October the long distance covered and
losses in battle had caused the numbers of the two Battalions to
dwindle exceedingly, and they were formed into a provisional Company,
which accompanied the advance of the American Forces right up to the
Armistice.
A Third Light Battalion had also been mobilised and supplied by the
French with seventy-two Tanks. Recruiting, too, had been continued and
there were no less than 7000 officers and men awaiting admission to the
Corps at Burg alone.
Meanwhile, on August 24, 1918, the 301st U. S. Heavy Battalion had left
Wool for France, and was almost immediately sent to the forward area,
where it was attached to begin with to the 1st and later to the 4th and
2nd British Tank Brigades. With the 4th Brigade and still later with
the 2nd Tank Brigade the 301st was, as we shall see in Chapters XX and
XXI, destined to take part in several successful actions.
The 301st had based its methods of training almost entirely upon
British lines, and though the American Tank Corps would undoubtedly
have struck out improvements and methods of its own had the war gone
on, the 301st, being throughout its active service brigaded with
British Tanks, very wisely adopted a battle organisation practically
uniform with the British. Only in minor details did their habits
vary. Their reconnaissance procedure, for instance, was almost
exactly like ours, except for one improvement. Special Reconnaissance
N.C.O.’s relieved Reconnaissance Officers, Tank Commanders and Section
Commanders from the work of guiding the machines on approach marches.
From the tankodromes to the lining-up points the Tanks were in charge
of these N.C.O.’s, who were directly under the orders of the Battalion
Reconnaissance Officer. This system worked out extremely well.
In later chapters we shall see how worthy a representative both of the
arms of the United States and of the best traditions of the British
Tank Corps the 301st Battalion proved themselves in the supreme test of
battle.
In February 1919, to the regret of their British colleagues, the men
of the 301st sailed for America, when General Elles expressed the
sentiments of all ranks of his Corps in a special order.
“_February 15, 1919._
“1. On the departure of the 301st American Tank Battalion, I wish
to place on record my appreciation of the services it has rendered.
2. The Battalion has practically formed part of the British Tank
Corps since April 1918, and while fully maintaining its national
identity, has co-operated with British troops and adapted itself to
British methods with a spirit that deserves fullest recognition.
3. In the field the 301st Battalion, after experiencing heavy
casualties in its first engagement at Bony, which might have
deterred less determined troops, volunteered for the next action,
in which, as in subsequent ones, it inflicted heavy casualties upon
the enemy at Brancourt, the Selle and Catillon.
4. I feel I am voicing the opinion of all commanders and troops who
have been associated with them, in expressing sincere regret at the
departure of our American comrades and in wishing them all good
fortune in the future.
(_Signed_) H. J. ELLES,
Major-General,
Commanding Tank Corps in the Field.”
TANKS IN PALESTINE
_The Second and Third Battles of Gaza, April and November 1917_
“Gaza yet stands, but all her sons are fallen,
All in a moment overwhelmed and fallen.”
_Samson Agonistes._
The Tanks that had fought in the Battle of the Somme, in the autumn of
1916, had proved successful enough for the authorities to consider that
a test ought to be made of their capabilities in some other theatre of
war.
Accordingly a small--a very small--detachment of Tanks was sent to
“assist our troops in the Sinai Peninsula.”
Unfortunately only eight Tanks were ultimately sent, and
further,[51]“through an unfortunate error, old experimental machines
were sent out instead of new ones as intended.”
The experiment was thus upon so extremely miniature a scale that
it cannot be said to have proved anything save what was already
clear, that is, the general proposition that with a few mechanical
modifications Tanks are perfectly suitable to desert warfare.
The Tanks were, of course, too few to exert any influence upon the
fortunes of war in Palestine, and the two actions in which they fought
amid palms and cactuses and lay up in groves of fig trees, form a
curious, rather than an important, little incident in their history.
The field on which they fought was like the plain of Flanders, one of
those ominous lands which seem predestined for ever to witness the
strife of men.
[52]“The land from the Wadi el Arish--the ancient ‘River of
Egypt’--to the Philistian plain had for twenty-six hundred years
been a cockpit of war. Sometimes a conqueror from the north like
Nebuchadnezzar, Napoleon and Mehemet Ali, or from the south like
Ali Bey, met the enemy in Egypt or Syria, but more often the
decisive fight was fought in the gates. Ascalon, Gaza, Rafa, El
Arish, are all names famous in history. Up and down the strip of
seaward levels marched the great armies of Egypt and Assyria, while
the Jews looked fearfully on from their barren hills.... In this
gate of ancient feuds it had now fallen to Turkey’s lot to speak
with her enemy.”
In December 1916 a little company of 22 officers and 226 other ranks,
under Major Nutt, embarked with their eight Tanks at Devonport and
Avonmouth and landed in Egypt in January.
The first business was to show the Staffs of the various fighting
units, with whom they were to co-operate, exactly what Tanks could and
could not do.
Demonstrations were therefore given among the sand dunes near Kilban, a
village which lies between Port Said and El Kantara on the Suez Canal.
One day in February--the exact date seems uncertain[53]--the detachment
received orders to entrain immediately for the fighting zone, and
within three hours of receiving the message, the whole little force
with its Tanks and accessories was travelling towards the forward area.
A delay occurred half-way, at El Arish, which had only recently been
captured, but next morning the Tank Train arrived at its destination,
Khan Yunus, an old Crusaders’ stronghold, surrounded by fig groves and
lying inland about fifteen miles south-west of Gaza.
Here the detachment remained for about ten days.
During these ten days the First Battle of Gaza had come to an end.
Gaza had not been captured, as, though we had fought in its streets, we
had just not been able to keep up the attack long enough to keep what
we had gained owing to lack of water.
In his despatch, General Murray, the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian
Expeditionary Force, characterised it as a most successful operation
which only the waterless nature of the country had prevented from being
“a complete disaster to the enemy.”
We had been obliged to withdraw again to our water supplies, but we
immediately began to prepare a second attack in greater force.
This time great cisterns were set up forward, and filled with
rail-borne water. Three weeks of careful preparation were allowed for
what was to prove one of the most hotly contested actions fought in the
Eastern theatre.
We were to attack a Turkish force of about 30,000 men which lay upon a
front of some sixteen miles, between Gaza on the north and Hereira and
Sheria to the south-east.
Two ridges, Sheikh Abbas and Mansura, run almost at right angles to the
coast and command the town of Gaza from the south, and the capture of
these heights was allotted to the 52nd, 53rd, and 54th Divisions.
On their left flank was the sea, and their right, on the Hereira front,
was protected by the Desert Column, consisting of cavalry units and of
the Imperial Camel Corps which was manned by Australian, New Zealand,
and British personnel.
The eight Tanks were to be widely spaced along the crucial five miles
of attack. The 53rd Division nearest to the sea was to have two Tanks,
which were to be held in reserve until the infantry had taken their
first objective. Next to them the 52nd Division was to have four Tanks,
which were to support the infantry in the attack on the Mansura Ridge.
With the 54th Division, two Tanks were to support the attack on the
Sheikh Abbas Ridge. The battle was to be in two phases; the Turkish
outer defences were to be taken in the first phase, and in the second
his inner ring was to be broken through and Gaza itself taken.
It was a country of sand dunes, deep nullahs, and criss-cross ridges, a
labyrinth admirably adapted to defence and containing endless natural
machine-gun positions. Between Gaza and the sea the enemy had built a
double line of trenches and redoubts[54]“strongly held by infantry and
machine-guns well placed and concealed in impenetrable cactus hedges
built on high mud banks and enclosing orchards and gardens on the
outskirts of the town.”
The Tank Detachment had been able to do little or no reconnaissance;
routes had been arranged to the starting-places, and petrol and
ammunition dumps had been formed in convenient places, but no forward
preparations had been possible.
All eight Tanks reached their assembly places before daybreak on
April 17, and at zero hour, the dawn of what promised to be a day
of scorching heat, the first phase of the attack was successfully
launched.
The advance of the 53rd and 52nd Divisions came as a complete surprise
to the Turks, and the six Tanks did not come into action at all on
the first day, as the enemy fled from his trenches and strongholds in
complete confusion, and the slow Mark I.’s and Mark II.’s had no chance
of getting in at him. The outer defence line had fallen by seven that
morning. The two Tanks, however, on the 54th Division’s front saw a
good deal of fighting. One received a direct hit and was destroyed, but
the other did admirable work in clearing the enemy out of his trenches,
north-west of the Abbas Ridge. The Tank inflicted heavy casualties,
and our infantry had only to come up and occupy the defences which the
Turks had abandoned.
By the evening the three attacking Divisions found themselves in
satisfactory positions on high ground, and proceeded to entrench
themselves and to prepare for the second phase.
On the morning of April 19 we again attacked, this time upon a wider
front, a French man-of-war and two British monitors supporting on the
left, and the Australians on the right. The three original Divisions
were, however, once more to deliver the main blow.
A very stiff programme was outlined for the seven surviving Tanks.
The four with the 52nd in the centre had finally four lines of defence
to attack, and their orders were changed during the night before the
action.
With the 53rd Division two Tanks were to work separately, each having a
succession of objectives, while with the 54th the single Tank had only
one redoubt allotted to it.
This time the Turks were ready for us.
One of the Tanks with the 53rd Division, the “Tiger,” led the infantry
advance on its sector. The enemy was quickly driven from our first
objective, Samson Ridge. The Tank went on to the second objective,
the El Arish redoubt, but the infantry being unable to follow, after
being in action for six hours and having fired 27,000 rounds from its
machine-guns, the Tank withdrew, all its crew being wounded.
On the front of the 52nd Division, our advance was hotly contested.
The Turks had massed hundreds of machine-guns along their entire front,
but on this sector their fire was particularly intense. One tank was
able to do good service at Outpost Hill, which it helped to clear
before receiving a direct hit.
Of the other three Tanks, one fell into a gully, the sides of which
unexpectedly crumbled under its weight; another was put out of action
by a direct hit, while the third eventually rallied.
The objective of the Tank fighting with the 54th Division was a
particularly strong redoubt. The work was held in force, but the
garrison soon surrendered on the advance of the Tank. Our infantry
immediately took over the position, which the Turks forthwith proceeded
to shell.
It was not long before the Tank was hit and one of its tracks broken,
and the Turks, counter-attacking, eventually captured Tank, infantry
and redoubt.
By nightfall our position all along the line was unfavourable. The left
of the 54th Division was more or less in the air. We had, in several
parts of the line, been forced off the lately won main ridges. We had
lost 7000 men, and our troops were worn out by the dust and heat, and
were once more short of water. The battle had to be admitted as a
failure. The Tanks had been too few and of too old a type for the work
they had been given.
Their co-operation was, however, much appreciated, and they were
considered to have given a good deal of protection to the infantry.
It is interesting to note that by the time the battle was over these
antiquated machines are said, on an average, each to have covered forty
miles of country.
_The Third Battle of Gaza_
The Second Battle of Gaza had been so completely unsuccessful that
the troops who had been engaged in it had to be withdrawn from their
advanced positions.
The Tanks were concentrated in a fig grove to the rear. Here, no work
being found for them, they stayed till October, being reinforced by
three Mark IV. machines.
General Allenby had now succeeded to the command, and there was to be
another attack upon Gaza, for the town and its defences effectually
barred our further advance along the coast or towards Jerusalem.
We were this time to operate upon a still wider front. The usual shock
troops, the same three Divisions and their eight Tanks, were to attack
nearest the coast.
Next to them, a mixed force of French, Italian and West Indian troops
were to make feint raids near Outpost Hill.
Opposite Gaza itself several cavalry Divisions, mounted and dismounted,
were to attack, and from Hereira to Beersheba a synchronised assault
was to be made by the Australians. The position was, in fact, to be
turned by an extensive flanking movement.
On October 23, 1917, the Tanks moved up to a new station on the beach.
From here, on horseback and by boat, the new area was thoroughly
reconnoitred. This was the special country of cactus hedge and strong
mud bank, and in it had been dug a veritable labyrinth of trenches. It
had been a country of small fig groves and of little irrigated gardens,
and its close boundaries afforded unending cover to the enemy. However,
it was divided into Tank sectors, and by dint of patient toil, the
Tank Commanders at last formed a more or less coherent picture of the
intricacies. Tank Officers and N.C.O.’s were attached to each Brigade
with which they were to work, for ten days before the battle.
Most of the Tanks were detailed to bring up R.E. stores, such as wire,
pickets, shovels and sandbags for their infantry. These things they
were to carry on their roofs.
The first phase of the attack, timed in consideration of a full moon
for an hour before midnight, was to be independent of Tanks, and was
to consist of an infantry attack protected by a creeping barrage.
While this attack was going on, six of the Tanks were to move to their
starting-points, in order to be ready to advance at 3 a.m. Two Tanks
were held in reserve. It will be observed that the plans, preparations
and liaison were in general much more complete than for the Second
Battle of Gaza, but unfortunately one mistake of that battle was
repeated.
The six first-line Tanks were given among them no less than twenty-nine
objectives to attack.
At eleven o’clock on the night of November 1–2, the first phase of the
battle began.
The 156th Infantry Brigade attacked Umbrella Hill, the first
objective. The Turks were taken completely by surprise, there was
little resistance, and even their artillery seemed too startled to fire.
Unfortunately, however, the smoke of the battle and a dense haze made
so thick an atmosphere that not a ray of the expected moonlight reached
the combatants, and the infantry had to fight and the Tanks to manage
their approach march in profound darkness.
Also, when the enemy’s artillery at last woke up, it was to open a
heavy fire on our back areas, where the second wave was gathering. All
the Tanks, however, came safely through and were at their stations half
an hour before the second zero at 3 a.m.
The Turkish resistance had by now stiffened, and when the Tanks and
the fresh infantry advanced behind a heavy barrage it was to meet with
dogged opposition.
The two Tanks detailed to the El Arish redoubt were, after a stiff
fight, successful in driving the enemy out of the enclosed stronghold,
and were making their way through the maze of trenches, cactus hedges
and gardens beyond, when one received a direct hit and the other got
ditched in the darkness. Both crews at once joined the infantry.
Slowly, scrambling up the mud banks, often fighting hand to hand in the
darkness, we advanced. The Turks were fighting stubbornly, but inch by
inch we pushed them back. The remaining Tanks lumbered slowly on.
At last all along the coast all the objectives were taken. No. 6 Tank
captured Sea Post, and, followed by the infantry, moved along the
enemy’s trenches, crushing down the wire as far as Beach Post. It
successively attacked three other strong points and deposited its R.E.
stores at the appointed place. It was again moving forward to attack
a certain isolated Turkish trench when one track broke, so ending a
brilliant innings. The crew went on, but the Tank had to be temporarily
abandoned.
The two reserve Tanks both caught fire through the empty sandbags with
which their roofs were loaded being set ablaze by the heat of their
exhaust pipes.
The coastal attack had done its work, and the Turks’ hold upon Gaza had
been loosened.
The other attackers, the troops who had advanced from Beersheba, broke
through the enemy’s resistance completely, and drove them back for nine
miles on an eight-mile front.
The battle was decisive, and after about three days’ fighting our
troops at last entered Gaza. Our persistency in attack was well
rewarded. The _Spectator_, commenting on the battle, said, “Samson took
away the gates of Gaza, but General Allenby has secured the gates of
Palestine.”
On the whole the Tanks had been a success.
All machines except one reached their first objectives; four reached
their second, third, and fourth, and one Tank reached its fifth.
All five damaged machines were afterwards salved.
This was the last Tank action fought with the Army of Palestine, for,
for some reason or other, the repaired and renovated Tanks were never
used again.
Later, however, during the Turkish retreat, we had great trouble in
rounding up the tattered and wandering Turkish rearguard.
We felt the need of some sort of sheep-dog, so a mission was sent to
France to ask for a number of Whippet Tanks.
By an ironical chance, this mission reached Tank Headquarters in France
on March 21, the very day the German offensive was launched. It need
not be added that no Whippets were sent.
There seemed no work left for the heavies, and the Tank Detachment,
therefore, handed over their machines to the Ordnance Department at
Alexandria, and returned to England.