(_November 30_)
In order to understand the events that followed, we have to imagine a
victorious but very weary British Army holding a newly consolidated
salient against an enemy whom they have just roused to a revengeful
fury by a sudden stinging slap in the face.
The enemy had been horribly frightened, and now that he had recovered
he realised how urgently his prestige demanded signal vindication.
We were, it would seem, half expecting in a tired unimaginative sort
of way that he might hit at us on the new Bourlon Wood flank of our
salient. On the Gouzeaucourt side were old-established defences. These
we held thinly--it never entering our heads apparently that he would
attack an old piece of the line.
But the German Army Commander, General von der Marwitz, had an
ambitious scheme in his mind. He meant to pinch off our salient and, if
possible, to capture the entire third and fourth Corps, who held it.
His right wing was to operate from Bourlon southward, and his left from
Masnières westwards, the two attacks converging on Havrincourt and Metz.
The attack was launched shortly after daylight on November 30, and
failed completely on the right against Bourlon Wood; here the enemy was
caught by our artillery and machine-guns and mown down by hundreds. On
the left, however, the attack succeeded; first, it came as a surprise;
secondly, the Germans heralded their assault by lines of low-flying
aeroplanes, which made our men keep down and so lose observation. Under
the protection of this aeroplane barrage and a very heavy trench
mortar bombardment the German infantry advanced and speedily captured
Villers Guislain and Gouzeaucourt.
It was not till nearly ten o’clock on November 30 that
Brigadier-General Courage of the 2nd Tank Brigade received a telephone
message warning him of the attack.
The Tanks had been definitely “dismissed,” and were busy refitting,
and at that moment every machine was in complete _déshabillé_. Many of
the engines were in process of being tinkered with, and not a single
Tank was filled up or contained its battle equipment. Those whom some
emergency has obliged to get out an ordinary car on a cold winter’s
morning when it has neither petrol, oil, nor water in it, and has half
its engine strewn about the garage, will understand the difficulties
that faced the Tank Corps. They will realise that when no less than
twenty-two Tanks of “B” (2nd) Battalion had started for the battle by
12.40, a very smart piece of work had been done. Very soon fourteen
Tanks of “A” (1st) Battalion followed them, and by two o’clock twenty
Tanks of “H” (8th) Battalion were able to move up in support.
In the words of Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch, “Great credit is due to
the officers and men of the (2nd) Tank Brigade for the speed with which
they brought their Tanks into action.”
By the time the first twenty Tanks reached Gouzeaucourt, however, the
Guards, who had been hurried up with all speed, had managed to retake
it, and the Tanks were therefore pushed out as a screen to cover their
consolidation.
Here they remained all day, beating off enemy counter-attacks.
All day along both sides of the salient the enemy hammered fiercely
at our lines. Here and there he penetrated them. Cooks, servants, and
signallers, every available man, was given a rifle and put into the
line, and the Despatch tells of wonderful individual deeds that were
done as the battle surged and eddied confusedly. We did not propose to
allow the Germans to hold their new possessions, the points of vantage
out of which they had hustled us.
On December 1, Tanks, Guards, and dismounted Indian cavalry hit back
against Villers Guislain and Gauche Wood.
“Tanks were,” the Despatch notes, “in great measure responsible
for the capture of the wood. Heavy fighting took place for this
position, which it is clear that the enemy had decided to hold at
all costs. When the infantry and cavalry finally took possession
of the wood, great numbers of German dead and smashed machine-guns
were found. In one spot four German machine-guns, with dead crews
lying round, were discovered within a radius of twenty yards. Three
German field guns, complete with teams, were also captured in this
wood.
“Other Tanks proceeded to Villers Guislain, and in spite of heavy
direct artillery fire three reached the outskirts of the village,
but the fire of the enemy’s machine-guns prevented our troops
advancing from the south from supporting them, and the Tanks
ultimately withdrew.”
For two more days the enemy pressed on against us, and the battle raged
round Bourlon, Fontaine, Marcoing, and La Vacquerie.
Everywhere he dented in our line, and by December 4 the outline of our
front showed an impossible series of irregularities. We must either
renew the attack on a big scale, or make up our minds
[47]“to withdraw to a more compact line on the Flesquières Ridge.
“Although this decision involved giving up important positions
most gallantly won, I had no doubt as to the correct course under
the conditions. Accordingly, on the night of December 4–5 the
evacuation of the positions held by us north of the Flesquières
Ridge was commenced. On the morning of December 7 this withdrawal
was completed successfully without interference from the enemy.”
It is as well that the enemy did not “interfere,” for through some
oversight the Tanks did not receive due notice of the intended
withdrawal, and certain salvage parties, busily at work on disabled
Tanks, in forward positions, knew nothing of the evacuation until, to
their astonishment, they found our infantry streaming back past them in
the darkness. There was then nothing for it but to abandon the wrecks
and to get back themselves with such gear as they could carry.
So ended the second phase of the battle.
It had been an exceedingly vexatious business.
Putting the best construction we could upon it, we had to admit to
having been caught napping. The German attack had thrown us into
complete, if momentary, confusion. But afterwards, when the situation
could be calmly reviewed, contemporary criticism was unanimously agreed
that we had, after all, suffered little but moral damage. And from
that sort of damage the British have the art of deriving wholesome
instruction in a unique degree. We braced ourselves up, and determined
that this sharp rap over the knuckles should do us good.
But to the Tank Corps the exploits of the 2nd Brigade were more
directly advantageous.
Amid the hubbub and confusion the Tank crews, like the Guards and the
2nd Cavalry Division, had known but one impulse--they had gone straight
east against the enemy. That was the pole to which their compass
pointed.
While everything had been doubt and hesitation they had had but one
thought, to fill and adjust their machines and hurry them forward. At
9 a.m. the Tank crews had been peacefully preparing to break camp and
leave for their training area. By four in the afternoon seventy-three
Tanks had been launched with decisive effect against the enemy.
To many High Commanders who had believed that Tanks could only be used
in a “full-dress” attack after weeks of preparation, the events of
November 30 came as a joyful revelation.
So for the Tanks ended the 1917 campaign.