RETIEF'S NEK.
A bad night--Start for Relief's Nek--Description of ground--Orders
to attack--Leading companies take wrong direction--Remaining
companies advance against Nek--They close up to the Boer
position--Further advance impossible--Death of Sir Walter
Barttelot--Orders to retire at dusk--Difficulty of bringing in
wounded--A good Samaritan.
It was dark on Sunday evening, the 22nd of July, when the Bedfords
started from Meyer's Kop; and directly they had gone the wind rose and
the rain came down in torrents, splashing up the black soil, turning the
camp into a morass, and penetrating through everything--blankets,
waterproof sheets, canvas sheeting. The wind blew our blankets about and
the rain drenched everything for many hours without ceasing, all fires
were quenched by the downpour, and we sat and cursed and were wretched.
One or two of us were fortunate enough to get hold of some corrugated
iron, and I remember getting an hour or two's broken sleep by crawling,
all wet and muddy, under a long sheet of this iron, which I had
stretched over my blankets.
To add to our troubles, one of the companies on picket fired a few shots
in the middle of all our discomfort, but, as the firing did not
continue, no further steps were taken: however, about half-past two, the
Volunteer company burst out into heavy firing which they continued for
some time. As they were on picket quite close to us, the Adjutant ran up
to see what was the matter, and found that they were firing at some
lights some distance in front of them: so the firing soon stopped, and
we huddled under our dripping blankets until three o'clock, when we were
routed out and told to pack our kits and load the wagons. Overnight the
Colonel had had confidential orders to move before daybreak towards
Retief's Nek, where we were to meet General Hunter and receive further
orders; so by four o'clock we were on the move. The night was pitch
dark, but luckily the rain had stopped: the whole camp and the ground
round it was a sea of mud, and it was with the greatest difficulty that
we could start the wagons, already fully loaded with rations and mails,
to which had been added the men's blankets, now trebled in weight owing
to the absorption of rain: in consequence of the compression, the water
was soon running out of the bottoms of the wagons, which will give an
idea how wet the blankets had been when loaded.
As it was, after squelching and slipping along in slimy mud, we had to
wait at the top of the hill for the wagons to be hauled up to drier
ground; by that time it was dawn, and we were able to proceed at a
better pace across country towards Retief's Nek.
There was one nasty drift on the way, muddy and slippery, which caused
considerable delay to our small column; but after this we trekked along
for some hours over grassy veldt, until we came in sight of Retief's
Nek, when the Colonel rode on to communicate with General Hunter, and
the battalion halted under the lee of a huge mass of rock, rising sheer
out of the plain. This was about eleven o'clock, so we seized the
opportunity to eat some biscuit and what cooked food we happened to have
in our haversacks, and to rest; for after our dreadful night and long
tramp, we were fairly well tired.
After some little while, the Colonel came back, summoned the officers,
and told us the orders he had received from General Hector Macdonald,
who was in charge of the operations; we then went some little distance
aside, and the position was shown to us and the orders explained.
In front, the ground, level and grassy, stretched away for about a mile
and a half to a low conical hill, which appeared to be of slaty rock,
and the top of which shone and glistened in the sun like white marble;
a little to the rear of this, and seemingly connected with it by a
narrow nek, rose another hill, very similar in appearance, but dark and
lowering. Separated from these hills on our right by a gap, perhaps 600
or 700 yards wide, rose a spur with a knoll half way up, a little less
in height than the kopje (which we had now named Marble Kop), and from
this knoll the spur rose abruptly to a great height, broken and jagged,
the slopes covered with huge black rocks: this cliff bore round to our
right for perhaps a mile or more, very steep and precipitous, until it
was abreast of where we were standing, when the range of mountains swung
away to our right and was lost in the distance. Still to the front, but
a little to our right, rose a narrow grassy kopje, with a couple of
houses at its foot. This kopje was separated from the great range of
hills by a narrow, funnel shaped passage which seemed to be about 600
yards wide at the entrance; but whether this narrow kopje, which ran
straight back, eventually joined the broken and jagged cliffs in the
distance, or whether it was an isolated hill and the passage ran round
behind it, could not be decided from the spot upon which we were then.
Marble Kop was the position the battalion were to attack, and it was to
be supported in its advance by the battery, which would take up a
position on a hill which we could not then see, but which was
immediately in front of Marble Kop, and some considerable distance away
from it: no nearer position could be found for the guns.
On the left of Marble Kop rose abruptly to a point a lofty range of
hills, looking quite inaccessible, and bearing round to our left in a
great sweep. Between this point and Marble Kop was another gap of some
considerable width, which was the pass of Retief's Nek; and down at the
bottom of this pass and hidden in a fold of ground, the road ran from
where guns were posted straight into and beyond the pass.
Our orders from General Macdonald were to attack Marble Kop, and on
arrival there to open an enfilading fire on a trench which the enemy was
reported to have dug across the pass: there were to be no supports for
us, and there was no information as to the position of the enemy, or his
strength, or whether Marble Kop was occupied by him: a deadly stillness
was in the air, and the strongest telescope did not reveal the presence
of the enemy at any point which was visible.
The companies now proceeded to move off in the following order:--G
company under Captain Mackenzie, then H under Captain Wisden; after them
A under Major O'Grady, followed by B with Major Panton in command, and C
under Captain Wroughton; E under Captain Aldridge bringing up the rear.
The remaining companies were on various duties; D under Lieut. Ashworth
was escorting the guns and took no part in the action, F under Captain
Gilbert, and the Volunteer company under Sir Walter Barttelot, were
baggage and rear guard respectively: they came up shortly after we had
advanced, when the wagons had been parked by Major Scaife, who was
baggage master--these two companies then proceeding to join in the
attack.
The leading company, G, was directed to advance towards Marble Kop,
proceeding in a circuitous direction, and skirting the base of the
narrow kopje, then in front and lying at our feet. This kopje G should
have left on the right. The companies were to advance in column of
sections, each extended to ten paces, and with large intervals between
each line; all officers and supernumeraries were to be in among the men
in line, so as not to render themselves too conspicuous. The companies
were soon fairly launched and moving off across the grassy veldt in
great parallel lines, about a hundred or more yards apart, and
stretching well away to the right and left, so as not to afford to the
enemy a more extensive objective than was necessary. The leading company
was a long way off, and the men were appearing smaller and smaller as
they got further away to the front, when it was noticed that the column,
instead of skirting the narrow kopje in front and leaving it on their
_right_, had misunderstood these instructions and were entering the
funnel shaped passage, thus leaving the narrow kopje on their _left_.
There was then no time or means of recalling them without considerable
delay, owing to the distance, fully a mile, which they had already
traversed, so it was considered advisable to allow them to continue
their advance in the direction which they had chosen; the point of
attack had been distinctly pointed out to every one concerned, and if,
as often happens in these widely extended movements, certain
contingencies had arisen which necessitated the direction of the attack
being changed, yet no further instruction could be given by the
commanding officer, and the execution of the attack must, perforce, be
left to the discretion of each company commander.
Under the extended order system as carried out during this war, the
company commander becomes a far more important personage than he has
been during the last twenty years, with an immensely free hand, within
certain limits, directly active operations commence.
The machine guns under Captain Green had gone along with H company, and
had by this time, with the three leading companies, gone quite out of
sight into the funnel shaped passage; C company, which was the fifth in
order of succession, was just inside the entrance, and E was following
in rear: the ammunition cart and water cart and the rest of the first
line were coming on behind. This was the situation about one o'clock,
and I was walking up the narrow kopje, intending to watch the progress
of events from its summit, when suddenly from inside the passage on the
right, into which the companies had gone, came, like a clap of thunder,
a most fearful outburst of firing, which continued for some time without
intermission, and which echoed and re-echoed among the ravines and rocky
hills, until one could hardly hear one's own voice.
From the top of the kopje nothing could be seen, either of our men or
the enemy, and the infernal pandemonium still continued in the valley
below; but to the incessant ping-boom, ping-boom of the Mauser,
unmistakeable from its propinquity, was now added the ping, ping, ping
of the Lee Metford, and the continuous stutter of the Maxim, as this
highly strung machine, shaking and quivering with nervous energy,
stammered out whole belts full of ammunition without ceasing.
Undoubtedly, Captain Green had got hold of a soft thing and was taking
the utmost advantage of it, and squeezing the last ounce out of the
Maxim, which fired as it had never fired before and probably never will
again. The water in the casing fizzed and spluttered, but more was
handy; the empty belts littered the ground, but the ammunition cart was
not far off, and so the vastly important work of spattering with bullets
the hillside opposite, which a moment before had been as still as the
grave, was continued without intermission. The companies in front had
dropped into cover behind some huge rocks which fringed both sides of
the valley, immediately on the first shots being fired; and they had
ever since continued to fire at their invisible foe, who were lining the
hillside and the jagged crest line not 800 yards away.
Captain Mackenzie had, at the outset, exposed himself somewhat
recklessly, and had been knocked over in the open with a bullet in his
ankle; his subaltern, Lieut. Hopkins, seeing this, shouted to a couple
of men to accompany him, and dashed out without a moment's thought
towards his captain, in the face of a murderous fire which covered the
ground around them with a cloud of dust spirts. Together with the two
men, who turned out to be Corporal Hoad and Lance-Corporal Neville,
Lieut. Hopkins raised Captain Mackenzie and bore him, groaning and
sweating with agony from his broken ankle, to safety.
For this gallant act these three, the young officer and the two
Corporals (both young soldiers), were recommended for the Victoria
Cross, the highest distinction to which a soldier can aspire. However,
in lieu of this, Lieut. Hopkins was offered a company in the Manchester
regiment, and the two Corporals were each awarded the Distinguished
Conduct Medal.
Nothing could be done to withdraw the companies in front, and the Maxim
had also to remain; but orders were sent to B, C, and E companies to
move to their left to the other side of the kopje. This they soon did,
and the attack was launched again at Marble Kop, but on this occasion
from the direction in which it had been originally intended to advance.
As matters turned out, however, it was perhaps as well that the mistake
had been made and the advance commenced in the wrong direction, as our
three companies, although useless to the battalion in continuing the
advance, were still of inestimable value where they were lying, as they
held a good number of the enemy in check and prevented them from leaving
their cover and proceeding to other positions, from which they could,
perhaps, have done more damage. While our three companies kept up a
dropping fire and while the Maxim rattled out its scattered shots at
intervals, no Boer would dare to leave his cover; and so matters
remained _in statu quo_ in this valley until dusk.
Meanwhile, our battery had commenced shelling vigorously the slopes of
the hills on the right of Marble Kop, and B and C companies, with E
following, were moving over to the open ground directly in front of it;
from here they advanced in succession by half-companies and stretched
away out into the veldt, E company being meanwhile held in reserve.
We sat and watched the companies diminishing in the distance, and, when
the leading half-company was about a thousand yards from us and about
the same distance from the foot of Marble Kop, we saw rifle fire opened
on them from their right front. They continued their advance like a
parade ground movement, halting, lying down to fire and then rising and
going on again, the lines in rear conforming to the movements of those
in front, and the men on the right of all the lines delivering their
fire against their hidden enemy among the hills on the right front.
Gradually the lines in rear decreased their distances, closing up to the
front and reinforcing and thickening the firing line: this manoeuvre
adds more rifles to the firing line and enables more fire to be brought
to bear on the enemy, but at the same time it increases the
vulnerability of the foremost line, rendering more men liable to be hit
owing to their proximity to each other, so, possibly, the advantages may
or may not outweigh the disadvantages. In this particular case, however,
where the enemy were behind perfect cover, the disadvantages of
thickening the firing line predominated, and the enemy's bullets fell
pretty thickly amongst our men.
It appeared at this stage of the proceedings, that Marble Kop was
unoccupied, and that the bulk of the firing was coming from a concealed
party of sharpshooters at long range, stationed somewhere on the right
front, upon whom the shrapnel of our guns seemed to have little or no
effect: however our men, although hampered by having to fire half right,
continued to pour in a constant fire at ranges of from 600 to 800 yards,
and perhaps longer.
About this time, also, F company and the Volunteer Company appeared,
coming up from the rear in similar formation (half company columns) to
that adopted by us: seeing that the firing line wanted a wider front
instead of a thicker formation, F company was directed by signal to
continue moving to the front, but to gradually edge off to the left, so
as eventually to come up on the left of the present firing line,
composed of B company.
So F company trudged off and carried out this manoeuvre beautifully,
coming up into line with B company and lying down and opening fire about
half an hour later: meantime the Volunteer company had received similar
orders to move further off and to prolong the line to the left of F
company; this movement had used up all the companies at our disposal,
except E, who were now moved off to the left also, but were still to
remain as a reserve in rear of the centre, in view of possible
contingencies which might arise. There were one or two wounded being
brought in, so a dressing station was established under some cover,
formed by a few large rocks and a tree or two; and the doctor, who had
remained in the valley on the right attending to one or two men of G
company who had been hit, was sent for. The first line transport with
the ammunition carts, water cart and the medical officer's cart had, for
some inexplicable reason, remained in this valley, although the majority
of the battalion had been moved in another direction; they did not come
near us all the afternoon, men having to be sent over to get
ammunition, which, at a later stage of the fight, was running short
rapidly.
For the second time that day I sat down and searched the hills
thoroughly with a telescope; not a sign of an enemy did I see, and yet
the jets and puffs of dust thrown up amongst the men spread all over the
veldt up to a thousand yards in front distinctly showed that the firing
was from the right front. Away on our right, the spur, which has been
alluded to as being separated from Marble Kop by a gap about six hundred
yards wide, was being steadily shelled by our battery all along its
length, and on its face where it joined the big jagged cliffs and
trended off to the right; but it was now seen that this spur continued
round to the left also, and forked out into another lofty range of
hills, which swung round with a semi-circular sweep, enclosing a valley
into which various underfeatures and knolls led out from the spur and
from the lofty range itself. The conclusion I came to at the time was
that the Boers were in position on these knolls and underfeatures,
rising in tiers, one above another, and that the majority of the firing
was directed on our men through and over the gap between the spur and
Marble Kop; this supposition was supported by information given by the
stretcher bearers, who were now coming in pretty frequently with wounded
men from the firing line, so I signalled information to this effect to
the officer commanding the battery; the distance, however, was too
great, and the enemy were too well posted for shrapnel to do any harm:
moreover, the gunners, from their long distance in the rear and because
of the intervening end of the spur, could not see any of the
underfeatures, behind which the enemy were situated.
The advance was continued until the right of the firing line, B company,
was about 600 yards from the foot of Marble Kop; they could go no
further with any advantage, and were fully occupied, as was C company,
in keeping down the fire from their right front. Beyond them F company
was pushing forwards towards the left of Marble Kop where the pass
opened out, and were moving down into a fold of the ground, which hid
them from my sight; slightly behind them and on their left was the
Volunteer company, slowly pushing on, firing and advancing, and lying
down to fire again, and continuing this with the greatest coolness and
steadiness.
I was watching them through my telescope for some little time, noticing
Sir Walter Barttelot running forward and the half-company following him,
and I thought how unmistakeable a leader he looked, with no equipment
and no rifle, standing and pointing with his stick to places which men
should occupy. Sir Walter did not know the meaning of fear or
nervousness, and the pluck and marvellous endurance he displayed during
the campaign was a constant wonder to all of us, and put to shame many a
soldier of half his age.
Soon the Volunteer company disappeared, like F company, in the fold of
the ground, and I hoped that they would succeed in pushing on into the
pass and round by the left of Marble Kop, and so create a diversion in
the state of affairs. One or two wounded men being brought in from these
companies proved what I suspected--that the huge, black, conical hill,
rising on the left of the pass, was also occupied by the enemy's
marksmen, who were behind the rocks and ledges of the steep slopes. This
being so, things looked bad for our chance of being able to push round
the left side of Marble Kop, which was, like its front, a slippery mass
of smooth volcanic rock rising to a sharp pinnacle, and without an atom
of cover. Nothing was to be gained by rushing this rock and swarming up
its slippery sides (which we could easily have done), because, once
there and necessarily crowded, we should have been exposed without the
least protection to an overwhelming fire from the hills on the right and
left of the Kop, while we could have done little good by our rifle fire,
which would, of course, have to be directed up hill.
However, half of E company, waiting patiently in reserve, was sent out
in support of F and the Volunteers, in case they should succeed in
gaining a footing, and I went out myself a little way to find out if I
could see what was beyond the fold in the ground into which these two
companies had disappeared. Soon I met a stretcher borne along with
difficulty by two men of F company, Privates Stewart and Biles, and upon
it I was shocked to see Sir Walter Barttelot; he was unconscious and
breathing heavily, and had been shot through the body by a bullet fired
from the lofty hill on our left front. Sadly the men continued on their
way to the dressing station, where Dr. Edwards immediately attended to
him; but the case was hopeless from the first, and he breathed his last,
still unconscious, soon after arrival.
From the men I learned that Captain Gilbert with most of his Company had
brilliantly dashed into a Kaffir kraal under a severe fire from the
left, and were there doing their best to subdue the enemy's scathing
fire; several men had been wounded, Lieut. Anderson had been dangerously
shot in the neck, and more stretchers were wanted. On the way back,
therefore, volunteers were called for from E company to go out with
stretchers, and right gallantly they came forward, plenty of them; they
went out under the steady shower of bullets, right up to the firing
line, and brought back most of the wounded who could not walk.
About four o'clock, a message was received from the Colonel that, if it
was impossible, without supports as we were, to carry the Nek, a
retirement should be made, and a reply was sent that the Nek could
certainly be carried, as the men were only waiting for the order to rush
Marble Kop; but that the advantage thus gained would be valueless, as no
troops could remain on the smooth pinnacle, with no cover and commanded
on both sides.
Orders were therefore sent to each company commander to retire as
quickly as possible as soon as it was dusk. All this time the firing in
the valley on the right had been going on, and at intervals the Maxim
spluttered out a handful of rounds and kept the enemy from quitting,
and, possibly, from taking up other positions from which they could have
added their quota of fire to that already being showered on us.
The stretchers were still coming in, and some of the men of E company
had once more volunteered to make another journey, although this work
was much more dangerous than lying behind an ant heap in the firing
line, and the men deserve all the credit that it is possible to give
them for their pluck and coolness. Four volunteers, when asked for, were
also easily forthcoming to carry to the four Company commanders the
orders to retire; one of these men, Hurrell, of E, had only just
returned with a stretcher, but off he went again, and, I am thankful to
say, safely returned.
There were now a number of poor fellows lying on the grass, and the
doctor and Corporal Knapp and Private Gill were busy doing the best for
them that circumstances would allow; several others, who were only
slightly wounded and were able to walk, were sent off to camp, and the
stretchers were sent back to the firing line in anticipation of the
retirement at dusk.
Although we had been in action since mid-day and it was now nearly five
o'clock, not an ambulance had arrived; but at last ours was seen slowly
approaching from the valley on our right where it had remained: the
labour of removing the groaning, wounded men--one of whom had been shot
in the body, another in the thigh, another in the chest--in the clumsy
old ambulance, which carried only two at a time, was commenced by the
doctor.
It was now getting dusk, and a desultory fire was still being kept up by
the enemy, when suddenly this increased in intensity and became a
continuous clatter of musketry. The whole veldt between us and Marble
Kop became spattered with puffs of dust thrown up by the Mauser bullets,
some of the shots even reaching to the dressing station, which,
unfortunately, had no Red Cross flag raised, although the Boers must
have seen the ambulance wagon standing by with its white tilt and large
flag flying.
The reason of this sudden outburst of musketry was the retirement of our
men, who were running back smartly to be clear of the heavy fire:
several little clumps of men were lagging somewhat in rear, carrying
their wounded with them, and the Boers kept up a furious fire directed
on these small parties. Several men were hit in this way, and the
remainder were furious at the conduct of the Boers; but their firing was
perhaps excusable, as, in the dusk, I doubt whether they could
distinguish the stretcher parties at that long distance.
In contravention of the old-fashioned idea that all retirements should
be conducted slowly, and that it is a disgrace to move out of a slow
walk, is the common-sense feeling that, if troops are to withdraw under
a heavy fire, the quicker they carry out the movement the earlier they
will be beyond range, and the fewer casualties will occur: troops who
have served in India on any of the numerous hill expeditions which take
place in that country soon learn to act upon this plan.
It was almost dark when the companies began to arrive at the dressing
station, and, as the bullets were still flying about, we formed up in a
hollow a little further back and waited for the remainder to come in: a
good many men, and almost all the officers, were still in rear bringing
along their wounded. Some of the companies, notably F and the
Volunteers, had a long way to come, and the former had to wait till
quite dark before they could rush out of the cover afforded by the kraal
and successfully carry in those who had been badly hit. Lieut. Anderson
had been very dangerously wounded in the throat, and the men had some
difficulty in moving him: his wound had been bound up under a dreadful
storm of bullets by a young soldier called Say of F company. Several
other men were especially noted in their care for wounded comrades and
their total disregard of danger: a large number of others showed the
possession of bravery in a marked degree by securing and issuing
ammunition, carrying orders, and assisting in other ways, under a heavy
and continuous fire.
[9]Our casualties were severe, there being one officer killed and four
wounded, whilst three men were killed and thirty-two wounded.
The three companies in the valley on our right retired about the same
time as we did, and we proceeded to camp, which lay behind the position
occupied by the battery and by D company, their escort: it must have
been nearly seven o'clock when we reached our bivouacs and the wagons
were brought up and unloaded of their wet and sopping blankets. However,
we were too dead tired (having worn our blankets and heavy equipment for
fifteen hours) and exhausted for want of sleep and food to think much of
discomfort; and first we had to look after our wounded. Volunteers were
soon forthcoming, and we managed to procure some tents, without any
pegs, which we at last succeeded in pitching: the wounded arrived, the
majority being able to walk, but some being brought in on stretchers,
and a few, two at a time, on the single wretched ambulance which was all
we had; and they were stowed away and made as comfortable as we could
manage in the tents.
A real genuine Good Samaritan of a modern type appeared in the shape of
an acting Chaplain, Mr. Leary, a Colonial born and bred, who did right
good service in looking after our men--whom he had never seen before. He
went to and fro with the ambulance, and, after one or two trips, got the
men taken on a couple of miles further and put in the Field Hospital,
which was at Boshop Farm. He is a right good man, just the one for a
soldiers' padre, and he ought to be a Bishop: I hope he will be one
before long.
We managed to rake up some Bovril, and gave the wounded that and some
tea: the padre took out a bucketful of soup to give to the men still
waiting at the dressing station to be removed. Our doctor, a civilian
named Edwards, and also a Colonial, from New South Wales, worked like a
horse: his labour and the padre's that night only began when ours was
finished.
The following orders relating to the action were published a day or two
afterwards:--
Extract from Battalion Orders, 24th July, 1900.
"It is with the deepest regret that Lieut.-Col. Donne records the death
in action yesterday of Sir Walter Barttelot, Bart., Commanding the
Volunteer Company. Sir Walter Barttelot served throughout the long and
arduous marches of the battalion, showing an example of fortitude and
devotion to duty unsurpassed in the annals of the regiment, and which
had deservedly won him the love of his comrades of all ranks. Sir Walter
Barttelot passed unharmed through the actions of Welkom, Zand River,
Doornkop, the Capture of Pretoria and the battle of Diamond Hill, in all
of which he led his volunteers to the attack. In the desperate assault
yesterday on the Boer position at Retief's Nek, he fell gallantly at the
head of his company, to be mourned both by the regiment and the county
of Sussex as one of the bravest soldiers and truest of men that have
given their lives for Queen and country."
Extract from Battalion Orders, 26th July, 1900.
"Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Hunter, K.C.B., referred as follows to the conduct
of the battalion in the action of Retiefs Nek on 23rd July.
"'Your men worked splendidly in the attack. They could not have done
more. I wish you to convey to them, please, my high admiration of the
dauntless way in which they advanced under such a fire.
"'Nothing could have been finer, and I deeply deplore the heavy losses
incurred.'
"Lieut.-Col. Donne feels proud to publish these remarks from such a
distinguished General as Sir A. Hunter, with whom he has often had the
honour of serving before.
"Although the attack could not be pressed home, owing to darkness and
the cross-fire of the enemy, yet the losses of the battalion were not in
vain, and the boldness of the attack on the right justly contributed to
the success next morning of the turning movement on the left, which
resulted in the rout of the Boers.
"The names of those who have fallen in this, as well as in all other
actions, will be recorded at no distant date on a monument to be
probably erected in the County Cathedral at home, or in such conspicuous
place as may be deemed worthy to commemorate their deeds of valour on
these South African battlefields."[10]
Sir Walter Barttelot was buried the next day under a huge eucalyptus
growing by itself in a field to the east of Boshop Farm: two of the men
who had been killed were buried there, too; their names were Bennett and
Buck.
A slab of timber was erected over Sir Walter's grave, upon which an
inscription had been cut by one of the Volunteer company.
FOOTNOTES:
[9] Our casualties during the day were as follows:
KILLED.
Capt. Sir W. G. Barttelot,
Volunteer Company
Private E. Bennett, G "
Private C. Buck, B "
Private J. Mills, B "
WOUNDED.
Capt. E. L. Mackenzie
2nd Lieut. J. C. W. Anderson
2nd Lieut. H. G. Montgomerie
2nd Lieut. G. E. Leachman
Clr.-Sergt. A. Nye, F Company
Lce.-Corp. J. Butt, H Company
Lce.-Corp. A. King, F Company d
Lce.-Corp. F. Manser, C Company
Private A. Clarke, B Company
Private A. Perry, B Company
Private E. Brown, B Company
Private J. Leadbetter, B Company
Private L. Paddon, B Company
Private J. Hall, B Company
Private J. Nicholls, B Company
Private J. Hyde, B Company
Private A. Baker, F Company
Private G. Parsons, F Company
Private E. Coldwell, F Company
Private W. Croft, F Company
Private H. Smith, F Company
Private A. Holder, F Company d
Private H. Weeks, F Company
Private A. Thomas, C Company
Private F. Baker, C Company
Private M. Jeal, C Company
Private W. Brown, C Company
Private A. Winchester, C Company
Private G. Duke, C Company
Private P. Griffiths, H Company
Private W. Boniface, G Company
Private J. Hiscock, Vol. Company d
Private M. Weller, Vol. Company
Private P. Pilcher, Vol. Company
Private E. Gouldsmith, Vol. Company
Private R. Burtenshaw, E Company
d Died of wounds.
[10] They are inscribed upon the Memorial at Brighton.--ED.