DIAMOND HILL, SECOND DAY.
Boer main position--Reconnaissance by Lieut. Morphett--Advance of
C.I.V.'s--General advance--Failure of Boers to occupy outer
ridge--They hold the second crest in force--No further advance
possible--Nightfall.
The following day, the 12th of June, we did not start very early, but
moved after breakfast up to the hill we had attacked and captured the
previous day, where A company was still on picket. Arrived there, we
waited for some time, until the afternoon in fact, before we moved
again.
In front of us, across the valley, was a long ridge, steep of access on
our side and, apparently, flat on top; this ridge on our right ran down
into the valley in a grassy slope, becoming less and less steep as it
trended further away; but on our left it became more and more
precipitous, until, in the far distance, it appeared almost like a wall.
There were no signs of the enemy on it, but they were there all the
same.
There was a farm in the valley below us surrounded by trees and
vegetation, said to belong to one Botha, and the road wound along from
our left rear past this farm, and disappeared in a cleft in the hills in
front of us. We all realised that the position held by the enemy was a
terribly strong one, and on the flanks it appeared, as far as we could
see with our glasses, to run for miles in a similar way; and there did
not seem to be any break or change in the surface of the ground opposite
to it, which continued to present the same grassy undulating slopes as
far as we could see.
On our left, miles away, we could hear an occasional gun fired, and on
our right there had been a shot or two from the Artillery; but for the
moment all was still and peaceful, so we sat and nibbled our biscuits
and waited.
About one o'clock the five-inch gun, from somewhere in our left rear,
began shelling Botha's farm and the ridge near it and beyond: they made
excellent practice, and searched the slopes of the hill thoroughly. Near
the farm there was a sort of cleft in the hills, into which the road
ran: we could trace its existence for some little way back into the hill
by the brushwood growing on the edge of the cleft, and just now we were
watching this place, some of us, with exceeding great interest. The
General had ordered two companies to proceed in a short time towards
this cleft, to move up it, and then to swing round to the right and take
the hill in flank, thus covering the advance of the remainder of the
Brigade, who were prolonging the line on our right, and were to attack
on the part of the hill previously mentioned, where the grassy slopes
were more gentle and ran easily up to the summit.
Now, for all we knew, this cleft might have been full of Boers on all
sides, before and behind, and we were not looking forward to what was
evidently going to be a nasty piece of work; but the matter was settled,
we had got our orders, and we meant to carry them out to the best of our
ability, somehow or other. So we watched with renewed interest the
shells of a cow gun dropping about on the ridge and the slope of the
hill, experiencing feelings of much satisfaction when one or two, as
they occasionally did, fell plump into the cleft in the hill, where we
hoped crowds of the enemy were concealed. Although not visible, we knew
they were there, as shots occasionally came over and struck the ground
near us, when anyone incautiously went too far forward, to look at the
position.
Towards two o'clock, the General wished a few men sent over in the
direction of the farm, to feel our way; so Lieut. Morphett and a
section of E company went out, widely extended, and with orders to go to
the Farm and signal back any information, and to occupy the walls and
hold out at the Farm until reinforcements arrived.
Directly this small party showed themselves over the ridge behind which
we were lying, fire was opened on them by the enemy, who on this
occasion showed their stupidity in wasting their ammunition in firing at
extreme ranges. We could not, of course, see from what point of the hill
the firing was coming, but from the direction in which the bullets were
dropping and the way the dust flew up, we could see that those of the
enemy who were firing were somewhere on our left front. So we got some
men out and opened a steady dropping fire on the slopes of the hill to
our left, and especially on a row of poplar trees which looked a good
place in which to conceal sharpshooters. Our maxim gun came up too, and
rained a hail of bullets all over the hillside at varying ranges. This
is about all the good this machine gun is in the advance, because, when
the actual forward movement takes place, the gun cannot keep pace and is
left behind: of course a gun on a light field carriage could be brought
on by hand, but, during the campaign, the gun we were supplied with was
a huge, cumbrous affair, as big as a field gun and about as heavy. It
took two mules to draw it, and all sorts of manoeuvres and operations
had to be gone through before a single round could be fired. In this
respect the pattern of machine gun needs considerable improvement before
it will ever be of any sound practical use in the field, with infantry
and in the advance, at any rate.
After a while the enemy's fire lessened, although it still continued to
some extent, and we could see Morphett and his few men working their way
through the trees, and up to and beyond the farm. Soon they signalled to
us that all was clear and no enemy at the farm, but reported some to be
on a ridge in front of the farm, and in the row of trees to the left,
which we had already searched with our fire. So we peppered this row of
trees again with the Maxim, but were unable to develope any rifle fire
on the ridge, as the distance was rather too great for us to fire over
the heads of our men in front--some of the shots might have dropped
short.
During this little episode the Derbyshire had been sent miles away to
the right, and the City Imperial Volunteers had moved against the slopes
of the hill, some way to our right. It was pleasant to watch their
advance party skirmishing up the slopes, which became steeper near the
top. They did it very well, and we watched them with much interest,
pushing their way, well extended, moving slowly so as to keep their
breath, going steadily on advancing and gaining a firmer footing all the
time, although they must have been in momentary expectation of being
engulfed in a torrent of fire. We could see their advanced scouts out in
front creeping up to the crest line, and we waited, breathlessly,
fearing to hear at any instant the infernal din and clatter of a heavy
musketry fire opened on their column. Still they crept on and the
supports got closer up, and we were in dread that the Boers were waiting
only until the supports came closer up yet, before they opened a furious
and disorganising fire as they did at Magersfontein.
At last the skirmishers gained the crest line, and we could see them run
forward and disappear over the ridge, followed by the supports and the
remainder of the regiment. Curiously enough, the ridge was not held by
the Boers, and the advance of the Brigade could take place at once. Our
little scheme of attack in the cleft was not, therefore, required, as
the C.I.V.'s had gained the summit; but the General sent forward two
companies to occupy the hill overlooking the farm.
Why the Boers had neglected to occupy this long ridge and splendid
position, I have never been able to understand: there was every point in
their favour, except one, and we should have been compelled to make
frontal attacks all along the line, at very great loss, no doubt, before
we could have got a footing on the ridge.
Once up there, the weak point was revealed: there was no line of retreat
for the Boers, except over open country, where we could have slated them
handsomely as they went. I think, all the same, that they should have
held this fine ridge all along its length, and eventually withdrawn to a
secondary position in rear, which they could have held for any length of
time. This secondary position, we found, they were actually occupying in
strength, but they neglected the primary position, and thus lost an
opportunity, to my mind, of checking our advance for, possibly, another
day, and doing us a lot of harm besides. However, the enemy's mistakes
are always our gain.
Our two companies advanced in column of sections, in widely extended
order, with considerable distances between the sections, as we expected
to meet a heavy flanking fire going across the valley. As it happened,
however, only a dropping fire was opened on us, and we reached the farm
unscathed, scattered through it, and stretched away up the hill beyond.
A moment's glance sufficed to show that this hill was of no advantage to
us, and so we pushed on round it to the left, down the cleft, across the
road and up the other side. Nothing was to be seen from here but the
gently rising hill, with some rocks on our left front, so we lay down
and waited for further orders, as our original instructions to occupy
the ridge had been completed.
On our right rear we could see the C.I.V.'s still coming over the ridge
and disappearing over the rising ground to the right, and, from their
movements, we could judge that they were coming under a hot fire as they
crossed the heights and came out on the open ground. From what we saw
afterwards, this view appeared correct, as the enemy, failing to occupy
the ridge itself, had retired to a strong position among rocks quite
1,500 yards to the right front, where, at his leisure and in perfect
safety himself, he could slate our troops as they advanced over the
open.
Hearing all this firing on our right, while in front of us was absolute
peace and quietness, we became rather suspicious, and searched the
ground in front with our glasses; but, as is usually the case, no signs
of any enemy could be seen. The longer this stillness continued the more
suspicious it appeared; and we advanced cautiously when, shortly
afterwards, half of D company arrived with an order to move on and
occupy the rocky ridge to our left front. Another company was coming to
support us, and some guns were following: another Brigade was coming up
in rear, so, apparently, a general advance was being made. Still full of
suspicious feelings intensified by the stillness and inaction, we moved
on, but deployed into a wider front, so as to occupy as much of the
ridge as possible when we got there. The half of D company under Lieut.
Ashworth was on the right, then came E company under Captain Aldridge,
while F under Captain Gilbert was on the left: each being in column of
half companies and well extended. There were about 80 or 100 yards
between the two lines, which were now advancing over an open grassy
plateau, that rose gently to our front, where frowned the black rocks,
our objective.
Slowly we went on, and a few shots dropped over, coming, seemingly, from
our right; later some more spirted up the dust at our feet, and we
quickened our pace slightly as we approached the rocky fringe which was
our destination. About 30 yards on our side of the edge, there was a
fringe of loose rocks and boulders, and, as we reached the first of
these and mounted the gradual slope which led upwards to the top, we
were enabled to look over the summit of the rocks, and our heads thus
became visible to the enemy beyond, who were evidently waiting for this.
Suddenly there was the most terrific outburst of rifle fire from our
front, and a perfect hailstorm of bullets rattled, whistled and shrieked
over our heads; luckily we were still too low down, or else the Boers
were just a moment too soon in delivering their fire, as but few men
were touched: instantly the officers yelled to their men to get under
cover, and down all hands dropped into perfect safety. Then up we crept
on hands and knees to the top, which was fringed with enormous rocks,
furnishing the most excellent cover: and through the interstices of
these we could open fire on the enemy; not that we actually saw any
enemy (during the whole of that eventful day I did not see one single
Boer), but we found out where they were. In front of us, and on the
other side of a deep valley covered with rocks, was another rocky ridge,
exactly similar to that upon which we were lying; and from this the
enemy's bullets were still shrieking and whistling over our heads,
fired, doubtless, from chinks and crevices between rocks similar to
those we were now using.
About 800 yards was the range, and we pushed up every rifle into the
firing line, made head cover for ourselves, and kept up a furious fire
for some little time. The second line coming up behind us, composed of
the rear half companies, had some casualties, Lieut. Morphett being shot
in the thigh, and one or two of the men being wounded. Private Bowles
of F company was shot on the foot, through boot and all, by a dropping
bullet; he was much astonished and spun round and round several times.
Soon afterwards B and C companies, under Major Panton and Capt.
Wroughton, came up to reinforce us, and they also were spread out behind
rocks and told to keep up a continual fire. Probably owing to the fact
that they could see nothing, the enemy gradually reduced their rifle
fire until it almost ceased; but they now opened on us with a couple of
pom-poms, fortunately for us not beginning until after we had reached
the rocks and had established ourselves under cover. Almost at the same
time, a heavy shell fire was commenced at us, but soon discontinued, as
we afforded the enemy's gunners no object to shoot at. This shell fire
was from our left front; we could not locate the gun, but wherever it
was, it remained there, and in action, all the afternoon, although we
were not afterwards troubled by it. The pom-poms came from the far
right, where we could just distinguish the rocky tops of some elevated
ground, and had they been closer would no doubt have done considerable
damage, as they were quite on our right flank.
As though all this shell and rifle and pom-pom fire was not enough, we
were now treated to a shell from the rear, which struck close to a man
of B company and covered him with dust and dirt. Taking a man with me, I
ran down into a safe spot, and we both waved our helmets vigorously for
some minutes, when apparently we were observed from the battery which
was firing at us, as no more shells came over our way.
The intensity of our firing had now somewhat dropped, as had that of the
enemy, neither of us giving the other much to fire at; but the Boers
were very watchful, and you could not look over your rock without one
or two shots whizzing past immediately.
There was nothing more to be done but to sit and wait; it was impossible
to advance further, even if we had had orders to do so.
About five o'clock there was a tremendous outburst of firing, but not
all in our direction; and then we saw, to our left rear, a battalion of
Guards, (Coldstreamers they were) coming up towards the rocks. They went
through precisely the same experience as we had, and after a while
commenced company volleys at the opposite side of the ravine, where the
Boers were concealed, and continued for some time to pour in consistent
volley firing. Meantime the Boer fire dropped to almost nothing, but
every now and then, whenever there was a longer interval than usual
between the volleys of the Guards, the rattle and whizz of the Mausers
developed suddenly into a furious hailstorm, and as quickly died away
again, showing that the Boers had some system of control of fire.
General Bruce Hamilton came up to where I was and had a look at the
position, and I pointed out to him the direction from which the pom-pom
fire had come; he looked at the hills through his telescope, and said he
saw some of the Boers' horses collected at the base of a rock, and would
send a gun up to us to have a shot at them. The gun came up shortly
afterwards, but it was then too late to see any distance, and the shells
fell short.
All the afternoon, a most interesting artillery duel had been going on
between the 82nd Battery and the enemy's gun to which I have alluded, as
being in position to our left front: our battery came into action near
the cleft in the hill through which the road past Botha's Farm runs, and
for some hours shelled the Boer position on all sides. The Boers
answered the fire pluckily, and shelled the battery consistently for
some time: we had a good view of the whole action, and it seemed
marvellous that our guns could be worked at all in the face of the
clouds of shrapnel which were hurtling through the air, all round the
battery; but although they lost heavily in men and horses, they kept
their guns going until it was too dark to see any longer.
Just as it was getting dusk, orders were received to withdraw from the
position after dark, but to leave three companies on picket, and to send
the remainder to the camp, which was being formed at Botha's Farm,
behind the hill. B, C and E companies were therefore left on picket, and
F company and the half of D returned to camp.
The remainder of the battalion had stayed in reserve behind the hill
near the farm, G company being in advance somewhat and on the left of
the 82nd Battery, and the others behind the hill, near the Farm.
Sad to relate, Captain Maguire was shot through the head whilst
ascending the hill near the farm: he was not even in sight of the enemy,
and must have been killed by a dropping bullet fired at extreme range.
Poor Maguire, always so cheery and full of spirits; it was his first and
only action, and he was the only man of ours killed in the two days
fighting.[8]
Lord Roberts wired to the War Office on the 12th of June as follows:
"After surrendering the city (Pretoria) Botha retired to a place about
15 miles east on the Middleburg road: he had a small force at first, but
during the last few days the numbers increased, and his being so near
the town kept up excitement in the country, prevented burghers from
laying down their arms, and interfered with the collection of supplies.
"It became necessary to attack them. This I did yesterday.
"He held a very strong position (practically unassailable in front)
which enabled him to place the main portion of his troops on his flanks,
which he knew from former experience were his vulnerable parts.
"I sent French, with Porter's and Dickson's Cavalry Brigades and
Hutton's Mounted Infantry round by our left: Ian Hamilton with
Broadwood's and Gordon's Cavalry Brigades, Ridley's Mounted Infantry,
and Bruce Hamilton's Infantry Brigade round by our right.
"Both columns met with great opposition, but about three in the
afternoon I saw two of Hamilton's Infantry battalions advancing to what
appeared to be the key of the enemy's defence on their left flank. This
was almost gained before dark and I ordered the force to bivouac on the
ground they had won."
FOOTNOTE:
[8] Our Casualties on the 12th of June were:--
KILLED.
Captain C. Maguire.
WOUNDED.
2nd Lieut. G. Morphett.
Cr. Sergeant F. Akehurst, B Company.
Lce. Corporal A. Tester, G " (died of wounds)
Private R. Davis G "
" W. Miller D "
" C. Divall F "
" J. Bowles F "
" A. Dennett F "
" F. Needham B "
" F. Guntley D "
" G. Wadham Vol. "