YUSAFZAIS AND GADUNS: OPERATIONS.[25]
None of the dwellers in the territories described in the last chapter
gave us any trouble during the first few years which followed upon the
taking over of the frontier by the British. In 1853, however, it became
necessary to punish the Hindustani fanatics, who had afforded some
assistance to the Hassanzais during the expedition which the British
Government undertook against them in the previous year, and who had
seized the fort at Kotla on the right bank of the Indus, belonging to
the Nawab of Amb. Early in January 1853, Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson,
C.B., moved the following force down to the Indus opposite Kotla:
Two guns, Mountain Train Battery.
1st Sikh Infantry.
3rd Sikh Infantry.
Two Dogra regiments of the Kashmir Army.
Six Wallpieces.
Six Zamburaks.
On the 6th the force was ferried across from Kirpilian in two large
boats, and the Sikh regiments and mountain guns advanced, when the
Hindustanis evacuated the fort and fled, being pursued and having
considerable loss inflicted upon them by the Nawab of Amb’s men. There
was no more trouble in the Peshawar district until the year of the
Mutiny, and it was then almost entirely due to the presence on the
Yusafzai frontier of the Hindustani fanatics, who were supported by
contributions of men and money from traitorous princes and private
individuals in India.
[Sidenote: The Mutineers of the 55th]
The Yusafzai country was then controlled by the fort at Mardan, usually
garrisoned by the Corps of Guides; in the middle of May, however, this
regiment had started upon its famous march to Delhi, and its place at
Mardan had been taken by part of the 55th Native Infantry. On the night
of the 21st May news reached General Cotton at Peshawar that some
companies of the 55th, stationed at Nowshera, had mutinied, and that
some of these had joined their comrades at Mardan. On the night of the
23rd a small force, accompanied by John Nicholson as political officer,
quitted Peshawar for the purpose of disarming the 55th Native Infantry
at Mardan. At sunrise on the 25th the disaffected regiment saw the
column approaching Mardan; “and then all but a hundred and twenty, who
were restrained by the threats and persuasions of the officers, broke
tumultuously from the fort, and fled. The column pressed on in pursuit;
but the mutineers were far ahead; the ground was so heavy that the
artillery could not get within range; and the chase was all in vain
until Nicholson, taking with him a few of the police sowars, dashed to
the front and rode into the fugitive masses. Breaking before his charge,
they scattered themselves over the country in sections and companies;
but all day long he pursued them, hunted them out of the villages in
which they sought for refuge, drove them over ridges, cut down their
stragglers in ravines, and never rested till, having ridden over seventy
miles, slain a hundred and twenty, and wounded between three and four
hundred of the traitors, taken a hundred and fifty prisoners, and
recovered two hundred and fifty stand of arms and the regimental
Colours, he was forced by the approach of night to draw rein, while
those who had escaped him fled across the border into the hills of
Swat.”[26]
The virtual ruler of Swat at that time was one whom Oliver has called “A
Border Pope”—an aged priest, known as the Akhund, and he decided that
these fugitives should not be accorded an asylum. They were accordingly
guided to the Indus and put across the stream, whence they intended to
endeavour to make their way to Kashmir. The majority of them succumbed,
however, to the perils of the journey by way of Hazara or Kohistan, but
a few took refuge in the country of the Khudu Khels, whose Khan was
hostile to us, and in whose territory a settlement of Hindustanis had
been established at a place called Mangal Thana, as a branch of the
parent colony at Sitana. The presence of the Hindustanis was the cause
of some trouble in July 1857 at Shekh Jana, and a fortnight later the
fanatics, under the leadership of one Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan, crossed
the border and raised the standard of religious war at a border village
called Narinji, where some 650 desperadoes had collected. A small force
was moved out from Mardan and Nowshera, and, marching at first in
another direction so as to conceal the object of the expedition, arrived
unexpectedly before Narinji. The position of the village was very
strong, and in the days of Sikh rule it had more than once been
unsuccessfully attacked, but under cover of the fire of the mountain
guns, it was now speedily taken and destroyed. The enemy had lost very
severely, and the retirement, which now took place, was quite unopposed.
Our casualties had been five killed and twenty-one wounded.
The chief object of the operations—the capture of the Maulvi—had not,
however, been attained; cattle were raided from British territory; and
the enemy were being daily reinforced by men from Buner, Chamla and
Swat. Major J. L. Vaughan, who had charge of the operations, now
received additional troops from Peshawar, and early on the 1st August he
left his camp at Shewa with the following force:
2 24–pounder Howitzers.
4 guns, Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.
50 bayonets, 27th Foot.
50 bayonets, 70th Foot.
50 bayonets, 87th Foot.
150 sabres, 2nd Punjab Cavalry.[27]
50 bayonets, 21st Native Infantry.[28]
400 bayonets, 5th Punjab Infantry.[29]
200 bayonets, 6th Punjab Infantry.[30]
150 bayonets, 16th Punjab Infantry.[31]
225 Mounted Levies and Police.
100 Foot Levies and Police.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1857]
Three hundred and fifty rifles were detached to take Narinji in flank
and rear, and reached their position about half an hour after the main
body had appeared in front of the village. The flanking party was
vigorously opposed, but the frontal attack had a comparatively easy
task, many of the defenders withdrawing early—among them being the
Maulvi. The retreat was to some extent cut off, and many were killed,
among the slain being several of the mutineers of the 55th Native
Infantry. Our losses were only one killed and eight wounded.
The village was then completely destroyed and the troops retired.
The spirit of the people was not, however, by any means broken, for less
than three months later the Assistant-Commissioner of Yusafzai, while
encamped at Shekh Jana with a small escort, was attacked by the
Hindustanis and Khudu Khels, assisted by the men of Shekh Jana and
Narinji. The Assistant-Commissioner escaped with his life, but five of
his party were killed, and the whole of his baggage was looted.
_Expedition against the Hindustanis and Khudu Khels, 1858._—On the 22nd
April, 1858, a force was assembled, for the punishment of this outrage,
on the left bank of the Kabul River opposite Nowshera. It numbered 4877
of all ranks, was commanded by Major-General Sir Sydney Cotton, K.C.B.,
and was divided into two brigades, respectively under Lieutenant-Colonel
Renny and Major Alban, both of the 81st Foot, but before crossing the
frontier, was divided into three columns as under:
FIRST COLUMN.
4 guns, Peshawar Light Field Battery.[32]
2 guns, Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.[33]
260 bayonets, 98th Foot.
100 sabres, 7th Irregular Cavalry.[34]
200 sabres, Guides Cavalry.
30 sabres, Peshawar Light Horse.[35]
100 bayonets, Sappers and Miners.
300 bayonets, 21st Native Infantry.[36]
300 bayonets, Guides Infantry.
400 bayonets, 9th Punjab Infantry.[37]
400 bayonets, 18th Punjab Infantry.[38]
SECOND COLUMN.
200 bayonets, 81st Foot.
100 sabres, 18th Irregular Cavalry.[39]
47 bayonets, Sappers and Miners.
200 bayonets, Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment.
450 bayonets, 8th Punjab Infantry.[40]
THIRD COLUMN.
105 bayonets, 81st Foot.
10 bayonets, 98th Foot.
25 sabres, 7th Irregular Cavalry.
25 sabres, 18th Irregular Cavalry.[39]
60 sabres, Guides Cavalry.
254 bayonets, Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment.
155 bayonets, 21st Native Infantry.
76 bayonets, Guides Infantry.
54 bayonets, 8th Punjab Infantry.[40]
137 bayonets, 9th Punjab Infantry.
185 bayonets, 18th Punjab Infantry.
[Sidenote: Expedition of 1858]
The force assembled at the frontier village of Salim Khan, which was
made the base of operations, and on the 25th April the people of
Totalai, who had long been oppressed by the chief of the Khudu Khels,
now, encouraged by the proximity of the troops, made a rush upon
Panjtar, intending to seize the chief, Mukarrab Khan, but he escaped to
Chinglai, when his village was burnt before the troops arrived upon the
scene. The first object of the expedition was thus unexpectedly and
easily attained.
The following arrangements were now made: the First Column, under the
Major-General commanding, marching by Chinglai, was to enter Khudu Khel
territory by the Darhan Pass; the Second Column was to move directly on
Panjtar; while the Third remained in charge of the camp at Salim Khan.
The Darhan Pass was found to be a very narrow defile, about two miles in
length, the passage of which might easily have been disputed; no
opposition was, however, encountered, and the troops reached Chinglai,
which was destroyed under a slight and ineffectual fire from the enemy
holding the heights. The column returned on the 27th to Salim Khan via
Panjtar and the Jehangirra Darra. This route was found to form a very
much more difficult approach to Chinglai than the Darhan Pass route, the
track being chiefly through broken country, at one point passing through
a rocky defile called Taralai—a very formidable obstacle if disputed.
Although some of Mukarrab Khan’s men, mounted and on foot, were seen, no
attack was made upon the column. The Second Column had meanwhile
thoroughly destroyed Panjtar and returned to Salim Khan.
The General now determined to attack a stronghold of the Khan’s, called
Mangal Thana, situated on one of the main spurs of the Mahaban Mountain.
This place had also been the resort of Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan, who had
so perseveringly endeavoured, at Narinji and other places, to raise
Yusafzai in rebellion in 1857.
The force was again divided into three columns, which were now, however,
somewhat differently constituted—the First to act against Mangal Thana,
the Second to proceed as a support to Panjtar, the Third remaining in
reserve at Salim Khan. On the 28th April the First Column left camp
while it was moonlight; the ascent of the hills was found to be very
difficult, and it was necessary to leave half the column at Dukarai. No
opposition was, however, met with, and Mangal Thana was found to be
abandoned.
Mangal Thana consisted of two villages, one above the other, the upper
containing the citadel of the leader of the fanatics with enclosures for
his followers, and the whole surrounded by strong fortifications of
stones and timber. The position was about 5000 feet above sea-level, and
the neighbourhood was densely wooded. The troops bivouacked here for the
night, blew up the fort next day, and returned on the 30th to camp at
Salim Khan.
[Sidenote: Operations against the Fanatics]
The colony of fanatics at Sitana had now to be dealt with, and
accordingly, on the 2nd May, the force marched to Khabal, about four
miles from Sitana. Between Amb, on the right bank of the Indus, and our
frontier village of Topi, is a narrow strip of land forming part of the
Utmanzai territory. It contains, in addition to the two or three small
hamlets of Topi, the villages of Upper and Lower Khabal (exactly
opposite Torbela), Upper and Lower Kai, and Lower Sitana, Mandi and
Upper Sitana. The Utmanzais of this strip had, previous to this date,
had feuds with the Saiyids and Hindustanis of Sitana, and consequently
welcomed our troops as allies against a common foe.
Early on the 4th May a force of five guns and 1050 rifles was sent to
the left bank of the Indus, and advanced against the villages from the
east; the main column moved against them from the south; while the men
of our ally, the Nawab of Amb, occupied the hills to the north. On
approaching Lower Sitana, two regiments were detached to move up the
mountain in rear, the position was attacked in front, and the enemy were
driven with considerable loss to their second position. Here they were
met by one of the regiments coming up in their rear, and driven back on
the bayonets of the troops in front. Hand-to-hand fighting now ensued
until every Hindustani in the position was either killed or captured.
Some Gadun allies of the fanatics made no stand, retiring precipitately.
The enemy’s position having been carried at all points and their
villages destroyed, the force retired, being closely followed up. This
was the first time the Enfield rifle had been used against the
tribesmen, and the effectiveness of its fire made a great impression.
Our losses had been six killed and twenty-nine wounded.
That night the force encamped on the Sitana Plain by the Indus bank,
whence it proceeded next day to Khabal.
The Hindustanis, expelled from Sitana by the Utmanzais, had taken refuge
with the Upper Gaduns, and to prevent the Utmanzais being compelled, on
our retirement, to readmit them, the Gadun villages immediately on the
Yusafzai border were surrounded by our troops, and coercive measures
were threatened. This had an immediate effect, the Upper and Lower
Gaduns sending in their representatives and binding themselves, equally
with the Utmanzais, to expel and keep out the Saiyids and Hindustanis,
and to resist any other tribe which should try to readmit them.
The force then marched back to Nowshera, where it was broken up.
[Sidenote: The Gaduns Troublesome]
The Hindustani fanatics, now ejected from Sitana, settled at Malka, on
the north side of the Mahaban Mountain, but in 1861 they came down to a
place called Siri, close to their old haunts, and began abducting Hindu
traders from across the Hazara border. The only way whereby it seemed
possible to check these crimes was to punish the tribes which allowed
these robbers passage through their territories. The Utmanzais and
Gaduns were accordingly placed under blockade, and towards the end of
1861 these came in, made submission, and again agreed to exclude the
Hindustanis. For a brief period the kidnapping ceased; then in the
spring of 1863 came reports of two murders, followed in the summer by
the news that the Hindustanis had suddenly reoccupied Sitana. Not only
had the tribes above mentioned done nothing to prevent this, according
to agreement, but some of the tribesmen had actually invited this
occupation. A blockade of the Gaduns and Utmanzais was therefore
reimposed, and a large number of troops and levies were disposed on
either bank of the Indus, while the 101st Fusiliers were ordered up to
Hazara.
The Hindustanis were now showing a very bitter spirit against the
British Government, their leaders were preaching something of a _jehad_,
and attacks on our posts and villages were now projected or undertaken.
On the night of the 3rd September a party of Hindustanis attempted to
attack the camp of the Guides engaged on blockade duty at Topi, but were
driven off in panic; the Hassanzais, instigated by the Maulvi of Sitana,
made an unprovoked attack upon and destroyed several outlying villages
in Amb territory; later the same clan threatened Chamberi, and attacked
and killed several of the Amb levies on the Black Mountain. By this time
it seemed clear that most of the Hazara tribes had now thrown in their
lot against the British, and an expedition against them appeared
inevitable; it was therefore decided that the force employed should be a
large one, and that Brigadier-General Sir Neville Chamberlain should
command it.
Two columns were to be employed, the one operating from the Peshawar
Valley, the other from Hazara, and the movements proposed for each were
as under: the Peshawar Column was to assemble at Nawa Kala and Swabi,
with the apparent intention of moving on Mangal Thana, but when ready to
move was to march through the Ambela Pass, occupy Koga in the Chamla
Valley, and thence march on Sitana by Chirori; the Hazara Column
remaining stationary at Darband to overawe the riverain tribes and
protect the Hazara border. Additional troops were detailed to hold the
line of the Indus, Hazara and Yusafzai at Darband, Torbela, Topi,
Abbottabad, Rustam Bazar and Mardan. Hostilities were not anticipated
from the Bunerwals, with whom we had no quarrel, and who were known to
have no sympathy with the Hindustanis; but it was unfortunate that the
absolute necessity for keeping the line of operations secret prevented
the Bunerwals being informed that their frontier would be approached by
our troops. Consequently they not unnaturally believed that an invasion
of their country was intended, and eventually joined the coalition
against us.
[Sidenote: Ambela Expedition]
_Ambela Expedition, 1863._—The preliminary arrangements for the
expedition appear to have suffered to no inconsiderable extent from the
fact that, in order not to alarm the frontier tribes, General
Chamberlain had been asked not to join his command until the last
moment. On the 19th October he wrote to his brother: “I never before had
such trouble or things in so unsatisfactory a state. Carriage, supplies,
grain-bags, all deficient. Some of our guns and the five and a half inch
mortars have to be sent back as useless, after having taken the pick of
men and animals to equip a half-inch battery of R.A. Our 1st L.F.
batteries have to be stripped to make the Half Battery R.A.
efficient.”[41]
General Chamberlain reached Swabi on the 13th October, and marched on
the 18th to the mouth of the Darhan Pass with the following troops:
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.
Hazara Mountain Train Battery.[42]
1st Punjab Infantry.[43]
5th Gurkhas.
The other troops of the expeditionary force closed up at the same time
to Nawa Kala from their camps in rear, and a proclamation was now issued
to all the tribes concerned, stating the object of the operations and
the reason for following this particular route. Then on the night of the
19th the following troops marched from Nawa Kala and joined at Parmalao
the advanced column:
100 sabres, Guides Cavalry.
100 sabres, 11th Bengal Cavalry.[44]
Guides Infantry.
5th Punjab Infantry.
27th Punjab Native Infantry.[45]
The junction effected, the whole moved on, under Colonel Wilde, to the
mouth of the Ambela Pass, which was reached at sunrise on the 20th.
On the 20th the pass was entered and traversed, the head of the pass
being held by some 250 Bunerwals, who were, however, dislodged without
any great difficulty, and Colonel Wilde’s column encamped on and beyond
the pass on tolerably open and level ground; he posted picquets to hold
the most important points, but was not strong enough to do more. The
main column had left Nawa Kala at 1 a.m. on the 20th October, and, after
a short halt at Rustam, closed up to the rear of the advanced troops
late in the afternoon. Both parties had found the road extraordinarily
difficult; the track was tolerably good up to the village of Surkhabi,
in our own territory, but thereafter deteriorated, in the pass often
lying in the bed of a stream, and in other places being overgrown with
jungle. In most parts it was possible to move only in single file; the
rear guard did not get beyond Surkhabi; and though the ammunition mules
managed, with difficulty, to keep up with their units, not a single
baggage animal reached camp during the night of the 20th–21st, and only
few had arrived there twenty-four hours later. It had been intended that
Colonel Wilde should push forward the few cavalry with him, supported by
the other arms, to reconnoitre the road down the further side of the
pass and the head of the Chamla Valley, but in view of the difficulties
of the road, it was deemed best to postpone any forward movement.
[Sidenote: The Advance Commences]
While halted on the pass, representatives came in from the people of
Chamla and Buner expressing feelings of friendship, and no opposition
seems therefore to have been anticipated from these tribes when the
force again moved forward on the morning of the 22nd. To prevent any
misunderstanding, a full explanation of our intentions was sent to the
Buner maliks, and careful instructions were given to our reconnoitring
party of cavalry and infantry, now sent on, to follow a road avoiding
Buner territory as far as possible. The descent from the top of the
Kotal was found to be tolerably good going, and the rest of the pass was
unoccupied by any of the tribesmen.
From the foot of the range on the northern side, two roads passed
through the Chamla Valley; one skirted the village of Ambela and lay
under the hills dividing Chamla from Buner on the north side of the
valley, while the other went by Koga on the south; and as Ambela, though
actually in Chamla, was regarded by the Bunerwals as one of their own
villages, the advance guard was ordered to proceed by the Koga road so
as to avoid all possibility of offence or misunderstanding.
Passing the kotal leading into Buner it was seen to be crowded by
Bunerwals, but they did not come down into the valley, which appeared to
be quite unoccupied. The reconnoitring party pushed on through Koga to
Kuria and then returned towards the Ambela; by this time it was seen
that numbers of Bunerwals had come down from the hills with the evident
intention of cutting off the retreat of the party. The tribesmen were
charged by the cavalry and driven back, and the infantry—the 20th Punjab
Infantry[46] under Major Brownlow—then formed the rearguard. Daylight
had now gone, the enemy came on again and pressed the 20th very closely,
rushing in among them sword in hand. As the retiring troops drew near
camp, the picquets became engaged, and there was a general attack upon
them in the front and on the flanks of the camp, which was kept up until
midnight.
[Sidenote: Hostility of the Bunerwals]
That the Bunerwals should thus have taken a decidedly hostile part
against us was very serious, and our position now required to be
strengthened and the plan of operations to be changed. The line of
communications was secured by calling up additional infantry and levies,
but it was evident that the Hindustani settlements on the Mahaban
Mountain could not now be reached by the Chamla Valley, with a powerful
and hostile tribe on the left flank of the line of march.
On the 24th all sick, superfluous baggage and spare transport were
passed down the pass to the rear, and the troops—on this date about 6000
in number—were employed in improving the communications. The Bunerwals
remained quiet, but it was noticed that they were joined by large bodies
of the Hassanzais, Chagarzais, Mada Khels and Hindustanis.
Shortly after daylight next morning the enemy were observed on a ridge
opposite and close to the advanced picquets of the right defence, and
Major Keyes, who was there in command, advanced and dislodged them. He
took up a position on a ridge commanding the plain over which the enemy
had retired, and found he was then himself commanded, at a range of 700
yards, from a conical hill on which the tribesmen were collecting. He
sent into camp for reinforcements, but these did not reach him until 2
p.m., when the hill was attacked and captured. It afterwards transpired
that the enemy had intended to attack both sides of the camp, but one
force did not come on.
The attention of the General commanding was now drawn to the left side
of the camp, where was the Guru Mountain separating the Ambela Pass from
Buner. The enemy had collected here in large bodies, and it was
necessary to meet any attack from that quarter, and to provide for the
security of a sick convoy which it was proposed to send to the rear. On
the morning of the 26th, therefore, the left picquets, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, were reinforced with the following:
Hazara Mountain Battery.
30 marksmen, 71st and 101st Regiments.
200 rifles, 71st Regiment.
5th Punjab Infantry.
6th Punjab Infantry.
[Sidenote: The “Eagle’s Nest”]
These troops proceeded to the vicinity of the “Eagle’s Nest” picquet,
situated a full mile from the camp, and occupying the top of a very
steep, rocky knoll rising out of the southern face of the mountain, and
forming the apex of that portion overlooking the left side of the camp.
This picquet had hitherto only been held during the day. Colonel Vaughan
now placed the thirty marksmen with eighty men of the 20th Punjab
Infantry in the “Eagle’s Nest”—as many as it was capable of holding—and
stationed another 120 men of the 3rd[47] and 20th Punjab Infantry among
some large rocks at the base of the knoll. The rest of the force with
Colonel Vaughan was disposed about a small underfeature, 400 yards west
of the picquet.
On the crest of the hill opposite to and distant 500 yards from our
picquet, was a breastwork occupied by about 2000 of the enemy, and
shortly after noon these made two fierce assaults upon the “Eagle’s
Nest,” and also attacked the rest of the troops immediately under
Colonel Vaughan. All these attacks were gallantly repulsed, but our
casualties were heavy, amounting to twenty-nine killed and ninety-two
wounded; the enemy also lost seriously, and though no further attack was
made, a heavy fire was kept up during the rest of the day. The picquet
was not, as usual, withdrawn at sunset, and Colonel Vaughan’s party
maintained its positions all night; next day it was determined to hold
permanently the “Eagle’s Nest” with forty British and 300 Native
soldiers, and another post on an adjoining height, called “Vaughan’s
Picquet,” with the Hazara Mountain Battery, fifty British and 300 Native
soldiers. Of the enemy’s killed and wounded many were Hindustanis, and
some were apparently ex-soldiers of the late 55th Native Infantry.
News was now received that the Akhund of Swat, the Border Pope, had
thrown in his lot with the Bunerwals, and had summoned also the people
of Bajaur and Dir; Chamla sent its quota; the Utman Khels, Afridis from
Lundkhwar, also took the field; and it was evident that there was now a
general combination against us of almost all the tribes from the Indus
to the boundary of Afghanistan. Old feuds seemed to be forgotten, for
tribes and chiefs, usually bitter enemies, were now ready to fight side
by side against us; and it was clear how greatly the situation had
changed for the worse since the force had first entered the Ambela Pass.
Then the troops had merely to deal with the tribes on the Mahaban
Mountain, to expel the Hindustanis from that tract, and march to its
borders through a friendly, or at least a not actively hostile, country.
General Chamberlain recognised that it would be inadvisable to make any
advance, such as had been contemplated, with his present force against
so large a combination. He therefore decided to remain on the defensive
in the position he now occupied, which was secure, where at any rate his
communications were safeguarded, and where supplies and reinforcements
could easily reach him, trusting that the discouragement of repeated
unsuccessful attacks would gradually weaken the enemy’s numbers and
break up the coalition.
Between the 27th and 29th the force was strengthened by the arrival of
two guns of the 3rd Punjab Light Field Battery,[48] the 14th Sikhs, and
the 4th Gurkhas, but it was known that the tribesmen too had received
reinforcements, and that an attack was shortly to be made upon the camp
defences.
[Sidenote: The “Crag Picquet”]
On the night of the 29th–30th the advanced picquets of the right defence
were furnished by the 1st Punjab Infantry and a company of the Guides,
under Major Keyes. Above the main picquets and commanding them was “the
Crag”—a high rock, the ascent to which was most precipitous, and the
summit of which was incapable of containing more than a very few men.
Shortly before daybreak this position was heavily attacked, and it soon
became apparent that its garrison was hard pressed. Reinforcements were
at once sent forward from the lower picquets, but, before “the Crag”
could be reached, the small garrison was overpowered and driven off the
rock, though the men held the ground lower down. Major Keyes decided to
hold his ground until daylight among the rocks immediately below the
summit and sent for help. As day broke the picquets were here reinforced
by the 20th Punjab Infantry under Major Brownlow, and this officer
advanced by a ridge which ran to the right of “the Crag” and threatened
the enemy in rear, while Major Keyes attacked in front. The assault thus
carried out and supported was entirely successful; a hand-to-hand fight
ensued when the summit of the rock was reached, but the enemy were
driven out at the point of the bayonet and the position was recovered.
No sooner had “the Crag” been recaptured than the right attack fell to
pieces and the tribesmen fled in panic. Lieutenants Fosbery, 104th
Fusiliers, and Pitcher, 1st Punjab Infantry, were awarded the Victoria
Cross for gallantry on this occasion.
While this attack on the right was in progress, another by men from Swat
was delivered on the front of the camp, but this was easily repulsed; a
demonstration was also made against the upper left flank picquets. Our
losses on this day amounted to fifty-five killed and wounded, but those
of the enemy had been so heavy, and the effect of the defeat so great,
that many of the tribesmen returned to their homes.
The General commanding now decided to arrange for a new line of
communications which should not be exposed to attack from the direction
of the Guru Mountain. A line of road was therefore selected between the
villages of Khanpur and Sherdara, and the base of operations was changed
from Rustam to Parmalao. On the 28th October and 5th November the 7th
Fusiliers, 93rd Highlanders, 23rd[49] and 24th[50] Punjab Native
Infantry were ordered up to this frontier; a body of 275 police, horse
and foot, was sent up to Nawa Kala to assist in the protection of the
rearward communications; and later on 4200 camels and 2100 mules were
collected at Nowshera, in view of the demand for pack transport which
might have to be met when the force eventually moved forward. Working
parties were also employed in making a road, to facilitate the forward
march on Ambela, along the western slopes of the right ridge, and thus
covered from any fire from the Guru Mountain. On the 6th November the
operations on this road caused us considerable loss. The working parties
had been sent forward as usual, covered by picquets beyond and above
them, and all had gone well until the time came to withdraw. The working
parties were successfully retired, but the forward covering parties seem
to have, for some unknown reason, remained too long on their ground, and
were surrounded by the enemy, who moved up in large numbers. The light
was failing, and the enemy seem to have broken in between some of the
picquets: many of the covering party fought their way back to camp, but
our losses this day amounted to seventy-eight of all ranks killed and
wounded; the bodies of some of the former had temporarily to be left
behind, but were recovered next day.
On the 8th the new road to the rear was taken into use, and a
commencement was made in removing supplies, etc., to the south side of
the pass, where it was proposed to form a new camp, thereby saving much
picquet duty and affording an actually stronger position.
[Sidenote: “Crag Picquet” Attacked]
On the 11th the enemy ascended the hills about Lalu, on our right front,
in large numbers, evidently with the intention of attacking the picquets
on that side of the camp. These were accordingly reinforced and their
defences strengthened. “The Crag” had recently been much enlarged and
improved, and was now capable of accommodating a garrison of 160 men,
while it was supported by the mountain guns of the Peshawar Battery from
the main picquet. At 4 p.m. on the 11th Major Brownlow assumed command
of “the Crag,” having under him fifteen of the 101st Fusiliers, thirty
of the 14th Sikhs, and 115 of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry. Two of
the four mountain guns commanded the left shoulder of “the Crag” hill
and the front of the “Centre” picquet below. The enemy occupied a
position about half a mile in length on a ridge facing and within 250
yards of “the Crag” picquet. Between the two positions was a hollow
intersected by a ravine. The right and rear of “the Crag” were
precipitous and practically unassailable; the left face was the weak
point, there being cover for an attacker to within a few yards of the
position. Anticipating an attack, every effort was this day made to
improve the defences. About 10 p.m. the enemy moved down in large
numbers to the hollow in front of the picquet, and shortly after made
repeated desperate attacks until daybreak upon the front and left of the
picquet, but were beaten back with loss, although at one time they
nearly penetrated the position at its left front angle; the situation
was saved by the gallantry and devotion of Major Brownlow and five men
of his regiment. By morning but very few of the enemy were anywhere
visible, and as Major Brownlow’s men had been for forty-eight hours on
duty, they were relieved at 8 a.m. on the 30th by ninety men of the 1st
Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant Davidson.
This officer soon after asked Major Keyes for reinforcements, as he did
not consider his ninety men sufficient garrison for the position, and
thirty additional men were sent him, all that could at the moment be
spared, as serious attacks were anticipated upon other portions of the
defence. These reinforcements had only just reached “the Crag,” when the
men of the picquet were seen to be vacating it and rushing down the hill
in confusion. Major Keyes at once proceeded to and occupied a breastwork
on the road between “the Crag” and the main picquet, and there rallied
the retreating men and checked the advance of the enemy. Feeling the
urgent need of the moral effect of a counter attack and the necessity
for giving time for the arrival of support, he ordered an assault upon
“the Crag.” This, though bravely led and executed, was unsuccessful,
owing to the paucity of men available, and the detachments fell back.
The enemy occupying “the Crag” were now pouring a heavy fire into the
camp, and its continued possession by them would render the lower
picquets untenable. Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, commanding the right
defences, now asked for the 101st Regiment, and taking also three
companies of the Guides, made for the advanced picquets, where the state
of affairs was as follows: Major Ross, with some of the 14th Sikhs and
men of other corps, was holding on halfway up “the Crag” hill, but
unable to advance any further; parties of the enemy, attacking the lower
picquets, were only kept back by the well-directed fire of the mountain
guns; while the 1st, 20th, and two companies of the Guides with Major
Keyes still held the breastwork, but could not hope to do so for long.
[Sidenote: Re-Capture of the “Crag”]
The 101st now at once advanced direct upon “the Crag,” and never halted
or broke until they had gallantly stormed the heights and secured the
picquet, driving the enemy over the hills beyond, while the three
companies of Guides swept the enemy from the right of the position. All
opposition now ceased along the whole line, the enemy having lost very
heavily, their casualties being 89 killed and 140 wounded. The defenders
of “the Crag” seem to have been seized with an unaccountable panic,
owing to the enemy concentrating a large force, unobserved, upon a weak
picquet: Lieutenant Davidson was killed at his post.
During the next four or five days no attacks of a serious character were
made by the enemy. Early on the morning of the 18th, the new camp being
ready for occupation, the whole of the troops occupying the Guru
Mountain were withdrawn, and the entire camp and troops transferred to
the heights on the south of the pass, while steps were also taken to
extend the position so as more effectually to command the water supply.
Imagining from the evacuation of the Guru position that the force was
retreating, the new left front of the camp was this day fiercely
attacked, but the enemy were repulsed with heavy losses on both sides.
[Sidenote: “Crag” Lost and Re-Captured]
On the 20th November “the Crag” picquet was garrisoned by 100 bayonets
from the 101st Fusiliers and an equal number from the 20th Punjab Native
Infantry; the “Water” picquet, within 450 yards of it, by 100 bayonets
of the 71st Foot and 100 men of the 3rd Punjab Infantry. About 9 a.m.
the enemy began to collect in large numbers near these picquets,
principally threatening “the Crag,” but were to some extent checked by
the fire of the Peshawar mountain battery. Up to late in the afternoon
the tribesmen had made no impression, though they had succeeded in
establishing themselves within a few yards of the breastworks. About 3
p.m., however, the unaccountable conduct of an officer on the left of
the picquet, who suddenly ordered the troops immediately under his
command to retire, gave the enemy possession of the post—though not
without a desperate resistance from the remainder of the garrison. On
the fall of “the Crag” being reported, General Chamberlain ordered up
the 71st Foot and the 5th Gurkhas to retake it; the 71st stormed the
position in front, the Gurkhas and 5th Punjab Infantry attacking the
lower portion in flank, and the work was retaken without much loss on
our side. Among the wounded, however, was the General commanding, who
had accompanied the storming party. Thus for the third time was “the
Crag” lost and won—a spot which, from the heavy casualties there
sustained on either side, had become known in the country side as the
_katlgar_, or place of slaughter.
This action, despite the temporary success gained, seemed to have a
depressing effect on the enemy; their numbers dwindled down, and from
this date until the 15th December they made no further attack in any
force. Sir Nevill Chamberlain’s wound proving more serious than was at
first expected, he asked to be relieved of the command, and on the 30th
November his place was taken by Major-General Garvock.
Meanwhile the political officers had had some success in their attempts
to detach certain clans from the coalition. Two divisions of the
Bunerwals had thus seceded; 2000 Swatis had been induced to return to
their homes; one or two influential chiefs had drawn off their
followers; while amongst the men who remained in the field a general
mistrust prevailed. The gathering, in fact, seemed to be only now held
together by the influence of the Akhund of Swat and of the Maulvi. Still
reinforcements reached the tribesmen from Kunar and Bajaur, while our
force was strengthened by the arrival of the 7th Fusiliers, the 93rd
Highlanders, the 3rd Sikhs and 23rd Punjab Native Infantry.
It was becoming increasingly evident that the Buner and Chamla tribes
were weary of the war, and were beginning to realise that we had never
harboured any idea of invading their country; and on the 10th December
they sent a deputation into our camp and agreed to accompany a force
sent to destroy the Hindustani settlement at Malka, and to expel the
Hindustanis from their country. On the 14th, however, they found
themselves obliged to admit that they had promised more than they could
perform; that their proposals had been over-ruled; and they advised us
that an attack would be made on the camp on the 16th, and promised that,
in the event of our taking the initiative, they, the Bunerwals, would
not actively oppose us.
[Sidenote: The Force Moves Forward]
General Garvock accordingly determined to attack the village of Lalu,
where there was a force of about 4000 of the enemy, and for this purpose
he moved out on the 15th with some 4800 men, unencumbered by tents or
baggage, formed into two columns. The first column assembled at the base
of “the Crag” picquet and drove the enemy before it to the “Conical”
hill. The second column now emerged from the camp, and deploying in
prolongation of the line formed by the other column, both prepared to
assault the “Conical” hill—a most formidable position, extraordinarily
precipitous, rocky, and scarped by nature. Covered by the mountain guns,
both columns descended the hill, crossed the valley, drove the enemy
from the heights, and captured the position. Colonel Wilde secured the
line of hills overlooking the Chamla Valley, while the rest of the
force, pushing on after the enemy, captured the villages of Banda and
Lalu. The enemy made a vigorous assault upon Colonel Wilde’s position,
but were driven off with great slaughter, and a desultory attack was
also made upon the front and left of the camp, now held by some 3000 men
under Colonel Vaughan. That night the first column occupied the ground
it had gained about Lalu; Colonel Wilde that between the camp and
“Conical” hill. Not a shot was fired that night. Early next morning the
cavalry—some 400 sabres under Lieutenant-Colonel Probyn—were brought
from camp, and the advance of the two columns was resumed, Colonel Wilde
leading. Advancing across the valley towards the Buner Pass, as the
column debouched into the open country the enemy appeared in great force
on the hills covering the approach to Ambela—a well-chosen position, of
great strength, and peculiarly capable of defence; but fearing that
their left would be turned by the cavalry and the other column, the
tribesmen abandoned the position and retreated slowly towards the pass
leading to Buner. The force pressed on, captured and burnt the village
of Ambela, and the first column endeavoured to cut off the enemy’s
retreat from the pass towards which they were retiring. Here the
tribesmen stood, and made a furious onset on the left of the line,
entangled in broken and wooded ground. But the attackers were destroyed
almost to a man, and the force pushed forward into the pass, driving the
enemy before it. It was now getting late, there was no wish to invade
Buner, and the enemy further was in great strength. General Garvock
therefore withdrew his troops, and bivouacked that night in the vicinity
of Ambela. During these two days the tribesmen present in the field were
estimated at 15,000, chiefly Hindustanis, Bajauris, and men from Dir and
Swat—none of the Bunerwals had taken any prominent part in the fighting.
That night the men of Bajaur and Dir fled to their homes, and the Swatis
alone remained in the field; on the morning of the 17th the Buner jirgah
came once more into camp, actually _asking for orders_. It was wisely
decided to require the Bunerwals themselves to destroy Malka without any
aid from our troops, and to this the Buner jirgah unanimously consented.
Accordingly, on the 19th, a party of six British officers, escorted by
the Guides and accompanied by part of the Buner jirgah, left Ambela, and
marched through Chamla and Amazai territory—by Kuria and Nagrai—to
Malka, which was reached on the 21st. On the following day the
settlement was burnt to the ground by the Bunerwals and Amazais, and the
party rejoined the force on the 23rd in the Ambela Pass. During these
four days matters once or twice looked uncertain, and indeed
threatening, but throughout the Bunerwals maintained their reputation
for keeping their engagements, while the sight of so powerful a clan
carrying out our orders upon their own allies, afforded a salutary
lesson to the surrounding tribesmen.
[Sidenote: End of Ambela Expedition]
General Garvock’s force now began to withdraw to the plains, and the
whole had reached Nawa Kala by Christmas Day. Our casualties during the
whole of these operations had been 238 killed and 670 wounded, while the
estimated total loss of the enemy was 3000.
During the next few years the behaviour of the Bunerwals may, in
comparison with that of many other frontier tribes, be described as
“good.” Raids were committed upon our border villages in 1868 and 1877,
and in 1878 and 1879 there was a certain amount of unrest in Buner, due
to the inflammatory preachings of certain mullahs. In 1884 renewed
outrages had to be punished by a blockade of the Salarzai Bunerwals; and
in 1887 a small column composed of cavalry and infantry was sent to
destroy the village of Surai Malandri in punishment for the incursions
of raiding parties across the Malandri Pass, but at the end of the year,
the Bunerwals submitting, the long-continued blockade was removed.
During the Black Mountain expedition of 1888 the Bunerwals evinced a
disposition to take part against us, but refrained from doing so; while
in 1895 they sent a contingent to help hold the passes against General
Low’s force, but arriving too late for the Malakand fighting, this party
returned home again. In 1897, however, the Bunerwals were well to the
fore in much of the fighting at the Malakand and in Upper Swat, but when
called to account at the end of 1897 they merely sent defiant answers to
the ultimatum of the political officers, and it therefore became
necessary to despatch an expedition into their country.
_Expedition against the Bunerwals and Chamlawals, January 1898._—The
Buner Field Force was placed under the command of Major-General Sir
Bindon Blood, and the greater part of it concentrated at Sanghao: it was
composed as under:
FIRST BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G.
1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment.
16th Bengal Infantry.[51]
20th Punjab Infantry.
31st Punjab Infantry.
SECOND BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General Jeffreys, C.B.
1st Battalion The Buffs.
21st Punjab Infantry.[52]
Guides Infantry.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
10th Field Battery R.A.
No. 7 Mountain Battery R.A.
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery R.A.[53]
1 Squadron 10th Bengal Lancers.[54]
Guides Cavalry.
2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry.
6 Companies 3rd Bombay Light Infantry.[55]
No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners.
No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners.
[Sidenote: Buner Expedition of 1898]
Sir Bindon Blood, with the bulk of his troops at Sanghao, intended to
force the Tanga Pass, about a mile to the northward, while a small
column composed of the 31st Punjab Infantry, the Guides Infantry and a
section of No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners, was to capture the
Pirsai Pass, when the cavalry, moving from Rustam, was to cross over the
Pirsai Pass and cut the enemy’s line of retreat from the Tanga. This
last-named pass was known to be held by about a thousand of the enemy,
as were the Ambela and Malandri, but only forty or fifty men had
collected for the defence of the Pirsai. The 2nd Brigade advanced on the
morning of the 7th January and found the position defended by at least
2000 men, and from a parallel ridge facing the pass the Buffs and
mountain guns opened fire at 1500 yards, under cover of which the rest
of the troops pushed forward through the ravine, while the 20th Punjab
Infantry had ascended a steep spur to the east, leading to a high peak
overlooking the position. When the 20th were seen to be approaching
their objective, the frontal attack commenced. The enemy, however,
demoralised by the heavy gun and rifle fire, made no real stand, and,
pressed by the 20th on their right, early began to abandon their
position, and finally fled down the valley towards Kingargali and the
hills beyond. Three battalions of the 1st Brigade pushed on to
Kingargali, which was found deserted. Meanwhile the cavalry and infantry
from Rustam and Pirsai had captured the Pirsai Pass without meeting with
but slight resistance, and the cavalry pushed on up the narrow valley as
far as Kuhai, returning to Chorbanda, two miles north of the pass, where
the night was spent. On the 10th this column joined the 1st Brigade at
Bampokha.
Two divisions of Bunerwals now at once came in and tendered their
submission, but it was decided to visit the territory of every division,
and General Meiklejohn’s column accordingly marched to Jawar Bai,
Hildai, Rega, where the house of the Mad Fakir (of whom more will be
heard later) was destroyed, and Barkeli. The 2nd Brigade, which had
returned to Sanghao after the capture of the Tanga Pass, entered Buner
by the Ambela Pass and occupied Koga and Nawagai, the cavalry
reconnoitring the Chamla Valley. These measures led to the prompt and
complete submission of all divisions of the Bunerwals and of the men of
Chamla, and the force was withdrawn by the Ambela Pass, and reached
Mardan on the 20th January.
[Sidenote: Operations against the Gaduns]
During the Ambela expedition of 1863 the behaviour of the Gadun tribe
had not been uniformly satisfactory, and consequently on the break up of
the force Colonel Wilde took a strong brigade into their country,
visited Meni, and also Khabal in the territory of the Utmanzais, whose
conduct had been of an equally hostile character. No opposition was
experienced, but it was decided to require the two tribes to perform a
similar service to that demanded of the Bunerwals, viz. to destroy a
Hindustani fort and settlement called Mandi adjacent to Sitana. This was
carried out and the force was then broken up; the effect of these
measures was immediately apparent, for within the next few weeks the
Mada Khels, the Amazais and the remaining sections of the Hassanzais all
sent deputations to our political officers and made their submission.
For some years, however, the Gaduns continued to give trouble,
committing outrages of all kinds and raiding on the border. They were
blockaded, coerced and fined, but continued to be troublesome; in 1897,
too, they were implicated in the attacks on the Malakand and Chakdara
posts, but in the end of that year they finally made submission and paid
up the fines demanded of them.
This chapter commenced with some account of our dealings with the
Hindustani fanatics, and may fittingly end with a few final words about
them. Expelled in 1864 from Malka, they retreated into the Chagarzai
country north of the Barandu River, but were not very comfortable there,
their hosts frequently threatening them with expulsion. In 1868 they
appear to have moved from their settlements in the Chagarzai territory
to Bajkatta in Buner, and here in April they were joined by Feroz Shah,
the son of the last king of Delhi. The presence of the Hindustanis in
Buner was abhorrent to the Akhund, who induced his co-religionists to
decide to expel them. In consequence of this resolve, the fanatics, now
some 700 strong, hurriedly retreated to Malka, where they commenced
re-building their houses. Some of them eventually got permission to
return to Buner, but, intriguing against the Akhund, the order of
expulsion was again put in force, and they were hunted out of the
country, suffering heavy losses, and took refuge, first with the
Chagarzais, then at Palosi—moving again to Thakot, and eventually back
again to the country of the Hassanzais who rented them some land at
Maidan near Palosi, where they remained until 1888. After their dramatic
appearance at Kotkai in the Black Mountain operations of 1888, they
resought an asylum among the Chagarzais, but are now, to the number of
700, living among the Amazais, neither occupying themselves greatly with
local feuds nor being seriously implicated in other disturbances. But of
late years there have not been wanting signs—faint, perhaps, but
discernible—of a slight revival of their former activity.