Inner discord is a terrible affliction and nothing is so cer

THE CASE OF WAGNER

BY

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

I

THE CASE OF WAGNER

II

NIETZSCHE _CONTRA_ WAGNER

III

_SELECTED APHORISMS_

TRANSLATED BY ANTHONY M. LUDOVICI

IV

WE PHILOLOGISTS

TRANSLATED BY J. M. KENNEDY

[Illustration]

The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche

The First Complete and Authorised English Translation

Edited by Dr Oscar Levy

Volume Six

T.N. FOULIS

13 & 15 FREDERICK STREET

EDINBURGH: AND LONDON

1911

CONTENTS

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THE CASE OF WAGNER

NIETZSCHE CONTRA WAGNER

SELECTED APHORISMS

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION TO "WE PHILOLOGISTS"

WE PHILOLOGISTS

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

Nietzsche wrote the rough draft of "The Case of Wagner" in Turin,

during the month of May 1888; he completed it in Sils Maria towards the

end of June of the same year, and it was published in the following

autumn. "Nietzsche _contra_ Wagner" was written about the middle of

December 1888; but, although it was printed and corrected before

the New Year, it was not published until long afterwards owing to

Nietzsche's complete breakdown in the first days of 1889.

In reading these two essays we are apt to be deceived, by their

virulent and forcible tone, into believing that the whole matter is

a mere cover for hidden fire,--a mere blind of æsthetic discussion

concealing a deep and implacable personal feud which demands and will

have vengeance. In spite of all that has been said to the contrary,

many people still hold this view of the two little works before us;

and, as the actual facts are not accessible to every one, and rumours

are more easily believed than verified, the error of supposing that

these pamphlets were dictated by personal animosity, and even by

Nietzsche's envy of Wagner in his glory, seems to be a pretty common

one. Another very general error is to suppose that the point at issue

here is not one concerning music at all, but concerning religion. It

is taken for granted that the aspirations, the particular quality,

the influence, and the method of an art like music, are matters quite

distinct from the values and the conditions prevailing in the culture

with which it is in harmony, and that however many Christian elements

may be discovered in Wagnerian texts, Nietzsche had no right to raise

æsthetic objections because he happened to entertain the extraordinary

view that these Christian elements had also found their way into

Wagnerian music.

To both of these views there is but one reply:--they are absolutely

false.

In the "Ecce Homo," Nietzsche's autobiography,--a book which from

cover to cover and line for line is sincerity itself--we learn what

Wagner actually meant to Nietzsche. On pages 41, 44, 84, 122, 129, &c,

we cannot doubt that Nietzsche is speaking from his heart,--and what

does he say? --In impassioned tones he admits his profound indebtedness

to the great musician, his love for him, his gratitude to him,--how

Wagner was the only German who had ever been anything to him--how his

friendship with Wagner constituted the happiest and most valuable

experience of his life,--how his breach with Wagner almost killed him.

And, when we remember, too, that Wagner on his part also declared that

he was "alone" after he had lost "that man" (Nietzsche), we begin to

perceive that personal bitterness and animosity are out of the question

here. We feel we are on a higher plane, and that we must not judge

these two men as if they were a couple of little business people who

had had a suburban squabble.

Nietzsche declares ("Ecce Homo," p. 24) that he never attacked persons

as persons. If he used a name at all, it was merely as a means to

an end, just as one might use a magnifying glass in order to make a

general, but elusive and intricate fact more clear and more apparent;

and if he used the name of David Strauss, without bitterness or spite

(for he did not even know the man), when he wished to personify

Culture-Philistinism, so, in the same spirit, did he use the name of

Wagner, when he wished to personify the general decadence of modern

ideas, values, aspirations and Art.

Nietzsche's ambition, throughout his life, was to regenerate European

culture. In the first period of his relationship with Wagner, he

thought that he had found the man who was prepared to lead in this

direction. For a long while he regarded his master as the Saviour of

Germany, as the innovator and renovator who was going to arrest the

decadent current of his time and lead men to a greatness which had died

with antiquity. And so thoroughly did he understand his duties as a

disciple, so wholly was he devoted to this cause, that, in spite of all

his unquestioned gifts and the excellence of his original achievements,

he was for a long while regarded as a mere "literary lackey" in

Wagner's service, in all those circles where the rising musician was

most disliked.

Gradually, however, as the young Nietzsche developed and began to gain

an independent view of life and humanity, it seemed to him extremely

doubtful whether Wagner actually was pulling the same way with him.

Whereas, theretofore, he had identified Wagner's ideals with his own,

it now dawned upon him slowly that the regeneration of German culture,

of European culture, and the trans-valuation of values which would be

necessary for this regeneration, really lay off the track of Wagnerism.

He saw that he had endowed Wagner with a good deal that was more his

own than Wagner's. In his love he had transfigured the friend, and the

composer of "Parsifal" and the man of his imagination were not one. The

fact was realised step by step; disappointment upon disappointment,

revelation after revelation, ultimately brought it home to him, and

though his best instincts at first opposed it, the revulsion of feeling

at last became too strong to be scouted, and Nietzsche was plunged into

the blackest despair. Had he followed his own human inclinations, he

would probably have remained Wagner's friend until the end. As it was,

however, he remained loyal to his cause, and this meant denouncing his

former idol.

"Joyful Wisdom," "Thus Spake Zarathustra," "Beyond Good and Evil," "The

Genealogy of Morals," "The Twilight of the Idols," "The Antichrist"

--all these books were but so many exhortations to mankind to step

aside from the general track now trodden by Europeans. And what

happened? Wagner began to write some hard things about Nietzsche;

the world assumed that Nietzsche and Wagner had engaged in a paltry

personal quarrel in the press, and the whole importance of the real

issue was buried beneath the human, all-too-human interpretations which

were heaped upon it.

Nietzsche was a musician of no mean attainments. For a long while, in

his youth, his superiors had been doubtful whether he should not be

educated for a musical career, so great were his gifts in this art; and

if his mother had not been offered a six-years' scholarship for her son

at the famous school of Pforta, Nietzsche, the scholar and philologist,

would probably have been an able composer. When he speaks about music,

therefore, he knows what he is talking about, and when he refers to

Wagner's music in particular, the simple fact of his long intimacy

with Wagner during the years at Tribschen, is a sufficient guarantee

of his deep knowledge of the subject. Now Nietzsche was one of the

first to recognise that the principles of art are inextricably bound

up with the laws of life, that an æsthetic dogma may therefore promote

or depress all vital force, and that a picture, a symphony, a poem or

a statue, is just as capable of being pessimistic, anarchic, Christian

or revolutionary, as a philosophy or a science is. To speak of a

certain class of music as being compatible with the decline of culture,

therefore, was to Nietzsche a perfectly warrantable association of

ideas, and that is why, throughout his philosophy, so much stress is

laid upon æsthetic considerations.

But if in England and America Nietzsche's attack on Wagner's art may

still seem a little incomprehensible, let it be remembered that the

Continent has long known that Nietzsche was actually in the right Every

year thousands are now added to the large party abroad who have ceased

from believing in the great musical revolutionary of the seventies;

that he was one with the French Romanticists and rebels has long since

been acknowledged a fact in select circles, both in France and Germany,

and if we still have Wagner with us in England, if we still consider

Nietzsche as a heretic, when he declares that "Wagner was a musician

for unmusical people," it is only because we are more removed than we

imagine, from all the great movements, intellectual and otherwise,

which take place on the Continent.

In Wagner's music, in his doctrine, in his whole concept of art,

Nietzsche saw the confirmation, the promotion--aye, even the

encouragement, of that decadence and degeneration which is now rampant

in Europe; and it is for this reason, although to the end of his life

he still loved Wagner, the man and the friend, that we find him, on

the very eve of his spiritual death, exhorting us to abjure Wagner the

musician and the artist.

ANTHONY M. LUDOVICI.

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION[1]

In spite of the adverse criticism with which the above preface has met

at the hands of many reviewers since the summer of last year, I cannot

say that I should feel justified, even after mature consideration, in

altering a single word or sentence it contains. If I felt inclined

to make any changes at all, these would take the form of extensive

additions, tending to confirm rather than to modify the general

argument it advances; but, any omissions of which I may have been

guilty in the first place, have been so fully rectified since, thanks

to the publication of the English translations of Daniel Halévy's and

Henri Lichtenberger's works, "The Life of Friedrich Nietzsche,"[2] and

"The Gospel of Superman,"[3] respectively, that, were it not for the

fact that the truth about this matter cannot be repeated too often, I

should have refrained altogether from including any fresh remarks of my

own in this Third Edition.

In the works just referred to (pp. 129 _et seq._ in Halévy's book, and

pp. 78 _et seq._ in Lichtenberger's book), the statement I made in my

preface to "Thoughts out of Season," vol. i., and which I did not think

it necessary to repeat in my first preface to these pamphlets, will be

found to receive the fullest confirmation.

The statement in question was to the effect that many long years before

these pamphlets were even projected, Nietzsche's apparent _volte-face_

in regard to his hero Wagner had been not only foreshadowed, but

actually stated in plain words, in two works written during his

friendship with Wagner,--the works referred to being "The Birth of

Tragedy" (1872), and "Wagner in Bayreuth" (1875) of which Houston

Stuart Chamberlain declares not only that it possesses "undying

classical worth" but that "a perusal of it is indispensable to all who

wish to follow the question [of Wagner] to its roots."[4]

The idea that runs through the present work like a leitmotif--the idea

that Wagner was at bottom more of a mime than a musician--was so far

an ever present thought with Nietzsche that it is even impossible to

ascertain the period when it was first formulated.

In Nietzsche's wonderful autobiography (_Ecce Homo,_ p. 88), in

the section dealing with the early works just mentioned, we find

the following passage: "In the second of the two essays [Wagner

in Bayreuth] with a profound certainty of instinct, I already

characterised the elementary factor in Wagner's nature as a

theatrical talent which, in all his means and aspirations, draws

its final conclusions." And as early as 1874, Nietzsche wrote in

his diary:--"Wagner is a born actor. Just as Goethe was an abortive

painter, and Schiller an abortive orator, so Wagner was an abortive

theatrical genius. His attitude to music is that of the actor; for he

knows how to sing and speak, as it were out of different souls and from

absolutely different worlds (_Tristan_ and the _Meistersinger_)".

There is, however, no need to multiply examples, seeing, as I have

said, that in the translations of Halévy's and Lichtenberger's

books the reader will find all the independent evidence he could

possibly desire, disproving the popular, and even the learned belief

that, in the two pamphlets before us we have a complete, apparently

unaccountable, and therefore "demented" _volte-face_ on Nietzsche's

part. Nevertheless, for fear lest some doubt should still linger in

certain minds concerning this point, and with the view of adding

interest to these essays, the Editor considered it advisable, in the

Second Edition, to add a number of extracts from Nietzsche's diary of

the year 1878 (ten years before "The Case of Wagner," and "Nietzsche

_contra_ Wagner" were written) in order to show to what extent those

learned critics who complain of Nietzsche's "morbid and uncontrollable

recantations and revulsions of feeling," have overlooked even the plain

facts of the case when forming their all-too-hasty conclusions. These

extracts will be found at the end of "Nietzsche _contra_ Wagner." While

reading them, however, it should not be forgotten that they were never

intended for publication by Nietzsche himself--a fact which accounts

for their unpolished and sketchy form--and that they were first

published in vol. xi. of the first German Library Edition (pp. 99-129)

only when he was a helpless invalid, in 1897. Since then, in 1901 and

1906 respectively, they have been reprinted, once in the large German

Library Edition (vol. xi. pp. 181-202), and once in the German Pocket

Edition, as an appendix to "Human-All-too-Human," Part II.

An altogether special interest now attaches to these pamphlets; for, in

the first place we are at last in possession of Wagner's own account

of his development, his art, his aspirations and his struggles, in the

amazing self-revelation entitled _My Life_[5]; and secondly, we now

have _Ecce Homo,_ Nietzsche's autobiography, in which we learn for the

first time from Nietzsche's own pen to what extent his history was that

of a double devotion--to Wagner on the one hand, and to his own life

task, the Transvaluation of all Values, on the other.

Readers interested in the Nietzsche-Wagner controversy will naturally

look to these books for a final solution of all the difficulties which

the problem presents. But let them not be too sanguine. From first

to last this problem is not to be settled by "facts." A good deal of

instinctive choice, instinctive aversion, and instinctive suspicion

are necessary here. A little more suspicion, for instance, ought

to be applied to Wagner's _My Life,_ especially in England, where

critics are not half suspicious enough about a continental artist's

self-revelations, and are too prone, if they have suspicions at all, to

apply them in the wrong place.

An example of this want of _finesse_ in judging foreign writers is to

be found in Lord Morley's work on Rousseau,--a book which ingenuously

takes for granted everything that a writer like Rousseau cares to say

about himself, without considering for an instant the possibility that

Rousseau might have practised some hypocrisy. In regard to Wagner's

life we might easily fall into the same error--that is to say, we might

take seriously all he says concerning himself and his family affairs.

We should beware of this, and should not even believe Wagner when he

speaks badly about himself. No one speaks badly about himself without

a reason, and the question in this case is to find out the reason. Did

Wagner--in the belief that genius was always immoral--wish to pose as

an immoral Egotist, in order to make us believe in his genius, of which

he himself was none too sure in his innermost heart? Did Wagner wish to

appear "sincere" in his biography, in order to awaken in us a belief in

the sincerity of his music, which he likewise doubted, but wished to

impress upon the world as "true"? Or did he wish to be thought badly

of in connection with things that were not true, and that consequently

did not affect him, in order to lead us off the scent of true things,

things he was ashamed of and which he wished the world to ignore--just

like Rousseau (the similarity between the two is more than a

superficial one) who barbarously pretended to have sent his children to

the foundling hospital, in order not to be thought incapable of having

had any children at all? In short, where is the bluff in Wagner's

biography? Let us therefore be careful about it, and all the more so

because Wagner himself guarantees the truth of it in the prefatory

note. If we were to be credulous here, we should moreover be acting in

direct opposition to Nietzsche's own counsel as given in the following

aphorisms (Nos. 19 and 20, p. 89):--

"It is very difficult to trace the course of Wagner's development,--no

trust must be placed in his own description of his soul's experiences.

He writes party-pamphlets for his followers.

"It is extremely doubtful whether Wagner is able to bear witness about

himself."

While on p. 37 (the note), we read:--"He [Wagner] was not proud enough

to be able to suffer the truth about himself. Nobody had less pride

than he. Like Victor Hugo he remained true to himself even in his

biography,--he remained an actor."

However, as a famous English judge has said:-- "Truth will come out,

even in the witness box," and, as we may add in this case, even in

an autobiography. There is one statement in Wagner's _My Life_ which

sounds true to my ears at least-a statement which, in my opinion,

has some importance, and to which Wagner himself seems to grant a

mysterious significance. I refer to the passage on p. 93 of vol.

i., in which Wagner says:--"Owing to the exceptional vivacity and

innate susceptibility of my nature ... I gradually became conscious

of a certain power of transporting or bewildering my more indolent

companions."

This seems innocent enough. When, however, it is read in conjunction

with Nietzsche's trenchant criticism, particularly on pp. 14, 15, 16,

17 and 18 of this work, and also with a knowledge of Wagner's music, it

becomes one of the most striking passages in Wagner's autobiography;

for it records how soon he became conscious of his dominant instinct

and faculty.

I know perfectly well that the Wagnerites will not be influenced by

these remarks. Their gratitude to Wagner is too great for this. He has

supplied the precious varnish wherewith to hide the dull ugliness of

our civilisation. He has given to souls despairing over the materialism

of this world, to souls despairing of themselves, and longing to be

rid of themselves, the indispensable hashish and morphia wherewith to

deaden their inner discords. These discords are everywhere apparent

nowadays. Wagner is therefore a common need, a common benefactor.

As such he is bound to be worshipped and adored in spite of all

egotistical and theatrical autobiographies.

Albeit, signs are not wanting--at least among his Anglo-Saxon

worshippers who stand even more in need of romanticism than their

continental brethren, --which show that, in order to uphold Wagner,

people are now beginning to draw distinctions between the man and

the artist. They dismiss the man as "human-all-too-human," but they

still maintain that there are divine qualities in his music. However

distasteful the task of disillusioning these psychological tyros may

be, they should be informed that no such division of a man into two

parts is permissible, save in Christianity (--the body and the soul--);

but that outside purely religious spheres it is utterly unwarrantable.

There can be no such strange divorce between a bloom and the plant on

which it blows, and has a black woman ever been known to give birth to

a white child?

Wagner, as Nietzsche tells us on p. 19, "was something complete, he was

a typical _decadent,_ in whom every sign of 'free will' was lacking,

in whom every feature was necessary." Wagner, allow me to add, was

a typical representative of the nineteenth century, which was the

century of contradictory values, of opposed instincts, and of every

kind of inner disharmony. The genuine, the classical artists of that

period, such men as Heine, Goethe, Stendhal, and Gobineau, overcame

their inner strife, and each succeeded in making a harmonious whole

out of himself--not indeed without a severe struggle; for everyone of

them suffered from being the child of his age, _i.e.,_ a decadent. The

only difference between them and the romanticists lies in the fact

that they (the former) were conscious of what was wrong with them, and

possessed the will and the strength to overcome their illness; whereas

the romanticists chose the easier alternative--namely, that of shutting

their eyes on themselves.

"I am just as much a child of my age as Wagner--_i.e.,_ I am a

_decadent"_ says Nietzsche. "The only difference is that I recognised

the fact, that I struggled against it."[6]

What Wagner did was characteristic of all romanticists and contemporary

artists: he drowned and overshouted his inner discord by means of

exuberant pathos and wild exaltation. Far be it from me to value

Wagner's music _in extenso_ here--this is scarcely a fitting

opportunity to do so;--but I think it might well be possible to show,

on purely psychological grounds, how impossible it was for a man like

Wagner to produce real art. For how can harmony, order, symmetry,

mastery, proceed from uncontrolled discord, disorder, disintegration,

and chaos? The fact that an art which springs from such a marshy soil

may, like certain paludal plants, be "wonderful," "gorgeous," and

"overwhelming," cannot be denied; but true art it is not. It is so just

as little as Gothic architecture is,--that style which, in its efforts

to escape beyond the tragic contradiction in its mediæval heart, yelled

its hysterical cry heavenwards and even melted the stones of its

structures into a quivering and fluid jet, in order to give adequate

expression to the painful and wretched conflict then raging between the

body and the soul.

That Wagner, too, was a great sufferer, there can be no doubt; not,

however, a sufferer from strength, like a true artist, but from

weakness--the weakness of his age, which he never overcame. It is for

this reason that he should be rather pitied than judged as he is now

being judged by his German and English critics, who, with thoroughly

neurotic suddenness, have acknowledged their revulsion of feeling a

little too harshly.

"I have carefully endeavoured not to deride, or deplore, or detest ..."

says Spinoza, "but to understand"; and these words ought to be our

guide, not only in the case of Wagner, but in all things.

Inner discord is a terrible affliction and nothing is so certain to

produce that nervous irritability which is so trying to the patient

as well as to the outer world, as this so-called spiritual disease.

Nietzsche was probably quite right when he said the only real and

true music that Wagner ever composed did not consist of his elaborate

arias and overtures, but of ten or fifteen bars which, dispersed here

and there, gave expression to the composer's profound and genuine

melancholy. But this melancholy had to be overcome, and Wagner with

the blood of a _cabotin_ in his veins, resorted to the remedy that

was nearest to hand--that is to say, the art of bewildering others

and himself. Thus he remained ignorant about himself all his life;

for there was, as Nietzsche rightly points out (p. 37, _note_),

not sufficient pride in the man for him to desire to know or to

suffer gladly the truth concerning his real nature. As an actor his

ruling passion was vanity; but in his case it was correlated with a

semi-conscious knowledge of the fact that all was not right with him

and his art. It was this that caused him to suffer. His egomaniacal

behaviour and his almost Rousseauesque fear and suspicion of others

were only the external manifestations of his inner discrepancies. But,

to repeat what I have already said, these abnormal symptoms are not in

the least incompatible with Wagner's music, they are rather its very

cause, the root from which it springs.

In reality, therefore, Wagner the man and Wagner the artist were

undoubtedly one, and constituted a splendid romanticist. His music as

well as his autobiography are proofs of his wonderful gifts in this

direction. His success in his time, as in ours, is due to the craving

of the modern world for actors, sorcerers, bewilderers and idealists

who are able to conceal the ill-health and the weakness that prevail,

and who please by intoxicating and exalting. But this being so, the

world must not be disappointed to find the hero of a preceding age

explode in the next. It must not be astonished to find a disparity

between the hero's private life and his "elevating" art or romantic and

idealistic gospel. As long as people will admire heroic attitudes more

than heroism, such disillusionment is bound to be the price of their

error. In a truly great man, life-theory and life-practice, if seen

from a sufficiently lofty point of view, must and do always agree; in

an actor, in a romanticist, in an idealist, and in a Christian, there

is always a yawning chasm between the two, which, whatever well-meaning

critics may do, cannot be bridged posthumously by acrobatic feats _in

psychologicis._

Let anyone apply this point of view to Nietzsche's life and theory.

Let anyone turn his life inside out, not only as he gives it to us in

his _Ecce Homo,_ but as we find it related by all his biographers,

friends and foes alike; and what will be the result? Even if we ignore

his works--the blooms which blowed from time to time from his life--we

absolutely cannot deny the greatness of the man's _private practice,_

and if we fully understand and appreciate the latter, we must be

singularly deficient in instinct and in _flair_ if we do not suspect

that some of this greatness is reflected in his life-task.

ANTHONY M. LUDOVICI.

LONDON, JULY 1911.

[Footnote 1: It should be noted that the first and second editions of

these essays on Wagner appeared in pamphlet form, for which the above

first preface was written.]

[Footnote 2: Fisher Unwin, 1911.]

[Footnote 3: T. N. Foulis, 1910.]

[Footnote 4: See _Richard Wagner,_ by Houston Stuart Chamberlain

(translated by G. A. Hight), pp. 15, 16.]

[Footnote 5: Constable & Co., 1911.]

[Footnote 6: See Author's Preface to "The Case of Wagner" in this

volume.]

THE CASE OF WAGNER

A MUSICIAN'S PROBLEM

A LETTER FROM TURIN, MAY 1888

"RIDENDO DICERE SEVERUM ..."

PREFACE

I am writing this to relieve my mind. It is not malice alone which

makes me praise Bizet at the expense of Wagner in this essay. Amid a

good deal of jesting I wish to make one point clear which does not

admit of levity. To turn my back on Wagner was for me a piece of fate;

to get to like anything else whatever afterwards was for me a triumph.

Nobody, perhaps, had ever been more dangerously involved in Wagnerism,

nobody had defended himself more obstinately against it, nobody had

ever been so overjoyed at ridding himself of it. A long history!--Shall

I give it a name?--If I were a moralist, who knows what I might not

call it! Perhaps a piece of _self-mastery._--But the philosopher does

not like the moralist, neither does he like high-falutin' words....

What is the first and last thing that a philosopher demands of himself?

To overcome his age in himself, to become "timeless." With what then

does the philosopher have the greatest fight? With all that in him

which makes him the child of his time. Very well then! I am just as

much a child of my age as Wagner--_i.e.,_ I am a decadent. The only

difference is that I recognised the fact, that I struggled against it.

The philosopher in me struggled against it.

My greatest preoccupation hitherto has been the problem of _decadence,_

and I had reasons for this. "Good and evil" form only a playful

subdivision of this problem. If one has trained one's eye to detect

the symptoms of decline, one also understands morality,--one

understands what lies concealed beneath its holiest names and tables

of values: _e.g., impoverished_ life, the will to nonentity, great

exhaustion. Morality _denies_ life.... In order to undertake such a

mission I was obliged to exercise self-discipline:--I had to side

against all that was morbid in myself including Wagner, including

Schopenhauer, including the whole of modern _humanity._--A profound

estrangement, coldness and soberness towards all that belongs to my

age, all that was contemporary: and as the highest wish, Zarathustra's

eye, an eye which surveys the whole phenomenon--mankind--from an

enormous distance,--which look down upon it.--For such a goal--what

sacrifice would not have been worth while? What "self-mastery"! What

"self-denial"!

The greatest event of my life took the form of a _recovery._ Wagner

belongs only to my diseases.

Not that I wish to appear ungrateful to this disease. If in this essay

I support the proposition that Wagner is _harmful,_ I none the less

wish to point out unto whom, in spite of all, he is indispensable--to

the philosopher. Anyone else may perhaps be able to get on without

Wagner: but the philosopher is not free to pass him by. The philosopher

must be the evil conscience of his age,--but to this end he must

be possessed of its best knowledge. And what better guide, or more

thoroughly efficient revealer of the soul, could be found for the

labyrinth of the modern spirit than Wagner? Through Wagner modernity

speaks her most intimate language: it conceals neither its good nor

its evil; it has thrown off all shame. And, conversely, one has almost

calculated the whole of the value of modernity once one is clear

concerning what is good and evil in Wagner. I can perfectly well

understand a musician of to-day who says: "I hate Wagner but I can

endure no other music." But I should also understand a philosopher who

said: "Wagner is modernity in concentrated form." There is no help for

it, we must first be Wagnerites....

THE CASE OF WAGNER

1.

Yesterday--would you believe it?--I heard _Bizet's_ masterpiece for the

twentieth time. Once more I attended with the same gentle reverence;

once again I did not run away. This triumph over my impatience

surprises me. How such a work completes one! Through it one almost

becomes a "masterpiece" oneself.--And, as a matter of fact, each time

I heard _Carmen_ it seemed to me that I was more of a philosopher, a

better philosopher than at other times: I became so forbearing, so

happy, so Indian, so _settled...._ To sit for five hours: the first

step to holiness!--May I be allowed to say that Bizet's orchestration

is the only one that I can endure now? That other orchestration which

is all the rage at present--the Wagnerian--is brutal, artificial and

"unsophisticated" withal, hence its appeal to all the three senses of

the modern soul at once. How terribly Wagnerian orchestration affects

me! I call it the _Sirocco._ A disagreeable sweat breaks out all over

me. All my fine weather vanishes.

Bizet's music seems to me perfect. It comes forward lightly,

gracefully, stylishly. It is lovable, it does not sweat. "All that

is good is easy, everything divine runs with light feet": this is

the first principle of my æsthetics. This music is wicked, refined,

fatalistic: and withal remains popular,--it possesses the refinement of

a race, not of an individual. It is rich. It is definite. It builds,

organises, completes: and in this sense it stands as a contrast to the

polypus in music, to "endless melody." Have more painful, more tragic

accents ever been heard on the stage before? And how are they obtained?

Without grimaces! Without counterfeiting of any kind! Free from the

_lie_ of the grand style!--In short: this music assumes that the

listener is intelligent even as a musician,--thereby it is the opposite

of Wagner, who, apart from everything else, was in any case the most

_ill-mannered_ genius on earth (Wagner takes us as if ... he repeats a

thing so often that we become desperate,--that we ultimately believe

it).

And once more: I become a better man when Bizet speaks to me. Also a

better musician, a better _listener._ Is it in any way possible to

listen better?--I even burrow behind this music with my ears. I hear

its very cause. I seem to assist at its birth. I tremble before the

dangers which this daring music runs, I am enraptured over those happy

accidents for which even Bizet himself may not be responsible.--And,

strange to say, at bottom I do not give it a thought, or am not aware

how much thought I really do give it. For quite other ideas are running

through my head the while.... Has any one ever observed that music

_emancipates_ the spirit? gives wings to thought? and that the more

one becomes a musician the more one is also a philosopher? The grey

sky of abstraction seems thrilled by flashes of lightning; the light

is strong enough to reveal all the details of things; to enable one to

grapple with problems; and the world is surveyed as if from a mountain

top.--With this I have defined philosophical pathos.--And unexpectedly

_answers_ drop into my lap, a small hailstorm of ice and wisdom, of

problems _solved._ Where am I? Bizet makes me productive. Everything

that is good makes me productive. I have gratitude for nothing else,

nor have I any other touchstone for testing what is good.

2.

Bizet's work also saves; Wagner is not the only "Saviour." With it one

bids farewell to the _damp_ north and to all the fog of the Wagnerian

ideal. Even the action in itself delivers us from these things. From

Mérimée it has this logic even in passion, from him it has the direct

line, _inexorable_ necessity; but what it has above all else is that

which belongs to sub-tropical zones--that dryness of atmosphere, that

_limpidezza_ of the air. Here in every respect the climate is altered.

Here another kind of sensuality, another kind of sensitiveness and

another kind of cheerfulness make their appeal. This music is gay, but

not in a French or German way. Its gaiety is African; fate hangs over

it, its happiness is short, sudden, without reprieve. I envy Bizet

for having had the courage of this sensitiveness, which hitherto in

the cultured music of Europe has found no means of expression,--of

this southern, tawny, sunburnt sensitiveness.... What a joy the golden

afternoon of its happiness is to us! When we look out, with this music

in our minds, we wonder whether we have ever seen the sea so _calm._

And how soothing is this Moorish dancing! How, for once, even our

insatiability gets sated by its lascivious melancholy!--And finally

love, love translated back into _Nature!_ Not the love of a "cultured

girl!"--no Senta-sentimentality.[1] But love as fate, as a fatality,

cynical, innocent, cruel,--and precisely in this way _Nature!_ The love

whose means is war, whose very essence is the _mortal hatred_ between

the sexes!--I know no case in which the tragic irony, which constitutes

the kernel of love, is expressed with such severity, or in so terrible

a formula, as in the last cry of Don José with which the work ends:

"Yes, it is I who have killed her,

I--my adored Carmen!"

--Such a conception of love (the only one worthy of a philosopher)

is rare: it distinguishes one work of art from among a thousand

others. For, as a rule, artists are no better than the rest of the

world, they are even worse--they _misunderstand_ love. Even Wagner

misunderstood it. They imagine that they are selfless in it because

they appear to be seeking the advantage of another creature often

to their own disadvantage. But in return they want to _possess_ the

other creature.... Even God is no exception to this rule, he is

very far from thinking "What does it matter to thee whether I love

thee or not?"--He becomes terrible if he is not loved in return.

"_L'amour_--and with this principle one carries one's point against

Gods and men--_est de tous les sentiments le plus égoïste, et par

conséquent, lorsqu'il est blessé, le moins généreux"_ (B. Constant).

3.

Perhaps you are beginning to perceive how very much this music

_improves_ me?--_Il faut méditerraniser la musique:_ and I have my

reasons for this principle ("Beyond Good and Evil," pp. 216 _et seq._).

The return to Nature, health, good spirits, youth, _virtue!_--And yet I

was one of the most corrupted Wagnerites.... I was able to take Wagner

seriously. Oh, this old magician! what tricks has he not played upon

us! The first thing his art places in our hands is a magnifying glass:

we look through it, and we no longer trust our own eyes.--Everything

grows bigger, _even Wagner grows bigger...._ What a clever rattlesnake.

Throughout his life he rattled "resignation," "loyalty," and "purity"

about our ears, and he retired from the _corrupt_ world with a song of

praise to chastity! !--And we believed it all....

--But you will not listen to me? You _prefer_ even the _problem_

of Wagner to that of Bizet? But neither do I underrate it; it has

its charm. The problem of salvation is even a venerable problem.

Wagner pondered over nothing so deeply as over salvation: his opera

is the opera of salvation. Someone always wants to be saved in

his operas,--now it is a youth; anon it is a maid,--this is _his

problem._--And how lavishly he varies his _leitmotif_! What rare and

melancholy modulations! If it were not for Wagner, who would teach us

that innocence has a preference for saving interesting sinners? (the

case in "Tannhäuser"). Or that even the eternal Jew gets saved and

_settled down_ when he marries? (the case in the "Flying Dutchman").

Or that corrupted old females prefer to be saved by chaste young men?

(the case of Kundry). Or that young hysterics like to be saved by

their doctor? (the case in "Lohengrin"). Or that beautiful girls most

love to be saved by a knight who also happens to be a Wagnerite? (the

case in the "Mastersingers"). Or that even married women also like

to be saved by a knight? (the case of Isolde). Or that the venerable

Almighty, after having compromised himself morally in all manner of

ways, is at last delivered by a free spirit and an immoralist? (the

case in the "Ring"). Admire, more especially this last piece of wisdom!

Do you understand it? I--take good care not to understand it....

That it is possible to draw yet other lessons from the works above

mentioned,--I am much more ready to prove than to dispute. That one

may be driven by a Wagnerian ballet to desperation--_and_ to virtue!

(once again the case in "Tannhäuser"). That not going to bed at the

right time may be followed by the worst consequences (once again the

case of "Lohengrin"),--That one can never be too sure of the spouse

one actually marries (for the third time, the case of "Lohengrin").

"Tristan and Isolde" glorifies the perfect husband who, in a certain

case, can ask only one question: "But why have ye not told me this

before? Nothing could be simpler than that!" Reply:

"That I cannot tell thee.

And what thou askest,

That wilt thou never learn."

"Lohengrin" contains a solemn ban upon all investigation and

questioning. In this way Wagner stood for the Christian concept,

"Thou must and shalt _believe!_" It is a crime against the highest

and the holiest to be scientific.... The "Flying Dutchman" preaches

the sublime doctrine that woman can moor the most erratic soul, or

to put it into Wagnerian terms "save" him. Here we venture to ask a

question. Supposing that this were actually true, would it therefore

be desirable?--What becomes of the "eternal Jew" whom a woman adores

and _enchains?_ He simply ceases from being eternal; he marries,--that

is to say, he concerns us no longer.--Transferred into the realm of

reality, the danger for the artist and for the genius--and these

are of course the "eternal Jews"--resides in woman: _adoring_ women

are their ruin. Scarcely any one has sufficient character not to be

corrupted--"saved" when he finds himself treated as a God:--he then

immediately condescends to woman.--Man is a coward in the face of all

that is eternally feminine: and this the girls know.--In many cases of

woman's love, and perhaps precisely in the most famous ones, the love

is no more than a refined form of _parasitism,_ a making one's nest

in another's soul and sometimes even in another's flesh--Ah! and how

constantly at the cost of the host!

We know the fate of Goethe in old-maidish moralin-corroded Germany. He

was always offensive to Germans, he found honest admirers only among.

Jewesses. Schiller, "noble" Schiller, who cried flowery words into

their ears,--he was a man after their own heart. What did they reproach

Goethe with?--with the Mount of Venus, and with having composed certain

Venetian epigrams. Even Klopstock preached him a moral sermon; there

was a time when Herder was fond of using the word "Priapus" when he

spoke of Goethe. Even "Wilhelm Meister" seemed to be only a symptom

of decline, of a moral "going to the dogs." The "Menagerie of tame

cattle," the worthlessness of the hero in this book, revolted Niebuhr,

who finally bursts out in a plaint which _Biterolf_[2] might well

have sung: "nothing so easily makes a painful impression as _when a

great mind despoils itself of its wings and strives for virtuosity in

something greatly inferior, while it renounces more lofty aims."_ But

the most indignant of all was the cultured woman: all smaller courts

in Germany, every kind of "Puritanism" made the sign of the cross

at the sight of Goethe, at the thought of the "unclean spirit" in

Goethe.--This history was what Wagner set to music. He _saves_ Goethe,

that goes without saying; but he does so in such a clever way that he

also takes the side of the cultured woman.

Goethe gets saved: a prayer saves him, a cultured woman _draws him out

of the mire._

--As to what Goethe would have thought of Wagner?--Goethe once set

himself the question, "what danger hangs over all romanticists: the

fate of romanticists?" His answer was: "To choke over the rumination

of moral and religious absurdities." In short: _Parsifal...._ The

philosopher writes thereto an epilogue. _Holiness_--the only remaining

higher value still seen by the mob or by woman, the horizon of the

ideal for all those who are naturally short-sighted. To philosophers,

however, this horizon, like every other, is a mere misunderstanding, a

sort of slamming of the door in the face of the real beginning of their

world,--their danger, their ideal, their desideratum.... In more polite

language: _La Philosophie ne suffit pas au grand nombre. Il lui faut la

sainteté...._

4.

I shall once more relate the history of the "Ring." This is its proper

place. It is also the history of a salvation: except that in this case

it is Wagner himself who is saved,--Half his life-time Wagner believed

in the _Revolution_ as only a Frenchman could have believed in it. He

sought it in the runic inscriptions of myths, he thought he had found

a typical revolutionary in Siegfried.-"Whence arises all the evil in

this world?" Wagner asked himself. From "old contracts": he replied,

as all revolutionary ideologists have done. In plain English: from

customs, laws, morals, institutions, from all those things upon which

the ancient world and ancient society rests. "How can one get rid of

the evil in this world? How can one get rid of ancient society?" Only

by declaring war against "contracts" (traditions, morality). _This

Siegfried does._ He starts early at the game, very early: his origin

itself is already a declaration of war against morality--he is the

result of adultery, of incest.... Not the saga, but Wagner himself is

the inventor of this radical feature; in this matter he _corrected_

the saga.... Siegfried continues as he began: he follows only his

first impulse, he flings all tradition, all respect, all _fear_ to the

winds. Whatever displeases him he strikes down. He tilts irreverently

at old god-heads. His principal undertaking, however, is to emancipate

woman,--"to deliver Brunnhilda." ... Siegfried and Brunnhilda; the

sacrament of free love; the dawn of the golden age; the twilight of the

Gods of old morality--_evil is got rid of...._

For a long while Wagner's ship sailed happily along this course. There

can be no doubt that along it Wagner sought his highest goal.--What

happened? A misfortune. The ship dashed on to a reef; Wagner had run

aground. The reef was Schopenhauer's philosophy; Wagner had stuck fast

on a _contrary_ view of the world. What had he set to music? Optimism?

Wagner was ashamed. It was moreover an optimism for which Schopenhauer

had devised an evil expression,--_unscrupulous_ optimism. He was more

than ever ashamed. He reflected for some time; his position seemed

desperate.... At last a path of escape seemed gradually to open before

him: what if the reef on which he had been wrecked could be interpreted

as a goal, as the ulterior motive, as the actual purpose of his

journey? To be wrecked here, this was also a goal. _Bene navigavi cum

naufragium feci ..._ and he translated the "Ring" into Schopenhauerian

language. Everything goes wrong, everything goes to wrack and ruin, the

new world is just as bad as the old one:--Nonentity, the Indian Circe

beckons.... Brunnhilda, who according to the old plan had to retire

with a song in honour of free love, consoling the world with the hope

of a socialistic Utopia in which "all will be well"; now gets something

else to do. She must first study Schopenhauer. She must first versify

the fourth book of "The World as Will and Idea." _Wagner was saved...._

Joking apart, this _was_ a salvation. The service which Wagner owes to

Schopenhauer is incalculable. It was the _philosopher of decadence_ who

allowed the _artist of decadence_ to find himself.--

5.

_The artist of decadence._ That is the word. And here I begin to

be serious. I could not think of looking on approvingly while this

_décadent_ spoils our health--and music into the bargain. Is Wagner

a man at all? Is he not rather a disease? Everything he touches he

contaminates. _He has made music sick._

A typical _décadent_ who thinks himself necessary with his corrupted

taste, who arrogates to himself a higher taste, who tries to establish

his depravity as a law, as progress, as a fulfilment.

And no one guards against it. His powers of seduction attain monstrous

proportions, holy incense hangs around him, the misunderstanding

concerning him is called the Gospel,--and he has certainly not

converted only the _poor in spirit_ to his cause!

I should like to open the window a little. Air! More air!--

The Case of Wagner Complete Works, Volume 8 · 第 1 / 11 段