jurisdiction._ Lee _v._ Brooklyn Pub. Co., 209 N. Y. 245.
_Report of investigation before grand jury._ Poston _v._ Washington R.
Co., 36 App. D. C. 359; Sweet _v._ Post Publishing Co., 215 Mass. 450.
_Report in advance of judicial proceeding as to evidence to be
adduced._ Houston Pub. Co. _v._ Tiernan, (Tex. Civ. App.) 171 S. W.
542. See Kelly _v._ Independent Pub. Co., 45 Mont. 127.
_Humorous report._ Bresslin _v._ Star Co., 85 Misc. 609.
_Matter added to the report._ Smith _v._ New Yorker Staats Zeitung,
154 App. Div. 458.
Footnote 467:
Only the opinion of Lord Coleridge, and that, too, slightly abridged,
is given. Lopes, J., concurred.
Footnote 468:
Curry _v._ Walter, 1 Esp. 456, 1 B. & P. 525; Lewis _v._ Levy, E. B. &
E. 537; Kimber _v._ Press Association, [1893] 1 Q. B. 65; McBee _v._
Fulton, 47 Md. 403; Salisbury _v._ Union Co., 45 Hun, 120 (_semble_);
Metcalf _v._ Times Co., 20 R. I. 674 (_semble_); Brown _v._ Providence
Co., 25 R. I. 117 (_semble_) _Accord_.
See Duncan _v._ Thwaites, 3 B. & C. 556; Parsons _v._ Age Herald Pub.
Co., 181 Ala. 439; Todd _v._ Every Evening Co., (Del.) 62 Atl. 1089;
Flues _v._ New Nonpareil Co., 155 Ia. 290; Cowley _v._ Pulsifer, 137
Mass. 392; Jones _v._ Pulitzer Pub. Co., 240 Mo. 200; Stanley _v._
Webb, 4 Sandf. 21; Matthews _v._ Beach, 5 Sandf. 256; Cincinnati Co.
_v._ Timberlake, 10 Ohio St. 548; Mengel _v._ Reading Eagle Co., 241
Pa. St. 367.
The report of _ex parte_ proceedings may be published before their
termination, if of such a character that there will be a final
decision. Kimber _v._ Press Association, [1893] 1 Q. B. 65.
Footnote 469:
Only the opinion of the court is given.
Footnote 470:
In 1843, see Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. lxx. pp.
1254–8; and in 1858, see vol. cxlix. pp. 947–82.—Reporter’s Note.
Footnote 471:
See Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. lxx. p. 1254; and
vol. cxlix. p. 947.—Reporter’s Note.
Footnote 472:
Garby _v._ Bennett, 57 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 853; Buckstaff _v._ Hicks, 94
Wis. 34 (_semble_—report of proceedings of common council of a city
not privileged); Dillon _v._ Balfour, L. R. 20 Ir. 600 _Accord_.
The publication must purport to be a report. Lewis _v._ Hayes, 165
Cal. 527.
Footnote 473:
The concurring opinions of Cockburn, C. J., and Baggallay and
Bramwell, JJ. A., and the arguments of counsel are omitted.
Footnote 474:
See Charlton _v._ Watton, 6 Car. & P. 385; Davison _v._ Duncan, 7. E.
& B. 229, 233; Popham _v._ Pickburn, 7 H. & N. 891; Davis _v._ Duncan,
L. R. 9 C. P. 396; Allbutt _v._ General Council, 23 Q. B. D. 400, 411.
By St. 51 & 52 Vict. c. 64, §§ 3 and 4, “§ 3. A fair and accurate
report in any newspaper of proceedings publicly heard before any court
exercising judicial authority shall, if published contemporaneously
with such proceedings, be privileged: Provided that nothing in this
section shall authorize the publication of any blasphemous or indecent
matter.
Ҥ 4. A fair and accurate report published in any newspaper of the
proceedings of a public meeting, or (except where neither the public
nor any newspaper reporter is admitted) of any meeting of a vestry,
town council, school board, board of guardians, board or local
authority formed or constituted under the provisions of any Act of
Parliament, or of any committee appointed by any of the
above-mentioned bodies, or of any meeting of any commissioners
authorized to act by letters patent, Act of Parliament, warrant under
the Royal Sign Manual, or other lawful warrant or authority, select
committees of either House of Parliament, justices of the peace in
quarter sessions assembled for administrative or deliberative
purposes, and the publication at the request of any Government office
or department, officer of state, commissioner of police, or chief
constable of any notice or report issued by them for the information
of the public, shall be privileged, unless it shall be proved that
such report or publication was published or made maliciously: Provided
that nothing in this section shall authorize the publication of any
blasphemous or indecent matter: Provided also, that the protection
intended to be afforded by this section shall not be available as a
defence in any proceedings if it shall be proved that the defendant
has been requested to insert in the newspaper in which the report or
other publication complained of appeared a reasonable letter or
statement by way of contradiction or explanation of such report or
other publication, and has refused or neglected to insert the same:
Provided further, that nothing in this section contained shall be
deemed or construed to limit or abridge any privilege now by law
existing, or to protect the publication of any matter not of public
concern and the publication of which is not for the public benefit.
“For the purposes of this section ‘public meeting’ shall mean any
meeting _bona fide_ and lawfully held for a lawful purpose, and for
the furtherance or discussion of any matter of public concern, whether
the admission thereto be general or restricted.” Kelly _v._ O’Malley,
6 T. L. R. 62, was decided under this statute.
_Newspaper publication of reports of administrative officers._ Tilles
_v._ Pulitzer Pub. Co., 241 Mo. 609; Schwarz _v._ Evening News Co., 84
N. J. Law 486; Bingham _v._ Gaynor, 203 N. Y. 27. _Contra_, Madill
_v._ Currie, 168 Mich. 546. See Morasca _v._ Item Co., 126 La. 426.
_Report of investigation by administrative officers._ Williams _v._
Black, 24 S. D. 501.
Footnote 475:
The case has been much abridged.
Footnote 476:
Allbutt _v._ General Council, 23 Q. B. D. 400 _Accord_. But see
Kimball _v._ Post Pub. Co., 199 Mass. 248; Peoples Bank _v._ Goodwin,
148 Mo. App. 364.
_Report of proceedings of a church commission._ Bass _v._ Mathews, 69
Wash. 214.
Footnote 477:
Only the opinion of Mellish, L. J., is given.
Footnote 478:
Macdougall _v._ Knight, 14 App. Cas. 194 (explaining S. C. 17 Q. B.
Div. 636); Salisbury _v._ Union Co., 45 Hun, 120 _Accord_.
See Annaly _v._ Trade Co., L. R. 26 Ir. 394.
Footnote 479:
Parsons _v._ Age Herald Pub. Co., 181 Ala. 439; Washington Herald Co.
_v._ Berry, 41 App. D. C. 322; Lundin _v._ Post Pub. Co., 217 Mass.
213; Schwarz _v._ Evening News Co., 84 N. J. Law, 486; Williams _v._
Black, 24 S. D. 501; Williams Printing Co. _v._ Saunders, 113 Va. 156
_Accord_.
But see U. S. _v._ Journal Co., 197 Fed. 415; Tilles _v._ Pulitzer
Pub. Co., 241 Mo. 609.
“Their Lordships regret to find that there appeared on the one side of
this case the time-worn fallacy that some kind of privilege attaches
to the profession of the Press as distinguished from the members of
the public. The freedom of the journalist is an ordinary part of the
freedom of the subject, and to whatever lengths the subject in general
may go so also may the journalist, but, apart from statute law, his
privilege is no other and no higher. The responsibilities which attach
to his power in the dissemination of printed matter may, and in the
case of a conscientious journalist do, make him more careful; but the
range of his assertions, his criticisms, or his comments is as wide
as, and no wider than, that of any other subject. No privilege
attaches to his position.” Lord Shaw in Arnold _v._ King-Emperor, 111
L. T. 324, 325.
Footnote 480:
The statement has been condensed, the facts sufficiently appearing in
the opinion of Mellor, J. The arguments of counsel and the concurring
opinion of Hannen, J., are omitted.
Footnote 481:
Barbaud _v._ Hookham, 5 Esp. 109; McDougall _v._ Claridge, 1 Camp.
267; Dunman _v._ Bigg, 1 Camp, 269 _n._; Todd _v._ Hawkins, 2 M. & R.
20, 8 Car. & P. 88; Shipley _v._ Todhunter, 7 Car. & P. 680; Harris
_v._ Thompson, 13 C. B. 333; Maitland _v._ Bramwell, 2 F. & F. 623;
Scarll _v._ Dixon, 4 F. & F. 250; Cooke _v._ Wildes, 5 E. & B. 328;
Croft _v._ Stevens, 7 H. & N. 570; Whiteley _v._ Adams, 15 C. B. N. S.
392; Spill _v._ Maule, L. R. 4 Ex. 232; Laughton _v._ Bishop, L. R. 4
P. C. 495; Davies _v._ Snead, L. R. 5 Q. B. 608; Waller _v._ Loch, 7
Q. B. D. 619; Cowles _v._ Potts, 34 L. J. Q. B. 247; Quartz Co. _v._
Beall, 20 Ch. Div. 501; Royal Aquarium _v._ Parkinson, [1892] 1 Q. B.
431; Pittard _v._ Oliver, [1891] 1 Q. B. 474; Phila. Co. _v._ Quigley,
21 How. 202; Broughton _v._ McGrew, 39 Fed. 672; Haight _v._ Cornell,
15 Conn. 74; Etchison _v._ Pergerson, 88 Ga. 620; Wharton _v._ Wright,
30 Ill. App. 343; Coombs _v._ Rose, 8 Blackf. 155; Kirkpatrick _v._
Eagle Lodge, 26 Kan. 384; Lynch _v._ Febiger, 39 La. Ann. 336;
Remington _v._ Congdon, 2 Pick. 310; Bradley _v._ Heath, 12 Pick. 163;
Farnsworth _v._ Storrs, 5 Cush. 412; York _v._ Pease, 2 Gray, 282;
Gassett _v._ Gilbert, 6 Gray, 94; Shurtleff _v._ Parker, 130 Mass. 293
(_semble_); Howland _v._ Flood, 160 Mass. 509; Landis _v._ Campbell,
79 Mo. 433; Rothholz _v._ Dunkle, 53 N. J. Law, 438; Jarvis _v._
Hatheway, 3 Johns, 180; O’Donaghue _v._ McGovern, 23 Wend. 26; Streety
_v._ Wood, 15 Barb. 105; Fowles _v._ Bowen, 30 N. Y. 20; Kilinck _v._
Colby, 46 N. Y. 427; McKnight _v._ Hasbrouck, 17 R. I. 70; Tillinghast
_v._ McLeod, 17 R. I. 208; Holt _v._ Parsons, 23 Tex. 9; Shurtleff
_v._ Stevens, 51 Vt. 501 (_semble_) _Accord_.
See also Dickeson _v._ Hilliard, L. R. 9 Ex. 79; Lyman _v._ Gowing, L.
R. 6 Ir. 259 (where the communication was made to unsuitable persons);
Phillips _v._ Bradshaw, 181 Ala. 541; Bohlinger _v._ Germania Ins.
Co., 100 Ark. 477.
_Communication by promoter of an enterprise to one whose assistance is
sought._ Cook _v._ Gust, 155 Wis. 594.
_Communication from superintendent of railroad to express company as
to employee who serves both._ International R. Co. _v._ Edmundson,
(Tex. Civ. App.) 185 S. W. 402.
_Communication by insurance adjuster to insurers._ Richardson _v._
Cooke, 129 La. 365.
_Indorsement of officer on recommendation for promotion._ Gray _v._
Mossman, 88 Conn. 247.
_Communication between stockholders as to manager of a corporation._
Ashcroft _v._ Hammond, 197 N. Y. 488.
_Communication by person immediately interested made honestly to
protect his own interest._ Delany _v._ Jones, 4 Esp. 190 (but see Lay
_v._ Lawson, 4 A. & E. 798); Fairman _v._ Ives, 5 B. & A. 642; Coward
_v._ Wellington, 7 Car. & P. 531; Tuson _v._ Evans, 12 A. & E. 733
(_semble_); Blackham _v._ Pugh, 2 C. B. 611; Wenman _v._ Ash, 13 C. B.
836 (_semble_, communication to unsuitable person); Manby _v._ Witt,
18 C. B. 544; Taylor _v._ Hawkins, 16 Q. B. 308; Amann _v._ Damm, 8 C.
B. N. S. 597; Force _v._ Warren, 15 C. B. N. S. 806; Oddy _v._ Paulet,
4 F. & F. 1009 (_semble_); Cooke _v._ Wildes, 5 E. & B. 328; Regina
_v._ Perry, 15 Cox C. C. 169; Bank _v._ Strong, 1 App. Cas. 307; Hunt
_v._ Great Northern Co., [1891] 2 Q. B. 189; Baker _v._ Carrick,
[1894] 1 Q. B. 838; Hobbs _v._ Bryers, L. R. 2 Ir. 496; Lang _v._
Gilbert, 4 All. (N. B.) 445; Gasley _v._ Moss, 9 Ala. 266; Butterworth
_v._ Conrow, 1 Marv. 361; Henry _v._ Moberly, 23 Ind. App. 305;
Nichols _v._ Eaton, 110 Ia. 509; Caldwell _v._ Story, 107 Ky. 10;
Baysett _v._ Hire, 49 La. Ann. 904; Dickinson _v._ Hathaway, 122 La.
Ann. 644; Beeler _v._ Jackson, 64 Md. 589; Brow _v._ Hathaway, 13 All.
239; Bacon _v._ Mich. Co., 66 Mich. 166; Howard _v._ Dickie, 120 Mich.
238; Alabama Co. _v._ Brooks, 69 Miss. 168; Lovell Co. _v._ Houghton,
116 N. Y. 520; Lent _v._ Underhill, 54 App. Div. 609; Reynolds _v._
Plumbers’ Ass’n, 30 Misc. 709; Behee _v._ Missouri R. Co., 71 Tex.
424; Missouri R. Co. _v._ Richmond, 73 Tex. 568; Missouri Co. _v._
Behee, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 107; Miller _v._ Armstrong, 24 N. Zeal. 968.
Footnote 482:
The arguments of counsel are omitted.
Footnote 483:
Johnson _v._ Evans, 3 Esp. 32; Fowler _v._ Homer, 3 Camp. 294; Jones
_v._ Thomas, 34 W. R. 104; Lightbody _v._ Gordon, 9 Scotch Sess. Cas.
(4th series) 934; Dale _v._ Harris, 109 Mass. 193 _Accord_.
See to the same effect Flanagan _v._ McLane, 87 Conn. 220; Wall _v._
Seaboard Ry., 18 Ga. App. 457; Cristman _v._ Cristman, 36 Ill. App.
567; Harper _v._ Harper, 10 Bush, 447; Hyatt _v._ Lindner, 133 La.
614; Bavington _v._ Robinson, 127 Md. 46, 124 Md. 85; Eames _v._
Whittaker, 123 Mass. 342; Wells _v._ Toogood, 165 Mich. 677; Lally
_v._ Emery, 59 Hun, 237; Hayden _v._ Hasbrouck, 34 R. I. 556; Viss
_v._ Calligan, 91 Wash. 673. Compare Hansen _v._ Hansen, 126 Minn.
426; Hooper _v._ Truscott, 2 B. N. C. 457; Harrison _v._ Fraser, 29 W.
R. 652.
But see Peak _v._ Taubman, 251 Mo. 390; Vanloon _v._ Vanloon, 159 Mo.
App. 255; Hagener _v._ Pulitzer Pub. Co., 172 Mo. App. 436.
_Relevant statement in course of dispute as to property._ Alderson
_v._ Kahle, 73 W. Va. 690.
Footnote 484:
The argument for the plaintiff and the opinions of Lord Tenterden, C.
J., Bayley, and Littledale, JJ., are omitted.
Footnote 485:
_Servant cases._ Edmondson _v._ Stevenson, Bull. N. P. 8; Weatherston
_v._ Hawkins, 1 T. R. 110; Rogers _v._ Clifton, 3 B. & P. 587;
Pattison _v._ Jones, 8 B. & C. 578; Gardner _v._ Slade, 13 Q. B. 796;
Murdoch _v._ Funduklian, 2 T. L. R. 614 (reversing S. C. 2 T. L. R.
215); Doane _v._ Grew, 220 Mass. 171; Carroll _v._ Owen, 178 Mich. 551
_Accord_.
_Commercial agency cases._ Lemay _v._ Chamberlain, 10 Ont. 638; Todd
_v._ Dun, 12 Ont. 791; Erber _v._ Dun, 12 Fed. 526; Johnson _v._
Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172; Pollasky _v._ Minchener, 81 Mich. 280;
Mitchell _v._ Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226; King _v._ Patterson, 49 N.
J. Law, 417; Taylor _v._ Church, 8 N. Y. 452; Sunderlin _v._
Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 188; Bradstreet Co. _v._ Gill, 72 Texas, 115
_Accord_.
Macintosh _v._ Dun, [1908] A. C. 390 _Contra_. _Aliter_ in case of
credit association not for profit. London Ass’n for Protection of
Trade _v._ Greenlands, [1916] 2 A. C. 15.
But information given to persons having no interest in the mercantile
standing of the plaintiff—for example, reports sent by a commercial
agency to its subscribers generally—is not privileged. Erber _v._ Dun,
12 Fed. 526; Trussell _v._ Scarlett, 18 Fed. 214 (criticising
Beardsley _v._ Tappan, 5 Blatchford, 497); Locke _v._ Bradstreet Co.,
22 Fed. 771; Pacific Packing Co. _v._ Bradstreet, 25 Idaho, 696;
Pollasky _v._ Minchener, 81 Mich. 280; Ormsby _v._ Douglass, 37 N. Y.
477; State _v._ Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348.
For other cases of communications privileged because made in answer to
proper inquiries, see Cockayne _v._ Hodgkisson, 5 Car. & P. 543;
Storey _v._ Challands, 8 Car. & P. 234; Kline _v._ Sewell, 3 M. & W.
297; Hopwood _v._ Thorn, 8 C. B. 293; Robshaw _v._ Smith, 38 L. T.
Rep. 423; Weldon _v._ Winslow, Odgers, Lib. & Sl. (5th ed.) 255;
Melcher _v._ Beeler, 48 Col. 233; Zuckerman _v._ Sonnenschein, 62 Ill.
115; Richardson _v._ Gunby, 88 Kan. 47; Atwill _v._ Mackintosh, 120
Mass. 177; Howland _v._ Blake Co., 156 Mass. 543; Froslee _v._ Lund’s
State Bank, 131 Minn. 435; Fahr _v._ Hayes, 50 N. J. Law, 275; Posnett
_v._ Marble, 62 Vt. 481; Rude _v._ Nass, 79 Wis. 321.
_Advice by attorney to client as to person with whom client has
business._ Kruse _v._ Rabe, 80 N. J. Law, 378.
_Fiduciary relations._ Communications made in the line of a business
duty, for example, by an agent or employee to his principal or
employer are privileged. Wright _v._ Woodgate, 2 C. M. & R. 573;
Scarll _v._ Dixon, 4 F. & F. 250; Stace _v._ Griffith, L. R. 2 P. C.
420; Hume _v._ Marshall, 42 J. P. 136; Washburn _v._ Cooke, 3 Den.
110; Lewis _v._ Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369.
_Family relations._ A _bona fide_ communication by a brother to his
sister reflecting on the character of her suitor is privileged. Anon.,
2 Smith, 4, cited; Adams _v._ Coleridge, 1 T. L. R. 4. So is a similar
communication by a son-in-law to his mother-in-law. Todd _v._ Hawkins,
2 M. & Rob. 20, 8 C. & P. 88.
_Inquiry as to character of candidate for admission to a society._
Cadle _v._ McIntosh, 51 Ind. App. 365.
Footnote 486:
Only this opinion and the dissenting opinion of Creswell, J., are
given. Erle, J., concurred with the Lord Chief Justice; Coltman, J.,
agreed with Cresswell, J.
Footnote 487:
“If it had been necessary, I should have been fully prepared to go the
whole length of the doctrine laid down by Tindal, C. J., in the case
of Coxhead _v._ Richards,” _per_ Willes, J., in Amann _v._ Damm, 8 C.
B. N. S. 592, 602. Blackburn, J., in Davies _v._ Snead, L. R. 5 Q. B.
605, 611, and Lindley, J., in Stuart _v._ Bell, [1891] 2 Q. B. 341,
347, expressed similar approval of the opinion of Tindal, C. J.
Vanspike _v._ Cleyson, Cro. El. 541; Peacock _v._ Reynal, 2 Br. &
Gold. 151, 15 C. B. N. S. 418, cited; Herver _v._ Dowson, Bull. N. P.
8; Cleaver _v._ Sarraude, 1 Camp. 268, cited; Picton _v._ Jackman, 4
Car. & P. 257; Dixon _v._ Smith, 29 L. J. Ex. 125, 126; Masters _v._
Burgess, 3 T. L. R. 96; Stuart _v._ Bell, [1891] 2 Q. B. 341; Hart
_v._ Reed, 1 B. Mon. 166; Fresh _v._ Cutter, 73 Md. 87; Noonan _v._
Orton, 32 Wis. 106 _Accord_.
Cockayne _v._ Hodgkisson, 5 Car. & P. 543 (_semble_); King _v._ Watts,
8 Car. & P. 614; Brown _v._ Vannaman, 85 Wis. 451 _Contra_. But see
Hocks _v._ Sprangers, 113 Wis. 123.
In Bennett _v._ Deacon, 2 C. B. 628, a creditor of a buyer volunteered
a warning to the seller as to the buyer’s credit. The court was evenly
divided as to whether the communication was privileged.
Compare Irion _v._ Knapp, 132 La. 60 (letter to a public board as to a
candidate for an appointment).
INDIAN PENAL CODE, § 499, exception 9. It is not defamation to make an
imputation on the character of another, provided that the imputation
be made in good faith for the protection of the interests of the
person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good.
Footnote 488:
As to this remarkable litigant, see the article by Irving Browne,
“Count Joannes,” 8 Green Bag. 435.
Footnote 489:
Only what relates to this count is given.
Footnote 490:
Krebs _v._ Oliver, 12 Gray, 239; Byam _v._ Collins, 111 N. Y. 143
_Accord_.
Anon., 15 C. B. N. S. 410 (cited); Adcock _v._ Marsh, 8 Ired. 360
_Contra_. See Dobbin _v._ Chicago R. Co., 157 Mo. App. 689.
Footnote 491:
The statement of the case has been condensed.
Footnote 492:
In Simmonds _v._ Dunne, Ir. R. 5 C. L. 358; Over _v._ Schiffling, 102
Ind. 191; York _v._ Johnson, 116 Mass. 482, the communications were
not privileged for want of a legitimate interest or duty on the part
of the defendant.
See Whiteley _v._ Newman, 9 Ga. App. 89.
Footnote 493:
Only the opinion of the court is given.
Footnote 494:
Jones _v._ Thomas, 34 W. R. 104; Pittard _v._ Oliver, [1891] 1 Q. B.
474; Broughton _v._ McGrew, 39 Fed. 672; Brow _v._ Hathaway, 13 All.
239; Billings _v._ Fairbanks, 136 Mass. 177, 139 Mass. 66; Keane _v._
Sprague (N. Y. City Court), 30 Alb. L. J. 283 _Accord_.
Webber _v._ Vincent, 9 N. Y. Supp. 101 _Contra_.
_Defamatory letter after termination of employment._ National Cash
Register Co. _v._ Salling, 173 Fed. 22.
Footnote 495:
In Christopher _v._ Akin, 214 Mass. 332, the plaintiff was a
journeyman painter in the employ of the defendant, and was at work on
the house of one Tillinghast. Tillinghast complained to the defendant
that some of his men had stolen a putty knife and other property
belonging to him. The defendant recompensed Tillinghast for the
property and testified that he was told by one of his men that the
plaintiff had admitted to him that he took the putty knife. The men
were paid off by the defendant at his shop on Saturday night,—their
time being made up to Wednesday. Their pay was handed to them in
envelopes. When a man was discharged his envelope contained his pay up
to Saturday night. The plaintiff’s envelope contained his pay in full,
less what the defendant had paid Tillinghast for the property, with a
bill for it. There were four or five men in the shop waiting to be
paid off when it came the plaintiff’s turn to be paid. The plaintiff
opened his envelope and counted the money and found the bill. The
plaintiff asked the defendant what that meant, and the defendant said
in response, “Do you want to know in front of all these men?” and he
said “Yes,” whereupon the defendant said, “That is the stuff you stole
from the Tillinghast job.” Morton, J., said: “Whether a communication
is or is not privileged does not depend so much on the manner or form
in which crime is imputed, where the alleged slander consists as here
of a charge of crime, as on the occasion and circumstances under which
the charge is made. If made in good faith in reference to a matter in
which the person making it is immediately interested, and for the
purpose of protecting his interest and in the belief that it is true
and without any malicious motive, the communication is what is termed
privileged; that is, the occasion and the circumstances under which it
is made are held to be such as, if nothing more appears, to excuse or
justify the statements that are made.”
See Madill _v._ Currie, 168 Mich. 546.
Compare Adam _v._ Ward, [1917] A. C. 309 (statement given to the press
by the army board in reply to a speech in Parliament regarding an army
officer).
Footnote 496:
The statement of the case is abridged; the arguments of counsel and
the concurring opinions of Lord Coleridge, C. J., and Denman, J., are
omitted.
Footnote 497:
Robinson _v._ Jones, L. R. 4 Ir. 391 _Accord_.
Footnote 498:
Robinson _v._ Jones, L. R. 4 Ir. 391 _Accord_. See also Smith _v._
Crocker, 5 T. L. R. 441; Muetze _v._ Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236.
_Statement in presence of third persons not interested._ Fowlie _v._
Cruse, 52 Mont. 222; Fields _v._ Bynum, 156 N. C. 413.
_Notice of discharge of employee posted on the premises._ Ramsdell
_v._ Pennsylvania Co., 79 N. J. Law, 379.
_Notice to customers in a local newspaper._ Hatch _v._ Lane, 105 Mass.
394. See Delany _v._ Jones, 4 Esp. 190 (but see Ley _v._ Lawson, 4 A.
& E. 798); Commonwealth _v._ Featherston, 9 Phila. 594; Holliday _v._
Ontario Co., 33 Up. Can. Q. B. 558.
_General publicity with respect to candidate for local office._
Duncombe _v._ Daniel, 1 Willmore, W. & H. 101, 8 Car. & P. 222; Jones
_v._ Varnum, 21 Fla. 431; State _v._ Haskins, 109 Ia. 656; Coleman
_v._ MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711; Bronson _v._ Bruce, 59 Mich. 467; Wheaton
_v._ Beecher, 66 Mich. 307; Belknap _v._ Ball, 83 Mich. 583; Aldrich
_v._ Press Co., 9 Minn. 133 (but see, _contra_, Marks _v._ Baker, 28
Minn. 162); Bigner _v._ Hodges, 82 Miss. 215; Lewis _v._ Few, 5 Johns.
1; Root _v._ King, 7 Cow. 613; Hunt _v._ Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173; Seely
_v._ Blair, Wright, (Ohio) 358, 683; Knapp _v._ Campbell, 14 Tex. Civ.
App. 199; Sweeney _v._ Baker, 13 W. Va. 158. Compare Flynn _v._
Boglarsky, 164 Mich. 513.
But a communication to the electors alone is privileged, if made in
good faith. Wisdom _v._ Brown, 1 T. L. R. 412; Pankhurst _v._
Hamilton, 3 T. L. R. 500; Burke _v._ Mascarich, 81 Cal. 302
(_semble_); Mott _v._ Dawson, 46 Ia. 533; Bays _v._ Hunt, 60 Ia. 251;
State _v._ Balch, 31 Kan. 465; Commonwealth _v._ Wardwell, 136 Mass.
164; Briggs _v._ Garrett, 111 Pa. St. 404.
But see, _contra_, Smith _v._ Burrus, 106 Mo. 94, where the
distinction between fair comment and qualified privilege was
overlooked. See also Estelle _v._ Daily News Pub. Co., 99 Neb. 397;
Arnold _v._ Ingram, 151 Wis. 438; Putnam _v._ Browne, 162 Wis. 524.
Footnote 499:
The court found that the defendant acted in good faith.
Footnote 500:
Ashford _v._ Evening Star Co., 41 App. D. C. 395; Addington _v._ Times
Pub. Co., 138 La. 731; Briggs _v._ Garrett, 111 Pa. St. 404
(_semble_); Express Co. _v._ Copeland, 64 Tex. 354 _Accord_. Compare
Bingham _v._ Gaynor, 141 App. Div. 301; Ivie _v._ Minton, 75 Or. 483.
_Statement at a meeting to oppose a candidate for public office._
Baker _v._ Warner, 231 U. S. 588.
_Criticism of minister in a church convention._ Dickson _v._ Lights,
(Tex. Civ. App.) 17 S. W. 834.
_Criticism of member of association_ at a meeting to discuss the
affairs of the association. Caldwell _v._ Hayden, 42 App. D. C. 166.
_Reply to defamatory statements._ Adam _v._ Ward [1917] A. C. 309;
Preston _v._ Hobbs, 161 App. Div. 363; Smith _v._ Kemp, 132 La. 943.
Footnote 501:
Only part of the opinion is given.
Footnote 502:
_Criticism of member of congregation in a sermon._ Hassett _v._
Carroll, 85 Conn. 23.
_Statement by clergyman to congregation as to conduct of a trustee._
Everett _v._ DeLong, 144 Ill. App. 496.
Footnote 503:
The arguments of counsel and the concurring opinions of Lopes and Kay,
L.JJ., are omitted.
Footnote 504:
Bohlinger _v._ Germania Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477; Gambrill _v._
Schooley, 93 Md. 48 _Accord_. See Central R. Co. _v._ Jones, 18 Ga.
App. 414. But the dictation of a defamatory letter by a lawyer to his
clerk and the copying of it by another clerk in the regular course of
serving his clients, although a publication, is, nevertheless,
privileged. Boxsius _v._ Goblet, [1894] 1 Q. B. 842. And the authority
of Pullman _v._ Hill is greatly weakened by Edmonson _v._ Birch,
[1907] 1 K. B. 371, which treats as privileged the dictation of a
defamatory letter by a company through one of its officers to a
stenographer, and Roff _v._ British Chemical Co., [1918] 2 K. B. 277
(letter passed through the hands of two clerks of addressee). See to
the same effect Owen _v._ Ogilvie Co., 32 App. Div. 465.
_Exchange of letters by mistake whereby privileged letter goes to
wrong person._ See Tompson _v._ Dashwood, 11 Q. B. D. 43; Hebditch
_v._ McIlwaine, [1894] 2 Q. B. 54, 61.
A defamatory statement true of A. but published concerning B., by
mistake, will support an action by B. Shepheard _v._ Whitaker, L. R.
10 C. P. 502; Taylor _v._ Hearst, 107 Cal. 262; Griebel _v._ Rochester
Co., 60 Hun, 319. But see, _contra_, Hanson _v._ Globe Co., _supra_,
665 (Holmes, Morton, and Barker, JJ., dissenting).
Compare Brett _v._ Watson, 20 W. R. 723; Fox _v._ Broderick, 14 Ir. C.
L. R. 453, 459; Loibl _v._ Breidenbach, 78 Wis. 49.
Footnote 505:
The concurring opinions of Bramwell and Brett, L.JJ., and the argument
for defendant are omitted.
Footnote 506:
Salmon _v._ Isaac, 20 L. T. Rep. 885; Lawyers Pub. Co. _v._ West Pub.
Co., 32 App. Div. 585; Saunders _v._ Baxter, 6 Heisk. 369 _Accord_.
Footnote 507:
3 Q. B. Div. 237, S. C.
Footnote 508:
The charge of the learned baron is abridged; the arguments of counsel
and the concurring opinions of Bramwell and Cotton, L.JJ., are
omitted.
Footnote 509:
Barry _v._ McCollom, 81 Conn. 293; Bays _v._ Hunt, 60 Ia. 251, 255–6;
Hemmens _v._ Nelson, 138 N. Y. 517; Haft _v._ First Bank, 19 App. Div.
423 _Accord_.
Footnote 510:
The case is materially abridged.
Footnote 511:
Ranson _v._ West, 125 Ky. 457 (_semble_); Toothaker _v._ Conant, 91
Me. 438; Briggs _v._ Garrett, 111 Pa. St. 404; Conroy _v._ Pittsburgh
Times, 139 Pa. St. 334; Mulderig _v._ Wilkes Barre Times, 215 Pa. St.
470; Egan _v._ Dotson, 36 S. D. 459 _Accord_.
See also, Douglass _v._ Daisley, 114 Fed. 628.
Compare Glisson _v._ Biggio, 139 La. 23; Estelle _v._ Daily News Pub.
Co., 99 Neb. 397; Wiese _v._ Riley, 146 Wis. 640.
_Petition or memorial for removal of public officer privileged._ Blake
_v._ Pilfold, 1 M. & Rob. 198; Woodward _v._ Lander, 6 Car. & P. 548;
James _v._ Boston, 2 Car. & K. 4; Spackman _v._ Gibney, Odgers, Lib. &
Sl. (5th ed.) 278; Beatson _v._ Skene, 5 H. & N. 838; Harrison _v._
Bush, 5 E. & B. 344; Hart _v._ Von Gumpach, L. R. 4 P. C. 439; Stanton
_v._ Andrews, 5 Up. Can. Q. B. O. S. 211; Corbett _v._ Jackson, 1 Up.
Can. Q. B. 128; Rogers _v._ Spalding, 1 Up. Can. Q. B. 258; McIntire
_v._ McBean, 13 Up. Can. Q. B. 534; Bell _v._ Parke, 10 Ir. C. L. R.
279 (_semble_); White _v._ Nichols, 3 How. 266; Vogel _v._ Gruaz, 110
U. S. 311; Pearce _v._ Brower, 72 Ga. 243; Young _v._ Richardson, 4
Ill. App. 364; Rainbow _v._ Benson, 71 Ia. 301; Rabb _v._ Trevelyan,
122 La. 174; Bodwell _v._ Osgood, 3 Pick. 379; Wieman _v._ Mabee, 45
Mich. 484; Greenwood _v._ Cobbey, 26 Neb. 449; State _v._ Burnham, 9
N. H. 34; Thorn _v._ Blanchard, 5 Johns. 508; Vanderzee _v._ McGregor,
12 Wend. 545; Howard _v._ Thompson, 21 Wend. 319; Halstead _v._
Nelson, 24 Hun, 395; Decker _v._ Gaylord, 35 Hun, 584; Woods _v._
Wiman, 122 N. Y. 445, 47 Hun, 362; Cook _v._ Hill, 3 Sandf. 341; Van
Wyck _v._ Aspinwall, 17 N. Y. 190; Harwood _v._ Keech, 6 Th. & C. 665;
Logan _v._ Hodges, 146 N. C. 38; Gray _v._ Pentland, 2 S. & R. 23;
Kent _v._ Bongartz, 15 R. I. 72; Reid _v._ Delorme, 2 Brev. 76; Harris
_v._ Huntington, 2 Tyler, 129 _Accord_.
But not absolutely privileged, where the proceeding is not judicial.
Dickson _v._ Wilton, 1 F. & F. 419; Proctor _v._ Webster, 16 Q. B. D.
112; Woods _v._ Wiman, 122 N. Y. 445; Morah _v._ Steele, 157 App. Div.
109; Fulton _v._ Ingalls, 165 App. Div. 323.
Compare McKee _v._ Hughes, 133 Tenn. 455 (petition to revoke
merchant’s license).
Footnote 512:
The statement of the case, the arguments of counsel, the judgment of
Mellor, J., and portions of the judgments of Crompton and Blackburn,
JJ., are omitted.
Footnote 513:
Hibbs _v._ Wilkinson, 1 F. & F. 608; Turnbull _v._ Bird, 2 F. & F.
508; Hunter _v._ Sharpe, 4 F. & F. 983; Hunt _v._ Star Co., [1908] 2
K. B. 309; Walker _v._ Hodgson, [1909] 1 K. B. 239, 253; De Mestre
_v._ Syme, 9 Vict. L. R. (L) 10; Davis _v._ Duncan, L. R. 9 C. P. 396;
Queen _v._ Carden, 5 Q. B. D. 1, 8; Crane _v._ Waters, 10 Fed. 619;
Kinyon _v._ Palmer, 18 Ia. 377; Bradford _v._ Clark, 90 Me. 298;
People _v._ Glassman, 12 Utah, 238 _Accord_.
Footnote 514:
Stuart _v._ Lovell, 2 Stark. 93; Macleod _v._ Wakley, 3 Car. & P. 311;
Green _v._ Chapman, 4 Bing. N. C. 92; Parmiter _v._ Coupland, 6 M. &
W. 105; Whistler _v._ Ruskin, Odgers, Lib. & Sl., (5th ed.) 196;
Wilson _v._ Reed, 2 F. & F. 149; Morrison _v._ Belcher, 3 F. & F. 614;
Hedley _v._ Barlow, 4 F. & F. 224; Risk Allah Bey _v._ Whitehurst, 18
L. T. Rep. 615; Joynt _v._ Cycle Co., [1904] 2 K. B. 292; Massie _v._
Toronto Co., 11 Ont. 362; Burt _v._ Advertiser Co., 154 Mass. 238;
Cooper _v._ Stone, 24 Wend. 434; Reade _v._ Sweetzer, 6 Abb. Pr. N. S.
9, n.; Ullrich _v._ N. Y. Co., 23 Misc. 168 _Accord_.
Footnote 515:
See _contra_, Williams _v._ Spowers, 8 Vict. L. R. (Law) 82.
Footnote 516:
Honest belief is no defense apart from privilege. Van Wiginton _v._
Pulitzer Pub. Co., (C. C. A.) 218 Fed. 483; Brandt _v._ Story, 161 Ia.
451; Tanner _v._ Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578; Reid _v._ Nichols, 166 Ky.
423; Sweet _v._ Post Pub. Co., 215 Mass. 450; Clair _v._ Battle Creek
Journal Co., 168 Mich. 467; Ivie _v._ King, 167 N. C. 174; Spencer
_v._ Minnick, 41 Okl. 613; Williams _v._ Hicks Printing Co., 159 Wis.
90.
_Fair comment on public affairs and public officers._ See Gandia _v._
Pettingill, 222 U. S. 452; Lowe _v._ News Pub. Co., 9 Ga. App. 103;
Diener _v._ Star Chronicle Pub. Co., 230 Mo. 613; Cook _v._ Globe
Printing Co., 227 Mo. 471; Merrey _v._ Guardian Pub. Co., 79 N. J.
Law, 177; Bingham _v._ Gaynor, 203 N. Y. 27.
_Fair comment on candidates._ Walsh _v._ Pulitzer Pub. Co., 250 Mo.
142; Schull _v._ Hopkins, 26 S. D. 21; Ingalls _v._ Morrissey, 154
Wis. 632.
_Fair comment on persons seeking public patronage._ Ott _v._ Murphy,
160 Ia. 730.
Footnote 517:
Dibdin _v._ Swan, 1 Esp. 28; Heriot _v._ Stuart, 1 Esp. 437; Stuart
_v._ Lovell, 2 Stark. 93 (_semble_); Tabart _v._ Tipper, 1 Camp. 350
(_semble_); Dunne _v._ Anderson, Ry. & M. 287, 3 Bing. 88; Soane _v._
Knight, M. & M. 74; Thompson _v._ Shackell, M. & M. 187; Macleod _v._
Wakley, 3 Car. & P. 311; Fraser _v._ Berkeley, 7 Car. & P. 621; Evans
_v._ Harlow, Dav. & M. 507; Paris _v._ Levy, 9 C. B. N. S. 342;
Eastwood _v._ Holmes, 1 F. & F. 347; Hibbs _v._ Wilkinson, 1 F. & F.
608; Turnbull _v._ Bird, 2 F. & F. 508; Strauss _v._ Francis, 4 F. &
F. 939, 1107, 15 L. T. Rep. 674; Henwood _v._ Harrison, L. R. 7 C. P.
606; Jenner _v._ A’Beckett, L. R. 7 Q. B. 11; Mulkern _v._ Ward, 13
Eq. 619, 622; Whistler _v._ Ruskin, Odgers, Lib. & Sl., (5 ed.) 196;
Duplany _v._ Davis, 3 T. L. R. 184; McQuire _v._ Western Co., [1903] 2
K. B. 100; Crane _v._ Waters, 10 Fed. 619; Snyder _v._ Fulton, 34 Md.
128, 137; Gott _v._ Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235; O’Connor _v._ Sill, 60
Mich. 175; Dowling _v._ Livingstone, 108 Mich. 321; Cooper _v._ Stone,
24 Wend. 434 (_semble_); Reade _v._ Sweetzer, 6 Abb. Pr. N. S. 9, _n._
(_semble_); Adolf Philipp Co. _v._ New Yorker Staatszeitung, 165 App.
Div. 377; Press Co. _v._ Stewart, 119 Pa. St. 584 _Accord_.
“The defendant was, in my opinion, entitled to have the jury’s
decision, as to the plea of fair comment, whether or not, in all the
circumstances proved, the libel went beyond a fair comment on the
plaintiff and on the system of medical enterprise with which he
associated himself, as a matter of public interest treated by the
defendant honestly and without malice. The plea of fair comment does
not arise if the plea of justification is made good, nor can it arise
unless there is an imputation on a plaintiff. It is precisely where
the criticism would otherwise be actionable as a libel that the
defence of fair comment comes in. But the learned judge put aside that
defence, and told the jury that unless a justification was proved they
were bound to find a verdict for the plaintiff, and that, unless
justified, the libel is not fair comment and cannot come within the
region of fair comment.” Lord Loreburn, L. C., in Dakhyl _v._
Labouchere, [1908] 2 K. B. 325, 326–27.
Footnote 518:
The arguments are omitted.
Footnote 519:
The statement has been abridged, and the arguments of counsel together
with a small portion of the judgment are omitted.
Footnote 520:
Merivale _v._ Carson, _supra_, 775; McQuire _v._ Western Co., [1903] 2
K. B. 100, 110; Joynt _v._ Cycle Co., [1904] 2 K. B. 292; Digby _v._
Financial News, [1907] 1 K. B. 502; Hunt _v._ Star Co., [1908] 2 K. B.
309, 317; Walker _v._ Hodgson, [1909] 1 K. B. 239; Starks _v._ Comer,
190 Ala. 245; Com. _v._ Pratt, 208 Mass. 553; Williams _v._ Hicks
Printing Co., 159 Wis. 90; Putnam _v._ Browne, 162 Wis. 524 _Accord_.
In Walker _v._ Hodgson, Kennedy, L. J., said, p. 256: “Now it is true
that there may be comment of an injurious nature in which there is no
statement of facts, or which refers to facts which are admitted or are
indisputable. In such a case the fairness of the comment depends upon
the character of the criticisms, or the inferences of which it is
composed, that is, whether it is a comment made honestly and _bona
fide_, or a comment made _mala fide_ and maliciously.... But where the
words which are alleged to be defamatory allege, or assume as true,
facts concerning the plaintiff which the plaintiff denies, and which
either involve a slanderous imputation in themselves, or upon which
the comment bases imputations or inferences injurious to the
plaintiff, it is, I think, settled law that the defence of fair
comment fails, unless the comment is truthful in regard to its
allegation or assumption of such facts.” See also the remarks of
Buckley, L. J., in the same case, p. 253.
In Hubbard _v._ Allyn, 200 Mass. 167, Rugg, J., said (p. 170): “The
right of the defendant was not to make false statements of fact
because the subject matter was of public interest, but only to
criticise, discuss and comment upon the real acts of the plaintiff and
the consequences likely to follow from them, or upon any other aspect
of the case in a reasonable way. This may be done with severity.
Ridicule, sarcasm and invective may be employed. But the basis must be
a fact, and not a falsehood.”
Nor does it cover violent attacks and insulting statements. Press Pub.
Co. _v._ Gillette, (C. C. A.) 229 Fed. 108; Jozsa _v._ Moroney, 125
La. 813; Hines _v._ Shumaker, 97 Miss. 669; Patten _v._ Harpers Weekly
Corp., 158 N. Y. Supp. 70; Hayden _v._ Hasbrouck, 34 R. I. 556;
Spencer _v._ Looney, 116 Va. 767; Williams _v._ Hicks Printing Co.,
159 Wis. 90; Putnam _v._ Browne, 162 Wis. 524; Compare Dickson _v._
Lights, (Tex. Civ. App.) 170 S. W. 834. And see Phillips _v._
Bradshaw, 167 Ala. 199.
Footnote 521:
Robinson _v._ Coulter, 215 Mass. 566; Tawney _v._ Simonson, 109 Minn.
341 _Accord_.
The burden is on the plaintiff to show malice, not on the defendant to
show good faith. Jenoure _v._ Delmege, [1891] A. C. 73; Davis _v._
Hearst, 160 Cal. 143; Locke _v._ Bradstreet Co., 22 Fed. 771; Hemmens
_v._ Nelson, 138 N. Y. 517; Haft _v._ Newcastle Bank, 19 App. Div.
423; Strode _v._ Clement, 90 Va. 553.
_Definitions of “malice.”_ Doane _v._ Grew, 220 Mass. 171; Peake _v._
Taubman, 251 Mo. 390. See Marney _v._ Joseph, 94 Kan. 18.
“If proof of a malevolent motive would rebut the privilege, which we
do not decide, nothing less than that would do, so far as malice is
concerned. It is true, as is said in the very careful brief for the
plaintiff, that in most connections malice means only knowledge of
facts sufficient to show that the contemplated act is very likely to
have injurious consequences. Apart from statute it generally means no
more when the question is what is sufficient _prima facie_ to charge a
defendant. Burt _v._ Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 245. But
sometimes the defence is not that the damage was not to be foreseen,
but rests on what in substance is a privilege, whether of a kind
usually pleaded as such or not, that is to say, on a right to inflict
the damage even knowingly. In such cases, if malice in any sense makes
a difference, as distinguished from excess over what was reasonable or
needful to do or say under the circumstances, which often is included
under the same word, Gott _v._ Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235, 239, it means
that the defendant is not within the privilege because he was not
acting in _bona fide_ answer to the needs of the occasion, but outside
of it from a wish to do harm. See Wren _v._ Weild, L. R. 4 Q. B. 730,
735, 736; Clark _v._ Molyneux, 3 Q. B. D. 237, 246, 247.” Holmes, C.
J., in Squires _v._ Wason Mfg. Co., 182 Mass. 137, 141.
See Advertiser Co. _v._ Jones, 169 Ala. 196, 670; Davis _v._ Hearst,
160 Cal. 143.
_Reckless republication without inquiry._ Houston Chronicle Pub. Co.
_v._ Wegner, (Tex. Civ. App.) 182 S. W. 45.
_“Malice” on the face of publication._ Ashford _v._ Evening Star Co.,
41 App. D. C. 395; Dickson _v._ Lights, (Tex. Civ. App.) 170 S. W.
834.
Footnote 522:
16 C. B. N. S. 829, S. C.
Footnote 523:
Nevill _v._ Fine Arts Co., [1895] 2 Q. B. 156; Hollenbeck _v._
Ristine, 105 Ia. 488; Children _v._ Shinn, 168 Ia. 531; Atwill _v._
Mackintosh, 120 Mass. 177; Wagner _v._ Scott, 164 Mo. 289; McGaw _v._
Hamilton, 184 Pa. St. 108; Hellstern _v._ Katzer, 103 Wis. 391
_Accord_. Compare Davis _v._ New England Pub. Co., 203 Mass. 470;
Doane _v._ Grew, 220 Mass. 171.
Footnote 524:
Only the opinion of the court is given.
Footnote 525:
Parmiter _v._ Coupland, 6 M. & W. 105; Odger _v._ Mortimer, 28 L. T.
Rep. 472; Queen _v._ Carden, 5 Q. B. Div. 1, 8; Bryce _v._ Rusden, 2
T. L. R. 435; Duplany _v._ Davis, 3 T. L. R. 184; R. _v._ Flowers, 44
J. P. 377, _per_ Field, J.; LeFroy _v._ Burnside, L. R. 4 Ir. 556,
565, 566; Stewart _v._ McKinley, 11 Vict. L. R. 802; Browne _v._
McKinley, 12 Vict. L. R. 240; Smith _v._ Tribune Co., 4 Biss. 477;
McDonald _v._ Woodruff, 2 Dill. 244; Hallam _v._ Post Co., 55 Fed.
456, 59 Fed. 530; Parsons _v._ Age Herald Pub. Co., 181 Ala. 439;
Jarman _v._ Rea, 137 Cal. 339; Dauphiny _v._ Buhne, 153 Cal. 757; Star
Co. _v._ Donahoe, (Del.) 58 Atl. 513; Jones _v._ Townsend, 21 Fla.
431; Rearick _v._ Wilcox, 81 Ill. 77; Klos _v._ Zahorik, 113 Ia. 161;
Ott _v._ Murphy, 160 Ia. 730; Bearce _v._ Bass, 88 Me. 521; Negley
_v._ Farrow, 60 Md. 158; Commonwealth _v._ Clap, 4 Mass. 163, 169
(_semble_); Curtis _v._ Mussey, 6 Gray, 261; Burt _v._ Advertiser Co.,
154 Mass. 238 (compare Sillars _v._ Collier, 151 Mass. 50); Hubbard
_v._ Allyn, 200 Mass. 166; Foster _v._ Scripps, 39 Mich. 376; Bronson
_v._ Bruce, 59 Mich. 467; Bourreseau _v._ Detroit Co., 63 Mich. 425;
Wheaton _v._ Beecher, 66 Mich. 307; Belknap _v._ Ball, 83 Mich. 583;
Hay _v._ Reid, 85 Mich. 296; Smurthwaite _v._ News Co., 124 Mich. 377;
Aldrich _v._ Press Co., 9 Minn. 133 (but see, _contra_, Marks _v._
Baker, 28 Minn. 162); Smith _v._ Burrus, 106 Mo. 94; State _v._
Schmitt, 49 N. J. Law, 579; Lewis _v._ Few, 5 Johns. 1; Root _v._
King, 7 Cow. 613; Littlejohn _v._ Greeley, 13 Abb. Pr. 41; Hamilton
_v._ Eno, 81 N. Y. 116; Mattice _v._ Wilcox, 147 N. Y. 624; Hoey _v._
New York Times Co., 138 App. Div. 149; Ullrich _v._ N. Y. Co., 23
Misc. 168; Seely _v._ Blair, Wright, (Ohio) 358, 683; Post Co. _v._
Moloney, 50 Ohio St. 71; Upton _v._ Hume, 24 Or. 420; Barr _v._ Moore,
87 Pa. St. 385; Brewer _v._ Weakley, 2 Overt. 99; Banner Co. _v._
State, 16 Lea, 176; Democrat Co. _v._ Jones, 83 Tex. 302; Sweeney _v._
Baker, 13 W. Va. 158; Spiering _v._ Andrae, 45 Wis. 330; Eviston _v._
Cramer, 57 Wis. 570; Gagen _v._ Dawley, 162 Wis. 152; D. Ward _v._
Derrington, 14 S. Aust. L. R. 35; Haselgrove _v._ King, 14 S. Aust. L.
R. 192 _Accord_.
Mott _v._ Dawson, 46 Ia. 533; Bays _v._ Hunt, 60 Ia. 251 (but see
State _v._ Haskins, 109 Ia. 656, 658, and Morse _v._ Printing Co., 124
Ia. 707, 723); State _v._ Balch, 31 Kan. 465; Coleman _v._ McLennan,
78 Kan. 711; Marks _v._ Baker, 28 Minn. 162; State _v._ Burnham, 9 N.
H. 34; Neeb _v._ Hope, 111 Pa. St. 145; Briggs _v._ Garrett, 111 Pa.
St. 404; Press Co. _v._ Stewart, 119 Pa. St. 584; Jackson _v._
Pittsburgh Times, 152 Pa. St. 406; Ross _v._ Ward, 14 S. D. 240;
Boucher _v._ Clark Co., 14 S. D. 72 _Contra_.
See Palmer _v._ Concord, 48 N. H. 211.
In Burt _v._ Advertiser Co., 154 Mass. 238, Holmes, J., said: “But
there is an important distinction to be noticed between the so-called
privilege of fair criticism upon matters of public interest, and the
privilege existing in the case, for instance, of answers to inquiries
about the character of a servant. In the latter case, a _bona fide_
statement not in excess of the occasion is privileged, although it
turns out to be false. In the former, what is privileged, if that is
the proper term, is criticism, not statement, and however it might be
if a person merely quoted or referred to a statement as made by
others, and gave it no new sanction, if he takes upon himself in his
own person to allege facts otherwise libellous, he will not be
privileged if those facts are not true. The reason for the distinction
lies in the different nature and degree of the exigency and of the
damage in the two cases. In these, as in many other instances, the law
has to draw a line between conflicting interests, both intrinsically
meritorious. When private inquiries are made about a private person, a
servant, for example, it is often impossible to answer them properly
without stating facts, and those who settled the law thought it more
important to preserve a reasonable freedom in giving necessary
information than to insure people against occasional unintended
injustice, confined as it generally is to one or two persons. But what
the interest of private citizens in public matters requires is freedom
of discussion rather than of statement. Moreover, the statements about
such matters which come before the courts are generally public
statements, where the harm done by a falsehood is much greater than in
the other case. If one private citizen wrote to another that a high
official had taken a bribe, no one would think good faith a sufficient
answer to an action. He stands no better, certainly, when he publishes
his writing to the world through a newspaper, and the newspaper itself
stands no better than the writer. Sheckell _v._ Jackson, 10 Cush. 25,
26.”
_Participants in legal proceedings_ are legitimate subjects for
comment if restricted to their conduct therein. Rex _v._ White, 1
Camp. 359; Seymour _v._ Butterworth, 3 F. & F. 372; Hedley _v._
Barlow, 4 F. & F. 224; Woodgate _v._ Ridout, 4 F. & F. 202; Hibbins
_v._ Lee, 4 F. & F. 243; Risk Allah Bey _v._ Whitehurst, 18 L. T. Rep.
615; Reg. _v._ Sullivan, 11 Cox C. C. 44, 57; Kane _v._ Mulvany, Ir.
R. 2 C. L. 402; Miner _v._ Detroit Co., 49 Mich. 358. See also Kelly
_v._ Tinling, L. R. 1 Q. B. 699 (churchwarden); Harle _v._ Catherall,
14 L. T. Rep. 801 (waywarden).
_Matters not of public interest._ The right of comment was denied in
Latimer _v._ Western Co., 25 L. T. Rep. 44; Hogan _v._ Sutton, 16 W.
R. 127; Wilson _v._ Fitch, 41 Cal. 363.
See also Hearne _v._ Stowell, 12 A. & E. 719; Gathercole _v._ Miall,
15 M. & W. 319; Walker _v._ Brogden, 19 C. B. N. S. 65; Booth _v._
Briscoe, 2 Q. B. Div. 496.
Footnote 526:
Arguments omitted.
Footnote 527:
The decision of the Appellate Division, overruling demurrer to
complaint, is reported in 64 App. Div. 30.
Footnote 528:
Corelli _v._ Wall, 22 Times L. R. 532 (post cards depicting imaginary
incidents of an author’s life); Atkinson _v._ Doherty, 121 Mich. 372
(picture of plaintiff’s dead husband on cigar label); Henry _v._
Cherry, 30 R. I. 13 (picture as advertisement); Hillman _v._ Star Pub.
Co., 64 Wash. 691 (picture of plaintiff in connection with report of
arrest of her father for crime) _Accord_. Compare Chappell _v._
Stewart, 82 Md. 323 (shadowing).
Corliss _v._ Walker, 57 Fed. 434 (_semble_); Von Theodorovich _v._
Josef Beneficiary Ass’n, 154 Fed. 911 (_semble_); Pavesich _v._ New
England Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190 (picture as advertisement);
Foster-Milburn Co. _v._ Chinn, 134 Ky. 424 (picture as advertisement);
Douglas _v._ Stokes, 149 Ky. 506 (publishing photograph of deceased
deformed child of plaintiff); Itzkovitch _v._ Whitaker, 115 La. 479,
117 La. 708 (photograph in rogues’ gallery); Schulman _v._ Whitaker,
117 La. 704; Munden _v._ Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652 (picture as
advertisement); Edison _v._ Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq.
136 (picture—but here there was chiefly an interest of substance)
_Contra_.
See also Dill, J. in Vanderbilt _v._ Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 919.
As to photographing persons arrested on charges of crime, see Hodgman
_v._ Olsen, 86 Wash. 615.
NEW YORK, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, §§ 50, 51 (Laws of 1903, ch. 132, §§ 1,
2).
§ 50. A person, firm, or corporation that uses for advertising
purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait, or picture
of any living person without having first obtained the written consent
of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
§ 51. Any person whose name, portrait, or picture is used within this
state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without
the written consent first obtained as above provided may maintain an
equitable action in the supreme court of this state against the
person, firm, or corporation so using his name, portrait, or picture,
to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover
damages for any injuries maintained by reason of such use, and if the
defendant shall have knowingly used such person’s name, portrait, or
picture in such manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by
this act, the jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary damages.
See Binns _v._ Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51.
On the whole subject, see Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
Harvard Law Rev. 193; Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 Harvard Law
Rev. 343, 362–364.
Footnote 529:
4 Rep. 16 _b_, S. C.
Footnote 530:
Dame Morrison’s Case, Jenk. 316; Matthew _v._ Crasse, 2 Bulst. 89;
Sell _v._ Facy, 2 Bulst. 276, 3 Bulst. 48; Nelson _v._ Staff, Cro.
Jac. 422; Thomson’s Case, Bendl. 148; Countess of Salop’s Case, Bendl.
155; Taylor _v._ Tolwin, Latch, 218; Wicks _v._ Shepherd, Cro. Car.
155; Southold _v._ Daunston, Cro. Car. 269 _Accord_.
See Bridge _v._ Langton, Litt. 193; Norman _v._ Simons, 1 Vin. Abr.
Act. Words, D, _a_, 12.
In Felty _v._ Felty, 164 Ky. 355, plaintiff’s husband left her as a
result of the defamatory words.
Footnote 531:
The arguments of counsel are omitted, together with the concurring
opinions of Martin, Bramwell, and Wilde, BB.
Footnote 532:
Guy _v._ Gregory, 9 Car. & P. 584; Adams _v._ Smith, 58 Ill. 417;
Woodbury _v._ Thompson, 3 N. H. 194; Butler _v._ Hoboken Co., 73 N. J.
Law, 45; Beach _v._ Ranney, 2 Hill, 309; Terwilliger _v._ Wands, 17 N.
Y. 54 (overruling Bradt _v._ Towsley, 13 Wend. 253; Olmsted _v._
Brown, 12 Barb. 657; Fuller _v._ Fenner, 16 Barb. 333); Wilson _v._
Goit, 17 N. Y. 442; Bassell _v._ Elmore, 48 N. Y. 561; Shepherd _v._
Lamphier, 84 Misc. 498; Clark _v._ Morrison, 80 Or. 240 _Accord_. But
see Garrison _v._ Sun Publishing Ass’n, 207 N. Y. 1 (defendant
published a libel on plaintiff’s wife resulting in illness and loss of
her services).
McQueen _v._ Fulgham, 27 Tex. 463; Underhill _v._ Welton, 32 Vt. 40
_Contra_.
_Damage caused by another person’s repetition of the defendant’s
words_ is too remote. Holwood _v._ Hopkins, Cro. El. 787; Ward _v._
Weeks, 7 Bing. 211 (but see Riding _v._ Smith, 1 Ex. D. 91);
Rutherford _v._ Evans, 4 Car. & P. 74; Tunnicliff _v._ Moss, 3 Car. &
K. 83; Kendillon _v._ Maltby, 1 Car. & M. 402; Parkins _v._ Scott, 1
H. & C. 153; Dixon _v._ Smith, 5 H. & N. 450; Clarke _v._ Morgan, 38
L. T. Rep. 354; Bree _v._ Marescaux, 7 Q. B. Div. 434; Cates _v._
Kellogg, 9 Ind. 506; Stevens _v._ Hartwell, 11 Met. 542; Hastings _v._
Stetson, 126 Mass. 329; Hastings _v._ Palmer, 20 Wend. 225; Hallock
_v._ Miller, 2 Barb. 630; Olmsted _v._ Brown, 12 Barb. 657;
Terwilliger _v._ Wands, 17 N. Y. 54; Fowles _v._ Bowen, 30 N. Y. 20;
Bassell _v._ Elmore, 48 N. Y. 561 (but see Sewell _v._ Catlin, 3 Wend.
295; Keenholts _v._ Becker, 3 Den. 346).
See also Whitney _v._ Moignard, 24 Q. B. Div. 630; Speight _v._
Gosnay, 60 L. J. Q. B. 231; Adams _v._ Cameron, 27 Cal. App. 625;
Mills _v._ Flynn, 157 Ia. 477; Fitzgerald _v._ Young, 89 Neb. 693.
The rule is otherwise where the repetition is made as a privileged
communication. Gillett _v._ Bullivant, 7 L. T. 490; Derry _v._
Handley, 16 L. T. Rep. 263; Fowles _v._ Bowen, 30 N. Y. 20.
Footnote 533:
Only the opinion of the court is given.
Footnote 534:
The case is materially abridged.
Footnote 535:
The statement of the counts is abridged, and the arguments of counsel
are omitted.
Footnote 536:
But see now Paterson _v._ Welch, (Court of Sess. May 31, 1893) 20 R.
744. See also Odgers, Lib. & Sl. (1st ed.) 87, 91; Odgers, Outlines of
Law of Libel, 17, 18; Clerk & Lindsell, Torts, (1st ed.) 497–98;
Salmond, Torts, 426–27; Bower’s Code of Actionable Defamation, 338–39,
443–45.
Footnote 537:
“It may be reasonable to allow St. Peter a primacy of order, such a
one as the ringleader hath in a dance.”—Barrow’s Treatise of the
Pope’s Supremacy, Oxford edition of Works, 1830, vol. vii. p. 70. In
Fox’s Preface to Tyndall’s Works, “these three learned fathers of
blessed memory, William Tyndall, John Frith, and Robert Barons,” are
styled “chief ringleaders in these latter tymes of thys Church of
England.”—Reporter’s Note.
Footnote 538:
Only the opinion of Day, J., is given. Wills, J., concurred.
Footnote 539:
_Slander of title._ Mildmay’s Case, 1 Rep. 175; Marvin _v._ Maynard,
Cro. El. 419; Pennyman _v._ Rabanks, Cro. Eliz. 427; Newman _v._
Zachary, Al. 3; Rowe _v._ Roach, 1 M. & S. 304; Bignell _v._ Buzzard,
3 H. & N. 217; Webb _v._ Cecil, 9 B. Mon. 198; Ross _v._ Pynes, Wythe,
71, 3 Call, 490.
In Rowe _v._ Roach, _supra_, Lord Ellenborough said, p. 310: “The law
makes no allowance for the slander of strangers, whatever it may do in
behalf of those who have a real title, or a claim of title. _Rei
immiscet se alienæ_ is the good sense which must govern this case.
Here the defendant is a stranger himself, and shows no authority from
those who are parties in interest.”
Where defendant has some interest, it is enough if he actually
believes what he says against plaintiff’s title.
Gerard _v._ Dickenson, 4 Rep. 18 a, Cro. El. 196; Lovett _v._ Weller,
1 Rolle R. 409; Anon., Sty. 414; Pitt _v._ Donovan, 1 M. & S. 639;
Smith _v._ Spooner, 3 Taunt. 246; Green _v._ Button, 2 C. M. & R. 707;
Pater _v._ Baker, 3 C. B. 831; Watson _v._ Reynolds, M. & M. 1; Carr
_v._ Duckett, 5 H. & N. 783; Atkins _v._ Perrin, 3 F. & F. 179; Brook
_v._ Rawl, 4 Ex. 521; Burnett _v._ Tak, 45 L. T. Rep. 743; Steward
_v._ Young, L. R. 5 C. P. 122; Wren _v._ Weild, L. R. 4 Q. B. 730;
Hart _v._ Wall, 2 C. P. D. 146 (_semble_); Baker _v._ Piper, 2 T. L.
R. 733; Dicks _v._ Brooks, 15 Ch. D. 22; Halsey _v._ Brotherhood, 19
Ch. D. 386; Royal Co. _v._ Wright, 18 Pat. Cas. Rep. 95; Dunlop Co.
_v._ Talbot, 20 T. L. R. 579; Boulton _v._ Shields, 3 Up. Can. Q. B.
21; Hill _v._ Ward, 13 Ala. 310; McDaniel _v._ Baca, 2 Cal. 326;
Thompson _v._ White, 70 Cal. 135; Reid _v._ McLendon, 44 Ga. 156; Van
Tuyl _v._ Riner, 3 Ill. App. 556; Stark _v._ Chitwood, 5 Kan. 141;
Gent _v._ Lynch, 23 Md. 58; Swan _v._ Tappan, 5 Cush. 104; Walkley
_v._ Bostwick, 49 Mich. 374; Chesebro _v._ Powers, 78 Mich. 472;
Meyrose _v._ Adams, 12 Mo. App. 329; Butts _v._ Long, 106 Mo. App.
313; Andrew _v._ Deshler, 45 N. J. Law, 167; Kendall _v._ Stone, 5 N.
Y. 14; Like _v._ McKinstry, 4 Keyes, 397, 3 Abb. App. 62, 41 Barb.
186; Hovey _v._ Rubber Co., 57 N. Y. 119; Dodge _v._ Colby, 37 Hun,
515, 108 N. Y. 445; Lovell Co. _v._ Houghton, 116 N. Y. 520; Hastings
_v._ Giles Co., 51 Hun, 364, 121 N. Y. 674; Cornwell _v._ Parke, 52
Hun, 596, 123 N. Y. 657; McElwee _v._ Blackwell, 94 N. C. 261; Harriss
_v._ Sneeden, 101 N. C. 273.
Compare Virtue _v._ Creamery Mfg. Co., 123 Minn. 17.
As to the requirement of “malice,” see Coffman _v._ Henderson, 9 Ala.
App. 553; Fearon _v._ Fodera, 169 Cal. 370; Long _v._ Rucker, 166 Mo.
App. 572; Potosi Zinc Co. _v._ Mahoney, 36 Nev. 390; Fant _v._
Sullivan, (Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. 515.
See Smith, Disparagement of Property, 13 Columbia Law Rev. 13, 121.
Footnote 540:
Only the opinion of the court is given.
Footnote 541:
Tasburgh _v._ Day, Cro. Jac. 484; Gresham _v._ Grinsley, Yelv. 88;
Sneade _v._ Badley, 3 Bulst. 74, 1 Roll. 244; Law _v._ Harwood, Cro.
Car. 140, W. Jones, 196; Cane _v._ Golding, Sty. 169, 176; Manning
_v._ Avery, 3 Keb. 153; Haddan _v._ Lott, 15 C. B. 411; Evans _v._
Harlow, 5 Q. B. 624; Ashford _v._ Choate, 20 Up. Can; C. P. 471;
Collins _v._ Whitehead, 34 Fed. 121; Ebersole _v._ Fields, 181 Ala.
421; Stark _v._ Chitwood, 5 Kan. 141; Continental Co. _v._ Little, 135
Ky. 618; Swan _v._ Tappan, 5 Cush. 104; Gott _v._ Pulsifer, 122 Mass.
235; Dooling _v._ Budget Co., 144 Mass. 258; Boynton _v._ Shaw Co.,
146 Mass. 219; Wilson _v._ Dubois, 35 Minn. 471; Tobias _v._ Harland,
4 Wend. 537; Madison Church _v._ Madison Church, 26 How. Pr. 72;
Linden _v._ Graham, 1 Duer, 670; Bailey _v._ Dean, 5 Barb. 297;
Kendall _v._ Stone, 5 N. Y. 14; Kennedy _v._ Press Co., 41 Hun, 422;
Childs _v._ Tuttle, 48 Hun, 228; Maglio _v._ N. Y. Co., 93 App. Div.
546; Felt _v._ Germania Life Ins. Co., 149 App. Div. 14; Witteman
Bros. _v._ Witteman Co., 88 Misc. 266; McGuinness _v._ Hargiss, 56
Wash. 162 _Accord_.
Compare Fleming _v._ McDonald, 230 Pa. St. 75.
The breach of a contract by a third person is special damage. Green
_v._ Button, 2 C. M. & R. 707. But see _contra_, Kendall _v._ Stone, 5
N. Y. 14; Brentman _v._ Note, 3 N. Y. Sup. 420 (N. Y. City Court).
Footnote 542:
The arguments and the concurring opinions of Lords Watson, Macnaghten,
Morris, and Shand are omitted.
Footnote 543:
_Disparagement of goods._ In the case cited it was held actionable to
say falsely that plaintiffs’ manure was inferior to defendants’ if
done without legal excuse. Young _v._ Macrae, 3 B. & S. 264; Alcott
_v._ Millar, 21 T. L. R. 30; Dooling _v._ Budget Co., 144 Mass. 258
(_semble_); Boynton _v._ Shaw Co., 146 Mass. 219; Wilson _v._ Dubois,
35 Minn. 471; Wier _v._ Allen, 51 N. H. 177; Snow _v._ Judson, 38
Barb. 210; Kennedy _v._ Press Co., 41 Hun, 422 (_semble_); Paull _v._
Halferty, 63 Pa. St. 46; Young _v._ Geiske, 209 Pa. St. 515 _Accord_.
Footnote 544:
Lyne _v._ Nicholls, 23 T. L. R. 86; Barrett _v._ Associated
Newspapers, 23 T. L. R. 666; Burkett _v._ Griffith, 90 Cal. 532
_Accord_.
Compare Marlin Fire Arms Co. _v._ Shields, 171 N. Y. 384.
Footnote 545:
Prestolite Co. _v._ Heiden, (C. C. A.) 219 Fed. 845; Zittlosen Mfg.
Co. _v._ Boss, (C. C. A.) 219 Fed. 887; Coca-Cola Co. _v._ Butler, 229
Fed. 224; Hartzler _v._ Goshen Ladder Co., 55 Ind. App. 455; National
Biscuit Co. _v._ Pacific Coast Biscuit Co., 83 N. J. Eq. 369; Sanford
Iron Works _v._ Enterprise Machine Works, 130 Tenn. 669; Pacific Coast
Milk Co. _v._ Frye, 85 Wash. 133 _Accord_. In March _v._ Billings, 7
Cush. 322, under similar circumstances, the plaintiff recovered in an
action at law.
See also Coffin, Fraud as an Element of Unfair Competition, 16 Harvard
Law Rev. 272; Wyman, Competition and the Law, 15 Harvard Law Rev. 427;
Cox, The Prevention of Unfair Competition in Business, 5 Harvard Law
Rev. 139; Cushing, On Certain Cases Analogous to Trade Marks, 4
Harvard Law Rev. 321.
_Misleading similarity._ Hanover Milling Co. _v._ Metcalf, 240 U. S.
403; McDonald Mfg. Co. _v._ Mueller Mfg. Co., 183 Fed. 972; British
American Tobacco Co. _v._ British American Cigar Stores Co., (C. C.
A.) 211 Fed. 933; Hiram Walker & Sons _v._ Grubman, 224 Fed. 725;
Jenkins _v._ Kelly & Jones Co., (C. C. A.) 227 Fed. 211; Jacoway _v._
Young, (C. C. A.) 228 Fed. 630; Van Zile _v._ Norub Mfg. Co., 228 Fed.
829; Moline Plow Co. _v._ Omaha Stores Co., (C. C. A.) 235 Fed. 519;
Boston Shoe Shop _v._ McBroom Shoe Shop, 196 Ala. 262; Italian Swiss
Colony _v._ Italian Vineyard Co., 158 Cal. 252; Dunston _v._ Los
Angeles Van & Storage Co., 165 Cal. 89; Modesto Creamery _v._
Stanislaus Creamery Co., 168 Cal. 289; Motor Accessories Co. _v._
Marshalltown Mfg. Co., 167 Ia. 202; Bonnie & Co. _v._ Bonnie Bros.,
160 Ky. 487; Crutcher _v._ Starks, 161 Ky. 690; George G. Fox Co. _v._
Best Baking Co., 209 Mass. 251; C. A. Briggs & Co. _v._ National Wafer
Co., 215 Mass. 100; Grocers’ Supply Co. _v._ Dupuis, 219 Mass. 576;
Rodseth _v._ Northwestern Marble Works, 129 Minn. 472; Rubber &
Celluloid Co. _v._ Rubber Bound Brush Co., 81 N. J. Eq. 419, 519;
Westcott Chuck Co. _v._ Oneida Chuck Co., 199 N. Y. 247; World’s
Dispensary Ass’n _v._ Pierce, 203 N. Y. 419; Material Men’s Ass’n _v._
New York Material Men’s Ass’n, 169 App. Div. 843; German American
Button Co. _v._ Heymsfeld, 170 App. Div. 416; Collier _v._ Jones, 66
Misc. 97; Frohman _v._ William Morris, 68 Misc. 461; Elbs _v._
Rochester Egg Carrier Co., 134 N. Y. Supp. 979; Columbia Engineering
Works _v._ Mallory, 75 Or. 542; Rosenburg _v._ Fremont Undertaking
Co., 63 Wash. 52; J. I. Case Plow Works _v._ J. I. Case Machine Co.,
162 Wis. 185.
_Use of one’s own name_, see L. E. Waterman Co. _v._ Modern Pen Co.,
235 U. S. 88; Borden Ice Cream Co. _v._ Borden’s Consolidated Milk
Co., (C. C. A.) 201 Fed. 510; Deister Concentrator Co. _v._ Deister
Machine Co., 63 Ind. App. 412; C. H. Batchelder Co. _v._ Batchelder,
220 Mass. 42; Zagier _v._ Zagier, 167 N. C. 616.
_Where defendant passes off his product as plaintiff’s_, recovery is
allowed without proof of actual damage. Blofeld _v._ Payne, 4 B. & A.
410; Singleton _v._ Bolton, 3 Doug. 293 (_semble_); Sykes _v._ Sykes,
3 B. & C. 541; Morison _v._ Salmon, 2 M. & G. 385; Crawshay _v._
Thompson, 4 M. & G. 357 (_semble_); Rodgers _v._ Nowill, 5 C. B. 109;
Forster Co. _v._ Cutter Co., 211 Mass. 219. Compare Glendon Co. _v._
Uhler, 75 Pa. St. 467.
Footnote 546:
The learned judge here discussed McDonald _v._ Snelling, 14 All. 290,
and Rigby _v._ Hewitt, 5 Ex. 240, and cited 2 Pars. Cont. 456; Dixon
_v._ Fawcus, 30 L. J. Q. B. 137; Tarleton _v._ McGawley, Peake, 270;
Bell _v._ Midland Co., 10 C. B. N. S. 307 Keeble _v._ Hickeringill, 11
East, 574, _n._
Footnote 547:
Defendant put out an envelope, with the word “telegram” conspicuously
printed thereon, similar to that used by plaintiff, a telegraph
company, to be used for advertising circulars. Plaintiff claimed that
it tended to make its patrons think plaintiff was imposing on them by
allowing advertisers to use its facilities in order to gain their
attention and so injured its business. An injunction was denied.
Postal Telegraph Co. _v._ Livermore & Knight Co., 188 Fed. 696.
In Riding _v._ Smith, 1 Ex. D. 91, plaintiff sued for injury to his
business due to defendant’s charging his wife with adultery, by reason
whereof customers ceased to deal with him.
In Hamon _v._ Falle, 4 App. Cas. 247, an officer of an insurance
company notified a shipowner that the company would not insure the
ship if plaintiff was employed as master. Defendant set up that he
honestly believed plaintiff unfit. See also Bowen _v._ Matheson, 14
All. 499.
In Morasse _v._ Brochu, 151 Mass. 567, defendant in a sermon warned
his congregation against a physician who had been excommunicated for
remarrying after divorce.
Footnote 548:
Only the opinion of the court is given.
Footnote 549:
The opinion of the court on this point is omitted. The defendant’s
contention was not sustained.
Footnote 550:
Only the opinion is given.
Footnote 551:
“It is contended that the amount of the plaintiff’s loss is so
entirely a matter of pure chance as to be incapable of assessment. I
cannot for this purpose draw any distinction between a chance and a
probability. In the Oxford English Dictionary one of the definitions
of ‘chance’ is ‘a possibility or probability of anything happening, as
distinct from a certainty,’ and a citation is given from Reid’s
Intellectual Powers, ‘The doctrine of chances is a branch of
mathematics little more than an hundred years old.’ The two words
‘chance’ and ‘probability’ may be treated as being practically
interchangeable, though it may be that the one is somewhat less
definite than the other.... It is obvious, of course, that the chance
or probability may in a given case be so slender that a jury could not
properly give more than nominal damages, say one shilling; if they had
done so in the present case, it would have been entirely a question
for them, and this Court could not have interfered. But in the present
competition we find chance upon chance, two of which the plaintiff had
succeeded in passing. From being one of six thousand she had become a
member of a class of fifty, and, as I understand it, was first in her
particular division by the votes of readers of the paper; out of those
fifty there were to be selected twelve prize-winners; it is obvious
that her chances were then far greater and more easily assessable than
when she was only one of the original six thousand. If the plaintiff
had never been selected at all, the case would have been very
different; but that was not the case. In my opinion the existence of a
contingency, which is dependent on the volition of a third person, is
not enough to justify us in saying that the damages are incapable of
assessment.” Farwell, L. J., in Chaplin _v._ Hicks, [1911] 2 K. B.
786, 798.
Footnote 552:
Adler _v._ Fenton, 24 How. 407; Findlay _v._ McAllister, 113 U. S. 104
(_semble_); Austin _v._ Barrows, 41 Conn. 287; Green _v._ Kimble, 6
Blackf. 552; Moody _v._ Burton, 27 Me. 427; Lamb _v._ Stone, 11 Pick.
527; Wellington _v._ Small, 3 Cush. 145; Security Bank _v._ Reger,
(Okl.) 151 Pac. 1170; LeGierse _v._ Kellum, 66 Tex. 242 _Accord_.
Penrod _v._ Mitchell, 8 S. & R. 522; Penrod _v._ Morrison, 2 Pen. & W.
126; Mott _v._ Danforth, 6 Watts, 305; Hopkins _v._ Beebe, 26 Pa. St.
85, 87; Kelsey _v._ Murphy, 26 Pa. St. 78, 84; Collins _v._ Cronin,
117 Pa. St. 35, 45 _Contra_. See note in 47 L. R. A. 433–440.
In Smith _v._ Tonstall, Carthew, 3, defendant was held liable for
conspiracy with plaintiff’s debtor on _scire facias_ to procure a
false judgment and anticipate plaintiff by execution thereon and
carrying off of all the debtor’s property. Findlay _v._ McAllister,
113 U. S. 104 (_semble_); Adams _v._ Paige, 7 Pick. 541 _Accord_. See
Pullen _v._ Headberg, 53 Col. 502.
Footnote 553:
Only the opinion is given, and it is somewhat abridged.
Footnote 554:
In Randall _v._ Hazelton, 12 All. 412, plaintiff, a mortgagor, had a
gratuitous promise from the mortgagee not to foreclose without notice.
In order to obtain the property, defendant falsely told the mortgagee
that plaintiff wished the mortgage assigned to defendant and obtained
an assignment and foreclosed without plaintiff’s knowledge.
Footnote 555:
Statement, and part of opinion, omitted.
Footnote 556:
In Rice _v._ Manley, 66 N. Y. 82, plaintiff had a contract with a
third person for a cheese. By means of a forged telegram defendant
procured the third person to sell to him instead. The contract was
within the Statute of Frauds, but it was found that the third person
would have performed but for defendant’s act.
Footnote 557:
The arguments of counsel are omitted.
Footnote 558:
See American Ins. Co. _v._ France, 111 Ill. App. 382; Davis _v._ New
England Pub. Co., 203 Mass. 470; Haney Mfg. Co. _v._ Perkins, 78 Mich.
1; Benton _v._ Pratt, 2 Wend. 385.
“[If, from the nature of the case, the amount of damage caused to a
plaintiff by the tort of a defendant cannot be estimated with
certainty, shall the defendant therefore be exonerated from
liability?] Certainty, it is true, would thus be attained, but it
would be the certainty of injustice.” Christiancy, J., in Allison _v._
Chandler, 11 Michigan, 542, 555. See also pp. 553–556.
Footnote 559:
Standard Oil Co. _v._ Doyle, 118 Ky. 662; Dickson _v._ Dickson, 33 La.
Ann. 1261 _Accord_.
_Threats of vexatious suits against customers_: Emack _v._ Kane, 34
Fed. 46; Lewin _v._ Welsbach Light Co., 81 Fed. 904; Farquhar Co. _v._
National Harrow Co., 99 Fed. 160; Adriance _v._ National Harrow Co.,
121 Fed. 827, 98 Fed. 118; Dittgen _v._ Racine Paper Goods Co., 164
Fed. 85; Electric Renovator Co. _v._ Vacuum Cleaner Co., 189 Fed. 754;
Atlas Underwear Co. _v._ Cooper Underwear Co., 210 Fed. 347; Shoemaker
_v._ South Bend Spark Arrester Co., 135 Ind. 471; Pratt Food Co. _v._
Bird, 148 Mich. 631.
Footnote 560:
St. Johnsbury Co. _v._ Hunt, 55 Vt. 570 (arrest of plaintiff’s
engineer on a malicious and baseless charge, whereby the running of
plaintiff’s train was delayed) _Accord_.
Footnote 561:
Gunter _v._ Astor, 4 Moore, 12; Hartley _v._ Cummings, 5 C. B. 247;
Jones _v._ Blocker, 43 Ga. 331; Wharton _v._ Jossey, 46 Ga. 578; Lee
_v._ West, 47 Ga. 311 (_semble_); Smith _v._ Goodman, 75 Ga. 198;
Bundy _v._ Dodson, 28 Ind. 295; Jones _v._ Tevis, 4 Litt. 25; Tyson
_v._ Ewing, 3 J. J. Marsh, 185; Carew _v._ Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1;
Bixby _v._ Dunlap, 56 N. H. 456; Stille _v._ Jenkins, 3 Green, (N. J.)
302; Scidmore _v._ Smith, 13 John. 322; Covert _v._ Gray, 34 How. Pr.
450; Johnston Co. _v._ Meinhardt, 9 Abb. N. C. 393; Stout _v._ Woody,
63 N. C. 37; Haskins _v._ Royster, 70 N. C. 601; Robinson _v._ Culp, 3
Brev. 302; Daniel _v._ Swearengen, 6 S. C. 297; Fowler _v._ Stonum, 6
Tex. 60; Thacker Co. _v._ Burke, 59 W. Va. 253; Cowper _v._
Macfarlane, 6 Sess. Cas., 4th Series, 683 _Accord_.
See, also, Martinez _v._ Gerber, 3 M. & G. 88.
An action will lie against one who induces a servant to violate his
duty not to communicate the trade secrets of his employer. Jones _v._
Westervelt, 7 Cow. 445; Kerr _v._ Roxburgh, 3 Murr. (Scotland) 126;
Roxburgh _v._ McArthur, 3 Sess. Cas., 2d Series, 556.
Footnote 562:
In Blake _v._ Lanyon, 6 T. R. 221, a journeyman, while his work was
unfinished, left plaintiff and hired with defendant, who then did not
know the facts. Defendant was held liable for retaining the journeyman
after notice. Fawcet _v._ Beavres, 2 Lev. 63; Pilkington _v._ Scott,
15 M. & W. 657; Kennedy _v._ McArthur, 5 Ala. 151; Dacy _v._ Gay, 16
Ga. 203; Everett _v._ Sherfey, 1 Ia. 356; Stowe _v._ Heywood, 7 All.
118; Sargent _v._ Mathewson, 38 N. H. 54; Dickson _v._ Taylor, 1 Murr.
(Scotland) 141 _Accord_. Adams _v._ Bafeald, 1 Leon. 240; Caldwell
_v._ O’Neal, 117 Ga. 775 (if contract is oral only) _Contra_.
It was said also that there was no liability for the hiring of
plaintiff’s journeyman without notice of the facts. Eades _v._
Vandeput, 5 East, 39 n. (_a_); Sherwood _v._ Hall, 3 Sumn. 127;
Ferguson _v._ Tucker, 2 Har. & G. 182; Butterfield _v._ Ashley, 6
Cush. 249; Sargent _v._ Mathewson, 38 N. H. 54; Clark _v._ Clark, 63
N. J. Law, 1; Stuart _v._ Simpson, 1 Wend. 376; Caughey _v._ Smith, 47
N. Y. 244; Bell _v._ Lakin, 1 McMull. 364; Conant _v._ Raymond, 2 Aik.
243 _Accord_.
Footnote 563:
The arguments of counsel are omitted.
Footnote 564:
“The rule which governs the numerous cases upon this subject is, that
where the proximate effect of the criminal connection is an incapacity
to labor, by reason of which the master loses the services of his
servant, such loss of service is deemed to be the immediate effect of
the connection, and entitles the master to his action. The same
principle which gives a master an action where the connection causes
pregnancy or sexual disease applies to all cases where the proximate
consequence of the criminal act is a loss of health resulting in a
loss of service. There may be cases in which the seduction, without
producing pregnancy or sexual disease, causes bodily injury, impairing
the health of the servant, and resulting in a loss of services to her
master. So the criminal connection may be accomplished under such
circumstances, as, for instance, of violence or fraud, that its
proximate effect is mental distress or disease, impairing her health
and destroying her capacity to labor. In either of these cases the
master may maintain an action, because the loss of services is
immediately caused by the connection, as much as in cases of pregnancy
or sexual disease. Vanhorn _v._ Freeman, 1 Halst. 322. But if the loss
of health is caused by mental suffering, which is not the consequence
of the seduction, but is produced by subsequent intervening causes,
such as abandonment by the seducer, shame resulting from exposure, or
other similar causes, the loss of services is too remote a consequence
of the criminal act, and the action cannot be maintained. Boyle _v._
Brandon, 13 M. & W. 738; Knight _v._ Wilcox, 14 N. Y. 413.
“In the case at bar, as the ruling appears to have been general that
the action could not be maintained unless pregnancy or sexual disease
was proved, we think a new trial should be granted.” Morton, J., in
Abrahams _v._ Kidney, 104 Mass. 222. See to the same effect Blagge
_v._ Ilsley, 127 Mass. 191; Clark _v._ Clark, 63 N. J. Law, 1; White
_v._ Nellis, 31 N. Y. 405; Ingerson _v._ Miller, 47 Barb. 47.
Footnote 565:
The father can maintain no action in such a case: Goodwin _v._
Thompson, 2 Greene, 329; Jones _v._ Tevis, 4 Litt. 25; Hervey _v._
Moseley, 7 Gray, 479; Beard _v._ Holland, 59 Miss. 161, 164; Wilkinson
_v._ Dellinger, 126 N. C. 462. Unless the daughter was induced to
marry the defendant by the latter’s fraud. Hills _v._ Hobert, 2 Root,
48; Goodwin _v._ Thompson, _supra_.
Footnote 566:
A part of the argument and the concurring opinion of Montague Smith,
J., with which Keating, J., agreed, are omitted.
Footnote 567:
Whether it is an excess of fair competition to induce a servant at
will to leave the plaintiff, and enter the service of the defendant,
cannot be said to be definitely settled. In Salter _v._ Howard, 43 Ga.
601, the plaintiff prevailed; but in Campbell _v._ Cooper, 34 N. H.
49, the defendant was successful. The other cases commonly cited for
the plaintiff are distinguishable. In Sykes _v._ Dixon, 9 A. & E. 693,
and Peters _v._ Lord, 18 Conn. 337, the servant had left the plaintiff
of his own head before entering the service of the defendant. In Keane
_v._ Boycott, 2 H. Bl. 512, the defendant, a recruiting officer,
officiously induced the servant to leave the plaintiff, in order to
enlist as a soldier. In Speight _v._ Oliviera, 2 Stark. 493; Morgan
_v._ Molony, 7 Ir. L. R. N. S. 101, 240; Ball _v._ Bruce, 21 Ill. 161;
and Noice _v._ Brown, 39 N. J. Law, 569, as in the principal case, the
enticement was for an immoral purpose. In Cox _v._ Muncey, 6 C. B. N.
S. 375, a father induced an apprentice at will to leave the master,
but the motive of the father does not appear.
“[Keane _v._ Boycott, 2 H. Bl. 512] seems contrary to the general
principle and is certainly opposed to the decision of the Court of
Appeals in DeFrancesco _v._ Barnum, 45 Ch. D. 430. The defendant there
had enticed away an apprentice of the plaintiff. But the indenture
contained unreasonable stipulations, and it was held that it might be
avoided by the apprentice, and that it was not unlawful for the
defendant to persuade the apprentice to do that which was lawful. It
is different, however, if malice, force or fraud be used to take or
decoy the servant away. In that case the master has a right of action,
even though the servant be under no binding obligation. Per _Willes_,
J., Evans _v._ Walton, L. R. 2 Com. PL., pp. 621–622.” Clerk and
Lindsell, Torts, 5 ed. 227.
To induce a servant who is under contract with the plaintiff to leave
the latter at the expiration of the term of service, and to enter the
defendant’s service, is no more than lawful competition. Nichol _v._
Martyn, 2 Esp. 732; Boston Manufactory _v._ Binney, 4 Pick. 425.
Footnote 568:
The statement of the case and the arguments of counsel are omitted.
Footnote 569:
The learned judge here discussed and approved of Blake _v._ Lanyon, 6
T. R. 221.
Footnote 570:
The rest of the opinion on this point is omitted.
Footnote 571:
See note (4) to Skinner _v._ Gunton, 1 Wms. Saund. 230.—Reporter’s
note.
Footnote 572:
Only the opinion of Coleridge, J., on this point is given. It is now
generally admitted that this learned judge, although wrong on this
point, was right in maintaining that the actress was not a servant.
Footnote 573:
William Hankford, Justice of the Common Pleas in 1398, afterwards, in
1414 (1 H. 5), Chief Justice of England.—Reporter’s note.
Footnote 574:
Cattle _v._ Stockton Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 453, 458 (_semble_); Angle
_v._ Chicago R. Co., 151 U. S. 1; Bitterman _v._ Louisville R. Co.,
207 U. S. 205, 222–23; Dr. Miles Medical Co. _v._ Park & Sons Co., 220
U. S. 373, 394 (_semble_); Heaton Co. _v._ Dick, 55 Fed. 23, 52 Fed.
667; Heath _v._ American Book Co., 97 Fed. 533; Tubular Co. _v._
Exeter Co., 159 Fed. 824; Motley _v._ Detroit Co., 161 Fed. 389;
Chipley _v._ Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206; Doremus _v._ Hennessy, 176 Ill.
608; Heywood _v._ Tillson, 75 Me. 225, 236 (_semble_); Knickerbocker
Ice Co. _v._ Gardiner Dairy Co., 107 Md. 556; Walker _v._ Cronin, 107
Mass. 555; Beekman _v._ Marsters, 195 Mass. 205; Joyce _v._ Great
Northern R. Co., 100 Minn. 225; Mealey _v._ Bemidji Lumber Co., 118
Minn. 427; Lally _v._ Cantwell, 30 Mo. App. 524; Van Horn _v._ Van
Horn, 52 N. J. Law, 284; Haskins _v._ Royster, 70 N. C. 601; Jones
_v._ Stanly, 76 N. C. 355; Flaccus _v._ Smith, 199 Pa. St. 128; Delz
_v._ Winfree, 80 Tex. 400, 405; Raymond _v._ Yarrington, 96 Tex. 443;
Brown Co. _v._ Indiana Stove Works, 96 Tex. 453; Duffies _v._ Duffies,
76 Wis. 374, 377 (_semble_); Martens _v._ Reilly, 109 Wis. 464; Hewitt
_v._ Ontario Co., 44 Up. Can. Q. B. 287 _Accord_.
Boyson _v._ Thorn, 98 Cal. 578; Barron _v._ Collins, 49 Ga. 580
(_semble_); Chambers _v._ Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121; Bourlier _v._ Macauley,
91 Ky. 135; Kline _v._ Eubanks, 109 La. 241 (_semble_); Ashley _v._
Dixon, 48 N. Y. 430; De Jong _v._ Behrman, 148 App. Div. 37; Laskey
Feature Play Co. _v._ Fox, 93 Misc. 364; Swain _v._ Johnson, 151 N. C.
93; Sleeper _v._ Baker, 22 N. D. 386 _Contra_.
It was decided before the case of Lumley _v._ Gye that an action for
slander of title was maintainable where the only special damage laid
was the breach by a third person of his contract with the plaintiff.
Green _v._ Button, 2 C. M. & R. 707. But see, _contra_, Kendall _v._
Stone, 5 N. Y. 14; Brentman _v._ Note, 3 N. Y. Sup. 420 (N. Y. City
Court).
So an action would doubtless lie for defamatory words, not actionable
_per se_, which induced a third person to break his contract to marry
the plaintiff. But compare Davis _v._ Condit, 124 Minn. 365 (seduction
of plaintiff’s fiancée).
As to justification, see Leonard _v._ Whetstone, 34 Ind. App. 383.
On the general subject, see also Sweeney _v._ Smith, 167 Fed. 385;
Mahoney _v._ Roberts, 86 Ark. 130; Citizens’ Light, &c. Co. _v._
Montgomery Light, &c. Co., 171 Fed. 553, 560, 561; McGurk _v._
Cronenwett, 199 Mass. 457; Globe Ins. Co. _v._ Fireman’s Ins. Co., 97
Miss. 148; Biggers _v._ Matthews, 147 N. C. 299; Thacker Coal Co. _v._
Burke, 59 W. Va. 253; Huffcutt, Interference with Contracts and
Business in New York, 18 Harvard Law Rev. 423.
Footnote 575:
The statement of facts and the dissenting opinion of Lord Coleridge,
C. J., are omitted.
Footnote 576:
“That this was a wrongful interference on the part of the Omaha
Company, and that it resulted directly in loss to the contractor and
to the Portage Company, is apparent. It is not an answer to say that
there was no certainty that the contractor would have completed his
contract, and so earned these lands for the Portage Company. If such a
defence were tolerated, it would always be an answer in case of any
wrongful interference with the performance of a contract, for there is
always that lack of certainty. It is enough that there should be, as
there was here, a reasonable assurance, considering all the
surroundings, that the contract would be performed in the manner and
within the time stipulated, and so performed as to secure the land to
the company.
“It certainly does not lie in the mouth of a wrong-doer, in the face
of such probabilities as attend this case, to say that perhaps the
contract would not have been completed even if no interference had
been had, and that, therefore, there being no certainty of the loss,
there is no liability.” Brewer, J., in Angle _v._ Chicago R. Co., 151
U. S. 1, 12.
Footnote 577:
Statement abridged. Arguments omitted; also part of opinions.
Footnote 578:
As to the distinction between intent and motive, see Smith, Crucial
Issues in Labor Litigation, 20 Harvard Law Rev. 253, 256–259.
Footnote 579:
Compare Tunstall _v._ Sterns Coal Co., (C. C. A.) 192 Fed. 808.
Section 3 of the Trade Disputes Act, 6 Edward 7, Chap. 47, enacted
Dec. 21, 1906, is as follows:—
“Sect. 3. An act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a
trade dispute shall not be actionable on the ground only that it
induces some other person to break a contract of employment or that it
is an interference with the trade, business, or employment of some
other person, or with the right of some other person to dispose of his
capital or his labor as he wills.”
See Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation, 20 Harvard Law Rev.
253, 345, 429.
Footnote 580:
Only the opinion of Bowen, L. J., is given. Fry, L. J., concurred, but
Lord Esher, M. R., dissented. The decision was afterwards affirmed in
the House of Lords, [1892] A. C. 25.
Footnote 581:
Payne _v._ Railroad Co., 13 Lea, 507 (Freeman and Turney, JJ.,
dissenting); South Royalton Bank _v._ Suffolk Bank, 27 Vt. 505; Delz
_v._ Winfree, 80 Tex. 400, 405 (_semble_) _Accord_. See Lough _v._
Outerbridge, 143 N. Y. 271.
Footnote 582:
Statement rewritten.
Footnote 583:
See Boggs _v._ Duncan Furniture Co., 163 Ia. 106; Rogers, Predatory
Price Cutting as Unfair Trade, 27 Harvard Law Rev. 139.
Footnote 584:
The arguments are omitted.
Footnote 585:
In Holbrook _v._ Morrison, 214 Mass. 209, a land owner put a sign on
her land reading, “For Sale. Best Offer From Colored Family.”
Defendant wished to sell but was also moved by ill will toward
plaintiffs, whose real estate business was seriously interfered with
by the threatened sale. See Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because
of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 Harvard Law Rev. 411, 420;
Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation, 20 Harvard Law Rev. 429,
453, 455.
Footnote 586:
In this case, however, the means used by defendant involved trespasses
and fraud. See American Waltham Watch Co. _v._ United States Watch
Co., 173 Mass. 85.
Footnote 587:
See Faloon _v._ Schilling, 29 Kan. 292.
“_Spite fence._” Malicious use of property to the injury of a neighbor
was held not actionable in Capital Bank _v._ Henty, 7 A. C. 741, 766
(_semble_); Giller _v._ West, 162 Ind. 17; Brostrom _v._ Lauppe, 179
Mass. 315; Bordeaux _v._ Greene, 22 Mont. 254; Mahan _v._ Brown, 13
Wend. 261; Auburn Co. _v._ Douglass, 9 N. Y. 444 (_semble_); Pickard
_v._ Collins, 23 Barb. 444; Levy _v._ Brothers, 4 Misc. 48; Letts _v._
Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73; Koblegard _v._ Hale, 60 W. Va. 37; Metzger
_v._ Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267.
_Contra_ Norton _v._ Randolph, 176 Ala. 381; Burke _v._ Smith, 69
Mich. 380; Flaherty _v._ Moran, 81 Mich. 52; Kirkwood _v._ Finegan, 95
Mich. 543; Peek _v._ Roe, 110 Mich. 52; Barger _v._ Barringer, 151 N.
C. 433. See Wilson _v._ Irwin, 144 Ky. 311; Metz _v._ Tierney, 13 N.
M. 363; Smith _v._ Speed, 11 Okl. 95; Haverstick _v._ Sipe, 33 Pa. St.
368; Shell _v._ Kemmerer, 13 Phila. 502; McCorkle _v._ Driskell,
(Tenn.) 60 S. W. 172.
_Malicious diversion of percolating water_ was held to give no right
of action in Corporation of Bradford _v._ Pickles, [1895] A. C. 587;
Meeker _v._ East Orange, 76 N. J. Law, 435; Phelps _v._ Nowlen, 72 N.
Y. 39; Chatfield _v._ Wilson, 28 Vt. 49; Huber _v._ Merkel, 117 Wis.
355.
_Contra_ Chasemore _v._ Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349, 388 (_semble_);
Roath _v._ Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 540–44 (semble); Chesley _v._ King,
74 Me. 164 (_semble_); Stevens _v._ Kelley, 78 Me. 445, 452; Greenleaf
_v._ Francis, 18 Pick. 119 (_semble_); Swett _v._ Cutts, 50 N. H. 439,
447 (_semble_); Wyandot Club Co. _v._ Sells, 3 Ohio N. P. 210;
Wheatley _v._ Baugh, 25 Pa. St. 528, 533 (_semble_); Haldeman _v._
Bruckhart, 45 Pa. St. 514 (_semble_); Lybe’s Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 626
(_semble_); Williams _v._ Laden, 161 Pa. St. 283 (_semble_); Miller
_v._ Black Rock Co., 99 Va. 747 (_semble_).
But cases of this type are now coming to be treated on a different
principle of waste or unreasonable use of water underlying neighboring
tracts. Gagnon _v._ French Lick Hotel Co., 163 Ind. 687; Barclay _v._
Abraham, 121 Ia. 619; Stillwater Water Co. _v._ Farmer, 89 Minn. 58;
Springfield Waterworks Co. _v._ Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74.
(1) Has the owner of land the same ownership and control of
percolating water (water passing, or filtering, through the ground
beneath the surface of the earth, without flowing in definite
channels), that he has of the soil, _e. g._, the sand and the rocks?
Or (2) has he only a limited and qualified right in the percolating
water; a right of reasonable user limited by the correlative rights of
his neighbors?
On those questions there is, in recent cases, a conflict of authority.
For illustrative cases endorsing the first theory, see Acton _v._
Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324; Mayor of Bradford _v._ Pickles, [1895] A. C.
587; Meeker _v._ East Orange, 76 N. J. Law, 435. For illustrative
cases favoring the second theory, see Bassett _v._ Salisbury Mfg. Co.,
43 N. H. 569 (where the question related to the right of the defendant
to prevent water percolating under the surface of plaintiff’s land
from passing off through defendant’s land); Katz _v._ Walkinshaw, 141
Cal. 116, 140, 141.
We are concerned here only to point out how the adoption of one or the
other of the above conflicting views may affect the materiality of the
landowner’s motive in the use of percolating water.
If the first theory is adopted, then, in some jurisdictions, the
landowner would not be held liable, even though actuated by bad motive
(Mayor of Bradford _v._ Pickles, [1895] A. C. 587); and, in all other
jurisdictions, he would be liable only when, and because, he was
actuated by bad motive.
But if the second theory is adopted, the landowner might frequently be
held liable, irrespective of motive. On the second theory percolating
water might be regarded as, in a certain sense, the common property of
the adjoining owners (bearing some analogy to an underground lake);
and it would be held that each owner is entitled to only a reasonable
share, and is entitled to use that share only for certain purposes.
See 3 Farnham, Waters, § 935. Upon this view an owner who uses more
than his share, or who uses it for purposes outside those legally
allowable, would be liable entirely irrespective of motive. “Later
American cases,” says Professor Huffcut, “transfer the emphasis from
the showing of ‘malice’ to a showing of ‘unreasonable user,’ which may
or may not be accompanied by malice.” 13 Yale Law Journal, 222.
We may add that if bad motive should not be held, in itself, a
substantive ground of liability, yet the existence of bad motive might
be a piece of evidence bearing upon the question of reasonable user.
User for the sole purpose of gratifying ill will might not be deemed
reasonable.
On the general question of liability for malevolent acts in reference
to percolating water, see, Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because
of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 Harvard Law Rev. 411, 414–415;
Huffcut, Percolating Waters: the Rule of Reasonable User, 13 Yale Law
Journ. 222.
Footnote 588:
Statements abridged. Portions of opinion omitted.
Footnote 589:
In Rideout _v._ Knox, 148 Mass. 368, where a similar statute was held
constitutional, it was held error to charge that defendant could not
justify building the fence unless his sole motive was a legitimate
use; malice must be the dominant motive. See also Ingwerson _v._
Barry, 118 Cal. 342; Gallagher _v._ Dodge, 48 Conn. 387; Holmes _v._
Fuller, 68 Vt. 207; Karasek _v._ Peier, 22 Wash. 419; Jones _v._
Williams, 56 Wash. 588; Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of
the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 Harvard Law Rev. 411, 414–415.
Footnote 590:
The rest of the opinion is omitted. This case was followed in
Carrington _v._ Taylor, 11 East, 571. See Lamprey _v._ Danz, 86 Minn.
317; Whittaker _v._ Stangvick, 100 Minn. 386; Meredith _v._ Triple
Island Gun Club, 113 Va. 80.
Footnote 591:
Only the opinion of Bramwell, B., is given. Pollock, C. B., Martin and
Pigott, BB., concurred.
Footnote 592:
Statement rewritten. Only so much of the case is given as relates to a
single point.
Footnote 593:
Statement rewritten. Arguments omitted. Some of the opinions are
entirely omitted, and none are given in full.
Footnote 594:
... “The litigants are members of two rival associations of
workingmen, registered under the Trade Unions Act of 1871.”... Lord
Watson, [1898] A. C., p. 90. “It is not a dispute between employers
and employed,—between capital and labor,—but rather one between the
members of one trade union and of another trade union.”... Lord
Ashbourne, _ibid._ p. 109. “Each party had the financial support of
their union.” Lord Macnaghten, p. 147.
Footnote 595:
As to the terms of the ironworkers’ employment, see Lord Watson, pp.
90, 99, and Lord Herschell, p. 130.
Footnote 596:
See Lord Macnaghten, p. 146.
Footnote 597:
It was _held_, both by Kennedy, J., and by the Court of Appeal, that
Jackson and Knight were not liable. Upon this branch of the case there
was no appeal to the House of Lords.
Footnote 598:
See Lord Macnaghten, p. 148.
Footnote 599:
The statement here given is compiled from extracts recited in the
opinions of Lord Shand, p. 162, Lord Halsbury, p. 82, and Lord
Macnaghten, p. 149.
Footnote 600:
See Veeder, Advisory Opinions of the Judges in England, 13 Harv. Law
Rev. 358.
Footnote 601:
... “There is no ground for even a suggestion that the defendant’s
acts were due to competition in trade or employment. There could be no
competition between the two sets of men in the circumstances under
which they were then working, the one at wood, the other at iron only;
and even if they were competing, the plaintiffs were working well
within their right.” Hawkins, J., p. 23. “Now, although according to
the principles of the Mogul Case the action of Allen might have been
justified on the principles of trade competition, if it had been
confined to the time when the respondents were doing ironwork, and
were therefore acting in competition with the boilermakers, it appears
to me that as soon as he overstepped those limits, and induced their
employers to dismiss them by way of punishment, his action was without
just cause or excuse, and, consequently, malicious within the legal
meaning of that word.” Cave, J., p. 37. “This action was not an
effort, by competition, to enable the boilermakers to get the work
instead, but to punish the plaintiffs by causing the employment of
other shipwrights in their room.” Lord Ashbourne, p. 111.
Footnote 602:
GERMAN CIVIL CODE, §§ 226, 826.
226. The exercise of a right is not permitted, when its sole object is
to injure another.
826. Whoever intentionally inflicts damage upon another in a morally
reprehensible manner is bound to compensate the other for the damage.
See also Digest, xxxix, 3, 1, § 12, xxxix, 3, 2, § 9; L. 17, 55;
Domat, Civil Law (Cushing’s ed.) § 158; Erskine, Institutes of the Law
of Scotland, Bk. II, tit. 1, § 2; Bell, Principles of the Law of
Scotland, § 966; Planiol, Traité Elémentaire de droit civil, (4 ed.),
II, §§ 870–72; Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, I, § 121;
Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of
the Actor, 18 Harvard Law Rev. 411; Walton, Motive as an Element in
Torts in the Common and in the Civil Law, 22 Harvard Law Rev. 349.
Footnote 603:
Some opinions are omitted. None are given in full. Arguments omitted.
Footnote 604:
Read by Lord Davey in Lord Lindley’s absence.
Footnote 605:
[1895] 2 Q. B. 22, 23; [1898] A. C. 3.
Footnote 606:
[1898] A. C. p. 19, Lord Watson; p. 115, Lord Herschell; pp. 147–150,
Lord Macnaghten; pp. 161, 165, Lord Shand; p. 175, Lord Davey; p. 178,
Lord James.
Footnote 607:
ENGLAND, TRADE DISPUTES ACT, 1906, 6 Ed. 7, c. 47.
1.—The following paragraph shall be added as a new paragraph after the
first paragraph of section three of the Conspiracy and Protection of
Property Act, 1875:—
“An act done in pursuance of an agreement or combination by two or
more persons shall, if done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute, not be actionable unless the act, if done without any such
agreement or combination, would be actionable.”
2.—(1) It shall be lawful for one or more persons, acting on their own
behalf or on behalf of a trade union or of an individual employer or
firm in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, to attend at
or near a house or place where a person resides or works or carries on
business or happens to be, if they so attend merely for the purpose of
peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or of peacefully
persuading any person to work or abstain from working.
(2) Section seven of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act,
1875, is hereby repealed from “attending at or near” to the end of the
section.
3.—An act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute shall not be actionable on the ground only that it induces
some other person to break a contract of employment or that it is an
interference with the trade, business, or employment of some other
person, or with the right of some other person to dispose of his
capital or his labor as he wills.
4.—(1) An action against a trade union, whether of workmen or masters,
or against any members or officials thereof on behalf of themselves
and all other members of the trade union in respect of any tortious
act alleged to have been committed by or on behalf of the trade union,
shall not be entertained by any court.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the liability of the trustees
of a trade union to be sued in the events provided for by the Trades
Union Act, 1871, section nine, except in respect of any tortious act
committed by or on behalf of the union in contemplation or in
furtherance of a trade dispute.
5.—(1) This Act may be cited as the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, and the
Trade Union Acts, 1871 and 1876, and this Act may be cited together as
the Trade Union Acts, 1871 to 1906.
(2) In this Act the expression “trade union” has the same meaning as
in the Trade Union Acts, 1871 and 1876, and shall include any
combination as therein defined, notwithstanding that such combination
may be the branch of a trade union.
(3) In this Act and in the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act,
1875, the expression “trade dispute” means any dispute between
employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is
connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of the
employment, or with the conditions of labor, of any person, and the
expression “workmen” means all persons employed in trade or industry,
whether or not in the employment of the employer with whom a trade
dispute arises; and, in section three of the last-mentioned Act, the
words “between employers and workmen” shall be repealed.
See Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation, 20 Harvard Law Rev.
345, 351, note 3.
Footnote 608:
The statement has been abridged.
Footnote 609:
“The defendant associations had the absolute right to threaten to do
that which they had the right to do.” Parker, C. J., in National
Protective Association _v._ Cumming, 170 New York, 315, p. 329.
“It will be said that a man has the absolute right to threaten to do
that which he has a right to do. Granted that what you may absolutely
do you may absolutely threaten to do (give unqualified notice of your
intention to do). But it does not follow that you may conditionally
threaten to do it. The right to absolutely refuse to work and the
right to conditionally refuse do not, as against third persons, _i.
e._, persons other than the employer, stand to each other in the
relation of the greater to the less. The former does not necessarily
include the latter. They are distinct from each other; and the latter
may sometimes be the more important and the more dangerous right of
the two.” 20 Harvard Law Rev., p. 273.
“The right to quit an employment which is terminable at will may
include a right to give absolute and unqualified notice of intention
to leave.”
“It may also include, _as against an employer_, a right to annex any
possible condition to an offer to work or to a threat to refrain from
working. By ‘right as against an employer’ we mean that an employer
could not maintain an action against a laborer for annexing such
conditions. The employer is not legally damaged by such an offer. He
is not bound to accept it. As between B and C, the person with whom B
is directly dealing, it may be true that ‘the right to refuse to deal
involves the right to name any terms which one pleases, and to refuse
to deal except on these terms.’ C cannot maintain an action against B
for insisting on unreasonable terms. But the terms or conditions
annexed to an offer may relate to the offeree’s relations to a third
person, and [if the offeree accepts and performs the conditions] that
may raise a question whether such third person has any ground of
complaint.”
“We think that the right to work or not to work does not include, _as
against third persons_, the right to annex any possible condition to
an offer to work or to a notice of intention to refrain from work.
Suppose that B offers to work for C on condition that C commits a
battery on A. Could B effectively deny that he instigated the
commission of the battery? Could B escape liability to A on the ground
that he was merely stating to C the conditions on which he was willing
to exercise his right to labor or not to labor?” 20 Harvard Law Rev.
270–271.
The contrary view is open to several objections:—
“1. It assumes that, if certain conduct of B does not violate any
legal right of C, it cannot infringe a legal right of A.
“2. It overlooks the distinction between unconditionally exercising a
right, and offering to exercise it (or to refrain from exercising it)
on condition that the offeree shall take action which is intended to
produce (and does produce) damage to a third person.
“3. It assumes that one who intentionally instigates a second person
to inflict damage on a third person can escape responsibility by
putting the instigation in the form of a conditional offer to
exercise, or to refrain from exercising, a right which he had against
the second person.” 20 Harvard Law Rev. 269.
Footnote 610:
“In many of the cases the element of combination or conspiracy is
found. If the act be lawful, the combination or conspiracy to commit
it does not make the act unlawful; if it be unlawful, the combination
to commit it may render its commission easier and may aggravate the
injury; but it does not change the character of the act. The fact of
combination is treated by the courts as of great evidentiary value in
deciding the question of coercion or duress.” Burke, J., in Sumwalt
Ice Co. _v._ Knickerbocker Ice Co., 114 Md. 403, 414.
“The gist of a civil action of this sort is not the conspiracy but the
deceit or fraud causing damage to the plaintiff, the combination being
charged merely for the purpose of fixing joint liability on the
defendants.” Rugg, J., in New England Foundation Co. _v._ Reed, 209
Mass. 556.
See also Romer, L. J., in Giblan _v._ National Amalgamated Union,
[1903] 2 K. B. 600, 619–620. But compare Henshaw, J., in Vallejo Ferry
Co. _v._ Solano Club, 165 Cal. 255.
Footnote 611:
_Intimidation._ See Springhead Co. _v._ Riley, 6 Eq. 551 (intimidating
placards); Southern R. Co. _v._ Machinists Union, 111 Fed. 49; Knudsen
_v._ Benn, 123 Fed. 636; Atchison R. Co. _v._ Gee, 139 Fed. 582; Pope
Motor Co. _v._ Keegan, 150 Fed. 148 (collection of large crowd); Allis
Chalmers Co. _v._ Iron Molders’ Union, 150 Fed. 155 (crowds);
Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. _v._ Goldfield Miners’ Union, 159
Fed. 500; Kolley _v._ Robinson, (C. C. A.) 187 Fed. 415; Fortney _v._
Carter, (C. C. A.) 203 Fed. 454; Bittner _v._ West Virginia Coal Co.,
(C. C. A.) 214 Fed. 716; Goldberg _v._ Stablemen’s Union, 149 Cal.
429; Underhill _v._ Murphy, 117 Ky. 640; Sherry _v._ Perkins, 147
Mass. 212 (intimidating banner); Ideal Mfg. Co. _v._ Ludwig, 149 Mich.
133 (crowd); Baltic Mining Co. _v._ Judge, 177 Mich. 632; Minnesota
Stove Co. _v._ Cavanaugh, 131 Minn. 458; Jones _v._ Maher, 62 Misc.
388; O’Neil _v._ Behanna, 182 Pa. St. 236; Jensen _v._ Cooks’ Union,
39 Wash. 531; Commercial Printing Co. _v._ Tacoma Typographical Union,
85 Wash. 234.
_Picketing_, see American Steel Co. _v._ Wire Drawers’ Union, 90 Fed.
608; Iron Molders’ Union _v._ Allis Chalmers Co., (C. C. A.) 166 Fed.
45; Sona _v._ Aluminum Castings Co., (C. C. A.) 214 Fed. 936; Karges
Furniture Co. _v._ Woodworkers’ Union, 165 Ind. 421; Beck _v._
Teamsters’ Union, 118 Mich. 497.
_Annoyance of workers resorting to plaintiff._ Union P. R. Co. _v._
Ruef, 120 Fed. 102; Frank _v._ Herold, 63 N. J. Eq. 443; Jonas Glass
Co. _v._ Glass Blowers’ Ass’n, 77 N. J. Eq. 219.
_Inducing employer to break contracts._ Read _v._ Friendly Society,
[1902] 2 K. B. 732; Jonas _v._ Glass Blowers’ Ass’n, 77 N. J. Eq. 219;
Flaccus _v._ Smith, 199 Pa. St. 128.
_Inducing employees to break contract._ Hardie Tynes Mfg. Co. _v._
Cruse, 189 Ala. 66; Folsom _v._ Lewis, 208 Mass. 336; Jonas Glass Co.
_v._ Glass Blowers’ Ass’n, 77 N. J. Eq. 219; Grassi Contracting Co.
_v._ Bennett, 160 N. Y. Suppl. 279.
Footnote 612:
This section is as follows: “No person shall, by intimidation or
force, prevent or seek to prevent a person from entering into or
continuing in the employment of any person or corporation.”
Footnote 613:
In accord with the prevailing opinion, see Tunstall _v._ Stearns Coal
Co., 192 Fed. 808; Folsom _v._ Lewis, 208 Mass. 336; Burnham _v._
Dowd, 217 Mass. 351; Fairbanks _v._ McDonald, 219 Mass. 291;
Cornellier _v._ Haverhill Mfr’s Assn, 221 Mass. 554; Blanchard _v._
Newark District Council, 77 N. J. Law, 389; Ruddy _v._ United
Journeyman Plumbers, 79 N. J. Law, 467, 81 N. J. Law, 574. Compare
Giblan _v._ National Amalgamated Union, [1903] 2 K. B. 600; National
Fire Proofing Co. _v._ Mason Builders’ Ass’n, 169 Fed. 259; Gill
Engraving Co. _v._ Doerr, 214 Fed. 111.
_Contra_, Kemp _v._ Division No. 241, 255 Ill. 213.
_Purpose of gaining control of the labor market._ New England Cement
Co. _v._ McGivern, 218 Mass. 198; Jacobs _v._ Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207;
McCord _v._ Thompson Starrett Co., 129 App. Div. 130; Schwarcz _v._
International Union, 68 Misc. 528; Newton _v._ Erickson, 70 Misc. 291.
Compare Reynolds _v._ Davis, 198 Mass. 294.
Footnote 614:
See majority and minority opinions in the later case of Willcut & Sons
Co. _v._ Driscoll, 200 Mass. 110, also Booth _v._ Burgess, 72 N. J.
Eq. 181. Compare Rhodes _v._ Musicians’ Union, 37 R. I. 281.
Footnote 615:
The following condensed statement is taken from 20 Harvard Law Review,
445–447.
Footnote 616:
Loring, J., p. 583.
Footnote 617:
Ibid.
Footnote 618:
Only a part of the opinion is given (pp. 587–88).
Footnote 619:
Bossert _v._ Dhuy, 166 App. Div. 261, 221 N. Y. 342 _Accord_. But see
Grassi Contracting Co. _v._ Bennett, 160 N. Y. Suppl. 279.
In Bohn Mfg. Co. _v._ Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, “a large number of retail
lumber dealers formed a voluntary association, by which they mutually
agreed that they would not deal with any manufacturer or wholesale
dealer who should sell lumber directly to consumers not dealers, at
any point where a member of the association was carrying on a retail
yard; and they provided in their by-laws that, whenever any wholesale
dealer or manufacturer made any such sale, the secretary should notify
all the members of the fact. The plaintiff, a wholesaler, having made
such a sale directly to a consumer, the secretary threatened to send
notice of the fact, as provided in the by-laws, to all the members of
the association.” (This statement is copied from 17 Green Bag, 218.
See also statement by Professor Lewis, 44 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 469.) The
court refused to grant an injunction against sending out the notice.
Here the retail dealers did not threaten to cease dealing with any one
except their competitors, _i. e._, wholesale dealers who should
attempt to sell directly to consumers. They used no lever but their
own conduct. They did not threaten to induce outsiders to refrain from
working for, or selling goods to, the wholesalers. And even as to
their own conduct, they did not threaten to abstain from dealings with
wholesalers in all matters, but only in the purchase of lumber. Much
less did they threaten to abstain from dealing with persons who dealt
with the wholesalers. In a subsequent case the same court said: “It is
to be noted that the defendants in the Bohn case had similar
legitimate interests to protect which were menaced by the practice of
wholesale dealers in selling lumber to contractors and consumers; and
that the defendants’ efforts to induce parties not to deal with
offending wholesale dealers were limited to the members of the
association having similar interests to conserve, and that there was
no agreement or combination or attempt to induce other persons not
members of the association to withhold their patronage from such
wholesale dealers.” Ertz _v._ Produce Exchange Co., 79 Minn. 140, 144.
See also Jackson _v._ Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592; Brown _v._ Jacobs
Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429; and other cases collected by Professor
Wyman, 17 Green Bag, 210, 222.
_Strike unless plaintiff is discharged, as a means toward better
conditions in the shop_, see Minasian _v._ Osborne, 210 Mass. 250.
_Strike to get rid of personally objectionable foreman._ De Minico
_v._ Craig, 207 Mass. 593.
Footnote 620:
Statement abridged. Portions of opinion omitted.
Footnote 621:
Gompers _v._ Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418; Baldwin _v._
Escanaba Dealers’ Ass’n, 165 Mich. 98; Fink _v._ Butchers’ Union, 84
N. J. Eq. 638; McCormick _v._ Local Unions, 32 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 165
_Accord_.
Compare _Ex parte_ Heffron, 179 Mo. App. 639.
Footnote 622:
Bossert _v._ Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342; Cohn & Roth Electric Co. _v._
Bricklayers’ Union, 92 Conn. 161 _Accord_. See Iron Molders’ Union
_v._ Allis Chalmers Co., (C. C. A.) 166 Fed. 45. Also Wigmore, The
Boycott as Ground for Damages, 21 American Law Rev. 509, and
Interference with Social Relations, 21 American Law Rev. 764.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES
1. P. 403, changed “Holden v. McGillicuddy, 213 Mass. 563” to “Holden
v. McGillicuddy, 215 Mass. 563”.
2. P. 552, changed “they avoid the contract” to “they void the
contract”.
3. P. 840, changed “by continued user in connection” to “by continued
use in connection”.
4. Silently corrected obvious typographical errors and variations in
spelling.
5. Retained archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as printed.
6. Re-indexed footnotes using numbers and collected together at the end
of the last chapter.
7. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.