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A Discourse
_OF A_
METHOD
For the well guiding of
REASON,
And the Discovery of _Truth_
In the
SCIENCES.
[Illustration]
LONDON,
Printed by _Thomas Newcombe_.
MDCXLIX.
To the _Understanding READER_.
The Great DESCARTES (who may justly challenge the first place amongst
the Philosophers of this Age) is the Author of this Discourse; which in
the Originall was so well known, That it could be no mans but his own,
that his Name was not affix'd to it: I need say no more either of Him
or It; He is best made known by Himself, and his Writings want nothing
but thy reading to commend them. But as those who cannot compasse the
Originals of _Titian_ and _Van-Dyke_, are glad to adorne their Cabinets
with the Copies of them; So be pleased favourably to receive his Picture
from my hand, copied after his own Designe: You may therein observe the
lines of a well form'd Minde, The hightnings of Truth, The sweetnings
and shadowings of Probabilities, The falls and depths of Falshood; all
which serve to perfect this Masterpiece. Now although my after-draught
be rude and unpolished, and that perhaps I have touch'd it too boldly,
The thoughts of so clear a Minde, being so extremely fine, That as the
choisest words are too grosse, and fall short fully to expresse such
sublime Notions; So it cannot be, but being transvested, it must
necessarily lose very much of its native Lustre: Nay, although I am
conscious (notwithstanding the care I have taken neither to wrong the
Authours Sense, nor offend the Readers Ear) of many escapes which I have
made; yet I so little doubt of being excused, That I am confident, my
endeavour cannot but be gratefull to all Lovers of Learning; for whose
benefit I have Englished, and to whom I addresse this Essay, which
contains a Method, by the Rules whereof we may Shape our better part,
Rectifie our Reason, Form our Manners and Square our Actions, Adorn our
Mindes, and making a diligent Enquiry into Nature, wee may attain to the
Knowledge of the Truth, which is the most desirable union in the World.
Our Authour also invites all letterd men to his assistance in the
prosecution of this Search; That for the good of Mankinde, They would
practise and communicate Experiments, for the use of all those who
labour for the perfection of Arts and Sciences: Every man now being
obliged to the furtherance of so beneficiall an Undertaking, I could not
but lend my hand to open the Curtain, and discover this New Model of
Philosophy; which I now publish, neither to humour the present, nor
disgust former times; but rather that it may serve for an innocent
Divertisement to those, who would rather Reform themselves, then the
rest of the world; and who, having the same seeds and grounds, and
knowing That there is nothing New under the Sun; That Novelty is but
Oblivion, and that Knowledge is but Remembrance, will study to finde
out in themselves, and restore to Posterity those lost Arts, which
render Antiquity so venerable; and strive (if it be possible) to go
beyond them in other things, as well as Time: Who minde not those things
which are above, beyond, or without them; but would rather limit their
desires by their power, then change the Course of Nature; Who seek the
knowledge, and labour for the Conquest of themselves; Who have Vertue
enough to make their own Fortune; And who prefer the Culture of the
Minde before the Adorning of the Body; To such as these I present this
Discourse (whose pardon I beg, for having so long detain'd them from so
desirable a Conversation;) and conclude with this Advice of the Divine
_Plato_:
_Cogita in te, praeter Animum, nihil esse mirabile._
A DISCOURSE OF A METHOD, For the wel-guiding of Reason; AND The
discovery of Truth in the SCIENCES.
_If this Discourse seem too long to be read at once, it may be divided
into six parts. In the first, are divers Considerations touching the
Sciences. In the second, the principall Rules of that Method which the
Author hath studyed. In the third, some of those in morality, which he
hath drawn from this Method. In the fourth, the reasons whereby the
existence of God and of the humane Soul is proved; which are the
grounds of his Metaphysicks. In the fift, the order of these Physicall
questions, which he hath examined, and particularly the explication of
the hearts motion; with some other difficulties relating to Physick; as
also the difference between our Souls and those of beasts. In the last,
what he conceives requisit to make a further inquiry into Nature, then
hath hitherto been made. And what reasons induc'd him to write._
PART. I.
Right understanding is the most equally divided thing in the World; for
every one beleevs himself so well stor'd with it, that even those who in
all other things are the hardest to be pleas'd, seldom desire more of it
then they have; wherein it is not likely that all Men are deceived: But
it rather witnesseth, That the faculty of right-judging and
distinguishing truth from falshood (which is properly call'd,
Understanding or Reason) is naturally equal in all Men. And as the
diversity of our Opinions, is not, because some are more reasonable then
others; but only that we direct our thoughts several ways, neither do we
consider the same things. For 'tis not enough to have good faculties,
but the principal is, to apply them well. The greatest Souls are as
capable of the greatest Vices, as of the most eminent Vertues: And those
who move but very slowly, may advance much farther, if they always
follow the right way; then those who run and straggle from it.
For my part, I never presum'd that my Minde was more perfect in any
thing then an ordinary Mans; nay, I have often wish'd to have had my
thoughts as quick, my imagination as clear and distinct, and my memory
as large and as ready as some other Men have had. And I know no
Qualities which serve more then those to the perfection of the Minde;
for as for Reason or Understanding, forasmuch as it is the only thing
which makes us Men, and distinguisheth us from beasts, I will beleeve it
to be entire in every One, and follow herein the common opinion of the
Philosophers, who say, That there is only more or less among the
Accidents, and not amongst the Forms or nature of the Individuals of one
species.
But I shall not stick to say, That I beleeve my self very happy, in
having encountred from my youth with certain ways which have led me to
considerations and Maximes, from which I have found a Method; whereby
methinks, I have the means by degrees to augment my knowledg, and by
little and little to raise it up to the highest pitch, whereto the
meaness of my capacity, & the short course of my life can permit it to
attain. For I have already reaped such fruits from it, that although in
the judgment I make of my self, I endevour always rather to incline to
mistrust, then to presumption. And looking on the divers actions and
undertakings of all Men, with the eye of a Philosopher, there is almost
none which to me seems not vain and useless. Yet I am extremely
satisfied with the Progress, which (as it seems to me) I have already
made in the search of Truth, and do conceive such hopes for the future,
That if among the employments of Men, purely Men, there is any solidly
good, and of importance, I dare beleeve it is that which I have chosen:
Yet it may be that I deceive my self, and perhaps it is but a little
Copper and Glass which I take for Gold and Diamonds. I know how subject
we are to mistake in those things which concern us, and how jealous we
ought to be of the judgment of our friends, when it is in our favor. But
I should willingly in this Discourse, trace out unto you the ways which
I have followed, and represent therein my life, as in a Picture, to the
end, that every one may judge thereof; and that learning from common
Fame, what mens opinions are of it, I may finde a new means of
instructing my self; which I shall add to those which I customarily make
use of.
Neither is it my design to teach a Method which every Man ought to
follow, for the good conduct of his reason; but only to shew after what
manner I have endevoured to order mine own. Those who undertake to give
precepts, ought to esteem themselves more able, then those to whom they
give them, and are blame-worthy, if they fail in the least. But
proposing this but as a History, or if you will have it so, but as a
Fable; wherein amongst other examples, which may be imitated, we may
perhaps find divers others which we may have reason to decline: I hope
it will be profitable to some, without being hurtfull to any; and that
the liberty I take will be gratefull to all.
I have been bred up to Letters from mine infancy; & because I was
perswaded, that by their means a man might acquire a clear and certain
knowledg of all that's usefull for this life, I was extremely desirous
to learn them: But as soon as I had finish'd all the course of my
Studies, at the end whereof Men are usually receiv'd amongst the rank of
the learned. I wholly changed my opinion, for I found my self intangled
in so many doubts and errors, that me thought I had made no other profit
in seeking to instruct my self, but that I had the more discovered mine
own ignorance. Yet I was in one of the most famous Schools in _Europe_;
where I thought, if there were any on earth, there ought to have been
learned Men. I had learnt all what others had learnt; even unsatisfied
with the Sciences which were taught us, I had read over all Books
(which I could possibly procure) treating of such as are held to be the
rarest and the most curious. Withall, I knew the judgment others made of
me; and I perceiv'd that I was no less esteem'd then my fellow Students,
although there were some amongst them that were destin'd to fill our
Masters rooms. And in fine, our age seem'd to me as flourishing and as
fertile of good Wits, as any of the preceding, which made me take the
liberty to judg of all other men by my self, and to think, That there
was no such learning in the world, as formerly I had been made beleeve.
Yet did I continue the esteem I had of those exercises which are the
employments of the Schools: I knew that Languages which are there
learnt, are necessary for the understanding of ancient Writers, That the
quaintness of Fables awakens the Minde; That the memorable actions in
History raise it up, and that being read with discretion, they help to
form the judgment. That the reading of good books, is like the
conversation with the honestest persons of the past age, who were the
Authors of them, and even a studyed conversation, wherein they discover
to us the best only of their thoughts. That eloquence hath forces &
beauties which are incomparable. That Poetry hath delicacies and sweets
extremly ravishing; That the Mathematicks hath most subtile inventions,
which very much conduce aswel to content the curious, as to facilitate
all arts, and to lessen the labour of Men: That those writings which
treat of manners contain divers instructions, and exhortations to
vertue, which are very usefull. That Theology teacheth the way to
heaven; That Philosophy affords us the means to speake of all things
with probability, and makes her self admir'd, by the least knowing Men.
That Law, Physick and other sciences bring honor and riches to those who
practice them; Finally that its good to have examin'd them all even the
falsest and the most superstitious, that we may discover their just
value, and preserve our selves from their cheats.
But I thought I had spent time enough in the languages, and even also in
the lecture of ancient books, their histories and their fables. For 'tis
even the same thing to converse with those of former ages, as to travel.
Its good to know something of the manners of severall Nations, that we
may not think that all things against our _Mode_ are ridiculous or
unreasonable, as those are wont to do, who have seen Nothing. But when
we employ too long time in travell, we at last become strangers to our
own Country, and when we are too curious of those things, which we
practised in former times, we commonly remain ignorant of those which
are now in use. Besides, Fables make us imagine divers events possible,
which are not so: And that even the most faithfull Histories, if they
neither change or augment the value of things, to render them the more
worthy to be read, at least, they always omit the basest and less
remarkable circumstances; whence it is, that the rest seems not as it
is; and that those who form their Manners by the examples they thence
derive, are subject to fall into the extravagancies of the _Paladins_ of
our Romances, and to conceive designes beyond their abilities.
I highly priz'd Eloquence, and was in love with Poetry; but I esteem'd
both the one and the other, rather gifts of the Minde, then the fruits
of study. Those who have the strongest reasoning faculties, and who best
digest their thoughts, to render them the more clear and intelligible,
may always the better perswade what they propose, although they should
speak but a corrupt dialect, and had never learnt Rhetorick: And those
whose inventions are most pleasing, and can express them with most
ornament and sweetness, will still be the best Poets; although ignorant
of the Art of Poetry.
Beyond all, I was most pleas'd with the Mathematicks, for the certainty
and evidence of the reasons thereof; but I did not yet observe their
true use, and thinking that it served only for Mechanick Arts; I
wondred, that since the grounds thereof were so firm and solid, that
nothing more sublime had been built thereon. As on the contrary, I
compar'd the writings of the Ancient heathen which treated of Manner, to
most proud and stately Palaces which were built only on sand and mire,
they raise the vertues very high, and make them appear estimable above
all the things in the world; but they doe not sufficiently instruct us
in the knowledg of them, and often what they call by that fair Name, is
but a stupidness, or an act of pride, or of despair, or a paricide.
I reverenc'd our Theology, and pretended to heaven as much as any; But
having learnt as a most certain Truth, that the way to it, is no less
open to the most ignorant, then to the most learned; and that those
revealed truths which led thither, were beyond our understanding, I
durst not submit to the weakness of my ratiocination. And I thought,
that to undertake to examine them, and to succeed in it, requir'd some
extraordinary assistance from heaven, and somewhat more then Man. I
shall say nothing of Philosophy, but that seeing it hath been cultivated
by the most excellent wits, which have liv'd these many ages, and that
yet there is nothing which is undisputed, and by consequence, which is
not doubtfull. I could not presume so far, as to hope to succeed better
then others. And considering how many different opinions there may be on
the same thing, maintain'd by learned Men, and yet that there never can
be but one only Truth, I reputed almost all false, which had no more
then probability in it.
As for other Sciences, since they borrow their Principles from
Philosophy, I judg'd that nothing which was solid could be built upon
such unsound foundations; and neither honour nor wealth were sufficient
to invite me to the study of them. For (I thank God) I found not my self
in a condition which obliged me to make a Trade of Letters for the
relief of my fortune. And although I made it not my profession to
despise glory with the Cynick; yet did I little value that which I could
not acquire but by false pretences. And lastly, for unwarrantable
Studies, I thought I already too well understood what they were, to be
any more subject to be deceived, either by the promises of an Alchymist,
or by the predictions of an Astrologer, or by the impostures of a
Magician, or by the artifice or brags of those who profess to know more
then they do.
By reason whereof, as soon as my years freed me from the subjection of
my Tutors, I wholly gave over the study of Letters, and resolving to
seek no other knowledge but what I could finde in my self, or in the
great book of the World, I imployed the rest of my youth in Travell, to
see Courts and Armies, to frequent people of severall humors and
conditions, to gain experience, to hazard my self in those encounters of
fortune which should occurr; and every-where to make such a reflection
on those things which presented themselves to me, that I might draw
profit from them. For (me thought) I could meet with far more truth in
the discourses which every man makes touching those affairs which
concern him, whose event would quickly condemn him, if he had judg'd
amisse; then amongst those which letter'd Men make in their closets
touching speculations, which produce no effect, and are of no
consequence to them, but that perhaps they may gain so much the more
vanity, as they are farther different from the common understanding:
Forasmuch as he must have imployed the more wit and subtilty in
endeavouring to render them probable. And I had always an extreme desire
to learn to distinguish Truth from Falshood, that I might see cleerly
into my actions, and passe this life with assurance.
Its true, that whiles I did but consider the Manners of other men, I
found little or nothing wherein I might confirm my self: And I observ'd
in them even as much diversity as I had found before in the opinions of
the Philosophers: So that the greatest profit I could reap from them
was, that seeing divers things, which although they seem to us very
extravagant and ridiculous, are nevertheless commonly received and
approved by other great Nations, I learn'd to beleeve nothing too
firmly, of what had been onely perswaded me by example or by custom, and
so by little and little I freed my self from many errors, which might
eclipse our naturall light, and render us lesse able to comprehend
reason. But after I had imployed some years in thus studying the Book of
the World, and endeavouring to get experience, I took one day a
resolution to study also within my self, and to employ all the forces of
my minde in the choice of the way I was to follow: which (me thought)
succeeded much better, then if I had never estranged my self from my
Country, or from my Books.