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The Wisdom of the East Series
EDITED BY
L. CRANMER-BYNG
Dr. S. A. KAPADIA
THE CONFESSIONS OF AL GHAZZALI
“He who knows himself knows God.”
SAYINGS OF MUHAMMED.
WISDOM OF THE EAST
THE CONFESSIONS OF
AL GHAZZALI
TRANSLATED FOR THE FIRST TIME
INTO ENGLISH
BY CLAUD FIELD, M.A.
[Illustration]
LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
1909
PRINTED BY
HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD.
LONDON AND AYLESBURY.
CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION 7
Ghazzali’s Search for Truth 11
The Subterfuges of the Sophists 15
The Different Kinds of Seekers after Truth 20
The Aim of Scholastic Theology and its Results 21
Concerning the Philosophical Sects and the Stigma of Infidelity
which attaches to them all 25
Divisions of the Philosophic Sciences 27
Sufism 41
The Reality of Inspiration: its Importance for the Human Race 50
EDITORIAL NOTE
The object of the Editors of this series is a very definite one. They
desire above all things that, in their humble way, these books shall be
the ambassadors of good-will and understanding between East and West—the
old world of Thought and the new of Action. In this endeavour, and in
their own sphere, they are but followers of the highest example in the
land. They are confident that a deeper knowledge of the great ideals and
lofty philosophy of Oriental thought may help to a revival of that true
spirit of Charity which neither despises nor fears the nations of another
creed and colour. Finally, in thanking press and public for the very
cordial reception given to the “Wisdom of the East” Series, they wish to
state that no pains have been spared to secure the best specialists for
the treatment of the various subjects at hand.
L. CRANMER-BYNG.
S. A. KAPADIA.
NORTHBROOK SOCIETY, 185 PICCADILLY, W.
INTRODUCTION
BIRTH OF GHAZZALI
Aboû Hâmid Muhammed Ibn Muhammad Al Ghazzali was born in the city of Tus
in Khorassan, A.D. 1058, one year after the great poet and freethinker
Abu’ l’ Alā died. He was the son of a dealer in cotton thread (Gazzâl),
whence his name. Losing his father in early life, he was confided to the
care of a Sufi, whose influence extended through his subsequent career.
On finishing his studies he was appointed professor of theology at
Bagdad. Here he achieved such splendid success that all the Imāms became
his zealous partisans. So great, indeed, was his renown, so ardent the
admiration he inspired, that the Muhammedans sometimes said: “If all the
books of Islam were destroyed, it would be but a slight loss, provided Al
Ghazzali’s work on the Revivification of the Sciences of Religion were
preserved.” The following short treatise gives the history of the mind
of this remarkable man in his pursuit of truth. It might not inaptly
bear the title “Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit.” In its intellectual
subtlety it bears a certain resemblance to Newman’s _Grammar of Assent_,
and in its almost Puritanical sense of the terrors of the world to come,
it is akin to Bunyan’s _Grace Abounding_. It is also interesting as being
one of the very few specimens of genuine Eastern autobiography.
After describing the difficulty with which he escaped from an almost
Pyrrhonic scepticism, “not by systematic reasoning and accumulation of
proofs, but by a flash of light which God sent into my soul,” he reviews
the various sects whom he encountered in his search for truth.
I. The scholastic theologians, who profess to follow reason and
speculation.
II. The philosophers, who call themselves masters of Logic and
Demonstration.
III. The Sufis, who claim an immediate intuition, and who perceive the
real manifestation of truth as common men perceive material phenomena.
After mastering the first two systems and still finding the great problem
unsolved, he was forced to pronounce philosophy incompetent, and to
seek in some higher faculty than reason the solution of his doubts.
The intuition or ecstasy (“wajd”) of the Sufis was to him a sort of
revelation. His search for truth occupied several years, in the course of
which he renounced his professorship of theology at Bagdad and went into
devotional retirement at Jerusalem and Damascus, and also performed the
pilgrimage to Mecca.
He returned for a short time to Nishapur, the birthplace of Omar Khayyām,
his elder contemporary, whom, as Professor Browne tells us in his
_History of Persian Literature_, he met and disliked. He finally went
back to Tus, his native place, where he died, A.D. 1111. Professor D.
B. Macdonald, in an article on Ghazzali in the _Journal of the American
Oriental Society_, quotes the following account of his death as related
by his brother Ahmad: “On Monday at dawn my brother performed the
ablution and prayed. Then he said, ‘Bring me my grave-clothes,’ and he
took them and kissed them, and laid them on his eyes and said, ‘I hear
and obey the command to go into the King.’ And he stretched out his feet
and went to meet Him and was taken to the good-will of God Most High.”
The great service which Al Ghazzali rendered to the Sufis was, as Mr.
Whinfield has pointed out, in the preface to his translation of the
Masnavi, to provide them with a metaphysical terminology which he had
derived from the writings of Plotinus the Neo-Platonist. He also gave
them a secure position in the Church of Islam.
In his _Development of Muslim Theology_ Professor Macdonald calls
Ghazzali “the greatest, certainly the most sympathetic figure in the
history of Islam, and the only teacher of the after generations ever put
by a Muslim on a level with the four great Imāms.” He further says of
him: “Islam has never outgrown him, has never fully understood him. In
the renaissance of Islam which is now rising to view, his time will come,
and the new life will proceed from a renewed study of his works.”
C. F.
THE CONFESSIONS OF AL GHAZZALI
GHAZZALI’S SEARCH FOR TRUTH
“_In the name of the most merciful God._”
Quoth the Imām Ghazzali:
Glory be to God, Whose praise should precede every writing and every
speech! May the blessings of God rest on Muhammed His Prophet and His
Apostle, on his family and companions, by whose guidance error is escaped!
You have asked me, O brother in the faith, to expound the aim and the
mysteries of religious sciences, the boundaries and depths of theological
doctrines. You wish to know my experiences while disentangling truth lost
in the medley of sects and divergencies of thought, and how I have dared
to climb from the low levels of traditional belief to the topmost summit
of assurance. You desire to learn what I have borrowed, first of all from
scholastic theology; and secondly from the method of the Ta’limites,
who, in seeking truth, rest upon the authority of a leader; and why,
thirdly, I have been led to reject philosophic systems; and finally, what
I have accepted of the doctrine of the Sufis, and the sum total of truth
which I have gathered in studying every variety of opinion. You ask me
why, after resigning at Bagdad a teaching post which attracted a number
of hearers, I have, long afterwards, accepted a similar one at Nishapur.
Convinced as I am of the sincerity which prompts your inquiries, I
proceed to answer them, invoking the help and protection of God.
Know then, my brothers (may God direct you in the right way), that the
diversity in beliefs and religions, and the variety of doctrines and
sects which divide men, are like a deep ocean strewn with shipwrecks,
from which very few escape safe and sound. Each sect, it is true,
believes itself in possession of the truth and of salvation, “each
party,” as the Koran saith, “rejoices in its own creed”; but as the
chief of the apostles, whose word is always truthful, has told us, “My
people will be divided into more than seventy sects, of whom only one
will be saved.” This prediction, like all others of the Prophet, must be
fulfilled.
From the period of adolescence, that is to say, previous to reaching my
twentieth year to the present time when I have passed my fiftieth, I
have ventured into this vast ocean; I have fearlessly sounded its depths,
and, like a resolute diver, I have penetrated its darkness and dared its
dangers and abysses. I have interrogated the beliefs of each sect and
scrutinised the mysteries of each doctrine, in order to disentangle truth
from error and orthodoxy from heresy. I have never met one who maintained
the hidden meaning of the Koran without investigating the nature of his
belief, nor a partisan of its exterior sense without inquiring into the
results of his doctrine. There is no philosopher whose system I have not
fathomed, nor theologian the intricacies of whose doctrine I have not
followed out.
Sufism has no secrets into which I have not penetrated; the devout adorer
of Deity has revealed to me the aim of his austerities; the atheist has
not been able to conceal from me the real reason of his unbelief. The
thirst for knowledge was innate in me from an early age; it was like a
second nature implanted by God, without any will on my part. No sooner
had I emerged from boyhood than I had already broken the fetters of
tradition and freed myself from hereditary beliefs.
Having noticed how easily the children of Christians become Christians,
and the children of Moslems embrace Islam, and remembering also the
traditional saying ascribed to the Prophet, “Every child has in him
the germ of Islam, then his parents make him Jew, Christian, or
Zoroastrian,” I was moved by a keen desire to learn what was this innate
disposition in the child, the nature of the accidental beliefs imposed
on him by the authority of his parents and his masters, and finally the
unreasoned convictions which he derives from their instructions.
Struck with the contradictions which I encountered in endeavouring to
disentangle the truth and falsehood of these opinions, I was led to make
the following reflection: “The search after truth being the aim which I
propose to myself, I ought in the first place to ascertain what are the
bases of certitude.” In the next place I recognised that certitude is the
clear and complete knowledge of things, such knowledge as leaves no room
for doubt nor possibility of error and conjecture, so that there remains
no room in the mind for error to find an entrance. In such a case it
is necessary that the mind, fortified against all possibility of going
astray, should embrace such a strong conviction that, if, for example,
any one possessing the power of changing a stone into gold, or a stick
into a serpent, should seek to shake the bases of this certitude, it
would remain firm and immovable. Suppose, for instance, a man should come
and say to me, who am firmly convinced that ten is more than three, “No;
on the contrary, three is more than ten, and, to prove it, I change this
rod into a serpent,” and supposing that he actually did so, I should
remain none the less convinced of the falsity of his assertion, and
although his miracle might arouse my astonishment, it would not instil
any doubt into my belief.
I then understood that all forms of knowledge which do not unite these
conditions (imperviousness to doubt, etc.) do not deserve any confidence,
because they are not beyond the reach of doubt, and what is not
impregnable to doubt cannot constitute certitude.
THE SUBTERFUGES OF THE SOPHISTS
I then examined what knowledge I possessed, and discovered that in none
of it, with the exception of sense-perceptions and necessary principles,
did I enjoy that degree of certitude which I have just described. I
then sadly reflected as follows: “We cannot hope to find truth except
in matters which carry their evidence in themselves—that is to say, in
sense-perceptions and necessary principles; we must therefore establish
these on a firm basis. Is my absolute confidence in sense-perceptions and
on the infallibility of necessary principles analogous to the confidence
which I formerly possessed in matters believed on the authority of
others? Is it only analogous to the reliance most people place on their
organs of vision, or is it rigorously true without admixture of illusion
or doubt?”
I then set myself earnestly to examine the notions we derive from the
evidence of the senses and from sight in order to see if they could be
called in question. The result of a careful examination was that my
confidence in them was shaken. Our sight for instance, perhaps the best
practised of all our senses, observes a shadow, and finding it apparently
stationary pronounces it devoid of movement. Observation and experience,
however, show subsequently that a shadow moves not suddenly, it is true,
but gradually and imperceptibly, so that it is never really motionless.
Again, the eye sees a star and believes it as large as a piece of gold,
but mathematical calculations prove, on the contrary, that it is larger
than the earth. These notions, and all others which the senses declare
true, are subsequently contradicted and convicted of falsity in an
irrefragable manner by the verdict of reason.
Then I reflected in myself: “Since I cannot trust to the evidence of my
senses, I must rely only on intellectual notions based on fundamental
principles, such as the following axioms: ‘Ten is more than three.
Affirmation and negation cannot coexist together. A thing cannot both
be created and also existent from eternity, living and annihilated
simultaneously, at once necessary and impossible.’” To this the
notions I derived from my senses made the following objections: “Who
can guarantee you that you can trust to the evidence of reason more
than to that of the senses? You believed in our testimony till it was
contradicted by the verdict of reason, otherwise you would have continued
to believe it to this day. Well, perhaps, there is above reason another
judge who, if he appeared, would convict reason of falsehood, just as
reason has confuted us. And if such a third arbiter is not yet apparent,
it does not follow that he does not exist.”
To this argument I remained some time without reply; a reflection drawn
from the phenomena of sleep deepened my doubt. “Do you not see,” I
reflected, “that while asleep you assume your dreams to be indisputably
real? Once awake, you recognise them for what they are—baseless chimeras.
Who can assure you, then, of the reliability of notions which, when
awake, you derive from the senses and from reason? In relation to your
present state they may be real; but it is possible also that you may
enter upon another state of being which will bear the same relation to
your present state as this does to your condition when asleep. In that
new sphere you will recognise that the conclusions of reason are only
chimeras.”
This possible condition is, perhaps, that which the Sufis call “ecstasy”
(“hāl”), that is to say, according to them, a state in which, absorbed
in themselves and in the suspension of sense-perceptions, they have
visions beyond the reach of intellect. Perhaps also Death is that state,
according to that saying of the Prince of prophets: “Men are asleep;
when they die, they wake.” Our present life in relation to the future
is perhaps only a dream, and man, once dead, will see things in direct
opposition to those now before his eyes; he will then understand that
word of the Koran, “To-day we have removed the veil from thine eyes and
thy sight is keen.”
Such thoughts as these threatened to shake my reason, and I sought to
find an escape from them. But how? In order to disentangle the knot of
this difficulty, a proof was necessary. Now a proof must be based on
primary assumptions, and it was precisely these of which I was in doubt.
This unhappy state lasted about two months, during which I was, not,
it is true, explicitly or by profession, but morally and essentially a
thoroughgoing sceptic.
God at last deigned to heal me of this mental malady; my mind recovered
sanity and equilibrium, the primary assumptions of reason recovered
with me all their stringency and force. I owed my deliverance, not to a
concatenation of proofs and arguments, but to the light which God caused
to penetrate into my heart—the light which illuminates the threshold of
all knowledge. To suppose that certitude can be only based upon formal
arguments is to limit the boundless mercy of God. Some one asked the
Prophet the explanation of this passage in the Divine Book: “God opens
to Islam the heart of him whom He chooses to direct.” “That is spoken,”
replied the Prophet, “of the light which God sheds in the heart.” “And
how can man recognise that light?” he was asked. “By his detachment
from this world of illusion and by a secret drawing towards the eternal
world,” the Prophet replied.
On another occasion he said: “God has created His creatures in darkness,
and then has shed upon them His light.” It is by the help of this light
that the search for truth must be carried on. As by His mercy this light
descends from time to time among men, we must ceaselessly be on the watch
for it. This is also corroborated by another saying of the Apostle: “God
sends upon you, at certain times, breathings of His grace; be prepared
for them.”
My object in this account is to make others understand with what
earnestness we should search for truth, since it leads to results we
never dreamt of. Primary assumptions have not got to be sought for, since
they are always present to our minds; if we engage in such a search, we
only find them persistently elude our grasp. But those who push their
investigation beyond ordinary limits are safe from the suspicion of
negligence in pursuing what is within their reach.
THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF SEEKERS AFTER TRUTH
When God in the abundance of His mercy had healed me of this malady, I
ascertained that those who are engaged in the search for truth may be
divided into three groups.
I. Scholastic theologians, who profess to follow theory and speculation.
II. The Philosophers, who profess to rely upon formal logic.
III. The Sufis, who call themselves the elect of God and possessors of
intuition and knowledge of the truth by means of ecstasy.
“The truth,” I said to myself, “must be found among these three classes
of men who devote themselves to the search for it. If it escapes them,
one must give up all hope of attaining it. Having once surrendered blind
belief, it is impossible to return to it, for the essence of such belief
is to be unconscious of itself. As soon as this unconsciousness ceases
it is shattered like a glass whose fragments cannot be again reunited
except by being cast again into the furnace and refashioned.” Determined
to follow these paths and to search out these systems to the bottom,
I proceeded with my investigations in the following order: Scholastic
theology; philosophical systems; and, finally Sufism.
THE AIM OF SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY AND ITS RESULTS
Commencing with theological science, I carefully studied and meditated
upon it. I read the writings of the authorities in this department and
myself composed several treatises. I recognised that this science, while
sufficing its own requirements, could not assist me in arriving at the
desired goal. In short, its object is to preserve the purity of orthodox
beliefs from all heretical innovation. God, by means of His Apostle,
has revealed to His creatures a belief which is true as regards their
temporal and eternal interests; the chief articles of it are laid down
in the Koran and in the traditions. Subsequently, Satan suggested to
innovators principles contrary to those of orthodoxy; they listened
greedily to his suggestions, and the purity of the faith was menaced. God
then raised up a school of theologians and inspired them with the desire
to defend orthodoxy by means of a system of proofs adapted to unveil the
devices of the heretics and to foil the attacks which they made on the
doctrines established by tradition.
Such is the origin of scholastic theology. Many of its adepts, worthy of
their high calling, valiantly defended the orthodox faith by proving the
reality of prophecy and the falsity of heretical innovations. But, in
order to do so, they had to rely upon a certain number of premises, which
they accepted in common with their adversaries, and which authority and
universal consent or simply the Koran and the traditions obliged them
to accept. Their principal effort was to expose the self-contradictions
of their opponents and to confute them by means of the premises which
they had professed to accept. Now a method of argumentation like this
has little value for one who only admits self-evident truths. Scholastic
theology could not consequently satisfy me nor heal the malady from which
I suffered.
It is true that in its later development theology was not content merely
to defend dogma; it betook itself to the study of first principles,
of substances, accidents and the laws which govern them; but through
want of a thoroughly scientific basis, it could not advance far in its
researches, nor succeed in dispelling entirely the overhanging obscurity
which springs from diversities of belief.
I do not, however, deny that it has had a more satisfactory result for
others; on the contrary, I admit that it has; but it is by introducing
the principle of authority in matters which are not self-evident.
Moreover, my object is to explain my own mental attitude and not to
dispute with those who have found healing for themselves. Remedies vary
according to the nature of the disease; those which benefit some may
injure others.
* * * * *
PHILOSOPHY.—How far it is open to censure or not—On what points its
adherents may be considered believers or unbelievers, orthodox or
heretical—What they have borrowed from the true doctrine to render their
chimerical theories acceptable—Why the minds of men swerve from the
truth—What criteria are available wherewith to separate the pure gold
from the alloy in their systems.
I proceeded from the study of scholastic theology to that of philosophy.
It was plain to me that, in order to discover where the professors of
any branch of knowledge have erred, one must make a profound study of
that science; must equal, nay surpass, those who know most of it, so as
to penetrate into secrets of it unknown to them. Only by this method
can they be completely answered, and of this method I can find no trace
in the theologians of Islam. In theological writings devoted to the
refutation of philosophy I have only found a tangled mass of phrases full
of contradictions and mistakes, and incapable of deceiving, I will not
say a critical mind, but even the common crowd. Convinced that to dream
of refuting a doctrine before having thoroughly comprehended it was like
shooting at an object in the dark, I devoted myself zealously to the
study of philosophy; but in books only and without the aid of a teacher.
I gave up to this work all the leisure remaining from teaching and from
composing works on law. There were then attending my lectures three
hundred of the students of Bagdad. With the help of God, these studies,
carried on in secret, so to speak, put me in a condition to thoroughly
comprehend philosophical systems within a space of two years. I then
spent about a year in meditating on these systems after having thoroughly
understood them. I turned them over and over in my mind till they were
thoroughly clear of all obscurity. In this manner I acquired a complete
knowledge of all their subterfuges and subtleties, of what was truth and
what was illusion in them.
I now proceed to give a resumé of these doctrines. I ascertained that
they were divided into different varieties, and that their adherents
might be ranged under diverse heads. All, in spite of their diversity,
are marked with the stamp of infidelity and irreligion, although there
is a considerable difference between the ancient and modern, between the
first and last of these philosophers, according as they have missed or
approximated to the truth in a greater or less degree.
CONCERNING THE PHILOSOPHICAL SECTS AND THE STIGMA OF INFIDELITY WHICH
ATTACHES TO THEM ALL
The philosophical systems, in spite of their number and variety, may be
reduced to three: (1) The Materialists; (2) The Naturalists; (3) The
Theists.
(1) _The Materialists._ They reject an intelligent and omnipotent Creator
and Disposer of the Universe. In their view the world exists from all
eternity and had no author. The animal comes from semen and semen from
the animal; so it has always been and will always be; those who maintain
this doctrine are atheists.
(2) _The Naturalists._ These devote themselves to the study of nature and
of the marvellous phenomena of the animal and vegetable world. Having
carefully analysed animal organs with the help of anatomy, struck with
the wonders of God’s work and with the wisdom therein revealed, they are
forced to admit the existence of a wise Creator Who knows the end and
purpose of everything. And certainly no one can study anatomy and the
wonderful mechanism of living things without being obliged to confess
the profound wisdom of Him Who has framed the bodies of animals and
especially of man. But carried away by their natural researches they
believed that the existence of a being absolutely depended upon the
proper equilibrium of its organism. According to them, as the latter
perishes and is destroyed, so is the thinking faculty which is bound
up with it; and as they assert that the restoration of a thing once
destroyed to existence is unthinkable, they deny the immortality of the
soul. Consequently they deny heaven, hell, resurrection, and judgment.
Acknowledging neither a recompense for good deeds nor a punishment for
evil ones, they fling off all authority and plunge into sensual pleasures
with the avidity of brutes. These also ought to be called atheists, for
the true faith depends not only on the acknowledgment of God, but of His
Apostle and of the Day of Judgment. And although they acknowledge God and
His attributes, they deny a judgment to come.
(3) Next come the _Theists_. Among them should be reckoned Socrates, who
was the teacher of Plato as Plato was of Aristotle. This latter drew up
for his disciples the rules of logic, organised the sciences, elucidated
what was formerly obscure, and expounded what had not been understood.
This school refuted the systems of the two others, i.e. the Materialists
and Naturalists; but in exposing their mistaken and perverse beliefs,
they made use of arguments which they should not. “God suffices to
protect the faithful in war” (_Koran_, xxxiii. 25).
Aristotle also contended with success against the theories of Plato,
Socrates, and the theists who had preceded him, and separated himself
entirely from them; but he could not eliminate from his doctrine the
stains of infidelity and heresy which disfigure the teaching of his
predecessors. We should therefore consider them all as unbelievers, as
well as the so-called Mussulman philosophers, such as Ibn Sina (Avicenna)
and Farabi, who have adopted their systems.
Let us, however, acknowledge that among Mussulman philosophers none
have better interpreted the doctrine of Aristotle than the latter. What
others have handed down as his teaching is full of error, confusion,
and obscurity adapted to disconcert the reader. The unintelligible can
neither be accepted nor rejected. The philosophy of Aristotle, all
serious knowledge of which we owe to the translation of these two learned
men, may be divided into three portions: the first contains matter justly
chargeable with impiety, the second is tainted with heresy, and the third
we are obliged to reject absolutely. We proceed to details:
DIVISIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHIC SCIENCES
These sciences, in relation to the aim we have set before us, may be
divided into six sections: (1) Mathematics; (2) Logic; (3) Physics; (4)
Metaphysics; (5) Politics; (6) Moral Philosophy.
Mathematics comprises the knowledge of calculation, geometry, and
cosmography: it has no connection with the religious sciences, and proves
nothing for or against religion; it rests on a foundation of proofs
which, once known and understood, cannot be refuted. Mathematics tend,
however, to produce two bad results.
The first is this: Whoever studies this science admires the subtlety and
clearness of its proofs. His confidence in philosophy increases, and he
thinks that all its departments are capable of the same clearness and
solidity of proof as mathematics. But when he hears people speak of the
unbelief and impiety of mathematicians, of their professed disregard for
the Divine Law, which is notorious, it is true that, out of regard for
authority, he echoes these accusations, but he says to himself at the
same time that, if there was truth in religion, it would not have escaped
those who have displayed so much keenness of intellect in the study of
mathematics.
Next, when he becomes aware of the unbelief and rejection of religion
on the part of these learned men, he concludes that to reject religion
is reasonable. How many of such men gone astray I have met whose sole
argument was that just mentioned. And supposing one puts to them the
following objection: “It does not follow that a man who excels in one
branch of knowledge excels in all others, nor that he should be equally
versed in jurisprudence, theology, and medicine. It is possible to be
entirely ignorant of metaphysics, and yet to be an excellent grammarian.
There are past masters in every science who are entirely ignorant of
other branches of knowledge. The arguments of the ancient philosophers
are rigidly demonstrative in mathematics and only conjectural in
religious questions. In order to ascertain this one must proceed to a
thorough examination of the matter.” Supposing, I say, one makes the
above objection to these “apes of unbelief,” they find it distasteful.
Falling a prey to their passions, to a besotted vanity, and the wish to
pass for learned men, they persist in maintaining the pre-eminence of
mathematicians in all branches of knowledge. This is a serious evil, and
for this reason those who study mathematics should be checked from going
too far in their researches. For though far removed as it may be from the
things of religion, this study, serving as it does as an introduction to
the philosophic systems, casts over religion its malign influence. It is
rarely that a man devotes himself to it without robbing himself of his
faith and casting off the restraints of religion.
The second evil comes from the sincere but ignorant Mussulman who thinks
the best way to defend religion is by rejecting all the exact sciences.
Accusing their professors of being astray, he rejects their theories
of the eclipses of the sun and moon, and condemns them in the name of
religion. These accusations are carried far and wide, they reach the
ears of the philosopher who knows that these theories rest on infallible
proofs; far from losing confidence in them, he believes, on the contrary,
that Islam has ignorance and the denial of scientific proofs for its
basis, and his devotion to philosophy increases with his hatred to
religion.
It is therefore a great injury to religion to suppose that the defence of
Islam involves the condemnation of the exact sciences. The religious law
contains nothing which approves them or condemns them, and in their turn
they make no attack on religion. The words of the Prophet, “The sun and
the moon are two signs of the power of God; they are not eclipsed for the
birth or the death of any one; when you see these signs take refuge in
prayer and invoke the name of God”—these words, I say, do not in any way
condemn the astronomical calculations which define the orbits of these
two bodies, their conjunction and opposition according to particular
laws. But as for the so-called tradition, “When God reveals Himself in
anything, He abases Himself thereto,” it is unauthentic, and not found in
any trustworthy collection of the traditions.
Such is the bearing and the possible danger of mathematics.
(2) _Logic._ This science, in the same manner, contains nothing for or
against religion. Its object is the study of different kinds of proofs
and syllogisms, the conditions which should hold between the premises of
a proposition, the way to combine them, the rules of a good definition,
and the art of formulating it. For knowledge consists of conceptions
which spring from a definition or of convictions which arise from proofs.
There is therefore nothing censurable in this science, and it is laid
under contribution by theologians as well as by philosophers. The only
difference is that the latter use a particular set of technical formulæ
and that they push their divisions and subdivisions further.
It may be asked, What, then, this has to do with the grave questions
of religion, and on what ground opposition should be offered to the
methods of logic? The objector, it will be said, can only inspire the
logician with an unfavourable opinion of the intelligence and faith of
his adversary, since the latter’s faith seems to be based upon such
objections. But, it must be admitted, logic is liable to abuse. Logicians
demand in reasoning certain conditions which lead to absolute certainty,
but when they touch on religious questions, they can no longer postulate
these conditions, and ought therefore to relax their habitual rigour. It
happens, accordingly, that a student who is enamoured of the evidential
methods of logic, hearing his teachers accused of irreligion, believes
that this irreligion reposes on proofs as strong as those of logic, and
immediately, without attempting the study of metaphysics, shares their
mistake. This is a serious disadvantage arising from the study of logic.
(3) _Physics._ The object of this science is the study of the bodies
which compose the universe: the sky and the stars, and, here below,
simple elements such as air, earth, water, fire, and compound
bodies—animals, plants and minerals; the reasons of their changes,
developments, and intermixture. By the nature of its researches it is
closely connected with the study of medicine, the object of which is
the human body, its principal and secondary organs, and the law which
governs their changes. Religion having no fault to find with medical
science cannot justly do so with physical, except on some special
matters which we have mentioned in the work entitled _The Destruction
of the Philosophers_. Besides these primary questions, there are some
subordinate ones depending on them, on which physical science is open
to objection. But all physical science rests, as we believe, on the
following principle: Nature is entirely subject to God; incapable of
acting by itself, it is an instrument in the hand of the Creator; sun,
moon, stars, and elements are subject to God and can produce nothing of
themselves. In a word, nothing in nature can act spontaneously and apart
from God.
(4) _Metaphysics._ This is the fruitful breeding-ground of the errors
of philosophers. Here they can no longer satisfy the laws of rigorous
argumentation such as logic demands, and this is what explains the
disputes which arise between them in the study of metaphysics. The system
most closely akin to the system of the Muhammedan doctors is that of
Aristotle as expounded to us by Farabi and Avicenna. The sum total of
their errors can be reduced to twenty propositions: three of them are
irreligious, and the other seventeen heretical. It was in order to combat
their system that we wrote the work _Destruction of the Philosophers_.
The three propositions in which they are opposed to all the doctrines of
Islam are the following:
(1) Bodies do not rise again; spirits alone will be rewarded or punished;
future punishments will be therefore spiritual and not physical. They are
right in admitting spiritual punishments, for there will be such; but
they are wrong in rejecting physical punishments, and contradicting in
this manner the assertions of the Divine Law.
(2) “God takes cognisance of universals, not of specials.” This is
manifestly irreligious. The Koran asserts truly, “Not an atom’s weight in
heaven or earth can escape His knowledge” (x. 62).
(3) They maintain that the universe exists from all eternity and will
never end.
None of these propositions have ever been admitted by Moslems.
Besides this, they deny that God has attributes, and maintain that He
knows by His essence only and not by means of any attribute accessory to
His essence. In this point they approach the doctrine of the Mutazilites,
doctrines which we are not obliged to condemn as irreligious. On the
contrary, in our work entitled _Criteria of the differences which divide
Islam from Atheism_, we have proved the wrongness of those who accuse of
irreligion everything which is opposed to their way of looking at things.
(5) _Political Science._ The professors of this confine themselves to
drawing up the rules which regulate temporal matters and the royal power.
They have borrowed their theories on this point from the books which God
has revealed to His prophets and from the sentences of ancient sages,
gathered by tradition.
(6) _Moral Philosophy._ The professors of this occupy themselves with
defining the attributes and qualities of the soul, grouping them
according to genus and species, and pointing out the way to moderate
and control them. They have borrowed this system from the Sufis. These
devout men, who are always engaged in invoking the name of God, in
combating concupiscence and following the way of God by renouncing the
pleasures of this world, have received, while in a state of ecstasy,
revelations regarding the qualities of the soul, its defects and its evil
inclinations. These revelations they have published, and the philosophers
making use of them have introduced them into their own systems in order
to embellish and give currency to their falsehoods. In the times of the
philosophers, as at every other period, there existed some of these
fervent mystics. God does not deprive this world of them, for they
are its sustainers, and they draw down to it the blessings of heaven
according to the tradition: “It is by them that you obtain rain, it is
by them that you receive your subsistence.” Such were “the Companions of
the Cave,” who lived in ancient times, as related by the Koran (xviii.).
Now this mixture of moral and philosophic doctrine with the words of the
Prophet and those of the Sufis gives rise to two dangers, one for the
upholder of those doctrines, the other for their opponent.
The danger for their opponent is serious. A narrow-minded man, finding in
their writings moral philosophy mixed with unsupported theories, believes
that he ought to entirely reject them and to condemn those who profess
them. Having only heard them from their mouth he does not hesitate in
his ignorance to declare them false because those who teach them are in
error. It is as if some one was to reject the profession of faith made
by Christians, “There is only one God and Jesus is His prophet,” simply
because it proceeds from Christians and without inquiring whether it
is the profession of this creed or the denial of Muhammed’s prophetic
mission which makes Christians infidels. Now, if they are only infidels
because of their rejection of our prophet, we are not entitled to reject
those of their doctrines which do not wear the stamp of infidelity. In
a word, truth does not cease to be true because it is found among them.
Such, however, is the tendency of weak minds: they judge the truth
according to its professors instead of judging its professors by the
standard of the truth. But a liberal spirit will take as its guide this
maxim of the Prince of believers, Ali the son of Abu Talib: “Do not seek
for the truth by means of men; find first the truth and then you will
recognise those who follow it.” This is the procedure followed by a wise
man. Once in possession of the truth he examines the basis of various
doctrines which come before him, and when he has found them true, he
accepts them without troubling himself whether the person who teaches
them is sincere or a deceiver. Much rather, remembering how gold is
buried in the bowels of the earth, he endeavours to disengage the truth
from the mass of errors in which it is engulfed. The skilled coin-assayer
plunges without hesitation his hand into the purse of the coiner of false
money, and, relying on experience, separates good coins from bad. It is
the ignorant rustic, and not the experienced assayer, who will ask why
we should have anything to do with a false coiner. The unskilled swimmer
must be kept away from the seashore, not the expert in diving. The child,
not the charmer, must be forbidden to handle serpents.
As a matter of fact, men have such a good opinion of themselves, of their
mental superiority and intellectual depth; they believe themselves so
skilled in discerning the true from the false, the path of safety from
those of error, that they should be forbidden as much as possible the
perusal of philosophic writings, for though they sometimes escape the
danger just pointed out, they cannot avoid that which we are about to
indicate.
Some of the maxims found in my works regarding the mysteries of
religion have met with objectors of an inferior rank in science, whose
intellectual penetration is insufficient to fathom such depths. They
assert that these maxims are borrowed from the ancient philosophers,
whereas the truth is that they are the fruit of my own meditations, but
as the proverb says, “Sandal follows the impress of sandal.”[1] Some of
them are found in our books of religious law, but the greater part are
derived from the writings of the Sufis.
But even if they were borrowed exclusively from the doctrines of the
philosophers, is it right to reject an opinion when it is reasonable in
itself, supported by solid proofs, and contradicting neither the Koran
nor the traditions? If we adopt this method and reject every truth which
has chanced to have been proclaimed by an impostor, how many truths we
should have to reject! How many verses of the Koran and traditions of the
prophets and Sufi discourses and maxims of sages we must close our ears
to because the author of the _Treatise of the Brothers of Purity_ has
inserted them in his writings in order to further his cause, and in order
to lead minds gradually astray in the paths of error! The consequence of
this procedure would be that impostors would snatch truths out of our
hands in order to embellish their own works. The wise man, at least,
should not make common cause with the bigot blinded by ignorance.
Honey does not become impure because it may happen to have been placed in
the glass which the surgeon uses for cupping purposes. The impurity of
blood is due, not to its contact with this glass, but to a peculiarity
inherent in its own nature; this peculiarity, not existing in honey,
cannot be communicated to it by its being placed in the cupping glass;
it is therefore wrong to regard it as impure. Such is, however, the
whimsical way of looking at things found in nearly all men. Every word
proceeding from an authority which they approve is accepted by them,
even were it false; every word proceeding from one whom they suspect
is rejected, even were it true. In every case they judge of the truth
according to its professors and not of men according to the truth which
they profess, a _ne plus ultra_ of error. Such is the peril in which
philosophy involves its opponents.
The second danger threatens those who accept the opinions of the
philosophers. When, for instance, we read the treatises of the “Brothers
of purity” and other works of the same kind, we find in them sentences
spoken by the Prophet and quotations from the Sufis. We approve these
works; we give them our confidence; and we finish by accepting the errors
which they contain, because of the good opinion of them with which they
have inspired us at the outset. Thus, by insensible degrees, we are
led astray. In view of this danger the reading of philosophic writings
so full of vain and delusive utopias should be forbidden, just as the
slippery banks of a river are forbidden to one who knows not how to
swim. The perusal of these false teachings must be prevented just as one
prevents children from touching serpents. A snake-charmer himself will
abstain from touching snakes in the presence of his young child, because
he knows that the child, believing himself as clever as his father,
will not fail to imitate him; and in order to lend more weight to his
prohibition the charmer will not touch a serpent under the eyes of his
son.
Such should be the conduct of a learned man who is also wise. But the
snake-charmer, after having taken the serpent and separated the venom
from the antidote, having put the latter on one side and destroyed the
venom, ought not to withhold the antidote from those who need it. In the
same way the skilled coin-assayer, after having put his hand in the bag
of the false coiner, taken out the good coins and thrown away the bad
ones, ought not to refuse the good to those who need and ask for it.
Such should be the conduct of the learned man. If the patient feels a
certain dislike of the antidote because he knows that it is taken from
a snake whose body is the receptacle of poison, he should be disabused
of his fallacy. If a beggar hesitates to take a piece of gold which he
knows comes from the purse of a false coiner, he should be told that his
hesitation is a pure mistake which would deprive him of the advantage
which he seeks. It should be proved to him that the contact of the good
coins with the bad does not injure the former and does not improve the
latter. In the same way the contact of truth with falsehood does not
change truth into falsehood, any more than it changes falsehood into
truth.
Thus much, then, we have to say regarding the inconveniences and dangers
which spring from the study of philosophy.
SUFISM
When I had finished my examination of these doctrines I applied myself
to the study of Sufism. I saw that in order to understand it thoroughly
one must combine theory with practice. The aim which the Sufis set before
them is as follows: To free the soul from the tyrannical yoke of the
passions, to deliver it from its wrong inclinations and evil instincts,
in order that in the purified heart there should only remain room for God
and for the invocation of His holy name.
As it was more easy to learn their doctrine than to practise it, I
studied first of all those of their books which contain it: _The
Nourishment of Hearts_, by Abu Talib of Mecca, the works of Hareth
el Muhasibi, and the fragments which still remain of Junaid, Shibli,
Abu Yezid Bustami and other leaders (whose souls may God sanctify). I
acquired a thorough knowledge of their researches, and I learned all
that was possible to learn of their methods by study and oral teaching.
It became clear to me that the last stage could not be reached by mere
instruction, but only by transport, ecstasy, and the transformation of
the moral being.
To define health and satiety, to penetrate their causes and conditions,
is quite another thing from being well and satisfied. To define
drunkenness, to know that it is caused by vapours which rise from the
stomach and cloud the seat of intelligence, is quite a different thing to
being drunk. The drunken man has no idea of the nature of drunkenness,
just because he is drunk and not in a condition to understand anything,
while the doctor, not being under the influence of drunkenness, knows
its character and laws. Or if the doctor fall ill, he has a theoretical
knowledge of the health of which he is deprived.
In the same way there is a considerable difference between knowing
renouncement, comprehending its conditions and causes, and practising
renouncement and detachment from the things of this world. I saw that
Sufism consists in experiences rather than in definitions, and that what
I was lacking belonged to the domain, not of instruction, but of ecstasy
and initiation.