THE LEGALITY OF THE EQUIPMENT OF THE ALABAMA, AND A FEW PRECEDENTS FOR HER
CAREER, DRAWN FROM THE HISTORY OF THE WAR OF 1776.
Before I read my commission on the quarter-deck of the _Alabama_, I desire
to say a word or two as to the legality of her equipment, and to recall to
the recollection of the reader a few of the incidents of the war of the
Revolution of 1776, to show how inconsistent our Northern brethren have
been, in the denunciations they have hurled against that ship. Mr. Seward,
the Federal Secretary of State, and Mr. Charles Francis Adams, who was the
United States Minister at the Court of St. James, during the late war
between the States, have frequently lost their temper, when they have
spoken of the _Alabama_, and denounced her as a "pirate." In cooler
moments, when they come to read over the intemperate despatches they have
been betrayed into writing, they will probably be ashamed of them
themselves; since these despatches not only contradict the truth of
history, and set at defiance the laws of nations, but stultify themselves
in important particulars.
Great stress has been laid, by both of these gentlemen, on the foreign
origin of the _Alabama_, forgetting entirely, not only what was done by
their ancestors in the war of 1776, but what was attempted to be done by
Mr. Gideon Welles, their own Secretary of the Navy, in the year of grace
1861. I will refresh their memories on both these points, and first, as to
the latter. Mr. Welles attempted to do, nothing more nor less than the
Confederate States Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Mallory, did in the matter
of building the _Alabama_--that is to say, he endeavored to build some
_Alabamas_ in England himself, but failed! This little episode in the
history of the Federal Navy Department is curious, and worthy of being
preserved as a practical commentary on so much of the despatches of
Messrs. Seward and Adams, as relates to the foreign origin of my ship. The
facts were published soon after their occurrence, and have not been, and
cannot be denied. They were given to the public by Mr. Laird, the
gentleman who built the _Alabama_, and who was the party with whom the
Federal Navy Department endeavored to treat.
Mr. Laird was a member of the British Parliament, and having been abused,
without stint, as an aider and abettor of "pirates," by the Northern
newspapers, as soon as it became known that he was the builder of the
_Alabama_, he made a speech in the House of Commons, in defence of
himself, in the course of which he stated the fact I have charged, to wit:
that Mr. Welles endeavored to make a contract with him, for building some
_Federal Alabamas_. Here is so much of his speech as is necessary to
establish the charge:--"In 1861," said he, "just after the war broke out,
a friend of mine, whom I have known for many years, was over here, and
came to me with a view of getting vessels built in this country, for the
American Government--the Northern Government. Its agent in this country
made inquiries; plans and estimates were given to my friend, and
transmitted to the Secretary of the American Navy. I will read an abstract
from this gentleman's letter, dated the 30th of July, 1861. It is written
from Washington, and states:--'Since my arrival here, I have had frequent
interviews with our Department of Naval Affairs, and am happy to say that
the Minister of the Navy is inclined to have an iron-plated ship built out
of the country. This ship is designed for a specific purpose, to
accomplish a definite object. I send you, herewith, a memorandum handed me
last evening from the Department, with the request that I would send it to
you, by steamer's mail of to-morrow, and ask your immediate reply, stating
if you will agree to build such a ship as desired, how soon, and for how
much, with such plans and specifications as you may deem it best to send
me.' The extract from the memorandum states, that the ship is to be
finished complete, with guns and everything appertaining. On the 14th of
August, I received another letter from the same gentleman, from which the
following is an extract:--'I have this morning a note from the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, in which he says, "I hope your friends will tender
for the two iron-plated steamers."' After this, the firm with which I was
lately connected, having made contracts to a large extent with other
persons, stated that they were not in a condition to undertake any orders
to be done in so short a time. This was the reply:--'I sent your last
letter, received yesterday, to the Secretary of the Navy, who was very
desirous to have you build the iron-plated or bomb-proof batteries, and I
trust that he will yet decide to have you build one or more of the
gun-boats.'
"I think, perhaps, in the present state of the law in America, I shall not
be asked to give the name of my correspondent, but he is a gentleman of
the highest respectability. If any honorable member wishes, I shall have
no objection in handing the whole correspondence, with the original
letters, into the hands of you, sir, [the Speaker of the House,] or of the
First Minister of the Crown, in strict confidence, because there are
communications in these letters, respecting the views of the American
Government, which I certainly should not divulge, and which I have not
mentioned or alluded to before. But, seeing the American Government are
making so much work about other parties, whom they charge with violating
or evading the law, when, in reality, they have not done so, I think it
only fair to state these facts."
It thus appears that the Government of the United States preceded us in
the English market, having endeavored, a whole year before the _Alabama_
was built, to contract with Mr. Laird for the building of iron-plated, and
other ships, and that the only reason why the contract was not made, was,
that Mr. Laird had taken already so much work in hand, that he could not
take "any new orders, to be done in so short a time"--as that prescribed
by Mr. Welles, for it seems that he was in a hurry. The explanation
probably is, that we had offered Mr. Laird better terms than Mr. Welles,
and this is the only reason why the _Alabama_ was a Confederate, instead
of a Federal ship! This speech of Mr. Laird caused no little merriment in
the House of Commons, for, as before remarked, the Federal press, knowing
nothing of these secret transactions between Mr. Welles and Mr. Laird,
had been denouncing the latter for building the _Alabama_, in the coarse
and offensive language to which, by this time, it had become accustomed.
The disclosures could not but be ludicrous.
To dispose, now, of Mr. Seward's objection, that the _Alabama_ was
foreign-built. The reader will see, in a moment, that there is nothing in
this objection, when he reflects that a ship of war, in the light in which
we are considering her, is a _personification_, and not a mere material
thing. If her personification be true, and unobjectionable, it matters not
of what materials she may be composed, whence those materials may have
been drawn, or where they may have been fashioned. It is the commission
which a sovereign puts on board a ship, that causes her to personify the
sovereign power, and it is obviously of no importance how the sovereign
becomes possessed of the ship. It can make no difference to other nations,
so far as her character of ship of war is concerned, whether she is
fashioned out of the pines of Norway, or of Florida, or whether the copper
on her bottom comes from Lake Superior or Peru; or, finally, whether
Englishmen, or Frenchmen, or Americans shall have put her frame together,
in either of their respective countries. Even if she be built, armed, and
equipped in neutral territory, in plain violation of the neutral duty of
that territory, she is purged of this offence, so far as her character of
ship of war is concerned, the moment she reaches the high seas, and is
commissioned.
To apply this reasoning to the Alabama. If it be true, as stated by Mr.
Seward, that she was built in England, in violation of the neutrality of
that country, this might have subjected her to detention by England, or it
might have raised a question between the United States and England; but
the ship, having once escaped, and been commissioned, her origin is
necessarily lost sight of, and neither England nor any other country can
afterward inquire into it. Indeed, there can be no principle of the laws
of nations plainer than this, that when a ship is once commissioned by a
sovereign power, no other power can look into the antecedents of the ship.
From the moment that her commission is read on her quarter-deck, she
becomes the personification of the sovereign power, and the sovereign
avows himself responsible for all her acts. No one of these acts can be
impeached on the ground, that antecedently to her becoming a ship of war,
she committed some offence against the laws of nations, or against the
municipal law of some particular nation.
This point was settled years before our war, by the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the case of the _Santissima Trinidad_. It was alleged
that that ship had been fitted out in the United States, in violation of
the neutrality laws--during a war between Spain and her colonies--and the
question arose whether this invalidated her commission, as a ship of war.
Mr. Justice Story delivered the opinion of the court, in the course of
which he said:--
"In general, the commission of a public ship, signed by the proper
authorities of the nation to which she belongs [the nation to which
the _Santissima Trinidad_ belonged, was the _de facto_ nation of
Buenos Ayres] is complete proof of her national character. A bill of
sale is not necessary to be produced, nor will the courts of a
foreign country inquire into the means by which the title to the
property has been acquired. It would be to exert the right of
examining into the validity of the acts of the foreign sovereign, and
to sit in judgment upon them in cases where he has not conceded the
jurisdiction, and where it would be inconsistent with his own
supremacy. The commission, therefore, of a public ship, when duly
authenticated, so far at least as foreign courts are concerned,
imports absolute verity, and the title is not examinable. The
property must be taken to be duly acquired, and cannot be
controverted. This has been the settled practice between nations, and
it is a rule founded in public convenience and policy, and cannot be
broken in upon, without endangering the peace and repose, as well of
neutral as of belligerent sovereigns.
"The commission in the present case is not expressed in the most
unequivocal terms, but its fair import and interpretation must be
deemed to apply to a public ship of the government. If we add to
this, the corroborative testimony of our own, and the British Consul
at Buenos Ayres, as well as that of private citizens, to the
notoriety of her claim of a public character, and her admission into
our own ports as a public ship, with the immunities and privileges
belonging to such a ship, with the express approbation of our own
Government, it does not seem too much to assert, whatever may be the
private suspicion of a _lurking American interest_, that she must be
judicially held to be a public ship of the country, whose commission
she bears."
This was a very strong case. The ship had not only been fitted out in
violation of the neutrality laws of the United States, but the court
intimates that she might also be American owned; but whether she was or
not, was a fact into which the court could not inquire, the commission, in
the language of the court, importing "absolute verity."
But it is not true, as we shall see hereafter, that the _Alabama_ violated
either the laws of nations, or the municipal law of England. The next
question which presents itself for our consideration is, Was the _Alabama_
properly commissioned by a sovereign power? No question has ever been
raised as to the _bona fides_, or form of her commission. Mr. Seward even
has not attacked these. Our question, then, will be reduced to this, Was
she commissioned by a sovereign power? The answer to this question is,
that a _de facto_ government is sovereign, for all the purposes of war,
and that the Confederate States were a _de facto_ government; so
acknowledged by the United States themselves, as well as by the other
nations of the earth. The United States made this acknowledgment, the
moment President Lincoln issued his proclamation declaring a blockade of
the Southern ports; and they acted upon the doctrine that we were
belligerents during the whole war, by treating with us for the exchange of
_prisoners of war_.
This was no concession on their part. We had become strong enough to
compel them to this course, in spite of themselves. In other words, we had
become strong enough to make _war_, and when this is the case, let us see
what Vattel says is the duty of the other party: "The sovereign indeed,
never fails to bestow the appellation of 'rebels' on all such of his
subjects as openly resist him; but when the latter have acquired
sufficient strength to give him effectual opposition, and to oblige him to
carry on the war against them, according to the established rules, he must
necessarily submit to the use of the term 'civil war.' It is foreign to
our purpose in this place, to weigh the reasons which may authorize and
justify a civil war. We have elsewhere treated of cases in which subjects
may resist their sovereign. Setting, therefore, the justice of the case
wholly out of the question, it only remains for us to consider the maxims
which ought to be observed in a civil war and to explain whether the
sovereign is, on such occasions, bound to conform to the established laws
of war. A civil war breaks the bands of society and government, or at
least suspends their force and effect; it produces in the nation two
independent parties, which consider each other as enemies, and acknowledge
no common judge. These two parties, therefore, must necessarily be
considered as constituting, at least for a time, two separate bodies, two
distinct societies. Though one of the parties may have been to blame in
breaking the unity of the State, and resisting the lawful authority, they
are not the less divided in fact. Besides, who shall judge them? Who shall
pronounce on which side the right or wrong lies? On earth they have no
common superior. They stand, therefore, in precisely the same predicament
as two nations, who engage in a contest, and being unable to come to an
agreement, have recourse to arms." This was the law of nations as
expounded by Vattel more than a century ago. He tells us that when even a
revolt or rebellion has acquired sufficient magnitude and strength, to
make "effectual opposition to the sovereign," it is the duty of that
sovereign to talk of "civil war," and not of "rebellion," and to cease to
call his former subjects "rebels." How much more was it the duty of the
Northern States, in a war which was a war from the beginning, waged by
States against States, with all the forms and solemnities of war, and with
none of the characteristics of a secret revolt or rebellion, to treat us
as belligerents, even if they denied the _de jures_ of our movement? But
even according to the law laid down by Vattel, the United States, and the
Confederate States stood "precisely in the same predicament," with regard
to all the rights, duties, and obligations growing out of the war. That is
to say, they were, _quoad_ the war, the equals, one of the other, and
whatever one of them might do, the other might do.
Hence it follows, that if the United States could build _Alabamas_, and
capture the ships of her enemy, so could the Confederate States. And if
Mr. Welles, the Federal Secretary of the Navy, could go into the
ship-yards on the Mersey, and endeavor to contract for the delivery to him
of a ship or ships of war, "to be finished complete," in the words of Mr.
Laird's correspondent, "with guns, and everything appertaining," it is
difficult to perceive, why Mr. Mallory, the Secretary of the Confederate
States Navy, might not go into the same ship-yards, and contract for the
delivery to him, of an incomplete ship, without any guns at all!
But further, with reference to the right of the Confederate States to be
regarded as a _de facto_ government, invested with all the rights of war.
The Supreme Court of the enemy himself affirmed this right, early in the
war. When the Federal naval officers--the Southern renegades, who have
been before alluded to, among the rest--began to grow rich by the capture
of blockade runners, it became necessary, of course, to condemn the prizes
before they could get hold of their prize-money. Some of these cases went
up to the Supreme Court, on writ of error, and I shall quote from a case,
known as the "Prize Case," reported in 2d Black, 635. This case was
decided as early as the December Term, 1862, and Mr. Justice Greer
delivered the opinion of the court. The question arose upon the capture of
some English ships which had attempted to run the blockade. These ships
could not be condemned, unless there was a lawful blockade, which they had
attempted to break; and there could not be a lawful blockade, unless there
was a war, and not a mere insurrection, as Mr. Seward, with puerile
obstinacy, had so long maintained; and there could not be a war without,
at least, two parties to it, both of whom must be belligerents; and it is
of the essence of belligerency, as has been seen, that the parties
belligerent should be equal, with reference to all the objects of the war.
The vessels were claimed by the neutral owners, on Mr. Seward's own
ground, to wit: that the war, not being a war, but an insurrection, there
could be no such thing as a blockade predicated of it. Mr. Justice Greer,
in delivering the opinion of the court, among other things said: "It [the
war] is not the less a civil war, with belligerent parties in hostile
array, because it may be called an 'insurrection' by one side, and the
insurgents be considered as rebels and traitors. It is not necessary that
the independence of the revolted Province or State be acknowledged, in
order to constitute it a party belligerent in a war, according to the laws
of nations. Foreign nations acknowledge it as a war, by a declaration of
neutrality. The condition of neutrality cannot exist, unless there be two
belligerent parties. In the case of the _Santissima Trinidad_ (7 Wheaton,
337) this court says: 'The Government of the United States has recognized
the existence of a civil war between Spain and her colonies, and has
avowed her determination to remain neutral between the parties. Each party
is, therefore, deemed by us a belligerent, having, so far as concerns us,
the sovereign rights of war.'"
The belligerent character of the Confederate States was thus acknowledged
by the highest judicial tribunal of the United States, and the prizes were
condemned to the captors; and a precedent is cited by the court, in which
the United States recognized the right of the revolted Spanish colonies,
such as Columbia, Buenos Ayres, and Mexico, who were then in _consimili
casu_ with the Confederate States, to build and equip _Alabamas_ to prey
upon Spanish commerce, not as a mere matter of power simply, but in the
exercise of the "sovereign rights of war," under the laws of nations.
With regard to the new American republics, thus acknowledged by the United
States as belligerents, it will be recollected that one of the first acts
of Mr. John Quincy Adams, when he became President of the United States,
was to recommend the passage of a law authorizing him to send members to a
Congress of all the American States, to be assembled at Panama. Under this
law, members of that Congress were actually appointed--though they never
proceeded to their destination--and Mr. Clay, then Secretary of State, and
who had been among the foremost to advocate the recognition of the
independence of the South American republics, prepared an elaborate and
eloquent letter of instructions for their guidance, in which he dwelt upon
the very principles I am now invoking. The republics, whose ambassadors it
was thus proposed to meet, in an _International Congress_, were nothing
more than _de facto_ governments, like the Confederate States, the
independence of neither one of them having been acknowledged, as yet, by
Spain.
I may further mention, as a matter of historical notoriety, that it was a
common practice for the cruisers of those young republics, to carry their
prizes into the ports of the United States, and there have them condemned
and sold. The _Santissima Trinidad_ referred to in the case from the
Supreme Court above quoted, was one of these cruisers, with nothing more
behind her than a _de facto_ government, and she was held to be a
belligerent, and to be possessed, as such, of all the "sovereign rights of
war," under the laws of nations. What renders these transactions the more
remarkable, in the light of recent events, and in the face of the
denunciations which have been hurled against the _Alabama_ by the Federal
Government, because of her foreign origin, is, that most of these cruisers
were, in fact, _American_ ships, not only built and equipped in the United
States, but officered and manned by citizens of the Northern States, who
had gone southward in quest of plunder! Many of these ships were fitted
out on speculation, in the United States, and sailed from Boston, New
York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, _fully armed_ and _equipped for war_,
with enlisted crews on board.
A case of this kind came under my own actual observation. I was serving as
a midshipman on board the old sailing sloop-of-war _Erie_. We happened in
at the Swedish Island of St. Bartholomew, in the West Indies, during the
war between Buenos Ayres and Spain. We were on our way from New York to
one of the South American ports, to land General William H. Harrison,
afterward President of the United States, who had been appointed, by
President John Quincy Adams, Minister to Colombia. In St. Bartholomew we
found at anchor a Buenos Ayrean cruiser called the _Federal_. This was a
Baltimore-built schooner--Baltimore in those days being famous above all
the other American ports, for building fast vessels of this class. Her
captain, and all her officers, and a large proportion of her crew, were
Americans. This vessel, we ascertained, had boarded an American ship a few
days before, and taken from on board of her a portion of her cargo, under
the pretence that it was Spanish property. This being in our view a
violation of the laws of nations (as whether the property was Spanish or
not, we held that "free ships made free goods"), we resolved to commit one
of those outrages against neutral rights which have become so common in
our day, by seizing the cruiser. Admitting the act of the cruiser to have
been wrongful, the argument, so far as her seizure by us was concerned,
was all against us, and might have been contained in a "nutshell;" but
our captain, if he had ever read any international law, which was
exceedingly doubtful, had read it, like Wilkes, wrong end foremost, and
"went it blind," being quite sure of popular applause from the b'hoys at
home, and standing in no fear of consequences so far as Buenos Ayres was
concerned, as she was so weak that the Great Republic might kick her with
impunity.
We first demanded her of the Governor of the island, as a "pirate." The
Governor replied, that she was a commissioned ship, with a _de facto_
government behind her, and that she could not, so long as she retained
this character, be guilty of piracy. Further, that if she were a pirate,
she was _hostis humani generis_, and Sweden, within whose waters she was,
was as competent to deal with her, as the United States. He ended by
informing us, that in whatever category the vessel might be placed, being
in neutral jurisdiction, she could not be dealt with forcibly by the
captain of the _Erie_, and notified us, that if we attempted it, he would
fire upon us. The _Federal_ was moored under the guns of the fortification
which protected the harbor, and the following night, we fitted out a boat
expedition, pulled in under cover of the darkness--the night being black
and squally--and boarded her, and brought her out; the Governor being as
good as his word, and firing upon us, though without effect, as soon as he
discovered the movement. This was my first indoctrination in the laws of
the sea! and the first occasion on which I ever heard a shot fired in
anger. Sweden remonstrated, and the United States apologized, and there
the matter ended. I have mentioned the incident to show, that the very
cruisers which the Supreme Court of the United States was protecting by
its decisions, were nothing more than American vessels, under belligerent
flags, holding commissions under _de facto_ governments.
But I have another precedent or two, to which to call the attention of the
reader. It is a very useful practice for nations to pause occasionally,
and look back upon their own history. It teaches them many lessons, which
they would not otherwise learn. It shows them how to avoid
inconsistencies, and prevents them from becoming dishonest as
circumstances change. But, above all, it teaches them that man is a poor,
weak creature, selfish and corrupt, guided by the instincts and
inspirations of the moment; and that his reason--that God-like attribute,
which distinguishes him from the brute--is so fallible, that he rarely
sees a truth, if that truth militate against his supposed interests. It
makes all the difference in the world, whether a man's bull gores his
neighbor's ox, or his neighbor's bull gores his ox. The Yankee ship-owners
and ship-masters cried out, in pain, as the _Sumter_ and _Alabama_ were
capturing and destroying their ships, and called both of these cruisers
"pirates." I design now to show how the Yankee ship-owners and
ship-masters, of a generation or two back, captured and burned English
ships, and took great credit to themselves for their exploits, not
dreaming that they were pirates.
The precedents which I design to cite will be drawn from the history of
the war of 1776; it will be necessary, therefore to run a brief parallel
between that war and the war of 1861, to show that the precedents
established in the former are applicable to the circumstances of the
latter. To lay aside, entirely, the question of the right of the Southern
States to secede, and to put the war between the States on no higher
ground than that between the Colonies and Great Britain, which was a mere
rebellion, the following parallel appears:--The original thirteen
Colonies, when they formed a part of the British Government, declared
their independence of that Government. The Confederate States did the same
against the United States. Great Britain made war upon the Colonies in
consequence of this declaration; so did the United States against the
Confederate States. The Colonies claimed and exercised the rights of war.
So did the Confederate States. The Colonies, in the exercise of these
rights, destroyed much of the commerce of Great Britain. So did the
Confederate States, with regard to the United States. Both the Colonies
and the Confederate States were _de facto_ governments, when this property
was destroyed. Now, it can obviously make no difference that the Colonies
achieved their independence, and that the Confederate States failed to
achieve theirs. If what the Colonies did _was right, when they did
it_--that is to say, when they were still a _de facto_ government--what
the Confederate States did must have been right for the same reason. The
acknowledgment of the independence of the Colonies by the parent country,
whilst it had the effect to make them so many nations of the earth, could
add nothing to any rights they before possessed, as belligerents, for they
did not derive these rights from their status _de jure_, but from their
status _de facto_; nor did they derive them from Great Britain, but from
the laws of nations. It follows, that if nothing could be added to these
rights by the successful termination of the war, so nothing could be taken
away from them, by its unsuccessful termination. The parallel thus appears
perfect, in every particular, so far as belligerent rights are concerned,
and, of course, it is only of these rights that we are now speaking.
With this introduction I proceed to produce the precedents. Mr. James
Fenimore Cooper, the Naval Historian of the United States, is the author
whom I shall quote, and his authority will certainly not be disputed north
of the Potomac. One of the earliest cruises of the war of 1776, was made
by Captain, afterward Commodore, John Paul Jones. This gentleman, in
command of a vessel called the _Providence_, in the summer of 1776, made a
foray among the British fishermen, on the Banks of Newfoundland, taking no
less than twelve sail, and returning to Newport, in Rhode Island, at the
end of his cruise, having made sixteen prizes in all. The _Alabama_ never
flew at such small game as this. Although she cruised, as the reader will
see a little further on, for some time off these same Banks of
Newfoundland, she never deprived a Yankee fisherman of his "catch of cod."
Jones commanded a regular ship of war, but it was the privateers that were
the most numerous and destructive. With reference to this class of
vessels, the historian tells us that "Most of the Colonies had their
respective cruisers at sea or on their own coasts, and the ocean literally
began to swarm with privateers from all parts of the country, though New
England took the lead in that species of warfare. Robert Morris, in one of
his official letters, of a date later than that precise time, remarks that
the passion for privateering was so strong in this particular part of the
country, that even agriculture was abandoned in order to pursue it."
In another place, the historian tells us, that "As soon as the struggle
commenced in earnest, the habits of the people, their aptitude for
sea-service, and the advantages of both a public and _private_ nature,
that were to be obtained from successful cruising, induced thousands to
turn their longing eyes to an element that promised so many flattering
results. Nothing but the caution of Congress, which body was indisposed at
first to act as if general warfare, instead of a redress of grievances,
was its object, prevented a rushing toward the _private cruisers_, that
would probably have given the commerce of England a heavier and more
sudden blow than it had ever yet received. But a different policy was
pursued, and the orders to capture, first issued, were confined to vessels
bringing stores and supplies to the British forces in America. It was as
late as November, 1775, before Massachusetts, the colony which was the
seat of war, and which may be said to have taken the lead in the revolt,
established Courts of Admiralty, and enacted laws for the encouragement of
nautical enterprise."
The reader observes, from the above passage, from the historian, how
"circumstances alter cases." The "nautical enterprise" here spoken of, is
the same kind of nautical enterprise which has been charged, by virtuous
Massachusetts, whose people were in such haste to grow rich by
privateering, against the _Alabama_, as "piracy." The rush was not, it
seems, to the ships of war of the regular navy, to fight the battles of
the country, but to the privateers, which promised so many "flattering
results." It took a little time to warm the Congress and the people up to
their work, but when they were once fairly warmed, they took their jackets
off and went at it with a will, as is the wont of us Americans.
Let us dip a little further into Mr. Cooper, and see what more, these
staid New Englanders, who now have such a horror of "piracy," did. "The
proceedings in Congress," he continues, "in reference to assailing British
commerce, as has been seen, were reserved and cautious. War not being
regularly declared, and accommodation far from hopeless, the year 1775 was
suffered to pass away, without granting letters of marque and reprisal,
for it was the interest of the nation to preserve as many friends in
England as possible. As the breach widened, this forbearing policy was
abandoned, and the summer of 1776 let loose the nautical enterprise of the
country upon British commerce. The effect was at first astounding. Never
before had England found an enemy so destructive to her trade, and during
the first two years of privateering that followed, something like eight
hundred sail of merchantmen were captured. After this period, the efforts
of the Americans necessarily lessened, while the precautions of the enemy
increased. Still these enterprises proved destructive to the end of the
war; and it is a proof of the efficiency of this class of cruisers to the
last, that small privateers constantly sailed out of the English ports,
with a view to make money by recapturing their own vessels; the trade of
America at this time, offering but few inducements to such undertakings.
"Among the vessels employed [the historian tells us there were several
hundred of them], the _Halker_, the _Black Prince_, the _Pickering_, the
_Wild Cat_, the _Vengeance_, the _Marlborough_, in addition to those
elsewhere named, were very conspicuous. The _Marlborough_ is said to have
made twenty-eight prizes in one cruise. Other vessels were scarcely less
fortunate. Many sharp actions occurred, and quite as often to the
advantage of the cruisers, as to that of the enemy. In repeated instances
they escaped from British ships of war, under favorable circumstances, and
there is no question that in a few cases they captured them. * * * The
English West India trade, in particular, suffered largely by the private
warfare of the day. Two and fifty sail, engaged in this branch of the
commerce, are stated to have been captured as early as February, 1777. The
whole number of captures made by the Americans in this contest, is not
probably known, but six hundred and fifty prizes are said to have been
gotten into port. Many others were ransomed, and _some were destroyed at
sea_. There can be no minute accuracy in these statements, but the injury
done to the commerce of Great Britain was enormous, and there can be no
doubt, that the constant hazards it ran, had a direct influence in
obtaining the acknowledgment of the independence of the United States of
America, which great event took place on the 20th of January, 1783."
We thus see how history repeats itself, and how prone men are to forget
history. The "rebel pirates" of the Colonies--for such they were, if we
apply to them the polite nomenclature which became fashionable during our
late war--less than a century ago, were capturing, burning, and otherwise
destroying the commerce of Great Britain. The historian dwells upon the
record with pleasure, as an evidence of the patriotism, and "nautical
enterprise" of his countrymen; and this was but natural in the historian
of a commercial people. But when the commerce of the same people becomes
the object of capture, in a war far more justifiable, than the war of
1776, since it was waged by sovereign States, in defence of their very
existence, and not a mere rebellion, the cry is changed. It is the wrong
bull now which is goring the ox, and the _Alabama_ and her consorts are
committing unheard-of crimes and atrocities.
I call the reader's particular attention to the fact, that some of the
prizes of the Colonial cruisers were "_destroyed at sea_." This same act
when committed by the _Sumter_ and _Alabama_ was barbarous, atrocious! Now
let me run a brief parallel between the times of Paul Jones, by whom some
of this burning of British ships was done, and my own, to show how much
less excuse Jones had for such conduct, than I. In Jones' day, all the
commerce of the world was conducted in sailing ships, and all the navies
of the world were also composed of sailing ships. The consequence was,
that there was no such thing known, as a stringent blockade; for the
simple reason, that every gale of wind which arose, blew off the
blockading ships from before the blockaded ports, and it was, sometimes,
days before they could regain their stations. Besides, it is well known to
readers of American history, that Great Britain did not, at any time
during the Colonial war, attempt to blockade all the ports of the
Colonies. With a coast-line--from the St. Croix to St. Mary's in
Georgia--of fifteen hundred miles, this would have been impossible, even
with her great navy. The Colonial cruisers had, therefore, at all times
during the entire war, some of their ports open into which to send their
prizes. Still they "_destroyed some of them at sea_."
Some ninety years now pass away, and a second, and a greater war ensues
for American principles--this time between the States themselves. In the
meantime, the great and powerful steamship has made her appearance upon
the scene, revolutionizing not only the commerce of the world, but the
navies of the world. During the first months of the war, all the principal
ports of the Confederacy were blockaded, and it was not long before every
little nook and inlet was either in possession of the enemy, or had one or
more ships watching it. These ships were not the old-time sailing ships,
dependent upon the winds and the weather for efficiency--they were
steamers, independent of both, having the ability "to hold on" to the
blockaded port, both by day and by night, with a tenacity little less than
that of fate. Though it was possible for fast steam blockade-runners,
taking advantage of the darkness, sometimes to elude the vigilance of
these patient watchers, it was utterly impossible for a sailing vessel to
do so--and with a rare exception, here and there, all my prizes would be
sailing ships. Not only were all the Confederate ports thus hermetically
sealed to me, but the ports of neutrals had also been closed against me,
as the reader has seen, by unfriendly proclamations and orders in council.
In short, during my whole career upon the sea, _I had not so much as a
single port open to me, into which I could send a prize_.
What was expected of me under these circumstances? I had shown every
disposition, as the reader has seen, to avoid the necessity of burning my
prizes. I had sent prizes, both into Cuba and Venezuela, with the hope
that at least some of the nations of the earth would relent, and let me
in; but the prizes were either handed over to the enemy, on some
fraudulent pretext, or expelled. Unlike Jones, I had no alternative. There
was nothing left for me but to destroy my prizes, and this course had been
forced upon me, by the nations of the earth. How senseless and unjust,
then, was the clamor raised against me on this subject; especially in the
light of the precedents which the enemy himself had set me? Some senseless
prints even went so far as to declare that it was in violation of the laws
of war; but what is it that newspapers will not say, during such a contest
as that through which we have passed, when reason is dethroned by the
passions, and no longer sits in the judgment-seat? The right to destroy is
as perfect, as the right to sell, or make any other disposition of the
captured ship. But has a captor the right to destroy before adjudication?
the reader may ask. Certainly. The enemy has no right to adjudication at
all. Courts of Admiralty are not established for him. He has, and can have
no standing in such court. He cannot even enter an appearance there,
either in person, or by attorney; and if he could, he would have nothing
to show, for his very _status_ as an enemy would be sufficient ground for
condemning all the property he might claim. It is only neutrals who can
claim adjudication, and it is for the benefit of these alone that Courts
of Admiralty have been established. And if any neutrals have suffered in
the late war, for want of adjudication, the fault is with their own
government, and not with the Confederate cruisers, as the reader has just
seen. To instance the Cienfuegos cases: what detriment could have arisen
to Spain, if she had permitted my prizes to remain within her
jurisdiction, in the custody of my own prize agent, until a prize court in
New Orleans, or Mobile could have adjudicated them?