This is a point of great importance. It is here admitted, that the

individual citizens are under an obligation to obey the law which the

State is attempting to annul; but it is affirmed, that they may be

discharged from this obligation by an act of the State annulling the

law, _because_ the same authority which imposed the obligation upon them

has a right to release them from it. It is a matter of high concern for

all who wish to know, and knowing, mean to perform their _duties_, to

inquire how far this principle is true, or, if true, applicable to the

present case.

_The same authority which imposes an obligation must of necessity

possess the right of dispensing with it, or declaring its extent._ This

principle, properly explained, may be received as true. But what is the

authority which imposes the obligation,--for example, to execute a

contract? Does the Vice-President suppose that it is the _will_ of the

parties who make the contract, and that the same will which brought each

of them under the obligation, can, at any time, release him from it?

Does he suppose, for example, that it is the will of the two parties to

a contract of marriage which imposes upon them the obligations incident

to that contract, and that either party can, by a mere act of the will,

exempt him or herself from these obligations? We are quite sure, that

Mr. Calhoun would not himself think of maintaining a doctrine so

monstrous. What then is the authority which imposes the obligation? The

answer is plain. The authority imposing the obligation is the one which

makes the law, from which the obligation results. In ordinary cases,

when the obligation results from the laws of the land, the authority

imposing it is the Government of the country. In the case of contracts

between parties not subject to the same Government, the obligation

results from the moral law, and is imposed by the will of the great

Lawgiver of the Universe. The present is the case of an obligation

resulting from the law of the land. The citizens of South Carolina are

bound to pay the duties required by the existing Tariff, because it is a

part of the law of the land. They were brought under the obligation to

obey the laws of the United States, by the act of the State of South

Carolina, by which she and twelve other States formed themselves into

one body politic, under a common Government, just as an individual is

brought under the obligations resulting from a contract of marriage, by

his own will to enter into it. But the authority imposing the obligation

is in both cases not the will of the party, but the Government of the

country. The Government has the same right to repeal or alter the law

which it had to enact it, and in this sense the principle is true, that

the same authority which imposes the obligation, has a right to dispense

with it or to declare its extent. But the citizens of South Carolina,

whether in their individual or joint capacity, have no more right to

exempt themselves, by any act of their own, from the obligation to obey

the laws which they have come under by adopting the Constitution, or to

declare its extent, than they have to exempt themselves by their own act

from the obligation to support their wives and children, which they have

come under by entering into contracts of marriage. Nor does it make

any difference that the act, by which the citizens of Carolina became

parties to the social compact, was performed by them in their joint and

not in their individual capacity. There are many cases, in which

individuals are brought under obligations of various kinds by acts

partly or entirely independent of their own will. A child is brought

under the obligations which he owes to his parents by an act of theirs,

over which he had no control. Will it be pretended that they have a

right to relieve him from these obligations, or to determine their

extent? A husband is liable for his wife's debts,--a principal is bound

by the acts of his agents,--a ward by those of his guardian:--will it be

pretended that the wife, the agent, the guardian has, either in law or

morals, a dispensing or interpreting power over the obligations which

they have brought upon other individuals by their acts? No person of

sound mind could hazard so extravagant an assertion. Just as

preposterous would it be to imagine, that because the citizens of

Carolina were brought under their obligation to obey the laws by an act

of the State, that is, of themselves in their joint capacity, they have

therefore a right, acting in their joint capacity, to exempt themselves

individually from this obligation. Common sense revolts at the

suggestion. It is really wonderful, that principles so palpably

erroneous should be depended on by a man like Mr. Calhoun, as a

justification for measures of such transcendent importance and fearful

tendency.

The principle that the same authority which imposes an obligation may

dispense with or determine its extent is therefore, rightly understood,

a true and salutary one: but instead of sustaining the Vice-President's

doctrine, it completely refutes the very point which it was employed to

establish. The authority which imposes upon the citizen the obligation

to pay the duties is the Government of the country; and the same

authority only can, by repealing or modifying the law, release him from

this obligation, or in any way affect its character.

We have thus adverted, somewhat in detail, to the principal points in

the Vice-President's exposition, and have endeavored to show that the

doctrine of nullification is, upon the face of it, unconstitutional,

impracticable and of ruinous tendency, and that there is no solid

foundation for the few considerations of an argumentative character, by

which Mr. Calhoun has endeavored to support it. Before taking leave of

the subject, it may be proper to notice some views of a rather more

general description which occupy a considerable portion of his letter,

and are evidently regarded by its author as highly interesting and

important.

It has often been objected, and as we conceive with great justice, to

the pretensions of the Carolina politicians, that they contradict the

acknowledged principle of republican Government, that the will of the

majority should govern. That one State should undertake to annul the

proceedings of the whole twenty-four, is a thing plainly at variance

with this received and salutary axiom. In attempting to reply to this

objection, the Vice-President takes a distinction between what he calls

_absolute_ and _concurring majorities_. By the former, he understands

the numerical majority of the citizens taken in the aggregate; by the

latter, a majority of the different sections, classes or interests into

which they are divided. The absolute majority has, as he conceives, a

constant disposition to encroach upon the rights of the minority; and in

order to protect the sections or interests of which the minority is

composed, it is important that each of these sections or interests

should have a voice, as such, in the administration of the Government.

In this country the distinct sections or interests are chiefly the

States; and the doctrine of nullification, in authorizing a single State

to arrest the action of all the rest, although it contravenes the

principle of the absolute, is in perfect accordance with that of the

concurring majority. This latter principle is recognised, according to

the Vice-President, in the political institutions of most of the free

States of all periods. He cites particularly the case of Rome, where the

tribunes, representing the Plebeian class, had a negative upon the acts

of the Senate. In this country, he conceives it to have been the

intention of the framers of the Constitution, that the principle of the

absolute majority should prevail in the ordinary business of

administration, and that of the concurring majority in all questions

belonging to the formation, amendment or construction of the

Constitution. This is the great secret of the 'solidity and beauty of

our admirable system;' and the doctrine of nullification, which proceeds

upon this principle, instead of having a tendency to weaken this system,

on the contrary confirms and carries it into effect in one of its most

essential and salutary provisions.

To reasoning of this kind,--were it even more specious and plausible

than this in our opinion is,--it would be a sufficient answer, that it

is entirely of an abstract and speculative character, and affords of

course no proper basis for important political action. It is, in fact,

one of the most curious circumstances in this affair, that the leading

Southern politicians have throughout founded their pretensions, and

predicated the measures they recommend on principles, economical and

political, not only wholly theoretical and vague, but before unheard of,

broached by themselves for the first time, and repugnant to the received

opinions of the whole practical and scientific world. Such is their

doctrine, that the producer and not the consumer pays the taxes:--such

is this of absolute and concurring majorities. The very language

employed is entirely new. The phrase _concurring majority_, which, taken

separately, is wholly unintelligible, and when explained as it is,

involves a contradiction in terms, was, as far as we are informed,

invented by Mr. Calhoun. Now we put it in perfect sincerity to the

conscience of that gentleman and his political friends to say, whether

it is fair and reasonable to expect, that the people of the United

States will adopt instantaneously as a rule of action in the most

important concerns, the new theories that may occur to a few citizens,

however distinguished, in their abstract speculations on the sciences of

politics and political economy. We cheerfully give full credit to the

discoverers of these hitherto unheard of principles, for their talents,

ingenuity and research, and should always listen with great attention to

the suggestions they might make; but we cannot consent to receive them

at once, and without reflection or examination, as infallible guides for

conduct or even opinion. Before an abstract principle, however plausible

it may appear, can be safely adopted as a basis of action in important

matters, whether public or private, it must for a long time be

canvassed, examined, opposed and defended, until it is finally admitted

into the number of acknowledged and popular truths. We find,

accordingly, that in the British Parliament, which affords the most

illustrious example of deliberative legislation, no appeal is ever made

to abstract principles, even such as are generally admitted. The

argument turns entirely upon precedent and plain common sense. During

the last fifteen or twenty years, propositions have been repeatedly made

in the House of Commons of measures predicated on the pretended

discoveries of Malthus, in regard to the law of population. But,

although the belief in his doctrines was at one time nearly universal,

and was probably shared by most of the members of Parliament, no

measures predicated upon them could ever be got through. The event has

fully justified this caution, the doctrine in question being now almost

as universally rejected as it was at one time admitted. In the French

Chambers, there is a greater disposition to abstract speculations, but

the reference is always, in form at least, to acknowledged and received

principles. No individual, as far as we are informed, ever undertook

even there to broach an entirely new theory upon any subject, and

demand, at the same moment, that it should be made the basis of

immediate proceedings of the highest moment. To do this was reserved for

the statesmen of the Carolina school, and they have done it at every

stage in the progress of this business. At the very outset, Mr. McDuffie

one fine morning rises in the House of Representatives, and, after

entertaining his colleagues with a dissertation on the abstract

principles of political economy, concludes by saying to

them,--'Gentlemen, all this is entirely new: nobody ever heard of it

before; it is directly opposed to all the received opinions on this

subject; Adam Smith, Say, Ricardo, Hamilton, Gallatin know nothing about

it, but so it is;--_ipse dixi_;--I have said it, and you will of course

act upon it, and change at once the whole basis of your economical

legislation.' The majority, as might naturally have been expected,

decline complying with this polite proposal. This refusal is the

intolerable grievance, of which the Carolina gentlemen are now

complaining. What shall be the remedy?--At this point Mr. Calhoun in his

turn takes the field, with an entirely new theory on the principles of

the Constitution; for the very statement of which he is obliged to

invent new forms of language, and which goes to nothing less than giving

to one member of the body politic a right of controlling the action of

all the rest. Novel, dangerous as, on the face of it, it is, this

speculation too must be made the basis of immediate action: and sorry we

are to say, that its author has found, in his own State, a majority of

the community prepared to act upon it. For ourselves, we cannot

recognise such a mode of proceeding as judicious, customary, or at all

admissible in the practical administration of a wise and great people.

This being the true answer to this part of Mr. Calhoun's argument, it is

unnecessary to go at length into an examination of the doctrine of

absolute and concurring majorities. We shall therefore merely remark

that it is, as far as we have considered it, as incorrect and

unsubstantial, as it is novel. It is important, no doubt, that the

respective interests of the various territorial, professional, religious

and other sections of society should be, as far as may be convenient,

represented in the administration of the Government. This was the first

rude form, in which the great modern discovery of the principle of

_Representation_ in Government dawned upon the minds of our European

ancestors. The idea was acted upon in the political assemblies of the

middle ages, denominated States General and Parliaments, in which the

nobles, the clergy, the cities, the commons, and in some cases the

peasants had each a separate representation. But in these and all other

similar cases, the object was to obtain a concurrence of the different

classes of society in _making_ the law: nor do we believe that any

example can be produced, either from ancient or modern history, with

perhaps the single exception of the _Confederations_ of Poland, in which

the Constitution, written or unwritten, that is, the form prescribed by

express agreement or usage for _making_ the law, expressly authorizes

any individual citizen or class of citizens to _break_ the law. The idea

is obviously self-contradictory and absurd. The case of the tribunes at

Rome, to which the Vice-President alludes, is not in point. The tribunes

possessed, by law, a negative upon the acts of the Senate, precisely as

the President of the United States and the Governors of all the States

possess a qualified negative upon the acts of Congress, and the State

Legislatures. An act of the Roman Senate, which was negatived by a

tribune, never became a law, and of course could not be _nullified_.

In our Constitution, the idea of representing different interests in the

machinery for making the law, has been retained in favor of the States.

These, independently of their representation on the principle of the

numerical amount of their population in the House of Representatives,

have a distinct representation on a footing of perfect equality in the

Senate. A bill, which has obtained the sanction of the two Houses of

Congress, has _ipso facto_ been approved by a representation of the

_absolute majority_ of the whole people of the Union, and of what the

Vice-President is pleased to call the _concurring majority_, that is, a

majority of the representatives of the States, considered as distinct

communities. The arrangement is one, which the Vice-President, reasoning

consistently upon his own theory, ought to consider as perfect. But

this does not satisfy him. Not content with obtaining for each of and

all the States a full representation, on the principle both of the

absolute and concurring majorities,--the very thing which he professes

to wish for,--he insists that each shall have _in addition_ for itself a

right to _break_ the law, which it has itself concurred in making:--that

each State, after co-operating by its presence in imposing upon the

other States the obligations resulting from a law, has a right to exempt

itself by its own separate act from bearing its own share of these

burdens; and,--as the rights of all the States in this respect are of

course the same,--that the law, which is in form binding upon every

body, is in fact and in reality binding upon nobody, since each of the

parties supposed to be bound by it possesses individually a right to

break it.--A right to break the law!

This is really too extravagant, and were it not for the respect which we

have heretofore been disposed to entertain for the talents and character

of Mr. Calhoun, we should find some difficulty in believing that he can

be honest in expressing such opinions. The case furnishes a very strong

example of the extent, to which party feeling and disappointed personal

ambition can bewilder the conceptions of a naturally acute and powerful

mind. If the Vice-President will review his principles, with only a

small portion of the sagacity and correctness of judgment which he could

bring to any other subject, he will see at once that the right which he

claims for the States, is not that of being represented as distinct

interests in the making of the law, (which they are by the Constitution)

but that of _resisting_ the execution of it, when made; and that the

proceedings in which he is engaged, whether justifiable or not, are

essentially _revolutionary_.

The Vice-President indulges in another course of remarks of considerable

extent, which, though not directly applicable to the leading points of

the argument, are of too serious a cast to be passed over without

notice. He undertakes to show, that the Government of the Union would

not be authorized to employ force against a State which should annul one

of their acts; and, anticipating the objection that nullification is

equivalent to a secession from the Union, which would place the seceding

State in the attitude of a foreign one, he proceeds to reply to it by

pointing out what he considers the distinction between _nullification_

and _secession_. Secession is the actual retirement of one of the

partners to a common concern; nullification is the refusal of the same

partner to be bound by an act of the common agent. The object of the

former is to dissolve the partnership,--of the latter, to confine it to

its proper object. The right to secede, that is, to avoid the obligation

of all the acts of the partnership, supposes the right to nullify, that

is, to avoid the obligation of one: and there is therefore an obvious

inconsistency in the theory of those, who, as the Vice-President tells

us is the case with many persons, admit the former and deny the latter.

For himself, he liberally concedes both: a State, according to him, has

a right at discretion either to exempt itself by its own act from the

obligation to obey any particular act of the General Government, or to

nullify the whole, Constitution and all, at one fell swoop, and secede

entirely from the Union.

Presented in this crude, unsophisticated and unqualified shape, the

system of the Vice-President becomes almost ludicrous; but when we

recollect the respectability of the quarter from which it proceeds, and

the serious aspect which the practice upon it is assuming at the South,

a painful feeling irresistibly predominates. Did Mr. Calhoun, when he

was entering on these forbidden speculations, recollect the impressive

language in which the Father of his country, forty years ago, pointed

out their danger? 'It is of infinite moment, that you should properly

estimate the value of your national Union to your collective and

individual happiness; that you should cherish a cordial, habitual and

immoveable attachment to it; accustoming yourselves to think and speak

of it as the palladium of your political safety and prosperity;

_discountenancing whatever may suggest even a suspicion that it can in

any event he abandoned_; and indignantly frowning upon the first dawning

of every attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest,

or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link together its various

parts.' Is it _discountenancing whatever may suggest even a suspicion

that the Union can in any event be abandoned_, to affirm explicitly and

without qualification, that every State has a right at its own

discretion to secede from the Union? Is it _frowning indignantly upon

the first dawning of every attempt to enfeeble the sacred ties which

link together the United States_, to maintain that these links are a

mere cobweb, which any one of the States has a right to break through or

shake off at its own discretion? Is this a fit and proper lesson to come

from the high places of the Federal Government, from the second in

rank of the citizens who have been selected from the whole country, as

the immediate executors of the great charter of the Union? We agree with

Mr. Calhoun, that of the two heresies to which he alludes, the greater

includes and supposes the less:--that it would be inconsistent for any

one, who admits the right of nullifying at once, by secession, the

Constitution and all the laws, to deny the right of nullifying one; but

we utterly deny that either can be reconciled with the letter or spirit

of the Constitution. The social compact,--like the contract of

marriage,--is one in which the parties take each other for better or

worse, for sickness or health, for life and for death. It is one from

which they have no right to retire at discretion. They can have no

right, as States or individuals, to avoid, either wholly or in part, the

obligations of this compact, and the laws made under it, for the plain

and unanswerable reason, that this compact and the laws made under it

are the rule which determines for them what is right, and that

opposition to the rule of right must of course be wrong. Extreme cases

may undoubtedly occur, in which the obligation may, either wholly or in

part, be innocently avoided; but they cannot, from the nature of the

subject, be either contemplated in or reconciled with the law. The

patriot shrinks from dwelling upon the circumstances under which they

would happen, as he would from imagining a case, that should justify him

in lifting his hand against his own father. His heart sickens at the

thought that any such contingency can possibly occur. If forced to meet

it, he makes no vain attempt to reconcile his conduct with the rule

which he violates; no pretension to obey and break the law at one and

the same time:--he boldly avows that his act is unconstitutional, and

appeals for its justification to the Supreme Governor of the Universe,

who has engraved upon the heart of man a law which, in some extreme

cases, he is permitted to regard as paramount to every other.

We have now finished what we thought it necessary to say in the way of

direct commentary upon Mr. Calhoun's exposition. On the leading points

of the question, we have argued chiefly from his admission, which is

made in the fullest and most explicit manner, that the United States are

under a common Government, holding the same relation towards them that

the Governments of the several States and all others hold to the

communities over which they are respectively established. From the

fact thus admitted, it follows, of necessity, as we have repeatedly

remarked, that the Constitution is not a league or treaty, but a social

compact, and that the Union is not a cluster of twenty-four independent

States, but one body politic composed of twenty-four members,--each

exercising a certain portion of the legislative or sovereign power, but

having no pretension to independence. If this admission had been made

unguardedly by Mr. Calhoun, and were not assented to by other champions

of the same creed, it would be unfair to take advantage of it in the

argument; but this is not the case. This exposition by the

Vice-President is recognised by the nullifiers as the most authentic

statement that has yet appeared of their sentiments, and is constantly

referred to as the standard and symbol of the true nullifying faith.

Other writers of high authority on the same subject hold the same

language with the Vice-President, particularly the authors of the

addresses issued by the late Columbia Convention. The Report, attributed

to Mr. McDuffie, declares that 'the States entered into a _solemn

compact_ with each other, by which they established a _General

Government_,' and quotes in support of his position the remark of Mr.

Jefferson, that the States, by a _compact_, under the style and title of

the Constitution of the United States, constituted a _General

Government_. In like manner Mr. Turnbull, in his address to the people

of South Carolina, tells them that 'the Constitution of the United

States is admitted by contemporaneous writers to be a _compact_ between

(formed by) sovereign States, and that the subject matter (object) of

that compact was a _Government_.' Finally, General Hayne, in the address

to the people of the United States, remarks that the 'Constitution is a

_compact_ formed between the several States, acting as distinct

communities, and that the _Government_ created by it is a joint agency

of the States.' They all pursue the same line of reasoning with the

Vice-President, frequently quote his language, and evidently consider

his writings as the creed of the party.

So far, indeed, is the admission to which we have alluded from being

made by the Vice-President unguardedly or unintentionally, that in other

parts of his exposition he in fact goes by necessary implication a great

deal farther. He not only recognises the existence of a common

Government, and consequently of one body politic, but lays it down as

one of the leading points of his doctrine, that this body politic has

_unlimited power_ over its members, the States. Strange as it may

appear to readers who have not looked attentively at the subject, it is

actually one of the leading articles of the nullification creed, as

expounded by the Vice-President in the document before us, that the

United States are a body politic, possessing under the Constitution

unlimited power over all its members. A State nullifies an act of the

General Government; the General Government is then bound to apply to the

States for a grant of the disputed power, in the form prescribed for

amending the Constitution.--If three-fourths of the States grant the

power,--what follows? _The nullifying State is bound to acquiesce._ 'If

granted,' says the Vice-President, 'acquiescence would then become a

duty on the part of the State.' No matter how large the concession,--no

matter how important the alteration made in the character of our

institutions,--should the General Government even claim a right to

exercise all the powers of an unlimited military despotism, let but the

change be proposed and carried through in the form of an amendment of

the Constitution, and the individual States are _bound to acquiesce_!

And yet these States, who have not only formed themselves into one body

politic under a common Government, to which they have delegated the most

important powers that are exercised by other Governments, but who have

bound themselves to each other to acquiesce in any extension of these

powers that may be agreed upon by three-fourths of the number, remain

nevertheless as completely sovereign and independent, since the

conclusion of the compact containing these provisions, as they were

before!

In what way the characters of sovereignty and independence are to be

reconciled with the obligation, not only to obey a Government possessing

certain specified powers, but to acquiesce in any extension of these

powers that may be agreed upon by certain other parties, without the

consent of the supposed sovereign and independent State, neither the

Vice-President, nor Gov. Hamilton, nor Gen. Hayne, nor Mr. McDuffie, nor

Mr. Turnbull, nor any other writer on the subject of nullification has

condescended to inform us. They all freely admit, that the States are

bound in ordinary cases to obey the laws made by the General

Government:--that even in the particular cases where they have a right

to nullify these laws, they are bound to submit to the decision of

three-fourths of the States; and that in general they are bound to

acquiesce in any extension of the powers of the General Government,

that may be agreed upon without or against their consent by

three-fourths of the States; but still maintain with one voice and an

air of honest wonder that any body can differ from them, that each State

is still, to all intents and purposes, as completely sovereign and

independent, as before the adoption of the Constitution. 'The several

States,' says the Report of the Columbia Convention, 'retain their

sovereignty unimpaired.' 'The States are as sovereign now,' says the

address to the people of Carolina, 'as they were prior to entering into

the compact.' It is admitted that 'a _foreign_ or inattentive reader,

(_Qu_: Is Mr. Turnbull a native citizen?) unacquainted with the origin,

progress and history of the Constitution, would be very apt, from the

phraseology of the instrument, (a pretty good ground, one would think,

for argument upon its meaning) to regard the States as having divested

themselves of their sovereignty, and to have become (_regard to have

become_, is not good English, Mr. Turnbull) great corporations,

subordinate to one Supreme Government.' 'But this,' it seems, 'is (would

be) an error.' 'The Federal Constitution is a treaty, a confederation,

an alliance,' the parties to which are 'so many sovereign States.'

General Hayne, in like manner, describes the States, in the address to

the people, as 'the sovereign States of the confederacy.' 'The

Constitution,' says the Vice-President in the exposition before us, 'is

as strictly and as purely a confederation, as the one which it

superseded.' 'The case of a treaty between sovereigns is strictly

analogous to it.' '_At the bottom_ of almost every misconception as to

the relation between the States and the General Government, _lurks the

radical error_ that the latter is a national, and not, as in reality it

is, a confederated Government.'

In other times, when other doctrines were fashionable in South Carolina,

we were told by one of her distinguished statesmen of a very different

_radical_ error, which was _lurking at the bottom_ of a doctrine which

he then thought it his duty to oppose. 'The States, as political

bodies,'--said Mr. McDuffie in his well-known pamphlet, _The Trio_,

published about ten years ago,--'the States, as political bodies, have

no original inherent rights. That they have such rights, is a false,

dangerous and anti-republican assumption, which _lurks at the bottom_ of

all the reasoning in favor of State rights.'--Is there not room to

apprehend that the error, which really lurks at the bottom in both these

cases, is not precisely the one alluded to by either of these

distinguished statesmen, but another which was also signalised by Mr.

McDuffie on the same occasion and in the same pamphlet? 'Ambitious men

of inferior talents, finding that they have no hope to be distinguished

in the councils of the national Government, naturally wish to increase

the power and consequence of the State Governments, the theatres in

which they expect to acquire distinction. It is not, therefore, a regard

for the rights of the people, and a real apprehension that those rights

are in danger, that have caused so much to be said on the subject of

prostrate State sovereignties and consolidated empire. It is the

ambition of that class of politicians who expect to figure only in the

State Councils, and of those States who are too proud to acknowledge any

superior.'

This quotation was too provokingly apposite to be omitted; but we

frankly own that the question preceding it must, in reference to the

present case, be answered in the negative. The leading nullifiers,

though sufficiently ambitious, are not men 'of inferior talents, who can

have no hope of distinguishing themselves in the councils of the

national Government.' They possess talents of a high order, and had

already reached the most elevated stations in the National Government,

before their judgments, previously sound and acute, had given way to the

strange delusion which has now got possession of them. It is therefore

necessary to look for the motives of their present proceedings in other

quarters. Perhaps we may find them pretty satisfactorily accounted for,

in the following passage of the same publication by Mr. McDuffie. 'He

must have read the lessons of history to little purpose, who does not

perceive that the people of particular States are liable to fall

occasionally into a dangerous and morbid excitement upon particular

subjects; and that, under this excitement, they will impel their rulers

into the adoption of measures in their tendency destructive to the

Union.'

But without undertaking to scrutinize the motives of the leading

statesmen of South Carolina, we repeat that none of them have yet

condescended to inform us, how they reconcile their admissions as to the

authority of the General Government in ordinary cases, and that of the

United States under the amending clause, with their doctrine of

'unimpaired sovereignty.' Mr. Calhoun, in the document before us,

appears to be aware of the difficulty, but does not meet it in the full

and frank manner which we had a right to expect from a man of his

character. He takes refuge in vague and indefinite forms of language.

'Previous to the adoption of the present Constitution,' says he, 'no

power could be exercised over any State, by any other or all of the

States, without its own consent.' In other words, the States were then

independent of each other, and, in the common phrase, sovereign. How are

they now?--'The present Constitution,' continues Mr. Calhoun, 'has made

in this particular _a most important modification in their condition_. I

allude to the provision which gives validity to amendments of the

Constitution, when ratified by three-fourths of the States, a provision

which has not attracted as much attention as its importance

deserves.'[A] It appears, then, that although the sovereignty of the

States is _unimpaired_, their condition in this particular has undergone

_a most important modification_. Now the long word _modification_,

though it be, like Bardolph's _accommodated_, 'a soldier-like word, and

a word of exceeding good command,' means, with all its six syllables,

neither more nor less than the old-fashioned English monosyllable

_change_.--_Modification_, says Johnson, is the act of _modifying_; and

to _modify_ is to _change_. It seems, then, that the condition of the

States has undergone in this particular a most important _change_. It is

no longer what it was. But they were before independent: of course they

are now not independent. Such appears to be the plain English of the

vague term _modification_.

But to what extent has this modification been carried? Before the

adoption of the Constitution no power could be exercised over a State

without its own consent. Now, by the admission of Mr. Calhoun, the

United States can exercise unlimited power over a State without its own

consent. This is indeed a most important _modification_ of the

sovereignty of the State. Such, however, is the virtue of this valuable

word, that it prevents all the effect that would otherwise ensue to the

sovereignty of the State from the change signified by it. 'To understand

correctly the nature of this _concession_, (the _modification_ is after

all a _concession_,) we must not confound it with the power conferred

upon the General Government, and to be exercised by it as the joint

agent of the States. They are essentially different. The former is in

fact but a modification of the original sovereign power, residing in the

people of the several States.' It seems, then, that this _most important

modification_ is in fact _a modification_. '_Accommodated_ is when a man

is, as they say, _accommodated_, or when a man is being--whereby he may

be thought to be _accommodated_.' 'But,' continues the Vice-President,

'the original sovereign power residing in the people of the several

States, though modified, is not delegated. It still resides in the

States, and is still to be exercised by them, and not by the

Government.' He had just told us, that the condition of the several

States had undergone in this particular a most important modification,

by the concession of power made in the provision for amending the

Constitution:--now there is no delegation,--no concession,--the

sovereignty is modified, but the condition of the State remains as it

was before. Did the Vice-President himself understand exactly what he

meant to say?

'It still resides in the States, and is to be exercised by them, and not

by the Government.' How is this?--Before the adoption of the

Constitution, the whole political power of each State resided in the

State: now, a large portion of it has been transferred, by the provision

for amending the Constitution, to the United States. How then can it be

said, that the whole still resides in the State? Of what consequence is

it whether the power has been conceded to the General Government, or to

the United States? Provided it be gone from the State, it is obvious

that the sovereignty of the State is equally impaired, whether it now

belongs to one or the other. The point which Mr. Calhoun wishes to make

out is, that each State now possesses all the political power which it

possessed before the adoption of the Constitution. It is admitted that a

large concession has been made. But, says Mr. Calhoun, the power thus

granted has been granted to the United States, and not to the General

Government,--therefore, it still remains in the possession of the

granting State! The owner of a tract of land conveys away a part of it

for a valuable consideration; but the sale being made to B. and not to

C., it follows, says Mr. Calhoun, that the whole remains in possession

of A.

If arguments like these were found in a document purporting to be a mere

specimen of forensic ingenuity, or in the speech of a legal advocate

who might be supposed to defend his client, whether he thought his case

a good one or not, we should conclude, at once, that the person

employing them had, from a consciousness of the weakness of his cause,

resorted expressly to ambiguous language, and loose sophistical

reasoning. But the document before us is of a very different character

and consequence. The subject which it treats is a great practical

question. The author,--no less a person than the Vice-President of the

United States,--has placed himself at the head of an enterprise, which,

according to the degree of purity and singleness of heart with which he

engages in it, must be regarded as in him the noblest exercise of

patriotism, or the highest offence known to the law. Such is the

individual, whom we find under such circumstances resorting for his

justification to a sort of language, which, in ordinary cases, would be

received as the obvious resource and undoubted evidence of

_insincerity_. We shrink from characterizing such a course in the way

which appears most natural, and gladly avail ourselves of the pointed

and fearless denunciation of Mr. McDuffie.

'A man, who will contend that our Government is a confederacy of

independent States, whose independent sovereignty was never in any

degree renounced, and that it may be controlled or annulled at the will

of the several independent States or sovereignties, can scarcely be

regarded as belonging to the present generation. The several independent

States control the General Government! this is anarchy itself.'

It is unnecessary, we trust, to pursue this discussion any farther. The

nullifiers, we repeat, scarcely attempt to reconcile their full and

express admissions, that the Constitution is a social compact, by which

the States have formed themselves into a body politic under a common

Government, which body politic possesses, under the amending clause, an

unlimited power over the political condition of its members, with the

assertion, openly and obviously inconsistent with these admissions, that

each State still retains its independence and sovereignty entire and

unimpaired. Their whole argument, such as it is, consists in the eternal

repetition of two ideas. The States were independent at the time when

they made the Constitution,--therefore they are independent now. A. and

B. were single persons at the time when they entered into a contract of

marriage, therefore they are single still. The precise and avowed object

of the contract, in both cases, is to put an end to the relation which

the parties previously held towards each other, and to substitute for

it another and a different one. Yet it is sagely concluded, that because

they held towards each other this relation, which it was intended to

terminate, before, they must of necessity hold it afterwards; and this

is the conclusion which the Vice-President and his followers declare

themselves determined to enforce upon the people of the United States,

if necessary, at the cannon's mouth!

What then, it may be asked, is in fact the situation of the States under

the Constitution? Are they mere corporations, like our cities and towns,

deriving all their powers from the acts of the Government under which

they are placed? Assuredly not. The States are the original parties to

the social compact, and are recognised in it as entitled to exercise a

certain portion of the legislative power. In the exercise of this power,

they are, as we have already remarked, just as independent of the

General Government, as the General Government is of them in the exercise

of the powers with which it is invested by the same Constitution. But

although the General Government has no authority over the State

Governments, the United States, besides the control which they exercise

through the General Government over the citizens of the States, also

possess, under the amending clause of the Constitution, an almost

unlimited control over the political situation of the States themselves.

Under these circumstances, it is obvious, that the States, though

holding, not by law, but by an original right recognised in the

Constitution, the legislative power which they are entitled to exercise,

have yet no pretensions to sovereignty or absolute political

independence, and that, the only sovereign power, recognised in our

institutions is that of the people or body politic of the United States.

In the quotations which we have made from the pamphlet of Mr. McDuffie,

we have employed to a very moderate extent the _argumentum ad hominem_,

which, as our readers are aware, might be carried without difficulty a

great deal farther. There have probably been very few cases, in the

history of this or any other country,--especially relating to matters of

so much importance,--in which individuals have placed themselves before

the public, in a position so diametrically opposite to that which they

occupied but a short time before. Their inconsistency is equally glaring

in reference to the nature of the evil of which they complain, and the

means by which they propose to remedy it. But a few years ago, these

very persons not only supported and professed to believe in the policy

of protecting domestic industry, but actually originated the plan, and

employed the whole weight of their talents and influence in carrying it

through Congress. At the same time, they denounced the claim of a right

in the States to annul the acts of the General Government, as anarchy

itself. Now, the protecting policy is not only not advantageous but

utterly ruinous to the country; and not only ruinous but

unconstitutional, and not only unconstitutional but so plainly and

palpably unconstitutional, as to justify a resort to the most desperate

extremities to get rid of it. Now, the right of the States to annul at

discretion the acts of the General Government is not only not anarchy

itself, but is the simplest and most beautiful part of the whole

machinery of our political institutions. It would be easy to collect

from the writings and speeches of these gentlemen at the two periods

alluded to, whole pages of passages, presenting, on the same authority,

exactly the _pro_ and _con_ of every prominent point in the argument.

This has in fact been done to a considerable extent by Mr. Carey, and if

the subject were not a serious one, the contrast would be irresistibly

amusing. Our limits will not permit us to enlarge upon this point, and

the strength of the direct argument renders it unnecessary. In general,

we are not disposed to insist too rigorously upon formal party

consistency, and are willing to allow to political men a reasonable

latitude in reconsidering their opinions, and adapting their abstract

principles to the circumstances under which they are called to act. But

in a case so very peculiar as this, where the party is so clearly bound

to put himself in the right in the great court of public opinion, he

certainly gives his opponents a fearful advantage when he enables them,

on every leading point, to _condemn_ him unequivocally and peremptorily

_out of his own mouth_.

Is it in fact to be endured, that men of talents, reputation, commanding

stations in society, shall denounce as inexpedient, unconstitutional,

intolerably oppressive, as furnishing legitimate motives for resistance,

measures, which not ten years ago they openly supported, nay, themselves

originated and pressed upon the country? That they shall claim and

insist upon, as their dearest and most essential rights, pretensions,

which not ten years ago they denounced as chimerical, unconstitutional,

anarchical, involving in practice the destruction of all government? Can

the people of the United States believe, that the persons by whom these

diametrically opposite opinions have been successively maintained with

equal warmth and zeal, have been perfectly sincere in both? Or if, in

the exercise of a perhaps excessive charity, they believe them to have

been sincere, will they consider them as persons of a sufficiently sound

and cool judgment to be followed with safety, through the dangerous

paths into which they would lead us,--over the unfathomable precipices,

to the brink of which they have already brought their deluded

retainers?--We think not.

We have left ourselves but little room for direct remark upon the

Ordinance of the Carolina Convention; and if the views which we take of

its operation and character be correct, it does not necessarily call for

any extended commentary. We copy the entire document, as a sort of

political curiosity, and shall annex a few observations.

'_An Ordinance to nullify certain Acts of the Congress of the United

States, purporting to be laws laying duties and imposts on the

Importation of Foreign Commodities._

Whereas the Congress of the United States, by various Acts,

purporting to be Acts laying duties and imposts on foreign imports,

but in reality intended for the protection of Domestic Manufactures,

and the giving of bounties to classes and individuals engaged in

particular employments, at the expense and to the injury and

oppression of other classes and individuals, by wholly exempting

from taxation certain foreign commodities, such as are not produced

or manufactured in the United States, to afford a pretext for

imposing higher and excessive duties on articles similar to those

intended to be protected, hath exceeded its just powers under the

Constitution, which confers on it no authority to afford such

protection, and hath violated the true meaning and intent of the

Constitution, which provides for equality in imposing the

burdens of taxation upon the several States and portions of the

Confederacy;--And, whereas the said Congress, exceeding its just

power to impose taxes and collect revenue for the purpose of

effecting and accomplishing the specific objects and purposes which

the Constitution of the United States authorized it to effect and

accomplish, hath raised and collected unnecessary revenues, for

objects unauthorized by the Constitution:--

We, therefore, the People of the State of South Carolina in

Convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby

declared and ordained, that the several Acts and parts of Acts of

the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the

imposing of duties and imposts on the importations of the States,

and more especially an Act entitled "an Act in alteration of the

several Acts imposing duties on imports," approved on the 19th day

of May, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-eight, and also an Act

entitled "an Act to alter and amend the several Acts imposing duties

on imports," approved on the 14th day of July, one thousand eight

hundred and thirty-two, are unauthorized by the Constitution of the

United States, and violate the true meaning thereof, and are null,

void, and no law, nor binding upon this State, its officers or

citizens; and all promises, contracts and obligations made or

entered into, or to be made or entered into, with the purpose to

secure the duties imposed by the said Acts, and all judicial

proceedings which shall be hereafter had in affirmance thereof are

and shall be held utterly null and void.

And it is further ordained, That it shall not be lawful for any of

the constituted authorities, whether of this State or of the United

States, to enforce the payment of duties imposed by the said Acts

within the limits of this State; but that it shall be the duty of

the Legislature to adopt such Acts as may be necessary to give full

effect to this Ordinance, and to prevent the enforcement and arrest

the operation of the said Acts and parts of Acts of the Congress of

the United States within the limits of this State, from and after

the 1st day of February next, and the duty of all other constituted

authorities, and of all persons residing or being within the limits

of this State, and they are hereby required and enjoined to obey and

give effect to this Ordinance, and such Acts and measures of the

Legislature as may be passed or adopted in obedience thereto.

And it is further ordained, That in no case of law or equity,

decided in the Courts of this State, wherein shall be drawn in

question the authority of this Ordinance, or the validity of such

Act or Acts of the Legislature as may be passed for the purpose of

giving effect thereto, or the validity of the aforesaid Acts of

Congress, imposing duties, shall any appeal be taken, or allowed, to

the Supreme Court of the United States, nor shall any copy of the

record be permitted or allowed for that purpose; and if any such

appeal shall be attempted to be taken, the Courts of this State

shall proceed to execute and enforce their judgments, according to

the laws and usages of the State, without reference to such

attempted appeal; and the person or persons attempting to take such

appeal, may be dealt with for a contempt of the Court.

And it is further ordained, That all persons now holding any office

of honor, profit or trust, civil or military, under this State,

shall, within such time as the Legislature shall prescribe, take, in

such manner as the Legislature may direct, an oath well and truly to

obey, execute and enforce this Ordinance, and such Act or Acts of

the Legislature as may be passed in pursuance thereof, according to

the true intent and meaning of the same; and on the neglect or

omission of any such person or persons so to do, his or their office

or offices shall be forthwith vacated, and shall be filled up, as if

such person or persons were dead or had resigned; and no person,

hereafter elected to any office of honor, profit or trust, civil or

military, shall, until the Legislature shall otherwise provide and

direct, enter on the execution of his office, or be in any respect

competent to discharge the duties thereof, until he shall, in like

manner, have taken a similar oath; and no juror shall be impannelled

in any of the Courts of this State, in any cause in which shall be

in question this Ordinance, or any Act of the Legislature passed in

pursuance thereof, unless he shall first, in addition to the usual

oath, have taken an oath, that he will well and truly obey, execute

and enforce this Ordinance, and such Act or Acts of the Legislature

as may be passed to carry the same into operation and effect,

according to the true intent and meaning thereof.

And we, the People of South Carolina, to the end that it may be

fully understood by the Government of the United States, and the

People of the co-States, that we are determined to maintain this,

our Ordinance and Declaration, at every hazard,--do further declare,

that we will not submit to the application of force, on the part of

the Federal Government, to reduce this State to obedience; but that

we will consider the passage, by Congress, of any Act authorizing

the employment of any military or naval force against the State of

South Carolina, her constituted authorities or citizens, or any Act

abolishing or closing the ports of this State, or any of them, or

otherwise obstructing the free ingress and egress of vessels, to and

from the said ports, or any other Act on the part of the Federal

Government to coerce the State, shut up her ports, destroy her

commerce, or to enforce the acts hereby declared to be null and

void, otherwise than through the civil tribunals of the country, as

inconsistent with the longer continuance of South Carolina in the

Union: and that the people of this State will thenceforth hold

themselves absolved from all further obligation to maintain or

preserve their political connexion with the people of other States,

and will forthwith proceed to organize a separate Government, and do

all other acts and things, which sovereign and independent States

may of right do.'

If, in a matter so serious as this, it were worth while to pay much

attention to forms of expression, the language of this document would

afford ample room for criticism. To begin with the very title: _an

Ordinance_. It has been well observed, that the Convention could hardly

have given to the paper expressing their intentions a less auspicious

name, than this obsolete vestige of the French _ancien regime_, the last

example of which, known to us in this country, was the celebrated

Ordinance to nullify the liberty of the press and the right of suffrage.

The result of this attempt at nullification by Charles X. was hardly

such as to encourage imitation, or to bring the phraseology employed by

him into very good odor.--_An Ordinance to nullify_,--why substitute the

affected term _nullify_, of which no one knows the real meaning, for the

standard English word _annul_, which every body understands? Obviously

for no other purpose, than to _mystify_ the good people of Carolina into

a course, which, if the true character of it were honestly presented to

them, they would shrink from with horror. The use of this term is an

improvement, at the suggestion of Mr. Turnbull, upon the title as

originally reported by Mr. Harper, which ran thus:--_an Ordinance to

provide for arresting the operation of certain acts, &c._ This was at

least intelligible. Again: _an Ordinance to nullify certain acts of

Congress purporting to be laws_. Why _purporting_ to be laws?--They are

laws. The Acts of the General Government are, as such, laws. They may be

inexpedient, oppressive, unconstitutional,--but they are still _laws_.

This is their appropriate name as Acts of the Government, and has no

connexion with the question of their validity. The phraseology of the

first sentence of the Ordinance is still more singular:--_Whereas the

Congress of the United States, by various Acts purporting to be Acts

laying duties and imposts on foreign imports, but in reality intended

for the protection of domestic manufactures._ Purporting to be acts

laying duties and imposts on foreign imports! Can any one doubt that

they are Acts laying duties on foreign imports? The objection to them

is, that they lay duties for a purpose not recognised by the

Constitution; but no man in his senses can pretend to doubt, that they

do in fact lay duties on foreign imports.

The rest of the Ordinance is about as correctly drawn, as the title and

the first sentence: but, without enlarging on mere phraseology, let us

proceed to considerations of a more substantial character. The questions

that naturally suggest themselves on a perusal of this extraordinary

document are, What is its immediate operation? What measures will it

call for, on the part of the General Government? What will be its

ultimate effect upon the political situation of the country?

1. _What is its immediate operation?_ In the view which we take of it,

the Ordinance, standing by itself, is entirely inoperative. It pretends

to release the citizens of South Carolina from the obligation to obey

the Revenue laws, but it leaves the Government of the United States in

possession of all the means which they had before to enforce them. If

the importer refuse to pay the duties and give the usual bonds, the

goods will of course be seized and sold without farther process. If he

give bonds and refuse to pay them when due, the usual legal process will

be had in the District Court; and, as the jurors serving in that Court

are not called on to take the oath to obey the Ordinance, there will be

no appearance even of a conflict of obligations. The Judge, whose duty

it is to instruct the jury in the law, will of course tell them that the

Ordinance, as far as it contradicts the laws of the United States, has

no legal effect, and they will give their verdict accordingly. If, in

some cases, juries, under the influence of the popular excitement,

should undertake to judge of the law for themselves, and give verdicts

in clear cases against the Government, there would be, no doubt, some

practical inconvenience, but in theory the law would still have its

course. There would be no collision between the authority of the General

and State Governments, and no occasion for any interposition of force by

the former. The situation of things would be substantially the same as

it was in this city during the last war with Great Britain, where the

juries habitually gave verdicts against the Government, in cases where

the right was clearly on its side. Still the law ostensibly had its

course, and the public peace was not broken. The Ordinance, therefore,

standing by itself, is a mere dead letter.

2. _What measures does it call for, on the part of the General

Government?_ The Ordinance, being entirely inoperative, and having no

legal or practical effect which the Government can or ought to notice,

of course calls for no measures in the way of counteraction. Considered

as an indication of the state of the public feeling in South Carolina,

it calls undoubtedly for measures of precaution against the occurrence

of a future state of things, which the adoption of this Ordinance by the

Convention renders probable, and which would require the interposition

of the military power of the Government. The Ordinance makes it 'the

duty of the Legislature to adopt such measures and pass such acts, as

may be necessary to give full effect to the Ordinance, and to prevent

the enforcement and arrest the operation of the Revenue laws.' The

Legislature will probably do something in pursuance of this direction;

and upon the character of the measures which they may adopt will depend,

of course, the character of those with which the Government of the

United States will be called on to meet them. Should they pass an act,

making it penal for the officers of the General Government to perform

their duties, and attempt to enforce it upon the person of the Marshal,

there would then be a case of open insurrection against the Government

of the country. In ordinary cases, the Marshal, when obstructed in the

execution of his duty, calls for aid on the bystanders; but if this

resource prove ineffectual, or if circumstances render it inexpedient to

depend upon it, the particulars of the case are communicated in the form

of a certificate from the District Judge to the President, who

immediately employs the military force of the country, either the

regular army or the militia, at his discretion, to suppress the

insurrection, as he is authorized to do by the letter of the

Constitution and various statutes. The militia would of course not be

resorted to, unless the regular military and naval force should be found

insufficient. This course was pursued by General Washington, in the case

of the whisky insurrection in Pennsylvania, and was attended with

complete success. The misguided persons, who might be taken and brought

to trial for obstructing the execution of the laws, would probably plead

in justification the law of the State; but the District Judge would of

course instruct the jury, that 'the laws of the United States are the

supreme law of the land, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any

State to the contrary notwithstanding.' If the popular excitement should

be so great, that juries should in clear cases acquit prisoners, the

latter would of course escape the punishment they deserved, but no

material inconvenience would be suffered by the country. The President,

by a proper development of military force, would be able to execute the

laws and preserve the public peace. Should Carolina, in pursuance of the

threat held out in the Ordinance, undertake, in consequence of the

employment of military force by the President, to place herself still

more openly in opposition to the Government, by attempting to withdraw

from the Union, and arraying an army against that of the United States,

the result would be civil war,--an occurrence every way deplorable, and

one of which we shudder to contemplate the possibility, but of which we

cannot permit ourselves to doubt the issue.

Such, however, being the state of things which may and probably will

grow out of the adoption of this Ordinance, it is apparent that it calls

imperiously for _measures of precaution_. Ample means should be in

readiness to meet a crisis so serious and alarming. A seasonable display

of energy and decision may, in this case, as it did in that of the

whisky insurrection, save the country years of civil commotion, and

probably decide the fate of the Union. We are, therefore, glad to learn

that the President has already stationed in the disturbed district, as

commander of the troops, an officer of the highest character for

experience, talents and patriotism, and has made some other

demonstrations for the same ultimate purpose. In general, the course of

the Government, on this most important subject, as far as it has been

developed, accords entirely with what we consider the true policy of the

country. The tone of the President's Message to Congress, and of Mr.

McLane's Report in relation to this topic, is temperate and judicious,

and the view taken of the nature of the crisis correct: a promise is

also made of farther and more energetic measures, should the occasion

require them. If the General Government continue to pursue with

discretion, but at the same time with firmness and energy, the course

upon which they have thus entered, they will find themselves supported

by the friends of the country of all parties, and in all quarters of the

Union.

The only parts of the late communications of the Government, having any

bearing upon this subject, which we have read with regret, have been

those which recommend a reduction of the revenue. Independently of the

ruinous tendency of a repeal of the protecting duties, considered as

such, it appears to us that the moment is singularly unpropitious for

the agitation of any plan, tending to diminish the receipts into the

Treasury. In general, our statesmen have shown an unnecessary solicitude

about the disposition of a future possible surplus revenue, which has

thus far never existed for a single moment since the organization of the

Government. Mr. Jefferson felt this solicitude to a very great degree,

and looked forward to the payment of the then existing national debt, as

a period when we should find ourselves not a little embarrassed by the

amount of our superabundant treasures. Long before the expected period

came, a foreign war intervened, and instead of having any surplus wealth

to dispose of, we were compelled to borrow at very high interest. The

present Administration have shown a strong, and in itself very laudable

and politic anxiety to extinguish the debt; and have also, for two or

three years past, begun to look forward with alarm to the influx of an

overwhelming flood of surplus revenue, which is to burst upon us after

the debt shall be paid. In the mean time, however, before any surplus

whatever is realized,--while a considerable portion of the debt still

remains unpaid,--two States have taken such a position in relation to

the General Government, as will probably lead to a development of

military force. The proceedings of Carolina have been already noticed at

length. Georgia, on her part, peremptorily refuses to permit the

judgment of the Supreme Court in the Missionary case to be executed. A

return of this refusal will be made this winter to the Court, which will

then, in the regular course of law, direct the Marshal of the district

to execute the judgment himself. In this he will probably be resisted,

and upon the fact being certified to the President, it will be his duty

to employ the military force of the country to give effect to the laws.

Although the President, in pursuance of what we consider an erroneous

construction of the Intercourse Act of 1802, did not undertake to

prevent by force the irruption of Georgia into the Cherokee territory,

we are bound to presume that he will feel no hesitation about enforcing

a judgment of the Supreme Court, regularly rendered in due course of

law, and of which he cannot question the validity, without assuming the

functions of an appellate tribunal. The result will be open collision.

With every appearance of the occurrence of civil commotions in two

States within the next year, it seems to us to be scarcely

expedient,--independently of any other consideration,--to think of

measures for reducing the revenue. As no surplus has yet been actually

realized, the very first movement of troops would make it necessary to

resort to new loans, which, if the troubles should continue, must be

increased to an indefinite extent, and would effectually prevent the so

much dreaded evil of an eventual surplus. We are inclined in fact to

doubt very much, whether it will ever be found practicable to bring down

the revenue below its present amount, even supposing it to afford ten or

fifteen millions more than is wanted for the ordinary expenses of the

Government. Such is the condition of human affairs, that periods of

trouble of one kind or another must in the nature of things occur, at

least as often as once in twenty or thirty years. These will, in

general, render it necessary to resort to loans, which during the

intervals of tranquillity must be extinguished. If, with taxes as light

and as little felt as those which we now pay, we are able to defray the

ordinary charges of the Government,--sustain the public credit,--meet

the exigencies of foreign and civil war when they occur, and pay off the

debts they impose upon us in time of peace, we shall do more,--far

more,--than any other nation of ancient or modern times has done before

us. At all events, the moment when we are about to enter on a period of

civil commotion, of which the extent, duration and consequences cannot

even be conjectured, is obviously the last that should be chosen for

commencing a system of reduction.

3. _What will be the effect of the present troubles upon the political

condition of the country?_ This will depend entirely upon the conduct of

the General Government, and especially of the Executive branch, upon

which, under present circumstances, the weight of responsibility

principally falls. If the crisis be met with the necessary firmness and

discretion, there can hardly be a doubt, that the resources of the Union

are amply sufficient to secure the execution of the laws. If, from a

want of firmness and discretion in the Executive, or of a disposition in

Congress to sustain the Executive in the measures required by the

crisis,--contingencies of which we cannot anticipate the

possibility,--the nullifiers are permitted to carry their projects into

effect, the Government is of course at an end. The state of things which

would then ensue, has been described somewhat in detail in a preceding

part of this article. The ports of Carolina would be free, and the

country would be deluged through them, with foreign goods imported

without duties. The revenue would fall off to nothing; the manufactures

would all be destroyed; the public credit would cease, and the public

service come to a stand for want of funds; a general bankruptcy of

private fortunes would overspread the country, and the body politic

would fall into a state of complete dissolution.

Of these disastrous results we are, however, unwilling to admit the

possibility, although they would necessarily follow from the success of

the projects of the nullifiers. It has been well observed, that the

attempt of a State to place itself in direct opposition to the authority

of the Federal Government, is one of the evils naturally incident to our

political system;--that the occurrence of such an attempt is a sort of

crisis, which we must have expected to go through at one time or

another, as the individual, in his progress to maturity, is subject to

the attacks of certain diseases, from which he can hardly hope to

escape;--and that the circumstances, under which this attempt is now

made, afford perhaps as favorable a prospect as any that could well be

imagined for such a termination of it, as will at once prevent any

immediate mischief, and discourage the renewal of similar attempts in

future. The State which now places itself in open opposition to the law,

however distinguished in other times for intelligence, patriotism, and

generosity, is physically and politically one of the least effective in

the Union.--With a white population of less than two hundred and fifty

thousand souls, of whom at least a third are opposed to the

project;--with a dangerous internal enemy in her bosom;--unsupported by

the co-operation of any other State, her nearest neighbors being among

the most determined opponents of her views;--it is apparent that

Carolina takes the field against the Union under every disadvantage. The

fanaticism with which the nullifying party are inspired may perhaps give

occasion to some distressing scenes: but should the General Government

meet the crisis in a proper manner, the odds on the first development of

military force will be so desperate, that we incline to think there will

be very little occasion for actual violence, and that tranquillity will

be restored with hardly any injury to life or property. Should such be

the event, the probability of future occurrences of a similar kind will

be diminished; our institutions will acquire new force and stability;

and the general result of the whole affair will be favorable, rather

than adverse to the prosperity of the country. Had the experiment of a

violent opposition to the authority of the General Government been tried

for the first time by New-York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, New-England in a

body, or any State or combination of States which would have been able

to carry with it a great array of actual physical force, the crisis

would have been of a very different character.

We may add, that it is difficult to conceive of any case in which the

right could be more clearly with the General Government, and against

the discontented State, than it is in this: a circumstance, which adds

to the vast preponderance of material power at the disposal of the

former, the moral influence which is so important and even essential to

the success of any cause. However the nullifiers may, under the

influence of the enthusiasm which now possesses them, have wrought

themselves up into a sincere belief in the justice of their cause, it is

impossible but that in cooler moments they should feel its weakness.

This conviction will press itself upon them with new force when the

power of the Government is actually displayed, and will produce an

indecision on their part, which will contribute very much to bring the

struggle to a favorable issue.

Still, the crisis,--though as little dangerous as any one of the same

description that could well be imagined,--is yet one of fearful

importance, and the friends of the country cannot but look forward with

deep and painful anxiety to its termination. The question of the

continuance of our present form of Government,--of the existence on this

continent of republican institutions of any description,--is now to be

decided. The precise problem, as we understand it, is not whether the

Union shall be preserved, but whether the Union shall be preserved under

our present mild and beneficent system of polity, or whether, after a

temporary dissolution of the bonds that now unite us,--we shall be

brought together again into a new body politic, consolidated by the iron

bands of military power. That the States composing this Union can ever

remain for any length of time politically separate from each other, is

in the nature of things impossible. The experiment was tried in the

short interval between the Declaration of Independence and the adoption

of the Constitution, and was found impracticable. If repeated, under

whatever circumstances, the result would be the same. We have shown in a

preceding part of this article that, by the present Constitution, the

States formed themselves into one body politic under a common

Government, and that they are now, in form, _one people_. If the

Constitution were in this respect a false representation of their actual

and substantial political condition;--if they were really separated from

each other by important substantial differences, whether of geographical

position, origin, language, physical conformation, or any others, there

would then be a constant tendency to a dissolution of the Union; and

separation, being the natural state of the parties, would probably, when

it had once taken effect, become the permanent one. Thus the attempt of

the British Government to combine their European possessions and the

colonies now composing the United States under one system of civil

polity, was obviously at variance with the law of nature, and could only

terminate sooner or later in the way in which it did. The same may be

said of their present attempt to combine under the same political system

with their European possessions, the northern part of this

continent,--the vast peninsula of Hindostan with its hundred million

inhabitants,--the southern termination of Africa, and half the islands

on the face of the globe,--including the Australian Continent, with its

dependencies, which, of themselves, may be said to constitute another

_new world_. All these scattered limbs,--_membra disjecta_,--of the

mighty Queen of the Ocean,--are destined to fall off successively from

the parent body, and form themselves into independent States. With the

members of this Union, the case is different. Descended from the same

original stock; united by community of language, literature, manners,

laws, religion and government; enclosed, notwithstanding the vast extent

of their territory, by a border of unbroken geographical

continuity;--brought up from their first plantation, through the long

period of colonial infancy, to their present flourishing and glorious

maturity, as sisters of one family;--bound together by the million

various indissoluble ties of personal relationship, that have been

created by a constant intercourse of more than two centuries,--the

States composing this Union not only are, according to the form of the

Constitution, but they are in fact and in feeling _one people_. They

were united, before they framed the Constitution, by the high and

paramount decree of the great Lawgiver of the universe: and whom God

hath joined, man _cannot_ put asunder. It is not enough to say, that the

Union ought not to be dissolved,--that the States have no right to

dissolve it,--that it is better that it should not be dissolved:--the

truth is, that it _cannot_ permanently be dissolved. Its members cannot

exist for any length of time in a state of separation from each other.

The present form of Union may,--should Providence intend to visit us

with his severest judgments,--be temporarily broken up. What would be

the consequence? The very act of its destruction would in all

probability be attended by a development of military power and a series

of military movements, which would end in the recombination of the

States into another Union, under a military Government. Should we even

suppose,--what is next to impossible,--a peaceful temporary separation,

what would still be the consequence? The continual relations between

twenty-four neighboring States of kindred origin and civilization, would

necessarily lead to collisions, which would grow into wars, and these

would continue until conquest had again consolidated the whole country

into a new Union, not as at present, under the quiet reign of

constitutional liberty, but under the sway, in some of its various

forms, of a lawless and sanguinary despotism.

The necessity of these results is apparent on the slightest reflection,

and is confirmed by the examples of all the nations of which we know the

history. To look only to the mother country:--a thousand years ago, the

British islands were occupied by hundreds of independent communities,

essentially different in their origin, languages, manners, laws, every

thing that constitutes civilization. Continued wars gradually brought

them under common Governments, until, at the close of the last century,

the union of Great Britain and Ireland finally completed the

consolidation of the whole into one political body. So it has been in

France, in Holland, in Spain, in Germany, in Italy, in Russia. So it has

been in ancient times and other regions;--in Egypt, China, Greece, Rome.

So it has always been and always must be every where. The European

nations have all arrived through centuries of carnage and confusion at

their present condition; they are still tending violently to a more

complete union, which, after other centuries of carnage and confusion,

they will ultimately reach. It has been our blessed fortune to begin

where they have ended or are likely to end; to grow up from the hour of

our political birth, in those happy bonds of fraternal kindness, which

have been forced upon all other great nations by a long experience of

the sorest evils. If, in an hour of wild delusion,--of mad insensibility

to the causes of our present prosperity,--of criminal ingratitude to the

Giver of all good,--we should burst these flowery fetters, the only

possible result would be, that after a period, more or less protracted,

of that confusion and carnage which we have thus far escaped, we should

exchange them for the chains, that are now clanking round the limbs of

every other people on the globe, and from which the enlightened and

civilized nations of Europe are at this moment straining in agony to set

themselves free.

The question, therefore, is not whether we shall maintain the Union,

which must at all events exist, but whether we shall maintain our

present republican institutions, or exchange them, after an intervening

period of anarchy and civil war, for a Government of a different,

probably an arbitrary character. The crisis, we repeat, though as little

alarming as any one of the kind that could well be imagined, is

nevertheless fraught with painful interest. But, though there

is much in the present aspect of political affairs to create

apprehension;--although we are certainly very far from considering the

country as perfectly secure;--we are nevertheless inclined to look

forward with hope rather than despondency. We derive consolation, as

well from the circumstances already mentioned, which induce us to

believe that, with the exercise of suitable firmness and discretion on

the part of the Executive, the troubles in Carolina may be appeased

without much difficulty, as from a general survey of the history and

present situation of the country. It so happens in the progress of human

affairs, that the secret principles, which determine the welfare of

nations, appear to operate with much greater activity at particular

times and places than they do at others, although it may not be in every

case very easy to point out exactly the causes of the difference. Why,

at the same period, and under nearly similar circumstances, some

communities should be active, virtuous, civilized, prosperous and free,

while others are roaming through the woods in the untamed wildness of

barbarism, or bowing down like beasts of burden under the yoke of a

taskmaster,--why the metropolis of civilization is to be found in one

age upon the banks of the Ganges, the Euphrates or the Nile, and in

another upon those of the Tiber, the Thames, or the Potomac; are

questions, which philosophy has not yet brought to a quite satisfactory

solution. An English lady, in a fine poetical fiction, has attributed

the various fortunes of the different nations and races of men to the

influence of a Spirit to whom she has not given a name, but whom she

would probably have called the Genius of Civilization, if a word so long

could have been conveniently compressed into one of her verses. The

presence of this Genius in a country is described as the fruitful cause

of every blessing, and his retirement as the signal of impending decay

and ruin; but his origin is unknown, his progress secret, and his

movements are governed by caprice rather than by any obvious and

assignable cause.[B] Without pursuing this train of thought, which would

soon carry us very far beyond the limits of an article, it may be

sufficient for our purpose to remark, that the presence of the most

active principles of national prosperity, whatever they may be, has no

where and at no time been more clearly perceptible than in the condition

of this country, from the period of its first settlement to this day.

When we look back to the handful of obscure adventurers and persecuted

outcasts who formed our small beginnings, and compare their humble

dwellings, scattered thinly along the coast, with the great and

flourishing empire that now stretches in pride and beauty far and wide

over half the continent, we cannot but feel that the history of the

world offers no example, in any way parallel, of a rapid and extensive

development of all the elements of national prosperity. When we

contemplate the condition of the country at this very time; population

proceeding in the same steady untiring progress,--wealth augmenting in a

still more rapid ratio,--every branch of industry animated by the

highest degree of activity and enterprise,--agriculture, and commerce

supplying the markets of the world with our products,--manufactures

rapidly rivaling the most perfect establishments of Europe,--improvement

in science and learning, education, morals, and religion, the object of

general attention and solicitude;--when we contemplate this state of

things, we cannot doubt, that the causes to which we have owed our

prosperity are still as busily at work as they have ever been before.

What they are, it might not be safe, even in reference to our own

country with which we are most familiar, to attempt to say. When we

venture to assign, as one of them, the character of our Government, the

sages of Europe smile in conscious superiority at our simplicity, and

assure us that we have become what we are in spite of our institutions,

and not in consequence of them. When we hint at the fixed religious

principles, the stern morality, the persevering industry of the pilgrim

fathers of New-England, who have formed the kernel of the whole

population of the Union, we are scornfully told that the mass of the

original settlers were, after all, the refuse of the British jails. The

only principle of our success, which is readily admitted by our friends

abroad as real, (it being one which confers no credit upon us) is the

immense extent of our territory; although, if this circumstance alone

could make a people prosperous, it is not easy to see why civilization

should not be as active on the vast central _plateaux_ of Tartary and

Mexico, as it is in the valley of the Mississippi. But whatever may be

the cause, such at all events is the effect. We are undoubtedly at a

period of our national existence corresponding with the youth of a

vigorous and healthy individual, when the body is daily developing new

resources in all its parts, and possesses an elasticity which enables it

to throw off without difficulty almost every principle of evil that may

be introduced into it. We say not this to encourage a reckless

confidence, or a disposition to bold and hazardous experiments on our

political institutions. We are well aware that the strength and buoyant

spirits, which betray to excess, may be themselves the very causes of

ruin. We would rather in ordinary times allay than exalt the sentiment

of national pride, which so easily runs into presumption. But when the

crisis is actually upon us,--when the hour of danger has come, and many

good and wise men are perhaps too prone to despond, and even despair of

the Republic, it may then be well to remind them and ourselves, that if

the trial is likely to be severe, our political Constitution, as we have

reason to hope, is strong enough to enable us, with the favor of

Providence, to go through this and many other trials of equal severity,

should it be our fortune to encounter them, with safety.

Let the friends of the country, therefore, in their several spheres of

action, meet the crisis with a cheerful, resolute spirit, and with the

calm and steady courage that belongs to freemen and Christians. Let no

differences of opinion upon minor questions,--no personal or sectional

preferences be permitted to deter any one from a zealous and cordial

co-operation in the great and good work of securing the Union. Among the

private citizens, the Union party within the State of South Carolina

occupy the post of peculiar honor and danger, and should receive our

warmest sympathy. They have now a glorious opportunity of displaying in

the face of the country, of the world, the noblest civic virtues. But

whatever may be done by individuals within or without the State, the

result will, after all, depend in a very great degree, as we have

already said, upon the temper and conduct of the General Government. It

is therefore with real satisfaction, that we find the Administration

exhibiting, thus far, the union of firmness and discretion which the

occasion requires. We are no partisans, political or personal, of

General Jackson. We have in no way contributed to his elevation; and

although, as journalists, we have taken no part in the recent contest,

we have felt it to be our duty, as individuals, to oppose his

re-election. But he is now the Chief Magistrate of the country. The

people look to him to carry them safely through the present season of

alarm and peril, and in all the suitable measures which he may take for

this purpose, the friends of the country, without distinction of party,

will give him their support. The maxim which ought to direct his course

was distinctly stated by himself three years ago, in terms which cannot

be surpassed for precision or energy, and which ought at this period to

be the watchword of every citizen. THE FEDERAL UNION,--IT MUST BE

PRESERVED.