CHAPTER V

EDUCATION THROUGH SELF-REALISATION

Activity, versatility, imaginative sympathy, a large and free

outlook, self-forgetfulness, charm of manner, joy of heart,--are

there many schools in England in which the soil and atmosphere are

favourable to the vigorous growth of all these qualities? I doubt it.

In the secondary schools, of all grades and types, the education

given is so one-sided, thanks to the inexorable pressure of the

scholarship system, that the harmonious development of the child's

nature is not to be looked for. In the elementary schools, from which

the chilling shadow cast by thirty years of "payment by results" is

passing slowly--very slowly--away, the instinct of the teacher is to

distrust the child and do everything, or nearly everything, for him,

the result being that the whole _régime_ is still unfavourable to the

spontaneous outgrowth of the child's higher qualities. There are of

course schools, both secondary and elementary, in which one or more

of the Utopian qualities flourish with considerable vigour. There are

elementary schools, for example, in which the children, being allowed

by enterprising teachers to walk in new paths without leading

strings, have become unexpectedly active and versatile. And there are

others--mostly in the slum regions of great towns--in which the

devotion, the sympathetic kindness, and the gracious bearing of the

teachers have won from the children the response of unselfish

affection, attractive manners, and happy faces.[20] Yet even in these

exceptional cases it may be doubted if the development of the

particular quality or qualities for which the school is distinguished

reaches the high-water mark which is reached in each and all of the

seven qualities in Utopia. As for the elementary schools which remain

faithful, as so many still do, to the traditions of the old

régime,--if in these any of the seven qualities manage to resist the

adverse influences to which they are all exposed, they have at best

but a starved and stunted life.

I have spoken much and with unsparing frankness of the shortcomings

of our elementary schools. The time has come for me to say with

emphasis that however grave and however numerous may be the defects

of elementary education in England, they are defects which it shares

with all other branches of education, and which England shares with

all other Western lands. The plain truth is that education as such is

a failure in the West, a failure in the sense that the very qualities

which it ought to foster--the cardinal virtues, mental, moral, and

spiritual, which are present in embryo in every child, waiting to be

realised--are not merely neglected by it, in its insane ardour for

"results," but are also exposed, in most of its schools, to strongly

adverse influences. And the reason why education as such is a failure

in the West is that from its earliest days it has been a house

divided against itself, those who were and are responsible for

it having been under the influence of two mutually destructive

assumptions, which they have vainly tried to reconcile with one

another.

The first of these assumptions is my initial "truism,"--that the

function of education is to foster growth. This is admitted,

implicitly if not directly, by all who think and speak about

education, and even, in their unguarded moments, by most of those

who teach. It is generally admitted, for example, that such mental

qualities as attention, memory, judgment, intelligence, reason,

such moral qualities as loyalty, courage, truthfulness, kindness,

unselfishness, such semi-moral qualities as cleanliness, orderliness,

carefulness, alertness, industry, punctuality, are capable of being

developed by education. It is further admitted that such special

qualities as literary or artistic taste, the mathematical or the

historical sense, an aptitude for business or finance, are ready

to evolve themselves, in response to the fostering influence of

practical experience directed by skilful teaching. It is admitted,

in other words, that there is much in human nature, apart from what

is purely or mainly physical, which is both capable and worthy of

cultivation, and which education ought therefore to try to cultivate.

So far, so good. These admissions, with the fundamental admission

which underlies them all, might form the basis of a sound philosophy

of education, if they were not liable to be stultified and even

nullified by the counter assumption that human nature is innately

evil and corrupt. For from the latter assumption has followed, both

logically and naturally, a theory of education which is not merely

unfavourable but fatal to growth. If human nature is innately evil,

if it has no inborn capacity for goodness or truth, what is there in

it that is worth training? So far as the "great matters" of life are

concerned, the child must be educated by being told in minute detail

what to do, and by being alternately bribed and bullied into doing

it. As he can neither think, nor believe, nor desire, nor do what

is right, he must be told what to think, what to believe, what to

desire, what to do; and as it is assumed that the tasks set him by

his teacher will not be intrinsically attractive, he must be induced

to perform them by the threat of external punishments and the promise

of external rewards. In other words, in the spheres of religion and

morals, so far as these can be walled off from the rest of human

life, he must be educated, not by being helped to grow, but by being

compelled to obey; and as the spheres of religion and morals cannot

possibly be walled off from the rest of human life, the idea of

educating the child through the medium of passive and mechanical

obedience will gradually extend its influence over all the other

departments and aspects of his home and school life, his innate

sinfulness finding its equivalent, in secular matters, in his innate

helplessness and stupidity, while in the place of the creeds, codes,

and catechisms by which his spiritual welfare is provided for, he

will be fed during the hours of secular instruction on rations of

information, formulated rules, and minute directions of various

kinds. Under this _régime_ of wire-pulling on the part of the teacher

and puppet-like dancing on the part of the child, the growth of

the child's faculties,--of the whole range of his faculties, for

they will all come under the blighting influence of the current

misconception of the bent of his nature and the consequent

under-estimate of his powers,--far from being fostered, will be

systematically thwarted and starved. This is the fate which might be

expected to befall the child if the doctrine of his innate sinfulness

were allowed to dominate his education; and this is the fate which

has befallen and is befalling him in all grades of society and in all

the countries of the West.

It is the doctrine of original sin, of the congenital depravity of

man's nature, which blocks the way to the reform of education,--blocks

the way to it by compelling education to become the destroying angel

instead of the foster-nurse of the child's expanding life. In

criticising the defects of our educational system, we have too long

mistaken symptoms for causes, and believed that we were removing the

latter when we were only palliating or at best excising the former.

To pinch off a withered bud, to lop off a withered limb, of the

diseased tree of education, to train in this or that direction a

branch which is as yet unaffected, is but lost labour so long as

the tree is being slowly poisoned at its roots by a fundamental

misconception of the character and capacity of the child. It is time

that we should reconsider our whole attitude towards human nature.

The widespread belief that sundry faculties, physical, mental, and

moral, admit of being cultivated and ought to be cultivated in the

schoolroom--a belief which is ever affirming itself against the

educational systems and practices that are ever giving it the

lie--may surely be construed into an admission that my primary truism

is at least a truth. If this is so, if the business of the teacher

is, as I contend, to help the child to grow, healthily, vigorously,

and symmetrically, on all the planes of his being, the inference is

irresistible that education will achieve nothing but failure until

its foundations have been entirely relaid. For faith in the inherent

soundness, in the natural goodness, of the seed or sapling, or

whatever else he may undertake to rear, is the first condition of

success on the part of the grower. And to ask education to bring to

sane and healthy maturity the plant which we call human nature, and

in the same breath to tell it that human nature is intrinsically

corrupt and evil, is to set it an obviously impracticable task. One

might as well supply a farmer with the seeds of wild grasses and

poisonous weeds, and ask him to grow a crop of wheat. Growth can and

does transform potential into actual good, but no process of growth

can transform what is innately evil into what is finally good. A

poisonous seed will ripen of inner necessity into a poisonous plant;

and the more carefully it is fed and tended, the larger and stronger

will the poisonous plant become.

The time has come, then, for us to throw to the winds the

time-honoured, but otherwise dishonoured and discredited, belief that

the child is conceived in sin and shapen in iniquity, and that

therefore his nature, if allowed to obey its own laws and follow its

own tendencies, will ripen into death, instead of into a larger

and richer life. I shall perhaps be told that if this belief is

abandoned, other religious beliefs will go with it. Let them go. They

have kept bad company, and if they cannot dissociate themselves from

it, they had better share its fate. What is real and vital in our

religious beliefs will gain incalculably by being disengaged from

what may once have had a life and a meaning of its own but is now

nothing better than a morbid growth. To tell a man that, apart from a

miracle, he is predestined to perdition, is the surest way to send

him there; and it is probable that the doctrine of his own innate

depravity is the deadliest instrument for achieving his ruin, that

Man, in his groping endeavours to explain to himself the dominant

facts of his existence, has ever devised.

Nor is the practical failure of the doctrine--its failure to achieve

any lasting result but the strangulation of Man's expanding life--the

only proof that it is inherently unsound. There is positive proof

that the counter doctrine, the doctrine of Man's potential goodness,

is inherently true. We have seen that the great arterial instincts

which manifest themselves in the undirected play of young children,

are making for three supreme ends,--the sympathetic instincts for the

goal of _Love_, the artistic instincts for the goal of _Beauty_, the

scientific instincts for the goal of _Truth_. We have seen, in other

words, that the push of Nature's forces in the inner life of the

young child is ever tending to take him out of himself in the

direction of a triune goal which I may surely be allowed to call

_Divine_. If we follow towards "infinity" the lines of love, of

beauty, and of truth, we shall begin at last to dream of an ideal

point--the meeting-point of all and the vanishing-point of each--for

which no name will suffice less pregnant with meaning or less

suggestive of reality than that of God. It is towards God, then, not

towards the Devil, that the ripening, expansive forces of Nature

which are at work in the child, are directing the process of his

growth. We are taught that Man is by nature a "child of wrath." The

more closely we study his ways and works when, as a young child, he

is left (more or less) to his own devices, the stronger does our

conviction become that he is by nature a "child of God." Those who

are in a position to speak tell us that the normal child is born

physically healthy. If the men of science would study the other sides

of his being as carefully as they have studied his physique, they

would, I feel sure, be able to tell us that he is also born mentally,

morally, and spiritually healthy, and that on these sides, as well as

on the physical side, his growth might be and ought to be a natural

movement towards perfection. For some of my readers such arguments as

these are perhaps too much in the air to be convincing. Well, then,

let us appeal to experience. Let us see what the systematic

cultivation of his natural faculties has done for the child in

Utopia. I have already pointed out that the unselfishness of the

children--the complete absence of self-seeking and self-assertion--is

one of the most noticeable features of the life of their school. Now

there is no place for moral teaching on the time-table of the

school: and I can say without hesitation that the direct inculcation

of morality is wholly foreign to Egeria's conception of education.

How, then, has the emancipation of the child from the first enemy of

Man's well-being--from all those narrowing, hardening, and

demoralising influences which we speak of collectively as egoistic or

selfish--been effected in Utopia? By no other means than that of

allowing the child's nature to unfold itself, on many sides of its

being and under thoroughly favourable conditions. The twofold desire

which we all experience,--to accept and rest in the ordinary

undeveloped self, and at the same time to exalt and magnify it,--is

the surest and most fruitful source of moral evil. Indeed, it may be

doubted if there is any source of moral evil, apart from those which

are purely sensual, which has not at least an underground connection

with this. If we are to "cap" this deadly fountain, and so prevent it

from desolating human life, we must realise, once and for all, that

the two desires which master us cannot be simultaneously gratified;

that we cannot both rest in the ordinary self and magnify it; that we

can magnify it only by _making it great_, by helping it to grow. When

we have realised this, we shall be ready to receive the further

lesson that in proportion as the self magnifies itself by the natural

process of growth, so does its desire to magnify itself gradually die

away,--die away with the dawning consciousness that in and through

the process of its growth it is outgrowing itself, forgetting itself,

escaping from itself, that the thing which so ardently desired to be

magnified is in fact ceasing to be. This vital truth,--which my

visits to Utopia have borne in upon me,--that healthy and harmonious

growth is in its very essence _out_growth or escape from self, has

depths of meaning which are waiting to be fathomed. For one thing, it

means, if it has any meaning, that what is central in human nature

is, not its inborn wickedness but its infinite capacity for good, not

its rebellious instincts and backsliding tendencies but its

many-sided effort to achieve perfection.

We must now make our choice between two alternatives. We must decide,

once and for all, whether the function of education is to foster

growth or to exact mechanical obedience. If we choose the latter

alternative, we shall enter a path which leads in the direction of

spiritual death. If we choose the former, we must cease to halt

between two opinions, and must henceforth base our system of

education, boldly and confidently, on the conviction that growth is

in its essence a movement towards perfection, and therefore that

self-realisation is the first and last duty of Man.

It is by answering possible objections to Utopianism that I shall

best be able to unfold Egeria's philosophy of education. I shall

perhaps be told that in my advocacy of that philosophy _I am

preaching dangerous doctrines; that the only alternative for

obedience is the lawlessness of unbridled licence; and that anarchy,

social, moral, and spiritual, is the ultimate goal of the path which

I am urging the teacher to enter._ Let me point out, in answer to

this protest, that it is mechanical obedience which I condemn, not

obedience as such. If I condemn mechanical obedience, I do so

because it is unworthy of the name of obedience, because the higher

faculties of Man's being, the faculties which are distinctively

human--reason, imagination, aspiration, spiritual intuition, and the

like--take no part in it, because it is the obedience of an

automaton, not of a living soul. What I wish to oppose to it is

_vital obedience_, obedience to the master laws of Man's being,

obedience to the laws which assert themselves as central and supreme,

obedience more particularly to those larger and obscurer laws which

obedience itself helps us to discover, obedience in fine to that

hierarchy of laws--(the superior law always claiming the fuller

measure and the higher kind of obedience)--which, if we are to use

the Divine Name, we must needs identify with the will of God.

Obedience, in this sense of the word, is a sustained and soul-deep

effort in which all the higher faculties of Man's being take part,

an effort which is in some sort a voyage of discovery, the doing of

the more obvious duty being always rewarded by the deepening of the

doer's insight and the widening of his outlook, and by the consequent

unveiling to him of the way in which he is to walk and the goal at

which he is to aim. That the path of soul-growth is the path of vital

obedience can scarcely be doubted. The effort to grow is always

successful just so far as it implies knowledge of the laws of the

nature that is unfolding itself, and readiness to obey those laws;

and so far as it is successful, it carries with it the outgrowth of

the very faculties by which knowledge--the higher knowledge which

makes further growth possible--is to be gained. Here, as

elsewhere, there is an unceasing interaction between perception and

expression, between knowledge of law and obedience to law, what is

given as obedience being received back as enlightenment, and what is

received as enlightenment being given back as larger, fuller, and

more significant obedience.

And, be it carefully observed, it is obedience to the laws of human

nature, not obedience to the idiosyncrasies of the individual nature,

which the process of soul-growth at once implies and makes possible.

Growth is, in its essence, a movement towards that perfect type which

is the real self of each individual in turn, and the approach to

which involves the gradual surrender of individuality, and the

gradual escape from the ordinary self. A man is to cling to and

affirm his individuality, not in order that he may rest in it and

make much of it, but in order that he may outgrow it and pass far

beyond it in that one way--the best way for him--which it, and it

alone, is able to mark out for him. In other words, he is to assert

his individual self in order that he may universalise himself in his

own way, and not in obedience to the ruling of custom and authority,

in order that he may escape from himself through the real outlet of

sincere self-expression, and not through the sham outlet of hypocrisy

and cant.

What I may call the Utopian scheme of education, far from making for

antinomianism and anarchy, is the sworn enemy of individualism and

therefore, _a fortiori_, of everything that savours of licence. It is

the conventional type of education, with its demands for mechanical

obedience to external authority, which leads through despotism to

social and political chaos. The whole _régime_ of mechanical

obedience is favourable, in the long run, to the development of

anarchy. Let us take the case of a church or an autocracy which

demands implicit obedience from its subjects, and is prepared to

exact such obedience by the application of physical force or its

moral equivalent. What will happen to it when its subjects begin to

ask it for its credentials? The fact that it has always demanded from

them literal rather than spiritual obedience, and that, in its

application of motive force, it has appealed to their baser desires

and baser fears, makes it impossible for it to justify itself to

their higher faculties, rational or emotional, and makes it necessary

for it to meet their incipient criticism with renewed threats of

punishment and renewed promises of reward. But the very fact that it

is being asked for its credentials means that the force on which it

has hitherto relied is weakening, that its power to punish and

reward, which has always been resolvable into the power to make

people believe that it can punish and reward, is being called in

question and is therefore crumbling away. And behind that power there

is nothing but chaos. For the _régime_ of mechanical obedience, by

arresting the spontaneous growth of Man's higher nature, and by

making its chief appeal to his baser desires and baser fears, becomes

of necessity the foster-mother of egoism; and when egoism, which

makes each man a law to himself and the potential enemy of his kind,

is unrestrained by authority, the door is thrown wide open to

anarchy, and through anarchy to chaos. This is what is happening in

the West, in our self-conscious and critical age. In every field of

human action, in religion, in politics, in social life, in art, in

letters, authority is being asked for its credentials; and as this

demand, besides being a disintegrating influence, is a sign that the

force on which authority relies is weakening, it is not to be

wondered at that there is a steady drift in many Western countries in

the direction of anarchy,--religious, political, social, artistic,

literary,--or that this _régime_ of incipient anarchy is taking the

form of an ignoble scramble for wealth, for power, for position, for

fame, for notoriety, for anything in fine which may serve to exalt a

man above his fellows, and so minister to the aggrandizement of his

lower self.

In this drift towards anarchy the school is playing its part. I do

not wish to suggest that the boys and girls of this or any other

Western country are beginning to ask their teachers for their

credentials, or are likely to rise in rebellion against them. The

preparation for anarchy that is going on in the school is not only

quite compatible with what is known as "strict discipline," but is

also, in part at least, the effect of it. What is happening is that

in an acutely critical age the _régime_ of mechanical obedience to

external authority which has been in force in the West for nearly

2000 years, and which is now taking its victims straight towards

anarchy, is being carefully rehearsed in our schools of all types and

grades. During the years when human nature is most pliable (owing to

its richness in sap), most easily trained, and most amenable to

influence, good or evil, the child's spontaneous effort to outgrow

himself and so escape from his lower self,--an end which is not to be

reached except by the path of free self-expression,--is persistently

thwarted till at last it dies away; blind and literal obedience to

external authority, for which the consent of his higher faculties

is not asked, and in the giving of which they are not allowed to

take part, is persistently exacted from him till at last his

higher faculties cease to energise, and his lower nature begins to

monopolise the rising sap of his life; in order to enforce the blind

obedience that is asked for, an appeal is made, by an elaborate

system of external rewards and external punishments, to his selfish

desires and ignoble fears; while the examination system, with

its inevitable accompaniments of prizes and class-lists, makes a

special appeal to his competitive instincts,--instincts which are

anti-social, and may even, in extreme cases, become anti-human in

their tendency. And when authority has thus been presented to him, in

a form which he has never been expected to welcome, and when, by the

same process, the growth of his higher self has been arrested, and

his anarchical instincts--his selfishness and self-assertion--have

been systematically cultivated, the critical spirit and temper will

be deliberately aroused in him, especially if he happens to attend

one of those secondary schools which are regarded as highly efficient

because their lists of University distinctions and other "successes"

are inordinately long; for the education given to him in such a

school by his scholarship-hunting teachers is of necessity so bookish

and so one-sided that his intellectual, dialectically critical

faculties are apt to become hypertrophied, while other faculties

which might have kept these in check are neglected and starved. The

product of such a system of education,--benumbed or paralysed on many

sides of his being by the repressive _régime_ to which he has so long

been subjected, but vigorously alive on the sides of egoism and

intellectual criticism,--will be an anarchist _in posse_ (unless,

indeed, his vitality has been depressed by his school-life below the

point at which reaction becomes possible);--an anarchist _in posse_,

even though, in his terror of anarchism in others, he should become a

pillar of the Established Church of his country, a J.P. of his town

or county, and an active member of the nearest Conservative

Association.

In Utopia, on the other hand, where selfishness is outgrown and

forgotten, and where the spirit of comradeship and brotherhood

pervades the school, there can be no preparation for anarchy, if only

for the reason that there is no authority--no despotic authority,

forcibly imposing its will on the school _ab extra_--to be

potentially dethroned. For all her scholars, Egeria is the very

symbol and embodiment of love, the centre whence all happy,

harmonious, life-giving, peace-diffusing influences radiate, and to

which, when they have vitalised the souls of the children and

transformed themselves into sentiments of loyalty and devotion, they

all return. I am not exaggerating a whit when I say that the Utopian

school is an ideal community, a community whose social system,

instead of being inspired by that spirit of "competitive selfishness"

which makes "each for himself, and the devil take the hindmost" its

motto, seems to have realised the Socialistic dream of "Each for all,

and all for each."

I shall perhaps be asked _what provision is made in Utopia for

enabling the children to go through the drudgery of school-life, to

master the "3 R's," to "get up" the various subjects which the Code

prescribes, and so forth_. To this question there is but one answer:

the best possible provision. "Qui veut la fin veut les moyens." In

the life of organised play which the children lead, attractive ends

are ever being set before them. If they are to achieve these ends,

they must take the appropriate means. What children in other schools

might regard as drudgery, the Utopian takes in his stride. Reading,

writing, and arithmetic are means to ends beyond themselves, ends

which are constantly presenting themselves to the Utopian. If he is

to gratify his communicative instinct, he must learn to read and

write. If he is to gratify his dramatic instinct, he must, _inter

alia_, read with intelligence books of reference which would be

considered too advanced for the ordinary school-child. If he is to

gratify his inquisitive and constructive instincts, he must learn

to count, measure, and calculate. For whatever means may have to

be taken, must be taken by him. Egeria, as he knows well, will

do nothing for him which he can reasonably be expected to do for

himself. There are subjects, such as drawing, dancing, and singing,

which are, or at any rate ought to be, intrinsically delightful,

as being natural channels of self-expression. There are other

subjects, such as history, geography, and English, which can be made

delightful by being treated dramatically. The word "drudgery" has no

meaning for the Utopian child. A group of children in the highest

class recently committed to memory the whole "Trial Scene" of the

_Merchant of Venice_--some 300 lines or so of blank verse--in order

that they might give themselves the pleasure of acting it. They

accomplished this feat in a little more than a month. In the ordinary

elementary school the child who has committed 150 lines to memory

in the course of a year has done all that is required of him. The

getting up of a subject is drudgery only when the child can see no

meaning in what he is doing, only when the getting up of the subject

is regarded as an end in itself. In Utopia no subject, apart from

those which I have spoken of as intrinsically delightful, is taught

for its own sake. Subjects are taught there either as the means to

desired ends, or because they afford opportunities for the training

of the expansive instincts, the gratification of which is a pure

pleasure to every healthy child.

But not only does the Utopian child, with his eyes always fixed on

desirable ends, find a pleasure in doing things which other children

are wont to regard as drudgery, but he has the further advantage of

being able to master with comparative facility what other children

find difficult as well as distasteful. From first to last, the

training given in Utopia makes, as we have seen, for the development

of faculty. In my last chapter I set forth in detail some of the ways

and means by which Egeria tries to cultivate the expansive instincts

of her pupils. Behind all these ways and means stands the master

method--or shall I say the master principle?--of self-expression.

Recognising, as she does, that each of the expansive instincts is a

definite expression of the soul's spontaneous effort to grow, and a

clear indication of a particular direction in which Nature wishes the

soul to grow,--and recognising, as she also does, that the business

of growing must be done by the growing organism and cannot be

delegated to any one else,--Egeria entrusts the work of

self-realisation to the child himself, and makes no attempt to

relieve him of an obligation which no one but himself can discharge.

Now self-realisation is a twofold process. In the absence of a fitter

and more adequate word, I have applied the term _perceptive_ to those

faculties by means of which we lay hold upon the world that surrounds

us, and draw it into ourselves and make it our own. And I have

contended that this group of faculties has, as its counterpart

and correlate, another group of faculties which I have called

_expressive_,--the faculties by means of which we go out of ourselves

into the world that surrounds us, and give ourselves to it and try to

identify ourselves with it,--and that the relation between these two

groups is so vital and so intimate that each in turn may be regarded

as the very life and soul of the other. In words which I have already

used, the perceptive faculties, at any rate in childhood, grow

through the interpretation which expression gives them, and in no

other way, and the expressive faculties grow by interpreting

perception, and in no other way. That these two groups of faculties

are, as it were, the reciprocating engines by means of which the

vital movement which we call self-realisation is effected, is the

conviction on which Egeria's whole scheme of education may be said to

be pivoted. In Utopia self-expression is the medium through which the

expansive instincts are encouraged to unfold themselves. And this

life of self-expression has as its necessary counterpart the

continuous development of the perceptive faculties along the whole

range of the child's nature.

Hence the all-round capacity of the Utopian child. The development of

his perceptive faculties which his life of self-expression tends to

produce, takes many forms. One of these, and one which in some sort

underlies and interpenetrates all the rest, is the outgrowth of what

I may call the _intuitional_ faculty,--a general capacity for getting

into touch with any new environment in which the child may find

himself, of subconsciously apprehending its laws and properties, of

feeling his way through its unexplored land. It is by means of this

capacity for putting forth a new _sense_ in response to the stimulus

of each new environment, that the Utopian child is able to master

with comparative ease the various subjects which he is expected to

learn. And not with ease only, but with effect. It is, as we have

seen, through the action of an appropriate sense, and in no other

way, that the information which is supplied to the scholar, when he

is learning this or that subject, is converted into _knowledge_, and

is so made available both for the further understanding of the given

subject and for the nutrition of the scholar's own inner life.

From every point of view, then, the Utopian scholar has a marked

advantage, in respect of the things with which education is supposed

to be mainly concerned--the mastery of subjects and the acquisition

of knowledge--over the product of the conventional type of school.

Whatever the Utopian may have to learn, is a pleasure to him either

for its own sake or as a means to some desirable end. Whatever he may

have to learn, he learns with comparative ease, because his

perceptive faculties have been systematically trained, and he is

therefore at home, in greater or lesser degree, in any new

environment. And whatever he may have to learn, he learns with

effect, because he is able to digest the information that he

receives, and convert it into knowledge, and so retain it in the form

in which it will best conduce both to his further progress in that

particular branch of study and to the general building up of his

mind.

In the ordinary result-hunting school the scholar fares very

differently from this. As a rule, he takes but little pleasure in his

work, for subjects which have their chief value as means to desirable

ends are presented to him as ends in themselves, and as such are

rightly regarded by him as meaningless and therefore as intolerably

dull; while subjects which are either intrinsically attractive, as

being natural channels of self-expression, or potentially attractive

as providing opportunities for self-expression, have no attraction

for him, as in neither case is self-expression on his part permitted.

Again, he finds great difficulty in mastering the subjects on his

time-table, or even in making the first step towards mastering them,

for, owing to his perceptive faculties as a whole having been

starved by the repressive _régime_ which denied them the outlet

of expression, he has not evolved the power of putting forth an

appropriate sense in response to the stimulus of a new environment,

and is therefore helpless in the presence of what is unfamiliar or

unexpected. One of his faculties, his memory, has indeed been

hypertrophied by being unduly exercised, and his capacity for

receiving information is in consequence unhealthily great; but

because he lacks, in this case or in that, the _sense_ which might

enable him to digest the information received and convert it into

knowledge, the food with which he has been crammed speedily passes

through him, undigested and unassimilated, and the hours which he has

spent in acquiring information will have done as little for his

progress in the given subject as for the general growth of his mind.

The difference between the two schemes of education--that which

exacts mechanical obedience, and that which seeks to foster

growth--may be looked at from another point of view. Under the

former, interference with what I may call the subconscious processes

of Nature is at its maximum. Under the latter, at its minimum. In

order to realise what this means let us suppose that such

interference were possible where fortunately it is and must ever be

impossible,--in the first and second years of the child's life.

Fortunately for the child, it is impossible for us to educate him,

in any formal sense of the word, until he has mastered his mother

tongue. Were it otherwise, his mother tongue would never be mastered.

Before he reaches the age of two the child accomplishes the

marvellous feat of acquiring an entirely new language. While he is

learning it Nature is his only teacher, and under her tuition he

masters the new language without the least strain and with complete

success. But let us suppose that it was possible for a teacher of the

conventional type to give minute directions to a child by some other

medium of expression than that of language. And let us suppose that

such a teacher made up her mind that she, and not Nature, was to

teach the child his mother tongue. One can readily imagine what would

happen. The teacher would probably have a theory that no child should

begin to talk till he was two or even two and a half years old; and

if so, the child would be kept in a state of enforced dumbness till

he reached that age. In any case, he would be strictly forbidden

to speak till his teacher gave him formal permission to do so.

Half-an-hour in the morning, and half-an-hour in the afternoon would

probably be set aside for the language lesson. For so many weeks or

months the child would be strictly limited to words of two or three

letters. For so many more weeks or months, to words of four or five

letters. Things which had names of more than the prescribed number

of letters would be kept away from the child; or, if that was

impossible, he would not be allowed to talk about them. For half a

year perhaps he would be limited to the use of nouns and verbs.

Prepositions might then be introduced into his vocabulary; and,

later, adjectives and adverbs. And so on; and so on. And the outcome

of all this elaborate training would be that the child would never

learn to talk his mother tongue.

It is by methods analogous in all respects to this that many of the

subjects on the time-table are taught in thousands of our schools.

The teacher seems to imagine that he knows, fully and precisely, how

each subject ought to be taught; and instead of standing aside, and

trying to learn how Nature wishes this or that subject to be taught

(if Nature can be said to take any interest in "subjects"), and then

trying to co-operate with her subconscious tendencies, he makes out

his elaborate scheme of instruction, sets before the child as the

goal of his efforts the production of certain formal results, and

drives him towards these with whip and bridle, satisfied that if he

succeeds in producing them, the subject will have been duly mastered.

And all the time he will not have given a thought to what is

happening to the child's inner life. Yet it is more than probable

that the teacher's disregard of, and therefore incessant interference

with, the subconscious processes of Nature has quite as disastrous

results in the teaching of composition, let us say, or drawing, as it

would certainly have in the hypothetical case of the teaching of the

child's mother tongue.

But in truth the Utopian conception of what constitutes efficiency

differs so radically from the current conception, that little is to

be gained by comparing them. If I am asked by those who value outward

and visible results for their own sake, whether the training given in

Utopia is "efficient," I can but answer: "Yes, but efficient in a

sense which you cannot even begin to understand,--efficient in the

sense of developing faculty and fostering life, whereas the price

paid for your boasted efficiency is the starvation of faculty and the

destruction of life."

* * * * *

"_But how_," it will be asked, "_are the Utopian children, one and

all, induced to exert themselves? The standard of activity in the

school is, on your own showing, exceptionally high. Much is expected

of the children. Yet there are no rewards for them to hope for, and

no punishments for them to fear. How, then, are those who are by

nature less energetic or less persevering than the rest to be induced

to rise to the level of the teacher's expectation?_" By implication

this question has been answered again and again. But it deserves a

direct answer, and I will try to give it one.

To begin with, it is incorrect to say that there are no rewards or

punishments in Utopia. Outward rewards and outward punishments are

entirely unknown there; but there are inward rewards to be had for

the seeking, and there are inward punishments to be feared, though it

must be admitted that the fear of them seldom overshadows, even for

a passing moment, the sunlit life of the Utopian child. What induces

the Utopian child to work is, in brief, delight in his work. He is

allowed and even encouraged to energise along the lines which his

nature seems to have marked out for him, and in response to the

stress of forces which seem to be welling up from the depths of his

inner life. Exertion of this kind is in itself a delight. Nature has

taken care to make all the exercises by which growth is fostered, at

any rate in the days of childhood when growth is most rapid and

vigorous, intrinsically attractive. Had she done otherwise she would

have failed to make due provision for the growth of Man's being

during the years which precede the outgrowth of self-consciousness,

and the possibility of self-discipline, of the narrower and sterner

kind.

And not only are the exercises by which healthy and harmonious growth

is secured intrinsically attractive, but also the sense of well-being

which accompanies such growth is an unfailing source of happiness. In

Utopia the end for which the children are working is not an external

reward or prize to be conferred on them if they achieve certain

prescribed results, but rather the actual goal to which the path that

they have entered is taking them,--a goal which is ever lighting the

path with its foreglow, and which is therefore at once an infinitely

distant lodestar and an ever present delight. For the consummation of

any process of growth is always the perfection, the final well-being,

of the thing that grows; and therefore in each successive stage of

the process there is a truer prefigurement of the perfection which

is being gradually achieved, and a fuller sense of that well-being

which, at its highest level, is perfection's other self.

For the Utopian, then, to walk in the path of self-realisation is its

own reward; and to wander from that path is its own punishment. But

as the forces of Nature are all co-operating to keep the child in

the path of self-realisation, and as Egeria has allied herself with

those forces and is working with them in every possible way, the

rewards which the Utopian wins for himself are very many, while the

punishments which he inflicts on himself are very few. In other

words, the pressure on him to exert himself is so strong, his

opportunities for exerting himself (under Egeria's sympathetic rule)

are so many, and the pleasure of exerting himself is found to be so

great, that the temptation to be idle or rebellious can scarcely be

said to exist.

It is indeed in respect of the motives to exertion which they

respectively supply, that the superiority of the Utopian to the

conventional type of education is perhaps most pronounced. I have

said that Egeria allies herself with the expansive forces of Nature.

The teacher of the conventional type has to fight against those

forces. Let us assume that the two teachers are on a level in respect

of their capacity for influencing and stimulating their pupils,

and let us indicate that level by the algebraical symbol _x_. Then

the difference between the motive force which Egeria exerts, and

the motive force which her rival exerts, is the difference between

_x_ + _y_, and _x_ - _y_, _y_ being used to symbolise the aggregate

motive force of the expansive tendencies of the child's inner nature.

Such a difference is incalculable. The scheme of education which is

based on distrust of the child's nature and belief in its intrinsic

sinfulness and stupidity, necessarily arrays against itself the

hidden forces of that maligned and despised nature, and must needs

overcome their resistance before it can hope to achieve its proposed

end. While Egeria is helping Nature to provide suitable channels for

the various expansive tendencies that are at work in the child, and

to guide them all into the central channel of self-realisation, her

rival is engaged in digging a canal (to be filled, when finished,

with dead, stagnant water) which is so designed that not only will no

use be made by it of the life stream of the child's latent energies,

but also costly culverts and other works will have to be constructed

for it in order to divert and send to waste that troublesome

current.

The waste of motive force which goes on under any scheme of education

through mechanical obedience, is indeed enormous. And what is most

lamentable is that the energies of the teacher are being largely

wasted in the effort to neutralise the latent energies of the child.

No wonder that, in order to produce his meagre and illusory,

"results," the teacher should have to resort to motive forces which,

by appealing to the lower side of the child's nature, will enable

him to bear down the resistance, and, in doing so, to impede the

outgrowth of the higher,--to the hope of external rewards and the

threat of external punishments. And no wonder that, owing to the

teacher having to work unceasingly against the grain of the

child's nature, of these two demoralising forces, the fear of

punishment--which, if not the more demoralising, is certainly the

more wasteful of energy--should bulk the more largely in the eyes

of the child.

In fine, then, whereas the conventional type of education is so

wasteful of motive force that it dissipates the greater part of the

teachers' and the scholars' energies in needless friction,--in

Utopia, on the other hand, there is such an economy of motive force

that the very joy which, under its scheme of education, always

accompanies the child's expenditure of energy, and which might be

regarded as merely a waste by-product, becomes in its turn a powerful

incentive to further exertion.

* * * * *

"_But is there not too much joy in Utopia? Is not the sky too

cloudless? Is not the atmosphere too clear? Does the Utopian never

act from a sense of duty? Has he never to do anything that is

distasteful to him?_" This objection raises an interesting question.

Is the function of the sense of duty to enable us to do distasteful

things? And if so, are we to regard it as the highest of motives to

moral action? In the days when Kant's idea of the "moral imperative"

was in the ascendant, the belief got abroad that the essence of

virtue was to do what you hated doing. Looking back to my Oxford

days, I recall some doggerel lines, of German origin, in which this

belief finds apt expression. A disciple who is in trouble about his

soul says to his master:

"Willing serve I my friends, but do it, alas! with affection,

And so gnaws me my heart, that I'm not virtuous yet."

To this the master replies:

"Help except this there is none: you must strive with

might to contemn them,

And with horror perform then what the law may enjoin."

If this conception of morality is correct, if it is true that the

atmosphere of the virtuous life should be one of horror and even of

hatred, then it must be admitted that the Utopian children are

receiving a seriously defective education. But the "if" is a large

one; and for my part I incline to the belief that love, as a motive

to action, is better than hatred, joy than horror, sunshine than

gloom.

The day will indeed come when the Utopian--a child no longer--will

have to do things, either for his own sake or in order to discharge

obligations to others, which will be, or will seem to be, against the

grain even of his happy nature; and the sense of duty will then have

to come to his aid. But there is no reason why he, or his teachers,

should anticipate that day. To compel him, while still a child, to

work against the grain of his nature, when there was no real need for

this, would not be the best preparation for the trials that await

him. To compel him to spend the greater part of his school-life in

doing what was distasteful to him, would be the worst possible

preparation for them.

For, to begin with, the sense of duty is not the highest motive to

action. A far higher motive is love. If the sense of duty to God, for

example, had not devotion to God and love of God behind it, the

object of one's worship would be a malignant rather than a beneficent

deity, a devil rather than a God. Or let us take the case of a child

who is dangerously ill, and who needs to be carefully and even

devotedly nursed. By whom will he be the more effectively nursed,--by

his mother who loves him passionately, or by a hired nurse who cannot

be expected to love him but who has a strong sense of duty to her

employers? (I am assuming that as regards professional skill, and

the sense of duty to God, the two women are on a level.) Surely the

mother, sustained by love in the endurance of sleeplessness and

fatigue, and in the exercise of that unceasing vigilance which lets

no symptom escape it, will be the better nurse. Love, as a motive to

moral action, has the immense advantage over the sense of duty of

being able to rob the hour of trial of its gloom, by strengthening

the lover to make light of labour and difficulty till at last the

sense of effort is lost in the sense of joy. But if love is the

highest of all motives, is it not well that the child's life should

as far as possible, and for as long as possible, be kept under its

influence, to the exclusion of other motives. We have seen that the

Utopian child takes many things in his stride which other children

would regard as distasteful. If they are not distasteful to him, the

reason is that he does them, not from a sense of duty, but under the

inspiration of love,--love of life, love of Egeria, love of his

schoolmates, love of his school. And the longer he can remain on the

high plane of love, the better it will be for his after life.

And when the time comes for him to yield himself to the "saving arms"

of duty, he will have had the best of all preparations for that hour

of trial, for he will have been braced and strengthened for it by the

most moralising of all disciplines, that of growth. What is the sense

of duty? We too seldom ask ourselves this question. Is it not a

feeling of obligation, of being in debt, to some person, or persons,

or institution, or society, or even to some invisible Power;--to

a friend, for example, a relative, a dependent, an employer, a

"contracting party," a commanding officer,--or, again, to one's trade

or profession, to one's political party, to one's church, to one's

country,--or, in the last resort, to God? And is not this feeling

accompanied by the secret conviction that until the debt has been

liquidated, to the best of the debtor's ability, justice will not

have been done? The sense of duty is, I think, a derivative sense,

an offshoot from the more primitive sense of justice,--a sense so

primitive that it may almost be said to have made possible our social

life. If this is so, if the sense of duty is resolvable into the

sense of justice, then the training which is given in Utopia--a

training which makes for healthy and harmonious growth, and therefore

(as we have seen) for outgrowth or escape from self--is the best

preparation for a life of duty, that can possibly be given. For under

its influence the sense of justice, which is essentially a social

instinct, knowing no distinction between oneself and one's neighbour,

will be relieved of the hostile pressure of its arch-enemy, the

anti-social instinct of selfishness,[21] and will therefore make

rapid and vigorous growth. The sense of justice is, as might be

expected, strongly developed in the selfless atmosphere of Utopia,

where indeed it has helped, in no small degree, to evolve the

wonderful social life of the school; and, that being so, there is no

fear but what the Utopian will be sustained by the sense of duty when

the time comes for him to work against the grain of his nature. But

however strong may be his sense of duty, he will always have the

great advantage of being seldom called upon to do what he dislikes,

and therefore of being able to keep the fibre of his sense of duty

from being either unduly relaxed or unduly hardened by overwork; for

he has been accustomed from his earliest days to make light of, and

even find a pleasure in, what is usually accounted drudgery, and he

has been accustomed to work, in school and out of school, under the

inspiration of joy and love.

_But is the education given in Utopia useful?_ I wish I knew who was

asking this question, for I cannot hope to answer it to his

satisfaction until I know what is his standard of values. What end

does he set before the teachers of our elementary schools? If he

would tell me this, I might be able to say Yes or No to his question.

At present there seems to be no agreement among educationalists,

professional or amateur, as to what constitutes usefulness in

education. Those who belong to the "upper classes" are apt to assume

that the "lower orders" will have been adequately educated when they

have been taught reading, writing, arithmetic, needlework, and

"religion," subjected to a certain amount of repressive discipline,

and compelled to go to church or chapel. If, after having passed

through this mill, the children of the "lower orders" do not develop

into good men and women and useful citizens, it is not their

education which is to blame, but the inborn sinfulness of their

corrupt and fallen natures. Such an education is regarded by those

who advocate it as pre-eminently _useful_. There is no nonsense about

it, no cant of idealism, no taint of socialism. It keeps the "lower

orders" in their places, and forbids them to dream of rising above

"that state of life unto which it" has pleased "God to call them." As

it is a _reductio ad absurdum_ of the conventional type of education,

my objection to it is that it makes the best possible provision for

securing the end which the conventional type seems to have set

before itself,--in other words, for depressing the vitality of the

child, for starving his faculties, for arresting his growth. As

such, it has not even the merit of being sordidly useful; for

unless stupidity is a better thing than intelligence, slowness than

alertness, helplessness than initiative, lifelessness than vital

activity, the child who has passed through that dreary mill will be

far less effective, even as a day-labourer, than the child whose

school-life has been one of continuous and many-sided growth. It is

strange that the reactionary members of the "upper classes" should be

too short-sighted to discern this obvious truth. But perhaps they

have a secret conviction that by so educating the "lower orders" as

to make them slow and stupid, helpless and lifeless, they will be the

better able to keep them in a state of subservience to and dependence

on themselves.[22] If this is so, there is method in the madness of

the "upper classes"; and their conception of the course that

education ought to take has the merit of being entirely true to their

basely selfish conception of the end that education ought to serve.

I have alluded to this pseudo-utilitarian theory, not because it is

intrinsically worthy of serious attention, but because there is

undoubtedly a strong and influential current of opinion which sets in

its direction. There are other advocates of a "useful" education who

seem to regard the elementary school, not as a training ground for

good men and women, but as a kind of technical institute in which the

children are to be trained for the various callings by which, when

they grow up, they will have to earn their daily bread. This theory

need not be seriously considered, for its inherent absurdity has

caused it to be tacitly abandoned by all whose opinion carries

weight; and the more reasonable theory that the education given in

the elementary school should be as far as possible adapted to the

environment of the school--that it should be given a rural bias, for

example, or a marine bias, or even an urban bias--has begun to take

its place. That it should ever have found advocates is interesting as

showing how easy it is for unenlightened public opinion to

misinterpret the word "useful."[23]

There is a third class of critics, composed for the most part of

members of Local Education Committees, who seem to think that ability

to pass a "leaving" examination is the only valid proof of the

usefulness of elementary education. If these influential critics, who

are showing in various ways that they care more for machinery than

for life, could have their will, they would probably revert to the

"good old days" of cut-and-dried syllabuses, formal examinations of

individual scholars, percentages of passes, and the like. As I have

already taken pains to explain what the _régime_ of the "good old

days" really meant, I need not waste my time in exposing the

fallacies which underlie this conception of "usefulness."

Here, then, are three distinct standards of usefulness in elementary

education. According to the first, education is useful in proportion

as it tends, by repressing the activities and atrophying the

faculties of the scholars, to keep the "lower orders" in their

places, and in so doing to provide the "upper classes" with a

sufficiency of labourers and servants. According to the second, it is

useful in proportion as it is able to prepare the scholars for their

various callings in after life.[24] According to the third, in

proportion as it enables the scholars to pass with credit certain

"leaving" and other examinations of a formal type.

I will now assume that the end of education is to produce, or at any

rate contribute to the production of, good men and women; and that

the education given in elementary schools is useful in exact

proportion as it serves this end. I am not using the word "good" in

its Sunday School sense. Nor does the word suggest to my mind that

blend of stupidity, patience, and submissiveness which sometimes

passes for "goodness" when the "upper classes" are taking thought for

the welfare of the "lower orders." The good man, as I understand the

phrase, is a good son, a good brother, a good husband, a good father,

a good citizen, a good townsman, a good workman, a good servant, a

good master. In fine, he is a good specimen of his kind, well

grown and well developed, efficient on all the planes of his

being,--physical, mental, moral, spiritual. This conception of what

constitutes useful education differs radically from those which I

have just been considering; but I believe that when it has been

adequately expounded, and submitted to the judgment of those whose

opinion is worth having, it will not be seriously gainsaid.

If education is useful in proportion as it tends to produce good men

and women, the education given in Utopia is useful to the highest

degree. For a child cannot become a good man (or woman) except by

_growing_ good; and if he is to grow good, his nature must be allowed

to develop itself freely and harmoniously (for just so far as it is

normal and healthy it is necessarily making for its own perfection),

and the one end and aim of the teacher must be to stimulate and

direct this process of spontaneous growth. This, as we have seen, is

the one end and aim of Egeria; and it is therefore clear that she

is taking effective steps--the most effective that can possibly

be taken--to produce good men and women. We have but to name the

qualities which are characteristic, as we have already seen, of her

pupils and ex-pupils,--activity, versatility, imaginative sympathy,

a large and free outlook, self-forgetfulness, charm of manner, joy

of heart,--in order to convince ourselves that those who have passed

through the Utopian school are on the high road which leads to

"goodness." So obvious is all this, that in defining the word

"useful" I may be said to have decided the question in favour of

Utopia; and what is now in dispute is not whether Utopianism is

"useful," in any sense of the word, but whether my sense of the word

is the right one.

I cannot go much further into this question without exceeding the

limits of the theme which I am handling in this chapter. For in

considering the after life of the Utopian child, I am entering a

region in which the idea of _education_ begins to merge itself in the

larger idea of _salvation_; and though education, as begun in Utopia,

is in its essence a life-long process, I must pay some heed to the

limits which tradition and custom have imposed on the meaning of the

word.

But before I close this chapter I must be allowed to give one

illustration in support of my contention that the education given in

Utopia is useful. Of the many complaints that are brought against the

output of our elementary schools, one of the most serious is that the

boys and girls who have recently left school are voracious readers of

a vicious and demoralising literature which seems to be provided for

their special benefit. The reason why they take so readily to this

garbage is that they have lost their appetite for wholesome food.

They are not interested in healthy literature, in Nature-study, in

music, in art, in handicraft,--in any pursuit which might take them

out of themselves into a larger and freer life; and so they fall

victims to the allurements of a literature which appeals to their

baser, more sensual, and more selfish instincts,--the very instincts

which growth (in the true sense of the word) spontaneously relegates

to a subordinate position and places under effective control. It is

the inertness, the apathy, the low vitality of the average child of

fourteen, which is the cause of his undoing. His taste for false and

meretricious excitement--a taste which may lead him far along the

downward path--is the outcome of his very instinct to live, an

instinct which, though repressed by the influences that have choked

its natural channels, cannot resign itself to extinction, and at

last, in its despairing effort to energise, forces for itself the

artificial outlet of an imaginative interest in vice and crime.

The "young person" who, on leaving school, becomes a voracious

devourer of unwholesome literature, cannot be said to have received

a "useful" education. That vice and crime--whether practised or

imagined--are in the first instance artificial outlets, outlets which

the soul would not use if its expansive instincts were duly fostered,

is proved by the absence of "naughtiness" in the Utopian school,

and the absence of any taste for morbid excitement amongst Utopian

ex-scholars. The unwholesome literature which gives so much concern

to those who are interested in the welfare of the young, is unknown

in Utopia. And in this, as in other matter, the "goodness" of the

children and "young persons" is due, not to any lack of life and

spirit, but to the very abundance of their vitality. Apart from the

fact that vigorous growth, whether in plant or animal or human soul,

is in itself a sure prophylactic against the various evils to which

growing life is exposed, the Utopians are guarded against the danger

of demoralising books and demoralising amusements by their many-sided

interest in life. Their instinct to live, finding natural and

adequate outlets in many directions, has no need to force for itself

the artificial outlet of morbid excitement,--an outlet for imprisoned

energies, which has too often proved an opening to a life of vice and

crime. There is a Shakespeare in every cottage in Utopia; but the

advocates of a repressive and restrictive education for the "lower

orders" need not be alarmed at this, for the Utopians, who have found

the secret of true happiness, are freer than most villagers from

social discontent. Nor are Egeria's ex-pupils less efficient as

labourers or domestic servants because they are interested in good

literature, in Nature-study, in acting, or because they can still

dance the Morris Dances and sing the Folk Songs which they learned in

school.

FOOTNOTES:

[20] I am thinking more particularly of some of the Roman

Catholic schools in the Irish quarter of Liverpool, where the

singularly kind and gracious bearing of the teaching "sisters"

towards their poor, ill-fed, and ill-clad pupils is an educative

influence of incalculable value.

[21] The sense of justice, which would give to each his due,

and therefore not more than his due to oneself, seems to hold the

balance between selfishness and love, being as it were, equidistant

from the greed and self-indulgence of the former and the lavishness

and self-devotion of the latter. If this is so, and if the sense of

duty is, as I have suggested, an offshoot from the sense of justice,

one can understand why, on the one hand, the sense of duty should be

needed to hold the self-seeking instincts in check, and why, on the

other hand, it should be an altogether lower and weaker motive than

love, by which indeed, _in its own interest_, it should always be

ready to be superseded.

[22] I was once present when the Utopian children were going

through a programme of Folk Songs and Morris Dances in the village

hall. A lady who was looking on remarked to me: "This is all very

fine; but if this sort of thing goes on, where are we going to find

our servants?" The selfishness of this remark is obvious. What is

less obvious, but more significant, is its purblindness. In point of

fact the Utopian girls make excellent domestic servants, and are well

content to "go into service."

[23] Some two or three years ago it was seriously proposed

that _marine navigation_ should be taught in all the elementary

schools of a certain maritime county!

[24] The parent who wrote to a schoolmaster, "Please do not

teach my boy any more poetry, as he is going to be a grocer," must

have been under the influence of this conception of usefulness.

What Is and What Might Be A Study of Education in General and Elementary Education in Particular · 第 3 / 5 章