[Sidenote: [The 4^the p{ro}se.]]
[Sidenote: _P._ This is the old objection against Providence, so
ably handled by Cicero in his _Book of Divination_; and you
yourself have anxiously discussed it.]
++Þanne seide she. þis is q{uo}d she þe olde questiou{n} of
þe p{ur}ueaunce of god. {and} marcus tulius whan he 4652
deuided[e] þe deuinac{i}ou{n}s. þat is to sein in hys booke
þat he wroot of deuinac{i}ou{n}s. he moeued[e] gretly þis
questiou{n}. {and} þou þi self hast souȝt it mochel {and}
outerly {and} lo{n}g[e].
[Sidenote: But neither of you have offered a satisfactory solution
of the difficulty.]
but ȝit ne haþ it nat ben determined 4656
ne yspedd fermely {and} diligently of any of yow.
[Sidenote: The cause of this mystery is that the human
understanding cannot conceive the simplicity of the divine
prescience, for if it were possible to comprehend this, every
difficulty would at once disappear.]
¶ And þe cause of þis derkenesse {and} [of this] difficulte
is for þat þe moeuynge of þe resou{n} of mankynde ne
may nat moeue{n} to. þat is to sein applien or ioygnen to 4660
þe simplicite of þe deuyne p{re}science. ¶ þe whiche
symplicite of þe deuyne p{re}science ȝif þat men [myhten
thinken it in any maner{e} / þ{a}t is to seyn / þ{a}t yif men] myȝte
þinken {and} co{m}p{re}henden þe þinges as god seeþ hem. 4664
þan ne sholde þer dwellen outerly no doute.
[Sidenote: I shall, therefore, try to explain and solve this
difficult question.]
þe whiche
resou{n} {and} cause of difficulte I shal assaie at þe laste
to shewen {and} to speden.
[Sidenote: [* fol. 36 _b_.]]
¶ whan I haue *firste
[yspendyd / {and}] ansewered to þo resou{n}s by whiche þ{o}u 4668
art ymoeued.
[Sidenote: I ask, then, why you do not approve the reasoning of
such as think--that Prescience does not obstruct the liberty of
the will, because it is not the necessitating cause of future
events?]
¶ For I axe whi þ{o}u wenest þat þilk[e]
resou{n}s of hem þat assoilen þis questiou{n} ne ben nat
spedeful ynouȝ ne sufficient þe whiche soluc{i}ou{n} or þe
whiche resou{n} for þat it demiþ þat þe p{re}science nis nat 4672
cause of necessite to þinges to comen. þan ne weneþ it
nat þat fredom of wille be distourbed or ylett by p{re}science.
[Linenotes:
4653 _deuided[e]_--deuynede
_booke_--book
4654 _moeued[e]_--moeuede
4655 _souȝt_--I-sowht
4656 _long[e]_--longe
_haþ_--MS. haþe
4657 _yspedd_--MS. yspedde, C. Isped
_fermely_--MS. feruently, C. fermely
4658 _derkenesse_--dirknesse
[_of this_]--from C.
4662-3 [_myhten----men_]--from C.
4663 _myȝte_--myhten
4667 _firste_--fyrst
4668 [_yspendyd and_]--from C.
_þo_--the
_whiche_--which
4669 _art_--MS. arte
_þilk[e]_--thilke
4671 _spedeful_--spedful
4672 _whiche_--which
4674 _wille_--wyl]
[Headnote:
NECESSITY AND PRESCIENCE.]
[Sidenote: Do you draw an argument of the necessity of future
events, from any other topic than this,--that those things which
are foreknown must of necessity happen?]
for ne drawest þou nat argumentes from ellys
where of þe necessite of þinges to comen. As who seiþ 4676
any oþer wey þan þus. but þat þilke þinge[s] þat þe p{re}scie{n}ce
woot byforn [ne] mowen nat vnbitide. þat is to
seyn þat þei moten bitide.
[Sidenote: If divine prescience imposes no necessity upon future
things, must not the issue of things be voluntary, and man’s will
free and unconstrained?]
¶ But þan yif þat p{re}science
ne putteþ no necessite to þinges to comen. as þou þi self 4680
hast confessed it {and} byknowen a litel herbyforn{e}.
¶ what [[pg 162]]
cause [or what] is it. as who seiþ þere may no cause be.
by whiche þat þe endes (exitus) uoluntarie of þinges
myȝten be constreyned to certeyne bitydyng.
[Sidenote: For argument sake let us suppose there is no
prescience, would, then, the events which proceed from free-will
alone be under the power of necessity?]
¶ For 4684
by grace of possessiou{n}. so þat þou mowe þe better vndirstonde
þis þat folweþ. ¶ I pose (inpossibile) þat
þer ne be no p{re}science. þan axe I q{uo}d she in as
moche as app{er}teniþ to þat. sholde þan þinges þat 4688
comen of frewille ben constreined to bytiden by
necessite.
[Sidenote: _B._ No.]
{Boici}us. nay q{uo}d I.
[Sidenote: _P._ Let us, then, admit Prescience, but that it
imposes no necessity on what is to happen; the freedom of the will
would still remain entire and absolute.]
þan aȝeinward q{uo}d
she. I suppose þat þere be p{re}science but þat ne putteþ
no necessite to þinges. þan trowe I þat þilk self fredom 4692
of wille shal dwelle{n} al hool {and} absolut {and} vnbounden.
[Sidenote: But although Prescience, you may say, is not the
necessary cause of future events, yet it is a sign that they shall
necessarily happen, and hence it follows that, although there were
no prescience, future events would still be an inevitable
necessity.]
but þou wolt sein þat al be it so þat p{re}science
nis nat cause of þe necessite of bitidynge to þinges to
comen. ¶ Algates ȝitte it is a signe þ{a}t þe þinges ben 4696
to bytiden by necessite. by þis manere þan al þouȝ þe
p{re}science ne hadde neuer yben. ȝit algate or at þe
lest[e] wey. it is certeyne þing þat þe e{n}dys {and} þe
bitydynges of þinges to come{n} sholde ben necessarie. 4700
[Sidenote: For the sign of a thing is not really the thing itself,
but only points out what the individual is.]
¶ For euery sygne sheweþ {and} signifieþ oonly what þe
þing is ¶ but it ne makiþ nat þe þing þat it signifieþ.
[Sidenote: Wherefore, it must be first proved that everything
happens by necessity before we can conclude that prescience is a
sign of that necessity.]
¶ For whiche it byhoueþ firste to shewen þat no þing
ne bitidiþ [þ{a}t it ne bytydith] by necessite. so þat it 4704
may apere þ{a}t þe p{re}scie{n}ce is signe of þis necessite
[Sidenote: For if there be no necessity, prescience cannot be the
sign of that which has no existence.]
¶ or ellys yif þere nere no necessite. certys þilke p{re}science
ne myȝt[e] nat ben signe of þinge þat nis nat.
[Linenotes:
4677 _þinge[s]_--thinges
4683 _whiche_--which
4685 _better_--beter{e}
4688 _moche_--mochel
4689 _frewille_--free wyl
4691 _þat ne_--þat is ne
4692 _þat_--MS. þan
_þilk self_--thilke selue
4693 _wille_--wil
4699 _lest[e]_--leeste
4700 _sholde_--sholden
4703 _whiche_--which
_firste_--fyrst
4704 [_þat----bytydith_]--from C.
4707 _myȝt[e]_--myhte
_þinge_--thing]
[Headnote:
NOT ALL THINGS CONTROLLED BY NECESSITY.]
[Sidenote: The assertion that nothing happens but by necessity,
must be proved by arguments drawn from causes connected and
agreeing with this necessity, and not from signs or foreign
causes.]
¶ But certys it is nowe certeyne þat þe preue of þis 4708
susteniþ by stedfast resou{n} ne shal nat ben ladd ne
p{ro}ued by signes ne by argumentys ytaken fro wiþ oute.
but by causes couenable {and} necessarie ¶ But þou
mayst sein how may it be þat þe þinges ne bitiden nat 4712
þat ben ypurueyed to comen. but certys ryȝt as we [[pg 163]]
trowen þat þo þinges whiche þat þe p{ur}ueau{n}ce woot byforn
to comen. ne ben nat to bitiden. but [þ{a}t] ne sholde
we nat demen. but raþer al þouȝ [þat] þei schal bitiden. 4716
ȝit ne haue þei no necessite of hire kynde to bitiden.
{and} þis maist þou lyȝtly ap{er}ceyue{n} by þis þat I shal
seyn.
[Sidenote: We see many things when they are done before our eyes;
such as a charioteer driving his chariot, and other things of like
nature.]
but we seen many þinges whan þei ben don byforn
oure eyen ryȝt as men seen þe karter worken in þe 4720
to{ur}nynge {and} in attempryng or in adressy{n}g of hys
kartes or chariottes. ¶ and by þis manere as who seiþ
mayst þou vnd{er}sto{n}de of alle manere oþir werkeme{n}.
[Sidenote: Now, is there any necessity which compels these things
to be done?]
¶ Is þere þanne any necessite as who seiþ in oure lokynge 4724
[þ{a}t] constreineþ or compelliþ any of þilke þinges
to ben don so.
[Sidenote: _B._ No. For if all things were moved by
compulsion--the efforts of art would be vain and fruitless.]
b. nay q{uo}d I ¶ For in ydel {and} in
veyne were alle þe effect of crafte yif þat alle þinges
weren moeued by constreynynge. þat is to seyn by constreynynge 4728
of oure eyen or of oure syȝt.
[Sidenote: _P._ The things, then, which are done are under no
necessity that they should be done; then first before they were
done, they were under no necessity of coming to pass; wherefore
some things happen, the event of which is unconstrained by
necessity.]
_P._ þise þi{n}g{us}
þan q{uo}d she þat whan men don hem ne han non
necessite þat men don hem. eke þo same þinges first or
þei be don. þei ben to comen wiþ out necessite.
[Sidenote: [* fol. 37.]]
for whi 4732
þer ben so{m}me þinges to bytide of whiche þe endys
{and} þe bitidynges of hem ben absolut *{and} quit of alle
necessite.
[Sidenote: These things therefore, although foreknown, have free
events: for as the knowledge of present things imposes no
necessity upon things which are now done, so neither does the
foreknowledge of futurities necessitate the things which are to
come.]
for certys I ne trowe nat þat any man wolde seyn
þis. þat þo þinges þat men don now þ{a}t þei ne weren 4736
to bitiden. first or þei were ydon ¶ and þilk same
þinges al þouȝ þ{a}t men hadde{n} ywyst hem by-forn.
ȝitte þei han fre bitidynges. for ryȝt as science of
þinges p{re}sent ne bryngeþ in no necessite to þinges 4740
[þ{a}t men doon // Ryht so the p{re}science of thinges to
comen ne bryngeth in no necessite to thinges] to bytiden
[Sidenote: But you may doubt whether there can be any certain
prescience of things, of which the event is not necessitated: for
here there seems to be an evident contradiction.]
but þou mayst seyn þat of þilke same it is ydouted. as
wheþer þat of þilke þinges þat ne han non endes {and} 4744
bytidynges necessaryes yif þer-of may ben any p{re}science
[Linenotes:
4708 _nowe_--now
4709 _susteniþ_--ysustenyd
_stedfast_--stydefast
_ladd_--MS. ladde, C. lad
4714 _whiche_--which
4715 [_þat_]--from C.
_sholde_--sholden
4716 _demen_--MS. denyen
[_þat_]--from C.
4717 _necessite_--MS. necessites
4721 _hys_--hise
4725 [_þat_]--from C.
4727 _veyne_--veyn
_alle_--al
_crafte_--craft
4729 _þise_--MS. þise þise, C. the
4732 _wiþ out_--w{i}t{h}-owte
4733 _bytide_--bytyden
_whiche_--which
4737 _were_--weeren
_ydon_--MS. ydone, C. I-doon
_þilk_--thilke
4741-2 [_þat----thinges_]--from C.
4744 _endes_--issues]
[[pg 164]]
[Headnote:
THE NATURE OF TRUE KNOWLEDGE.]
[Sidenote: If things are foreknown, you may contend they must
necessarily happen; and if their event is not necessary, they
cannot be foreseen, because true knowledge can comprehend nothing
but what is absolutely certain.]
¶ For certys þei seme to discorde. for þou
wenest þat yif þat þinges ben yseyn byforn þat necessite
folweþ hem. and yif ({et} putas) necessite faileþ hem þei ne 4748
myȝten nat ben wist byforn. {and} þat no þinge ne may
ben comp{re}hendid by science but certeyne.
[Sidenote: And if things uncertain in their events are foreseen as
certain, this knowledge is nothing more than a false opinion.]
{and} yif þo
þinges þat ne han no certeyne bytidynges ben ypurueied
as certeyn.
[Sidenote: For it is very remote from true knowledge to judge of
things otherwise than they really are.]
it sholde ben dirkenesse of oppiniou{n} nat 4752
soþefastnesse of science [{and} þ{o}u weenyst þ{a}t it be diu{er}se
fro the hoolnesse of science / þ{a}t any man sholde deme
a thing to ben oother weys thanne it is it self].
[Sidenote: The cause of this error is that men imagine that their
knowledge is wholly derived from the nature of the things known,
whereas it is quite the reverse.]
and þe
cause of þis errour is. þat of alle þe þinges þat euery 4756
wyȝt haþ yknowe. þei wenen þat þo þinges ben y-knowe
al oonly by þe strengþe {and} by þe nature of þe þinges
þat ben ywyst or yknowe. {and} it is al þe contrarie. for
alle þat eu{er}e is yknowe.
[Sidenote: Things are not known from their inherent properties,
but by the faculties of the observer.]
it is raþer comp{re}hendid {and} 4760
yknowe{n} nat after his strengeþ {and} hys nature. but after
þe faculte þat is to seyn þe power {and} [the] nature of
hem þat knowen.
[Sidenote: The roundness of a body affects the sight in one way,
and the touch in another.]
{and} for þat þis shal mowe shewen by
a short ensample þe same roundenes of a body .O. oþer 4764
weyes þe syȝt of þe eye knoweþ it. {and} oþer weyes þe
touchi{n}g.
[Sidenote: The eye, from afar, darts its rays upon the object, and
by beholding it comprehends its form.]
þe lokynge by castynge of his bemes waiteþ
{and} seeþ fro afer alle þe body to-gider wiþ oute mouynge
of it self.
[Sidenote: But the object is not distinguished by the touch unless
the hand comes in contact with it and feels it all round.]
but þe touchinge cliuiþ {and} conioigneþ to þe 4768
rounde body (orbi) {and} moueþ abouten þe environynge.
{and} comp{re}hendiþ by p{ar}ties þe roundenesse.
[Linenotes:
4746 _seme_--semyn
_discorde_--discorden
4749 _þat_--yif
4753-5 [_and----self_]--from C.
4757 _haþ_--MS. haþe
4760 _alle_--al
4763 _mowe_--mowen
4764 _roundenes_--Rowndnesse
4765 _syȝt_--sihte
4767 _alle_--al
4769 _abouten_--abowte
4770 _roundenesse_--Rowndnesse]
[Headnote:
SENSE, REASON, AND INTELLIGENCE.]
[Sidenote: Man himself is surveyed in divers ways--by the senses,
by the imagination, by reason, and by the intelligence (of the
Deity).]
¶ and þe man hym self oþer weies wyt byholdiþ hym. {and}
oþ{er}weyes ymaginac{i}ou{n} {and} oþer weyes resou{n}. {and} 4772
oþer weyes intelligence.
[Sidenote: The senses take note of his material figure--the
imagination considers the form alone, exclusive of the matter.]
¶ For þe wit co{m}p{re}he{n}diþ
fro wiþ outen furþe þe figure of þe body of þe man. þat
is establissed in þe matere subiect. But þe ymaginac{i}ou{n}
[comp{re}hendith only the figur{e} w{i}t{h} owte the mater{e} / 4776
[Sidenote: Reason transcends the imaginations, and examining
existences in general discovers the particular species, but the
eye of Intelligence soars still higher; for, going beyond the
bounds of what is general, it surveys the _simple forms_
themselves, by its own pure and subtle thought:]
Resou{n} surmou{n}teth ymaginaciou{n}]
{and} co{m}p{re}hendeþ [[pg 165]]
by an vniuersel lokynge þe co{mmun}e spece (sp{eci}em)
þat is in þe singuler peces. ¶ But þe eye of intelligence
is heyȝer for it so{ur}mou{n}teþ þe envirounynge of þe 4780
vniu{er}site {and} lookeþ ouer þat by pure subtilite of þouȝt.
[Sidenote: in which this is chiefly to be considered, that the
higher power of perception embraces the lower; but the inferior
cannot attain to the energy of the superior:]
þilk same symple forme of man þat is p{er}durably in þe
deuyne þouȝt. in whiche þis auȝt[e] gretely to ben considered
þat þe heyest strengþe to co{m}prehenden þinges 4784
enbraceþ {and} conteyneþ þe lower[e] strengþe [but the
lower{e} strengthe ne arysith nat in no maner{e} to heyer{e}
strengthe].
[Sidenote: for the senses cannot go beyond the perception of
matter; the imagination cannot comprehend existences in general,
nor can the reason conceive the simple form.]
for wit ne may no þinge co{m}p{re}hende oute of
matere. ne þe ymagynac{i}ou{n} ne lokeþ nat þe vniuerseles 4788
speces. ne resou{n} ne takeþ nat þe symple forme. so as
i{n}telligence takeþ it.
[Sidenote: But the Intelligence looking down (as from above) and
having conceived the form, discerns all things that are below it,
and comprehends what does not fall within the reach of the other
faculties of the mind.]
but þe intelligence þat lokeþ al
abouen whan it haþ co{m}p{re}hendid þe forme it knoweþ
{and} demeþ alle þe þinges þat be{n} vndir þat forme. but 4792
she knoweþ he{m} vndir þilke manere in þe whiche it
comp{re}hendiþ þilke same symple forme þat ne may
neuer be knowen to non of þat oþer. þat is to seyn to
non of þo þre forseide strengþes of þe soule.
[Sidenote: Without the aid of those faculties Intelligence
comprehends things _formally_ (_i. e._ by beholding their simple
forms) by one effort of mind.]
for it 4796
knoweþ þe vniuersite of resou{n} {and} þe figure of
þe ymaginac{i}ou{n}.
{and} þe sensible mat{er}ial conseiued. {and} þou
wenest þ{a}t it be diuerse fro þe hoolnesse of science. þat
any man sholde deme a þing to ben oþ{er}weyes þan it is 4800
it self {and} þe cause of þis erro{ur} {et}c’. {vt sup}ra. by wit.
[Sidenote: Reason, without the aid of Imagination and Sense, in
considering things in general, comprehends all imaginable and
sensible things.]
ne it ne vseþ nat nor of resou{n} ne of ymaginac{i}ou{n} ne
of wit wiþ oute forþe but it byholdeþ alle þinges so as I
shal seye. by a strok of þouȝt formely wiþ oute disco{ur}s 4804
or collac{i}ou{n} ¶ Certys resou{n} whan it lokeþ any þing
vniu{er}sel it ne vseþ nat of ymaginac{i}ou{n} nor of wit {and}
algates ȝit [it] co{m}prendiþ þe þinges ymaginable {and}
sensible.
[Sidenote: For instance, reason defines her general conceptions
thus:--]
[Sidenote: [* fol. 37 _b_.]]
for resou{n} is she þat *diffinisseþ þe vniuersel 4808
of hir conseite ryȝt þus. [[pg 166]]
[Sidenote: Man is a rational two-footed animal, which, though it
be a general idea, yet every one knows that man thus defined is
perceived both by the imagination and the senses, notwithstanding
that in this instance reason does not make use of imagination or
the senses, but of her own rational conception.]
¶ Man is a resonable t[w]o-footid
beest. and how so þat þis knowynge [is] vniuersel.
ȝit nys þer no wyȝt þat ne woot wel. þat a ma{n} is [a thing]
ymaginable {and} sensible ¶ and þis same co{n}sidereþ wel 4812
resou{n}. but þat nis nat by ymaginac{i}ou{n}. nor by witte.
but it lokiþ it by [a] resonable concepc{i}ou{n}.
[Sidenote: The imagination also, although it derives its power of
seeing and forming figures from the senses, yet in the absence and
without the use of the senses it considers and comprehends all
sensible things by its own imaginative power.]
¶ Also ymaginac{i}ou{n}
al be it so. þat it takeþ of wit þe bygyny{n}g{us}
to seen {and} to formen þe figures. algates al þouȝ þat wit 4816
ne ware not p{re}sent. ȝit it envirouniþ {and} co{m}p{re}hendiþ
alle þinges sensible. nat by resou{n} sensible of demynge.
but by resou{n} ymaginatif.
[Sidenote: Do not you see that men attain to the knowledge of
things more by their own faculties, than by the inherent property
of things?]
¶ sest þou nat þan þat alle
þe þinges in knowynge vsen more of hir faculte or of hir 4820
power. þan þei don of [the] faculte or of power of þinges
þat ben yknowen.
[Sidenote: Nor is it unreasonable that it should be so--for since
every judgment is the act of the person judging; every one must
needs do his own work by the help of his own faculties, and not by
the aid of foreign power.]
ne þat nis no wronge. for so as euery
iugement is þe dede or þe doynge of hym þat demeþ. It 4823
byhoueþ þat euery wyȝt p{er}forme þe werke {and} hys entenc{i}ou{n}
nat of forein power[;] but of hys propre power.
[Linenotes:
4774 _fro wiþ outen furþe_--w{i}t{h} owte forth
4776-7 [_comprehendith----ymaginacioun_]--from C.
4777 _comprehendeþ_--MS. co{m}p{re}hendynge
4778 _an_--omitted
4780 _heyȝer_--heyer{e}
4783 _whiche_--which
_auȝt[e]_--owhte
4784 _heyest_--heyiste
4785 _lower[e]_--lower{e}
4785-7 [_but----strengthe_]--from C.
4787 _wit_--witte
_oute_--owt
4791 _haþ_--MS. haþe
4793 _whiche_--which
4795-6 _non_--none
4796 _strengþes_--thinges
4798-4801 _and þou----vt supra_--omitted
4805 _collacioun_--MS. callac{i}ou{n}, C. collaciou{n}
4806 _wit_--witte
4810 [_is_]--from C.
4813 _witte_--wit
4821 _don_--MS. done, C. doon
[_the_]--from C.
4822 _yknowen_--Iknowe]
_no wronge_--nat wrong
4824 _werke_--werk
4825 _forein_--foreyne]
[Headnote:
HOW OUR KNOWLEDGE OF OUTWARD THINGS IS GAINED.]