Those readers who have not studied the history of ecclesiastical

legislation, will perhaps be surprised to find, that men of gravity, men

who had reached the years of discretion, and were assembled together in

solemn council, should evince such a prying and puerile spirit; that

they should display such miserable and childish imbecility. But, whoever

will take a wider survey of human affairs, will be inclined to blame,

not so much the legislators, as the system of which the legislators

formed a part. For as to the men themselves, they merely acted after

their kind. They only followed the traditions in which they were bred.

By virtue of their profession, they had been accustomed to hold certain

views, and, when they rose to power, it was natural that they should

carry those views into effect; thus transplanting into the law-book the

maxims they had already preached in the pulpit. Whenever, therefore, we

read of meddling, inquisitive, and vexatious regulations imposed by

ecclesiastical authority, we should remember, that they are but the

legitimate result of the ecclesiastical spirit; and that the way to

remedy such grievances, or to prevent their occurrence, is not by vainly

labouring to change the tendencies of that class from whence they

proceed, but rather by confining the class within its proper limits, by

jealously guarding against its earliest encroachments, by taking every

opportunity of lessening its influence, and finally, when the progress

of society will justify so great a step, by depriving it of that

political and legislative power which, though gradually falling from its

hands, it is, even in the most civilized countries, still allowed in

some degree to retain.

But, setting aside these general considerations, it will, at all events,

be admitted, that I have collected sufficient evidence to indicate what

would have happened to France, if the Protestants had obtained the upper

hand. After the facts which I have brought forward, no one can possibly

doubt, that if such a misfortune had occurred, the liberal, and,

considering the age, the enlightened policy of Henry IV. and Louis XIII.

would have been destroyed, in order to make way for that gloomy and

austere system, which, in every age and in every country, has been found

to be the natural fruit of ecclesiastical power. To put, therefore, the

question in its proper form, instead of saying that there was a war

between hostile creeds, we should rather say that there was a war

between rival classes. It was a contest, not so much between the

Catholic religion and the Protestant religion, as between Catholic

laymen and Protestant clergy. It was a struggle between temporal

interests and theological interests,--between the spirit of the present

and the spirit of the past. And the point now at issue was, whether

France should be governed by the civil power or by the spiritual

power,--whether she should be ruled according to the large views of

secular statesmen, or according to the narrow notions of a factious and

intolerant priesthood.

The Protestants having the great advantage of being the aggressive

party, and being, moreover, inflamed by a religious zeal unknown to

their opponents, might, under ordinary circumstances, have succeeded in

their hazardous attempt; or, at all events, they might have protracted

the struggle for an indefinite period. But, fortunately for France, in

1624, only three years after the war began, Richelieu assumed the

direction of the government. He had for some years been the secret

adviser of the queen-mother, into whose mind he had always inculcated

the necessity of complete toleration.[189] When placed at the head of

affairs, he pursued the same policy, and attempted in every way to

conciliate the Protestants. The clergy of his own party were constantly

urging him to exterminate the heretics, whose presence they thought

polluted France.[190] But Richelieu, having only secular objects,

refused to embitter the contest by turning it into a religious war. He

was determined to chastise the rebellion, but he would not punish the

heresy. Even while the war was raging, he would not revoke those edicts

of toleration by which the full liberty of religious worship was

granted to the Protestants. And when they, in 1626, showed signs of

compunction, or at all events of fear, he publicly confirmed the Edict

of Nantes,[191] and he granted them peace; although, as he says, he knew

that by doing so he should fall under the suspicion of those 'who so

greatly affected the name of zealous Catholics.'[192] A few months

afterwards, war again broke out; and then it was that Richelieu

determined on that celebrated siege of Rochelle, which, if brought to a

successful issue, was sure to be a decisive blow against the French

Protestants. That he was moved to this hazardous undertaking solely by

secular considerations is evident, not only from the general spirit of

his preceding policy, but also from his subsequent conduct. With the

details of this famous siege history is not concerned, as such matters

have no value except to military readers. It is enough to say that, in

1628, Rochelle was taken; and the Protestants, who had been induced by

their clergy[193] to continue to resist long after relief was hopeless,

and who, in consequence, had suffered the most dreadful hardships, were

obliged to surrender at discretion.[194] The privileges of the town were

revoked, and its magistrates removed; but the great minister by whom

these things were effected, still abstained from that religious

persecution to which he was urged.[195] He granted to the Protestants

the toleration which he had offered at an earlier period, and he

formally conceded the free exercise of their public worship.[196] But,

such was their infatuation, that because he likewise restored the

exercise of the Catholic religion, and thus gave to the conquerors the

same liberty that he had granted to the conquered, the Protestants

murmured at the indulgence; they could not bear the idea that their eyes

should be offended by the performance of Popish rites.[197] And their

indignation waxed so high, that in the next year they, in another part

of France, again rose in arms. As, however, they were now stripped of

their principal resources, they were easily defeated; and, their

existence as a political faction being destroyed, they were, in

reference to their religion, treated by Richelieu in the same manner as

before.[198] To the Protestants generally, he confirmed the privilege of

preaching and of performing the other ceremonies of their creed.[199] To

their leader, Rohan, he granted an amnesty, and, a few years afterwards,

employed him in important public services. After this, the hopes of the

party were destroyed; they never again rose in arms, nor do we find any

mention of them until a much later period, when they were barbarously

persecuted by Louis XIV.[200] But from all such intolerance Richelieu

sedulously abstained; and having now cleared the land from rebellion, he

embarked in that vast scheme of foreign policy, of which I have already

given some account, and in which he clearly showed that his proceedings

against the Protestants had not been caused by hatred of their religious

tenets. For, the same party which he attacked at home, he supported

abroad. He put down the French Protestants, because they were a

turbulent faction that troubled the state, and wished to suppress the

exercise of all opinions unfavourable to themselves. But so far from

carrying on a crusade against their religion, he, as I have already

observed, encouraged it in other countries; and, though a bishop of the

Catholic church, he did not hesitate, by treaties, by money, and by

force of arms, to support the Protestants against the House of Austria,

maintain the Lutherans against the Emperor of Germany, and uphold the

Calvinists against the King of Spain.

[189] On his influence over her in and after 1616, see _Le Vassor_,

_Hist. de Louis XIII_, vol. ii. p. 508; _Mém. de Pontchartrain_,

vol. ii. p. 240; _Mém. de Montglat_, vol. i. p. 23; and compare,

in _Mém. de Richelieu_, vol. ii. pp. 198-200, the curious

arguments which he put in her mouth respecting the impolicy of

making war on the Protestants.

[190] In 1625, the Archbishop of Lyons wrote to Richelieu, urging him

'assiéger la Rochelle, et châtier ou, pour mieux dire, exterminer

les huguenots, toute autre affaire cessante.' _Bazin_, _Hist. de

Louis XIII_, vol. ii. p. 276. See also, on the anxiety of the

clergy in the reign of Louis XIII. to destroy the Protestants,

_Benoist_, _Hist. de l'Edit de Nantes_, vol. ii. pp. 155, 166,

232, 245, 338, 378, 379, 427; _Sismondi_, _Hist. des Français_,

vol. xxii. p. 485.

[191] He confirmed it in March 1626; _Flassan_, _Hist. de la Diplomatie

Française_, vol. ii. p. 399; and also in the preceding January.

See _Benoist_, _Hist. de l'Edit de Nantes_, vol. ii. appendix,

pp. 77, 81.

[192] 'Ceux qui affectent autant le nom de zélés catholiques.' _Mém. de

Richelieu_, vol. iii. p. 16; and at p. 2, he, in the same year

(1626), says, that he was opposed by those who had 'un trop

ardent et précipité désir de ruiner les huguenots.'

[193] _Sismondi_, _Hist. des Français_, vol. xxiii. p. 66.

[194] On the sufferings of the inhabitants, see extract from the Dupuis

Mss., in _Capefigue's Richelieu_, vol. i. p. 351. Fontenay

Mareuil, who was an eye-witness, says, that the besieged, in some

instances, ate their own children; and that the burial-grounds

were guarded, to prevent the corpses from being dug up and turned

into food. _Mém. de Fontenay Mareuil_, vol. ii. p. 119.

[195] And in which he would most assuredly have been supported by Louis

XIII.; of whom an intelligent writer says 'Il étoit plein de

piété et de zèle pour le service de Dieu et pour la grandeur de

l'église; et sa plus sensible joie, en prenant La Rochelle et les

autres places qu'il prit, fut de penser qu'il chasseroit de son

royaume les hérétiques, et qu'il le purgeroit par cette voie des

différentes religions qui gâtent et infectent l'église de Dieu.'

_Mém. de Motteville_, vol. i. p. 425, edit. Petitot, 1824.

[196] _Bazin_, _Hist. de Louis XIII_, vol. ii. p. 423; _Sismondi_,

_Hist. des Français_, vol. xxiii. p. 77; _Capefigue's Richelieu_,

vol. i. p. 357; _Mém. de Fontenay Mareuil_, vol. ii. p. 122.

[197] 'Les huguenots murmuraient de voir le rétablissement de l'église

romaine au sein de leur ville.' _Capefigue's Richelieu_, vol. i.

p. 359.

[198] 'Dès qu'il ne s'agit plus d'un parti politique, il concéda, comme

à la Rochelle, la liberté de conscience et la faculté de prêche.'

_Capefigue's Richelieu_, vol. i. p. 381. Compare _Smedley's Hist.

of the Reformed Religion in France_, vol. iii. p. 201, with

_Mémoires de Richelieu_, vol. iv. p. 484.

[199] The Edict of Nismes, in 1629, an important document, will be

found in _Quick's Synodicon_, vol. i. pp. xcvi.-ciii., and in

_Benoist_, _Hist. de l'Edit de Nantes_, vol. ii. appendix, pp.

92-98; and a commentary on it in _Bazin_, _Hist. de Louis XIII_,

vol. iii. pp. 36-38. M. Bazin, unfortunately for the reputation

of this otherwise valuable work, never quotes his authorities.

[200] In 1633, their own historian says: 'les Réformez ne faisoient plus

de party.' _Benoist_, _Hist. de l'Edit de Nantes_, vol. ii. p.

532. Compare Sir Thomas Hanmer's account of France in 1648, in

_Bunbury's Correspond. of Hanmer_, p. 309, Lond. 1838.

I have thus endeavoured to draw a slight, though, I trust, a clear

outline, of the events which took place in France during the reign of

Louis XIII., and particularly during that part of it which included the

administration of Richelieu. But such occurrences, important as they

are, only formed a single phase of that larger development which was now

displaying itself in nearly every branch of the national intellect. They

were the mere political expression of that bold and sceptical spirit

which cried havoc to the prejudices and superstitions of men. For, the

government of Richelieu was successful, as well as progressive; and no

government can unite these two qualities, unless its measures harmonize

with the feelings and temper of the age. Such an administration, though

it facilitates progress, is not the cause of it, but is rather its

measure and symptom. The cause of the progress lies far deeper, and is

governed by the general tendency of the time. And as the different

tendencies observable in successive generations depend on the difference

in their knowledge, it is evident, that we can only understand the

working of the tendencies, by taking a wide view of the amount and

character of the knowledge. To comprehend, therefore, the real nature of

the great advance made during the reign of Louis XIII., it becomes

necessary that I should lay before the reader some evidence respecting

those higher and more important facts, which historians are apt to

neglect, but without which the study of the past is an idle and trivial

pursuit, and history itself a barren field, which, bearing no fruit, is

unworthy of the labour that is wasted on the cultivation of so

ungrateful a soil.

It is, indeed, a very observable fact, that while Richelieu, with such

extraordinary boldness, was secularizing the whole system of French

politics, and by his disregard of ancient interests, was setting at

naught the most ancient traditions, a course precisely similar was being

pursued, in a still higher department, by a man greater than he; by one,

who, if I may express my own opinion, is the most profound among the

many eminent thinkers France has produced. I speak of Réné Descartes, of

whom the least that can be said is, that he effected a revolution more

decisive than has ever been brought about by any other single mind. With

his mere physical discoveries we are not now concerned, because in this

Introduction I do not pretend to trace the progress of science, except

in those epochs which indicate a new turn in the habits of national

thought. But I may remind the reader, that he was the first who

successfully applied algebra to geometry;[201] that he pointed out the

important law of the sines;[202] that in an age in which optical

instruments were extremely imperfect, he discovered the changes to which

light is subjected in the eye by the crystalline lens;[203] that he

directed attention to the consequences resulting from the weight of the

atmosphere;[204] and that he, moreover, detected the causes of the

rainbow,[205] that singular phenomenon, with which, in the eyes of the

vulgar, some theological superstitions are still connected.[206] At the

same time, and as if to combine the most varied forms of excellence, he

is not only allowed to be the first geometrician of the age,[207] but

by the clearness and admirable precision of his style, he became one of

the founders of French prose.[208] And although he was constantly

engaged in those lofty inquiries into the nature of the human mind,

which can never be studied without wonder, I had almost said can never

be read without awe, he combined with them a long course of laborious

experiment upon the animal frame, which raised him to the highest rank

among the anatomists of his time.[209] The great discovery made by

Harvey of the circulation of the blood, was neglected by most of his

contemporaries;[210] but it was at once recognized by Descartes, who

made it the basis of the physiological part of his work on Man.[211] He

likewise adopted the discovery of the lacteals by Aselli,[212] which,

like every great truth yet laid before the world, was, at its first

appearance, not only disbelieved, but covered with ridicule.[213]

[201] Thomas (_Eloge_, in _[OE]uvres de Descartes_, vol. i. p. 32) says,

'cet instrument, c'est Descartes qui l'a créé; c'est

l'application de l'algèbre à la géométrie.' And this, in the

highest sense, is strictly true; for although Vieta and two or

three others in the sixteenth century had anticipated this step,

we owe entirely to Descartes the magnificent discovery of the

possibility of applying algebra to the geometry of curves, he

being undoubtedly the first who expressed them by algebraic

equations. See _Montucla_, _Hist. des Mathémat._ vol. i. pp. 704,

705, vol. ii. p. 120, vol. iii. p. 64.

[202] The statements of Huygens and of Isaac Vossius to the effect that

Descartes had seen the papers of Snell before publishing his

discovery, are unsupported by any direct evidence; at least none

of the historians of science, so far as I am aware, have brought

forward any. So strong, however, is the disposition of mankind at

large to depreciate great men, and so general is the desire to

convict them of plagiarism, that this charge, improbable in

itself, and only resting on the testimony of two envious rivals,

has been not only revived by modern writers, but has been, even

in our own time, spoken of as a well-established and notorious

fact! The flimsy basis of this accusation is clearly exposed by

M. Bordas Demoulin, in his valuable work _Le Cartesianisme_,

Paris, 1843, vol. ii. pp. 9-12; while, on the other side of the

question, I refer with regret to _Sir D. Brewster on the Progress

of Optics, Second Report of British Association_, pp. 309, 310;

and to _Whewell's Hist. of the Inductive Sciences_, vol. ii. pp.

379, 502, 503.

[203] See the interesting remarks of Sprengel (_Hist. de la Médecine_,

vol. iv. pp. 271, 272), and _[OE]uvres de Descartes_, vol. iv.

pp. 371 seq. What makes this the more observable is this: that

the study of the crystalline lens was neglected long after the

death of Descartes, and no attempt made for more than a hundred

years to complete his views by ascertaining its intimate

structure. Indeed, it is said (_Thomson's Animal Chemistry_, p.

512) that the crystalline lens and the two humours were first

analyzed in 1802. Compare _Simon's Animal Chemistry_, vol. ii.

pp. 419-421; _Henle_, _Traité d'Anatomie_, vol. i. p. 357;

_Lepelletier_, _Physiologie Médicale_, vol. iii. p. 160; _Mayo's

Human Physiol._, p. 279; _Blainville_, _Physiol. comparée_, vol.

iii. pp. 325-328; none of whom refer to any analysis earlier than

the nineteenth century. I notice this partly as a contribution to

the history of our knowledge, and partly as proving how slow men

have been in following Descartes, and in completing his views;

for, as M. Blanville justly observes, the chemical laws of the

lens must be understood, before we can exhaustively generalize

the optical laws of its refraction; so that, in fact, the

researches of Berzelius on the eye are complemental to those of

Descartes. The theory of the limitation of the crystalline lens

according to the descending scale of the animal kingdom, and the

connexion between its development and a general increase of

sensuous perception, seem to have been little studied; but Dr.

Grant (_Comparative Anatomy_, p. 252) thinks that the lens exists

in some of the rotifera; while in regard to its origin, I find a

curious statement in _Müller's Physiology_, vol. i. p. 450, that

after its removal in mammals, it has been reproduced by its

matrix, the capsule. (If this can be relied on, it will tell

against the suggestion of Schwann, who supposes, in his

_Microscopical Researches_, 1847, pp. 87, 88, that its mode of

life is vegetable, and that it is not 'a secretion of its

capsule'). As to its probable existence in the hydrozoa, see

_Rymer Jones's Animal Kingdom_, 1855, p. 96, 'regarded either as

a crystalline lens, or an otolithe;' and as to its embryonic

development, see _Burdach_, _Traité de Physiologie_, vol. iii.

pp. 435-438.

[204] Torricelli first weighed the air in 1643. _Brande's Chemistry_,

vol. i. p. 360; _Leslie's Natural Philosophy_, p. 419: but there

is a letter from Descartes, written as early as 1631, 'où il

explique le phénomène de la suspension du mercure dans un tuyau

fermé par en haut, en l'attribuant au poids de la colonne d'air

élevée jusqu'au delà des nues.' _Bordas Demoulin_, _le

Cartésianisme_, vol. i. p. 311. And Montucla (_Hist. des

Mathémat._ vol. ii. p. 205) says of Descartes, 'nous avons des

preuves que ce philosophe reconnut avant Torricelli la pesanteur

de l'air.' Descartes himself says, that he suggested the

subsequent experiment of Pascal. _[OE]uvres de Descartes_,

vol. x. pp. 344, 351.

[205] Dr. Whewell, who has treated Descartes with marked injustice, does

nevertheless allow that he is 'the genuine author of the

explanation of the rainbow.' _Hist. of the Induc. Sciences_, vol.

ii. pp. 380, 384. See also _Boyle's Works_, vol. iii. p. 189;

_Thomson's Hist. of the Royal Society_, p. 364; _Hallam's Lit. of

Europe_, vol. iii. p. 205; _[OE]uvres de Descartes_, vol. i. pp.

47, 48, vol. v. pp. 265-284. On the theory of the rainbow as

known in the present century, see _Kaemtz_, _Course of

Meteorology_, pp. 440-445; and _Forbes on Meteorology_, pp.

125-130, in _Report of British Association_ for 1840. Compare

_Leslie's Natural Philosophy_, p. 531; _Pouillet_, _Elémens de

Physique_, vol. ii. p. 788.

[206] The Hebrew notion of the rainbow is well known; and for the ideas

of other nations on this subject, see _Prichard's Physical

History of Mankind_, vol. v. pp. 154, 176; _Kame's Sketches of

the History of Man_, vol. iv. p. 252, Edinb. 1788; and

_Burdache's Physiologie_, vol. v. pp. 546, 547, Paris, 1839.

[207] Thomas calls him 'le plus grand géomètre de son siècle.'

_[OE]uvres de Descartes_, vol. i. p. 89. Sir W. Hamilton

(_Discussions on Philosophy_, p. 271) says, 'the greatest

mathematician of the age;' and Montucla can find no one but Plato

to compare with him: 'On ne sauroit donner une idée plus juste de

ce qu'a été l'époque de Descartes dans la géométrie ancienne....

De même enfin que Platon prépara par sa découverte celles des

Archimède, des Apollonius, &c., on peut dire que Descartes a

jetté les fondemens de celles qui illustrent aujourd'hui les

Newton, les Leibnitz, &c.' _Montucla_, _Hist. des Mathémat._

vol. ii. p. 112.

[208] 'Descartes joint encore à ses autres titres, celui d'avoir été un

des créateurs de notre langue.' _Biog. Univ._ vol. xi. p. 154.

Sir James Mackintosh (_Dissert. on Ethical Philos._ p. 186) has

also noticed the influence of Descartes in forming the style of

French writers; and I think that M. Cousin has somewhere made a

similar remark.

[209] Thomas says, 'Descartes eut aussi la gloire d'être un des premiers

anatomistes de son siècle.' _[OE]uvres de Descartes_, vol. i. p.

55; see also p. 101. In 1639, Descartes writes to Mersenne

(_[OE]uvres_, vol. viii. p. 100) that he had been engaged 'depuis

onze ans' in studying comparative anatomy by dissection. Compare

p. 174, and vol. i. pp. 175-184.

[210] Dr. Whewell (_Hist. of the Inductive Sciences_, vol. iii. p. 440)

says: 'It was for the most part readily accepted by his

countrymen; but that abroad it had to encounter considerable

opposition.' For this no authority is quoted; and yet one would

be glad to know who told Dr. Whewell that the discovery was

readily accepted. So far from meeting in England with ready

acceptance, it was during many years most universally denied.

Aubrey was assured by Harvey that, in consequence of his book on

the Circulation of the Blood, he lost much of his practice, was

believed to be crackbrained, and was opposed by 'all the

physicians.' _Aubrey's Letters and Lives_, vol. ii. p. 383. Dr.

Willis (_Life of Harvey_, p. xli., in _Harvey's Works_, edit.

Sydenham Society, 1847) says 'Harvey's views were at first

rejected almost universally.' Dr. Elliotson (_Human Physiology_,

p. 194) says, 'His immediate reward was general ridicule and

abuse, and a great diminution of his practice.' Broussais

(_Examen des Doctrines Médicales_, vol. i. p. vii.) says, 'Harvey

passa pour fou quand il annonça la découverte de la circulation.'

Finally, Sir William Temple, who belongs to the generation

subsequent to Harvey, and who, indeed, was not born until some

years after the discovery was made, mentions it in his works in

such a manner as to show that even then it was not universally

received by educated men. See two curious passages, which have

escaped the notice of the historians of physiology, in _Works of

Sir W. Temple_, vol. iii. pp. 293, 469, 8vo., 1814.

[211] 'Taken by Descartes as the basis of his physiology, in his work on

Man.' _Whewell's Hist. of the Induc. Sciences_, vol. iii. p. 441.

'Réné Descartes se déclara un des premiers en faveur de la

doctrine de la circulation.' _Renourd_, _Hist. de la Médecine_,

vol. ii. p. 163. See also _Bordas Demoulin_, _le Cartésianisme_,

vol. ii. p. 324; and _[OE]uvres de Descartes_, vol. i. pp. 68,

179, vol. iv. pp. 42, 449, vol. ix. pp. 159, 332. Compare

_Willis's Life of Harvey_, p. xlv., in _Harvey's Works_.

[212] 'Les veines blanches, dites lactées, qu'Asellius a découvertes

depuis peu dans le mésentère.' _De la Formation du F[oe]tus_,

sec. 49, in _[OE]uvres de Descartes_, vol. iv. p. 483.

[213] Even Harvey denied it to the last. _Sprengel_, _Hist. de la Méd._

vol. iv. pp. 203, 204. Compare _Harvey's Works_, edit. Sydenham

Soc. pp. 605, 614.

These things might have been sufficient to rescue even the physical

labours of Descartes from the attacks constantly made on them by men who

either have not studied his works, or else, having studied them, are

unable to understand their merit. But the glory of Descartes, and the

influence he exercised over his age, do not depend even on such claims

as these. Putting them aside, he is the author of what is emphatically

called Modern Philosophy.[214] He is the originator of that great

system and method of metaphysics, which, notwithstanding its errors, has

the undoubted merit of having given a wonderful impulse to the European

mind, and communicated to it an activity which has been made available

for other purposes of a different character. Besides this, and superior

to it, there is another obligation which we are under to the memory of

Descartes. He deserves the gratitude of posterity, not so much on

account of what he built up, as on account of what he pulled down. His

life was one great and successful warfare against the prejudices and

traditions of men. He was great as a creator, but he was far greater as

a destroyer. In this respect he was the true successor of Luther, to

whose labours his own were the fitting supplement. He completed what the

great German reformer had left undone.[215] He bore to the old systems

of philosophy precisely the same relation that Luther bore to the old

systems of religion. He was the great reformer and liberator of the

European intellect. To prefer, therefore, even the most successful

discoverers of physical laws to this great innovator and disturber of

tradition, is just as if we should prefer knowledge to freedom, and

believe that science is better than liberty. We must, indeed, always be

grateful to those eminent thinkers, to whose labours we are indebted for

that vast body of physical truths which we now possess. But, let us

reserve the full measure of our homage for those far greater men, who

have not hesitated to attack and destroy the most inveterate prejudices:

men who, by removing the pressure of tradition, have purified the very

source and fountain of our knowledge, and secured its future progress,

by casting off obstacles in the presence of which progress was

impossible.[216]

[214] M. Cousin (_Hist. de la Philos._ II. série, vol. i. p. 39) says of

Descartes, 'Son premier ouvrage écrit en français est de 1637.

C'est donc de 1637 que date la philosophie moderne.' See the same

work, I. série, vol. iii. p. 77; and compare _Stewart's Philos.

of the Mind_, vol. i. pp. 14, 529, with _Eloge de Parent_, in

_[OE]uvres de Fontenelle_, Paris, 1766, vol. v. p. 444, and vol.

vi. p. 318: 'Cartésien, ou, si l'on veut, philosophe moderne.'

[215] 'Descartes avait établi dans le domaine de la pensée

l'indépendance absolue de la raison; il avait déclaré à la

scholastique et à la théologie que l'esprit de l'homme ne pouvait

plus relever que de l'évidence qu'il aurait obtenue par lui-même.

Ce que Luther avait commencé dans la religion, le génie français

si actif et si prompt l'importait dans la philosophie, et l'on

peut dire à la double gloire de l'Allemagne et de la France que

Descartes est le fils aîné de Luther.' _Lerminier_, _Philos. du

Droit_, vol. ii. p. 141. See also, on the philosophy of Descartes

as a product of the Reformation. _Ward's Ideal of a Christian

Church_, p. 498.

[216] For, as Turgot finely says, 'ce n'est pas l'erreur qui s'oppose

aux progrès de la vérité. Ce sont la mollesse, l'entêtement,

l'esprit de routine, tout ce qui porte à l'inaction,' _Pensées_

in _[OE]uvres de Turgot_, vol. ii. p. 343.

It will not be expected, perhaps it will hardly be desired, that I

should enter into a complete detail of the philosophy of Descartes: a

philosophy which, in England at least, is rarely studied, and therefore,

is often attacked. But it will be necessary to give such an account of

it as will show its analogy with the anti-theological policy of

Richelieu, and will thus enable us to see the full extent of that vast

movement which took place in France before the accession of Louis XIV.

By this means, we shall be able to understand how the daring innovations

of the great minister were so successful, since they were accompanied

and reinforced by corresponding innovations in the national intellect;

thus affording an additional instance of the way in which the political

history of every country is to be explained by the history of its

intellectual progress.

In 1637, when Richelieu was at the height of his power, Descartes

published that great work which he had long been meditating, and which

was the first open announcement of the new tendencies of the French

mind. To this work he gave the name of a 'Method;' and, assuredly, the

method is the most alien to what is commonly called theology that can

possibly be conceived. Indeed, so far from being theological, it is

essentially and exclusively psychological. The theological method rests

on ancient records, on tradition, on the voice of antiquity. The method

of Descartes rests solely on the consciousness each man has of the

operations of his own mind, and lest anyone should mistake the meaning

of this, he, in subsequent works, developed it at great length, and with

unrivalled clearness. For his main object was to popularize the views

which he put forward. Therefore, says Descartes, 'I write in French

rather than in Latin, because I trust that they who only employ their

simple and native reason will estimate my opinions more fairly than they

who only believe in ancient books.'[217] So strongly does he insist upon

this, that, almost at the beginning of his first work, he cautions his

readers against the common error of looking to antiquity for knowledge;

and he reminds them that 'when men are too curious to know the practices

of past ages, they generally remain very ignorant of their own.'[218]

[217] 'Et si j'écris en français, qui est la langue de mon pays, plutôt

qu'en latin, qui est celle de mes précepteurs, c'est à cause que

j'espère que ceux qui ne se servent que de leur raison naturelle

toute pure, jugeront mieux de mes opinions que ceux qui ne

croient qu'aux livres anciens.' _Discours de la Méthode_, in

_[OE]uvres de Descartes_, vol. i. pp. 210, 211.

[218] _Ibid._ vol. i. p. 127.

Indeed, so far from following the old plan of searching for truths in

the records of the past, the great essential of this new philosophy is

to wean ourselves from all such associations, and, beginning the

acquisition of knowledge by the work of destruction, first pull down, in

order that afterwards we may build up.[219] When I, says Descartes, set

forth in the pursuit of truth, I found that the best way was to reject

every thing I had hitherto received, and pluck out all my old opinions,

in order that I might lay the foundation of them afresh: believing that,

by this means, I should more easily accomplish the great scheme of life,

than by building on an old basis, and supporting myself by principles

which I had learned in my youth, without examining if they were really

true.[220] 'I, therefore, will occupy myself freely and earnestly in

effecting a general destruction of all my old opinions.'[221] For, if we

would know all the truths that can be known, we must, in the first

place, free ourselves from our prejudices, and make a point of

rejecting those things which we have received, until we have subjected

them to a new examination.[222] We, therefore, must derive our opinions,

not from tradition, but from ourselves. We must not pass judgment upon

any subject which we do not clearly and distinctly understand; for, even

if such a judgment is correct, it can only be so by accident, not having

solid ground on which to support itself.[223] But, so far are we from

this state of indifference, that our memory is full of prejudices:[224]

we pay attention to words rather than to things;[225] and being thus

slaves to form, there are too many of us 'who believe themselves

religious, when, in fact, they are bigoted and superstitious; who think

themselves perfect because they go much to church, because they often

repeat prayers, because they wear short hair, because they fast, because

they give alms. These are the men who imagine themselves such friends of

God, that nothing they do displeases Him; men who, under pretence of

zeal, gratify their passions by committing the greatest crimes, such as

betraying towns, killing princes, exterminating nations: and all this

they do to those who will not change their opinions.'[226]

[219] 'Er fing also vom Zweifel an, und ging durch denselben zur

Gewissheit über.' _Tennemann_, _Gesch. der Philos._ vol. x. p.

218. Compare _Second Discours en Sorbonne_, in _[OE]uvres de

Turgot_, vol. ii. p. 89.

[220] _Disc. de la Méthode_, in _[OE]uvres de Descartes_, vol. i.

p. 136.

[221] 'Je m'appliquerai sérieusement et avec liberté à détruire

généralement toutes mes anciennes opinions.' _Méditations_ in

_[OE]uvres de Descartes_, vol. i. p. 236.

[222] _Principes de la Philosophie_, part i. sec. 75, in _[OE]uvres de

Descartes_, vol. iii. pp. 117, 118; and compare vol. ii. p. 417,

where he gives a striking illustration of this view.

[223] _Méditations_, in _[OE]uvres de Descartes_, vol. i. pp. 303, 304.

[224] 'Nous avons rempli notre mémoire de beaucoup de préjugés.'

_Principes de la Philos._ part i. sec. 47, in _[OE]uvres_,

vol. iii. p. 91.

[225] _[OE]uvres_, vol. iii. p. 117.

[226] 'Ce qu'on peut particulièrement remarquer en ceux qui, croyant

être dévots, sont seulement bigots et superstitieux, c'est à dire

qui, sous ombre qu'ils vont souvent à l'église, qu'ils récitent

force prières, qu'ils portent les cheveux courts, qu'ils jeûnent,

qu'ils donnent l'aumône, pensent être entièrement parfaits, et

s'imaginent qu'ils sont si grands amis de Dieu, qu'ils ne

sauroient rien faire qui lui déplaise, et que tout ce que leur

dicte leur passion est un bon zèle, bien qu'elle leur dicte

quelquefois les plus grands crimes qui puissent être commis par

des hommes, comme de trahir des villes, de tuer des princes,

d'exterminer des peuples entiers, pour cela seul qu'ils ne

suivent pas leurs opinions.' _Les Passions de l'Ame_, in

_[OE]uvres de Descartes_, vol. iv. pp. 194, 195.

These were the words of wisdom which this great teacher addressed to his

countrymen only a few years after they had brought to a close the last

religious war that has ever been waged in France. The similarity of

those views to those which, about the same time, were put forth by

Chillingworth, must strike every reader, but ought not to excite

surprise; for they were but the natural products of a state of society

in which the right of private judgment, and the independence of the

human reason, were first solidly established. If we examine this matter

a little closer, we shall find still further proof of the analogy

between France and England. So identical are the steps of the progress,

that the relation which Montaigne bears to Descartes is just the same as

that which Hooker bears to Chillingworth; the same in reference to the

difference of time, and also in reference to the difference of opinions.

The mind of Hooker was essentially sceptical; but his genius was so

restrained by the prejudices of his age, that, unable to discern the

supreme authority of private judgment, he hampered it by appeals to

councils and to the general voice of ecclesiastical antiquity:

impediments which Chillingworth, thirty years later, effectually

removed. In precisely the same way, Montaigne, like Hooker, was

sceptical; but, like him, he lived at a period when the spirit of doubt

was yet young, and when the mind still trembled before the authority of

the Church. It is, therefore, no wonder that even Montaigne, who did so

much for his age, should have hesitated respecting the capacity of men

to work out for themselves great truths; and that, pausing in the course

that lay before him, his scepticism should often have assumed the form

of a distrust of the human faculties.[227] Such shortcomings, and such

imperfections, are merely an evidence of the slow growth of society, and

of the impossibility for even the greatest thinkers to outstrip their

contemporaries beyond a certain point. But, with the advance of

knowledge, this deficiency was at length supplied; and, as the

generation after Hooker brought forth Chillingworth, just so did the

generation after Montaigne bring forth Descartes. Both Chillingworth and

Descartes were eminently sceptical; but their scepticism was directed,

not against the human intellect, but against those appeals to authority

and tradition without which it had hitherto been supposed that the

intellect could not safely proceed. That this was the case with

Chillingworth, we have already seen. That it was likewise the case with

Descartes, is, if possible, still more apparent; for that profound

thinker believed, not only that the mind, by its own efforts, could root

out its most ancient opinions, but that it could, without fresh aid,

build up a new and solid system in place of the one which it had thrown

down.[228]

[227] As is particularly evident in his long chapter, headed 'Apologie

de Raimond Sebond.' _Essais de Montaigne_, livre ii. chap. xii.

Paris, 1843, pp. 270-382, and see _Tennemann_, _Gesch. der

Philos._ vol. ix. p. 455.

[228] He very clearly separates himself from men like Montaigne: 'Non

que j'imitasse pour cela les sceptiques, qui ne doutent que pour

douter, et affectent d'être toujours irrésolus; car, au

contraire, tout mon dessein ne tendoit qu'à m'assurer, et à

rejeter la terre mouvante et le sable pour trouver le roc ou

l'argile.' _Discours de la Méthode_, in _[OE]uvres de Descartes_,

vol. i. pp. 153, 154.

It is this extraordinary confidence in the power of the human intellect,

which eminently characterizes Descartes, and has given to his philosophy

that peculiar sublimity which distinguishes it from all other systems.

So far from thinking that a knowledge of the external world is essential

to the discovery of truth, he laid it down as a fundamental principle,

that we must begin by ignoring such knowledge;[229] that the first step

is to separate ourselves from the delusions of nature, and reject the

evidence presented to our senses.[230] For, says Descartes, nothing is

certain but thought; nor are there any truths except those which

necessarily follow from the operation of our own consciousness. We have

no knowledge of our soul except as a thinking substance:[231] and it

were easier for us to believe that the soul should cease to exist, than

that it should cease to think.[232] And, as to man himself, what is he

but the incarnation of thought? For that which constitutes the man, is

not his bones, nor his flesh, nor his blood. These are the accidents,

the incumbrances, the impediments of his nature. But the man himself is

the thought. The invisible me, the ultimate fact of existence, the

mystery of life, is this: 'I am a thing that thinks.' This, therefore,

is the beginning and the basis of our knowledge. The thought of each man

is the last element to which analysis can carry us; it is the supreme

judge of every doubt; it is the starting-point for all wisdom.[233]

[229] According to the view of Descartes, it was to be ignored, not

denied. There is no instance to be found in his works of a denial

of the existence of the external world; nor does the passage

quoted from him by Mr. Jobert (_New System of Philos._ vol. ii.

pp. 161, 162, Lond. 1849) at all justify the interpretation of

that ingenious writer, who confuses certainty in the ordinary

sense of the word with certainty in the Cartesian sense. A

similar error is made by those who suppose that his 'Je pense,

donc je suis,' is an enthymeme; and having taken this for

granted, they turn on the great philosopher, and accuse him of

begging the question! Such critics overlook the difference

between a logical process and a psychological one; and therefore

they do not see that this famous sentence was the description of

a mental fact, and not the statement of a mutilated syllogism.

The student of the philosophy of Descartes must always

distinguish between these two processes, and remember that each

process has an order of proof peculiar to itself; or at all

events he must remember that such was the opinion of Descartes.

Compare, on the Cartesian enthymeme, _Cousin_, _Hist. de la

Philos._ I. série, vol. iv. pp. 512, 513, with a note in _Kritik

der reinen Vernunft, Kant's Werke_, vol. ii. pp. 323, 324.

[230] _Méditations_, in _[OE]uvres de Descartes_, vol. i. pp. 220, 226;

and again in the _Objections et Réponses_, _[OE]uvres_, vol. ii.

pp. 245, 246.

[231] 'Au lieu que, lorsque nous tâchons à connoître plus distinctement

notre nature, nous pouvons voir que notre âme, en tant qu'elle

est une substance distincte du corps, ne nous est connue que par

cela seul qu'elle pense.' _[OE]uvres de Descartes_, vol. iv. p.

432. Compare vol. iii. p. 96, _Principes de la Philosophie_, part

i. sec. 53.

[232] 'En sorte qu'il me seroit bien plus aisé de croire que l'âme

cesseroit d'être quand on dit qu'elle cesse de penser, que non

pas de concevoir qu'elle soit sans pensée.' _[OE]uvres de

Descartes_, vol. viii. p. 574. That 'the soul always thinks,' is

a conclusion also arrived at by Berkeley by a different process.

See his subtle argument, _Principles of Human Knowledge_, part i.

sec. 98, in _Berkeley's Works_, vol. i. p. 123; and for a curious

application of this to the theory of dreaming, see _Burdach_,

_Physiologie comme Science d'Observation_, vol. v. pp. 205, 230.

[233] _[OE]uvres de Descartes_, vol. i. pp. 251, 252, 279, 293, vol. ii.

pp. 252, 283.

Taking our stand on this ground, we rise, says Descartes, to the

perception of the existence of the Deity. For, our belief in His

existence is an irrefragable proof that He exists. Otherwise, whence

does the belief arise? Since nothing can come out of nothing, and since

no effect can be without a cause, it follows that the idea we have of

God must have an origin; and this origin, whatever name we give it, is

no other than God.[234] Thus, the ultimate proof of His existence is our

idea of it. Instead, therefore, of saying that we know ourselves because

we believe in God, we should rather say that we believe in God because

we know ourselves.[235] This is the order and precedence of things. The

thought of each man is sufficient to prove His existence, and it is the

only proof we can ever possess. Such, therefore, is the dignity and

supremacy of the human intellect, that even this, the highest of all

matters, flows from it, as from its sole source.[236] Hence, our

religion should not be acquired by the teaching of others, but should be

worked out by ourselves: it is not to be borrowed from antiquity, but it

is to be discovered by each man's mind; it is not traditional, but

personal. It is because this great truth has been neglected, that

impiety has arisen. If each man were to content himself with that idea

of God which is suggested by his own mind, he would attain to a true

knowledge of the Divine Nature. But when, instead of confining himself

to this, he mixes up with it the notions of others, his ideas become

perplexed; they contradict themselves; and the composition being thus

confused, he often ends by denying the existence, not, indeed, of God,

but of such a God as that in whom he has been taught to believe.[237]

[234] _Ibid._ vol. i. p. 419; and at p. 420: 'Or de tout cela on conclut

très-manifestement que Dieu existe.' See also pp. 159-162, 280,

290, 291. But the simplest statement is in a letter to Mersenne

(vol. viii. p. 529): 'J'ai tiré la preuve de l'existence de Dieu

de l'idée que je trouve en moi d'un être souverainement parfait.'

[235] 'Ainsi, quoique, de ce que je suis, je conclue avec certitude que

Dieu est, je ne puis réciproquement affirmer, de ce que Dieu est,

que j'existe.' _Règles pour la Direction de l'Esprit_, in

_[OE]uvres_, vol. xi. p. 274. See also _Principes de la

Philosophie_, part i. sec. 7, vol. iii. p. 66.

[236] On this famous argument, which it is said was also broached by

Anselm, see _King's Life of Locke_, vol. ii. p. 133; the

Benedictine _Hist. Lit. de la France_, vol. ix. pp. 417, 418;

_Mosheim's Eccles. Hist._ vol. i. p. 239; and _Cudworth's

Intellect. Syst._ vol. iii. p. 383.

[237] 'Et certes jamais les hommes ne pourroient s'éloigner de la vraie

connoissance de cette nature divine, s'ils vouloient seulement

porter leur attention sur l'idée qu'ils ont de l'être

souverainement parfait. Mais ceux qui mêlent quelques autres

idées avec celle-là composent par ce moyen un dieu chimérique, en

la nature duquel il y a des choses qui se contrarient; et, après

l'avoir ainsi composé, ce n'est pas merveille s'ils nient qu'un

tel dieu, qui leur est représenté par une fausse idée, existe.'

_[OE]uvres de Descartes_, vol. i. pp. 423, 424.

The mischief which these principles must have done to the old theology

is very obvious.[238] Not only were they fatal, in the minds of those

who received them, to many of the common dogmas--such, for instance, as

that of transubstantiation,[239]--but they were likewise directly

opposed to other opinions, equally indefensible, and far more dangerous.

For Descartes, by founding a philosophy which rejected all authority

except that of the human reason,[240] was, of course, led to abandon

the study of final causes,[241]--an old and natural superstition, by

which, as we shall hereafter see, the German philosophers were long

impeded, and which still hangs, though somewhat loosely, about the minds

of men.[242] At the same time, by superseding the geometry of the

ancients, he aided in weakening that inordinate respect with which

antiquity was then regarded. In another matter, still more important, he

displayed the same spirit, and met with the same success. With such

energy did he attack the influence, or rather the tyranny of Aristotle,

that although the opinions of that philosopher were intimately

interwoven with the Christian theology,[243] his authority was entirely

overthrown by Descartes; and with it there perished those scholastic

prejudices, for which Aristotle, indeed, was not responsible, but which,

under the shelter of his mighty name, had, during several centuries,

perplexed the understandings of men, and retarded the progress of their

knowledge.[244]

[238] This is delicately but clearly indicated in an able letter from

Arnaud, printed in _[OE]uvres de Descartes_, vol. ii. pp. 1-36:

see in particular pp. 31, 34. And Duclos bluntly says: 'Si,

depuis la révolution que Descartes a commencée, les théologiens

se sont éloignés des philosophes, c'est que ceux-ci ont paru ne

pas respecter infiniment les théologiens. Une philosophie qui

prenoit pour base le doute et l'examen devoit les effaroucher.'

_Duclos_, _Mémoires_, vol. i. p. 109.

[239] On the relation of the Cartesian philosophy to the doctrine of

transubstantiation, compare _Palmer's Treatise on the Church_,

vol. ii. pp. 169, 170, with _Hallam's Lit. of Europe_, vol. ii.

p. 453; and the remark ascribed to Hobbes, in _Aubrey's Letters

and Lives_, vol. ii. p. 626. But Hobbes, if he really made this

observation, had no right to expect Descartes to become a martyr.

[240] 'Le caractère de la philosophie du moyen âge est la soumission à

une autorité autre que la raison. La philosophie moderne ne

reconnaît que l'autorité de la raison. C'est le cartésianisme qui

a opéré cette révolution décisive.' _Cousin_, _Hist. de la

Philos._ II. série, vol. i. pp. 258, 259.

[241] 'Nous rejetterons entièrement de notre philosophie la recherche

des causes finales.' _Principes de la Philos._, part i. sec. 28,

in _[OE]uvres de Descartes_, vol. iii. p. 81. See also part iii.

sec. 3, p. 182; and his reply to Gassendi, in _[OE]uvres_, vol.

ii. pp. 280, 281. Compare _Cousin_, _Hist. de la Philosophie_,

II. série, vol. ii. p. 71, with _Sprengel_, _Hist. de la

Médecine_, vol. v. p. 203.

[242] Dr. Whewell, for instance, says, that we must reject final causes

in the inorganic sciences, but must recognize them in the organic

ones; which, in other words, simply means, that we know less of

the organic world than of the inorganic, and that because we know

less, we are to believe more; for here, as everywhere else, the

smaller the science the greater the superstition. _Whewell's

Philos. of the Inductive Sciences_, 8vo., 1847, vol. i. pp. 620,

627, 628; and his _Hist. of the Induc. Sciences_, vol. iii. pp.

430, 431. If the question were to be decided by authority, it

would be enough to appeal to Bacon and Descartes, the two

greatest writers on the philosophy of method in the seventeenth

century; and to Auguste Comte, who is admitted by the few persons

who have mastered his _Philosophie Positive_, to be the greatest

in our own time. These profound and comprehensive thinkers have

all rejected the study of final causes, which, as they have

clearly seen, is a theological invasion of scientific rights. On

the injury which this study has wrought, and on the check it has

given to the advance of our knowledge, see _Robin et Verdeil_,

_Chimie Anat._ Paris, 1853, vol. i. pp. 489, 493, 494, vol. ii.

p. 555; _Renouard_, _Hist. de la Médecine_, vol. i. pp. 232, 237;

_Sprengel_, _Hist. de la Médecine_, vol. ii. p. 220; _Geoffroy

Saint-Hilaire_, _Hist. des Anomalies de l'Organisation_, vol.

iii. pp. 435, 436; _Herder_, _Ideen zur Gesch. der Menschheit_,

vol. iii. p. 270; _Lawrence's Lectures on Man_, p. 36; and

_Burdach_, _Traité de Physiologie_, vol. i. p. 190.

[243] 'Auf das innigste verbunden mit der Theologie, nicht allein in den

katholischen, sondern selbst auch in den protestantischen

Ländern.' _Tennemann_, _Gesch. der Philos._ vol. ix. p. 516.

Descartes, in a letter to Mersenne (_[OE]uvres_, vol. vi. p. 73),

writes, in 1629, 'La théologie, laquelle on a tellement

assujettie à Aristote, qu'il est impossible d'expliquer une autre

philosophie qu'il ne semble d'abord qu'elle soit contre la foi.'

Compare vol. vii. p. 344, vol. viii. pp. 281, 497.

[244] Dr. Brown (_Philosophy of the Mind_, Edinburgh, 1838, p. 172)

calls Descartes 'that illustrious rebel, who, in overthrowing the

authority of Aristotle,' &c. See also _Duvernet_, _Hist. de la

Sorbonne_, vol. ii. p. 192; _Cuvier_, _Hist. des Sciences_, part

ii. p. 532; and _Locke's Works_, vol. iii. p. 48. This, I need

hardly say, refers to the habit of appealing to Aristotle, as if

he were infallible, and is very different from that respect which

is naturally felt for a man who was probably the greatest of all

the ancient thinkers. The difference between the Aristotelian and

Cartesian systems is touched on rather hastily in _Cudworth's

Intellect. Syst._ vol. i. pp. 170, 171.

These were the principal services rendered to civilization by one of the

greatest men Europe has ever produced. The analogy between him and

Richelieu is very striking, and is as complete as their relative

positions would allow. The same disregard of ancient notions, the same

contempt for theological interests, the same indifference to tradition,

the same determination to prefer the present to the past: in a word, the

same essentially modern spirit, is seen alike in the writings of

Descartes, and in the actions of Richelieu. What the first was to

philosophy, that was the other to politics. But, while acknowledging the

merits of these eminent men, it behoves us to remember that their

success was the result, not only of their own abilities, but likewise of

the general temper of their time. The nature of their labours depended

on themselves; the way in which their labours were received, depended on

their contemporaries. Had they lived in a more superstitious age, their

views would have been disregarded, or, if noticed, would have been

execrated as impious novelties. In the fifteenth, or early in the

sixteenth century, the genius of Descartes and of Richelieu would have

lacked the materials necessary to their work; their comprehensive minds

would, in that state of society, have found no play; they would have

awakened no sympathies; their bread would have been cast upon those

waters which return it not again. And it would have been well for them

if, in such a case, indifference were the only penalty with which they

would be visited. It would have been well if they had not paid the

forfeit incurred by many of those illustrious thinkers who have vainly

attempted to stem the torrent of human credulity. It would have been

well if the church had not risen in her wrath--if Richelieu had not been

executed as a traitor, and Descartes burned as a heretic.

Indeed, the mere fact that two such men, occupying so conspicuous a

place before the public eye, and enforcing views so obnoxious to the

interests of superstition, should have lived without serious danger, and

then have died peaceably in their beds--the mere fact that this should

have happened, is a decisive proof of the progress which, during fifty

years, had been made by the French nation. With such rapidity were the

prejudices of that great people dying away, that opinions utterly

subversive of theological traditions, and fatal to the whole scheme of

ecclesiastical power, were with impunity advocated by Descartes, and put

in practice by Richelieu. It was now clearly seen, that the two foremost

men of their time could, with little or no risk, openly propagate ideas

which, half a century before, it would have been accounted dangerous

even for the most obscure man to whisper in the privacy of his own

chamber.

Nor are the causes of this impunity difficult to understand. They are to

be found in the diffusion of that sceptical spirit, by which, in France

as well as in England, toleration was preceded. For, without entering

into details which would be too long for the limits of this

Introduction, it is enough to say, that French literature generally was,

at this period, distinguished by a freedom and a boldness of inquiry,

of which, England alone excepted, no example had then been seen in

Europe. The generation which had listened to the teachings of Montaigne

and of Charron, was now succeeded by another generation, the disciples,

indeed, of those eminent men, but disciples who far outstripped their

masters. The result was, that, during the thirty or forty years which

preceded the power of Louis XIV.,[245] there was not to be found a

single Frenchman of note who did not share in the general feeling--not

one who did not attack some ancient dogma, or sap the foundation of some

old opinion. This fearless temper was the characteristic of the ablest

writers of that time;[246] but what is still more observable is, that

the movement spread with such rapidity as to include in its action even

those parts of society which are invariably the last to be affected by

it. That spirit of doubt, which is the necessary precursor of all

inquiry, and therefore of all solid improvement, owes its origin to the

most thinking and intellectual parts of society, and is naturally

opposed by the other parts: opposed by the nobles, because it is

dangerous to their interests; opposed by the uneducated, because it

attacks their prejudices. This is one of the reasons why neither the

highest nor the lowest ranks are fit to conduct the government of a

civilized country; since both of them, notwithstanding individual

exceptions, are, in the aggregate, averse to those reforms which the

exigencies of an advancing nation constantly require. But, in France,

before the middle of the seventeenth century, even these classes began

to participate in the great progress; so that, not only among thoughtful

men, but likewise among the ignorant and the frivolous, there was seen

that inquisitive and incredulous disposition, which, whatever may be

said against it, has at least this peculiarity, that, in its absence,

there is no instance to be found of the establishment of those

principles of toleration and of liberty, which have only been recognized

with infinite difficulty, and after many a hard-fought battle against

prejudices whose inveterate tenacity might almost cause them to be

deemed a part of the original constitution of the human mind.[247]

[245] That is in 1661, when Louis XIV. first assumed the government.

[246] M. Barante (_Tableau de la Littérature Française_, pp. 26, 27)

notices 'cette indépendance dans les idées, ce jugement audacieux

de toutes choses, qu'on remarque dans Corneille, dans Mézéray,

dans Balzac, dans Saint-Réal, dans Lamothe-Levayer.' To these may

be added Naudé, Patin, and probably Gassendi. Compare _Hallam's

Literat. of Europe_, vol. ii. pp. 364, 365, with _Mackintosh's

Ethical Philos._ p. 116, and _Lettres de Patin_, vol. i. p. 297,

vol. ii. pp. 33, 186, 191, 242, 342, 498, 508, vol. iii. p. 87.

[247] The increase of incredulity was so remarkable, as to give rise to

a ridiculous assertion, 'qu'il y avoit plus de 50,000 athées dans

Paris vers l'an 1623.' _Baillet_, _Jugemens des Savans_, Paris,

1722, 4to. vol. i. p. 185. Baillet has no difficulty in rejecting

this preposterous statement (which is also noticed in

_Coleridge's Literary Remains_, vol. i. p. 305; where, however,

there is apparently a confusion between two different periods);

but the spread of scepticism among the upper ranks and courtiers,

during the reign of Louis XIII. and the minority of Louis XIV.,

is attested by a great variety of evidence. See _Mém. de Madame

de Motteville_, vol. iii. p. 52; _Mém. de Retz_, vol. i. p. 266;

_Conrart_, _Mém._ p. 235 note; _Des Réaux_, _Historiettes_, vol.

vii. p. 143; _Mém. de Brienne_, vol. ii. p. 107 note.

It is no wonder if, under these circumstances, the speculations of

Descartes and the actions of Richelieu should have met with great

success. The system of Descartes exercised immense influence, and soon

pervaded nearly every branch of knowledge.[248] The policy of Richelieu

was so firmly established, that it was continued without the slightest

difficulty by his immediate successor: nor was any attempt made to

reverse it until that forcible and artificial reaction which, under

Louis XIV., was fatal, for a time, to every sort of civil and religious

liberty. The history of that reaction, and the way in which, by a

counter-reaction, the French Revolution was prepared, will be related in

the subsequent chapters of this volume; at present we will resume the

thread of those events which took place in France before Louis XIV.

assumed the government.

[248] Volumes might be written on the influence of Descartes, which was

seen, not only in subjects immediately connected with his

philosophy, but even in those apparently remote from it. Compare

_Broussais_, _Examen des Doctrines Médicales_, vol. ii. pp. 55

seq.; _Lettres de Patin_, vol. iii. p. 153; _Sprengel_, _Hist. de

la Médecine_, vol. iv. p. 238; _Cuvier_, _Hist. des Sciences_,

part ii. pp. 327, 332, 352, 363; _Stäudlin_, _Geschichte der

theologischen Wissenschaften_, vol. i. p. 263; _Tennemann_,

_Gesch. der Philos._ vol. x. pp. 285 seq.; _Huetius de Rebus ad

eum pertinentibus_, pp. 35, 295, 296, 385-389; _Mosheim's Eccles.

Hist._ vol. ii. p. 258; _Dacier_, _Rapport Historique_, p. 334;

_Leslie's Nat. Philos._ p. 121; _Eloges_, in _[OE]uvres de

Fontenelle_, Paris, 1766, vol. v. pp. 94, 106, 137, 197, 234,

392, vol. vi. pp. 157, 318, 449; _Thomson's Hist. of Chemistry_,

vol. i. p. 195; _Quérard_, _France Lit._ vol. iii. p. 273.

A few months after the death of Richelieu, Louis XIII. also died, and

the crown was inherited by Louis XIV., who was then a child, and who for

many years had no influence in public affairs. During his minority, the

government was administered, avowedly by his mother, but in reality by

Mazarin: a man who, though in every point inferior to Richelieu, had

imbibed something of his spirit, and who, so far as he was able, adopted

the policy of that great statesman, to whom he owed his promotion.[249]

He, influenced partly by the example of his predecessor, partly by his

own character, and partly by the spirit of his age, showed no desire to

persecute the Protestants, or to disturb them in any of the rights they

then exercised.[250] His first act was to confirm the Edict of

Nantes;[251] and, towards the close of his life, he even allowed the

Protestants again to hold those synods which their own violence had

been the means of interrupting.[252] Between the death of Richelieu and

the accession to power of Louis XIV., there elapsed a period of nearly

twenty years, during which Mazarin, with the exception of a few

intervals, was at the head of the state; and in the whole of that time,

I have found no instance of any Frenchman being punished for his

religion. Indeed, the new government, so far from protecting the church

by repressing heresy, displayed that indifference to ecclesiastical

interests which was now becoming a settled maxim of French policy.

Richelieu, as we have already seen, had taken the bold step of placing

Protestants at the head of the royal armies; and this he had done upon

the simple principle, that one of the first duties of a statesman is to

employ for the benefit of the country the ablest men he can find,

without regard to their theological opinions, with which, as he well

knew, no government has any concern. But Louis XIII., whose personal

feelings were always opposed to the enlightened measures of his great

minister, was offended by this magnanimous disregard of ancient

prejudices; his piety was shocked at the idea of Catholic soldiers being

commanded by heretics; and, as we are assured by a well-informed

contemporary, he determined to put an end to this scandal to the church,

and, for the future, allow no Protestant to receive the staff of marshal

of France.[253] Whether the king, if he had lived, would have carried

his point, is doubtful;[254] but what is certain is, that, only four

months after his death, this appointment of marshal was bestowed upon

Turenne, the most able of all the Protestant generals.[255] And in the

very next year, Gassion, another Protestant, was raised to the same

dignity; thus affording the strange spectacle of the highest military

power in a great Catholic country wielded by two men against whose

religion the church was never weary of directing her anathemas.[256] In

a similar spirit, Mazarin, on mere grounds of political expediency,

concluded an intimate alliance with Cromwell; an usurper who, in the

opinion of the theologians, was doomed to perdition, since he was soiled

by the triple crime of rebellion, of heresy, and of regicide.[257]

Finally, one of the last acts of this pupil of Richelieu's[258] was to

sign the celebrated treaty of the Pyrenees, by which ecclesiastical

interests were seriously weakened, and great injury inflicted on him who

was still considered to be the head of the church.[259]

[249] On the connexion between Richelieu and Mazarin, see _Sismondi_,

_Hist. des Français_, vol. xxiii. pp. 400, 530; and a curious,

though perhaps apocryphal anecdote in _Tallemant des Réaux_,

_Historiettes_, vol. ii. pp. 231, 232. In 1636 there was noticed

'l'étroite union' between Richelieu and Mazarin. _Le Vassor_,

_Hist. de Louis XIII_, vol. viii. part ii. p. 187.

[250] 'Mazarin n'avoit ni fanatisme ni esprit persécuteur,' _Sismondi_,

_Hist. des Français_, vol. xxiv. p. 531. That he did not

persecute the Protestants is grudgingly confessed in _Felice's

Hist. of the Protestants of France_, p. 292. See also _Smedley's

Reformed Religion in France_, vol. iii. p. 222.

[251] He confirmed it in July, 1643. See _Benoist_, _Hist. de l'Edit de

Nantes_, vol. iii. appendix, p. 3; and _Quick's Synodicon in

Gallia_, vol. i. p. ciii.

[252] In 1659, there was assembled the Synod of Loudon, the moderator of

which said, 'It is now fifteen years since we had a national

synod.' _Quick's Synodicon in Gallia_, vol. ii. p. 517.

[253] Brienne records the determination of the king, 'que cette dignité

ne seroit plus accordée à des Protestans.' _Sismondi_, _Histoire

des Français_, vol. xxiv. p. 65.

[254] He was so uneasy about the sin he had committed, that before his

death he intreated the Protestant marshals to change their creed:

'Il ne voulut pas mourir sans avoir exhorté de sa propre bouche

les maréchaux de la Force et de Chatillon à se faire

Catholiques.' _Benoist_, _Hist. de l'Edit de Nantes_, vol. ii. p.

612. The same circumstance is mentioned by Le Vassor, _Hist. de

Louis XIII_, vol. x. part ii. p. 785.

[255] Louis XIII. died in May 1643; and Turenne was made marshal in the

September following. _Lavallée_, _Hist. des Français_, vol. iii.

pp. 148, 151.

[256] Sismondi (_Hist. des Français_, vol. xxiv. p. 65) makes the

appointment of Gassion in 1644; according to Montglat

(_Mémoires_, vol. i. p. 437) it was at the end of 1643. There are

some singular anecdotes of Gassion in _Les Historiettes de

Tallemant des Réaux_, vol. v. pp. 167-180; and an account of his

death in _Mém. de Motteville_, vol. ii. p. 290, from which it

appears that he remained a Protestant to the last.

[257] The Pope especially was offended by this alliance (_Ranke_, _die

Päpste_, vol. iii. p. 158, compared with _Vaughan's Cromwell_,

vol. i. p. 343, vol. ii. p. 124); and, judging from the language

of Clarendon, the orthodox party in England was irritated by it.

_Clarendon's Hist. of the Rebellion_, pp. 699, 700. Contemporary

notices of this union between the cardinal and the regicide, will

be found in _Mém. de Retz_, vol. i. p. 349; _Mém. de Montglat_,

vol. ii. p. 478, vol. iii. p. 23; _Lettres de Patin_, vol. ii.

pp. 183, 302, 426; _Marchand_, _Dict. Historique_, vol. ii. p.

56; _Mem. of Sir Philip Warwick_, p. 377; _Harris's Lives of the

Stuarts_, vol. iii. p. 393.

[258] De Retz (_Mémoires_, vol. i. p. 59), who knew Richelieu, calls

Mazarin 'son disciple.' And at p. 65 he adds, 'comme il marchoit

sur les pas du cardinal de Richelieu, qui avoit achevé de

détruire toutes les anciennes maximes de l'état.' Compare _Mém.

de Motteville_, vol. ii. p. 18; and _Mém. de la Rochefoucauld_,

vol. i. p. 444.

[259] On the open affront to the Pope by this treaty, see _Ranke_, _die

Päpste_, vol. iii. p. 159: 'An dem pyrenäischen Frieden nahm er

auch nicht einmal mehr einen scheinbaren Antheil: man vermied es

seine Abgeordneten zuzulassen: kaum wurde seiner noch darin

gedacht.' The consequences and the meaning of all this are well

noticed by M. Ranke.

But, the circumstance for which the administration of Mazarin is most

remarkable, is the breaking out of that great civil war called the

Fronde, in which the people attempted to carry into politics the

insubordinate spirit which had already displayed itself in literature

and in religion. Here we cannot fail to note the similarity between this

struggle and that which, at the same time, was taking place in England.

It would, indeed, be far from accurate to say that the two events were

the counterpart of each other; but there can be no doubt that the

analogy between them is very striking. In both countries, the civil war

was the first popular expression of what had hitherto been rather a

speculative, and, so to say, a literary scepticism. In both countries,

incredulity was followed by rebellion, and the abasement of the clergy

preceded the humiliation of the crown; for Richelieu was to the French

church what Elizabeth had been to the English church. In both countries

there now first arose that great product of civilization, a free press,

which showed its liberty by pouring forth those fearless and innumerable

works which mark the activity of the age.[260] In both countries, the

struggle was between retrogression and progress; between those who clung

to tradition, and those who longed for innovation; while, in both, the

contest assumed the external form of a war between king and parliament,

the king being the organ of the past, the parliament the representative

of the present. And, not to mention inferior similarities, there was one

other point of vast importance in which these two great events coincide.

This is, that both of them were eminently secular, and arose from the

desire, not of propagating religious opinions, but of securing civil

liberty. The temporal character of the English rebellion I have already

noticed, and, indeed, it must be obvious to whoever has studied the

evidence in its original sources. In France, not only do we find the

same result, but we can even mark the stages of the progress. In the

middle of the sixteenth century, and immediately after the death of

Henry III., the French civil wars were caused by religious disputes, and

were carried on with the fervour of a crusade. Early in the seventeenth

century, hostilities again broke out; but though the efforts of the

government were directed against the Protestants, this was not because

they were heretics, but because they were rebels: the object being, not

to punish an opinion, but to control a faction. This was the first great

stage in the history of toleration; and it was accomplished, as we have

already seen, during the reign of Louis XIII. That generation passing

away, there arose, in the next age, the wars of the Fronde; and in this,

which may be called the second stage of the French intellect, the

alteration was still more remarkable. For, in the mean time, the

principles of the great sceptical thinkers, from Montaigne to Descartes,

had produced their natural fruit, and, becoming diffused among the

educated classes, had influenced, as they always will do, not only those

by whom they were received, but also those by whom they were rejected.

Indeed, a mere knowledge of the fact, that the most eminent men have

thrown doubt on the popular opinions of an age, can never fail, in some

degree, to disturb the convictions even of those by whom the doubts are

ridiculed.[261] In such cases, none are entirely safe: the firmest

belief is apt to become slightly unsettled; those who outwardly preserve

the appearance of orthodoxy, often unconsciously waver; they cannot

entirely resist the influence of superior minds, nor can they always

avoid an unwelcome suspicion, that when ability is on one side, and

ignorance on the other, it is barely possible that the ability may be

right, and the ignorance may be wrong.

[260] 'La presse jouissait d'une entière liberté pendant les troubles de

la Fronde, et le public prenait un tel intérêt aux débats

politiques, que les pamphlets se débitaient quelquefois au nombre

de huit et dix mille exemplaires.' _Sainte-Aulaire_, _Hist. de la

Fronde_, vol. i. p. 299. Tallemant des Réaux, who wrote

immediately after the Fronde, says (_Historiettes_, vol. iv. p.

74), 'Durant la Fronde, qu'on imprimoit tout.' And Omer Talon,

with the indignation natural to a magistrate, mentions, that in

1649, 'toutes sortes de libelles et de diffamations se publioient

hautement par la ville sans permission du magistrat.' _Mém.

d'Omer Talon_, vol. ii. p. 466. For further evidence of the great

importance of the press in France in the middle of the

seventeenth century, see _Mém. de Lenet_, vol. i. p. 162; _Mém.

de Motteville_, vol. iii. pp. 288, 289; _Lettres de Patin_, vol.

i. p. 432, vol. ii. p. 517; _Monteil_, _Hist. des divers Etats_,

vol. vii. p. 175.

In England, the Long Parliament succeeded to the licensing

authority of the Star-chamber (_Blackstone's Commentaries_, vol.

iv. p. 152); but it is evident from the literature of that time,

that for a considerable period the power was in reality in

abeyance. Both parties attacked each other freely through the

press; and it is said that between the breaking out of the civil

war and the restoration, there were published from 30,000 to

50,000 pamphlets. _Morgan's Ph[oe]nix Britannicus_, 1731, 4to.

pp. iii. 557; _Carlyle's Cromwell_, vol. i. p. 4; _Southey's

Commonplace Book_, third series, p. 449. See also on this great

movement of the press, _Bates's Account of the Late Troubles_,

part i. p. 78; _Bulstrode's Memoirs_, p. 4; _Howell's Letters_,

p. 354; _Hunt's Hist. of Newspapers_, vol. i. p. 45; _Clarendon's

Hist. of the Rebellion_, p. 81; _Nichols's Lit. Anec._ vol. iv.

pp. 86, 102.

[261] Dugald Stewart (_Philos. of the Mind_, vol. i. p. 357) says,

'Nothing can be more just than the observation of Fontenelle,

that "the number of those who believe in a system already

established in the world, does not, in the least, add to its

credibility; but that the number of those who doubt of it, has a

tendency to diminish it."' Compare with this _Newman on

Development_, Lond. 1845, p. 31; and the remark of Hylas in

_Berkeley's Works_, edit. 1843, vol. i. pp. 151, 152, first

dialogue.

Thus it fell out in France. In that country, as in every other, when

theological convictions diminished, theological animosities subsided.

Formerly religion had been the cause of war, and had also been the

pretext under which it was conducted. Then there came a time when it

ceased to be the cause: but so slow is the progress of society, that it

was still found necessary to set it up as the pretext.[262] Finally,

there came the great days of the Fronde, in which it was neither cause

nor pretext,[263] and in which there was seen, for the first time in

France, an arduous struggle by human beings avowedly for human purposes:

a war waged by men who sought, not to enforce their opinions, but to

increase their liberty. And, as if to make this change still more

striking, the most eminent leader of the insurgents was the Cardinal de

Retz; a man of vast ability, but whose contempt for his profession was

notorious,[264] and of whom a great historian has said, 'he is the first

bishop in France who carried on a civil war without making religion the

pretence.'[265]

[262] Compare _Capefigue's Richelieu_, vol. i. p. 293, with a remarkable

passage in _Mém. de Rohan_, vol. i. p. 317; where Rohan contrasts

the religious wars he was engaged in during the administration of

Richelieu, with those very different wars which had been waged in

France a little earlier.

[263] 'L'esprit religieux ne s'était mêlé en aucune manière aux

querelles de la Fronde.' _Capefigue_, vol. ii. p. 434. Lenet, who

had great influence with what was called the party of the

princes, says that he always avoided any attempt 'à faire aboutir

notre parti à une guerre de religion.' _Mém. de Lenet_, vol. i.

p. 619. Even the people said that it was unimportant whether or

not a man died a Protestant; but that if he were a partizan of

Mazarin he was sure to be damned: 'Ils disoient qu'étant mazarin,

il falloit qu'il fût damné.' _Lenet_, vol. i. p. 434.

[264] Indeed he does not conceal this even in his memoirs. He says

(_Mém._ vol. i. p. 3), he had 'l'âme peut-être la moins

ecclésiastique qui fût dans l'univers.' At p. 13, 'le chagrin que

ma profession ne laissoit pas de nourrir toujours dans le fonds

de mon âme.' At p. 21, 'je haïssois ma profession plus que

jamais.' At p. 48, 'le clergé, qui donne toujours l'exemple de la

servitude, la prêchoit aux autres sous le titre d'obéissance.'

See also the remark of his great friend Joly (_Mém. de Joly_, p.

209, edit. Petitot, 1825); and the account given by Tallemant des

Réaux, who knew De Retz well, and had travelled with him,

_Historiettes_, vol. vii. pp. 18-30. The same tendency is

illustrated, though in a much smaller degree, by a conversation

which Charles II., when in exile, held with De Retz, and which is

preserved in _Clarendon's Hist. of the Rebellion_, p. 806, and is

worth consulting merely as an instance of the purely secular view

that De Retz always took of political affairs.

[265] 'Cet homme singulier est le premier évêque en France qui ait fait

une guerre civile sans avoir la religion pour prétexte.' _Siècle

de Louis XIV_, in _[OE]uvres de Voltaire_, vol. xix. p. 261.

We have thus seen that, during the seventy years which succeeded the

accession of Henry IV., the French intellect developed itself in a

manner remarkably similar to that which took place in England. We have

seen that, in both countries, the mind, according to the natural

conditions of its growth, first doubted what it had long believed, and

then tolerated what it had long hated. That this was by no means an

accidental or capricious combination, is evident, not only from general

arguments, and from the analogy of the two countries, but also from

another circumstance of great interest. This is, that the order of

events, and as it were their relative proportions, were the same, not

only in reference to the increase of toleration, but also in reference

to the increase of literature and science. In both countries, the

progress of knowledge bore the same ratio to the decline of

ecclesiastical influence, although they manifested that ratio at

different periods. We had begun to throw off our superstitions somewhat

earlier than the French were able to do; and thus, being the first in

the field, we anticipated that great people in producing a secular

literature. Whoever will take the pains to compare the growth of the

French and English minds, will see that, in all the most important

departments, we were the first, I do not say in merit, but in the order

of time. In prose, in poetry, and in every branch of intellectual

excellence, it will be found, on comparison, that we were before the

French nearly a whole generation; and that, chronologically, the same

proportion was preserved as that between Bacon and Descartes, Hooker and

Pascal,[266] Shakespeare and Corneille, Massinger and Racine, Ben Jonson

and Molière, Harvey and Pecquet. These eminent men were all justly

celebrated in their respective countries; and it would perhaps be

invidious to institute a comparison between them. But what we have here

to observe is, that among those who cultivated the same department, the

greatest Englishman, in every instance, preceded the greatest Frenchman

by many years. The difference, running as it does, through all the

leading topics, is far too regular to be considered accidental. And as

few Englishmen of the present day will be so presumptuous as to suppose

that we possess any native and inherent superiority over the French, it

is evident that there must be some marked peculiarity in which the two

countries differed, and which has produced this difference, not in their

knowledge, but in the time at which their knowledge appeared. Nor does

the discovery of this peculiarity require much penetration. For,

notwithstanding that the French were more tardy than the English, still,

when the development had fairly begun, the antecedents of its success

were among both people precisely the same. It is, therefore, clear,

according to the commonest principles of inductive reasoning, that the

lateness of the development must be owing to the lateness of the

antecedent. It is clear that the French knew less because they believed

more.[267] It is clear that their progress was checked by the prevalence

of those feelings which are fatal to all knowledge, because, looking on

antiquity as the sole receptacle of wisdom, they degrade the present in

order that they may exaggerate the past: feelings which destroy the

prospects of man, stifle his hopes, damp his curiosity, chill his

energies, impair his judgment, and, under pretence of humbling the pride

of his reason, seek to throw him back into that more than midnight

darkness from which his reason alone has enabled him to emerge.

[266] Hooker and Pascal may properly be classed together, as the two

most sublime theological writers either country has produced; for

Bossuet is as inferior to Pascal as Jeremy Taylor is inferior to

Hooker.

[267] One of the most remarkable men they have ever possessed notices

this connexion, which he expresses conversely, but with equal

truth: 'moins on sait, moins on doute; moins on a découvert,

moins on voit ce qui reste à découvrir.... Quand les hommes sont

ignorans, il est aisé de tout savoir.' _Discours en Sorbonne_, in

_[OE]uvres de Turgot_, vol. ii. pp. 65, 70.

The analogy thus existing between France and England, is, indeed, very

striking, and, so far as we have yet considered it, seems complete in

all its parts. To sum up the similarities in a few words, it may be

said, that both countries followed the same order of development in

their scepticism, in their knowledge, in their literature, and in their

toleration. In both countries, there broke out a civil war at the same

time, for the same object, and, in many respects, under the same

circumstances. In both, the insurgents, at first triumphant, were

afterwards defeated; and the rebellion being put down, the governments

of the two nations were fully restored almost at the same moment: in

1660 by Charles II.; in 1661, by Louis XIV.[268] But there the

similarity stopped. At this point there began a marked divergence

between the two countries;[269] which continued to increase for more

than a century, until it ended in England by the consolidation of the

national prosperity, in France by a revolution more sanguinary, more

complete, and more destructive, than any the world has ever seen. This

difference between the fortunes of such great and civilized nations is

so remarkable, that a knowledge of its causes becomes essential to a

right understanding of European history, and will be found to throw

considerable light on other events not immediately connected with it.

Besides this, such an inquiry, independently of its scientific interest,

will have a high practical value. It will show, what men seem only

recently to have begun to understand, that, in politics, no certain

principles having yet been discovered, the first conditions of success

are compromise, barter, expediency, and concession. It will show the

utter helplessness even of the ablest rulers, when they try to meet new

emergencies by old maxims. It will show the intimate connexion between

knowledge and liberty; between an increasing civilization and an

advancing democracy. It will show that, for a progressive nation, there

is required a progressive polity; that within certain limits, innovation

is the sole ground of security; that no institution can withstand the

flux and movements of society, unless it not only repairs its structure,

but also widens its entrance; and that, even in a material point of

view, no country can long remain either prosperous or safe, in which the

people are not gradually extending their power, enlarging their

privileges, and, so to say, incorporating themselves with the functions

of the state.

[268] Mazarin, until his death in 1661, exercised complete authority

over Louis. See _Siècle de Louis XIV_, in _[OE]uvres de

Voltaire_, vol. xix. pp. 318, 319; and _Lavallée_, _Hist. des

Français_, vol. iii. p. 195; so that, as Montglat says (_Mém._

vol. iii. p. 111), 'On doit appeler ce temps-là le commencement

du règne de Louis XIV.' The pompous manner in which, directly

after the death of Mazarin, the king assumed the government, is

related by Brienne, who was present. _Mém. de Brienne_, vol. ii.

pp. 154-158.

[269] By this I mean, that the divergence now first became clear to

every observer; but the origin of the divergence dates from a

much earlier period, as we shall see in the next chapter.

The tranquillity of England, and her freedom from civil war, are to be

ascribed to the recognition of these great truths;[270] while the

neglect of them has entailed upon other countries the most woful

calamities. On this account, therefore, if on no other, it becomes

interesting to ascertain how it was that the two nations we have been

comparing should, in regard to these truths, have adopted views

diametrically opposite, although, in other matters, their opinions, as

we have already seen, were very similar. Or, to state the question in

other words, we have to inquire how it was that the French, after

pursuing precisely the same course as the English, in their knowledge,

in their scepticism, and in their toleration, should have stopped short

in their politics; how it was that their minds, which had effected such

great things, should, nevertheless, have been so unprepared for liberty,

that, in spite of the heroic efforts of the Fronde, they not only fell

under the despotism of Louis XIV., but never cared to resist it; and, at

length, becoming slaves in their souls as well as in their bodies, they

grew proud of a condition which the meanest Englishman would have

spurned as an intolerable bondage.

[270] That is to say, their practical recognition; theoretically, they

are still denied by innumerable politicians, who, nevertheless,

assist in carrying them into effect, fondly hoping that each

innovation will be the last, and enticing men into reform under

the pretext that by each change they are returning to the spirit

of the ancient British constitution.

The cause of this difference is to be sought in the existence of that

spirit of protection which is so dangerous and yet so plausible, that it

forms the most serious obstacle with which advancing civilization has to

contend. This, which may truly be called an evil spirit, has always been

far stronger in France than in England. Indeed, among the French, it

continues, even to the present day, to produce the most mischievous

results. It is, as I shall hereafter point out, intimately connected

with that love of centralization which appears in the machinery of their

government, and in the spirit of their literature. It is this which

induces them to retain restrictions by which their trade has long been

troubled, and to preserve monopolies which, in our country, a freer

system has effectually destroyed. It is this which causes them to

interfere with the natural relation between producers and consumers; to

force into existence manufactures which otherwise would never arise, and

which, for that very reason, are not required; to disturb the ordinary

march of industry, and, under pretence of protecting their native

labourers, diminish the produce of labour by diverting it from those

profitable channels into which its own instincts always compel it to

flow.

When the protective principle is carried into trade, these are its

inevitable results. When it is carried into politics, there is formed

what is called a paternal government, in which supreme power is vested

in the sovereign, or in a few privileged classes. When it is carried

into theology, it produces a powerful church, and a numerous clergy, who

are supposed to be the necessary guardians of religion, and every

opposition to whom is resented as an insult to the public morals. These

are the marks by which protection may be recognized; and from a very

early period they have displayed themselves in France much more clearly

than in England. Without pretending to discover their precise origin, I

will, in the next chapter, endeavour to trace them back to a time

sufficiently remote to explain some of the discrepancies which, in this

respect existed between the two countries.

* * * * *

_Note to p. 93._ Descartes died in Sweden on a visit to Christina; so

that, strictly speaking, there is an error in the text. But this does

not affect the argument; because the works of Descartes, being eagerly

read in France, and not being prohibited, we must suppose that his

person would have been safe, had he remained in his own country. To burn

a heretic is a more decisive step than to suppress a book; and as the

French clergy were not strong enough to effect the latter, it is hardly

likely that they could have accomplished the former.