"British sailors have a knack,
Haul away, yo ho, boys.
Of hauling down a Frenchman's jack
'Gainst any odds, you know, boys."
OLD SONG.
There was, I flatter myself, some little skill in the introduction of the
foregoing chapter, which has played the part of chorus during the time that
the _Bombay Castle_ has proceeded on to Canton, has taken in her cargo, and
is on her passage home, in company with fifteen other East Indiamen and
several country ships, all laden with the riches of the East, and hastening
to pour their treasures into the lap of their country. Millions were
floating on the waters, entrusted to the skill of merchant-seamen to convey
them home in safety, and to their courage to defend them from the enemy,
which had long been lying in wait to intercept them. By a very unusual
chance or oversight, there had been no men-of-war despatched to protect
property of such enormous value.
The Indian fleet had just entered the Straits of Malacca, and were sailing
in open order, with a fresh breeze and smooth water. The hammocks had been
stowed, the decks washed, and the awnings spread. Shoals of albicore were
darting across the bows of the different ships; and the seamen perched upon
the cat-heads and spritsail-yard, had succeeded in piercing with their
harpoons many, which were immediately cut up, and in the frying-pans for
breakfast. But very soon they had "other fish to fry;" for one of the
Indiamen, the _Royal George_, made the signal that there were four strange
sail in the S.W.
"A gun from the commodore, sir," reported Newton, who was officer of the
watch. "The flags are up--they are not our pennants."
It was an order to four ships of the fleet to run down and examine the
strange vessels.
Half-an-hour elapsed, during which time the glasses were at every
mast-head. Captain Drawlock himself, although not much given to climbing,
having probably had enough of it during his long career in the service, was
to be seen in the main-top. Doubts, suspicions, declarations, surmises, and
positive assertions were bandied about, until they were all dispelled by
the reconnoitring ships telegraphing, "a French squadron, consisting of one
line-of-battle ship, three frigates, and a brig." It was, in fact, the
well-known squadron of Admiral Linois, who had scoured the Indian seas,
ranging it up and down with the velocity as well as the appetite of a
shark. His force consisted of the _Marengo_, of eighty guns; the famed
_Belle Poule_, a forty-gun frigate, which outstripped the wind; the
_Sémìllante_, of thirty-six guns; the _Berceau_, ship corvette, of
twenty-two, and a brig of sixteen. They had sailed from Batavia on purpose
to intercept the China fleet, having received intelligence that it was
unprotected, and anticipating an easy conquest, if not an immediate
surrender to their overpowering force.
"The recall is up on board of the commodore," said Mathews, the first mate,
to Captain Drawlock.
"Very well, keep a good look-out; he intends to fight, I'll answer for it.
We must not surrender up millions to these French scoundrels without a
tussle."
"I should hope not," replied Mathews; "but that big fellow will make a
general average among our tea canisters, I expect, when we do come to the
scratch. There go the flags, sir," continued Mathews, repeating the number
to Captain Drawlock, who had the signal-book in his hand.
"Form line of battle in close order, and prepare for action," read Captain
Drawlock from the signal-book.
A cheer resounded through the fleet when the signal was made known. The
ships were already near enough to each other to hear the shouting, and the
confidence of others added to their own.
"If we only had _all_ English seamen on board, instead of these Lascars and
Chinamen, who look so blank," observed Newton to Mathews, "I think we
should show them some play."
"Yes," growled Mathews; "John Company will some day find out the truth of
the old proverb, 'Penny wise and pound foolish!'"
The French squadron, which had continued on the wind to leeward until they
could fetch the India fleet, now tacked, and laid up directly for them. In
the meantime, the English vessels were preparing for action: the clearing
of their lumbered decks was the occasion of many a coop of fowls, or pig of
the true China breed, exchanging their destiny for a watery grave.
Fortunately, there were no passengers. Homeward-bound China ships are not
encumbered in that way, unless to astonish the metropolis with such
monstrosities as the mermaid, or as the Siamese twins, coupled by nature
like two hounds (separated lately indeed by Lytton Bulwer, who has
satisfactorily proved that "unity between brethren," so generally esteemed
a blessing, on the contrary, is a bore). In a short time all was ready, and
the India fleet continued their course under easy sail, neither courting
nor avoiding the conflict.
At nightfall the French squadron hauled to the wind; the conduct of the
China fleet rendered them cautious, and the French admiral considered it
advisable to ascertain, by broad daylight, whether a portion of the English
ships were not men-of-war; their cool and determined behaviour certainly
warranted the suspicion. It was now to be decided whether the Indiamen
should take advantage of the darkness of the night to escape, or wait the
result of the ensuing day. The force opposed to them was formidable and
concentrated; their own, on the contrary, was weak from division, each ship
not having more than sixty English seamen on board; the country ships none
at all, the few belonging to them having volunteered on board of the
Indiamen. In his decision Commodore Dance proved his judgment as well as
his courage. In an attempt to escape, the fleet would separate; and, from
the well-known superior sailing of the French squadron, most of them would
be overtaken, and, being attacked singlehanded, fall an easy prey to the
enemy.
In this opinion the captains of the Indiamen, who had communicated during
the night, were unanimous, and equally so in the resolution founded upon
it, "to keep together and fight to the last." The India fleet lay to for
the night, keeping their lights up and the men at their quarters; most of
the English seamen sound asleep, the Lascars and Chinese sitting up in
groups, expressing, in their own tongues, their fear of the approaching
combat, in which, whether risked for national honour or individual
property, they could have no interest.
The morning broke, and discovered the French squadron about three miles to
windward. Admiral Linois had calculated that if the fleet consisted only of
merchant vessels they would have profited by the darkness to have attempted
to escape, and he had worked to windward during the night, that he might be
all ready to pounce down upon his quarry. But when he perceived that the
English ships did not attempt to increase their distance he was sadly
puzzled.
The French tricolour hardly had time to blow clear from their taffrails,
when the English unions waved aloft in defiance; and that Admiral Linois
might be more perplexed by the arrangements of the night, three of the most
warlike Indiamen displayed the red ensign, while the remainder of the ships
hoisted up the blue. This _ruse_ led the French admiral to suppose that
these three vessels were men-of-war, composing the escort of the fleet.
At nine o'clock the commodore made the signal to fill; and the French
squadron not bearing down, the India fleet continued its course under easy
sail. The French admiral then edged away with his squadron, with the
intention of cutting off the country ships, which had been stationed to
leeward; but which, since the British fleet had hauled their wind, had been
left in the rear. It was now requisite for the British commander to act
decidedly and firmly. Captain Timmins, an officer for courage and conduct
not surpassed by any in our naval service, who commanded the _Royal
George_, edged to within hail of the commodore, and recommended that the
order should be given to tack in succession, bear down in a line-a-head,
and engage the enemy. This spirited advice was acted upon; the _Royal
George_ leading into action, followed by the other ships in such close
order that their flying jib-booms were often pointed over the taffrails of
their predecessors.
In a quarter of an hour was to be witnessed the unusual spectacle of a
fleet of merchant ships exchanging broadsides with the best equipped and
highest disciplined squadron that ever sailed from France. In less than an
hour was presented the more unusual sight of this squadron flying from the
merchant ships, and the signal for a general chase answered with
enthusiastic cheers.
That Admiral Linois might have supposed, previous to the engagement, that
some of the British ships were men-of-war, is probable; but that he knew
otherwise after they had commenced action, must also have been the case.
The fact was, he was frightened at their determined courage and their
decided conduct; and he fled, not from the guns, but from the _men_.
I do not know on record any greater instance of heroism on the part of
British seamen; and I am delighted that Newton Forster was in the conflict,
or of course I could not have introduced it in this work.
And now, those who read for amusement may, if they please, skip over to the
next chapter. There are points connected with the India service which I
intend to comment upon; and as all the wisdom of the age is confined to
novels, and nobody reads pamphlets, I introduce them here.
When one man is empowered to hold in check, and to insist upon the
obedience of a large proportion of his fellows, it can only be by "opinion"
that his authority can be supported.
By "opinion" I mean the knowledge that he is so empowered by the laws of
the country to which they all belong, and by which laws they will be
punished, if they act in opposition to his authority. The fiat of the
individual commanding is in this case the fiat of the nation at large; to
contend with this fiat is not contending with the individual, but with the
nation, to whose laws they must submit, or return to their country no more.
A commander of a vessel, therefore, armed with martial law, is, in fact,
representing and executing, not his own will, but that of the nation who
have made the law; for he is amenable, as well as his inferiors, if he acts
contrary to, or misuses it.
In the merchant service martial law is not permitted; the bye-laws relative
to shipping, and the common law of the country, are supposed to be
sufficient; and certainly the present system is more advisable than to vest
such excessive power in the hands of men, who, generally speaking, neither
require nor are fit to be entrusted with it. Where, as in the greater
number of merchant vessels, the master and his subordinate officers compose
one-third, if not one-half of the complement on board, nothing but the most
flagrant conduct is likely to produce insubordination.
But in the East India service the case is different. The vessels themselves
are of dimensions equal, if not superior, to our largest class of frigates,
and they carry from thirty to forty guns; the property embarked in them is
also of such an extent, that the loss almost becomes national: their
commanders are men of superior attainments, as gentlemen and as officers;
finally, the complement of seamen under their command is larger than on
board of many of the king's ships.
The above considerations will at once establish that those bye-laws which
afford protection to the well-governing of the merchant service in general,
are not sufficient to maintain the necessary discipline on board of the
East India ships. The greater the disproportion between the unit who
commands and the numbers who obey, the greater the chance of mutiny.
Sedition is the progeny of assembly. Even where grievances may be real, if
there is no contact and no discussion, there will be no insubordination;
but imaginary grievances, canvassed and discussed in assembly, swell into
disaffection and mutiny. When, therefore, numbers are collected together,
as in the vessels of the East India service, martial law becomes
indispensable; and the proof of it is, that the commanders of these vessels
have been forced to exercise it upon their own responsibility. A letter of
marque should be granted to all vessels carrying a certain number of men,
empowering the commanders, under certain sureties and penalties, to
exercise this power. It would be a boon to the East India ships, and
ultimately a benefit to the navy.
To proceed. The merchant ships of the Company are men-of-war; the
men-of-war of the Company are--what shall I call them? By their right
names--they are all _Bombay Marine_: but let me at once assert, in applying
their own name to them as a reproach, that the officers commanding them
are not included in the stigma. I have served with them, and have pleasure
in stating that, taking the average, the vessels are as well officered as
those in our own service; but let us describe the vessels and their crews.
Most of the vessels are smaller in scantling than the run down (and
constantly _going down_) ten-gun brigs in our own service, built for a
light draft of water (as they were originally intended to act against the
pirates, which occasionally infest the Indian seas), and unfit to contend
with anything like a heavy sea. Many of them are pierced for, and actually
carry fourteen to sixteen guns; but, as effective fighting vessels, ought
not to have been pierced for more than eight. I have no hesitation in
asserting that an English cutter is a match for any of them, and a French
privateer has, before now, proved that she was superior. The crews are
composed of a small proportion of English seamen, a small proportion of
Portuguese sea-cunnies, a proportion of Lascars, and a proportion of Hindoo
Bombay marines. It requires two or three languages to carry on the duty;
customs, religions, provisions, all different, and all living and messing
separate. How is it possible that any officer can discipline a ship's
company of this incongruous description, so as to make them "pull
together"? In short, the vessels and the crews are equally contemptible,
and the officers, in cases of difficulty, must be sacrificed to the pride
and meanness of the Company. My reason for taking notice of the "Bombay
Marine" arises from an order lately promulgated, in which the officers of
this service were to take rank and precedence with those of the navy. Now,
as far as the officers themselves are concerned, so far from having any
objection to it, I wish, for their own merits and the good-will that I bear
them, that they were incorporated into our navy-list; but as long as they
command vessels of the above description, in the event of a war, I will put
a case, to prove the absurdity and danger which may result. There is not
one vessel at this present time in their service which would not be sunk by
one well-directed broadside from a large frigate; yet, as many of their
officers are of long standing, it is very probable that a squadron of
English frigates may fall in with one of these vessels, the captain of
which would be authorised by his seniority to take the command of the whole
of them. We will suppose that this squadron falls in with the enemy, of
equal or superior force; can the officer in command lead on to the attack?
If so, he will be sent down by the first broadside. If he does not, from
whom are the orders to proceed during the action? The consequences would be
as injurious as the arrangement is ridiculous.
The charter of the East India Company will soon expire; and if it is to be
renewed, the country ought to have some indemnification for the three
millions which this colony or conquest (which you please) annually draws
from it. Now there is one point which deserves consideration: the
constitutional protection of all property is by the nation, and as a naval
force is required in India, that force should be supplied by the armaments
of the nation, at the expense of the Company. I have already proved that
the Bombay Marine is a useless and incompetent service: let it be abolished
altogether, and men-of-war be sent out to supply their place. It is most
important that our navy should be employed in time of peace, and our
officers gain that practical knowledge without which the theoretical is
useless. Were this insisted upon, a considerable force would be actively
employed, at no expense to the country, and many officers become valuable,
who now are remaining inactive, and forgetting what previous knowledge they
may have acquired of their nautical duties.
At the same time, every East India ship should be compelled to take on
board her whole complement of English seamen, and not be half manned by
Lascars and Chinamen.
But I presume I must be careful how I attempt to legislate for that
country, or I shall have two tame elephants sent after me by the man _what_
puts his hair in papers!