THE CAUSES OF FOREIGN ENMITY TO THE UNITED STATES.

The hostility of foreign governments to the United States is due as much

at least to dread of their growing power as dislike of their democracy;

and accordingly the theory of the Secessionists as to the character of

our Union has been as acceptable to the understandings of our foreign

enemies as the acts of the Rebels against its government have been

pleasing to their sympathies. They well know that a union of States

whose government recognized the right of Secession would be as weak as

an ordinary league between independent sovereignties; and as the rapid

growth of the States in population, wealth, and power is certain, they

naturally desire, that, if united, these States shall be an aggregation

of forces, neutralizing each other, rather than a fusion of forces,

which, for general purposes, would make them a giant nationality.

Accordingly, centralized France reads to us edifying homilies on the

advantages of disintegration; and England, rich with the spoils of

suppressed insurrections, adjures us most plaintively to respect the

sacred rights of rebellion. The simple explanation of this hypocrisy or

irony is, that both France and England are anxious that the strength of

the United States shall not correspond to their bulk. The looser the tie

of union, the greater the number of confederacies into which the nation

should split, the safer they would feel. The doctrine of the inherent

and undivided sovereignty of the States will therefore find resolute

champions abroad as long as it has the most inconsiderable faction to

support it at home.

The European nations are kept in order by what is called the Balance of

Power, and this policy they would delight to see established on this

continent. Should the different States of the American Union be

occupied, like the European states, in checking each other, they could

not act as a unit, and their terrific rate of growth in wealth and

population, as compared with that of the nations across the Atlantic,

would not excite in the latter such irritation and alarm. The magic

which has changed English abolitionists into partisans of slaveholders,

and French imperialists into champions of insurrection, came from the

figures of the Census Reports. It is calculated that the United States,

if the rate of growth which obtained between 1850 and 1860 is continued,

will have, forty years hence, a hundred millions of inhabitants, and

four hundred and twenty thousand millions of dollars of taxable

wealth,--over three times the present population, and over ten times the

present wealth, of the richest of European nations. It is probable that

this concrete fact exerts more influence on the long-headed statesmen of

Europe than any abstract dislike of democracy. The only union which they

could bring against such a power would be a league, a confederacy, a

continuous and subsisting treaty, between sovereign powers. Is it

surprising that they should wish our union to be of the same character?

Is it surprising that the contemplation of a government, whether

despotic or democratic, which could act directly on a hundred millions

of people, with the supreme right of taxing property to the amount of

four hundred and twenty billions of dollars, should fill them with

dismay?

The inherent weakness of a league, even when its general object is such

as to influence the passions of the nations which compose it, is well

known to all European statesmen. The various alliances against France

show the insuperable difficulties in the way of giving to confederacies

of sovereign states a unity and efficiency corresponding to their

aggregate strength, and the necessity which the leaders of such

alliances are always under of expending half their skill and energy in

preventing the loosely compacted league from falling to pieces. The

alliance under the lead of William III. barely sustained itself against

Louis XIV., though William was the ablest statesman in Europe, and had

been trained in the tactics of confederacies from his cradle. The

alliance under the lead of Marlborough owed its measure of success to

his infinite address and miraculous patience as much as to his

consummate military genius; and the ignominious "secession" of England,

in the treaty of Utrecht, ended in making it one of the most conspicuous

examples of the weakness of such combinations. When the exceptional

military genius, as in the case of Frederick and Napoleon, has been on

the side of the single power assailed, the results have been all the

more remarkable. The coalition against Frederick, the ruler of five

millions of people, was composed of sovereigns who ruled a hundred

millions; and at the end of seven years of war they had not succeeded in

wringing permanently from his grasp a square mile of territory. The

first coalitions against Napoleon resulted only in making him the master

of Europe; and he was crushed at last merely by the dead weight of the

nations which the senselessness of his political passions brought down

upon his empire. Indeed, the trouble with all leagues is, that they are

commanded, more or less, by debating-societies; and a debating-society

is weak before a man. The Southern Confederacy is a confederacy only in

name; for no despotism in Europe or Asia has more relentless unity of

purpose, and in none does debate exercise less control over executive

affairs. All the powers of the government are practically absorbed in

Jefferson Davis, and a rebellion in the name of State Rights has ended

in a military autocracy, in which all rights, personal and State, are

suspended.

Now, as it is impossible for European governments to combine efficiently

against such a colossal power as the United States promise within a few

generations to be, provided the unity of the nation is preserved with

its growth, they naturally favor every element of disintegration which

will reduce the separate States to the condition of European states.

Earl Russell's famous saying, that "the North is fighting for power, the

South for independence," is to be interpreted in this sense. What he

overlooked was the striking fact which distinguishes the States of the

American Republic from the states of Europe. The latter are generally

separated by race and nationality, or, where composed of heterogeneous

materials, are held together by military power. The people of the United

States are homogeneous, and rapidly assimilate into American citizens

the foreigners they so cordially welcome. No man has lifted his hand

against the government as an Irishman, a Frenchman, a German, an

Italian, a Dane, but only as a slaveholder, or as a citizen of a State

controlled by slaveholders. The insurrection was started in the interest

of an institution, and not of a race. To compare such a rebellion with

European rebellions is to confuse things essentially distinct. The

American government is so constituted that nobody has an interest in

overturning it, unless his interest is opposed to that of the mass of

the citizens with whom he is place on an equality; and hence his treason

is necessarily a revolt against the principle of equal rights. In

Europe, it is needless to say, every rebellion with which an American

can sympathise is a rebellion in favor of the principle against which

the slaveholders' rebellion is an armed protest. An insurrection in

Russia to restore serfdom, an insurrection in Italy to restore the

dethroned despots, an insurrection in England to restore the Stuart

system of kingly government, an insurrection anywhere to restore what

the progress of civilization had made contemptible or accursed, would be

the only fit parallel to the insurrection of the Southern Confederates.

The North is fighting for power which is its due, because it is just and

right; the South is fighting for independence, in order to remove all

checks on its purpose to oppress and enslave. The fact that the power

for which the North fights is a very different thing from the power

which a European monarchy struggles to preserve and extend, the fact

that it is the kind of power which oppressed nationalities seek in their

efforts for independence, only makes our foreign critics more

apprehensive of its effects. It is a dangerous power to them, because,

founded in the consent of the people, there is no limit to its possible

extension, except in the madness or guilt of that portion of the people

who are restive under the restraints of justice and impatient under the

rule of freedom.

It would be doing cruel wrong to Earl Russell's intelligence to suppose

that he really believed what he said, when he drew a parallel between

the American Revolution and the Rebellion of the Confederate States, and

asserted that the right of the Southern States to secede from the

American Union was identical with the right of the Colonies to sever

their connection with Great Britain. We believe the Colonies were right

in their revolt. But if the circumstances had been different,--if since

the reign of William III. they had nominated or controlled almost every

Prime Minister, had shaped the policy of the British Empire, had enjoyed

not only a representation in Parliament, but in the basis of

representation had been favored with a special discrimination in their

favor against Kent and Yorkshire,--if both in the House of Lords and the

House of Commons they had not only been dominant, but had treated the

Bentincks, Cavendishes, and Russells, the Montagus, Walpoles, and Pitts,

with overbearing insolence,--and if, after wielding power so long and so

arrogantly, they had rebelled at the first turn in political affairs

which seemed to indicate that they were to be reduced from a position of

superiority to one of equality,--if our forefathers had acted after this

wild fashion, we should not only think that the Revolution they achieved

was altogether unjustifiable, but we should blush at the thought of

being descended from such despot-demagogues. This is a very feeble

statement of the case which would connect the Revolt of the American

Colonies with the Revolt of the American Liberticides; and Earl Russell

is too well-informed a statesman not to know that his parallel fails in

every essential particular. He threw it out, as he threw out his

sounding antithesis about "power" and "independence," to catch ears not

specially blessed with brains between them.

But European statesmen, in order to promote the causes of American

dissensions, are willing not only to hazard fallacies which do not

impose on their own understandings, but to give aid and comfort to

iniquities which in Europe have long been antiquated. They thus tolerate

chattel slavery, not because they sympathize with it, but because it is

an element of disturbance in the growth of American power. Though it has

for centuries been outgrown by the nations of Western Europe, and is

repugnant to all their ideas and sentiments, they are willing to give it

their moral support, provided it will break up the union of the people

of the States, or remain as a constantly operating cause of enmity

between the sections of a reconstructed Union. They would tolerate

Mormonism or Atheism or Diabolism, if they thought it would have a

similar effect; but at the same time they would not themselves legalize

polygamy, or deny the existence of God, or inaugurate the worship of the

Devil. Indeed, while giving slavery a politic sanction, they despise in

their hearts the people who are so barbarous as to maintain such an

institution; and the Southern rebel or Northern demagogue who thinks his

championship of slavery really earns him any European respect is under

that kind of delusion which it is always for the interest of the plotter

to cultivate in the tool. It was common, a few years ago, to represent

the Abolitionist as the dupe or agent of the aristocracies of Europe. It

certainly might be supposed that persons who made this foolish charge

were competent at least to see that the present enemy of the unity of

the American people is the pro-slavery fanatic, and that it is on his

knavery or stupidity that the ill-wishers to American unity now chiefly

rely.

For the war has compelled these ill-wishers to modify their most

cherished theory of democracy in the United States. They thought that

the marvellous energy for military combination, developed by a democracy

suddenly emancipated from oppression, such as was presented by the

French people in the Revolution of 1789, was not the characteristic of a

democracy which had grown up under democratic institutions. The first

was anarchy _plus_ the dictator; the second was merely "anarchy _plus_

the constable." They had an obstinate prepossession, that, in a settled

democracy like ours, the selfishness of the individual was so stimulated

that he became incapable of self-sacrifice for the public good. The ease

with which the government of the United States has raised men by the

million and money by the billion has overturned this theory, and shown

that a republic, of which individual liberty and general equality form

the animating principles, can still rapidly avail itself of the property

and personal service of all the individuals who compose it, and that

self-seeking is not more characteristic of a democracy in time of peace

than self-sacrifice is characteristic of the same democracy in time of

war. The overwhelming and apparently unlimited power of a government

thus _of_ the people and _for_ the people is what the war has

demonstrated, and it very naturally excites the fear and jealousy of

governments which are based on less firm foundations in the popular mind

and heart and will.

It is doubtless true that many candid foreign thinkers favor the

disintegration of the American Union because they believe that the

consolidation of its power would make it the meddlesome tyrant of the

world. They admit that the enterprise, skill, and labor of the people,

applied to the unbounded undeveloped resources of the country, will

enable them to create wealth very much faster than other nations, and

that the population, fed by continual streams of immigration, will also

increase with a corresponding rapidity. They admit, that, if kept

united, a few generations will be sufficient to make them the richest,

largest, and most powerful nation in the world. But they also fear that

this nation will be an armed and aggressive democracy, deficient in

public reason and public conscience, disposed to push unjust claims with

insolent pertinacity, and impelled by a spirit of propagandism which

will continually disturb the peace of Europe. It is curious that this

impression is derived from the actions of the government while it was

controlled by the traitors now in rebellion against it, and from the

professions of those Northern demagogues who are most in sympathy with

European opinion concerning the justice and policy of the war. Mr.

Fernando Wood, the most resolute of all the Northern advocates of peace,

recommended from his seat in Congress but a month ago, that a compromise

be patched up with the Rebels on the principle of sacrificing the negro,

and then that both sections unite to seize Canada, Cuba, and Mexico. The

kind of "democracy" which Mr. Jefferson Davis and Mr. Fernando Wood

represent is the kind of democracy which has always been the great

disturber of our foreign relations, and it is a democracy which will be

rendered powerless by the triumph of the national arms. The United

States of 1900, with their population of a hundred millions, and their

wealth of four hundred and twenty billions, will, we believe, be a power

for good, and not for evil. They will be strong enough to make their

rights respected everywhere; but they will not force their ideas on

other nations at the point of the bayonet; they will not waste their

energies in playing the part of the armed propagandist of democratic

opinions in Europe; and the contagion of their principles will only be

the natural result of the example of peace, prosperity, freedom, and

justice, which they will present to the world. In Europe, where power

commonly exists only to be abused, this statement would be received with

an incredulous smile; but we have no reason to doubt, that, among the

earnest patriots who are urging on the present war for Liberty and Union

to a victorious conclusion, it would be considered the most commonplace

of truths.

The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 15, No. 89, March, 1865 A Magazine of Literature, Art, and Politics · 第 48 / 50 题