CHAPTER XXXIII.

STRANGE METHODS OF THE E.E.F. STAFF.

It will be remembered that Lieutenant Jabotinsky was responsible for the

idea of forming a Jewish Legion to help England in her great struggle

for world freedom.

The British Government was impressed with the possibilities he placed

before it, and eventually he was summoned to the War Office by Lord

Derby, then Secretary of State for War, and to the War Cabinet by

General Smuts, to expound his proposals. These high officials did not

disdain to meet and confer with Jabotinsky on the Jewish Legion

question, although at that time he was merely a private soldier, serving

in the 20th Battalion of the London Regiment. They knew that he held a

very high place in the Zionist movement, and was looked up to by the

Jewish masses the world over as one of its most brilliant young leaders.

This fact was also known to the Staff of the E.E.F., but when, as an

officer, in August, 1919, Lieutenant Jabotinsky sought an interview with

the Commander-in-Chief, hoping that he might induce the local

authorities to change their anti-Jewish policy in Palestine, he was not

only refused a hearing, but methods were immediately employed to strike

him down which I can only describe as despicable and un-English.

Jabotinsky was, of course, pro-British to the core. During his service

in Palestine he had been for a time specially attached to the Zionist

Commission with the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief. While he was

employed in this capacity he brought about the acceptance of a programme

by the Jewish Colonists, expressly calling for a British Mandate for

Palestine.

All through his military service with the Battalion he, to my personal

knowledge, did his utmost to allay the feelings of resentment felt by

the Jewish soldiers at the bad treatment they received at the hands of

the military authorities, treatment utterly undeserved and uncalled for,

but apparently deliberately adopted to further what appeared to be the

local policy of making the practical application of the Balfour

Declaration an impossibility.

Hostility to all things Jewish was so open, that only those who wilfully

shut their eyes could fail to see the game that was being played by

certain interested parties. Jabotinsky saw that the line of action

adopted must inevitably lead to outbreaks against the Jews, and

naturally wanted to ward off such a calamity.

Do not let the reader imagine that there was bad blood between the

Palestinian Arabs and the Zionists. That both had dwelt together in

unity and concord for over forty years is proof to the contrary.

The anti-Jewish outbreak, which actually took place later on, was

carefully fostered, and the hooligan element amongst the Arabs openly

encouraged to acts of violence by certain individuals who, for their

own ends, hoped to shatter the age-long aspirations of the Jewish

people.

There can be no doubt that it was assumed in some quarters that when

trouble, which had been deliberately encouraged, arose, the Home

Government, embarrassed by a thousand difficulties at its doors, would

agree with the wire-pullers in Palestine, and say to the Jewish people

that the carrying out of the Balfour Declaration, owing to the hostility

displayed by the Arabs, was outside the range of practical politics.

To these schemers it must have been somewhat galling, to say the least

of it, to find certain men openly fighting them, foot by foot, and inch

by inch, for the realisation of the ideals expressed in the famous

Declaration.

One of these men was Jabotinsky, a man with a notable name in Jewry,

therefore a thrust at him would also be a blow to Jewish prestige in

Palestine. He was a mere foreigner, a Jew from Russia, and presumably

without influential friends--a man, surely, on whom officialdom could

safely pour out the vials of its unjust wrath, without any fear of evil

consequences to itself.

At all events, contemptible methods were adopted in order to strike at

the man who had dared to let the authorities know that their local

policy was a menace to his people dwelling in the Holy Land, and a

serious danger to the Restoration.

When Jabotinsky saw that certain members of the Staff were adopting

measures towards Jewish soldiers, and Jewish ideals in Palestine, which

must inevitably result in disaster, and being loth to believe that the

Commander-in-Chief could be privy to such a policy, he addressed the

following letter to General Allenby.

SIR,

I was the initiator of both the Zion Mule Corps and the actual

Jewish Battalions. To-day I am forced to witness how my work is

breaking into pieces under the intolerable burden of

disappointment, despair, broken pledges, and anti-Semitism,

permeating the whole administrative and military atmosphere, the

hopelessness of all effort and of all devotion.

The common opinion is that you are an enemy of Zionism in

general, and of the Jewish Legion in particular. I still try to

believe that this is not true, that things happen without your

knowledge, that there is a misunderstanding, and that the

situation can yet improve.

In this hope, as the last attempt to stop a process which

threatens to impair for ever Anglo-Jewish friendship throughout

the world, I beg you to grant me a personal interview and

permission to speak freely. This letter is entrusted to your

chivalry.

(Signed) V. JABOTINSKY.

I knew nothing whatever about the despatch of this letter, and although

I am aware that red tape will hold up its hands in holy horror at the

audacity of it, it must be remembered that Jabotinsky's position was an

exceptional one. He was not a British subject, and not used to the

routine of British red tape. Members of the British Imperial War

Cabinet thought it good policy to hear his views, and, no doubt, when he

entrusted this letter to the chivalry of General Allenby, he felt

confident that if he was making any deviation from ordinary routine, it

was for a good purpose and would not be counted against him.

It is an open, straightforward, honest letter, a heartfelt cry from a

man who sees that the whole structure which he has been at such pains to

build is in serious peril of being overthrown by the machinations of the

anti-Jewish people on the Staff.

And now a curious thing happened. It was known to the Staff that

Jabotinsky was at the time staying in Jaffa, and that he was to be found

almost daily at the house of a friend who was living there. About a week

after he had sent his letter to the Commander-in-Chief, a Staff-Major

from G.H.Q., E.E.F., appeared in Jaffa and took up his quarters in the

same house as that in which Jabotinsky's friend dwelt. When the

inevitable meeting took place, the Staff-Major, who, by the way, knew

Jabotinsky well, remarked that the Commander-in-Chief had received his

(Jabotinsky's) letter, and would probably send for him one of these

days, but that, in the meantime, it would be well if Jabotinsky stated

his grievances then and there to himself. "You can speak to me openly as

to a friend," said the Major. "I have some influence at G.H.Q., and I

shall be glad to assist in righting any wrong done to Jews."

On hearing this, Jabotinsky unhesitatingly explained the situation, both

as to its effects on the Regiment and on Jewish aspirations in

Palestine. The result of this "friendly conversation" was a mendacious

report written by the Staff-Major to the Deputy Adjutant-General at

G.H.Q., E.E.F.

Sometime afterwards, by a mere chance, I saw a copy of this report, and

so far as it referred to Jabotinsky, it was practically untrue from

beginning to end.

If the responsible authorities at G.H.Q. knew of the method adopted to

lure Jabotinsky into the "friendly conversation" which served as a

pretext for a gross libel on his character, it reminds one of the good

old days when Governments had recourse to "Agents provocateurs." What

G.H.Q. certainly should have known was that the accusations levelled at

Jabotinsky by a member of their Staff were absolutely untrue. They knew

him to be a good and gallant officer who had done his duty, and much

more than his duty, faithfully and well to England, but it would appear

as if they were greedy for such a document and swallowed it with avidity

without any reference to me or, so far as I know, to anybody else.

I think that even the most prejudiced of my readers will admit that in

fairness and justice to Jabotinsky this secret report should have been

submitted to him for his information, and such explanation and

refutation as he could give, before any action was taken against him.

It is strictly laid down in the King's Regulations that all adverse

reports must be shown to the officer whose reputation is affected, but,

as I have shown over and over again, the Staff of the E.E.F. were

apparently a law unto themselves and above even King's Regulations!

I knew nothing whatever of all that had been going on; I knew nothing of

Jabotinsky's letter to the Commander-in-Chief; I knew nothing of his

interview with the Staff-Major from G.H.Q., and, needless to say, I knew

nothing of the report which the latter had written.

My first inkling of the situation was through an official letter

emanating from the Deputy Adjutant-General, which stated that "the

Commander-in-Chief has his own duly constituted advisers on matters of

policy and is not prepared to grant an interview to a Lieutenant of the

38th Battalion Royal Fusiliers to discuss such matters."

From this moment G.H.Q. lost no time in getting rid of Jabotinsky. On

the 29th August, 1919, I received an urgent order to send this officer

to Kantara for immediate demobilization. This took me by surprise, for I

was very short of Jewish Officers, and stood much in need of

Jabotinsky's services in the Battalion.

I wrote and protested against his demobilization, stating that I needed

his services, but the only result was the receipt of the following

peremptory memorandum:

"A direct order was conveyed for Lieutenant Jabotinsky to

proceed to Demobilization Camp, Kantara, forthwith. If he has

not already gone, this officer will leave for Kantara by rail

to-day. Non-compliance with this order will lead to disciplinary

action being taken. Please report departure."

The above was signed by a Staff Officer.

As a result of this piece of Prussianism, Jabotinsky had to proceed to

Kantara, where at lightning speed he was demobilised.

He wrote a protest to the Army Council, which I forwarded with my own

views on the case. The appeal was a lengthy one, but I will merely quote

the following passage:

"With the deepest reluctance and regret I must say that I

consider this action shows ingratitude. I do not deserve it at

the hands of the British Authorities. From the first days of

this War I have worked and struggled for British interests. I am

neither a British subject nor an immigrant. I had never been in

the United Kingdom or in any British Dominion before this War. I

came to England in 1915 as a Russian Journalist, correspondent

of the oldest Liberal paper in Russia, the Moscow _Wiedomosti_.

As a correspondent I did my best to explain to the Russian

public the British effort and to combat the anti-British

propaganda. At the same time I started on my own initiative a

pro-Entente and pro-British propaganda amongst neutral and

Russian Jewry. At that time many Jews bitterly resented

England's alliance with Russia. In the autumn, 1915, I founded a

Yiddish fortnightly (_Di Tribune_) in Copenhagen, which took up

a strong anti-German and anti-Turkish attitude. Its articles

were constantly quoted in the American Jewish Press, and found

their way even into Germany and Austria. Here again I have the

right to say that I was one of the few--perhaps one of the _two_

men (counting Dr. Weizmann first)--responsible for the origin of

the present pro-British attitude of all Jewry. I may add that I

did all this at my own expense, or with means provided by my

Zionist friends, without any support from any British source.

Against this I know of no facts which could justify the

attitude taken up by G.H.Q., E.E.F. I have never heard of any

complaint or censure of my conduct as Officer or Man; I have

never been informed or even given a hint that anything in my

activity could be objected to.

My compulsory Demobilization under these conditions will throw

a slur on my name. I consider it unjust. I request that it be

annulled, and that I be reinstated in my well-earned position

as an Officer of the Judæans."

A reply to this appeal was never received, and I do not know whether it

ever reached the Army Council.

Thus came about the victimization of Jabotinsky, the man who had done so

much for England in her hour of need; who had over and over again in the

firing line shown that he was prepared to make even the last great

sacrifice itself in the cause for which England was fighting. As a

reward for all his devotion to England he was, by strange and un-English

devices, practically drummed out of the Army.

I think my readers will agree with me that the scandalous course of

action pursued by the Staff of the E.E.F. in the case of Lieutenant

Jabotinsky would, if it became popular in high places, soon bring our

country to ruin and rob us of our fair name.

We know what the corrupt Bureaucrats have done for the once mighty

Russian Empire. Had fair play and justice held sway there we would never

have beheld the present orgy of Bolshevism which is sweeping through

that unhappy country.

Let all kings, princes, rulers and governors remember that to "do

justice and ensue it" makes the stoutest barrier against Bolshevism,

for, as it says in Ecclesiastes, "oppression maketh a wise man mad."

With the Judæans in the Palestine Campaign · 第 33 / 36 章