CHAPTER VI.

THE IMPEACHMENT OF THE PRESIDENT.

1. In the preceding chapters we have traced step by step the development

of the theory of reconstruction and the formulation of the reconstruction

acts of the 39th and 40th Congresses. We have noticed the wide divergence

between the ideas of Johnson and those of the Republican party, and have

seen that the whole program was carried over the vetoes of the President

by the overwhelming Republican majority. But the contest between the

President and Congress, which had been embittered by so many personalities

on both sides, did not come to an end with the passage of legislation

which fully embodied the congressional theory, but continued until it

culminated in a desperate effort of the Republican party to remove Johnson

from the presidential chair.

The very conditions under which he assumed the presidential office

rendered his position difficult, and made estrangement of the executive

and legislative departments an easy matter. On the particular issue of

reconstruction Lincoln and Congress were at variance; but the tragic

nature of Lincoln's death caused this matter to be forgotten in the

overwhelming sense of the loss of the man who had safely guided the

government through the most trying years of its history. But, for a

Congress so extremely Northern and Republican, with antagonisms and

prejudices which only fratricidal wars can create, to be compelled to work

with a man not only a Southerner, but practically a Democrat, must of

necessity bring about a crisis.

Moreover, the flourishing condition of the spoils system served to

aggravate the antagonism between the two departments. History shows that,

while selfish motives are always indignantly repudiated by politicians,

they account for many of the more important political movements of the

century. With the immense federal patronage at his disposal, Johnson

realized that he had a powerful instrument of revenge at hand, and he did

not hesitate to use it. At a time when every congressman was under the

strongest pressure from his home constituency, inability to gratify the

demands of the voracious office-seeker was indeed a cause for bitterness.

We can thus easily distinguish three causes which, working together upon a

strongly Republican Congress, resulted in the attempted removal of the

President. First, the antagonism arising from different fundamental

political ideas, the strained conditions of the times, and the woeful

tactlessness of Johnson; second, the almost morbid yet natural fears of

the Republican party regarding the sometime seceded States; third, the

anger aroused by the use of federal patronage to further the interests of

the President.

2. Impeachment, however, was too serious a matter for Congress to enter

upon lightly. Art. II, sec. iv, of the Constitution provides for

impeachment as follows: "The President, Vice-President and all civil

officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment

for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and

misdemeanors." Obviously the President had not committed and would not

commit anything that could legally be called treason or bribery: Had he

done or would he do anything which could be construed as a high crime or

misdemeanor? The answer largely depended upon the person's point of view.

The extreme radical held that Johnson's whole career as President could be

considered as an attempt treasonably to reinstate the Southern States in a

position of power. The more moderate Republicans could not be made to

acquiesce in this view, and it soon became evident that Johnson would

never be brought to trial on impeachment, unless he could be made to

violate some clearly defined law. The radical element, however, did not

easily accept this situation. By every means possible they tried to force

the moderates into line. The whole past career of the President was

critically studied, and every act which could by any possible means be

construed as a breach of presidential duty was put in the list of offences

for which he should be tried. But all to no purpose. Something more

tangible must be produced, or the trial would never occur.

3. Notwithstanding the evident indisposition on the part of many to

proceed to extreme measures, the radicals determined to force matters to

an issue, if possible. Under Mr. James M. Ashley of Ohio as leader, the

attack was begun shortly after the opening of the second session of the

Thirty-ninth Congress. On December 17, 1866, Mr. Ashley moved to suspend

the rules so as to permit him to report a resolution from the Committee on

Territories. His motion was not agreed to, and the first step towards

impeachment was therefore a failure. The motion is of interest, however,

as evidencing the deliberate intention of the radicals to discover some

act which would justify impeachment. The resolution provided for a select

committee who were to inquire "whether any acts have been done by any

officer of the Government of the United States which in contemplation of

the Constitution are high crimes or misdemeanors, and whether said acts

were designed or calculated to overthrow, subvert or corrupt the

Government of the United States, or any department thereof."

Again on January 7 resolutions looking to impeachment were offered by Mr.

Ashley and two other persons. Mr. Ashley's resolution was adopted, while

the others were referred to the Committee on Reconstruction and the

Committee on the Judiciary. The resolutions which were referred gave as a

reason for impeachment, "the purpose of securing the fruits of the

victories gained on the part of the republic during the late war, waged by

rebels and traitors against the life of the nation"--a decidedly strong

statement to make, in view of the predominance of the Republican party at

the time, and its ability to render nugatory any attempt of the President

to take away from the republic "the fruits of the victories gained."

Exaggerated expressions of this sort show how far the contest had

degenerated from a conflict of opinions as to the constitutional position

of the revolted States, into a personal warfare. Another significant

reason for impeachment given in these resolutions was, that it was

necessary in order to give "effect to the will of the people as expressed

at the polls during the recent elections by a majority numbering in the

aggregate more than four hundred thousand votes." It has already been

shown how disastrously the campaign resulted for Johnson, and how it

furnished popular sanction for the radical reconstruction legislation

which was passed over the presidential vetoes. But, to assume that a

popular expression of disapproval of the President's political program

made impeachment a moral necessity, was to assume a novel position. It was

also declared in these resolutions that the President was to be impeached

for the high crimes and misdemeanors "of which he is manifestly and

notoriously guilty, and which render it unsafe longer to permit him to

exercise the powers he has unlawfully assumed."

These expressions seeming to be too indefinite, the specific charges

submitted by Mr. Ashley met with more favor, and were accordingly adopted.

These charges centered about an alleged "usurpation of power and violation

of law" which was to be found in corrupt uses of the appointing,

pardoning, and veto powers, improper disposition of public offices and

corrupt interference in elections. These were clinched again by the

general charge that the President had "committed acts which, in

contemplation of the Constitution, are high crimes and misdemeanors,"--a

charge obviously introduced to include any points which might in the

future be made against him.

4. As the event proved, the attempt to bring matters to a successful issue

in the 39th Congress was a failure. The Committee on the Judiciary went to

work vigorously, calling many witnesses and collecting as much material as

possible; but on the 28th of February it reported, with only one

dissenting, voice, that in spite of all its efforts not enough testimony

had been gathered to warrant any report beyond a recommendation that the

investigation be continued. The ninth member of the committee, Mr. Rogers

of New Jersey, reported emphatically that a careful examination of the

subject had convinced him that "there is not a particle of evidence to

sustain any of the charges," and that "the case is wholly without a

particle of evidence upon which an impeachment could be founded." He

further declared that but little of the testimony taken would be admitted

in the courts, and that the whole matter should be dropped, as it would

certainly end "in a complete vindication of the President." Logically, the

standpoint of Mr. Rogers was a correct one. From a strictly legal view of

the case, there was very serious doubt as to the advisability of

attempting impeachment; but the opponents of the President counted upon

their large majority to force the matter, and the line of action

recommended by the majority of the committee was adopted.

As has been seen, the 40th Congress assembled immediately upon the

adjournment of the 39th; and on March 7, 1867, the new Judiciary Committee

was authorized to proceed with the investigation, and to continue it

during any recess the House might take. By another resolution agreed to

March 29, the committee was requested to report immediately upon the

reassembling of Congress, which was to be in the following July, if

political conditions seemed to require it.[180]

The committee accordingly continued its investigations, but, though the

radicals felt sure that it was composed of men who would favor

impeachment, it at first reported by a majority of five to four against

impeachment. A recommitment resulted in the conversion of one member of

the committee[181] to impeachment views; and on November 25 Mr. Boutwell,

of Massachusetts, reported from the committee a resolution impeaching the

President for high crimes and misdemeanors.

5. The debate on this resolution was entered upon in December, 1867, and

was marked by the effort on the part of the radicals to support a most

indefinite and general charge. In spite of the thoroughness of the

investigation of the Judiciary Committee, in which neither time nor

expense had been spared, the attitude of the moderates was justified.

Nothing had been unearthed which from the legal standpoint could be

considered a high crime or misdemeanor. Failing in this, Mr. Boutwell

assumed the ground that the evidence showed that President Johnson had

been deliberately using his office to bring back, so far as possible, the

Democratic party into power, and that his efforts to restore the

insurrectionary States to their former power had been in the interest of

the rebellion.

Although most Republicans at this time could not believe that the

inhabitants of the Southern States were sincere in their protestations of

a desire to lay aside all differences and once more become loyal citizens,

there were many who could not agree to Mr. Boutwell's definition of high

crimes and misdemeanors; and these moderate Republicans, aided by the

Democrats, defeated the resolution by a vote of one hundred and eight to

fifty-seven.[182] The attempt to impeach without definite legal charges

had failed.

But the President soon gave the House the very opportunity it desired.

While the direct attack upon the President was being carried on by means

of the effort to impeach him, an indirect attack was made by the

legislative limitation of his powers. One of the cries of alarmists had

been that there was danger that the President might in some way take

advantage of his constitutional position as commander-in-chief of the army

and navy, so as to injure the government and advance his own interests.

Some went even farther and declared that he designed with the aid of the

army to overthrow the government, and place the United States in the power

of the rebels. Such charges, viewed from the standpoint of history, seem

too absurd for consideration, but during the reconstruction period the

feverish condition of the country made possible the acceptance of almost

any startling rumor.

6. But even those who did not apprehend that Johnson would use the army

for any improper purpose, were willing to limit his power and prestige by

depriving him of his military authority; and this was accordingly done by

a section introduced into the army appropriation bill.[183] This section

required all orders to the army to be made through the General of the

Army, thus practically making his approval of them necessary. It also

prevented the President or the Secretary of War from removing, suspending

or relieving from command the General of the Army, and even forbade his

being assigned for duty away from headquarters, except at his own request.

This had the effect of taking away from the President all his

constitutional powers as commander-in-chief. As the section was put as a

rider on an appropriation bill and a veto must cover the whole bill,

Johnson contented himself with a simple protest and returned the act with

his signature.[184]

7. The attack upon the civil powers of the President was made through the

Tenure-of-Office Act.[185] As the violation of this act was the ground of

the most serious charge in the impeachment trial, a somewhat detailed

study of its provisions, and of the views expressed by the President in

his veto of it, is advisable. The bill provided that "every person holding

any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and

consent of the Senate," and every person so appointed in the future,

should be entitled to hold such office until a successor should have been

appointed in like manner, that is to say, _with the advice and consent of

the Senate_. The only liberty of action allowed the President was during

the recess of the Senate, when he was permitted to suspend an officer

until the next meeting of the Senate, and appoint a _pro tempore_

official. Within twenty days after the meeting of the Senate, however, he

was required to give his reasons for the suspension. If the Senate

approved of the removal, a permanent appointment was to be made; if they

refused to concur, the suspended officer was immediately to resume his

duties. Any violation of this act by the President was made an impeachable

offense, by the declaration that "every removal, appointment, or

employment made, had, or exercised, contrary to the provisions of this act

* * * are hereby declared to be high misdemeanors." The other provisions

were of minor importance, and do not require notice here.

The veto message of the President was a calm, dignified and judicial

discussion of the constitutionality of the bill, and was in every way a

creditable document, sustaining fully the high character of his previous

vetoes. He called attention to the fact that the whole question of the

authority of the President in cases of removal from office had been

discussed thoroughly in Congress as early as 1789, and decided in favor of

the President. He quoted Madison's argument to prove that all executive

power, except what is specifically excepted, is vested in the President,

and that as no exception was made as to the power of removal, it must be

vested in him. He also cited many possible cases, in which it would be

absolutely necessary for the President to possess the power of

removal.[186] A decision of the Supreme Court was referred to,[187] in

which it was observed that both the legislative and the executive

department had assumed in practice that the power of removal was vested in

the President alone. When, for instance, the Departments of State, War and

the Treasury were created in 1789, provision was made for a subordinate

who should take charge of the office "when the head of the Department

should be removed _by the President of the United States_." Story, Kent

and Webster were all quoted as affirming the same legislative construction

of the Constitution. The great practical value of the power during the

Civil War was noticed, and its present and future necessity strongly

urged; and the message closed with an earnest appeal to Congress not to

violate the original spirit of the Constitution.

8. The passage of the bill over the veto placed Johnson in a situation in

which a collision was almost sure to come. As the chief executive of the

country he was charged with the duty of carrying out the provisions of the

reconstruction acts, notwithstanding his strong personal repugnance to

them. Under the advice of Attorney-General Stanbery he had construed the

acts literally, and he had thus frustrated in part the object of the

legislation. But the co-operation of the army was necessary, and

unfortunately for President Johnson, the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton,

strongly opposed his views, and conducted himself as far as possible in

accordance with the wishes of the congressional majority. The continued

friction between the President and the Secretary of War seemed to

President Johnson to necessitate Stanton's retirement, but repeated hints

to that effect were not recognized by the latter. Finally, on August 5,

1867, the President informed him that "public considerations of a high

character constrained" him to say that his resignation would be accepted.

The Secretary's prompt reply was that "public considerations of a high

character" constrained him not to resign until the next session of

Congress. A week later, August 12, the President formally suspended him

and appointed General Grant Secretary _ad interim_.[188] Stanton then

submitted "under protest to superior force."

When Congress met in December the President reported his suspension of

Stanton, and after long discussion the Senate, on January 13, 1868,

refused to concur.[189] When informed of this action of the Senate,

General Grant immediately turned over the Secretary's office to Stanton,

thus definitely committing himself to the congressional interpretation of

the law. Grant's action was a sore disappointment to the President.

Johnson had refused to accept the Tenure-of-Office Act as constitutional,

and had purposed to make this a test case. In the correspondence which

passed between him and General Grant after the latter's acquiescence in

the action of the Senate, Johnson claimed that it was understood that

Grant was either to refuse to give up the office to Stanton, or, if he

should be unwilling to take so prominent a part in the contest, to resign

and permit the office to be filled with some one whose views agreed with

the President's, so that Stanton, if he sought to regain the office, might

be compelled to resort to the courts. In this way the constitutionality of

the act could be tested. Johnson's statements as to the understanding with

Grant were substantially endorsed by the Cabinet, on the strength of a

conversation between Johnson and Grant at a cabinet meeting. Grant,

however, firmly denied that there was any such agreement or

understanding.[190]

A few days after Stanton had resumed his duties as Secretary of War, the

President sought to put in operation a plan for rendering his possession

of the office ineffective. On January 19, he ordered General Grant, in

charge of the army, to disregard all of Stanton's orders unless he knew

directly from the President that they were the latter's orders.[191] The

order was repeated in writing at Grant's request on January 29. On the

following day, Grant refused to carry it out, declaring that an order from

Secretary Stanton would be considered satisfactory evidence that it was

authorized by the Executive.[192] This correspondence between Johnson and

Grant was subsequently called for by Congress, and an attempt was made to

frame articles of impeachment on the ground that the President was

instructing Grant to disobey the orders of his superior. Careful

examination of the legal bearings of the question convinced a majority of

the Reconstruction Committee that nothing would be gained by inserting

charges based on this correspondence. The President had shrewdly worded

his communication so as not to violate any legal technicalities.[193]

Having failed in his first two attacks upon Stanton, Johnson finally

resorted to a still stronger measure. Completely ignoring the

Tenure-of-Office Act, he addressed a letter to Stanton, February 21,

removing him from office, and directing him to transfer all the property

of the War Department to Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas. Thomas, having

received his appointment as secretary _ad interim_, proceeded to the

office and formally demanded possession. Stanton avoided giving a direct

answer to the demand, and on the following morning Gen. Thomas was

arrested for violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act. After bail had been

procured he renewed his demand, but Stanton ignored his appointment.

Several plans were devised by the President and Thomas' lawyers to make

the contest center around Thomas, but the congressional managers decided

to drop the matter, and concentrate their energies upon a presidential

impeachment.[194]

The last step of the President opened the way for immediate action.

Violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act was explicitly declared an

impeachable offense, and as to the flagrancy of its violation by the order

of February 21 there could be no question. Many of the wavering

Republicans now had their doubts of the expediency of impeachment cleared

away, and on February 24 the resolution formally impeaching the President

of "high crimes and misdemeanors in office" was passed.[195]

9. On March 2, the first nine articles of impeachment were adopted; two

additional articles were added on the 3d; and on the 4th they were

presented to the Senate. On March 30, the trial began. The articles

charged the President with high crimes and misdemeanors in respect of the

order for the removal of Stanton, the appointment of Thomas as Secretary

of War _ad interim_, the attempt to hinder Stanton in the exercise of his

lawful duties, the wilful violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act, the

attempt to seize the properties of the War Department, the attempt

unlawfully to disburse moneys through the appointment of Thomas, an

attempt to make General Emory violate the Tenure-of-Office Act, the

attempt to injure the good reputation of the legislative department by

speeches delivered at various specified places, and his determined

opposition to the reconstruction policy as outlined in the various acts of

Congress.[196]

These articles were very sweeping, and were designed as a sort of drag-net

to include all of the complaints which could possibly be brought against

the President. Yet the House of Representatives, previous to the attempted

removal of Secretary Stanton, after the most searching examination into

the President's record, had failed to find sufficient ground on which to

base an impeachment. Therefore the only charges that deserved really

serious attention were those growing out of the violation of the

Tenure-of-Office Act. In the President's reply to the charges he explains

his attitude on this matter. In his opinion the Tenure-of-Office Act was

unconstitutional. The very fact that he as Executive was legally held

responsible for the acts of the Secretary of War made it necessary for him

to exercise the power of removal or of indefinite suspension. He had at

first complied with the letter of the act in order to avoid a further

struggle with Congress; but, having been frustrated by Congress in his

design, the only alternative that remained to him, in view of his strained

relations with the Secretary of War, was the latter's unconditional

removal.

10. The President's case, as to the constitutionality of his action and

the unconstitutionality of the Tenure-of-Office Act, was strong, and was

presented with great ability by the President's counsel. But, from the

very beginning, it was obvious that the case would be determined mainly on

political lines.

If the Republican party could hold all the Republican Senators to the

decision of the majority, a verdict of guilty was assured. Consequently,

the strongest efforts were made to bring all into line. But some proved

recalcitrant. The prospect that the President of the United States was to

be forced out of his office as a punishment for his opposition to the

Legislative Department was not edifying. Hitherto the presidential office

had possessed great dignity. To be sure, Johnson's conduct had gone far

towards the destruction of that dignity, but a conviction on impeachment

charges would drag down the office immeasurably. Some of the Senators also

realized that the tendency of Congress during the whole struggle had been

towards an encroachment upon the executive powers, and that there was

serious danger that the balance of the governmental system might be

destroyed. While, therefore, they strongly disapproved of Johnson's

conduct, they felt unwilling to expose the government to the shock which

would accompany his removal from the presidential chair. The trial

proceeded slowly and the case was ably contested by counsel on both sides;

but the prosecution was practically brought to a close on May 16, by the

vote which was taken on the eleventh article of impeachment. This article

was chosen for the first test of strength, because it embodied those

charges which had caused the most feeling, and which were best calculated

to cause Senators to cast aside judicial restraints and vote according to

their prejudices. But, seven Republicans refused to line themselves with

the radical majority. They and the twelve Democratic Senators voted for

acquittal. Thirty-five Republicans voted "guilty," but this lacked one of

the needful two-thirds majority. Ten days later another vote was taken on

the second and third articles, with the same result. The fight was then

given up, and the court of impeachment was declared adjourned.

11. It was a fortunate thing for the country that the attempt failed. The

convulsions of the Civil War had unsettled most seriously our conceptions

of the relations of the three co-ordinate departments of the government.

Lincoln had not hesitated to assume powers totally outside the ordinary

functions of the Executive. The country had sustained him in this; but,

with the return of peace, and with Johnson in the presidential chair,

Congress had determined to resume its powers. Again the country responded,

but the violence of the reaction caused the pendulum to swing too far in

the opposite direction; and our institutions were placed in greater danger

than the were in before. But, just as the Civil War had settled the

question as to the indissolubility of the Union, so no less emphatically

did the failure of the impeachment trial confirm the equality of the three

departments of our government.

AUTHORITIES.

Blaine, James G. Twenty Years of Congress. Norwich, 1884.

Congressional Globe. 37th-40th Congresses. Washington, 1861-1868.

Cooper, T. V., and Fenton, H. T. American Politics. Boston, 1890.

Cox, S. S. Three Decades of Federal Legislation. Providence, 1888.

Dunning, Wm. A. Articles on Civil War and Reconstruction, in Political

Science Quarterly, vols. i. and ii., and on The Impeachment, in Papers Am.

Hist. Assoc., vol. iv.

Gillet, R. H. Democracy in the United States. New York, 1868.

Herbert, Hilary A. Editor. Why the Solid South? Baltimore, 1890.

House Journal. 37th-40th Congresses. Washington, 1861-1868.

House Reports. Vol. ii., 1865-66. Washington, 1866.

House Reports. Vol. ii., 1866-67. Washington, 1867.

Hurd, J. C. Theory of our National Existence. Boston, 1881.

Johnston, Alexander. History of the United States. New York, 1891.

Johnston, Alexander. Representative American Orations. New York and

London.

Johnston, Alexander. Reconstruction, Emancipation Proclamation, Freedmen's

Bureau, etc., Lalor, Cyclopedia of Polit. Science. 3 vols. New York, 1890.

Lowell. J. R. Political Essays, in "Works." Vol. V. Boston and New York,

1891.

McPherson, Edward. History of the Reconstruction. Washington, 1880.

Moore, Frank. Speeches of Andrew Johnson. Boston, 1866.

Patton, J. H. The Democratic Party. New York, 1888.

Pollard, E. A. The Lost Cause Regained. New York, 1868.

Poore, Ben: Perley. Veto Messages of the Presidents of the United States.

Washington, 1886.

Ridpath. History of the United States. New York and Cincinnati.

Savage, J. Life and Public Services of Andrew Johnson. New York, 1866.

Scott, E. G. Reconstruction during the Civil War. Boston and New York,

1895.

Stanwood, E. History of Presidential Elections. Boston and New York.

Senate Journal. 37th-40th Congresses. Washington, 1861-1868.

Sterne, Simon. Constitutional History and Political Development of the

United States. New York and London, 1888.

Stephens, Alexander H. The War between the States. Philadelphia.

Taylor, Richard. Destruction and Reconstruction. New York, 1879.

Williams, G. W. History of the Negro Race in America. New York, 1883.

Wilson, Henry. Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America. New York.

Wilson, Henry. History of the Reconstruction Measures. Hartford, 1868.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Scott, _Reconstruction during the Civil War_, 245 ff.

[2] _House Journal_, 1st Session, 37th Congress, pp. 123-5.

[3] Alexander H. Stephens, in _The War between the States_, uses this fact

as a basis for the charge that Johnson was inconsistent in refusing to

ratify the Sherman-Johnston Convention.

[4] _House Journal_, 2d Session, 37th Congress, p. 33.

[5] _Senate Journal_, 2d Session, 37th Congress, pp. 202-4.

[6] _House Journal_, 37th Congress, 3d Session, p. 43. Introduced December

5, 1862, by C. L. Vallandigham, whose subsequent career is well known. See

Cox _Three Decades of Federal Legislation_, pp. 80-85.

[7] The italics are mine.

[8] _House Journal_, 1st Session, 38th Congress, p. 48.

[9] _Ibid._, pp. 65-6.

[10] See Cox, _Three Decades of Federal Legislation_, 123.

[11] _House Journal_, 1st Session, 38th Congress, pp. 238-9.

[12] For a very able discussion of the "Efforts at Compromise, 1860-61,"

see Frederic Bancroft's article in _Political Science Quarterly_, vi, pp.

401-423.

[13] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 37th Congress, p. 129.

[14] _Ibid._, 2d Session, 37th Congress, part i, p. 8.

[15] _Senate Journal_, 3d Session, 37th Congress, p. 24.

[16] See Pollard's _Lost Cause Regained_, pp. 44-57, for a discussion of

the growth of Southern sentiment favoring measures of peace.

[17] It is improbable that he ever modified his views as to the continued

existence of the States--views which were essentially those of his

successor, though less dogmatically asserted. See Hurd, _Theory of Our

National Existence_, 36 and _Index_; Pollard, _Lost Cause Regained_, 65.

[18] Cooper, _American Politics_, pp. 141-3.

[19] Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 36.

[20] _Congressional Globe_, 3d Session, 37th Congress, part i, p. 834.

[21] _House Journal_, 3d Session, 37th Congress, pp. 69, 70.

[22] Cooper, _American Politics_, bk. i, pp. 141-3. On Lincoln's plan of

Reconstruction, _Cf._ Gillet, _Democracy in the United States_, pp. 297-9;

Pollard, _Lost Cause Regained_, 65, which claims that Lincoln could have

successfully carried out his policy had he lived, but does not sustain the

statement; Cox, _Three Decades_, etc., pp. 336-345; Wilson, _Rise and Fall

of the Slave Power_, iii, 519-20; Scott, _Reconstruction during the Civil

War_, 267 ff.

[23] These excepted classes were: (1) Confederate civil and diplomatic

officers; (2) Confederates who had left U. S. judicial positions; (3)

officers above colonel in army and lieutenant in navy; (4) those who had

formerly been U. S. Congressmen and had aided the rebellion; (5) those who

left U. S. Army and Navy to aid the rebellion; (6) those who had treated

negroes captured while in U. S. military or naval service otherwise than

as prisoners of war.

[24] Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, iii, 531-41;

_Cf._ Gillet, _Democracy in the United States_, pp. 304-7.

[25] For results of this reorganization in Tennessee, see chap. iii.

[26] With one exception--a Republican, Whaley, of West Virginia, voted

with the negative.

[27] So called from the chairmen of the House and Senate committees

reporting the bill.

[28] _Congressional Globe_, appendix, 1st Session, 38th Congress, p. 84.

See also _Lalor_, iii, 546; Cox, _Three Decades_, etc., 339-341; Wilson,

_Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, iii, 520-28; Johnson's

_American Orations_, iii, 242-260; Scott, _Reconstruction during the Civil

War_, 274 ff.

[29] Cooper, _American Politics_, bk. i, p. 169.

[30] _Congressional Globe_, part ii, 38th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1246.

[31] _Congressional Globe_, iii, p. 2106, 1st Session, 38th Congress.

[32] Cooper, _American Politics_, bk. i, 169-70. The President's action

caused much dissatisfaction, Davis and Wade publishing a protest which

impugned Lincoln's motives, declaring that he had committed an outrage on

American legislation. See Johnson, in _Lalor_, iii. 5 and 6; Cox, _Three

Decades_, etc., 341.

[33] _Senate Journal_, 2d Session, 38th Congress, Feb. 8. Blaine (_Twenty

Years of Congress_, ii, 46) explains that this joint resolution was

intended as a rebuke to the President by the refusal of Congress to accept

the proclamation of December 8, 1863, as a basis for the restoration of

the States fulfilling its requirements. He then points out how Lincoln,

with his usual tact, overthrows what triumph may have accrued to the

leaders of the opposition by explaining that he "signed the joint

resolution in deference to the view of Congress implied in its passage and

presentation." His (Lincoln's) own opinion was that as a matter of course

Congress had complete power to accept or reject electoral votes, and that

the Executive had no right to interpose with a veto, whatever his own

opinions might be. Blaine says that "his triumph was complete, both in the

estimation of Congress and of the people."

[34] See Cox, _Three Decades of Federal Legislation_, 123; Johnston, in

_Lalor_, iii, 54; Wilson (Woodrow), _Division and Reunion_, 261-2.

[35] _Senate Journal_, 2d Session, 37th Congress, pp. 194-6.

[36] The inconsistency in declaring a State to be extinct, and at the same

time acknowledging the obligation to guarantee to it a republican form of

government, is due to careless phraseology. Obviously Sumner uses the word

"State," in these resolutions, where he means state governments.

[37] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 38th Congress, part ii, p. 2041.

See also his remarks on the Confiscation bill. Cox's _Three Decades of

Federal Legislation_, pp. 365-374, contains a chapter on the policy of

Stevens.

[38] See Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, iii,

531-541.

[39] McPherson, _Reconstruction_, pp. 44 f. Cf. Wilson, _Rise and Fall of

the Slave Power in America_, iii, 592.

[40] McPherson, pp. 46-7.

[41] McPherson, 44 ff; Moore, _Life and Speeches of Andrew Johnson_, 481

ff.

[42] McPherson, p. 47.

[43] McPherson, pp. 47-8.

[44] See Gillett, _Democ. in the U. S._, pp. 333-337, for a discussion of

Johnson's policy and mistakes from the Democratic standpoint.

[45] Mr. Blaine in his _Twenty Years of Congress_, vol. ii, pp. 63-70,

ascribes the apparently great modification of Johnson's attitude towards

the South to two causes: First, the personal influence of Seward; second,

the flattery of Southern leaders. He assumes Johnson to have been

thoroughly determined to carry out a harsh policy of reconstruction, and

points out that of the six members of the Cabinet, excluding Mr. Seward,

three were radical and three conservative in their views, offsetting each

other in their influence upon Johnson. He then calls attention to the fact

that Mr. Seward's most conspicuous faculty was the power to convince

listeners against their will through his personal conversation with them.

With this remarkable faculty he believes Mr. Seward to have deliberately

settled down to the task of reversing the President's views as to

reconstruction. "Equipped with these rare endowments," he says, "it is not

strange that Mr. Seward made a deep impression upon the mind of the

President. In conflicts of opinion the superior mind, the subtle address,

the fixed purpose, the gentle yet strong will, must in the end prevail."

Mr. Seward's fervent pleadings, Blaine thinks, caused a marked change in

Johnson's beliefs, and inclined him to look favorably upon the glory of a

merciful, lenient administration. The leaders in the South, quickly

noticing the change in Johnson's attitude, took advantage of the

opportunity, and by judicious flattery completed the work which Seward had

begun, and placed Johnson before the world as the ardent champion of

immediate restoration. The theory impresses one with its apparent

reasonableness, but as Mr. Blaine produces no evidence beyond his own

authority, one is inclined to look upon it as an ingenious explanation

based upon the environment of Johnson. Doubtless Seward presented his view

on the situation with his accustomed ability, and probably it influenced

Johnson's view to a certain extent. The second part of the supposition can

also readily be granted--that the vanity of Johnson was played upon by

those whose flattery was most pleasing to one who had sprung from the

ranks of those accustomed to be dictated to and spurned by these same men.

Yet to ascribe the adoption of so important a policy, affecting all the

fundamental principles upon which strict and loose constructionists are

divided, to these influences, appears to be a superficial judgment based

upon opinions formed in the heat of the struggle, when extraneous

influences are always given undue prominence by the participants. The

whole career of Johnson proves the logical exactness with which he

followed strict construction dogma in all points excepting the doctrine of

secession.

[46] McPherson, _Hist. of Recon._, 45, 46

[47] The repudiation of the Sherman-Johnston agreement of April 18th was

of a negative character, and did not commit the administration to any

policy. Coming, as it did, so shortly after his inauguration, it was taken

by those expecting harsh measures from the President as an indication of

such a policy. An examination of the circumstances, however, shows that

Johnson was merely following the policy supposed to have been adopted by

Lincoln, and evidenced by instructions sent to Grant on March 3 in regard

to a proposed conference with Lee. Stephens' charge (_War between the

States_, ii, 632), that Johnson was bound to ratify the agreement as

consistent with the Crittenden Resolution of 1861, is inadmissible.

Generals in the field manifestly have no right to decide momentous

political questions. For a copy of the Sherman-Johnston agreement, and the

official dispatch giving particulars of its disapproval, see McPherson,

_Hist. of Recon._, 121-2.

[48] McPherson, p. 13-14.

[49] McPherson, p. 8.

[50] See Appendix; Savage, _Life and Public Services of Andrew Johnson_,

370-373.

[51] Blaine, ii, 70-76, ascribes this amnesty proclamation to the personal

influence of Mr. Seward, who favored all but the 13th excepted class

(property holders above $20,000). This certainly offers a good explanation

of the promptness of his action, and is not inconsistent with the theory

of Johnson's attitude as outlined above.

[52] McPherson, p. 11; Blaine, ii, 77, 78.

[53] Tennessee, of course, having been reorganized during Lincoln's

administration, under the direction of Military Governor Johnson, cannot

be considered in connection with Johnson's policy as President. Louisiana

and Arkansas also retained their reorganized governments until the

reconstruction acts took effect. See Blaine, ii, 79, 80.

[54] The phraseology differed in the different States, depending upon the

sensitiveness and pride of the legislature.

[55] McPherson, _Reconst._, 7, 8.

[56] McPherson, _Reconst._, 49.

[57] _Ibid._, 51-2.

[58] McPherson, 20.

[59] _Ibid._, 21-2.

[60] McPherson, 43; Blaine, ii, 102-3.

[61] See _Why the Solid South_, edited by Hilary A. Herbert, for a

detailed presentation of the Southern view.

[62] The report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, June 18th

(_House Reports_, No. 30, 1st Session, 39th Congress; McPherson, 84-93),

gives a spirited summary of the action of the Southern States since the

appointment of the provisional governors. See also Blaine, _Twenty Years

of Congress_, ii, 84-107.

[63] Lalor, iii, 546.

[64] Senate: Republicans, 40; Democrats, 11; House: Republicans, 145;

Democrats, 40. The work before Congress was well expressed by Schuyler

Colfax in his speech made upon taking the Speaker's chair. Speaking of

Congress he said: "Representing, in its two branches, the States and the

people, its first and highest obligation is to guarantee to every State a

republican form of government. The rebellion having overthrown

constitutional State governments in many States, it is yours to mature and

enact legislation which, with the concurrence of the Executive, shall

establish them anew on such a basis of enduring justice as will guarantee

all the necessary safeguards to the people, and afford what our Magna

Charta, the Declaration of Independence, proclaims is the chief object of

government--protection to all men in their inalienable rights. * * * *

Then we may hope to see the vacant and once abandoned seats around us

gradually filling up, until this hall shall contain representatives from

every State and district; their hearts devoted to the Union for which they

are to legislate, jealous of its honor, proud of its glory, watchful of

its rights, and hostile to its enemies." _Congressional Globe_, 39th

Congress, 1st Session, p. 5. See Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii,

111, 112.

[65] Among the Senators elected were Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President

of the Confederacy, and H. V. Johnson, a Senator in the rebel Congress,

both from Georgia; from North Carolina, W. A. Graham, Senator in the rebel

Congress; from South Carolina, B. F. Perry, a Confederate States judge,

and J. I. Manning, volunteer aid to General Beauregard at Fort Sumter and

Manassas (McPherson, 106-7). Among the Representatives chosen were: from

Alabama, Cullen A. Battle, a Confederate general, and T. J. Foster, a

Representative in the rebel Congress; from Georgia, Philip Cook and W. T.

Wofford, generals in the Confederate army; from Mississippi, A. E.

Reynolds and R. A. Pinson, rebel colonels, and J. T. Harrison, in rebel

provisional Congress; from North Carolina, Josiah Turner was a rebel

colonel, and a member of the rebel Congress, and T. C. Fuller a rebel

Congressman; from South Carolina, J. D. Kennedy was a colonel, and Samuel

McGowan a general in the rebel army, and James Farrow, a rebel

Congressman.

[66] By Mr. Brooks, of New York. _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st

Session, pp. 3, 4.

[67] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 39th Congress, p. 2; Blaine,

_Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 113-115.

[68] Wilson, _History of Reconstruction_, 16 ff.

[69] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 24-30.

[70] Senator Lane committed suicide on July 11, 1866. Mortification caused

by abuse, as the result of his action, is supposed to have unbalanced him

mentally. _Cf._, Blaine, ii, 185.

[71] The resolution as adopted by the House on the 4th contained in

addition: "and until such report shall have been made, and finally acted

upon by Congress, no member shall be received into either House from any

of the so-called Confederate States, and all papers relating to the

representation of the said States shall be referred to the said committee

without debate." The Senate, however, considered such provisions to affect

powers granted to each House separately, and which should not be entrusted

to a joint committee. Therefore they were struck out, but on December 14

the House of Representatives passed resolutions binding itself to be

governed by similar principles.

[72] The other members of the committee were: on the part of the Senate,

Howard of Michigan, Grimes of Iowa, Harris of New York, Williams of

Oregon, and Johnson of Maryland; on the part of the House, Washburne of

Illinois, Morrill of Vermont, Grider of Kentucky, Bingham of Ohio,

Conkling of New York, Boutwell of Massachusetts, Blow of Missouri, and

Rogers of New Jersey.

[73] Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 115.

[74] Wilson, _History of the Reconstruction Measures_, 42-105, contains a

summary of the debates on reconstruction; see also Blaine, _Twenty Years

of Congress_, ii, 128 ff.

[75] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 72-5.

[76] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 39th Congress, p. 1019.

[77] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 39th Congress, p. 1309. These

strong statements of the advisability of confiscation alarmed the Southern

States greatly, and caused them to hate and fear Thaddeus Stevens. See

Lalor, iii, 546 ff. The following extract from General Taylor's

_Destruction and Reconstruction_ (pp. 243-4), is characteristic of the

Southern estimate of the man. General Taylor had occasion to call upon

Stevens while endeavoring to get permission to visit Jefferson Davis, then

in confinement at Fortress Monroe. He goes on to say: "Thaddeus Stevens

received me with as much civility as he was capable of. Deformed in body

and temper like Caliban, this was the Lord Hategood of the fair; but he

was frankness itself. He wanted no restoration of the Union under the

Constitution, which he called a worthless bit of old parchment. The white

people of the South ought never again to be trusted with power, for they

would inevitably unite with the Northern 'Copperheads' and control the

government. The only sound policy was to confiscate the lands and divide

them among the negroes, to whom, sooner or later, suffrage must be given.

Touching the matter in hand, Johnson was a fool to have captured Davis,

whom it would have been wiser to assist in escaping. Nothing would be done

with him, as the Executive had only pluck enough to hang poor devils, such

as Wirz and Mrs. Surratt. Had the leading traitors been promptly strung

up, well; but the time for that had passed. (Here, I thought, he looked

lovingly at my neck, as Petit Andre was wont to do at those of his

merry-go-rounds.)"

[78] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1476.

[79] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1616.

[80] _Ibid._, p. 1617.

[81] _Ibid._, p. 1828.

[82] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 155.

[83] _Ibid._, p. 150.

[84] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1169.

[85] _Ibid._, p. 2256.

[86] Gillet's _Democracy in the United States_, pp. 309-13, discusses the

Freedmen's Bureau from the Northern Democratic standpoint.

[87] The first bill creating a Freedmen's Bureau was introduced in the

House during the 37th Congress by Mr. Eliot, of Massachusetts, who during

the 39th Congress was chairman of the Select Committee on Freedmen. It was

not reported, but the same bill was presented in the first session of the

38th Congress, and passed the House by a vote of 69 to 67. It was returned

from the Senate on June 30, 1864, amended so as to attach the Bureau to

the Treasury Department. A committee of conference agreed upon a new bill

creating a department of freedmen's affairs, reporting to the President.

This passed the House, but failed in the Senate. The next attempt

succeeded. _Congressional Globe_, 2d Session, 38th Congress, p. 1307. See

Cox's _Three Decades of Federal Legislation_ for an account of the

Freedmen's Bureau; also Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in

America_, iii, 472-485; Wilson (Woodrow), _Division and Reunion_, 263.

[88] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1299. Mr.

Doolittle on the 19th of December, 1865, had introduced a bill relative to

the Bureau of Freedmen, but when reported from the Committee on Military

Affairs, to which it had been referred, it was indefinitely postponed.

[89] This committee had been established by a resolution introduced by Mr.

Eliot, of Massachusetts, on December 6, 1865. So much of the President's

message as related to freedmen, and all papers relating to the same

subject, were to be referred to it. The following were appointed members

of the committee: T. D. Eliot of Massachusetts, W. D. Kelley of

Pennsylvania, G. S. Orth of Indiana, J. A. Bingham of Ohio, Nelson Taylor

of New York, B. F. Loan of Missouri, J. B. Grinnell of Iowa, H. E. Paine

of Wisconsin, and S. S. Marshall of Illinois.

[90] Cox confuses this act with the act passed over the veto on July 16,

declaring that it was passed over the veto on February 21. _Three Decades

of Federal Legislation_, p. 444.

[91] See Wilson (Henry), _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_,

iii, 490-97; Wilson, _History of Reconstruction_, 148-184; Blaine, _Twenty

Years of Congress_, ii, 164-170; Wilson (Woodrow), _Division and Reunion_,

264.

[92] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 39th Congress. McPherson,

_History of the Reconstruction_, pp. 73-4.

[93] The veto messages of the Presidents of the United States, from

Washington to Cleveland, inclusive, have been compiled by Ben: Perley

Poore by order of the Senate.

[94] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 915-917;

McPherson, _History of Reconstruction_, pp. 68-72.

[95] See Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, iii,

497-99; Wilson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 184-195; Blaine, _Twenty

Years of Congress_, ii, 171-2.

[96] The votes were: House, 104 to 33; Senate, 33 to 12. For the text of

the bill, see _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 39th Congress;

McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, pp. 149-50. Blaine, _Twenty

Years of Congress_, ii, 172, states that the bill was far less popular

than the measure vetoed on February 19. "It required potent persuasion,

re-enforced by the severest exercise of party discipline, to prevent a

serious break in both Houses against the bill."

[97] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 52-56.

[98] _House journal_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, 300, 315. The resolution

was carried particularly to silence the Tennessee claimants for

recognition. The somewhat anomalous position of that State gave grounds

for the argument that it should be classed in the same category with the

other Southern States. Thus Mr. Stevens was able to get the power for the

joint committee which he had originally claimed.

[99] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, pp. 58-63.

[100] See Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America_, iii,

684-692; _History of Reconstruction_, 117-149; Blaine, _Twenty Years of

Congress_, ii, 172-79.

[101] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 39th Congress, pp. 39, 40.

[102] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session; McPherson,

_History of the Reconstruction_, pp. 75-8.

[103] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1679-81;

McPherson, _History of Reconstruction_, pp. 75-8.

[104] _Senate Journal_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 431-2; McPherson,

_History of the Reconstruction_, pp. 82-3; Blaine, _Twenty Years of

Congress_, ii, 275-80.

[105] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 81-2; _Congressional

Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, 2609.

[106] McPherson, 160-164.

[107] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, pp. 164-6;

_Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session.

[108] Hurd, in his _Theory of our National Existence_, p. 42, says that

this report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction "as being the most

authoritative declaration of principles supposed to have been afterwards

carried out in political action, is a document which, either for good or

evil, will probably be regarded as one of the most important in the

history of this country."

[109] For an extended discussion of the constitutional views of the

members of the committee, see Hurd's _Theory_, etc., pp. 224 ff.

[110] _House Reports_, No. 30, 39th Congress, 1st Session. McPherson,

_History of Reconstruction_, pp. 84-93.

[111] Gillet, _Democracy in the United States_, pp. 318-20.

[112] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 39th Congress, pp. 9, 10, 351.

[113] _Ibid._, 141-2, 232. For general discussions and summaries of the

debates on the 14th Amendment, see Wilson, _Rise and Fall of the Slave

Power in America_, iii, 647-660; Wilson, _History of Reconstruction_,

218-266; Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 193-214.

[114] The vote was: yeas, 120; nays, 46.

[115] _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 2459.

[116] Yeas, 128, nays, 37.

[117] On May 29, _Congressional Globe_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p.

2869.

[118] See Pollard's _Lost Cause Regained_, p. 74.

[119] _Senate Journal_, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 502.

[120] On the reorganization of Tennessee, see Blaine, _Twenty Years of

Congress_, ii, 50-52, 214-17; Cox, _Three Decades of Federal Legislation_.

[121] _House Reports_, No. 30, pt. 1; McPherson, _History of the

Reconstruction_, pp. 105-6.

[122] Ratified by the Senate July 11, yeas, 15, nays, 6; by the House July

12, yeas, 43, nays, 11. Tennessee was the third State to ratify the

amendment, Connecticut and New Hampshire being the first two.

[123] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, pp. 151-4.

[124] Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 219-220.

[125] The Congressional committee of investigation, appointed at the

beginning of the 2d session, in December, submitted a detailed report of

the riots. See _House Reports_, No. 16, 2d Session, 39th Congress. See

also Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 233-237.

[126] _House Reports_, No. 16, 39th Congress, 2d Session, p. 26.

[127] See below for an account of this canvass.

[128] _House Reports_, No. 16, 39th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 24-27;

McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 137.

[129] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 118, 119; Blaine,

_Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 220-223.

[130] Among these Republicans were Thurlow Weed, Edgar Cowan, James R.

Doolittle, A. W. Randall, O. H. Browning, James Dixon, Henry J. Raymond,

R. S. Hale, J. A. Dix, Marshall O. Roberts and Montgomery Blair.

[131] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 240-1.

[132] Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 222.

[133] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 127.

[134] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 129. This manner of

indicating his disinterestedness caused great offense in some quarters.

See the account below of the Pittsburg convention of soldiers and sailors

of September 26.

[135] See Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 237-239.

[136] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 130.

[137] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 131, 132.

[138] McPherson, 135. The following is a good example of the manner in

which Johnson lowered himself to the level of the disorderly element, who

made a bedlam out of some of the meetings he attended. The extract is from

the Cleveland speech: "Who can come and place his finger on one pledge I

ever violated, or one principle I ever proved false to? (A voice, 'How

about New Orleans?' Another voice, 'Hang Jeff Davis.') Hang Jeff Davis, he

says. (Cries of 'No' and 'Down with him!') Hang Jeff Davis, he says. (A

voice, 'Hang Thad. Stevens and Wendell Phillips.') Hang Jeff Davis. Why

don't you hang him? (Cries of 'Give us the opportunity.') Have you not got

the court? Have not you got the Attorney General? (A voice, 'Who is your

Chief Justice who has refused to sit upon the trial?' Cheers.) I am not

the Chief Justice. I am not the prosecuting attorney. (Cheers.) I am not

the jury.

"I will tell you what I did do. I called upon your Congress that is trying

to break up the government. (Cries, 'You be d--d!' and cheers mingled with

hisses. Great confusion. 'Don't get mad, Andy.') Well, I will tell you who

is mad. 'Whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad.' Did your

Congress order them to be tried? ('Three cheers for Congress')," etc.

[139] Tennessee, Texas, Georgia, Missouri, Virginia, North Carolina and

Alabama were represented among the signers to the call.

[140] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 124.

[141] Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 224-228.

[142] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 241, 242.

[143] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 242.

[144] The address was prepared by Senator Creswell, of Maryland. See

Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 223-228.

[145] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 243; Blaine, _Twenty

Years of Congress_, ii, 228-230.

[146] Blaine, _Twenty Years of Congress_, ii, 230-233.

[147] General John A. Logan was first chosen president, but was unable to

attend.

[148] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 242, 243.

[149] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 140.

[150] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 194.

[151] Scott, _Reconstruction during the Civil War_, 290 ff.

[152] _House Journal_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 12-23; McPherson,

_History of the Reconstruction_, 143-147.

[153] _House Journal_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 15.

[154] The resolution passed the House on December 4, and the Senate on

December 5. _House Journal_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 30; _Senate

Journal_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 22.

[155] _Senate Journal_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 202.

[156] _House Journal_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 345.

[157] _Congressional Globe_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 1074.

[158] _Congressional Globe_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 1076.

[159] _Congressional Globe_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 1360.

[160] _Ibid._, 1381-2.

[161] _Ibid._, 1360.

[162] _Congressional Globe_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 1399.

[163] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 192.

[164] _House Journal_, 2d Session, 39th Congress, 563-572.

[165] Act of January 22, 1867.

[166] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 40th Congress, 13.

[167] The Committee on the Judiciary was instructed on March 7 to report a

supplementary bill (_Congressional Globe_, 17), and the Wilson bill was

accordingly reported by it.

[168] _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 40th Congress, 302-3; 313-14.

[169] _Congressional Globe_, appendix, 1st Session, 40th Congress, 39;

McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 192.

[170] Except in Virginia, where the number was modified in proportion to

the change made by the separation of West Virginia.

[171] By the act of that date all persons elected or appointed to any

office under the government of the United States were required to take the

following oath previous to entering upon the duties of such office: "I, A.

B., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have never voluntarily borne arms

against the United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have

voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to

persons engaged in armed hostility thereto; that I have neither sought nor

accepted nor attempted to exercise the functions of any office whatever,

under any authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United

States; that I have not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended

government, authority, power or constitution within the United States,

hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear (or affirm) that, to

the best of my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the

Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and

domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I

take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of

evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the

office on which I am about to enter, so help me God."

[172] Appendix, _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 40th Congress, 39, 40.

[173] Johnson, _Reconstruction_, in Lalor, iii, 552; Cox, _Three Decades

of Federal Legislation_, 378.

[174] _Congressional Globe_, appendix, 1st Session, 39th Congress, 43-4.

[175] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 335-6.

[176] Stanbery had ruled that the willingness of an applicant to take the

oath must be regarded as final evidence of his qualification to register.

Thus those notoriously incapacitated from taking the oath honestly, could

not be prevented from registering. This additional power virtually enabled

the boards of registration to exercise their own discretion as to whom

they should enroll.

[177] Scott, _Reconstruction during the Civil War_, 317 ff.

[178] Cox, _Three Decades of Federal Legislation_, 512-14.

[179] McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, 336-7.

[180] McPherson, 190.

[181] Dunning, in _Papers of the American Historical Association_, iv,

473; _Congressional Globe_, 1st Session, 40th Congress, p. 565.

[182] McPherson, 264.

[183] _Ibid._, 178.

[184] McPherson, 178.

[185] Vetoed March 2, 1867, and repassed by both houses on the same day.

For copy of the act, see McPherson, 176 ff.

[186] His argument here, however, is weak, as the power of suspension

would easily have covered all such cases.

[187] _Ex parte_ Hennen, January, 1839, 13 Peters, 139.

[188] McPherson, 261.

[189] _Ibid._, 262.

[190] The text of the correspondence between Grant and Johnson may be

found in McPherson, _History of the Reconstruction_, p. 282 ff.

[191] McPherson, p. 283.

[192] _Ibid._, p. 284.

[193] McPherson, 265. The fact also that Grant had refused to be governed

by Johnson's instructions made the attempt still less serious.

[194] See Dunning, _Papers American Historical Association_, 1890, p. 481.

[195] McPherson, 266. The vote was 128 to 47, divided strictly on party

lines.

[196] For the full text of the eleven articles, see McPherson, 266 ff. For

a critical discussion of the legal points involved in the trial, see

Dunning, in _Papers American Historical Association_, iv, 483 ff.

Transcriber's Notes:

Passages in italics are indicated by _italics_.

Foonote 80 appears on page 58 of the text, but there is no corresponding

marker on the page.

Punctuation has been corrected without note.

The following misprints have been corrected:

"propsed" corrected to "proposed" (page 23)

"Constution" corrected to "Constitution" (page 26-27)

"reconstructon" corrected to "reconstruction" (page 48)

"or" corrected to "for" (page 50)

"join tcommittee" corrected to "joint committee" (page 53)

"falied" changed to "failed" (page 61)

"eqality" corrected to "equality" (page 77)

"resolulutions" corrected to "resolutions" (page 93)

Other than the corrections listed above, inconsistencies in spelling and

hyphenation have been retained from the original.

The Struggle between President Johnson and Congress over Reconstruction · 第 6 / 6 章