CHAPTER IV.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866.

1. The four months following the adjournment of the first session of the

39th Congress were full of excitement. The public was thoroughly aroused,

and all incidents were considered in the light they threw upon the

question of the hour. The President's uncompromising hostility to the 14th

Amendment brought about a crisis in the Cabinet.[124] William Dennison,

Postmaster-General, was the first to declare the impossibility of

maintaining cabinet relations with the President. He resigned on July 11,

and A. W. Randall, of Wisconsin, First Assistant Postmaster-General, was

appointed in his place. Mr. Randall was a devoted adherent of the

administration, and president of the National Union Club which called the

convention of August 14. The second resignation was that of James Speed,

Attorney-General, on July 18. Coming from Kentucky, Mr. Speed had had the

reputation of being quite conservative in his views regarding

reconstruction, and his formal notice of separation from the President

created no little excitement. His intimate connection with the

administration gave unusual force to his denunciation of its policy, made

at the time of taking the chair as permanent president of the convention

of Southern loyalists. Henry Stanbery of Ohio was appointed as his

successor, and retained his position until he resigned to assist in the

defense of the President in the impeachment trial. A few days after Mr.

Speed's withdrawal, the Secretary of the Interior, James Harlan, tendered

his resignation, and O. H. Browning, of Illinois, was appointed to fill

the vacancy.

It is altogether probable that these resignations would have been made

earlier than they were, had it not been feared that the control of these

important administrative departments would fall into the hands of those

who would use their powers in opposition to Congress. But the time had

come when the incumbents considered that by the retention of the offices

they were being forced to share the odium attached to the President, and

deemed total separation from him as the best method of justification.

The laws discriminating against the colored man, and the numerous

instances of cruelty which had been reported to the North, were an

important factor in creating and sustaining the common feeling of

hostility to the administration. But the New Orleans riots, occurring on

July 30, did more to rouse the people of the North, and convince them that

stern measures were necessary, than all that had preceded. The massacre

stood out vividly against the background of "black laws," and furnished an

argument of the most effective kind to be used in the campaign.

2. The riots were of a peculiarly exasperating character. The

constitutional convention of 1864, summoned by the proclamation of Major

General Banks, had passed resolutions giving the president of the

convention power "to reconvoke the convention for any cause." A majority

of the members came to the conclusion, in the spring of 1866, that the

State constitution should be amended, to place it in harmony with the

congressional policy.[125] They determined to have the convention

reconvoked for this purpose. The president, Judge E. H. Durell, declined

to take advantage of his prerogative, but the delegates, not to be

thwarted in this way, proceeded to elect a president _pro tem._ who was

willing to issue the desired proclamation. The governor of the State, J.

M. Wells, concurred in this rather questionable procedure, and issued a

proclamation for an election to fill existing vacancies.

It being well understood that negro suffrage was one of the ultimate

objects desired by the supporters of the proposed constitutional

convention, active hostility to the movement rapidly developed. The

proclamation of the president _pro tem._ called for the assembling of the

delegates on July 30; and though the only object of this meeting was to

determine officially the existing vacancies to be filled in the fall

elections, the enemies to the enfranchisement of the freedmen determined

to crush the movement in its incipient stage. It is an easy matter to stir

up the passions and prejudices of the people, and the indiscreet speeches

of certain of the delegates only added to the popular excitement. A negro

procession organized in honor of the convention was attacked by a mob in

front of Mechanics' Hall, where the convention was in session. The attack

was soon extended to the hall itself, the police of the city joining hands

with the assailants. When the riot was over nearly two hundred persons

were found to have been killed or wounded, the greatest sufferers being

the negroes, who were shot down in front of the hall without mercy.

The flagrancy of the act, the connivance of the city authorities, and the

fact that, while legal steps were taken against the delegates and innocent

spectators, the actual murderers were in no way molested, furnished to the

people of the incensed North ample proof of the inability of the South to

maintain local government, and of the advisability of refusing to restore

these States to their former position in the Union. New Orleans was taken

as a fair example of what might happen at any place in the South. There

was no satisfactory justification for these acts of violence, and there

was little inclination in the North to consider the legal technicalities

involved in the attempt to amend the constitution of Louisiana. They

simply took cognizance of the fact that about fifty loyal citizens had

been murdered in cold blood, with the city authorities silently

acquiescing. In the face of such a fact, the solicitude of the President

to preserve the "inherent rights of the States" did not appeal to the

masses, and Johnson was forced to begin his campaign badly handicapped.

But, in addition to the blow given to the theory of the administration,

Johnson was forced to labor against a certain amount of personal censure,

brought about by his supposed attitude before the riots and his known

attitude after them. It was freely charged that he was in full sympathy

with the determination of the Mayor of New Orleans, and the

Lieutenant-Governor and Attorney-General of Louisiana, to prevent the

convention from accomplishing its plans. In support of the charge, his

answer to the inquiry as to whether the military power would interfere

with the attempt to arrest the members of the convention upon criminal

process was cited. His reply was as follows:[126] "The military will be

expected to sustain, and not to obstruct or interfere with the proceedings

of the court." While this may have indicated too great confidence in the

civil authorities of Louisiana, it certainly did not imply any connivance

in or sympathy with the summary proceeding of July 30. Possibly the

well-known opposition of Johnson to negro suffrage may have stimulated the

rioters to bolder defiance of Northern sentiment, but censure of him can

extend no farther. But, in his political canvass in the fall,[127] while

endeavoring in every way to discredit the 39th Congress in the eyes of the

people, he committed a grave error by an indirect defense of the rioters,

attacking the members of the convention as traitors who incited the negro

population to rioting, and throwing the responsibility of the whole affair

back upon Congress as having originated and fostered the plan to force

negro suffrage upon Louisiana.[128]

3. The fall campaign was formally opened by the supporters of the

presidential policy, who had immediately accepted the report of the

Committee on Reconstruction as the platform of the Republican

anti-administration faction, and had determined to appeal on that issue to

the people. Their hope was that the conservative element of the

population, thoroughly worn out by the struggle, would uphold the speedy

restoration of the Southern States, and that thereby a coalition might be

made between the Democrats and the administration Republicans strong

enough to unseat many of the radical members, reverse the majority, and so

give the administration control in the 40th Congress.

The first steps were promptly taken. The executive committee of the

National Union Club, a political organization established in Washington by

supporters of the administration, issued on June 25, just one week after

the submission of the report of the Committee on Reconstruction, a call

for a national convention to be held in Philadelphia on August 14.[129]

Delegates to this convention were to be chosen by those supporting the

administration and agreeing to certain "fundamental propositions" which

formed the platform of the conservatives. These propositions maintained

the absolute indissolubility of the Union, the universal supremacy of the

Constitution and acts of Congress in pursuance thereof, the constitutional

guarantee to maintain the rights, dignity and equality of the States, and

the right of each State to prescribe the qualifications of electors,

without any federal interference. They declared that the usurpation and

centralization of powers infringing upon the rights of the States "would

be a revolution, dangerous to republican government, and destructive of

liberty;" that the exclusion of loyal senators and representatives,

properly chosen and qualified under the Constitution and laws, was unjust

and revolutionary; that as the war was at an end, "war measures should

also cease, and should be followed by measures of peaceful

administration;" and that the restoration of the rights and privileges of

the States was necessary for the prosperity of the Union. This formal call

was approved, and its principles endorsed by the Democratic congressmen,

who issued an address to the "People of the United States" on July 4,

urging them to act promptly in the selection of delegates to the

convention.

In accordance with the call, every State and Territory was represented in

the convention. A glance at the list of delegates shows that they included

many of the prominent Democrats of the country, re-enforced by a number of

the prominent Republicans[130] who were in sympathy with the

administration. The enthusiastic manner in which the summons was answered

seemed to the friends of the administration to indicate an unquestionable

overthrow of the radicals. They thought that harmony was soon to reign

over all portions of the Union, which was once more being drawn closely

together by the watchword "National Union."

Reverdy Johnson, who had submitted in the Senate the minority report of

the Committee on Reconstruction, was chosen chairman, and Senator Cowan,

of Pennsylvania, chairman of the committee on resolutions. The resolutions

were reported on August 17, and unanimously adopted by the convention.

They re-affirmed the fundamental principles set forth in the call of June

25, and appealed to the people of the United States to elect none to

Congress but those who "will receive to seats therein loyal

representatives from every State in allegiance to the United States." They

reiterated the claim that in the ratification of constitutional amendments

all the States "have an equal and an indefeasible right to a voice and

vote thereon." In concession to Northern sentiment, they declared that the

South had no desire to re-establish slavery; that the civil rights of the

freedmen were to be respected, the rebel debt repudiated, the national

debt declared sacred and inviolable, and the duty of the government to

recognize the services of the federal soldiers and sailors admitted. A

final resolution commended the President in the highest terms, as worthy

of the nation, "having faith unassailable in the people and in the

principles of free government."[131]

These views were fully elaborated in an address prepared by Henry J.

Raymond, and read before the convention. Little attempt was made to

qualify or render less offensive the argument that the Southern States

must be allowed their representation in Congress, whether or not such

action was for the best interest of the Union. Referring to this the

address declared that "we have no right, for such reasons, to deny to any

portion of the States or people rights expressly conferred upon them by

the Constitution of the United States." We should trust to the ability of

our people "to protect and defend, under all contingencies and by

whatever means may be required, its honor and welfare."[132]

A committee of the convention hastened formally to present its proceedings

to President Johnson, who had taken the keenest interest in the plans of

the National Union party. In his remarks to the committee he feelingly

referred to the somewhat theatrical entrance of the delegates of South

Carolina and Massachusetts, "arm in arm, marching into that vast

assemblage, and thus giving evidence that the two extremes had come

together again, and that for the future they were united, as they had been

in the past, for the preservation of the Union." Speaking to a sympathetic

audience, who applauded him to the echo, and believing that the people

were now endorsing his opposition to Congress, he saw no necessity for

tempering his statements, and cast aside his discretion. His

characterization of Congress was as follows: "We have witnessed, in one

department of the government, every endeavor to prevent the restoration of

peace, harmony and union. We have seen hanging upon the verge of the

Government, as it were, a body called, or which assumes to be, the

Congress of the United States, while in fact it is a Congress of only a

part of the States. We have seen this Congress pretend to be for the

Union, when its every step and act tended to perpetuate disunion and make

a disruption of the States inevitable. Instead of promoting reconciliation

and harmony, its legislation has partaken of the character of penalties,

retaliation and revenge. This has been the course and policy of one

portion of the Government."[133] Again, to show the disinterestedness of

his own course, he said: "If I had wanted authority, or if I had wished to

perpetuate my own power, how easily could I have held and wielded that

power which was placed in my hands by the measure called the Freedmen's

Bureau bill (laughter and applause). With an army, which it placed at my

discretion, I could have remained at the capital of the nation, and with

fifty or sixty millions of appropriations at my disposal, with the

machinery to be unlocked by my own hands, with my satraps and dependents

in every town and village, with the Civil Rights bill following as an

auxiliary (laughter), and with the patronage and other appliances of the

Government, I could have proclaimed myself dictator." ("That's true!" and

applause.)[134]

But his indiscretions did not end with speeches before his sympathizers.

Two weeks later he started on a trip, nominally to assist in the ceremony

of laying the cornerstone of the Douglas monument in Chicago.[135] As a

matter of fact, however, he was merely taking advantage of an opportunity

to defend his policy publicly. Johnson was of too impassioned a nature to

be able to judge as to how far the President of the United States could

afford to adopt the methods of the stump speaker. All constraint was

thrown away, and he acted at many times the part most natural to him, that

of a popular orator addressing the masses. His speeches at no time lacked

clearness. All could see where he stood, and nothing was left for

speculation.

His first important effort while on his journey was at New York on August

29, where he responded to a toast proposed by the mayor of the city. In

this speech he defined the issue as follows: "The rebellion has been

suppressed, and in the suppression of the rebellion it [the government]

has * * * established the great fact that these States have not the power,

and it denied their right, by forcible or peaceable means, to separate

themselves from the Union. (Cheers, 'Good!') That having been determined

and settled by the Government of the United States in the field and in one

of the departments of the government--the executive department of the

government--there is an open issue; there is another department of your

government which has declared by its official acts, and by the position of

the Government, notwithstanding the rebellion was suppressed for the

purpose of preserving the Union of the States and establishing the

doctrine that the States could not secede, yet they have practically

assumed and declared and carried up to the present point, that the

Government was dissolved and the States were out of the Union. (Cheers.)

We who contended for the opposite doctrine years ago contended that even

the States had not the right to peaceably secede; and one of the means and

modes of possible secession was that the States of the Union might

withdraw their representatives from the Congress of the United States, and

that would be practical dissolution. We denied that they had any such

right. (Cheers.) And now, when the doctrine is established that they have

no right to withdraw, and the rebellion is at an end * * * we find that in

violation of the Constitution, in express terms as well as in spirit, that

these States of the Union have been and still are denied their

representation in the Senate and in the House of Representatives."[136]

Then, speaking of the people of the South: "* * Do we want to humiliate

them and degrade them and drag them in the dust? ('No, no!' Cheers.) I say

this, and I repeat it here to-night, I do not want them to come back to

this Union a degraded and debased people. (Loud cheers.) They are not fit

to be a part of this great American family if they are degraded and

treated with ignominy and contempt. I want them when they come back to

become a part of this great country, an honored portion of the American

people."[137]

Another representative speech was the one which he made in Cleveland on

September 3: "I tell you, my countrymen, I have been fighting the South,

and they have been whipped and crushed, and they acknowledge their defeat

and accept the terms of the Constitution; and now, as I go around the

circle, having fought traitors at the South, I am prepared to fight

traitors at the North. (Cheers.) God willing, with your help we will do

it. (Cries of 'We won't.') It will be crushed North and South, and this

glorious Union of ours will be preserved. (Cheers.) I do not come here as

the Chief Magistrate of twenty-five States out of thirty-six. (Cheers.) I

came here to-night with the flag of my country and the Constitution of

thirty-six States untarnished. Are you for dividing this country? (Cries

of 'No.') Then I am President, and I am President of the whole United

States. (Cheers.)"[138]

Speeches of this nature, coming at a time when the outrages in the South

had so greatly incensed the North, had a most depressing influence upon

the fortunes of the National Union party, and failed utterly in the object

for which they were intended. The trip proved to be a grave political

mistake. The undignified spectacle of a President receiving coarse

personal abuse and retorting in scarcely less coarse expressions was

quickly taken advantage of by his opponents; and the phrase "swinging

around the circle" has assumed historic dignity as a description of his

journey.

4. The "off year" national convention plan adopted by the National Union

Club was immediately accepted by the congressional party, which was no

less active in preparations for the struggle. On July 4, the same day on

which the Democratic congressmen issued their address to the people,

representative Southern Unionists,[139] supporters of Congress, issued a

call to "the Loyal Unionists of the South," for a convention to be held in

Philadelphia on September 3.[140] The call stated that the convention was

"for the purpose of bringing the loyal Unionists of the South" into

conjunction with the true friends of republican government in the North.

"* * The time has come when the restructure of Southern State government

must be laid on constitutional principles. * * * We maintain that no

State, either by its organic law or legislation, can make transgression on

the rights of the citizen legitimate. * * * Under the doctrine of 'State

sovereignty,' with rebels in the foreground, controlling Southern

legislatures, and embittered by disappointment in their schemes to destroy

the Union, there will be no safety for the loyal element of the South. Our

reliance for protection is now on Congress, and the great Union party that

has stood and is standing by our nationality, by the constitutional

rights of the citizen, and by the beneficent principles of the

government."

The convention met at the time appointed, with representatives present

from all the lately insurrectionary States.[141] James Speed of Kentucky,

Attorney-General until July 18, was elected permanent chairman. For

purposes of co-operation, the Northern States had been invited to send

delegations, and all responded. Thus the convention was as truly national

as the "National Union" convention of August 14 had been. It was decided,

however, that for the purpose of rendering the declaration of the Southern

Unionists more significant, the Northern and Southern Unionists should

hold their sessions separately, and Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania was

accordingly elected chairman of the Northern section.

The resolutions of the Southern section were reported by Governor Hamilton

of Texas, chairman of the committee on resolutions, and they naturally

endorsed the action of Congress in its entirety.[142] While demanding the

restoration of the States, they declared Johnson's policy to be "unjust,

oppressive, and intolerable," and that restoration under his "inadequate

conditions" would only magnify "the perils and sorrows of our condition."

They agreed to support Congress and to endeavor to secure the ratification

of the 14th Amendment. Congress alone had power to determine the political

status of the States and the rights of the people, "to the exclusion of

the independent action of any and every other department of the

Government." "The organizations of the unrepresented States, assuming to

be state governments, not having been legally established," were declared

"not legitimate governments until reorganized by Congress." In addition to

these resolutions, an address "from the loyal men of the South to their

fellow-citizens of the United States," was prepared and adopted after the

formal adjournment of the convention.[143] This reaffirmed, in far

stronger terms, the condemnation of President Johnson, specifying many

ways in which he had wrought injury to them, and closing with the

following significant and powerful declaration: "We affirm that the

loyalists of the South look to Congress with affectionate gratitude and

confidence, as the only means to save us from persecution, exile and death

itself; and we also declare that there can be no security for us or our

children, there can be no safety for the country against the fell spirit

of slavery, now organized in the form of serfdom, unless the Government,

by national and appropriate legislation, enforced by national authority,

shall confer on every citizen in the States we represent the American

birthright of impartial suffrage and equality before the law. This is the

one all-sufficient remedy. This is our great need and pressing

necessity."[144]

A third convention of the year was the Cleveland convention of soldiers

and sailors,[145] organized on September 17, with General Wood of the

regular army as chairman. This convention was composed of supporters of

the administration, and, like the National Union convention, contained a

considerable proportion of Democrats. The resolutions endorsed those of

the National Union convention, and declared that "our object in taking up

arms to suppress the late rebellion was to defend and maintain the

supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union with all the

dignity, equality, and rights of the States unimpaired."

The great mass of the soldiers, however, were earnest supporters of

Congress, and the results of the Cleveland convention were disappointing

to its originators; its principal effect was to create great enthusiasm

over the anti-administration convention of soldiers and sailors, which met

in Pittsburg on September 25 and 26.[146] This demonstration was intended

to offset whatever influence the Cleveland convention might have had over

the people, and it proved wonderfully effective. It was estimated that at

least twenty-five thousand old soldiers were in the city at the time. The

cause for this enthusiastic support is not difficult to find. The policy

of the administration appealed to the moderates--those who wished as rapid

a restoration to former conditions as possible, and those who were most

influenced by the appeal to so-called justice. The majority of the

soldiers, on the contrary, those who had made the greatest sacrifices for

their country, were the most sensitive concerning the results of their

sacrifices. Thoroughly accustomed to the thought of their great

accomplishments, the manumission of the slaves and the preservation of the

integrity of national power, they were keen to resent any steps which they

thought tended toward the annulling of these results. With this natural

bias, the arguments which the congressional party brought to bear upon

them were accepted with enthusiasm; and many of the leaders went into the

political campaign to be followed by the same soldiers who had followed

them through their military campaigns. The convention, however, was in no

sense a convention of officers. While the permanent president, Jacob D.

Cox, of Ohio,[147] had been a general of volunteers, the temporary

chairman, L. E. Dudley, had been a private, and the majority of the

offices of the convention were filled by men below the rank of

lieutenant.

As was to be expected from the nature of the convention, the feeling

against the administration was stronger and declared in more impassioned

tones than in the previous anti-administration convention. Its influence

upon the country was correspondingly greater. The army, recognized at this

time as the great preserver of the commonwealth, had great influence over

all classes of citizens. The anti-administration conventions, the New

Orleans massacre, and the violent attacks on Congress by the President

while "swinging around the circle," assured the triumph of the

congressional party.

The resolutions adopted at Pittsburgh were presented by General

Butler.[148] They were emphatic in tone, commencing with the declaration

that "the action of the present Congress in passing the pending

constitutional amendment is wise, prudent, and just," and that it was

unfortunate that it was not received in the proper spirit, the terms being

the mildest "ever granted to subdued rebels." The President's policy was

declared to be "as dangerous as it is unwise," and "if consummated it

would render the sacrifices of the nation useless." The power "to pass all

acts of legislation that are necessary for the complete restoration of the

Union" was declared to rest in Congress. The declaration of the President

to the committee of the National Union convention, that he could have made

himself dictator through the Freedmen's Bureau, aided by the army and

navy, was characterized as an insult to "every soldier and sailor in the

Republic." The obligation of the soldiers and sailors to the loyal men of

the South was acknowledged; and it was added: "We will stand by and

protect with our lives, if necessary, those brave men who remain true to

us when all around are false and faithless."

This, the most successful of the four conventions, completed the

remarkable series of national gatherings organized for effect on the State

elections. They were all characterized by frankness of statement, and by

clear recognition of the points at issue. But, as frequently happens in

political campaigns, the most important incidents were those which were

not designed to affect national issues. The riot at New Orleans was

intended, by its participants, to affect only Louisiana politics, yet all

the Southern States were compelled to share the responsibility. The same

thing was true of all other incidents through which the South manifested,

during these critical months, an unwillingness to accept the political

results of the war.

5. The fall elections resulted in a decisive victory for the congressional

policy, which secured a two-thirds majority in both houses. The protests

of the President were shown to lack popular support, and his vetoes in the

coming sessions were to be considered as merely one necessary step in the

legislative formality of passing a bill. The country had decreed that

Johnson could not have a voice in legislation. The campaign had been in

all respects disastrous to the President. The support which he had

received was mainly drawn from the Democratic party, and was of a

half-hearted nature; for, however nearly they agreed in theory, the fact

still remained that he was nominally a Republican President, and that

almost all of his patronage was bestowed upon Republicans. He had thrown

out decided hints that he would reverse his policy. For example, in St.

Louis, on September 8, he said: "I believe in the good old doctrine

advocated by Washington, Jefferson and Madison--of rotation in office.

These people who have been enjoying these offices seem to have lost sight

of this doctrine. I believe that one set of men have enjoyed the

emoluments of office long enough. They should let another portion of the

people have a chance. * * * Congress says he [the President] shall not

turn them out, and they are trying to pass laws to prevent it being done.

Well, let me say to you, if you will stand by me in this action (cheers),

if you will stand by me in trying to give the people a fair

chance--soldiers and citizens--to participate in these offices, God being

willing I will kick them out. * * * God willing, with your help, I will

veto their measures whenever any of them come to me."[149] But all this

failed to give him that which he prided himself so much on having, the

support of the people; and, so far as reconstruction was concerned, his

influence was ended by the fall elections of 1866.

6. While such was the general result of the campaign, the South voted to

sustain the President's policy. The fact that Johnson had taken direct

issue with Congress, and was actively supporting Democratic principles,

had a wonderful influence upon the South. The papers enthusiastically

prophesied the complete overthrow of the Republican party. They reasoned

that the enormous patronage of the President would ensure him a following

so powerful that its coalition with Democracy could not but result in

victory. Then, they reasoned, it would only be necessary to wait until the

convening of the 40th Congress, when the obnoxious amendment would be

discredited and the States readmitted to the possession of all their

rights and privileges without further delay or conditions. They utterly

failed to realize the injury which their discriminative legislation, the

New Orleans riots, the widely spread reports of cruelty and oppression,

and the defiant attitude of their press, had inflicted on their cause.

They only saw that the administration and Congress were estranged, and

believed that to be a sure indication of final success.

In this frame of mind they came to the polls, and in all the Southern

States overwhelming Democratic majorities evidenced the popular sentiment

among the dominant classes. Accordingly, when the State legislatures

convened, the 14th amendment was rejected almost unanimously in all except

Tennessee, which had ratified it in July. Delaware, Maryland and Kentucky,

the border Union States, also rejected the amendment, allying themselves

with the Southern cause. Twenty-one of the remaining twenty-four States

ratified the amendment, endorsing thereby the action of Congress.[150]

Iowa, Nebraska and California did not act upon the amendment at this time.

Had Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner been able to persuade Congress to

adopt their theory of the status of the Southern States, the amendment

would have been assumed to be a part of the Constitution, as twenty-one

States were more than three-quarters of twenty-seven, the total number of

States represented in Congress. But the majority of congressmen were never

able to adopt, in its entirety, the theory that the rebellion had utterly

destroyed the States and left them mere territory. It preferred to

accomplish the same result by less violent means. The legislation enacted

as a result of the attitude of the South towards the amendment practically

treated the States as conquered territory, yet they were counted in

determining the ratification of both the 13th and the 14th amendment.

The defiant attitude taken by the Southern legislatures was a grave

mistake. The most of them did not convene until Congress was again in

session, after the defeat of the administration, and when they should have

been able to see that their only hope was in submission. But the South,

ever too ready to act first and consider the consequences afterwards, only

saw in the proposed amendment an insult to the white race and an injustice

to their leaders. That they should be asked deliberately to inflict upon

themselves this punishment, seemed a humiliation which self-respect could

permit them only to spurn. They did not stop to realize that the rejection

of these terms would cause measures still more severe to be enacted.

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