CHAPTER II.

JOHNSON'S THEORY: THE EXPERIMENT, AND ITS RESULTS.

1. We have briefly reviewed the theories that obtained greater or less

consideration during the progress of the war, and have seen that plan had

been agreed upon by which the Southern States might resume their normal

relations with the rest of the Union. Two or three States had, it is true,

been nominally reconstructed under the provisions of the proclamation of

December 8, 1863, but their good faith was strongly suspected, and their

representatives were not able to secure recognition in Congress. The high

personal esteem in which President Lincoln was held had prevented general

demonstrations against his policy, but there was a wide-spread suspicion

that he was inclined to deal too leniently with a people who had brought

so much expense and misery upon the nation. The indignation of the North

had increased with the progress of the war, and the belief that the South

could be held in check only by the most stringent regulations and

requirements was held by many.

2. So long as armed rebellion existed the question of reconstruction was a

minor one, the attention of all being chiefly directed to the problem:

"How can this rebellion be crushed out, and the South made thoroughly to

realize that resistance is useless?" But when Andrew Johnson took the oath

of office the rebellion was virtually a thing of the past, and the giant

problem for the nation to solve during his administration was: "How shall

we treat these conquered States lying helpless, awaiting whatever fate

may be allotted them?" No other issue of importance served to offset it.

The whole nation was debating the question, and all were waiting to see in

what way the Executive would grapple with it.[38]

3. Those who feared that Lincoln had lacked sufficient firmness and had

been too tender hearted, believed that in Johnson the nation had as its

Executive a man with correct convictions and a strength of character which

ensured both the proper treatment of the South and the stability of the

Union. Johnson had an excellent record as military governor of Tennessee,

where his fearlessness and vigorous administration had given him a

reputation which brought to him the nomination of vice-president. From his

severity to the rebels while governor of Tennessee it was reasoned that he

would still remain severe and unyielding in his treatment of them as

President of the United States. He himself was always fond of alluding to

his past record as indicating his future course. Thus, only six days after

he took the oath of office, he said while addressing a delegation of

citizens of Indiana:[39] "In reference to what my administration will be,

while I occupy my present position, I must refer you to the past. You may

look back to it as evidence of what my course will be; * * * mine has been

but one straightforward and unswerving course, and I see no reason now why

I should depart from it. * * * My past is a better foreshadowing of my

future course than any other statement on paper that might be made."

Moreover, an examination of the speeches made by him during the war shows

the grounds on which the people were justified in expecting a severe

policy. An extract from an address delivered in Nashville, June 9, 1864,

shows his views at that time as to who should carry on the work of

reconstruction.[40] "In calling a convention to restore the State, who

shall restore and re-establish it? Shall the man who gave his influence

and his means to destroy the government * * * participate in the great

work of reorganization? * * * Traitors should take a back seat in the work

of restoration. If there be but five thousand men in Tennessee loyal to

the Constitution, loyal to freedom, loyal to justice, these true and

faithful men should control the work of reorganization and reformation

absolutely." Later on in the same speech he said, referring to the traitor

"born and reared among us:" "My judgment is that he should be subjected to

a severe ordeal before he is restored to citizenship. A fellow who takes

the oath merely to save his property, and denies the validity of the oath,

is a perjured man, and not to be trusted."

4. Emphatic statements such as these, often repeated, insisting that the

government of the States must be carefully kept in the hands of those

whose loyalty was above suspicion, and advocating severe ordeals for those

considered traitors, warranted the people of the nation in their faith in

his extreme devotion to a strong Union. Yet soon after his inauguration a

change in his attitude could be noticed. In his numerous speeches and

interviews he shifts his ground, very gradually at first, but soon meeting

the issue squarely, pledging himself to a policy which he faithfully

carried into execution, and which the candid student must recognize as

being thoroughly believed in by the President. Clemency towards the

masses, but severity towards the leaders of the rebellion, was his

attitude in his speech of April 21, above alluded to. He expressed his

views as follows:[41] "It is not promulgating anything I have not

heretofore said, to say that traitors must be made odious, that treason

must be made odious, that traitors must be punished and impoverished.

They must not only be punished, but their social power must be destroyed.

If not, they will still maintain an ascendency, and may again become

numerous and powerful; for, in the words of a former senator of the United

States, 'when traitors become numerous enough, treason becomes

respectable.' And I say that, after making treason odious, every Union man

and the Government should be remunerated out of the pockets of those who

have inflicted this great suffering upon the country. But do not

understand me as saying this in a spirit of anger, for, if I understand my

own heart, the reverse is the case; and while I say that the penalties of

the law, in a stern and inflexible manner, should be executed upon

conscious, intelligent and influential traitors--the leaders, who have

deceived thousands upon thousands of laboring men who have been drawn into

this rebellion--and while I say, as to the leaders, punishment, I also say

leniency, conciliation and amnesty to the thousands whom they have misled

and deceived."

As Johnson said, he promulgated nothing new in this statement of his

beliefs regarding the treatment of the South, save possibly a more

definite affirmation of clemency to the masses. In the Nashville speech of

June 9, 1864, he had still more emphatically urged extreme measures

towards the leaders.[42] "Treason must be made odious, and traitors must

be punished and impoverished. Their great plantations must be seized and

divided into small farms, and sold to honest, industrious men. The day for

protecting the lands and negroes of these authors of the rebellion is

past." Again on April 24, 1865, in an interview with a number of Virginia

refugees, he reiterated the necessity of severity. In this case, perhaps

owing to the nature of the interview, and the character of those to whom

he was speaking, he makes no distinction between the leaders and their

followers, his definition of treason apparently including all soldiers and

their abettors. In it he says:[43] "It is time that our people were taught

that treason is a crime, not a mere political difference, not a mere

contest between two parties, in which one succeeded and the other simply

failed. They must know it is treason; for if they had succeeded, the life

of the nation would have been reft from it, the Union would have been

destroyed. Surely the Constitution sufficiently defines treason. It

consists in levying war against the United States, and in giving their

enemies aid and comfort."

The great liberality with which, beginning with the following month, the

President used the pardoning power, and the extreme leniency with which

all the leaders were treated, were in striking contrast with these

sentiments. A situation was presented for Johnson to meet as President,

which necessitated modifications of views held by him as governor. His

attitude towards the leaders must be admitted to have undergone actual

modification, notwithstanding his claim a few months later that he simply

wished to make the leaders sue for pardon and realize the enormity of

their offence.

5. The real secret of the apparently strange development of his policy,

which we are about to trace out, lies in the fact that although at this

time nominally a Republican, he was in reality a strict constructionist.

He had always been a Democrat, and still held Democratic views. Only when

secession began to be urged by the southern branch of the Democracy, did

he break loose from his old ties. Accustomed to interpret the Constitution

from a strict constructionist standpoint, accustomed to the belief that

the power of the State was restricted only by the specific limitations of

the Constitution, and that the federal government could exercise no power

beyond that expressly granted it, he naturally treated the question of

reconstruction from the same standpoint. The surprising thing in Johnson's

career is the fact that in spite of his strict construction views, he was

strongly opposed to secession. He was therefore not strictly logical. The

extreme strict constructionist claimed that the fact that the Constitution

did not forbid a State from seceding, made secession constitutional. But

Johnson's love for the Union was too great to permit him to carry his

strict construction views to such an extreme. On the contrary, the fact

that the Constitution offered no way for a State to secede from the Union

proved to him that secession was unconstitutional, and he looked upon that

fact as one of the greatest safeguards for the protection of the

Commonwealth.[44] To his mind it logically followed that because secession

was unconstitutional, it was absolutely impossible for a State to secede,

and therefore equally impossible for a State to commit treason.

Individuals might commit treason and be punished therefor, but States

never. However strongly at any time he may have urged the punishment of

traitors, he never argued for or believed in the abrogation of any of the

State's privileges. His reputation for belief in severity was based

entirely upon severity on individuals. "Make treason odious" was his

favorite expression, but always used in a concrete sense.[45]

6. After his accession to the Presidency, the only modification of his

policy was an increased clemency to the conquered rebel. This can be

accounted for easily as the natural result of actual contact with the

problem. Rhetorically to assert that all traitors must be punished is one

thing--to apply the punishment is another. Then Johnson's most able

advisers approved his attitude and urged even greater moderation. Finally,

his firm faith in the success of his provisional governments persuaded him

to a still more liberal use of the pardoning power, while the growing

opposition of Congress added the element of stubbornness to the

complication. But, the true explanation of the change is to be found in

his general constitutional views.

So early as April 21 he frankly states his position. In his speech on

that day he says: "Provision" (in the Constitution) "is made for the

admission of new States; no provision is made for the secession of old

ones. * * * The Government is composed of parts, each essential to the

whole, and the whole essential to each part."[46] He emphatically urges

that the Constitution provides a panacea for rebellion. "The United States

(that is, the great integer) shall guarantee to each State (the integers

composing the whole) in this Union a republican form of government. Yes,

if rebellion has been rampant, and set aside the machinery of a State for

a time, there stands the great law to remove the paralysis and revitalize

it, and put it on its feet again." He also harmonizes his strict

construction views with the fact of emancipation. "A State may be in the

Government with a peculiar institution, and by the operation of rebellion

lose that feature; but it was a State when it went into rebellion, and

when it comes out without the institution it is still a State."

President Johnson did not allow many days to pass by after his

installation, before he began to give practical evidence of his attitude

towards the conquered South.[47] The first step which he made was an

order, issued April 29, restoring partial commercial intercourse to that

portion of the Confederate States lying east of the Mississippi river and

within the lines of national military occupation. This removed at the

outset one of the chief burdens that had resulted from the insurrection,

and would he thought act powerfully in the restoration of peaceful

pursuits in that section. The following August another proclamation

removed all remaining restrictions on trade in those States, declaring

that all necessity for restriction had ceased.[48]

On May 9, 1865, the order restoring the administration of the United

States in the State of Virginia was issued.[49] It authorized the

Secretary of the Treasury to nominate assessors of taxes, collectors of

customs, and other officers of the Treasury Department, and further

provided that in making appointments the preference should be given to

"qualified loyal persons residing within the districts where their

respective duties are to be performed. But if suitable persons shall not

be found residents of the districts, then persons residing in other States

or districts shall be appointed." Post offices and post routes were to be

established, and district judges empowered to hold courts, while "to carry

into effect the guarantee of the Federal Constitution of a republican form

of state government, * * * Francis H. Pierpiont, Governor of the State of

Virginia, will be aided by the Federal Government," in his administration

of the state government, in whatever way might be necessary.

The Amnesty Proclamation was issued on May 29, and was in effect a renewal

of the provisions of Lincoln's proclamation of December 8, 1863, relating

to amnesty; but it increased the number of classes excepted from the

benefits of the proclamation, from seven to fourteen,[50] and provided

that special application for pardon might be made by any of the excepted

classes, to the President, who would exercise liberal clemency. Inasmuch

as the excepted classes included all those whom less than three weeks

previously he had been denouncing as traitors to be punished and

impoverished, such great liberality, displayed in so short a time, was

somewhat surprising.[51] The proclamation further empowered the Secretary

of State to make all needful regulations for the administration and

recording of the amnesty oath; and in accordance with this provision the

Secretary of State ordered that the oath might be taken before any

commissioned officer of the United States, or before any civil or military

officer of a loyal State or Territory, who was legally qualified to

administer oaths.

On the same day that he issued the Amnesty Proclamation, President Johnson

appointed William W. Holden Provisional Governor of North Carolina.[52]

This was his first radical step in the carrying out of his policy of

reconstruction. The order restoring the authority of the United States in

Virginia was not of so great importance, as the State had nominally been

under the Pierpiont government since near the beginning of the war, and the

mere restoration of certain United States officers in that State did not

involve to any extent the vital questions of the hour.[53] But with the

appointment of Mr. Holden, and the instructions accompanying the order of

appointment, President Johnson unfolded, in its entirety, his theory.

The order declared that the rebellion, though now almost entirely

overcome, had deprived the people of North Carolina of all civil

government, and that accordingly the United States was constitutionally

bound to secure to them a republican form of government. Therefore for the

purpose of enabling the people to organize a government, he appointed

William W. Holden Provisional Governor of North Carolina, whose duty it

should be "at the earliest practicable period, to prescribe such rules and

regulations as may be necessary and proper for convening a convention,

composed of delegates to be chosen by that portion of the people of said

State who are loyal to the United States, and no others, for the purpose

of altering or amending the constitution thereof; and with authority to

exercise, within the limits of said state, all the powers necessary and

proper to enable such loyal people of the State of North Carolina to

restore said State to its constitutional relations to the Federal

government, and to present such a republican form of state government as

will entitle the State to the guarantee of the United States therefor, and

its people to protection by the United States against invasion,

insurrection, and domestic violence," provided, however, that all electors

should have previously taken the oath of allegiance, and should be voters

according to the law of North Carolina in force previous to secession. The

order further directed that the Provisional Governor should be aided by

the military power in carrying out the proclamation. The other clauses

were similar to clauses in the order re-establishing the authority of the

United States in Virginia.

Similar proclamations were issued as follows: June 13, for Mississippi;

June 17, for Georgia and Texas; June 21, for Alabama; June 30, for South

Carolina; July 13, for Florida.

Within three months after his inauguration, accordingly, Johnson had set

the forces going throughout the South by which he hoped that peace and

tranquillity might be established, and the Union once more become an

undivided whole. In the execution of this most important work, he had not

asked for the co-operation or advice of Congress. Confident of the

correctness of his ideas, feeling sure that they were only the logical

results of a true interpretation of the Constitution, he pursued his

policy of reconstruction. In so doing he was also consistently following

the path marked out by his predecessor. His plan was essentially that

which Lincoln had advocated and attempted to carry into execution. But we

have seen that even under a man enjoying such universal confidence as did

Lincoln, the country viewed with distrust, and Congress openly resented, a

policy which seemed to commit to a recently insurrectionary people the

whole responsibility for proper reconstruction, requiring from them no

surety for sincerity save an oath which all knew would be regarded by the

majority as a mere form with little significance. The same policy when

adopted by Johnson was naturally looked upon with still more suspicion.

Lincoln was a man of tact and judgment, who was capable of seeing and

confessing a mistake, whose sole object was to do that which, all things

being considered, should seem best for the Union.

Johnson, on the contrary, from his natural arbitrariness and narrowness,

was a man who held most tenaciously to his views, had little consideration

for the views of others, and who was always determined that his own way

should be carried out. Under such circumstances it would have been little

short of marvelous, had he been able to carry out a policy in itself

disliked, without sooner or later coming into collision with those who

disapproved his theory.

The provisional governors appointed were not slow in carrying out the

provisions of the proclamations, and conventions met in the various states

as follows: Mississippi, August 14; Alabama, September 12; South Carolina,

September 13; North Carolina, October 2; Georgia, October 25; Florida,

October 25; and Texas in March, 1866. In all these conventions the

secession ordinances were repealed, annulled or declared null and

void,[54] and slavery was declared abolished. All but Mississippi and

South Carolina repudiated the rebel debt, and all but Mississippi and

Texas ratified the 13th Amendment.

Meanwhile Johnson made liberal use of the pardoning power, and large

numbers of the excepted classes were thus restored to all the privileges

of citizens of the United States. The reconstruction was very rapid; so

rapid, as Johnson himself said, that he could scarcely realize it; "it

appears like a dream."

The extreme similarity of this method of reconstruction to that advocated

by the Democracy could not escape attention, and Democrats freely asserted

that in his ideas the President was "going over to them." This, while to a

certain extent true, for he was always a Democrat in principle, was

vigorously denied by Johnson in an interview with Geo. L. Stearns on

October 3, 1865. In it he claimed that the Democratic party, finding its

own views untenable, was gradually coming to adopt his principles, which

he reasserted in the following form: "The States are in the Union, which

is one and indivisible. Individuals tried to carry them out, but did not

succeed, as a man may try to cut his throat and be prevented by the

bystanders; and you can not say he cut his throat because he tried to do

it. * * * Now we want to reconstruct the state governments, and have the

power to do it. The state institutions are prostrated, laid out on the

ground, and they must be taken up and adapted to the progress of events;

this cannot be done in a moment. * * * We must not be in too much of a

hurry; it is better to let them reconstruct themselves than to force them

to do it; for if they go wrong the power is in our hands, and we can check

them in any stage, to the end, and oblige them to correct their errors; we

must be patient with them. I did not expect to keep out all who were

excluded from the amnesty, or even a large number of them; but I intended

they should sue for pardon, and so realize the enormity of the crime they

had committed."

7. Johnson realized that the sentiment in favor of negro suffrage was

gaining great power in the North; and while feeling that pure manhood

suffrage was undesirable and totally impracticable, because of the danger

of thereby creating a "war of races," which he seemed constantly to fear,

he determined to use his influence towards a gradual introduction of the

suffrage. He would give the suffrage to negroes who had served in the

army, to those who could read and write, and to those owning real estate

to the value of two hundred and fifty dollars. He made suggestions of this

nature in letters to Governor Starkey of Mississippi, and Governor Hahn of

Louisiana.[55] By some such limited suffrage he hoped that the radical

element in the North would be satisfied, while there could result no

danger to those States in which the negro population predominated.

He had long believed that the apportionment of Representatives should be

based on the number of qualified voters; while a member of the legislature

of Tennessee he had moved that the apportionment in that State be so made;

and in the interview with Mr. Stearns he said: "The apportionment is now

fixed until 1872; before that time we might change the basis of

representation from population to qualified voters, North as well as

South, and, in due course of time, the States, _without regard_ to color,

might extend the elective franchise to all who possessed certain mental,

moral or such other qualifications as might be determined by an

enlightened public judgment."[56]

But however desirable a limited suffrage might be, he insisted that the

only safety for the nation lay in leaving the whole subject to the

discretion of the individual State. The only approach which he would make

to national interference would be through constitutional amendment. In an

interview with Senator Dixon of Connecticut, on January 28, 1866, he

suggested that such an amendment might be worded in the following manner:

"Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States which may

be included within this Union according to the number of qualified voters

in each State.

"Direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be

included within this Union according to the value of all taxable property

in each State."[57]

The great advantage of an amendment of this kind, in President Johnson's

opinion, was that Congress would thus shift all responsibility regarding

negro suffrage to the States. Each State would determine the

qualifications for voters, and its representation in Congress would depend

entirely upon the narrowness or broadness of the suffrage.

In the same interview with Senator Dixon, he described the current

contention over negro suffrage as "ill-timed, uncalled for, and calculated

to do great harm."

8. While the President was expressing his belief in qualified

representation, and advising the States in process of reconstruction to

grant some form of limited suffrage, the States themselves manifested no

disposition to follow his advice. While he was describing them in October

as lying helpless, they were busy framing laws which were aimed to

counteract, so far as possible, the force of the emancipation

proclamation.

When Georgia declared slavery abolished she did so with the proviso that

"acquiescence in the action of the Government of the United States is not

intended to operate as a relinquishment, or waiver, or estoppel of such

claim for compensation of loss sustained by reason of the emancipation of

his slaves, as any citizen of Georgia may hereafter make upon the justice

and magnanimity of that Government."[58] Alabama, South Carolina, and

Florida in their ratifications of the 13th Amendment stated their

understanding to be that it did not confer upon Congress power to

legislate upon the political status of the freedman. The Alabama

legislature passed joint resolutions in which it was affirmed: "That

Alabama will not voluntarily consent to change the adjustment of political

power as fixed by the Constitution of the United States, and to constrain

her to do so, in her present prostrate and helpless condition, with no

voice in the councils of the nation, would be an unjustifiable breach of

faith."[59]

But most important of all was the legislation of these States respecting

the freedman. All were confronted by a host of emancipated blacks, whose

legal status had to be determined. The legislatures had before them work

of the most delicate nature, inasmuch as it not only vitally affected

every person in their own section, but also attracted the keenest interest

from the whole North. All realized that Johnson's policy would here

undergo the crucial test. Would the legislators of these States, so soon

thrown upon their own responsibility, show due consideration for the new

order of things, or would they take advantage of their opportunity and

proceed to draw the color line as sharply as ever, discriminating against

the negro, and denying him privileges which should be allowed him? Had

the South proved equal to the situation, the wisdom of Johnson's policy

would have been sustained, and the bitterness characteristic of the 39th

and 40th Congresses would have been avoided.

Mississippi was the first to adopt "black laws" obnoxious to the North.

Her vagrant act was passed November 24, 1865. This provided that freedmen

found with no lawful employment or business, or unlawfully assembling

together, should be deemed vagrants, and be fined and imprisoned at the

discretion of the court. A poll tax for a freedmen's pauper fund was to be

levied on all freedmen, and should any fail or refuse to pay, he was to be

hired out by the sheriff to any one who would pay the tax and costs,

preference being given to his former master. Two days later a civil rights

act was passed. This allowed freedmen to sue and be sued, implead and be

impleaded, and to own personal property, but added the important proviso

that the section should not be construed "to allow any freedman, free

negro or mulatto to rent or lease any lands or tenements, except in

incorporated towns or cities," where they should be controlled by the

corporate authorities. Intermarriage of a white with any freedman, free

negro or mulatto, should be punished by imprisonment in the state

penitentiary for life. A laborer quitting before expiration of term of

service without good cause, forfeited to his employer all wages for that

year up to the time of quitting. Any one was authorized to arrest and

return a deserting freedman, receiving therefor five dollars reward and

mileage, all costs to be paid from the wages of the deserter. Any one

persuading or attempting to persuade any freedman to desert his employer

before his term of service expired, was guilty of a misdemeanor, and

liable to a fine of not less than twenty-five and not more than two

hundred dollars, and if the offender attempted to persuade the freedman

to desert, with a view of employing him without the limits of the State,

the fine was to be not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars.

While it was made lawful for a freedman to charge a white man with a

criminal offence against his person or property, and to make all needful

affidavits, a supplementary act passed December 2 provided that where

sufficient proof was made before a court or jury that the arrest and trial

had been falsely or maliciously caused, the freedman should be fined, and

charged with all costs, and on failure to pay should be hired out at

public outcry for the shortest time necessary to discharge the debt. An

act passed November 29, among other restrictions, forbade freedmen to

carry any fire arms, ammunition, dirk or bowie knife, under penalty, and

declared that a freedman exercising the functions of a minister of the

gospel, without a license from some regularly organized church, should be

guilty of a misdemeanor, and become liable to an imprisonment not

exceeding thirty days and to a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars.

Similar laws were enacted in the other States, varying slightly in

severity of punishment. The labor contract act of Louisiana, passed in

December, is of especial interest as an evidence of the systematic way in

which the Southern legislators hoped to mould the unwieldy mass of

freedmen into a docile set of serfs. All agricultural laborers were

required by this act to make their contract for the ensuing year before

the tenth day of January; said contract to embrace the labor of the whole

family. After the contract had been agreed to, no laborer was to be

allowed to "leave his place of employment until the fulfillment of his

contract, unless by consent of his employer, or on account of harsh

treatment, or breach of contract on the part of employer," under penalty

of forfeiture of all wages to the time of leaving. "Failing to obey

reasonable orders, neglect of duty, and leaving home without permission,

will be deemed disobedience; impudence, swearing, or indecent language to

or in the presence of the employer, his family or agent, or quarreling or

fighting with one another, shall be deemed disobedience. For any

disobedience a fine of one dollar shall be imposed upon the offender. For

all lost time from work hours, unless in case of sickness, the laborer

shall be fined twenty-five cents per hour. For all absence from home

without leave the laborer will be fined at the rate of two dollars per

day."[60]

The cruelty and injustice possible in the administration of these acts is

even greater than their casual perusal would indicate. Many of these acts,

nominally applying to both races with equal severity, were in reality

intended to apply solely to the negro. The vagrants always proved to be

colored. The acts purporting to secure the protection of the freedmen were

cunningly hedged in by limitations which made them worthless. The employer

was made the sole judge of the acts of his employees--a privilege which

could not but be flagrantly abused. Laws that made it almost impossible

for the freedman to secure the just return for his labor, were followed by

laws punishing him for his poverty. The fines for his so-called offences

were excessively severe, and the punishments were almost always such as to

reduce him to slavery for limited terms. The whole system, taken advantage

of as it could not fail to be where the dominant classes were almost

unanimously desirous to retain the negro in subjection, resulted in his

practical slavery during those seasons of the year in which his labor was

most needed, and in utter neglect and lack of support when his labor was

not in demand.

9. Although the enactment of these stringent laws at this time was a

political mistake, and was fraught with most serious consequences for the

South, it is proper to notice what was said in their justification. Many

of them did not differ materially from similar statutes in the Northern

States. Even some of the harshest laws, those which were received with

wide-spread indignation throughout the North, could almost be duplicated

by laws at that time in force in such States as Rhode Island and

Connecticut. Even the phraseology, the using of the words master, mistress

and servant, which was deemed objectionable and suggestive by Northern

Republicans, could be found in Northern statutes.

The South felt confident that the negro was unable actively to assume the

duties of citizenship. The Southern people feared, and with reason, that

the immense mass of undeveloped humanity was liable to become turbulent

and unmanageable, unless stringent laws could be framed which would hold

it in check.[61] They were sincere in their statements that they believed

that the interests of property, peace and good order demanded these laws.

Unfortunately, the humanitarian ideas of the North harmonized too well

with the political ideas of Congress. The enactment of the laws against

the negro seemed to strike at the one and make possible the success of the

other. The radical majority were quick to see their advantage, and did not

hesitate to make the most of the opportunity. They assumed that the South

deliberately intended to defy Northern sentiment, and ignored the

possibility that the legislation in question was sincerely believed to be

a necessary act of self-defense.

10. To Stevens and his followers the South had proved its impenitent

condition, and had justified the most stringent measures of

reconstruction. They declared that Johnson's policy had been fairly tested

and that the results of the experiment were apparent. They argued that the

South, emboldened by the conciliatory conduct of the President, was

permitting the old rebel leaders to continue to wield the chief influence

in affairs of state. The exclusion of these leaders from participation in

the preliminary work of the reconstruction conventions was no check upon

their influence in the State, and with the completion of reconstruction

there was nothing to prevent them from occupying the chief state offices.

What the President in the previous April had feared, was coming to pass,

through his failure to do that which he had then said must be done--to

make treason and traitors odious. In proof of the ascendency of the old

elements, the highly questionable legislation of the South was cited, and

the conviction of the Republican party that sterner measures were

necessary was strengthened. As a natural result the doctrine of Thaddeus

Stevens that the South should be regarded and governed as a conquered

territory became practically the doctrine of the majority of Republicans,

and Stevens became the leader of the House of Representatives. The year

1865 had made plain the necessities of the hour, the condition of the

South, the attitude of the President, and in short had prepared the people

for the great struggle which was to follow in the 39th and 40th

Congresses.[62]

The Struggle between President Johnson and Congress over Reconstruction · 第 2 / 6 章