THE ECONOMIC CONFLICT OVER RATIFICATION AS VIEWED BY CONTEMPORARIES
Having discovered the nature of the social conflict connected with the
formation and adoption of the Constitution, and having shown the
probable proportion of the people who participated in the conflict and
the several group interests into which they fell, it is interesting,
though not fundamentally important, to inquire whether the leading
thinkers of the time observed the nature of the antagonisms present in
the process. A full statement of the results of such an inquiry would
require far more space than is at command in this volume; and
consequently only a few illustrative and representative opinions can be
given.
No one can pore for weeks over the letters, newspapers, and pamphlets of
the years 1787–1789 without coming to the conclusion that there was a
deep-seated conflict between a popular party based on paper money and
agrarian interests, and a conservative party centred in the towns and
resting on financial, mercantile, and personal property interests
generally. It is true that much of the fulmination in pamphlets was
concerned with controversies over various features of the Constitution;
but those writers who went to the bottom of matters, such as the authors
of _The Federalist_, and the more serious Anti-Federalists, gave careful
attention to the basic elements in the struggle as well as to the
incidental controversial details.
The superficiality of many of the ostensible reasons put forth by the
opponents of the Constitution was penetrated by Madison. Writing to
Jefferson, in October, 1788, he says: “The little pamphlet herewith
inclosed will give you a collective view of the alterations which have
been proposed by the State Conventions for the new Constitution. Various
and numerous as they appear, they certainly omit many of the true
grounds of opposition. The articles relating to Treaties, to paper
money, and to contracts, created more enemies than all the errors in the
system, positive and negative, put together.”[689]
Naturally the more circumspect of the pamphleteers who lent their
support to the new system were careful about a too precise alignment of
forces, for their strength often lay in the conciliation of opponents
rather than in exciting a more deep-seated antagonism. But even in such
conciliatory publications the material advantages to be expected from
the adoption of the Constitution are constantly put forward.
Take, for example, this extract from a mollifying “Address to the
Freemen of America” issued while the Convention was in the midst of its
deliberations: “Let the public creditor, who lent his money to his
country, and the soldier and citizen who yielded their services, come
forward next and contribute their aid to establish an effective federal
government. It is from the united power and resources of America only
that they can expect permanent and substantial justice.... Let the
citizens of America who inhabit the western counties of our states fly
to a federal power for protection [against the Indians].... Let the
farmer who groans beneath the weight of direct taxation seek relief from
a government whose extensive jurisdiction will enable it to extract the
resources of our country by means of imposts and customs. Let the
merchant, who complains of the restrictions and exclusions imposed upon
his vessels by foreign nations, unite his influence in establishing a
power that shall retaliate those injuries and insure him success in his
honest pursuits by a general system of commercial regulations. Let the
manufacturer and mechanic, who are everywhere languishing for want of
employment, direct their eyes to an assembly of the states. It will be
in their power only to encourage such arts and manufactures as are
essential to the prosperity of our country.”[690]
It is in the literature of the contest in the states where the battle
over ratification was hottest that we find the most frank recognition of
the fact that one class of property interests was in conflict with
another. This recognition appears not so much in attacks on opponents as
in appeals to the groups which have the most at stake in the outcome of
the struggle, although virulent abuse of debtors and paper money
advocates is quite common. Merchants, money lenders, public creditors
are constantly urged to support the Constitution on the ground that
their economic security depends upon the establishment of the new
national government.
Perhaps the spirit of the battle over ratification is best reflected in
the creed ironically attributed to each of the contending parties by its
opponents. The recipe for an Anti-Federalist essay which indicates in a
very concise way the class-bias that actuated the opponents of the
Constitution, ran in this manner: “Wellborn, nine times—Aristocracy,
eighteen times—Liberty of the Press, thirteen times repeated—Liberty of
Conscience, once—Negro slavery, once mentioned—Trial by jury, seven
times—Great Men, six times repeated—Mr. Wilson, forty times....—put them
altogether and dish them up at pleasure.”[691]
To this sarcastic statement of their doctrines, the Anti-Federalists
replied by formulating the “Political Creed of Every Federalist” as
follows: “I believe in the infallibility, all-sufficient wisdom, and
infinite goodness of the late convention; or in other words, I believe
that some men are of so perfect a nature that it is absolutely
impossible for them to commit errors or design villainy. I believe that
the great body of the people are incapable of judging in their nearest
concerns, and that, therefore, they ought to be guided by the opinions
of their superiors.... I believe that aristocracy is the best form of
government.... I believe that trial by jury and the freedom of the press
ought to be exploded from every wise government.... I believe that the
new constitution will prove the bulwark of liberty—the balm of
misery—the essence of justice—and the astonishment of all mankind. In
short, I believe that it is the best form of government which has ever
been offered to the world. I believe that to speak, write, read, think,
or hear any thing against the proposed government is damnable heresy,
execrable rebellion, and high treason against the sovereign majesty of
the convention—And lastly I believe that every person who differs from
me in belief is an infernal villain. AMEN.”[692]
MARSHALL’S ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT
It must not be thought that this antagonism of economic interests which,
in the language of controversy, frequently took on the form of a war
between “aristocracy” and “democracy” was observed only by partisans
whose views were distorted by the heat of battle. On the contrary, it
was understood by the keenest thinkers—in fact, one may say that the
more profound the wisdom of the observer, the clearer was his
comprehension of the issues at stake. Next to Madison, whose concept of
the Constitution-making process has already been fully discussed,[693]
John Marshall probably understood best the nature of the new instrument,
the social forces which produced it, and the great objects it was
designed to accomplish. In speaking from the bench, as Chief Justice, he
used, of course, the language of jurisprudence and spoke of the
Constitution as a creation of the whole people.[694] But as a historian
of great acumen, in which capacity he was not hampered by the
traditional language of the bench and bar, Marshall sketched with
unerring hand the economic conflict which led to the adoption of the
Constitution, and impressed itself upon the nature of that instrument.
In his masterly _Life of Washington_, he sets forth this conflict in
unmistakable terms:
1. In the first place, the mercantile interest was sorely tried under
the Articles of Confederation. There “was a general discontent with the
course of trade. It had commenced with the native merchants of the north
who found themselves incapable of contending in their own ports with
foreigners; and was soon communicated to others. The gazettes of Boston
contained some very animated and angry addresses which produced
resolutions for the government of the citizens of that town,
applications to their state legislature, a petition to congress, and a
circular letter to the merchants of the several sea ports throughout the
United States.... The merchants of the city of Philadelphia presented a
memorial to the legislature of that state, in which, after lamenting it
as a fundamental defect in the constitution that full and entire power
over the commerce of the United States had not been originally vested in
Congress ... they prayed that the legislature would endeavour to procure
from Congress a recommendation to the several states to vest in that
body the necessary powers over the commerce of the United States.”[695]
2. The public creditors had lost faith in the old government. “That the
debt of the United States should have greatly depreciated will excite no
surprise when it is recollected that the government of the Union
possessed no funds, and without the assent of jealous and independent
sovereigns could acquire none to pay the accruing interest; but the
depreciation of the debt due from those states, which made an annual and
adequate provision for the interest, can be ascribed only to a want of
confidence in the governments which were controlled by no fixed
principles; and it is therefore not entirely unworthy of attention. In
many of those states which had repelled every attempt to introduce into
circulation a depreciated medium of commerce or to defeat the annual
provision of funds for the payment of the interest, the debt sunk in
value to ten, five, and even less than four shillings in the pound.
However unexceptionable might be the conduct of the existing
legislature, the hazard from those which were to follow was too great to
be encountered without an immense premium.”
3. A profound division ensued throughout the United States based on
different views of the rights of property. “At length,” continues
Marshall, “two great parties were formed in every state which were
distinctly marked and which pursued distinct objects with systematic
arrangement. The one struggled with unabated zeal for the exact
observance of public and private engagements. By those belonging to it,
the faith of a nation or of a private man was deemed a sacred pledge,
the violation of which was equally forbidden by the principles of moral
justice and of sound policy. The distresses of individuals were, they
thought, to be alleviated only by industry and frugality, not by a
relaxation of the laws or by a sacrifice of the rights of others. They
were consequently the uniform friends of a regular administration of
justice, and of a vigorous course of taxation which would enable the
state to comply with its engagements. By a natural association of ideas,
they were also, with very few exceptions, in favor of enlarging the
powers of the federal government....
“The other party marked out for themselves a more indulgent course.
Viewing with extreme tenderness the case of the debtor, their efforts
were unceasingly directed to his relief. To exact a faithful compliance
with contracts was, in their opinion, a harsh measure which the people
would not bear. They were uniformly in favor of relaxing the
administration of justice, of affording facilities for the payment of
debts, or of suspending their collection, and of remitting taxes. The
same course of opinion led them to resist every attempt to transfer from
their own hands into those of congress powers which by others were
deemed essential to the preservation of the union. In many of these
states, the party last mentioned constituted a decided majority of the
people, and in all of them it was very powerful. The emission of paper
money, the delay of legal proceedings, and the suspension of the
collection of taxes were the fruits of their rule wherever they were
completely predominant.... Throughout the union, a contest between these
parties was periodically revived; and the public mind was perpetually
agitated with hopes and fears on subjects which essentially affected the
fortunes of a considerable proportion of society.”
4. Finally, so sharp was this division into two parties on the lines of
divergent views of property rights, that the Constitution, far from
proceeding from “the whole people,” barely escaped defeat altogether. So
positive is this statement by the great Chief Justice and so decidedly
does it contradict his juristic theory of the nature of the supreme law
that the two should be studied together. For this reason, the two views
enunciated by Marshall are printed in parallel columns:
“So balanced were the parties in “The government [of the United
some of them [the states] that States] proceeds directly from
even after the subject had been the people; it is ‘ordained and
discussed for a considerable time, established’ in the name of the
the fate of the constitution people; and it is declared to be
could scarcely be conjectured; ordained ‘in order to form a more
and so small in many instances, perfect union, establish justice,
was the majority in its favor, insure domestic tranquillity, and
as to afford strong ground secure the blessings of liberty’
for the opinion that, had the to themselves and to their
influence of character been posterity.... The government of
removed, the intrinsic merits of the Union then (whatever may be
the instrument would not have the influence of this fact on the
secured its adoption. Indeed it case) is, emphatically and truly,
is scarcely to be doubted that a government of the people. In
in some of the adopting states a form and substance it emanates
majority of the people were in from them. Its powers are granted
the opposition. In all of them, by them and are to be exercised
the numerous amendments which directly on them and for their
were proposed demonstrate the benefit.... It is the government
reluctance with which the new of all; its powers are delegated
government was accepted; and that by all; it represents all, and
a dread of dismemberment, not an acts for all.” Marshall, in
approbation of the particular McCulloch _vs._ Maryland (4
system under consideration, had Wheaton, 316), in 1819.
induced an acquiescence in it....
North Carolina and Rhode Island
did not at first accept the
constitution, and New York was
apparently dragged into it by a
repugnance to being excluded from
the confederacy.” Marshall, in his
_Life of Washington_, written
in 1804–07.
THE CONFLICT IN THE STATES
Turning aside from these more general observations on the nature of the
conflict over the ratification of the Constitution, let us now take up
the struggle in the several states and examine the views entertained by
some of the representative participants in it.
_New Hampshire._—That New Hampshire was rather sharply divided into an
“aristocratic” and a “country” party at the period of the adoption of
the Constitution was remarked by an observing Frenchman;[696] and the
New Hampshire Spy, published at Portsmouth, in the issue of October 27,
1787; aligns the mercantile and mechanical interest on the side of the
new Constitution; adding that the “honest farmer” can have no
objections, either. “The _honest man_,” runs the plea, “can have no
objection to a federal government, for while it obliges him to pay a
sacred regard to past contracts, it will eventually secure him in his
person and his property. The _mercantile interest_ have suffered enough
_to induce_ them to wish for, and espouse a federal reform.... The
_mechanical interest_ can have no aversion to it, when they are informed
that an efficient government will protect and encourage commerce, which
is the very soul of mechanism.... Nor can the _honest farmer_ have any
objection; the increase of commerce will naturally increase the demand
for such articles as he may have for sale; he will be enabled to pay his
taxes and, if economy shakes hands with industry, increase his farm and
live independent of troublesome creditors. Since then no one respectable
order of citizens can have any just reason to reject the new
Constitution, we may venture to conclude that none but _fools_,
_blockheads_, and _mad men_ will dare oppose it.”
_Massachusetts._—The contest over the Constitution in Massachusetts was
a sharp conflict between the personalty interests on the one hand and
the small farmers and debtors on the other, and this fact seems to have
been recognized by every thoughtful leader on both sides. This view of
the social struggle was set forth on so many occasions and by so many
eminent observers that it is difficult to select from the mass of
material the most typical statement of the situation. Perhaps that by
General Knox is not excelled for its clarity and conciseness. Writing to
Washington, January 14, 1788, a few days after the state convention had
begun its labors, he describes the alignment over ratification as
follows:
“There are three parties existing in that state [Massachusetts] at
present, differing in their numbers and greatly differing in their
wealth and talents.
“The 1st. is the commercial part of the state to which are added all the
men of considerable property, the clergy, the lawyers—including all the
judges of all the courts, and all the officers of the late army, and
also the neighborhood of all the great towns—its numbers may include
3/7ths of the state. This party are for vigorous government, perhaps
many of them would have been still more pleased with the new
Constitution had it been more analogous to the British Constitution.
“The 2d party are the eastern part of the state lying beyond New
Hampshire formerly the province of Main—This party are chiefly looking
towards the erection of a new state and the majority of them will adopt
or reject the new Constitution as it may facilitate or retard their
designs—this party 2/7ths.
“The 3d party are the Insurgents or their favorers, the great majority
of whom are for an annihilation of debts, public and private, and
therefore they will not approve the new Constitution—this party
2/7ths.”[697]
Several months before Knox had formulated this view of the conflict,
indeed, early in the struggle over ratification, the Federalist
agitators were busy with appeals to practical economic interests. The
Massachusetts Gazette of October 26, 1787, for example, contains a
letter signed by “Marcus” in which the groups likely to be affected
advantageously by the new Constitution are enumerated and an argument
directed to each of them: “It is the interest of the merchants to
encourage the new constitution, because commerce may then be a national
object, and nations will form treaties with us. It is the interest of
the mechanicks to join the mercantile interest, because it is not their
interest to quarrel with their bread and butter. It is the interest of
the farmer because the prosperity of commerce gives vent to his produce,
raises the value of his lands, and commercial duties will alleviate the
burden of his taxes. It is the interest of the landholder, because
thousands in Europe, with moderate fortunes will migrate to this country
if an efficient government gives them a prospect of tranquillity. It is
the interest of all gentlemen and men of property, because they will see
many low demagogues reduced to their tools, whose upstart dominion
insults their feelings, and whose passions for popularity will dictate
laws, which ruin the minority of creditors and please the majority of
debtors. It is the interest of the American soldier as the military
profession will then be respectable and Florida may be conquered in a
campaign. The spoils of the West Indies and South America may enrich the
next generation of Cincinnati. It is the interest of the lawyers who
have ability and genius, because the dignities in the Supreme Court will
interest professional ambition and create emulation which is not now
felt.... It is the interest of the clergy, as civil tumults excite every
passion—the soul is neglected and the clergy starve. It is the interest
of all men whose education has been liberal and extensive because there
will be a theatre for the display of talents.”
In fact, from the very beginning of the movement, the most eminent
advocates of a new system were aware of the real nature of the struggle
which lay before them. They knew that there was a deep-seated antagonism
between the “natural aristocracy” and the “turbulent democracy” which
was giving the government of Massachusetts trouble. Such an analysis of
the difficulty is set forth by Stephen Higginson, a leading Federalist
of Boston, in March, 1787: “The people of the interior parts of these
states [New England] have by far too much political knowledge and too
strong a relish for unrestrained freedom, to be governed by our feeble
system, and too little acquaintance with real sound policy or rational
freedom and too little virtue to govern themselves. They have become too
well acquainted with their own weight in the political scale under such
governments as ours and have too high a taste for luxury and dissipation
to sit down contented in their proper line, when they see others
possessed of much more property than themselves. With these feelings and
sentiments they will not be quiet while such distinctions exist as to
rank and property; and sensible of their own force, they will not rest
easy till they possess the reins of Government and have divided property
with their betters, or they shall be compelled by force to submit to
their proper stations and mode of living.”[698]
Discerning opponents of the Constitution, as well as its advocates, were
aware of the alignment of forces in the battle. Rufus King explained to
Madison in January, 1788, that the opposition was grounded on antagonism
to property rather than to the outward aspects of the new system.
“Apprehension that the liberties of the people are in danger,” he said,
“and a distrust of men of property or education have a more powerful
effect upon the minds of our opponents than any specific objections
against the Constitution.... The opposition complains that the lawyers,
judges, clergymen, merchants, and men of education are all in favor of
the Constitution—and for that reason they appear to be able to make the
worse appear the better cause.”[699]
The correctness of King’s observation is sustained by a vigorous writer
in the Boston Gazette and Country Journal of November 26, 1787, who
charges the supporters of the Constitution with attempting to obscure
the real nature of the instrument, and enumerates the interests
advocating its adoption. “At length,” says the writer, “the luminary of
intelligence begins to beam its effulgent rays upon this important
production; the deceptive mists cast before the eyes of the people by
the delusive machinations of its INTERESTED advocates begins to
dissipate, as darkness flies before the burning taper.... Those furious
zealots who are for cramming it down the throats of the people without
allowing them either time or opportunity to scan or weigh it in the
balance of their intelligences, bear the same marks in their features as
those who have been long wishing to erect an aristocracy in THIS
COMMONWEALTH—their menacing cry is for a RIGID government, it matters
little to them of what kind, provided it answers THAT description....
They incessantly declare that none can discover any defect in the system
but bankrupts who wish no government and officers of the present
government who fear to lose a part of their power.... It may not be
improper to scan the characters of its most strenuous advocates: it will
first be allowed that many undesigning citizens may wish its adoption
from the best motives, but these are modest and silent, when compared to
the greater number, who endeavor to suppress all attempts for
investigations; these violent partisans are for having the people gulp
down the gilded pill blindfolded, whole, and without any qualification
whatever, these consist generally, of the NOBLE order of C—s, holders of
public securities, men of great wealth and expectations of public
office, B—k—s and L—y—s: these with their train of dependents from
[form] the aristocratick combination.”
Probably the most reasoned statement of the antagonism of realty and
personalty in its relation to the adoption of the Constitution in
Massachusetts was made in the letters of “Cornelius” on December 11 and
18, 1787: “I wish,” he said, “there never might be any competition
between the landed and the mercantile interests, nor between any
different classes of men whatever. Such competition will, however,
exist, so long as occasion and opportunity for it is given, and while
human nature remains the same that it has ever been. The citizens in the
seaport towns are numerous; they live compact; their interests are one;
there is a constant connection and intercourse between them; they can,
on any occasion, centre their votes where they please. This is not the
case with those who are in the landed interest; they are scattered far
and wide; they have but little intercourse and connection with each
other.... I conceive a foundation is laid for throwing the whole power
of the federal government into the hands of those who are in the
mercantile interest; and for the landed, which is the great interest of
this country, to lie unrepresented, forlorn, and without hope. It
grieves me to suggest an idea of this kind: But I believe it to be
important and not the mere phantom of imagination, or the result of an
uneasy and restless disposition.”[700]
_Connecticut._—There was no such spirited battle of wits over
ratification in Connecticut as occurred in Massachusetts. Nevertheless,
Ellsworth, in that state, produced a remarkable series of essays in
support of the new Constitution which were widely circulated and read.
In these papers there is revealed a positive antagonism between
agrarianism and personalty, but an attempt is made at conciliation by
subtly blending the two interests. Ellsworth opens: “The writer of the
following passed the first part of his life in mercantile employments,
and by industry and economy acquired a sufficient sum on retiring from
trade to purchase and stock a decent plantation, on which he now lives
in the state of a farmer. By his present employment he is interested in
the prosperity of agriculture and those who derive a support from
cultivating the earth. An acquaintance with business has freed him from
many prejudices and jealousies which he sees in his neighbors who have
not intermingled with mankind nor learned by experience the method of
managing an extensive circulating property. Conscious of an honest
intention he wishes to address his brethren on some political subjects
which now engage the public attention and will in the sequel greatly
influence the value of landed property.”[701]
The fact that the essential implications of this statement about his
primary economic interests being those of a farmer are untrue does not
affect the point here raised: Ellsworth recognised that the opposition
was agrarian in character, and he simulated the guise of a farmer to
conciliate it. Later on Ellsworth classifies the opposition. In the
first rank he puts the Tories as leading in resisting the adoption of
the Constitution because it would embarrass Great Britain. In the second
class, Ellsworth puts those who owe money. “Debtors in desperate
circumstances,” he says, “who have not resolution to be either honest or
industrious will be the next men to take alarm. They have long been
upheld by the property of their creditors and the mercy of the public,
and daily destroy a thousand honest men who are unsuspicious. Paper
money and tender acts is the only atmosphere in which they can breathe
and live. This is now so generally known that by being a friend to such
measures, a man effectually advertises himself as a bankrupt.... There
is another kind of people who will be found in the opposition: Men of
much self-importance and supposed skill in politics who are not of
sufficient consequence to obtain public employment, but can spread
jealousies in the little districts of country where they are placed.
These are always jealous of men in place and of public measures, and aim
at making themselves consequential by distrusting everyone in the higher
offices of society.... But in the present case men who have lucrative
and influential state offices, if they act from principles of self
interest will be tempted to oppose an alteration which would doubtless
be beneficial to the people. To sink from a controulment of finance or
any other great departments of the state, thro’ want of ability or
opportunity to act a part in the federal system must be a terrifying
consideration.”[702]
Leaving aside the Tories and office-holders, it is apparent that the
element which Ellsworth considers the most weighty in the opposition is
the agrarian party. The correctness of his analysis is supported by
collateral pieces of evidence. Sharon, one of the leading paper money
towns which opposed the ratification of the Constitution in Connecticut
had voted to assist Shays and had repeatedly attempted to secure paper
emission legislation.[703] In a few letters and speeches against the
Constitution the plaintive note of the agrarian is discernible.
The opponents of the Constitution in Connecticut found no skilled
champions such as led the fight in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts; and
no such spirited discussion took place. The debates in the state
ratifying convention were not recorded (save for a few fragments); but
the contest in the legislature over the proposition to send delegates to
the Philadelphia Convention showed that the resistance came from the
smaller agrarian interests similar to those in Rhode Island and
Massachusetts which had stood against the whole movement.
Mr. Granger from Suffield was opposed to the proposition to send
delegates to Philadelphia because “he conceived it would be disagreeable
to his constituents; he thought the liberties of the people would be
endangered by it; ... and concluded by saying that he imagined these
things would have a tendency to produce a regal government in this
country.” Mr. Humphrey from the inland town of Norfolk sided with Mr.
Granger and “concluded by saying that he approved the wisdom and policy
of Rhode Island in refusing to send delegates to the convention and that
the conduct of that state in this particular, was worthy of imitation.”
Mr. Perkins of Enfield “was opposed to the measure and said that the
state would send men that had been delicately bred and who were in
affluent circumstances, that could not feel for the people in this day
of distress.”[704]
_New York._—When it is remembered that the greatest piece of
argumentation produced by the contest over ratification, _The
Federalist_, was directed particularly to the electorate in New York,
although widely circulated elsewhere, it will appear a work of
supererogation to inquire whether the leaders in that commonwealth
understood the precise nature of the social conflict which was being
waged.[705] Nevertheless, it may be worth while to present Hamilton’s
analysis of it. On the side of the Constitution, he placed the “very
great weight of influence of the persons who framed it, particularly in
the universal popularity of General Washington—the good will of the
commercial interest throughout the states which will give all its
efforts to the establishment of a government capable of regulating,
protecting, and extending the commerce of the Union—the good will of
most men of property in the several states who wish a government of the
Union able to protect them against domestic violence and the
depredations which the democratic spirit is apt to make on
property ...—a strong belief in the people at large of the insufficiency
of the present confederation to preserve the existence of the Union.”
Over against these forces in favor of the Constitution, Hamilton places
the antagonism of some inconsiderable men in office under state
governments, the influence of some considerable men playing the part of
the demagogue for their own aggrandizement;—“and add to these causes the
democratical jealousy of the people which may be alarmed at the
appearance of institutions that may seem calculated to place the power
of the community in a few hands and raise a few individuals to stations
of great preeminence.”[706]
_New Jersey_ and _Delaware_.—The speedy ratification of the Constitution
in these states gave no time for the development of a sharp antagonism,
even had there been an economic basis for it. In the absence of this
actual conflict over the Constitution we can hardly expect to find any
consideration of the subject by contemporary writers of note.[707]
_Pennsylvania._—The opposition between town and country, between
personalty and realty in other words, was so marked in this commonwealth
during the struggle over the ratification of the Constitution that it
was patent to all observers and was the subject of frequent and
extensive comment by leaders on both sides. On September 28, 1787, Tench
Coxe wrote to Madison describing the disturbance over the resolution in
the state legislature calling the ratifying convention, and after
reciting the events of the day he added, “It appears from these facts
that the Western people [i.e. the agrarians] have a good deal of
jealousy about the new Constitution and it is very clear that the men
who have been used to lead the Constitutional [or radical party][708]
are against it decidedly.”[709] A month later Coxe again writes to
Madison: “The opposition here has become more open. It is by those
leaders of the constitutional [local radical] interest who have acted in
concert with the Western interest. The people of the party in the city
are chiefly federal, tho’ not so I fear in the Counties.”[710]
Writing about the same time from Philadelphia to Washington, Gouverneur
Morris said: “With respect to this state, I am far from being decided in
my opinion that they will consent. It is true that the City and its
Neighborhood was enthusiastic in the cause; but I dread the cold and
sower temper of the back counties and still more the wicked industry of
those who have long habituated themselves to live on the public, and
cannot bear the idea of being removed from power and profit of state
government which has been and still is the means of supporting
themselves, their families, and their dependents.”[711] Such comments on
the nature of the alignment of forces might be multiplied from the
writings of other Federalist leaders in Pennsylvania, but it appears to
be unnecessary to say more.
The leaders on the other side were constantly discanting upon the
opposition between town and country. The recalcitrant members of the
legislature in their protest to the people against the hasty calling of
the state convention declared, “We lamented at the time [of the
selection of delegates to the national Convention] that a majority of
our legislature appointed men to represent this state who were all
citizens of Philadelphia, none of them calculated to represent the
landed interests of Pennsylvania, and almost all of them of one
political party, men who have been uniformly opposed to that [state]
constitution for which you have on every occasion manifested your
attachment.”[712]
The author of the famous “Centinel” letters saw in the movement
favorable to the new Constitution a design of “the wealthy and ambitious
who in every community think they have a right to lord it over their
fellow creatures.”[713] In fact the most philosophic argument against
the adoption of the new system on account of its intrinsic nature was
made by the author of these letters.
At the opening of his series, Centinel inveighs against the precipitancy
which characterized the movements of the Federalists, and then attacks
the Constitution as the work of an active minority. “The late
revolution,” he says, “having effaced in a great measure all former
habits and the present institutions are so recent that there exists not
that great reluctance to innovation, so remarkable in old communities
and which accords with reason, for the most comprehensive mind cannot
foresee the full operation of material changes on civil polity.... The
wealthy and ambitious, who in every community think they have a right to
lord it over their fellow creatures have availed themselves very
successfully of this favorable disposition; for the people thus
unsettled in their sentiments have been prepared to accede to any
extreme of government. All the distresses and difficulties they
experience, proceeding from various causes, have been ascribed to the
impotency of the present confederation, and thence they have been led to
expect full relief from the adoption of the proposed system of
government; and in the other event immediately ruin and annihilation as
a nation.”[714]
After warning his countrymen against being lulled into false security by
the use of the great names of Washington and Franklin in support of the
Constitution, Centinel takes up the fundamental element in the new
system: the balance of powers as expounded in Adams’ _Defence of the
Constitutions_; and shows the inherent antagonism between “democracy”
and the Federalist concept of government in a manner that would do honor
to the warmest advocate of the initiative and referendum in our time.
“Mr. Adams’ _sine qua non_ of good government is three balancing powers;
whose repelling qualities are to produce an equilibrium of interests and
thereby promote the happiness of the whole community. He asserts that
the administrators of every government will ever be actuated by views of
private interest and ambition to the prejudice of the public good; that
therefore the only effectual method to secure the rights of the people
and promote their welfare is to create an opposition of interests
between the members of two distinct bodies in the exercise of the powers
of government, and balanced by those of a third. This hypothesis
supposes human wisdom competent to the task of instituting three
co-equal orders in government and a corresponding weight in the
community to enable them respectively to exercise their several parts
and whose views and interests should be so distinct as to prevent a
coalition of any two of them for the destruction of the third. Mr.
Adams, although he has traced the constitution of every form of
government that ever existed, as far as history affords materials, has
not been able to adduce a single instance of such a government; he
indeed says the British constitution is such in theory, but this is
rather a confirmation that his principles are chimerical and not to be
reduced to practice. If such an organization of power were practicable
how long would it continue? Not a day—for there is so great a disparity
in the talents, wisdom, and industry of mankind, that the scale would
presently preponderate to one or the other body, and with every
accession of power the means of further increase would be greatly
extended. The state of society in England is much more favorable to such
a scheme of government than that of America. There they have a powerful
hereditary nobility, and real distinctions of rank and interests; but
even there, for want of that perfect equality of power and distinction
of interests in the three orders of government, they exist but in name;
the only operative and efficient check upon the conduct of
administration is the sense of the people at large.... If the
administrators of every government are actuated by views of private
interest and ambition, how is the welfare and happiness of the community
to be the result of such jarring adverse interests?”[715]
In opposition to the Adams-Madison theory of balanced economic interests
and innocuous legislatures, which was the essence of the Federalist
doctrine, Centinel expounded his reasons for believing that distinct
property groups should not be set against one another in the government,
and that trust in the political capacity of the broad undifferentiated
mass of the community should be the basis of the Constitution; but it
should be noted that his undifferentiated mass was composed largely of
property holders. “I believe,” he says “that it will be found that the
form of government which holds those entrusted with power in the
greatest responsibility to their constituents, the best calculated for
freemen. A republican or free government can only exist where the body
of the people are virtuous and _where property is pretty equally
divided_. In such a government the people are sovereign and their sense
or opinion is the criterion of every public measure; for when this
ceases to be the case, the nature of the government is changed and an
aristocracy, monarchy, or despotism will rise on its ruins. The highest
responsibility is to be attained in a simple structure of government,
for the great body of the people never steadily attend to the operations
of government, and for the want of due information are liable to be
imposed upon. If you complicate the plan by various orders, the people
will be perplexed and divided in their sentiment about the sources of
abuses or misconduct; some will impute it to the senate, others to the
house of representatives, and so on, that the interposition of the
people may be rendered imperfect or perhaps wholly abortive. But if
imitating the constitution of Pennsylvania, you vest all the legislative
power in one body of men (separating the executive and the judicial),
elected for a short period, and necessarily excluded by rotation from
permanency and guarded from precipitancy and surprise by delays imposed
on its proceedings, you will create the most perfect responsibility; for
then, whenever the people feel a grievance, they cannot mistake the
authors and will apply the remedy with certainty and effect, discarding
them at the next election.”[716]
It is evident that a considerable number of the voters in Pennsylvania
clearly understood the significance of the division of powers created by
the Constitution. In a petition circulated and extensively signed by
Philadelphia citizens immediately after the completion of the labors of
the Convention and directed to the state ratifying convention, the
memorialists expressed their approval of the Constitution, and added:
“The division of the power of the United States into three branches
gives the sincerest satisfaction to a great majority of our citizens,
who have long suffered many inconveniences from being governed by a
single legislature. All single governments are tyrannies—whether they be
lodged in one man—a few men—or a large body of the people.”[717]
_Maryland._—The contest in Maryland over the ratification was keen and
spirited and every side of the question was threshed out in newspaper
articles and pamphlets.[718] Through all the controversy ran the
recognition of the fact that it was a struggle between debtors and
creditors, between people of substance and the agrarians. Alexander
Hanson in his considerable tract in favor of the ratification, dedicated
to Washington, treats the charge that the Constitution was an instrument
of property as worthy of a dignified answer. “You have been told,” he
says, “that the proposed plan was calculated peculiarly for the rich. In
all governments, not merely despotic, the wealthy must, in most things,
find an advantage from the possession of that which is too much the end
and aim of mankind. In the proposed plan there is nothing like a
discrimination in their favor.... Is it a just cause of reproach that
the Constitution effectually secures property? Or would the objectors
introduce a general scramble?”[719]
Recognizing the importance of the interests at stake, another Federalist
writer, “Civis,” in the Maryland Journal of February 1, 1788, appeals to
the voters for delegates to the coming state convention to be
circumspect in order to procure the ratification of the Constitution. He
laments that “men of property, character, and abilities have too much
retired from public employment since the conclusion of the war,” but
expresses the hope “that, in this all important crisis, they will again
step forth, with a true patriotic ardour, and snatch their dear country
from the dreadful and devouring jaws of anarchy and ruin.” He cautions
the citizens against voting for undesirable persons: “The characters
whom I would especially point out as your particular aversion, in the
present critical conjuncture, are all those in desperate or embarrassed
circumstances, who may have been advocates for paper money, the
truck-bill, or insolvent act; and who may expect to escape in the
general ruin of the country.”
On the other hand many opponents of the Constitution in Maryland
definitely declared the contest to be one between property and the
people of little substance. Such was practically the view of Luther
Martin[720] in basing his resistance on the ground that the new system
prevented the states from interfering with property rights. The spirit
of this opposition was also well reflected in a reply to the letter of
“Civis,” mentioned above, which took the form of an ironical appeal to
the voters to support only men of property and standing for the coming
state convention. “Choose no man in debt,” it runs, “because being in
debt proves that he wanted understanding to take care of his own
affairs.... A man in debt can scarcely be honest.... Vote for no man who
was in favor of paper money, for no _honest_ man was for that measure.
None but _debtors_ and desperate wretches advocated the diabolical
scheme.... Elect no man who supported the law allowing insolvent debtors
to discharge their persons from perpetual imprisonment, by _honestly_
delivering up _all_ their property to the use of their creditors. The
legislature _have_ no right to interfere with _private_ contracts, and
debtors might safely trust to the humanity and clemency of their
creditors who will not keep them in gaol all their lives, unless they
deserve it.... Men of great property are deeply interested in the
welfare of the state; and they are the most competent judges of the form
of government, best calculated to preserve their property, and such
liberties as it is proper for the common and inferior class of people to
enjoy. Men of wealth possess natural and acquired understanding, as they
manifest by amassing riches, or by keeping and increasing those they
derive from their ancestors, and they are best acquainted with the
wants, the wishes, and desires of the people, and they are always ready
to relieve them in their private and public stations.”[721]
_Virginia._—Madison remarked that he found in his state “men of
intelligence, patriotism, property, and independent circumstances”[722]
divided over the ratification of the Constitution although in some other
commonwealths men of this stamp were “zealously attached” to the new
government. This general reflection is not borne out however by some of
his contemporaries. Marshall, as we have noted above,[723] regarded the
conflict as being between two rather sharply divided parties, those who
favored maintaining public and private rights in their full integrity
and those who proposed to attack them through legislation.[724] In fact,
Madison himself at a later date declared that “the superiority of
abilities” was on the side of the Constitution.[725] Charles Lee claimed
that “except a few characters, the members [of the Virginia convention]
with the most knowledge and abilities and personal influence are also in
favor of the Constitution.”[726]
In the opposition Patrick Henry put the whole mass of small farmers. “I
believe it to be a fact,” he declared in the Virginia convention, “that
the great body of yeomanry are in decided opposition to it. I may say
with confidence that, for nineteen counties adjacent to each other,
nine-tenths of the people are conscientiously opposed to it. I may be
mistaken but I give you it as my opinion; and my opinion is founded on
personal knowledge in some measure, and other good authority.... You
have not solid reality—the hearts and hands of the men who are to be
governed.”[727]
_North Carolina._—It would have been strange if the leaders for and
against the Constitution in this commonwealth had not taken cognizance
of the nature of the conflict they were waging. The popular paper money
and debtor party had been powerful and active and had aroused the
solicitude of all men of substance; and the representatives of the
latter, as practical men, knew what they were doing in supporting an
overthrow of the old system. “It is essential to the interests of
agriculture and commerce,” exclaimed Davie, in the state ratifying
convention, “that the hands of the states should be bound from making
paper money, instalment laws, and pine barren acts. By such iniquitous
laws the merchant or farmer may be defrauded of a considerable part of
his just claims. But in the federal court, real money will be recovered
with that speed which is necessary to accommodate the circumstances of
individuals.”[728] Speaking on the same theme, paper money, Governor
Johnston said: “Every man of property—every man of considerable
transactions, whether a merchant, planter, mechanic, or of any other
condition—must have felt the baneful influence of that currency.”[729]
The recognition of the nature of the clash of interests is manifest in
scattered correspondence, as well as in speeches. For example, in a
letter to Iredell, January 15, 1788, Maclaine says: “In New Hanover
county the people if left to themselves are in favor of the change. Some
demagogues, a few persons who are in debt, and every public officer,
except the clerk of the county court, are decidedly against any change;
at least against any that will answer the purpose. Our friend Huske is
the loudest man in Wilmington against the new constitution. Whether
ambition, or avarice, or a compound of both actuates him I leave you to
judge.... I expect in a few weeks _The Federalist_ in a volume. He is
certainly a judicious and ingenious writer, though not well calculated
for the common people.... Your old friend Huske and Col. Read have
joined all the low scoundrels in the County [_i.e._ the country party]
and by every underhand means are prejudicing the common people against
the new constitution. The former is a candidate for the county.”[730]
This conflict between the town and country is explained by Iredell’s
biographer: “Soon after the [Revolutionary] War commenced a feud between
the town of Wilmington and the county of New Hanover. The leading men
‘upon ’Change’ were either Tories or those whose lukewarmness had
provoked suspicion: the agrestic population could but illy brook their
prosperity. From that day to the present [1857] the politics of the
burgess have been antagonistical to those of the former. The merchants
have ever been the predominant class in the borough: daily intercourse
has enabled them with facility to form combinations that have given them
the control of the moneyed institutions while their patronage has added
a potent influence with the press.”[731]
_South Carolina._—The materials bearing on the ratification of the
Constitution in South Carolina which are available to the northern
student are relatively scanty.[732] Nevertheless, in view of the marked
conflict between the agrarian back-country and the commercial seaboard,
it may easily be imagined that it was not unobserved by the leaders in
the contest over ratification who championed the respective regions.
This antagonism came out in a pamphlet war over the amendment of the
state constitution which was being waged about the time of the adoption
of the new federal system. In this war, “Appius,” the spokesman for the
reform party is reported to have declared that “wealth ought not to be
represented; that a rich citizen ought to have fewer votes than his poor
neighbor; that wealth should be stripped of as many advantages as
possible and it will then have more than enough; and finally, that in
giving property the power of protecting itself, government becomes an
aristocracy.”[733]
“Appius,” after this general statement of his theory, then explains
wherein the distribution of economic interests engendered antagonism in
politics in that state. “The upper and lower countries, have opposite
habits and views in almost every particular. One is accustomed to
expense, the other to frugality. One will be inclined to numerous
offices, large salaries, and an expensive government; the other, from
the moderate fortunes of the inhabitants, and their simple way of life
will prefer low taxes, small salaries, and a very frugal civil
establishment. One imports almost every article of consumption and pays
for it in produce; the other is far removed from navigation, has very
little to export, and must therefore supply its own wants. Consequently
one will favor commerce, the other manufactures; one wishes slaves, the
other will be better without them.”[734] In view of this opposition of
interests, “Appius” holds that there should be a redistribution of
representatives which will give the back-country its proper proportion
and enable the majority to rule.
To this argument Ford replies in the language of Federalism. The rights
of property are anterior to constitutions; the state constitution
recognizes and guarantees these rights; the substantial interests of the
minority must be forever immune from attacks by majorities. Otherwise
“the weaker party in society,” he declares, “would literally have no
right whatever: neither life, liberty, or property would be guaranteed
to them by the social compact, seeing the majority are not bound by it,
but might destroy the whole and by the same rule any part of it at
pleasure.... Virtue and vice would lose their distinction; the most
vicious views would be sanctified if pursued by the greater number, and
the most virtuous resistance punishable in the less. If the principles
of justice are derived from a higher source than human institutions (and
who will deny it?) I contend that the majority have no right to infringe
them.”[735] Hence, any change in the system which deprives the seaboard
minority of their preponderance in the state government cannot be too
severely reprobated.
It can hardly be supposed that an economic antagonism in the state that
was so clearly recognized by publicists in 1794, and that manifested
itself in the vote on the ratification of the Federal Constitution six
years before, was overlooked in the earlier contest.
Indeed, evidence that it was not appears in a pamphlet written in
defence of the Constitution by Dr. David Ramsay, who was afterward a
member of the ratifying convention in South Carolina. He particularly
warns his fellow-citizens against the debtor element. “Be on your
guard,” he says, “against the misrepresentations of men who are involved
in debt; such may wish to see the Constitution rejected because of the
following clause, ‘no state shall emit bills of credit, make anything
but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, pass any ex post
facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.’ This will
doubtless bear hard on debtors who wish to defraud their creditors, but
it will be real service to the honest part of the community. Examine
well the characters and circumstances of men who are averse to the new
constitution. Perhaps you will find that the above clause is the real
ground of the opposition of some of them, though they may artfully cover
it with a splendid profession of zeal for state privileges and general
liberty.”[736]
_Georgia._—The speedy and unanimous ratification of the Constitution in
Georgia seems to have prevented any very vigorous pamphleteering on the
question. Indeed, the energies of the state were being strained to the
limit in preparing for defence against the Indians, and there was little
time for theorizing. Foreign invasion generally silences domestic
discord.
CONCLUSIONS
At the close of this long and arid survey—partaking of the nature of
catalogue—it seems worth while to bring together the important
conclusions for political science which the data presented appear to
warrant.
The movement for the Constitution of the United States was originated
and carried through principally by four groups of personalty interests
which had been adversely affected under the Articles of Confederation:
money, public securities, manufactures, and trade and shipping.
The first firm steps toward the formation of the Constitution were taken
by a small and active group of men immediately interested through their
personal possessions in the outcome of their labors.
No popular vote was taken directly or indirectly on the proposition to
call the Convention which drafted the Constitution.
A large propertyless mass was, under the prevailing suffrage
qualifications, excluded at the outset from participation (through
representatives) in the work of framing the Constitution.
The members of the Philadelphia Convention which drafted the
Constitution were, with a few exceptions, immediately, directly, and
personally interested in, and derived economic advantages from, the
establishment of the new system.
The Constitution was essentially an economic document based upon the
concept that the fundamental private rights of property are anterior to
government and morally beyond the reach of popular majorities.
The major portion of the members of the Convention are on record as
recognizing the claim of property to a special and defensive position in
the Constitution.
In the ratification of the Constitution, about three-fourths of the
adult males failed to vote on the question, having abstained from the
elections at which delegates to the state conventions were chosen,
either on account of their indifference or their disfranchisement by
property qualifications.
The Constitution was ratified by a vote of probably not more than
one-sixth of the adult males.
It is questionable whether a majority of the voters participating in the
elections for the state conventions in New York, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Virginia, and South Carolina, actually approved the
ratification of the Constitution.
The leaders who supported the Constitution in the ratifying conventions
represented the same economic groups as the members of the Philadelphia
Convention; and in a large number of instances they were also directly
and personally interested in the outcome of their efforts.
In the ratification, it became manifest that the line of cleavage for
and against the Constitution was between substantial personalty
interests on the one hand and the small farming and debtor interests on
the other.
The Constitution was not created by “the whole people” as the jurists
have said; neither was it created by “the states” as Southern nullifiers
long contended; but it was the work of a consolidated group whose
interests knew no state boundaries and were truly national in their
scope.
INDEX
Adams, John, theories attacked, 313.
Annapolis convention, 62.
Army, place in government, 171 ff.
Articles of Confederation, conditions under, 47, 58;
system of government, 52.
Baldwin, Abraham, economic interests of, 74;
political philosophy of, 190.
Baltimore, petitions for protection, 42;
popular vote in, 247.
Bancroft, interpretation of history, 1.
Bassett, Richard, economic interests of, 75.
Bedford, Gunning, economic interests of, 76;
political philosophy of, 191.
Blair, John, economic interests of, 77.
Blount, William, economic interests of, 78.
Boston, petitions for protection, 44;
property interests in, 261 ff.;
vote in, 244.
Bowdoin, Governor, demands stronger union, 55.
Brearley, David, economic interests of, 79.
Broom, Jacob, economic interests of, 80;
political philosophy of, 191.
Burgess, Professor, cited, 62.
Butler, Pierce, economic interests of, 81;
political philosophy of, 192.
Capital, attacks on, 31 ff.;
invested in lands, 49;
_see_ Money and Securities.
Carroll, Daniel, economic interests of, 82.
“Centinel,” essays of, 312.
Checks and balances, 159 ff.
Cincinnati, Society of the, 38 ff.
Cities, populace feared, 215.
Clymer, George, 41;
economic interests of, 82;
political philosophy of, 193.
Commerce, demands for protection of, 40 ff.;
influence in politics, 172, 183 ff.
Congress, under the Articles of Confederation, 52;
calls the Convention at Philadelphia, 63.
Connecticut tax returns, in, 31;
suffrage qualifications, 66;
elections to state convention, 228;
vote on the Constitution, 228;
voters for members of convention, 240;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 265 ff.;
public securities in, 265;
conflict over ratification, 306 ff.
Constitution, U. S., juristic theory of, 10 ff., 299;
economic forces in creation and adoption, 16 ff.;
movement for, 52 ff.;
nature of, 152 ff.
Constitutional law, interpretation of, 13 ff.
Contracts, provision for safeguarding, 179 ff.
Convention, at Philadelphia, called, 63;
movement for, 52 ff.;
method of electing delegates, 64; 73 ff.
Creditors, consolidation of, 32.
Currency, depreciation of, 31.
Davie, William R., economic interests of, 84;
political philosophy of, 193.
Dayton, Jonathan, economic interests of, 85.
Debt, Public, _see_ Securities.
Debtors, political schemes, 28;
war on creditors, 31 ff.;
in revolt in New England, 59.
Delaware, suffrage qualification, 68;
elections to state convention, 230;
vote on the Constitution, 230;
voters for members of convention, 241;
ratification of the Constitution, 272.
Depreciation, of securities, 32.
Dickinson, John, economic interests of, 87;
political philosophy of, 194.
Disfranchised, the, 24 ff.
Economic interests, appealed to, in behalf of the Constitution, 53.
Economic interpretation of history, 5 ff.;
of law, 7 ff.;
of constitutional law, 13;
Madison’s, 14 ff.; 156 ff.
Elections, popular, feared, 214;
annual, 216;
popular vote on the Constitution, 239 ff.;
to state conventions, 226 ff.;
number voting in, 242 ff.;
_see_ Suffrage.
Ellsworth, Oliver, economic interests of, 88;
political philosophy of, 196;
on ratification, 220.
Executive, veto power, 213; 192, 193, 195, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202,
203, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216.
Farms, mortgaged, 22;
small, 27.
_Federalist, The_, on the Constitution, 152 ff.
Few, William, economic interests of, 90.
Fitzsimons, Thomas, 41;
economic interests of, 91;
political philosophy of, 196.
Franklin, Benjamin, on conditions of the country in 1787, 47;
and land speculation, 49;
economic interests of, 92;
political philosophy of, 197.
Freeholders, dangers from, 71;
best guardians of liberty, 195; 189–216 _passim_;
_see_ Suffrage and Elections.
Georgia, suffrage qualifications, 70;
elections to state convention, 236;
vote on the Constitution, 236;
voters for members of convention, 241;
reasons for speedy ratification, 290.
Gerry, Elbridge, views on the Cincinnati, 38;
economic interests of, 95;
political philosophy of, 197;
on property qualifications, 167.
Gilman, Nicholas, economic interests of, 93.
Gorham, Nathaniel, economic interests of, 99;
political philosophy of, 198;
on ratification, 219.
Hamilton, Alexander, views on the working-class, 25;
estimate of debt, 33;
economic interests of, 100;
political philosophy of, 199;
on ratification, 222.
Henry, Patrick, and land speculation, 49.
History, interpretation of, 1 ff.
Holmes, Justice, economic views cited, 9 n.
Houston, W. C., economic interests of, 114.
Houstoun, William, economic interests of, 115;
political philosophy of, 200.
Ingersoll, Jared, economic interests of, 116;
political philosophy of, 200.
Jenifer, Daniel, 116.
Jhering, work cited, 14 n.
Johnson, W. S., economic interests of, 117.
Judicial control, nature of, 162, 196;
Spaight against, 214; 216.
King, Rufus, economic interests of, 118;
political philosophy of, 201;
on ratification, 218.
Knox, General, believes the Confederation is in ruins, 58; 301.
Land, policy, 27;
western, speculation in, 23, 49;
members of the Convention, interests in, 151.
Langdon, John, economic interests of, 120.
Lansing, John, economic interests of, 123.
Lassalle, cited, 14 n.
Law, interpretation in the United States, 7 ff.;
England, 7.
Libby, O. G., work on the Constitution, 5.
Livingston, William, economic interests of, 123;
political philosophy of, 201.
Madison, James, interpretation of history and politics, 14 ff.;
on universal suffrage, 25;
on the dissolution of the Confederation, 60;
on the Annapolis convention, 62;
economic interests of, 125;
political philosophy of, 156;
on property qualifications, 165, 167;
on ratification, 222;
view as to causes of opposition to Constitution, 293.
Maitland, and economic interpretation, 8 n.
Majority rule, devices for checking, 156 ff.
Manufacturing, 23;
demands for protection, 41 ff.; 175.
Marshall, opinion as to nature of the Constitution cited, 10;
on the obligation of contracts, 181 f.; 287;
analysis of the conflict over the Constitution, 295 ff.
Martin, Alexander, economic interests of, 126.
Martin, Luther, and debtors, 28;
economic interests of, 126;
political philosophy of, 205.
Maryland, petitions for protection, 43;
suffrage qualifications, 69;
elections to state convention, 234;
vote on the Constitution, 235;
voters for members of convention, 241;
vote on Constitution in, 247;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 281;
conflict over ratification, 316 ff.
Mason, George, economic interests of, 127;
political philosophy of, 205.
Massachusetts, tax returns in, 31;
rebellion in, 59;
suffrage qualifications, 65;
elections to state convention, 226;
vote on the Constitution, 227;
voters for members of convention, 240;
elections in, 242;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 257 ff.;
public securities in, 261;
conflict over ratification, 301 ff.
McClurg, James, economic interests of, 130;
political philosophy of, 203.
McHenry, James, economic interests of, 130;
political philosophy of, 204;
elected to the Maryland convention, 247.
Mercer, J. F., economic interests of, 131;
political philosophy of, 207.
Merchants, petition for adequate naval protection, 56.
Mifflin, Thomas, economic interests of, 132.
Minority, rights of the, 156 ff.; 322.
Monarchy, favored by Dickinson, 195.
Money, distribution of, 31;
paper, 28 ff.;
forbidden in the Constitution, 179; 281.
Money-lending, 28.
Monroe, on the Annapolis convention, 62.
Morley, on Macaulay, 4 n.
Morris, Gouverneur, economic interests of, 133;
political philosophy of, 207;
on property qualifications, 166;
view of conflict in Pennsylvania, 311.
Morris, Robert, and land speculation, 49;
economic interests of, 133;
political philosophy of, 209.
Navy, _see_ Army.
New England, rebellion in, 59.
New Hampshire, tax returns in, 31;
suffrage qualifications, 65;
elections to state convention, 225;
vote on the Constitution, 226;
voters for members of state convention, 240;
economic interests and the Constitution, 254;
conflict over ratification, 300.
New Jersey, suffrage qualifications in, 68;
elections to state convention, 230;
vote on the Constitution, 230;
voters for members of convention, 241;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 271 f.;
public securities in, 271.
New York, petitions for protection, 43;
suffrage qualifications, 67;
number of voters in, 67;
elections to state convention, 229;
vote on the Constitution, 229;
demand for a second national Convention, 229;
voters for members of convention, 241;
popular vote on the Constitution, 244;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 268 ff.;
public securities in, 270;
conflict over ratification, 309.
North Carolina, suffrage qualifications, 69;
elections to state convention, 235;
ratification of Constitution deferred, 235;
ratification, 236;
voters for members of convention, 241;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 287 f.;
conflict over ratification, 319.
Paper money, 28 ff.
Paterson, William, 136, 209, 222.
Pennsylvania, suffrage qualifications, 68;
elections to state convention, 231;
vote on the Constitution, 233;
conflict over ratification, 231 ff.;
voters for members of convention, 241;
popular vote on the Constitution, 246;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 273 ff.;
public securities in, 274;
conflict over ratification, 310 ff.
Personal property, distribution of, in the United States, 19 ff.
Philadelphia, petitions for protection, 40, 44;
residents seek relief from financial disorders, 57;
popular vote in, 247.
Pierce, William, economic interests of, 137;
political philosophy of, 209.
Pinckney, Charles, economic interests of, 138;
political philosophy of, 210.
Pinckney, C. C., economic interests of, 137;
political philosophy of, 211.
Pound, Professor, writings cited, 9.
Powers, balance of, 159 ff.
President, _see_ Executive.
Property, rights of, 156 ff.;
qualifications on voters and officers, 164 ff.;
position under the Constitution, 176;
qualifications for officers, 213;
_see_ Suffrage and Elections.
Protection, for manufacturing, demanded, 40;
for trade, 175.
Public securities, records of, at Treasury Department, 20.
Randolph, Edmund, economic interests of, 139;
political philosophy of, 212;
on ratification, 219.
Ratification, _see_ separate states;
plan suggested by the Convention, 217;
accepted by Congress, 217;
criticism and defence of, 218 ff.;
accepted by the states, 225.
Read, George, economic interests of, 140;
political philosophy of, 213.
Real property, groups of interests, 26 ff.
Referendum, 239.
Representatives, House of, 160, 162, 191, 192, 197, 199, 207, 210, 212.
Rhode Island, ratification of the Constitution, 237.
Rutledge, John, economic interests of, 141;
political philosophy of, 213.
Schuyler, Philip, demands a national convention, 55, 108.
Securities, Public, amount of, 32 f.;
depreciation of, 32;
gain in appreciation of, 34 ff.;
members of the Convention holding, 149 f.;
in Massachusetts, 261 ff.;
in Connecticut, 266 f.;
in New York, 270;
in New Jersey, 271;
in Pennsylvania, 273;
in Virginia, 286;
in North Carolina, 287;
in South Carolina, 289.
Senate, 161, 162;
and property, 190, 192, 199, 206, 211, 212, 213;
_see_ Senators.
Senators, life term proposed, 213;
term of, 214;
popular election, 216.
Shays’ Rebellion, 39.
Sherman, Roger, economic interests of, 142;
political philosophy of, 213;
view of plan of ratification, 218.
Slave-holders, interest in the Constitution, 29.
Slaves, members of the Convention holding, 151;
danger of revolt, 174;
trade in, discussed in the Convention, 176;
Rutledge’s view of, 213.
Smith, Melancton, 246.
South Carolina, suffrage qualifications, 70;
popular vote on the Constitution, 248;
elections to state convention, 236;
vote on the Constitution, 236;
voters for members of Convention, 241;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 288 f.;
public securities in, 289;
conflict over ratification, 321.
Spaight, R. D., economic interests of, 143;
political philosophy of, 214.
States, restrictions on, 178 ff.;
causes of conflict among, 186 ff.
Stock Exchange, founding of, 35.
Strong, Caleb, economic interests of, 144;
political philosophy of, 214.
Suffrage, qualifications on, in 1787, 64 ff.;
discussed in the Convention, 164 ff., 190 ff.;
manhood in New York, 241;
for electors voting on the Constitution, 240 f.;
number disfranchised, 242.
Taxation, absence of power under the Confederation, 52;
power conferred by the Constitution, 169;
interpretation of the system, 170;
Hamilton on, 171.
Territories, provisions for, in the Constitution, 175.
Teutonic school, interpretation of history, 2.
Tories, 240.
Turner, Professor, historical interpretation, 5.
Veto, absolute, proposed, 213.
Veto power, 215.
Virginia, suffrage qualifications, 69;
elections to state convention, 235;
vote on the Constitution, 235;
voters for members of Convention, 241;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 282 ff.;
public securities in, 286;
conflict over ratification, 318.
Vote, popular, _see_ Elections.
Washington, George, and the Cincinnati, 39;
and land speculation, 49;
fears for the safety of the country, 58;
economic interests of, 144;
political philosophy of, 215.
Williamson, Hugh, and land speculation, 23, 50;
economic interests of, 146;
political philosophy of, 215.
Wilson, James, economic interests of, 147;
political philosophy of, 215.
Wilson, Woodrow, description of the movement for the Constitution, 61.
Women, legal position of, 24.
Working-class, and politics, 25.
Wythe, George, economic interests of, 148;
political philosophy of, 216.
-----
Footnote 1:
_The History of the Constitution of the United States_ (1882 ed.),
Vol. II, p. 284.
Footnote 2:
American Historical Review, Vol. II, p. 13.
Footnote 3:
Bancroft, _op. cit._, Vol. I, p. 6.
Footnote 4:
It has been left to a Russian to explain to Englishmen the origin of
Teutonism in historical writing. See the introduction to Vinogradoff,
_Villainage in England_. W. J. Ashley, in his preface to the
translation of Fustel de Coulanges, _Origin of Property in Land_,
throws some light on the problem, but does not attempt a systematic
study.
Footnote 5:
Note the painstaking documentation for the first chapters in Stubbs’
great work.
Footnote 6:
What Morley has said of Macaulay is true of many eminent American
historical writers: “A popular author must, in a thoroughgoing way,
take the accepted maxims for granted. He must suppress any whimsical
fancy for applying the Socratic elenchus; or any other engine of
criticism, scepticism, or verification to those sentiments or current
precepts or morals which may in truth be very equivocal and may be
much neglected in practice, but which the public opinion of his time
requires to be treated in theory and in literature as if they had been
cherished and held _semper, ubique, et ab omnibus_.” _Miscellanies_,
Vol. I, p. 272.
Footnote 7:
For instance, intimate connections can be shown between the vogue of
Darwinism and the competitive ideals of the mid-Victorian middle-class
in England. Darwin got one of his leading ideas, the struggle for
existence, from Malthus, who originated it as a club to destroy the
social reformers, Godwin, Condorcet, and others, and then gave it a
serious scientific guise as an afterthought.
Footnote 8:
See also the valuable and suggestive writings on American history by
Professor W. E. Dodd, of Chicago University; W. A. Schaper,
“Sectionalism in South Carolina,” _American Historical Association
Report_ (1900), Vol. I; A. Bentley, _The Process of Government_; C. H.
Ambler, _Sectionalism in Virginia_. There are three works by socialist
writers that deserve study: Simons, _Social Forces in American
History_; Gustavus Myers, _History of Great American Fortunes and
History of the Supreme Court_.
Footnote 9:
See Seligman, _The Economic Interpretation of History_.
Footnote 10:
Vincent, in his treatise on _Historical Research_ (1911), dismisses
the economic theory without critical examination.
Footnote 11:
The _Congressional Record_ requires more care in use than any other
great source of information on American politics.
Footnote 12:
Attention should be drawn, however, to the good work which is being
done in the translation of several European legal studies, the “Modern
Legal Philosophy Series,” under the editorial direction of the
Association of American Law Schools. Perhaps the most hopeful sign of
the times is the growth of interest in comparative jurisprudence. See
Borchard, “Jurisprudence in Germany,” Columbia Law Review, April,
1912.
Footnote 13:
For examples of Maitland’s suggestiveness, see the English Historical
Review, Vol. IX, p. 439, for a side light on the effect of money
economy on the manor and consequently on feudal law. See also the
closing pages of his _Constitutional History of England_, where he
makes constitutional law in large part the history of the law of real
property. “If we are to learn anything about the constitution, it is
necessary first and foremost that we should learn a good deal about
the land law. We can make no progress whatever in the history of
parliament without speaking of tenure; indeed our whole constitutional
law seems at times to be but an appendix to the law of real property”
(p. 538). Maitland’s entire marvellous chapter on “The Definition of
Constitutional Law” deserves the most careful study and reflection. He
was entirely emancipated from bondage to systematists (p. 539).
Footnote 14:
J. C. Carter, _The Proposed Codification of Our Common Law_ (1884),
pp. 6–8.
Footnote 15:
Of the newer literature on law, see the following articles by
Professor Roscoe Pound: “Do we need a Philosophy of Law?” Columbia Law
Review, Vol. V, p. 339; “Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence,” Green
Bag, Vol. XIX, p. 607; “Mechanical Jurisprudence,” Columbia Law
Review, Vol. VIII, p. 605; “Law in Books and Law in Action,” American
Law Review, Vol. XLIV, p. 12; Professor Munroe Smith, “Jurisprudence”
(in the Columbia University Lectures in Arts and Sciences); Goodnow,
_Social Reform and the Constitution_.
Footnote 16:
Consider, for example, the following remarks by this eminent Justice
in his dissenting opinion in the New York Bakery case: “This case is
decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does
not entertain.... The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer’s _Social Statics_.... General propositions do not decide
concrete cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition
more subtle than any articulate major premise.” 198 U. S. 75.
Footnote 17:
_Op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 367.
Footnote 18:
4 Wheaton, p. 316. No doubt the learned Justice was here more
concerned with discrediting the doctrine of state’s rights than with
establishing the popular basis of our government.
Footnote 19:
S. F. Miller, _Lectures on the Constitution_ (1891), p. 71.
Footnote 20:
_Op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 324.
Footnote 21:
See A. Bentley, _The Process of Government_.
Footnote 22:
In the preface to his first edition, Jhering says: “Die Schrift, von
der ich hiermit die erste Hälfte der Öffentlichkeit übergebe, ist eine
Ausläuferin von meinem Werk über den Geist des römischen Rechts. Der
letzte Band desselben ... schloss ab mit einer Grundlegung der Theorie
der Rechte im subjektiven Sinn, in der ich eine von der herrschenden
abweichende Begriffsbestimmung des Rechts im subjektiven Sinn gab,
indem ich an Stelle des Willens, auf den jene den Begriff desselben
gründete, das Interesse setze. Dem folgenden Bande war die weitere
Rechtfertigung und Verwertung dieses Gesichtspunktes Vorbehalten....
Der Begriff des Interesses nötigte mich, den Zweck ins Auge zu fassen,
und das Recht im subjektiven Sinn drängte mich zu dem im objektiven
Sinn, und so gestaltete sich das ursprüngliche Untersuchungsobjekt zu
einem ungleich erweiterten, zu dem des gegenwärtigen Buches: der Zweck
im Recht.... Der Grundgedanke des gegenwärtigen Werkes besteht darin,
dass der Zweck der Schöpfer des gesamten Rechts ist, dass es keinen
Rechtssatz gibt, der nicht einem Zweck, d.i. einem praktischen Motiv
seinen Ursprung verdankt.”
Footnote 23:
Was ist es, das den innersten Grund unserer politischen und socialen
Kämpfe bildet? Der Begriff des erworbenen Rechts ist wieder einmal
streitig geworden—und dieser Streit ist es, der das Herz der heutigen
Welt durchzittert und die tief inwendigste Grundlage der
politisch-socialen Kämpfe des Jahrhunderts bildet. Im Juristischen,
Politischen, Oekonomischen ist der Begriff des erworbenen Rechts der
treibende Springquell aller weitern Gestaltung, und wo sich das
Juristische als das Privatrechtliche völlig von dem Politischen
abzulösen scheint, da ist es noch viel politischer als das Politische
selbst, dann da ist es das sociale Element. Preface to _Das System der
erworbenen Rechte_ by Ferdinand Lassalle.
Footnote 24:
And before Madison’s century, Harrington had perceived its
significance. H. A. L. Fisher, _Republican Tradition in Europe_, p.
51.
Footnote 25:
Number 10.
Footnote 26:
The theory of the economic interpretation of history as stated by
Professor Seligman seems as nearly axiomatic as any proposition in
social science can be: “The existence of man depends upon his ability
to sustain himself; the economic life is therefore the fundamental
condition of all life. Since human life, however, is the life of man
in society, individual existence moves within the framework of the
social structure and is modified by it. What the conditions of
maintenance are to the individual, the similar relations of production
and consumption are to the community. To economic causes, therefore,
must be traced in the last instance those transformations in the
structure of society which themselves condition the relations of
social classes and the various manifestations of social life.” _The
Economic Interpretation of History_, p. 3.
Footnote 27:
The question of geographic distribution will be considered below,
Chap. X.
Footnote 28:
A few years ago a negro attendant at the Treasury sold a cart-load or
more of these records to a junk dealer. He was imprisoned for the
offence, but this is a small consolation for scholars. The present
writer was able to use some of the records only after a vacuum cleaner
had been brought in to excavate the ruins.
Footnote 29:
See below, p. 50.
Footnote 30:
See Curtis, _The Constitutional History of the United States_, Book I,
Chaps. II-VII; Fiske, _Critical Period of American History_; McMaster,
_History of the People of the United States_, Vol. I; Channing,
_History of the United States_, Vol. III.
Footnote 31:
See below, Chaps. IV and IX.
Footnote 32:
Working-men in the cities were not altogether indifferent spectators.
See Becker, _Political Parties in New York_. They would have doubtless
voted with the major interests of the cities in favor of the
Constitution as against the agrarians had they been enfranchised. In
fact, this is what happened in New York. See below, Chap. IX.
Footnote 33:
“If the authority be in their hands by the rule of suffrage,” struck
out in the Ms. See also the important note to this speech in Farrand,
_Records_, Vol. II, p. 204, note 17.
Footnote 34:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, p. 203.
Footnote 35:
December 5, 1791. _State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 126.
Footnote 36:
Roosevelt, _Gouverneur Morris_, pp. 14 ff.
Footnote 37:
Ambler, _Sectionalism in Virginia_, p. 44.
Footnote 38:
Libby has shown the degree of correspondence between the rural vote on
paper money measures, designed for the relief of debtors, and the vote
against the ratification of the Constitution. _Op. cit._, pp. 50 ff.
Footnote 39:
See below, p. 205.
Footnote 40:
The landholders were able to do this largely because New York City was
the entry port for Connecticut and New Jersey. The opportunity to
shift the taxes not only to the consumers, but to the consumers of
neighboring states, was too tempting to be resisted.
Footnote 41:
For a paragraph on nascent capitalism in South Carolina, see W. A.
Schaper, “Sectionalism in South Carolina,” _American Historical
Association Report_ (1900), Vol. I. See the letter of Blount, Davie,
and Williamson to the governor of North Carolina, below, p. 169.
Footnote 42:
It is not without interest to note that about the time Calhoun made
this criticism of New England capitalist devices he was attempting to
borrow several thousand dollars from a Massachusetts mill owner to
engage in railway enterprise in the south.
Footnote 43:
See, however, _State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, pp. 414 ff.
Footnote 44:
_Ibid._, Vol. I, pp. 442 ff.
Footnote 45:
See the picturesque description of the monetary system or lack of
system in Fiske, _Critical Period of American History_.
Footnote 46:
See below, p. 146.
Footnote 47:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 451; also see below, pp. 261–2.
Footnote 48:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 19.
Footnote 49:
W. De Knight, _History of the Currency_, p. 21.
Footnote 50:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 325.
Footnote 51:
_Ibid._, Vol, I, p. 231.
Footnote 52:
Callender, not a very reliable authority on most matters concerning
Hamilton, claims that twenty-five million dollars was made by the
funding of the public debt, and that about ten millions more was made
out of the state debt assumption process. He further declared that a
public debt of eighty million dollars had been created of which only
about thirty millions was all that was necessary. Gallatin held also
that the unnecessary debt created by the assumption act amounted to
about eleven million dollars. Callender, _A History of the United
States for 1796_, pp. 224 ff. The ethics of redeeming the debt at face
value is not here considered although the present writer believes that
the success of the national government could not have been secured
under any other policy than that pursued by Hamilton. Callender claims
that those who held it were, in large measure, speculators and that
they made huge fortunes out of the transaction. By a stroke of the pen
the federal government created capital to the amount of millions in
the hands of the holders.
Footnote 53:
_A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States_, p. 31.
Footnote 54:
Tables from Pitkin, _A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United
States_, pp. 367–368, and _An Account of the Receipts and Expenditures
of the United States for the Year 1795_, p. 65
Footnote 56:
Undoubtedly a large appreciation had taken place between 1787 and
1800.
Footnote 57:
“The public securities of the United States of America were a dead,
inactive kind of property, previous to the establishment of the
constitution of the new government; then they became at once the
object of avarice. They before had an existence as to value, on the
slender hope of having something done for them at some distant future
period; and obtained a motion only from the sagacity of the few, who
happened to be right in their conjectures respecting the then future
events of American financeering. Upon the adoption of the new system
of government they assumed all the properties of a rising credit, and
became an immense active capital for commerce.” James Sullivan, _An
Inquiry into the Origin and Use of Money_ (1792). Duane Pamphlets,
Library of Congress.
Footnote 58:
Tench Coxe, _A View of the United States of America_ (1795), p. 360.
Tucker, _Progress of the United States_ (1843), p. 205.
Footnote 59:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, p. 114.
Footnote 60:
_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 119.
Footnote 61:
_Ibid._, Vol. III, p. 43.
Footnote 62:
“A large majority of the officers of the army of the Revolution were
in favor of the new Constitution. The Cincinnati were mostly among its
warmest advocates; and as they were organized and were, many of them,
of exalted private and public worth and could act in concert through
all the states, their influence was foreseen and feared by its
opponents.” Blair, _The Virginia Convention of 1788_, Vol. I, p. 36,
note 41.
Footnote 63:
_American Museum_, Vol. I, p. 313. Other signers were C. Pettit, J.
Ross, I. Hazlehurst, M. Lewis, T. Coxe, R. Wells, J. M. Nesbit, J.
Nixon, J. Wilcocks, S. Howell, and C. Biddle.
Footnote 64:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 9.
Footnote 65:
_American State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, pp. 5 ff.
Footnote 66:
Carey, _American Museum_, Vol. IV, p. 348. See also Winsor, _Memorial
History of Boston_, Vol. IV, p. 77.
Footnote 67:
For illustrative evidence that the protection of manufactures and
shipping was being widely agitated previous to the adoption of the
Constitution, and that an extensive consciousness of identity of
interest was being developed among the individuals concerned, see the
articles in _The American Museum_, Vol. I, on American Manufactures;
Winsor, _Memorial History of Boston_, Vol. IV, Chap. III. See
memorials in _The American Museum_, from Philadelphia mercantile
interests (April 6, 1785), Vol. I, p. 313; from Boston merchants,
_ibid._, Vol. I, p. 320. For the merchants’ movement in New York, see
the Magazine of American History, April, 1893, pp. 324 ff.
Footnote 68:
Vol. I, p. 117.
Footnote 69:
M. Carey, _The American Museum_, for January, 1787, Vol. I, pp. 5 ff.
Footnote 70:
The Historical Magazine (1871), Vol. IX, Second Series, pp. 157 ff.
Footnote 71:
For an interesting and novel view of the state of commerce under the
Articles of Confederation, see Channing, _History of the United
States_, Vol. III, pp. 422 ff.
Footnote 72:
Haskins, _The Yazoo Land Companies_, p. 62. American Historical
Association Papers for 1891. See also the lists printed in A. M. Dyer,
_First Ownership of Ohio Lands_ (1911).
Footnote 73:
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p. 678.
Footnote 74:
But see Madison’s view as to the chief reason for calling the
Convention, below, p. 178.
Footnote 75:
A study of the newspapers of the period shows a large number of
prominent advocates of the Constitution among the merchants and
brokers advertising in the Federalist press.
Footnote 76:
Bancroft, _op. cit._, Book I, Chaps. II-VII; Fiske, _Critical Period_;
Marshall, _Life of Washington_ (1850 ed.), Vol. II, pp. 75 ff.
Footnote 77:
The Connecticut Courant, September 10, 1787.
Footnote 78:
Bancroft, _op. cit._, Vol. I, p. 29.
Footnote 79:
See below, p. 109.
Footnote 80:
Elliot’s _Debates_, Vol. I, p. 95. See below, Chaps. V and VII.
Footnote 81:
Bancroft, _op. cit._, Vol. I, p. 190.
Footnote 82:
See below, p. 263.
Footnote 83:
See above, p. 46 _n._
Footnote 84:
Ambler, _Sectionalism in Virginia_, p. 48.
Footnote 85:
Ms. Library of Congress: _Papers of the Continental Congress_
(Memorials), No. 41, Vol. VI, p. 283. Simpson, _Eminent
Philadelphians_.
Footnote 86:
_Ibid._, No. 42, Vol. VI, p. 254.
Footnote 87:
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p. 20.
Footnote 88:
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p. 30.
Footnote 89:
_Ibid._, Vol. IV, p. 83.
Footnote 90:
_Ibid._, Vol. IV, p. 88.
Footnote 91:
_Division and Reunion_, p. 12.
Footnote 92:
James Monroe to James Madison. New York, September 3, 1786. “I
consider the convention of Annapolis as a most important æra in our
affairs—the eastern men be assur’d mean it as leading further than the
object originally comprehended. If they do not obtain that things
shall be arranged to suit them in every respect, their intrigues will
extend to the objects I have suggested above—Pennsylvania is their
object—upon succeeding or failing with her they will gain or lose
confidence—I doubt not the emissaries of foreign countries will be on
the ground.” _Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p.
25.
Footnote 93:
_Political Science and Constitutional Law_, Vol. I, p. 103.
Footnote 94:
_Writings of James Madison_ (1865), Vol. I, p. 246.
Footnote 95:
On the suffrage and elections in general in the eighteenth century,
see the state constitutions in the well-known collections of Poore and
Thorpe; A. E. McKinley, _The Suffrage Franchise in the Thirteen
English Colonies_; Paullin’s “The First Elections under the
Constitution,” Iowa Journal of History and Politics, Vol. II; Jameson,
“Did the Fathers Vote,” New England Magazine, January, 1890; Thorpe,
_Constitutional History of the American People_; S. H. Miller, “Legal
Qualifications for Office,” _American Historical Association Report_
(1899), Vol. I; F. A. Cleveland, _Growth of Democracy_; C. F. Bishop,
_History of Elections in the American Colonies_; see below, Chap. IX.
Footnote 96:
The data on the constitutions here given are taken from Thorpe’s
collection, _Charters, Constitutions_, etc.
Footnote 97:
Senators were apportioned among the respective districts on the basis
of public taxes paid by the said districts.
Footnote 98:
_The Suffrage Franchise in the English Colonies_, p. 414.
Footnote 99:
_Greene’s Register for the State of Connecticut_, for the Year 1786,
p. 4.
Footnote 100:
Magazine of American History, April, 1893, p. 311.
Footnote 101:
See below, p. 241.
Footnote 102:
New York Journal, June 5, 1788.
Footnote 103:
_Ibid._
Footnote 104:
McKinley, _The Suffrage Franchise in the English Colonies_, p. 270.
Footnote 105:
Tench Coxe fixes the number of “taxables” in Pennsylvania at 39,765 in
1770 and 91,177 in 1793. _A View of the United States_, p. 413.
Footnote 106:
Ambler, _Sectionalism in Virginia_, p. 29, note 11; for details see
McKinley, _op. cit._, pp. 40 ff.
Footnote 107:
Schaper, “Sectionalism in South Carolina,” _American Historical
Association Report_ (1900), Vol. I, p. 368.
Footnote 108:
_Statutes at Large_ (S.C.), Vol. IV, p. 99.
Footnote 109:
See below, p. 242.
Footnote 110:
_Ibid._, p. 167.
Footnote 111:
Some of the states selected delegates before Congress issued the call.
Bancroft, _op. cit._, Vol. I, pp. 269 ff.
Footnote 112:
Herring, _National Portrait Gallery_, Vol. IV.
Footnote 113:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Connecticut Loan Office, Ledger B, Assumed
Debt_, folio 135; _ibid._, _Ledger C_, folio 135; _ibid._, _Ledger A_,
folio 136.
Footnote 114:
_Ibid._, _Ledger E, Treasury_, Vol. 44, folio 46; _Ledger C,
Treasury_, 6 per cents, Vol. 42, folio 55; and Treasury Ledgers,
_passim_. Consult Index.
Footnote 115:
It is here assumed that when a member of the Convention appears upon
the funding books of the new government he was a public creditor at
the time of the Convention. Of course, it is possible that some of the
members who are recorded as security holders possessed no paper when
they went to Philadelphia, but purchased it afterward for speculation.
But it is hardly to be supposed that many of them would sink to the
level of mere speculators. There is plenty of evidence for the
statement that many of the members did possess public paper _before_
the meeting of the Convention, but the incompleteness of the old
records prevents the fixing of the exact number. Those members who
purchased after the Convention for speculation must have had idle
capital seeking investment.
Footnote 116:
_Papers of the Delaware Historical Society_, No. XXIX (1900).
Footnote 117:
_National Encyclopædia of Biography_, Vol. XI, p. 530.
Footnote 118:
_History of the Bank of North America_, p. 68.
Footnote 119:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger E, Treasury_, Vol. 44, folio 26; and
_ibid._, _Ledger C, Treasury_, 6 per cents, Vol. 42, folio 33.
Footnote 120:
_National Encyclopædia of Biography_, Vol. XI, p. 530.
Footnote 121:
Delaware Mss., _Tax Lists_; Library of Congress. This was probably the
father of the member of the Convention.
Footnote 122:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office, Delaware_, 1777–1784, see under
date, May, 1779.
Footnote 123:
_Journal C_; _Register of Certificates_ (1777); and _Ledger C_.
Footnote 124:
_Biographia Americana_, p. 48.
Footnote 125:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 95.
Footnote 126:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office (Va.) Register of
Subscriptions_, 1791, see date March 8, 1791.
Footnote 127:
_Ibid._, _Register of Certificates of Public Debt Presented_.
Footnote 128:
_Ibid._, _Virginia Loan Office, 1791_, under date September 30, 1791.
Footnote 129:
_National Encyclopædia of Biography_, Vol. VII, p. 206.
Footnote 130:
Haskins, _The Yazoo Companies_, p. 83.
Footnote 131:
_Encyclopædia of Biography_, Vol. VII, p. 206.
Footnote 132:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office, N. C., 1791–1797_, folio 75.
Footnote 133:
_The Brearley Family Genealogy_ (Library of Congress).
Footnote 134:
_Biographia Americana_, p. 49.
Footnote 135:
L. Elmer, _Constitution and Government of New Jersey_, p. 274.
Footnote 136:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Register—Loan Office, N.J._, under date,
Feb. 1779.
Footnote 137:
_Ibid._, _Loan Office, N. J., Ledger_ C/2, folio 38.
Footnote 138:
_Brearley Family Genealogy_ (L. C.).
Footnote 139:
See records in Treasury for N. J. Loan Office, _passim_; also _Family
Genealogy_.
Footnote 140:
_Genealogy._
Footnote 141:
W. W. Campbell, _Life and Character of Jacob Broom_, Papers of the
Historical Society of Delaware, Vol. LI, pp. 10, 26.
Footnote 142:
_History of the Insurance Company of North America_, p. 138.
Footnote 143:
Campbell, _op. cit._, p. 26.
Footnote 144:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger E, Treasury_, 3%, Vol. 44, folio 67;
also _ibid._, _Ledger C, Treasury_, 6%, Vol. 42, folio 67.
Footnote 145:
_Calendar Madison Correspondence_, under Broom.
Footnote 146:
_National Encyclopædia of Biography_, Vol. II, p. 162.
Footnote 147:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 97.
Footnote 148:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office, S. C., 1791–1797_, folio 128.
The entry in the ledger notes the residence of Sarah Butler as
Charleston; there was another Sarah Butler in South Carolina at the
time, but according to the first Census she did not reside in that
city. For the evidence that Sarah Butler was the daughter of Pierce
Butler, see Salley, _South Carolina Marriages_, p. 108, for the record
of her marriage.
Footnote 149:
Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 93.
Footnote 150:
Madison Ms: Letter to James Madison, October 28, 1787. Library of
Congress.
Footnote 151:
_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 6.
Footnote 152:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office, Maryland, 1790–1797_, folio 98;
_Loan Office_, Penna., 1790–1791, folio 94; _Ledger C, 3% Stock_
(_Pa._), folio 54. _Alphabet to Dividend Book of Domestic Debt,
Maryland_, under “C” (book not found). Charles Carroll was also a
holder of securities. Ms. Treasury Department: _Maryland Loan Office,
1790–1797_, folios 157 and 226 for over $5000 worth of sixes and
threes.
Footnote 153:
Scharf, _History of Western Maryland_, Vol. I, p. 679; H. Crew,
_History of Washington_, p. 108.
Footnote 154:
_Magazine of American History_, Vol. V, p. 196.
Footnote 155:
Sanderson, _Biography of the Signers_ (1831 ed.), Vol. III, p. 147.
Footnote 156:
Sanderson, _ibid._, p. 150.
Footnote 157:
Simpson, _Lives of Eminent Philadelphians_ (1859 ed.), p. 693.
Footnote 158:
Sanderson, _ibid._, p. 147.
Footnote 159:
McMaster and Stone, _Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution_, p.
705.
Footnote 160:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger C_, 3% Stock, _Pa._, folio 231; see
also _Ledger E, Treasury_, 3%, Vol. 44, folio 170; and _Ledger C,
Treasury_, 6%, Vol. 42, folio 114. The existence of this latter small
account in sixes in 1797 is the basis for the surmise above that
Clymer held also his quota of sixes. With his business acumen he might
very well have disposed of most of this stock after “taking the rise”
in 1787–1792, for he could have made more money in business than from
the interest which the government paid.
Footnote 161:
Peele, _Lives of Distinguished North Carolinians_, p. 59.
Footnote 162:
_Ibid._, p. 69.
Footnote 163:
_Ibid._, p. 69.
Footnote 164:
_Ibid._, p. 80.
Footnote 165:
_Ibid._, p. 78.
Footnote 166:
_State Papers: Public Lands_, Vol. I, pp. 104–106.
Footnote 167:
_Ibid._, p. 129.
Footnote 168:
_Ibid._, p. 118.
Footnote 169:
John Wood, _Suppressed History of the Administration of John Adams_,
pp. 149 ff.
Footnote 170:
Ms. Treasury Department: _N. Y. Loan Office, 1791_, folio 130.
Footnote 171:
_Ibid._, _N. Y. Office, Deferred 6%, 1790–1796_, folio 208.
Footnote 172:
_Ibid._, _Ledger B, New York Office, Deferred 6% Stock, 1790_, folio
55.
Footnote 173:
J. Wood, _Suppressed History of the Administration of John Adams_
(1846 ed.), p. 145.
Footnote 174:
Stillé, _Life and Times of John Dickinson_, p. 14.
Footnote 175:
_Ibid._, p. 35.
Footnote 176:
_Eminent Philadelphians_, p. 747.
Footnote 177:
Stillé, p. 331.
Footnote 178:
_Ibid._, p. 327.
Footnote 179:
The Index in the Treasury Department gives the name of John Dickinson
among the security holders, but the volume referred to was not found.
Footnote 180:
Morris Ms. in the Library of Congress, _Private Letter Book_, Vol.
III, p. 160.
Footnote 181:
G. Brown, _The Life of Oliver Ellsworth_, p. 11.
Footnote 182:
Brown, _ibid._, p. 23.
Footnote 183:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Connecticut Loan Office, Ledgers A, B, and
C_, folio 21 in each volume.
Footnote 184:
Consult same volumes through the Index.
Footnote 185:
Facts here are taken from his _Autobiography_, in the Magazine of
American History, Vol. VII, pp. 343 ff.
Footnote 186:
Haskins, _The Yazoo Land Companies_, p. 81.
Footnote 187:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Register of Certificates of Public Debt
Presented to the Auditor of the Treasury_.
Footnote 188:
Volume 31, folio 346.
Footnote 189:
McMaster and Stone, _Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution_, p.
706.
Footnote 190:
Simpson, _Eminent Philadelphians_, p. 373.
Footnote 191:
McMaster and Stone, _op. cit._, p. 707.
Footnote 192:
Simpson, _op. cit._, 373.
Footnote 193:
Sumner, _The Financier and the Finances of the Revolution_, Vol. II,
p. 294.
Footnote 194:
Maclay, _Journal_ (1890 ed.), p. 178.
Footnote 195:
Ms. Treasury Department: _Register of Certificates of Public Debt
Presented to the Auditor of the Treasury_.
Footnote 196: