THE POLITICAL DOCTRINES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONVENTION
Having examined the economic implications of the Constitution in the
light of the greatest of all commentaries, _The Federalist_, it is now
interesting to inquire whether the members of the Convention at large
entertained substantially identical views as to the political science of
the system. There are several difficulties in the way of such an
investigation. Not all of the delegates, indeed not all of the most
influential, were speech makers or writers or philosophers. As intensely
practical men they were concerned with tangible results, not with the
manner in which political scientists might view the details of their
operations. There is, accordingly, a considerable danger of attempting
too much in making generalizations, and to obviate this as far as
possible, the method of taking the members in alphabetical order is
adopted, and the evidence of the views entertained by each is fully
documented.[437]
The leaders in politics and political philosophy in the eighteenth
century were not far removed from that frank recognition of class rights
which characterized English society, and they were not under the
necessity of obscuring—at least to the same extent as modern partisan
writers—the essential economic antagonisms featuring in law and
constitution making. Their clarity of thought was greatly facilitated by
the disfranchisement of the propertyless, which made it unnecessary for
political writers to address themselves to the proletariat and to
explain dominant group interests in such a manner as to make them appear
in the garb of “public policy.”
There does not appear, of course, in the writings of American political
scientists in the eighteenth century, that sharp recognition of class
rights which characterizes the feudal legists, because within the
propertied interests politically represented in the government, there
were divisions which had to be glossed over; and there were also
mutterings of unrest on the part of the disfranchised which later broke
out in the storm that swept away the property qualifications on voters
and introduced political equalitarianism. Under these circumstances the
supporters of the Constitution had to be somewhat circumspect in the
expression of their views; but, happily for science, the proceedings at
Philadelphia during the drafting of the Constitution were secret, and
they were able to discuss with utmost frankness the actual
politico-economic results which they desired to reach. Fortunately,
also, fragmentary reports of these proceedings have come down to us, and
have been put in a definitive form by Professor Farrand.
_Abraham Baldwin_, of Georgia, did not indulge in any lengthy
disquisitions on government in the Convention, and his literary remains
are apparently very meagre. However, his view that the Senate of the
United States ought to represent property came out in the debate on June
29, over a motion by Ellsworth to the effect that the “rule of suffrage
in the second branch be the same as that established by the Articles of
Confederation.” Baldwin immediately opposed the proposition, saying, “He
thought the second branch ought to be the representation of property,
and that in forming it therefore some reference ought to be had to the
relative wealth of their constituents, and to the principles on which
the senate of Massachusetts was constituted.”[438] At the time the
senate of that commonwealth rested upon special freehold and personalty
qualifications,[439] and the members were apportioned among the several
districts on the basis of the amount of taxes paid by each. It is thus
apparent that Baldwin wished the Senate of the new government to be
based frankly upon property.
_Gunning Bedford_, of Delaware, did not participate extensively in the
debates of the Convention, but it seems from the character of the few
remarks that he made that he favored a more democratic form than was
finally adopted, although he signed the Constitution. This inference is
drawn from a brief notice of his objection to the establishment of a
council of revision composed of the executive and a certain number of
the judiciary to exercise a sort of censorship over the acts of
Congress. Madison records as follows: “Mr. Bedford was opposed to every
check on the Legislative, even the Council of Revision first proposed.
He thought it would be sufficient to mark out in the Constitution the
boundaries to the Legislative Authority, which would give all the
requisite security to the rights of the other departments. The
Representatives of the People were the best judges of what was for their
interest, and ought to be under no external controul whatever. The two
branches would produce a sufficient controul within the Legislature
itself.”[440]
_Jacob Broom_ was among those who wished to “lessen the dependence of
the general government on the people,” to use Jefferson’s phrase, by
lengthening the terms of public officers. He seconded Read’s motion to
increase the term of Senators to nine years;[441] he opposed the
election of the executive by popular vote, and supported Luther Martin’s
resolution in favor of election by electors appointed by the
legislatures of the several states;[442] he wished to give life tenure
to the executive, that is, during good behavior,[443] and he favored the
suggestion that Congress should be given a negative over state
legislatures.[444] Broom seldom spoke in the Convention, but there is no
doubt that he believed in a restricted and well “balanced” democracy.
_Pierce Butler_, of South Carolina, on more than one occasion urged
the desirability of making property at least one of the elements in
the distribution of representation. On June 6, when Charles Pinckney
moved that the lower house of the national legislature should be
chosen by the state legislatures and not by the people, Butler said:
“I am against determining the mode of election until the ratio of
representation is fixed—if that proceeds on a principle favorable to
wealth as well as numbers of free inhabitants, I am content to unite
with Delaware (Mr. Read) in abolishing the state legislatures and
becoming one nation instead of a confederation of republics.”[445] In
connection with a discussion of the Senate, “he urged that the second
branch ought to represent the states according to their
property.”[446] Later in the sessions of the Convention he again
“warmly urged the justice and necessity of regarding wealth in the
apportionment of representation.”[447] He was also particularly
solicitous about slave property, and he declared that “the security
which the southern states want is that their negroes may not be taken
from them.”[448]
_Daniel Carroll_ favored the popular election of the executive, but he
advocated a three-fourths vote in Congress to overcome the executive
veto. Speaking on this point, “He remarked that as a majority was now to
be the quorum, seventeen in the larger and eight in the smaller house
might carry points. The advantage that might be taken of this seemed to
call for greater impediments to improper laws.”[449] Carroll did not
indulge in any philosophic reflections in the Convention so that his
“political science,” if he had worked out any definite system, is not
apparent in the records.
_George Clymer_ entertained the notions of government which were
common to the Federalists of his time. He held that “a representative
of the people is appointed to think _for_ and not _with_ his
constituents”;[450] and invariably, during the course of his career,
he “showed a total disregard to the opinions of his constituents when
opposed to the matured decisions of his own mind.” It was on these
principles that he “warmly opposed the proposition introducing a
clause in the Constitution which conferred upon the people the
unalienable right of instructing their representatives.”[451]
_W. R. Davie_, although he is reputed to have been an accomplished
orator and profound student, does not figure extensively in Madison’s
meagre records. At no point does he expound any philosophy of
government. His views were always practical. On the proposition to count
slaves in apportioning representation, he threw down the gauntlet to the
Convention, and declared that if the rate was not at least three-fifths,
North Carolina would not federate.[452] As to the basis of government
Davie “seemed to think that wealth or property ought to be represented
in the second branch; and numbers in the first branch.”[453]
Davie fully understood the significance of the obligation of contract
clause which was designed as a check on the propensities of popular
legislatures to assault private rights in property, particularly
personalty. Speaking in the convention of North Carolina on this clause,
he said: “That section is the best in the Constitution. It is founded on
the strongest principles of justice. It is a section, in short, which I
thought would have endeared the Constitution to this country.”[454]
Davie undoubtedly understood and approved the doctrines of balanced
classes in the government, as expounded in Adams’ _Defence of American
Constitutions_.[455]
At no time does Davie appear to have courted popular favor in his native
state, for a writer speaking of his candidacy for the legislature in
1798 says: “The ‘true Whigs,’ as they styled themselves, dined together
under the oaks and toasted Mr. Jefferson. The other party, who were
called ‘aristocrats,’ ate and drank in the house on entirely different
principles. General Davie dined in the house with the ‘aristocrats.’ The
‘true Whigs’ took offence at this and resolved to oppose his selection,
and it was only with much address that they were kept quiet.... If any
person had had the impudence to dispute the election, General Davie
would certainly not have been returned. The rabble, which in all places
is the majority, would have voted against him.”[456]
_John Dickinson_, of Delaware, frankly joined that minority which was
outspoken in its belief in a monarchy—an action that comported with his
refusal to sign the Declaration of Independence and his reluctance to
embark upon the stormy sea of Revolution. At the very opening of the
Convention, on June 2, he expressed his preference for a regal
government, although he admitted that the existing state of affairs
would not permit its establishment in America. Madison records him as
saying: “A limited Monarchy he considered as one of the best Governments
in the world. It was not certain that the same blessings were derivable
from any other form. It was certain that equal blessings had never yet
been derived from any of the republican form. A limited monarchy,
however, was out of the question.”[457]
Dickinson was also among the members of the Convention who wished to
establish a property qualification for voters because he thought no
other foundation for government would be secure. In the debate on this
subject on August 7, according to Madison’s notes: “Mr. Dickinson had a
very different idea of the tendency of vesting the right of suffrage in
the freeholders of the Country. He considered them as the best guardians
of liberty; And the restriction of the right to them as a necessary
defence agst. the dangerous influence of those multitudes without
property & without principle, with which our Country like all others,
will in time abound. As to the unpopularity of the innovation it was in
his opinion chimerical. The great mass of our Citizens is composed at
this time of freeholders, and will be pleased with it.”[458]
According to King’s notes: “Dickinson—It is said yr. restraining by ye
Constitution the rights of Election to Freeholders, is a step towards
aristocracy—is this true, No.—we are safe by trusting the owners of the
soil—the Owners of the Country—it will not be unpopular—because the
Freeholders are the most numerous at this Time—The Danger to Free
Governments has not been from Freeholders, but those who are not
Freeholders—there is no Danger—because our Laws favor the Division of
property—The Freehold will be parcelled among all the worthy men in the
State—The Merchants & Mechanicks are safe—They may become Freeholders
besides they are represented in ye State Legislatures, which elect the
Senate of the U.S.”[459]
No member of the Convention distrusted anything savoring of “levelling
democracy” more than _Oliver Ellsworth_. Later as Chief Justice he
denounced from the bench Jefferson and the French party as “the apostles
of anarchy, bloodshed, and atheism.”[460] In the Convention, he opposed
the popular election of the President[461] and favored associating the
judges with the executive in the exercise of a veto power over acts of
Congress.[462] He believed in the restriction of the suffrage to those
who paid taxes.[463] He was a warm advocate of judicial control, in
general, and thoroughly understood the political significance of the
system.[464]
_Thomas Fitzsimons_, the wealthy merchant and stockbroker from
Pennsylvania, was, after his kind, not a loquacious man, but rather a
man of action—a practical man; and the records of the Convention contain
no lengthy speech by him. When Gouverneur Morris, on August 7, proposed
to restrain the right to vote to freeholders, Fitzsimons seconded the
motion, apparently without saying anything on the point.[465] While he
thus sympathized with the movement to set the Constitution frankly on a
property basis, Fitzsimons was naturally more interested in such matters
as protection to manufactures and harbor improvements.[466]
_Benjamin Franklin_, who at the time of the Convention was so advanced
in years as to be of little real weight in the formation of the
Constitution, seems to have entertained a more hopeful view of democracy
than any other member of that famous group. He favored a single
chambered legislature,[467] opposed an absolute veto in the
executive,[468] and resisted the attempt to place property
qualifications on the suffrage.[469] He signed the Constitution when it
was finished, but he was accounted by his contemporaries among the
doubters, and was put forward by the opponents of ratification in
Pennsylvania as a candidate for the state convention, but was
defeated.[470]
_Elbridge Gerry_, of Massachusetts, participated extensively in the
debates of the Convention, but his general view of government was
doubtless stated in his speech on May 31, when he expressed himself as
not liking the election of members of the lower house by popular vote.
He said on this point: “The evils we experience flow from the excess of
democracy. The people do not want virtue; but are the dupes of pretended
patriots. In Massts. it has been fully confirmed by experience that they
are daily misled into the most baneful measures and opinions by the
false reports circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot
can refute. One principal evil arises from the want of due provision for
those employed in the administration of Governnt. It would seem to be a
maxim of democracy to starve the public servants. He mentioned the
popular clamour in Massts. for the reduction of salaries and the attack
made on that of the Govr. though secured by the spirit of the
Constitution itself. He had, he said, been too republican heretofore: he
was still, however, republican, but had been taught by experience the
danger of the levelling spirit.”[471]
When the proposition that Senators should be elected by the state
legislatures was up for consideration, “Mr. Gerry insisted that the
commercial and monied interest wd. be more secure in hands of the State
Legislatures, than of the people at large. The former have more sense of
character, and will be restrained by that from injustice. The people are
for paper money when the Legislatures are agst. it. In Massts. the
County Conventions had declared a wish for a depreciating paper that wd.
sink itself. Besides, in some States there are two Branches in the
Legislature, one of which is somewhat aristocratic. There wd. therefore
be so far a better chance of refinement in the choice.”[472]
_Nicholas Gilman_ was by temper and interest a man of affairs, more
concerned with the stability of public securities and the development of
western land schemes than with political theorizing. From Madison’s
record he does not appear to have said anything in the Convention.
_Nathaniel Gorham_ was opposed to property qualifications on the
suffrage in the federal Constitution and the association of the
judiciary with the executive in the exercise of the veto power.[473]
Speaking on the latter point, however, he said, “All agree that a check
on the legislature is necessary. But there are two objections against
admitting the judges to share in it which no observations on the other
side seem to obviate. The 1st is that the judges ought to carry into the
exposition of the laws no prepossessions with regard to them; 2d that as
the judges will outnumber the executive, the revisionary check would be
thrown entirely out of the executive hands, and instead of enabling him
to defend himself would enable the judges to sacrifice him.”
_Alexander Hamilton_ had a profound admiration for the British
constitution. “The House of Lords,” he said in the Convention, “is a
noble institution. Having nothing to hope for by a change and a
sufficient interest by means of their property, in being faithful to the
national interest, they form a permanent barrier against every
pernicious innovation whether attempted on the part of the Crown or of
the Commons.”[474] Doubtless his maturely considered system of
government was summed up in the following words: “All communities divide
themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich and well
born, the other the mass of the people. The voice of the people has been
said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has been
quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent
and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to
the first class a distinct, permanent share in the government. They will
check the unsteadiness of the second, and as they cannot receive any
advantage by a change, they therefore will ever maintain good
government. Can a democratic assembly who annually revolve in the mass
of the people, be supposed steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing
but a permanent body can check the imprudence of democracy.... It is
admitted that you cannot have a good executive upon a democratic
plan.”[475] In consonance with these principles Hamilton outlined his
scheme of government which included an assembly to consist of persons
elected for three years by popular vote, a senate chosen for life or
during good behavior by electors chosen by the voters, and a president
also elected for life or during good behavior by electors chosen by the
voters. The Convention failed to adopt his programme, and he entertained
a rather uncertain view of the Constitution as it was finally drafted,
doubting its stability and permanency.
_William Houstoun_, of Georgia, seems to have spoken only once or twice;
but he gave an indication of his political science in a remark which he
made to the effect that the Georgia constitution “was a very bad one,
and he hoped it would be revised and amended.”[476] The constitution to
which he alludes was the radical instrument made in 1777, which provided
for a legislature with a single chamber and an unusually wide extension
of the suffrage.[477]
_Jared Ingersoll_, in spite of his great abilities as a student and
lawyer, seems to have taken no part at all in the debates of the
Convention. Such at least is the view to which Madison’s records lead.
Something is known, however, of the political principles which he
entertained. Though he became intimately associated with President Reed
on his migration to Philadelphia in 1778, he never accepted the extreme
democratic principles embodied in the constitution of that state in
1776.[478] His biographer, after making an exception of Ingersoll’s
services in the Convention, says: “I am not aware that he held or sought
a position in any popular or representative body whatever. He was what
is called conservative in politics; that is to say, he was not by
constitutional temper a rebuilder or reconstructor of anything that had
been once reasonably well built; nor was his favorite order of political
architecture, the democratic. After the great subversion in 1801 he was
found as rarely as anybody in Pennsylvania on the side of the majority.
He was known to be inclined to the contrary, so far that with or without
his consent he was selected in that state, in the year 1812, as the
opposition or anti-Madisonian candidate for the office of Vice-President
of the United States.”[479]
_Rufus King_ correctly understood the idea of a balanced government
independent of “popular whims” and endowed with plenty of strength. He
favored a long term for the President, and speaking on the executive
department in the Convention he “expressed his apprehensions that an
extreme caution in favor of liberty might enervate the government we
were forming. He wished the house to recur to the primitive axiom that
the three great departments of governments should be separate and
independent: that the executive and the judiciary should be so, as well
as the legislative: that the executive should be equally so with the
judiciary.... He [the executive] ought not to be impeachable unless he
hold his office during good behavior, a tenure which would be most
agreeable to him; provided an independent and effectual forum could be
devised. But under no circumstances ought he to be impeachable by the
legislature. This would be destructive of his independence and of the
principles of the constitution. He relied on the vigor of the executive
as a great security for the public liberties.”[480] King also believed
in the principle of judicial control—that most effective check on the
popular attacks on property through legislatures.[481]
It was largely on King’s initiative that the prohibition against
interference with contracts was placed in the Constitution.[482]
_William Livingston_ took a middle ground between the “high-toned”
system of John Adams and the simple democracy of such writers as
“Centinel” of Pennsylvania.[483] _The Defence of the Constitutions_ he
impatiently characterized as “rubbage”; and a “Humiliating and
mortifying acknowledgement that man is incapable of governing himself.”
But for the opposite party that would set up a simple democratic
government through legislative majorities, Livingston had just as little
patience. “The security of the liberties of a people or state depends
wholly on a proper delegation of power. The several component powers of
government should be so distributed that no one man, or body of men,
should possess a larger share thereof than what is absolutely necessary
for the administration of government.... The people ever have been and
ever will be unfit to retain the exercise of power in their own hands;
they must of necessity delegate it somewhere.... But it has been found
from experience that a government by representation, consisting of a
single house of representatives, is in some degree liable to the same
inconveniences which attend a pure democracy; a few leading men
influence the majority to pass laws calculated not for the public good,
but to promote some sinister views of their own. To prevent this,
another representative branch is added: these two separate houses form
mutual checks upon each other; but this expedient has not been found to
be altogether effectual. If the legislative power, even tho’ vested in
two distinct houses is left without any controul, they will inevitably
encroach upon the executive and judicial.... But further, as prejudices
always prevail, more or less, in all popular governments, it is
necessary that a check be placed somewhere in the hands of a power not
immediately dependent upon the breath of the people, in order to stem
the torrent, and prevent the mischiefs which blind passions and
rancorous prejudices might otherwise occasion. The executive and
judicial powers should of course then be vested with this check or
controul on the legislature; and that they may be enabled fully to
effect this beneficial purpose, they should be rendered as independent
as possible.... Tho’ it is so short a time since our governments have
been put in motion, yet examples have not been wanting of the prevalence
of this dangerous thirst after more power in some of our legislatures; a
negative therefore lodged in the hands of the executive and judicial
powers, is absolutely necessary in order that they may be able to defend
themselves from the encroachments of the legislature.”[484] Livingston
thought that there were some grave defects in the Constitution as
drafted at Philadelphia and proposed some emendations. He believed that
the President should enjoy the appointing power without any control by
the Senate; he thought the Chief Justice should hold office during good
behavior and be empowered to appoint his colleagues; and he further held
that the President, the Chief Justice, and a Superintendent of Finance
should be organized into a council of revision to pass upon the acts of
Congress.
_James McClurg_, of Virginia, left the Convention during the early part
of August, and was silent on most of the questions before that body. On
July 17th, he proposed that the term of the executive should be changed
from seven years to “good behavior”;[485] and he was particularly
anxious to have the executive independent of the legislature. He said
that he “was not so much afraid of the shadow of monarchy as to be
unwilling to approach it; nor so wedded to republican government as not
to be sensible of the tyrannies that had been and may be exercised under
that form. It was an essential object with him to make the executive
independent of the legislature; and the only mode left for effecting it,
after the vote destroying his ineligibility the second time, was to
appoint him during good behavior.”[486] That McClurg had small respect
for legislatures in general is shown by a letter which he wrote to
Madison from Virginia on August 7, 1787, in which he said: “The
necessity of some independent power to controul the Assembly by a
negative, seems now to be admitted by the most zealous Republicans—they
only differ about the mode of constituting such a power. B. Randolph
seems to think that a magistrate annually elected by the people might
exercise such a controul as independently as the King of G. B. I hope
that our representative, Marshall, will be a powerful aid to Mason in
the next Assembly. He has observ’d the continual depravation of Mens
manners, under the corrupting influence of our Legislature; & is
convinc’d that nothing but the adoption of some efficient plan from the
Convention can prevent Anarchy first, & civil convulsions
afterwards.”[487]
_James McHenry_ belonged to the conservative party of his state and
opposed “radical alterations” in the constitution of that commonwealth
as it stood in November, 1791.[488]
Writing in February, 1787, on the property qualifications placed on
voters and representatives in Maryland, McHenry explained that
“These disabilities, exclusions, and qualifications have for their
object an upright legislature, endowed with faculties to judge of
the things most proper to promote the public good.” He was warmly
opposed to the doctrine that the people had a right to instruct
their representatives.[489] Democracy was, in his opinion,
synonymous with “confusion and licentiousness.”[490]
_James Madison_ was the systematic philosopher of the Convention and set
forth his views with such cogency and consistency on so many different
topics that no short quotations will suffice to state his doctrines. His
general scheme of political science was, however, embodied in the tenth
number of _The Federalist_ which has been discussed above and need not
be reconsidered here.[491]
_Alexander Martin_ was among the silent members of the Convention, for
Madison records only an occasional and incidental participation by him
in the proceedings.
_Luther Martin_ was the champion of the extreme states’ rights’ view,
and entertained rather democratic notions for his time, although, in
arguing against the clause prohibiting Congress to issue paper money, he
held that, “considering the administration of the government would be
principally in the hands of the wealthy,” there could be little danger
from an abuse of this power. Martin was in fact a champion of paper
money in his state, and he opposed that part of the Constitution which
prohibited the emission of bills of credit. As a representative of the
more radical section of his community, he was against the clauses
restricting the states to the use of the gold and silver coin of the
United States, and was opposed to the clause forbidding the impairment
of the obligation of contract. Speaking on the latter point he said:
“There might be times of such great public calamities and distress, and
of such extreme scarcity of specie, as should render it the duty of a
government for the preservation of even the most valuable part of its
citizens in some measure to interfere in their favor, by passing laws
totally or partially stopping the courts of justice, or authorizing the
debtor to pay by installments, or by delivering up his property to his
creditors at a reasonable and honest valuation. The times have been such
as to render regulations of this kind necessary in most or all of the
states, to prevent the wealthy creditor and the moneyed man from totally
destroying the poor, though even industrious debtor. Such times may
again arrive.... I apprehend, Sir, the principal cause of complaint
among the people at large, is the public and private debt with which
they are oppressed, and which in the present scarcity of cash threatens
them with destruction, unless they can obtain so much indulgence in
point of time that by industry and frugality they may extricate
themselves.”[492]
As might have been expected, a man entertaining such radical notions
about the power and duty of a government to interfere with the rights of
personalty in behalf of the debtor could not have accepted the
instrument framed at Philadelphia. In fact, Martin refused to sign the
Constitution; he wrote a vehement protest against it to the legislature
of his state; he worked assiduously against its ratification; and as a
member of the state convention, he voted against its approval by his
commonwealth—but in vain.
_George Mason_ thoroughly understood the doctrine of a balanced
government. Speaking in the Convention on the function of the upper
house, he said: “One important object in constituting the senate was to
secure the rights of property. To give them weight and firmness for this
purpose a considerable duration in office was thought necessary. But a
longer term than six years would be of no avail in this respect, if
needy persons should be appointed. He suggested therefore the propriety
of annexing to the office a qualification of property. He thought this
would be very practicable; as the rules of taxation would supply a scale
for measuring the degree of wealth possessed by every man.”[493] On
another occasion, he presented a motion requiring “certain
qualifications of landed property, in members of the legislature.”[494]
Although Mason refused to sign the Constitution, his reasons were based
on personal economic interests, not on any objections to its checks on
democratic legislatures.[495]
_J. F. Mercer_, of Maryland, who opposed the Constitution in its final
form and became the belligerent anti-federalist leader in that state,
does not appear to have been so warmly devoted to the “people’s cause,”
behind the closed doors of the Convention, for he took exceptions to the
proposition that the determination of the qualifications of voters
should be left to the several states. But his particular objection was
“to the mode of election by the people. The people cannot know and judge
of the characters of candidates. The worst possible choice will be
made.”[496]
_Thomas Mifflin_ took no part worthy of mention in the proceedings of
the Convention, and expounded no views of government during the debates.
_Gouverneur Morris_, of Pennsylvania, was the leader of those who wanted
to base the new system upon a freehold suffrage qualification; and, on
August 7, he made a motion to this effect. In the course of the
discussion which followed, Morris said: “He had long learned not to be
the dupe of words. The sound of Aristocracy, therefore, had no effect on
him. It was the thing, not the name, to which he was opposed, and one of
his principal objections to the Constitution as it is now before us, is
that it threatens this Country with an Aristocracy. The Aristocracy will
grow out of the House of Representatives. Give the votes to people who
have no property, and they will sell them to the rich who will be able
to buy them. We should not confine our attention to the present moment.
The time is not distant when this Country will abound with mechanics &
manufacturers who will receive their bread from their employers. Will
such men be the secure & faithful Guardians of liberty? Will they be the
impregnable barrier agst. aristocracy?—He was as little duped by the
association of the words, ‘taxation & Representation’—The man who does
not give his vote freely is not represented. It is the man who dictates
the vote. Children do not vote. Why? because they want prudence, because
they have no will of their own. The ignorant & the dependent can be as
little trusted with the public interest. He did not conceive the
difficulty of defining ‘freeholders’ to be insuperable. Still less that
the restriction could be unpopular. 9/10 of the people are at present
freeholders and these will certainly be pleased with it. As to Merchts.
&c. if they have wealth & value the right they can acquire it. If not
they don’t deserve it.”[497]
In all the proceedings of the Convention, Morris took a deep interest
and expressed his views freely, always showing his thorough distrust of
democratic institutions. As his biographer, Mr. Roosevelt puts it, “He
throughout appears as the _advocatus diaboli_; he puts the lowest
interpretation upon every act, and frankly avows his disbelief in all
generous and unselfish motives. His continual allusions to the
overpowering influence of the baser passions, and to their mastery of
the human race at all times, drew from Madison, although the two men
generally acted together, a protest against his ‘forever inculcating the
utter political depravity of men, and the necessity of opposing one vice
and interest as the only possible check to another vice and
interest.’”[498] This protest from Madison, however, betrays
inconsistency, for on more than one occasion in the Convention he
expounded principles substantially identical with those which he
reprobated in Morris.[499] Indeed, what appeared to be cynical
eccentricity on the part of the latter was nothing more than unusual
bluntness in setting forth Federalist doctrines.
_Robert Morris_, the merchant prince and speculator of Pennsylvania,
seems to have broken his rule of absolute silence only two or three
times in the Convention, and he apparently made no speech at all. He
nominated Washington as president of the assembly, and seconded Read’s
motion that Senators should hold office during good behavior.[500] There
is no doubt that Morris appreciated the relative weight of speeches and
private negotiations.[501]
In the proceedings of the Convention, _William Paterson_ was chiefly
concerned with protecting the rights of small states; but he signed the
Constitution, and after its adoption became an ardent Federalist,
serving as an associate justice of the Supreme Court. On the bench he
was one of the most scholarly and eminent supporters of the doctrine of
judicial control over legislation.[502]
_William Pierce_ took little part in the proceedings of the Convention.
On the question of states’ rights he held a broad view, saying, “state
distinctions must be sacrificed so far as the general government shall
render it necessary—without, however, destroying them altogether.
Although I am here as a representative from a small state, I consider
myself as a citizen of the United States, whose general interest I will
always support.”[503] On no occasion, apparently, did Pierce indulge in
any general reflections on the basis of all government. He did not sign
the Constitution, but he explained this fact by saying, “I was absent in
New York on a piece of business so necessary that it became unavoidable.
I approve of its principles and would have signed it with all my heart
had I been present. To say, however, that I consider it as perfect would
be to make an acknowledgement immediately opposed to my judgment.”[504]
_Charles Pinckney_ was among the members of the Convention who thought
that it was desirable to fix the property qualifications of members of
the national legislature firmly in the Constitution. Speaking on the
subject of property and government he said: “The Committee as he had
conceived were instructed to report the proper qualifications of
property for the members of the Natl. Legislature; instead of which they
have referred the task to the Natl. Legislature itself. Should it be
left on this footing, the first Legislature will meet without any
particular qualifications of property; and if it should happen to
consist of rich men they might fix such qualifications as may be too
favorable to the rich; if of poor men, an opposite extreme might be run
into. He was opposed to the establishment of an undue aristocratic
influence in the Constitution, but he thought it essential that the
members of the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judges—should be
possessed of competent property to make them independent & respectable.
It was prudent when such great powers were to be trusted to connect the
tie of property with that of reputation in securing a faithful
administration. The Legislature would have the fate of the Nation put
into their hands. The President would also have a very great influence
on it. The Judges would have not only important causes between Citizen &
Citizen but also where foreigners were concerned. They will even be the
Umpires between the U. States and individual States as well as between
one State & another. Were he to fix the quantum of property which should
be required, he should not think of less than one hundred thousand
dollars for the President, half of that sum for each of the Judges, and
in like proportion for the members of the Natl. Legislature. He would
however leave the sum blank. His motion was that the President of the U.
S., the Judges, and members of the Legislature should be required to
swear that they were respectively possessed of a clear unincumbered
Estate to the amount of —— in the case of the President, &c &c—”[505]
Pinckney, in fact, had no confidence in popular government, for on March
28, 1788, he wrote to Madison: “Are you not ... abundantly impressed
that the theoretical nonsense of an election of Congress by the people
in the first instance is clearly and practically wrong, that it will in
the end be the means of bringing our councils into contempt.”[506]
_General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney_ entertained views with regard to
the special position that should be enjoyed by property, which were
substantially identical with those held by his cousin. He proposed that
no salary should be paid to members of the Senate. As this branch, he
said, “was meant to represent the wealth of the country, it ought to be
composed of persons of wealth; and if no allowance was to be made the
wealthy alone would undertake the service.”[507] General Pinckney also
wished to extend property qualifications not only to members of the
legislature, but also to the executive and judicial departments.[508]
_Edmund Randolph_ was not only fully aware of the distress to which
property had been put under the Articles of Confederation, but he also
understood the elements of a “balanced” government. Speaking on the
subject of the structure of the Senate, he said: “If he was to give an
opinion as to the number of the second branch, he should say that it
ought to be much smaller than that of the first, so small as to be
exempt from the passionate proceedings to which numerous assemblies are
liable. He observed that the general object was to provide a cure for
the evils under which the U. S. Laboured; that in tracing these evils to
their origin every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of
democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for agst. this
tendency of our governments: and that a good Senate seemed most likely
to answer the purpose.... Mr. Randolph was for the term of 7 years. The
Democratic licentiousness of the State Legislatures proved the necessity
of a firm Senate. The object of this 2d. branch is to controul the
democratic branch of the Natl. Legislature. If it be not a firm body,
the other branch being more numerous, and coming immediately from the
people, will overwhelm it. The Senate of Maryland constituted on like
principles had been scarcely able to stem the popular torrent. No
mischief can be apprehended, as the concurrence of the other branch, and
in some measure, of the Executive, will in all cases be necessary. A
firmness & independence may be the more necessary also in this branch,
as it ought to guard the Constitution agst. encroachments of the
Executive who will be apt to form combinations with the demagogues of
the popular branch.”[509]
_George Read_ was most outspoken in his desire to see the Articles of
Confederation completely discarded. He said that “he was against
patching up the old federal system: he hoped the idea would be
dismissed. It would be like putting new cloth on an old garment. The
Confederation was founded on temporary principles. It cannot last; it
cannot be amended.”[510] He favored vesting an absolute veto power in
the executive;[511] and he proposed that Senators should hold office
during good behavior.[512]
_John Rutledge_ held that the apportionment of representatives should be
on a basis of wealth and population.[513] He favored a property
qualification for the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments;[514] and he thought that Senators should not be paid.[515]
In fact, he was one of the most ardent champions of the rights of
property in government in the Convention. He was strictly opposed to the
introduction of sentimental considerations in politics, for, speaking on
an aspect of slavery and the Constitution, he said: “Religion & humanity
had nothing to do with this question—Interest alone is the governing
principle with Nations—The true question at present is whether the
Southn. States shall or shall not be parties to the Union. If the
Northern States consult their interests they will not oppose the
increase of Slaves which will increase the commodities of which they
will become the carriers.”[516]
_Roger Sherman_ believed in reducing the popular influence in the new
government to the minimum. When it was proposed that the members of the
first branch of the national legislature should be elected, Sherman said
that he was “opposed to the election by the people, insisting that it
ought to be by the state legislatures. The people, he said, immediately
should have as little to do as may be about the government. They want
information and are constantly liable to be misled.”[517]
_Richard Dobbs Spaight_ does not seem to have made any very lengthy
speeches in the Convention, but his occasional motions show that he was
not among those who believed in “frequent recurrence to the people.” On
September 6, he moved that the length of the President’s term be
increased to seven years, and finding this lost he attempted to
substitute six years for four.[518] Spaight was the one member of the
Convention, however, who came out clearly and denounced judicial
control;[519] but he nevertheless proved a stout champion of the
Constitution in North Carolina—defending it warmly against charges to
the effect that it was aristocratic in character.[520]
_Caleb Strong_ carried into the Convention the old Massachusetts
tradition in favor of frequent elections. He favored a one year term for
representatives,[521] voted against a seven year term for
President,[522] and also opposed a seven year term for Senators.[523] He
supported the Constitution, however, in his native state, and was a
member of the convention that ratified it.
_George Washington’s_ part in the proceedings of the Convention was
almost negligible, and it does not appear that in public document or
private letter he ever set forth any coherent theory of government. When
he had occasion to dwell upon the nature of the new system he indulged
in the general language of the bench rather than that of the penetrating
observer. For example, in his Farewell Address, which was written
largely by Hamilton, he spoke of the government’s being “the offspring
of our own choice, uninfluenced and unawed, adopted upon full
investigation, and mature deliberation, completely free in its
principles, in the distribution of its powers, uniting security with
energy.”[524] He feared, however, the type of politics represented by
the Democratic Societies which sprang up during his administration, and
looked upon criticism of the government as akin to sedition.[525] Like
Jefferson, he also viewed with apprehension the growth of an urban
population, for in a letter to La Fayette at the time of the French
Revolution, he said, “The tumultuous populace of large cities are ever
to be dreaded. Their indiscriminate violence prostrates for the time all
public authority.”[526]
_Hugh Williamson_ was against placing property qualifications on voters
for members of Congress;[527] and he was opposed to the association of
the judges with the executive in the exercise of the veto power.[528] He
preferred to insert a provision requiring a two-thirds vote for every
“effective act of the legislature.”[529] He was, however, an opponent of
the paper money party in North Carolina[530] and in the Convention he
supported a proposition forbidding the states to pass ex post facto
laws, on the ground that “the judges can take hold of it.”[531]
_James Wilson_ was among the philosophers of the period who had
seriously pondered on politics in its historical and practical aspects.
In the Convention he took a democratic view on several matters. He
favored the annual election of representatives by the people,[532] he
advocated the popular election of United States Senators,[533] and he
believed also in the popular election of the President.[534] He
furthermore opposed the proposition to place property qualifications on
voters.[535] His check on popular legislation was to be found in
judicial control, at first in the association of the judges with the
executive in its exercise, and later in its simple, direct form.[536] In
fact, Wilson shared the apprehensions of his colleagues as to the
dangers of democratic legislatures, though he did not frankly advocate
direct property checks.[537] He doubtless believed that judicial control
would be sufficient.
_George Wythe_ was a representative of the old school of lawyers in
Virginia, and he was a profound student of historical jurisprudence,
although he apparently made no attempt to apply his learning to any of
the general political questions before the Convention. He was a warm
advocate of the doctrine of judicial control and gave practical effect
to principles while on the bench in Virginia.[538]
The conclusion seems warranted that the authors of _The Federalist_
generalized the political doctrines of the members of the Convention
with a high degree of precision, in spite of the great diversity of
opinion which prevailed on many matters.