PIETY
[Sidenote: The core of religion not theoretical.]
Hebraism is a striking example of a religion tending to discard
mythology and magic. It was a Hebraising apostle who said that true
religion and undefiled was to visit the fatherless and the widow, and do
other works of mercy. Although a complete religion can hardly remain
without theoretic and ritual expression, we must remember that after all
religion has other aspects less conspicuous, perhaps, than its
mythology, but often more worthy of respect. If religion be, as we have
assumed, an imaginative symbol for the Life of Reason, it should contain
not only symbolic ideas and rites, but also symbolic sentiments and
duties. And so it everywhere does in a notable fashion. Piety and
spirituality are phases of religion no less important than mythology, or
than those metaphysical spectres with which mythology terminates. It is
therefore time we should quite explicitly turn from religious ideas to
religious emotions, from imaginative history and science to imaginative
morals.
Piety, in its nobler and Roman sense, may be said to mean man’s
reverent attachment to the sources of his being and the steadying of his
life by that attachment. A soul is but the last bubble of a long
fermentation in the world. If we wish to live associated with permanent
racial interests we must plant ourselves on a broad historic and human
foundation, we must absorb and interpret the past which has made us, so
that we may hand down its heritage reinforced, if possible, and in no
way undermined or denaturalised. This consciousness that the human
spirit is derived and responsible, that all its functions are heritages
and trusts, involves a sentiment of gratitude and duty which we may call
piety.
[Sidenote: Loyalty to the sources of our being.]
The true objects of piety are, of course, those on which life and its
interests really depend: parents first, then family, ancestors, and
country; finally, humanity at large and the whole natural cosmos. But
had a lay sentiment toward these forces been fostered by clear knowledge
of their nature and relation to ourselves, the dutifulness or cosmic
emotion thereby aroused would have remained purely moral and historical.
As science would not in the end admit any myth which was not avowed
poetry, so it would not admit any piety which was not plain reason and
duty. But man, in his perplexities and pressing needs, has plunged, once
for all, into imaginative courses through which it is our business to
follow him, to see if he may not eventually reach his goal even by
those by-paths and dark circumlocutions.
[Sidenote: The pious Æneas.]
What makes piety an integral part of traditional religions is the fact
that moral realities are represented in the popular mind by poetic
symbols. The awe inspired by principles so abstract and consequences so
remote and general is arrested at their conventional name. We have all
read in boyhood, perhaps with derision, about the pious Æneas. His piety
may have seemed to us nothing but a feminine sensibility, a faculty of
shedding tears on slight provocation. But in truth Æneas’s piety, as
Virgil or any Roman would have conceived it, lay less in his feelings
than in his function and vocation. He was bearing the Palladium of his
country to a new land, to found another Troy, so that the blood and
traditions of his ancestors might not perish. His emotions were only the
appropriate expression of his priestly office. The hero might have been
stern and stolid enough on his own martial ground, but since he bore the
old Anchises from the ruins of Ilium he had assumed a sacred mission.
Henceforth a sacerdotal unction and lyric pathos belonged rightfully to
his person. If those embers, so religiously guarded, should by chance
have been extinguished, there could never have been a Vestal fire nor
any Rome. So that all that Virgil and his readers, if they had any
piety, revered in the world had been hazarded in those legendary
adventures. It was not Æneas’s own life or private ambition that was at
stake to justify his emotion. His tenderness, like Virgil’s own, was
ennobled and made heroic by its magnificent and impersonal object. It
was truly an epic destiny that inspired both poet and hero.
[Sidenote: An ideal background required.]
If we look closer, however, we shall see that mythical and magic
elements were requisite to lend this loftiness to the argument. Had
Æneas not been Venus’s son, had no prophetic instinct animated him, had
no Juno been planning the rise of Carthage, how could the future
destinies of this expedition have been imported into it, to lift it
above some piratical or desperate venture? Colonists passing in our day
to America or Australia might conceivably carry with them the seeds of
empires as considerable as Rome’s. But they would go out thinking of
their private livelihood and convenience, breaking or loosening whatever
pious bonds might unite them to the past, and quite irresponsibly laying
the foundations for an unknown future. A poet, to raise them to the
height of their unwitting function, would have to endow them with second
sight and a corresponding breadth of soul and purpose. He would need, in
a word, heroic figures and supernatural machinery.
Now, what supernatural machinery and heroic figures do for an epic poet
piety does for a race. It endows it, through mythical and magic symbols,
with something like a vision or representation of its past and future.
Religion is normally the most traditional and national of things. It
embodies and localises the racial heritage. Commandments of the law,
feasts and fasts, temples and the tombs associated with them, are so
many foci of communal life, so many points for the dissemination of
custom. The Sabbath, which a critical age might justify on hygienic
grounds, is inconceivable without a religious sanction. The craving for
rest and emotion expressed itself spontaneously in a practice which, as
it established itself, had to be sanctioned by fables till the recurrent
holiday, with all its humane and chastening influences, came to be
established on supernatural authority. It was now piety to observe it
and to commemorate in it the sacred duties and traditions of the race.
In this function, of course, lay its true justification, but the
mythical one had to be assigned, since the diffused prosaic advantages
of such a practice would never avail to impose it on irrational wills.
Indeed, to revert to our illustration, had Æneas foreseen in detail the
whole history of Rome, would not his faith in his divine mission have
been considerably dashed? The reality, precious and inestimable as on
the whole it was to humanity, might well have shocked him by its
cruelties, shames, and disasters. He would have wished to found only a
perfect nation and a city eternal indeed. A want of rationality and
measure in the human will, that has not learned to prize small
betterments and finite but real goods, compels it to deceive itself
about the rewards of life in order to secure them. That celestial
mission, those heavenly apparitions, those incalculable treasures
carried through many a storm, abused ÆEneas’s mind in order to nerve him
to his real duty. Yet his illusion was merely intellectual. The mission
undertaken was truly worth carrying out. Piety thus came to bear the
fruits of philanthropy in an age when the love of man was inconceivable.
A dull and visionary intellect could hit on no other way of justifying a
good instinct.
[Sidenote: Piety accepts natural conditions and present tasks.]
[Sidenote: The leadership of instinct is normal.]
Philosophers who harbour illusions about the status of intellect in
nature may feel that this leadership of instinct in moral life is a sort
of indignity, and that to dwell on it so insistently is to prolong
satire without wit. But the leadership of instinct, the conscious
expression of mechanism, is not merely a necessity in the Life of
Reason, it is a safeguard. Piety, in spite of its allegories, contains a
much greater wisdom than a half-enlightened and pert intellect can
attain. Natural beings have natural obligations, and the value of things
for them is qualified by distance and by accidental material
connections. Intellect would tend to gauge things impersonally by their
intrinsic values, since intellect is itself a sort of disembodied and
universal function; it would tend to disregard material conditions and
that irrational substratum of reason without which reason would have no
organs and no points of application. Piety, on the contrary, esteems
things apart from their intrinsic worth, on account of their relation to
the agent’s person and fortune. Yet such esteem is perfectly rational,
partiality in man’s affections and allegiance being justified by the
partial nature and local status of his life. Piety is the spirit’s
acknowledgment of its incarnation. So, in filial and parental affection,
which is piety in an elementary form, there is a moulding of will and
emotion, a check to irresponsible initiative, in obedience to the facts
of animal reproduction. Every living creature has an intrinsic and ideal
worth; he is the centre of actual and yet more of potential interests.
But this moral value, which even the remotest observer must recognise in
both parent and child, is not the ground of their specific affection for
each other, which no other mortal is called to feel their regard. This
affection is based on the incidental and irrational fact that the one
has this particular man for a father, and the other that particular man
for a son. Yet, considering the animal basis of human life, an
attachment resting on that circumstance is a necessary and rational
attachment.
This physical bond should not, indeed, disturb the intellect in its
proper function or warp its judgments; you should not, under guise of
tenderness, become foolish and attribute to your father or child greater
stature or cleverness or goodness than he actually possesses. To do so
is a natural foible but no part of piety or true loyalty. It is one
thing to lack a heart and another to possess eyes and a just
imagination. Indeed, piety is never so beautiful and touching, never so
thoroughly humane and invincible, as when it is joined to an impartial
intellect, conscious of the relativity involved in existence and able to
elude, through imaginative sympathy, the limits set to personal life by
circumstance and private duty. As a man dies nobly when, awaiting his
own extinction, he is interested to the last in what will continue to be
the interests and joys of others, so he is most profoundly pious who
loves unreservedly a country, friends, and associations which he knows
very well to be not the most beautiful on earth, and who, being wholly
content in his personal capacity with his natural conditions, does not
need to begrudge other things whatever speculative admiration they may
truly deserve. The ideal in this polyglot world, where reason can
receive only local and temporal expression, is to understand all
languages and to speak but one, so as to unite, in a manly fashion,
comprehension with propriety.
Piety is in a sense pathetic because it involves subordination to
physical accident and acceptance of finitude. But it is also noble and
eminently fruitful because, in subsuming a life under the general laws
of relativity, it meets fate with simple sincerity and labours in
accordance with the conditions imposed. Since man, though capable of
abstraction and impartiality, is rooted like a vegetable to one point
in space and time, and exists by limitation, piety belongs to the
equilibrium of his being. It resides, so to speak, at his centre of
gravity, at the heart and magnetic focus of his complex endowment. It
exercises there the eminently sane function of calling thought home. It
saves speculative and emotional life from hurtful extravagance by
keeping it traditional and social. Conventional absurdities have at
least this advantage, that they may be taken conventionally and may come
to be, in practice, mere symbols for their uses. Piety is more closely
linked with custom than with thought. It exercises an irrational
suasion, moralises by contagion, and brings an emotional peace.
[Sidenote: Embodiment essential to spirit.]
Patriotism is another form of piety in which its natural basis and
rational function may be clearly seen. It is right to prefer our own
essential to country to all others, because we are children and citizens
before we can be travellers or philosophers. Specific character is a
necessary point of origin for universal relations: a pure nothing can
have no radiation or scope. It is no accident for the soul to be
embodied; her very essence is to express and bring to fruition the
body’s functions and resources. Its instincts make her ideals and its
relations her world. A native country is a sort of second body, another
enveloping organism to give the will definition. A specific inheritance
strengthens the soul. Cosmopolitanism has doubtless its place, because a
man may well cultivate in himself, and represent in his nation,
affinities to other peoples, and such assimilation to them as is
compatible with personal integrity and clearness of purpose. Plasticity
to things foreign need not be inconsistent with happiness and utility at
home. But happiness and utility are possible nowhere to a man who
represents nothing and who looks out on the world without a plot of his
own to stand on, either on earth or in heaven. He wanders from place to
place, a voluntary exile, always querulous, always uneasy, always alone.
His very criticisms express no ideal. His experience is without
sweetness, without cumulative fruits, and his children, if he has them,
are without morality. For reason and happiness are like other
flowers—they wither when plucked.
[Sidenote: Piety to the gods takes form from current ideals.]
The object most commonly associated with piety is the gods. Popular
philosophy, inverting the natural order of ideas, thinks piety to the
gods the source of morality. But piety, when genuine, is rather an
incidental expression of morality. Its sources are perfectly natural. A
volitional life that reaches the level of reflection is necessarily
moral in proportion to the concreteness and harmony of its instincts.
The fruits which such harmonious instincts, expressed in consciousness,
may eventually bear, fruits which would be the aim of virtue, are not
readily imaginable, and the description of them has long ago been
intrusted to poets and mythologists. Thus the love of God, for example,
is said to be the root of Christian charity, but is in reality only its
symbol. For no man not having a superabundant need and faculty of loving
real things could have given a meaning to the phrase, “love of God,” or
been moved by it to any action. History shows in unequivocal fashion
that the God loved shifts his character with the shift in his
worshippers’ real affections. What the psalmist loves is the beauty of
God’s house and the place where his glory dwelleth. A priestly quietude
and pride, a grateful, meditative leisure after the storms of sedition
and war, some retired unity of mind after the contradictions of the
world—this is what the love of God might signify for the levites. Saint
John tells us that he who says he loves God and loves not his neighbour
is a liar. Here the love of God is an anti-worldly estimation of things
and persons, a heart set on that kingdom of heaven in which the humble
and the meek should be exalted. Again, for modern Catholicism the phrase
has changed its meaning remarkably and signifies in effect love for
Christ’s person, because piety has taken a sentimental turn and centred
on maintaining imaginary personal relations with the Saviour. How should
we conceive that a single supernatural influence was actually
responsible for moral effects themselves so various, and producing, in
spite of a consecutive tradition, such various notions concerning their
object and supposed source?
[Sidenote: The religion of humanity.]
Mankind at large is also, to some minds, an object of piety. But this
religion of humanity is rather a desideratum than a fact: humanity does
not actually appear to anybody in a religious light. The _nihil homine
homini utittus_ remains a signal truth, but the collective influence of
men and their average nature are far too mixed and ambiguous to fill the
soul with veneration. Piety to mankind must be three-fourths pity. There
are indeed specific human virtues, but they are those necessary to
existence, like patience and courage. Supported on these indispensable
habits, mankind always carries an indefinite load of misery and vice.
Life spreads rankly in every wrong and impracticable direction as well
as in profitable paths, and the slow and groping struggle with its own
ignorance, inertia, and folly, leaves it covered in every age of history
with filth and blood. It would hardly be possible to exaggerate man’s
wretchedness if it were not so easy to overestimate his sensibility.
There is a _fond_ of unhappiness in every bosom, but the depths are
seldom probed; and there is no doubt that sometimes frivolity and
sometimes sturdy habit helps to keep attention on the surface and to
cover up the inner void. Certain moralists, without meaning to be
satirical, often say that the sovereign cure for unhappiness is work.
Unhappily, the work they recommend is better fitted to dull pain than to
remove its cause. It occupies the faculties without rationalising the
life. Before mankind could inspire even moderate satisfaction, not to
speak of worship, its whole economy would have to be reformed, its
reproduction regulated, its thoughts cleared up, its affections
equalised and refined.
To worship mankind as it is would be to deprive it of what alone makes
it akin to the divine—its aspiration. For this human dust lives; this
misery and crime are dark in contrast to an imagined excellence; they
are lighted up by a prospect of good. Man is not adorable, but he
adores, and the object of his adoration may be discovered within him and
elicited from his own soul. In this sense the religion of humanity is
the only religion, all others being sparks and abstracts of the same.
The indwelling ideal lends all the gods their divinity. No power, either
physical or psychical, has the least moral prerogative nor any just
place in religion at all unless it supports and advances the ideal
native to the worshipper’s soul. Without moral society between the
votary and his god religion is pure idolatry; and even idolatry would be
impossible but for the suspicion that somehow the brute force exorcised
in prayer might help or mar some human undertaking.
[Sidenote: Cosmic piety.]
There is, finally, a philosophic piety which has the universe for its
object. This feeling, common to ancient and modern Stoics, has an
obvious justification in man’s dependence upon the natural world and in
its service to many sides of the mind. Such justification of cosmic
piety is rather obscured than supported by the euphemisms and
ambiguities in which these philosophers usually indulge in their attempt
to preserve the customary religious unction. For the more they personify
the universe and give it the name of God the more they turn it into a
devil. The universe, so far as we can observe it, is a wonderful and
immense engine; its extent, its order, its beauty, its cruelty, makes it
alike impressive. If we dramatise its life and conceive its spirit, we
are filled with wonder, terror, and amusement, so magnificent is that
spirit, so prolific, inexorable, grammatical, and dull. Like all animals
and plants, the cosmos has its own way of doing things, not wholly
rational nor ideally best, but patient, fatal, and fruitful. Great is
this organism of mud and fire, terrible this vast, painful, glorious
experiment. Why should we not look on the universe with piety? Is it not
our substance? Are we made of other clay? All our possibilities lie from
eternity hidden in its bosom. It is the dispenser of all our joys. We
may address it without superstitious terrors; it is not wicked. It
follows its own habits abstractedly; it can be trusted to be true to its
word. Society is not impossible between it and us, and since it is the
source of all our energies, the home of all our happiness, shall we not
cling to it and praise it, seeing that it vegetates so grandly and so
sadly, and that it is not for us to blame it for what, doubtless, it
never knew that it did? Where there is such infinite and laborious
potency there is room for every hope. If we should abstain from judging
a father’s errors or a mother’s foibles, why should we pronounce
sentence on the ignorant crimes of the universe, which have passed into
our own blood? The universe is the true Adam, the creation the true
fall; and as we have never blamed our mythical first parent very much,
in spite of the disproportionate consequences of his sin, because we
felt that he was but human and that we, in his place, might have sinned
too, so we may easily forgive our real ancestor, whose connatural sin we
are from moment to moment committing, since it is only the necessary
rashness of venturing to be without fore-knowing the price or the fruits
of existence.