11. That they are not the _King_'s Laws, nor the _Parliament_'s Laws, but
the _Laws of England_, in which after they have passed by the Legislative
Power, the People have the _Property_, and the King the _Executive_ part.
12. That no Abilities should qualify a noted Knave to be employed in
Business. A Knave can by none of his Dexterities make amends for the
Scandal he bringeth upon the Crown.
13. That those who will not be bound by the _Laws_, rely upon _Crimes_: a
third way was never found in the World to secure any Government.
14. That a Seaman be a Seaman; a Cabinet-Counsellor a Man of Business; an
Officer, an Officer.
15. In corrupted Governments the Place is given for the sake of the Man;
in good ones the Man is chosen for the sake of the Place.
16. That Crowds at Court are made up of such as would deceive: The _real
Worshippers_ are few.
17. That _Salus Populi_ is the greatest of all Fundamentals, yet not
altogether an immoveable one. It is a Fundamental for a Ship to ride at
Anchor when it is in Port, but if a Storm cometh the Cable must be cut.
18. _Property_ is not a fundamental Right in one Sense, because in the
beginning of the World there was none, so that Property itself was an
Innovation introduced by Laws.
Property is only secured by trusting it in the best Hands, and those are
generally chosen who are least likely to deceive; but if they should, they
have a legal Authority to abuse as well as use the Power with which they
are trusted, and there is no Fundamental can stand in their way, or be
allowed as an Exception to the Authority that was vested in them.
19. _Magna Charta_ would fain be made to pass for a Fundamental; and Sir
_Edward Coke_ would have it, that the Grand Charter was for the most part
declaratory of the principal Grounds of the fundamental Laws of _England_.
If that referreth to the Common Law, it must be made out that every thing
in _Magna Charta_ is always and at all times necessary in itself to be
kept, or else the denying a subsequent Parliament the Right of repealing
any Law doth by consequence deny the preceding Parliament the Right of
making it. But they are fain to say it was only a declarative Law, which
is very hard to be proved. Yet suppose it, you must either make the Common
Law so stated a thing that all Men know it before-hand, or else
universally acquiesce in it whenever it is alledged, from the Affinity it
hath to the Law of Nature. Now I would fain know whether the Common Law is
capable of being defined, and whether it doth not hover in the Clouds
like the Prerogative, and bolteth out like Lightening to be made use of
for some particular Occasion? If so, the Government of the World is left
to a thing that cannot be defined; and if it cannot be defined, you know
not what it is; so that the supream Appeal is, we know not what. We submit
to God Almighty though he is incomprehensible, and yet He hath set down
His Methods; but for this World, there can be no Government without a
stated Rule, and a Supream Power not to be controled neither by the Dead
nor the Living.
The Laws under the Protection of the King govern in the ordinary
Administration; the extraordinary Power is in Acts of Parliament, from
whence there can be no Appeal but to the same Power at another time.
To say a Power is Supream, and not Arbitrary, is not Sense. It is
acknowledg'd Supream, and therefore, _&c._
If the Common Law is Supream, then those are so who judge what is the
Common Law; and if none but the Parliament can judge so, there is an end
of the Controversy; there is no _Fundamental_; for the Parliament may
judge as they please, that is, they have the Authority, but they may judge
against Right, their Power is good, though their Act is ill; no good Man
will outwardly resist the one, or inwardly approve the other.
There is then no other Fundamental, but that _every Supream Power must be
Arbitrary_.
Fundamental is a Word used by the Laity, as the Word Sacred is by the
Clergy, to fix every thing to themselves they have a mind to keep; that
nobody else may touch it.
_Of_ PRINCES.
A Prince who will not undergo the Difficulty of Understanding, must
undergo the Danger of Trusting.
A wise Prince may gain such an Influence, that his Countenance would be
the last Appeal. Where it is not so in some degree, his Authority is
precarious.
A Prince must keep up the Power of his Countenance, which is not the least
of his Prerogatives.
The Conscience, as well as the Prerogative of a King, must be restrained
or loosened as is best for his People.
It may without Scandal be made of stretching Leather, but it must be drawn
by a steady Hand.
A King that lets Intercession prevail, will not be long worshipped.
A Prince used to War getteth a military Logick that is not very well
suited to the Civil Administration.
If he maketh War successfully, he groweth into a Demi-God; if without
Success, the World throweth him as much below Humanity as they had before
set him above it.
A Hero must be sometimes allowed to make bold Strokes, without being
fettered by strict Reason.
He is to have some generous Irregularities in his Reasoning, or else he
will not be a good Thing of his Kind.
PRINCES (_their Rewards of Servants_).
When a Prince giveth any Man a very extravagant Reward, it looketh as if
it was rather for an ill thing than a good one.
Both the Giver and Receiver are out of countenance where they are ill
suited, and ill applyed.
Serving Princes will make Men proud at first, and humble at last.
Resolving to serve well, and at the same time resolving to please, is
generally resolving to do what is not to be done.
A Man that will serve well must often rule the Master so hard that it will
hurt him.
It is thought an unsociable Quality in a Court to do ones Duty better than
other Men.
Nothing is less forgiven than setting Patterns Men have no mind to follow.
Men are so unwilling to displease a Prince, that it is as dangerous to
inform him right, as to serve him wrong.
Where Men get by pleasing, and lose by serving, the choice is so easy that
no body can miss it.
PRINCES, _their Secrets_.
Men are so proud of Princes Secrets, that they will not see the danger of
them.
When a Prince trusteth a Man with a dangerous Secret, he would not be
sorry to hear the Bell toll for him.
_Love of the Subjects to a_ PRINCE.
The Heart of the Subjects yieldeth but a lean Crop where it is not
cultivated by a wise Prince.
The Good-will of the Governed will be starved, if it is not fed by the
good Conduct of the Governors.
_Suffering for_ PRINCES.
Those who merit because they suffered, are so very angry with those that
made them suffer, that though their Services may deserve Employment, their
Temper rendereth them unfit for it.
_Of_ MINISTERS.
The World dealeth with Ministers of State as they do with ill Fidlers,
ready to kick them down Stairs for playing ill, though few of the
Fault-finders understand their Musick enough to be good Judges.
A Minister who undertaketh to make his Master very great, if he faileth,
is ruin'd for his folly; if he succeedeth, he is feared for his Skill.
A good Statesman may sometimes mistake as much by being too humble as by
being too proud: He must take upon him in order to do his Duty, and not in
order to the setting himself out.
A Minister is not to plead the King's Command for such things as he may in
justice be supposed to have directed.
It is dangerous to serve where the Master hath the Privilege not to be
blamed.
It is hard for a Prince to esteem the Parts of a Minister without either
envying or fearing them; and less dangerous for a Minister to shew all the
Weakness than all the Strength of his Understanding.
There are so many things necessary to make up a good Minister, that no
wonder there are so few of them in the World.
There is hardly a rasher thing, than for a Man to venture to be a good
Minister.
A Minister of State must have a Spirit of liberal Oeconomy, not a
restrained Frugality.
He must enlarge his Family-Soul, and suit it to the bigger Compass of a
Kingdom.
A Prince should be asked, why he _will_ do a thing, but not why he _hath_
done it.
If the Boys were to choose a School-master, it should be one that would
not whip them; the same thing if the Courtiers were to choose a Minister.
They would have a great many Play-days, no Rods, and leave to rob
Orchards.----The Parallel will hold.
_Wicked_ MINISTERS.
A Cunning Minister will engage his Master to begin with a small wrong
Step, which will insensibly engage him in a great one.
A Man that hath the Patience to go by Steps, may deceive one much wiser
than himself.
State-business is a cruel Trade; Good-nature is a Bungler in it.
_Instruments of_ STATE-MINISTERS.
Men in Business are in as much danger from those that work under them, as
from those that work against them.
When the Instruments bend under the Weight of their Business, it is like a
weak-legg'd Horse that brings his Rider down with him.
As when they are too weak they let a Man fall, so when they are too strong
they throw him off.
If Men of Business did not forget how apt their Tools are to break or
fail, they would shut up Shop.
They must use things called _Men_ under them, who will spoil the best
Scheme that can be drawn by Human Understanding.
Tools that are blunt cannot cut at all, and those that are sharp are apt
to cut in the wrong place.
Great difference between a good Tool and a good Workman.
When the Tools will be Workmen they cut their own Fingers, and every
body's else.
_Of the_ PEOPLE.
There is more Strength in _Union_ than in _Number_; witness the People
that in all Ages have been scurvily used, because they could so seldom
agree to do themselves Right.
The more the weaker, may be as good a Proverb as, The more the merrier.
A People can no more stand without Government, than a Child can go without
Leading-Strings: as old and as big as a Nation is, it can't go by itself,
and must be led. The _Numbers_ that make its Strength, are at the same
time the Cause of its Weakness and Incapacity of Acting.
Men have so _discovered themselves_ to _one another_, that Union is become
a mere Word, in reality impracticable.
They trust, or suspect, not upon Reason but ill-grounded Fame; they would
be at ease, saved, protected, _&c._ and give nothing for it.
The lower Sort of Men must be indulged the Consolation of finding fault
with those above them; without that, they would be so melancholy, that it
would be dangerous, considering their Numbers.
They are too many to be told of their Mistakes, and for that Reason they
are never to be cured of them.
The Body of the People are generally either so dead that they cannot move,
or so mad that they cannot be reclaimed: to be neither all in a Flame, nor
quite cold, requireth more Reason than great Numbers can ever attain.
The People can seldom agree to move together against a Government, but
they can to sit still and let it be undone.
Those that will be Martyrs for the People, must expect to be repayed only
by their _Vanity_, or their _Virtue_.
A Man that will head the Mob is like a Bull let loose, tyed about with
Squibs and Crackers.
He must be half mad that goeth about it, yet at sometimes shall be too
hard for all the wise Men in a Kingdom: For though good Sense speaketh
against Madness, yet it is out of Countenance whenever it meets it.
It would be a greater Reproach to the People that their _Favour_ is
short-liv'd, if their _Malice_ was not so too.
The Thoughts of the People have no regular Motion, they come out by
Starts.
There is an accumulative Cruelty in a number of Men, though none in
particular are ill-natured.
The angry Buzz of a Multitude is one of the bloodiest Noises in the World.
_Of_ GOVERNMENT.
An exact Administration, and good choice of proper Instruments doth
insensibly make the Government in a manner absolute without assuming it.
The best Definition of the best Government is, that it hath no
Inconveniences but such as are supportable; but Inconveniences there must
be.
The Interest of the Governors and the Governed is in reality the same, but
by Mistakes on both Sides it is generally very differing. He who is a
Courtier by Trade, and the Country Gentleman who will be popular, right or
wrong, help to keep up this unreasonable Distinction.
There are as many apt to be angry at being well, as at being ill governed.
For most Men to be well governed must be scurvily used.
As Mankind is made, the keeping it in order is an ill-natured Office.
It is like a great Galley where the Officers must be whipping with little
Intermission, if they will do their Duty.
It is in a disorderly Government as in a River, the lightest Things swim
at the top.
A Nation is best to be judged by the Government it is under at the time.
Mankind is moulded to good or ill, according as the Power over it is well
or ill directed. A Nation is a Mass of Dough, it is the Government that
kneadeth it into Form.
Where Learning and Trade flourish in a Nation, they produce so much
Knowledge, and That so much Equality among Men, that the Greatness of
Dependencies is lost, but the Nation in general will be the better for it:
For if the Government be wise, it is the more easily governed; if not, the
bad Government is the more easily overturned, by Mens being more united
against it than when they depended upon great Men; who might sooner be
gained over and weakend by being divided.
There is more reason for allowing _Luxury_ in a Military Government than
in another; the perpetual Exercise of War not only excuseth but
recommendeth the Entertainments in the Winter. In another it groweth into
a Habit of uninterrupted Expences and idle Follies, and the Consequences
of them to a Nation become irrecoverable.