THE ARGUMENT FROM EXISTENCE.
What, now, are the facts upon which the modern believer in deity
professes to base his belief and what are the arguments used to defend
the position taken up?
Premising that the reasons advanced for the belief in deity are more in
the nature of excuses than aught else, we may take first of all the
argument derived from the mere existence of the universe, with the
alleged impossibility of conceiving it as self-existent. Along with that
there may also be taken as a variant of the argument from existence, the
alleged impossibility of a natural "order" that should result from the
inherent properties of natural forces. Now it is at least plain that
whatever difficulty there is in thinking of the universe as either
self-existing or self-adjusting is in no degree lessened by assuming a
God as the originator and sustainer of the whole. The most that it does
is to move the difficulty back a step, and while with many "out of sight
out of mind" is as true of their attitude towards mental problems as it
is towards the more ordinary things of life, the policy can hardly be
commended in serious intellectual discussions. It is not a bit easier to
think of self-existence or self-direction in connection with a god than
it is in connection with the universe. And if we must rest ultimately
with an insoluble difficulty, it is surely better to stop with the
existence we know rather than to introduce a second existence which for
all we know may be quite mythical.
It is no reply to say that the idea of God involves self-existence. It
does nothing of the kind, or at least it can do so only by our making
yet another assumption that is as unjustifiable as the previous one. If
God is a personality, we have no conception of a personality that is
self-existent. The only personality that we know is the human
personality, and that is certainly derived. Our whole knowledge of human
personality is that of something which is derived from pre-existing
personalities, each of which is a centre of derived influences. Of
personality as either the cause or the commencement of a series we have
not the slightest conception. And the man who says he has can never have
carefully examined the contents of his own mind.
The truth is that the fact of the existence of the universe provides no
ground for argument in favour of either Atheism or Theism. Existence is
a common datum for all. Some existence must be assumed in all argument
since all argument implies something that is to be discussed and
explained. And for that very reason we can offer no explanation of
existence itself, since all explanation means the merging of one class
of facts in a larger class. The largest class of facts we have is that
which is included in the term "universe," and we cannot explain that by
assuming another existence--God--about which we know nothing. To explain
the unknown by the known is an intelligible procedure. To explain the
known by the unknown is to forsake all intellectual sanity. Thus every
difficulty that surrounds the conception of the universe as an ultimate
fact, surrounds the existence of God as an ultimate fact. You cannot get
rid of a difficulty by giving it another name. And whether we call
ultimate existence "God," or "matter," or "substance," is of no vital
importance to anyone who keeps his mind on the real issue that has to be
decided. If the question, What is the cause of existence? be a
legitimate one, it applies no less to the existence of God than it does
to the existence of matter, or force, or substance. All that we gain is
another problem which we add to the problems we already possess. We
increase our burden without enlarging our comprehension. If, on the
other hand, it is said that we need an all embracing formula that will
make our conception of the universe coherent, it may be replied that we
have that in such a conception as the persistence of force. And it is
surely better to keep to a formula that does at least work, than to
devise one that is altogether useless.
The inherent weakness of the theistic conception will be best seen by
taking an orthodox presentation of the argument under consideration. In
his well-known work on "Theism," Professor Flint says "that granting all
the atoms of matter to be eternal, grant that all the properties and
forces, which with the smallest degree of plausibility can be claimed
for them to be eternal and indestructible, and it is still beyond
expression improbable that these atoms, with these forces, if
unarranged, uncombined, unutilised by a presiding mind, would give rise
to anything entitled to be called a universe. It is millions to one that
they would never produce the simplest of the regular arrangements which
we comprehend under the designation of course of nature." (_Theism_; pp.
107-8.)
Now this is an admirably clear and terse statement of an argument which
is often presented in so verbose a manner that its real nature is, to a
considerable extent, disguised. But in this case, clearness of statement
makes for ease of refutation, as will be seen.
For, instead of the statement being, as the writer seems to think,
almost self-evidently true, it is almost obtrusively false. Instead of
its being millions to one, given matter and force with all their present
properties, against the present arrangement of things occurring, it is
inconceivable, assuming that nothing but the atoms and their properties
exist, that any other arrangement than the present one should have
resulted. For the present natural order is not something that is, so to
speak, separable from our conception of natural forces, it is something
that has grown out of and is the expression of the idea of nature. Thus,
given a proper understanding of the principle of gravitation, and it is
impossible to conceive an unsupported stone _not_ falling to the ground.
Given a proper conception of the properties of the constituents of a
chemical compound, and we can only conceive one result as possible. In
all cases our conception of what _must_ occur follows from the nature of
the forces themselves. This is necessarily the case since the conception
of the ultimate properties of matter has been built up by the
observation of the actual results. And one simply cannot conceive an
alteration in these results without thinking of some alteration or
modification of the causes of which they are the expression. What is
true of the part is true of the whole. The present structure of the
world stands as the inevitable outcome of the play of natural forces.
This is both the expression of an actual fact and a condition of
coherent thought. Uniformity of results from uniformity of conditions is
a pre-requisite to sane thinking.
In reality, the expression "millions to one" is no more than an appeal
to man's awe in facing a stupendous mechanism, and his feeling of
impotence when dealing with so complex a subject as the evolution of a
world. It can only mean that to a certain state of knowledge it _seems_
millions to one against the present order resulting. But to a certain
state of knowledge it would seem millions to one against so fluid a
thing as water ever becoming solid. To others it is a commonplace thing
and a necessary consequence of the properties of water itself. To a
savage it would be millions to one against a cloud of "fire mist" ever
becoming a world with a highly diversified fauna and flora. To a
scientist there is nothing more in it than antecedent and consequent.
Such expressions as its being "millions to one" against certain things
happening is never really more than an appeal to ignorance; it means
only that our knowledge is not great enough to permit our tracing the
successive stages of the evolution before us. Once the scientific
conception of the universe is grasped, the marvel is not that the
present order exists, the marvel would be that any other "order" should
be, or that any radical alteration in it should occur.
And there really is no need to throw the whole universe at the head of
the sceptic. That is an attempt to overcome him with sheer weight.
Intrinsically there is nothing more marvellous in the evolution of a
habitable globe from the primitive nebula, than there is in the fact
that an unsupported stone always falls to the ground. It is only our
familiarity with the one experience and our lack of knowledge concerning
the other that gives us the condition of wonder in the one case and lack
of it in the other. In the light of modern knowledge "order" is, as W.
H. Mallock says, "a physical platitude, not a divine paradox."
Moreover, if the odds are a million to one against the existence of the
present arrangement existing, the odds would be equally great against
the existence of any other arrangement. And as the odds are equally
great against all--seeing that _some_ arrangement must exist--there can
be no logical value in using the argument against one arrangement in
particular. The same question, "Why this arrangement and none other?"
might arise in any case.
Finally, the absurdity of arguing that the "order" of nature compels a
belief in deity may be seen by realising the fact that our conception of
order is itself the product of the experienced sequence which
constitutes the order in question. Our ideas of order are not
independent of the world, they are its product--an expression of the
relation between organism and environment. Given a different organism,
with different sense organs, and the world would appear different. On
the other hand the whole structure of man is the result of the existing
conditions. Assume the order to be changed, and the human
organism--presuming it still to exist, will undergo corresponding
modifications. It would not find less order or less beauty, the order
and the beauty would simply be found in another direction. And,
presumably, the theist would still point to the existence of _that_
order as clear proof of a designing intelligence.
Something needs to be said here on a more recent form of the argument
from the "order" of nature than the one we have been discussing. There
is no vital distinction between the old and the new form, but a
variation in terms seems to produce on some minds a conviction of
newness--itself a proof that the nature of the old form had never been
fully realised.
This new form is that based upon what is called "Directivity."
Recognising that it is no longer possible to successfully dispute the
scientific proposition that the state of the universe at any one moment
must be taken as the result of all the conditions then prevailing, and,
therefore, it is to the operation of the ultimate properties of matter,
force, ether,--or whatever name we choose to give to the substance of
the universe--it is argued that we nevertheless require some directing
force which will set, and keep the universe on its present track.
But there is really nothing in this beyond the now familiar appeal to
human impotence. "We do not know," "We cannot see," are quite excellent
reasons for saying nothing at all, but the very worst ground on which to
make positive statements, or on which to base positive beliefs. The
only condition that would justify our making human ignorance a ground
on which to make statements of the kind named would be that we had
demonstrably exhausted the possibilities of natural forces, and no
further developments were possible in this direction. Far from this
being the case there is not a single man of science who would dissent
from the statement that we are only upon the threshold of a knowledge of
their possibilities.
And this assumption of "direction" is unconvincing, if not suicidal in
character. Assuming that direction may have occurred, the fact of
direction adds nothing to the qualities or possibilities of existence,
any more than the "directivity" of a chemist adds to the possibilities
of certain elements when he brings them into combination. Unless the
possibilities of the compound were already in the elements guidance
would be useless. And, in the same way, unless the capacity for
producing the universe we see already existed in the atoms themselves,
no amount of "direction" could have produced it. God simply takes the
place of the chemist bringing certain chemical elements in, of the
engineer guiding certain forces along a particular channel. But no new
capacity is created, and all that is done by either the chemist or the
engineer _might_ occur without their interference. Otherwise it could
not occur at all.
Now there is no denying that natural forces _do_ produce the phenomena
around us. That is undeniable. And whether there be a god or not this
fact remains quite unaffected. All that God can do is to set up certain
combinations. But this does not exclude the possibility of this
combination taking place without the operation of deity. In fact, it
implies it. Either, then, natural forces possess the capacity to produce
the universe as we see it, or they do not. If they do not, then it is
impossible for us to conceive in what way even deity could produce it.
If, on the other hand, they have this capacity, the argument for the
existence of deity loses its force, and the theist is bound to admit
that all that he claims as due to the action of deity might have
happened without him. The theists own argument, if logically pursued
ends in divesting it of all coercive value.
It is curious that the theist should fail to see that a much stronger
argument for the operation of deity would have been of a negative
character, to have proved that in some way God manifested an inhibitive
influence and thus prevented certain things occurring which would have
transpired but for his interference. Regularity, or "order" is, as we
have seen, the necessary consequence of the persistence of force. And so
long as natural forces continue to express themselves in the way in
which experience has led us to expect there is no need for us to think
of anything beyond. The principle of inertia is with us here, for if it
be true that force will persist in a given direction unless deflected
from its course by some other force, it must be equally true that _all_
forces will work out a given consequence unless they are deflected from
their course by the operation of some superior force.
Now if it were possible for the theist to show that in certain cases the
normal consequences of known forces did not transpire, and that the
aberration could not be accounted for by the operation of any other
conceivable force, it might be argued with some degree of plausibility
that there exists a controlling power beyond which answers to God. That
might afford a plausible case for "directivity." But to insist upon the
prevalence of "natural order" will not help the case for theism. It will
rather embarrass it. It may, of course, impress all those whose
conception of scientific method is poor--and sometimes one thinks that
this is all that is deliberately aimed at--but it will not affect anyone
else. To the informed mind it will appear that the Goddite is weakening
his case with every step he takes in the direction of what he apparently
believes to be a demonstration of its logical invulnerability.