Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Martin Pettit and
the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
http://www.pgdp.net
THEISM OR ATHEISM
THE GREAT ALTERNATIVE
By CHAPMAN COHEN
THE PIONEER PRESS,
61, Farringdon Street,
----E.C.4----
1921.
Contents.
Part I.
AN EXAMINATION OF THEISM.
PAGE
Chapter I. What is God? 9
Chapter II. The Origin of the Idea of God 20
Chapter III. Have we a Religious Sense? 37
Chapter IV. The Argument from Existence 49
Chapter V. The Argument from Causation 59
Chapter VI. The Argument from Design 69
Chapter VII. The Disharmonies of Nature 85
Chapter VIII. God and Evolution 94
Chapter IX. The Problem of Pain 110
Part II.
SUBSTITUTES FOR ATHEISM.
Chapter X. A Question of Prejudice 131
Chapter XI. What is Atheism? 138
Chapter XII. Spencer and the Unknowable 151
Chapter XIII. Agnosticism 169
Chapter XIV. Atheism and Morals 181
Chapter XV. Atheism Inevitable 194
PREFACE.
Shrouded in the cloak of philosophy, the question of the existence of
God continues to attract attention, and, I may add, to command more
respect than it deserves. For it is only by a subterfuge that it assumes
the rank of philosophy. "God" enters into philosophy only when it is
beginning to lose caste in its proper home, and then in its new
environment it undergoes such a transformation as to contain very little
likeness to its former, and proper, self. It disowns its parentage and
claims another origin, and, like so many genealogists devising pedigrees
for the parvenu, certain philosophers attempt to map out for the
newcomer an ancestry to which he can establish no valid claim. Nothing
would, indeed, surprise the ancestor more than to be brought face to
face with his descendant. He would not be more astonished than would the
ancient Eohippus on meeting with a modern dray-horse. In anthropology or
history the idea of God may fairly claim a place, but it has no place in
philosophy on any sensible meaning of the word.
The consequence of this transference of the idea of God to the sphere of
philosophy is the curious position that the God in which people believe
is not the God whose existence is made the product of an argument, and
the God of the argument is not the God of belief. The theory and the
fact have no more likeness to each other than a chestnut horse has to a
horse-chestnut. A fallacy is perpetuated by appealing to a fact, but the
fact immediately discredits the fallacy by disowning it in practice. The
grounds upon which the belief in God is supposed to rest, the reasoning
from which it springs, are seen to follow the belief instead of
preceding it. The roots are in the air, and on closer inspection are
seen to be artificial adornments, so many imitations that have been hung
there for the purpose of imposing on near-sighted or careless observers.
The purpose of the following pages is to make clear the nature of this
alliance and to expose the real character of what we are asked to
worship. There are, of course, many on whose ears any amount of
reasoning will fall without effect. To that class this book will not
appeal; it may be questioned whether many will even read it. They will
go on professing the belief they have always professed, and taking pride
in the fact that they have an intellect which is superior to proof, and
which disdains evidence when it runs contrary to "my belief." Others
will, I expect, complain that the treatment of so solemn a subject is
not "reverent" enough. But why _any_ subject should be treated
reverently, as a condition of examination, is more than I have ever been
able to discover. It is asking the inquirer to commence his
investigation with a half-promise to find something good in what he is
about to examine. Whether a thing is worthy of reverence or not is a
conclusion that must follow investigation, not precede it. And one does
not observe any particular reverence shown by the religious person
towards those beliefs in which he does not happen to believe.
But there are some who will read thoughtfully an examination of so old a
subject as Theism, and it is to those that these pages are addressed.
One cannot hope to say anything that is strikingly new on so well worn a
subject as the existence of God, but there are many who will read an old
subject when presented in a new work, and even then there is also the
possibility of presenting an old topic in a slightly new form. And I
think these will find the main lines of the defence set up by the
Goddite dealt with in a manner that should at least make the point at
issue clear.
Finally, it is one aim of this book to press home the point that the
logical issue is between Theism and Atheism. That there is no logical
halting place between the two, and that any attempt to call a halt is
little more than a concession to a desire for mental or social
convenience, seems to me as clear as anything can well be. And there is
really nothing gained, ultimately, by the halt. Disinclination on the
part of the non-Theist to push the issue to its logical conclusion is
treated by the Theist as inability to do so, and is used as an argument
in support of his own belief. In matters of the intellect, compromise is
almost always a dangerous policy. It heartens one's enemies and
disheartens one's friends. And there is really no adequate reason why
those who have given up belief in deity should continue to treat this
master superstition of the ages as though it were one of our most
valuable inheritances, to be surrendered with lowered heads and sinking
hearts. We who know both sides know that in giving up the belief in
deity we have lost nothing of value, nothing that need cause us a single
regret. And on that point we certainly can speak with authority; for we
have been where the Theist is, he has not been where we are. Many of us
know quite well all that is meant by the fear and trembling with which
the believer looks upon a world without God. And we know how idle the
fear is--as idle as a child's fear of the dark. What the world is like
_with_ God, there is all the experience of history to inform us; and it
would indeed be strange if love and brotherhood, armed with the weapons
that science has given us, could not produce a better human society than
has ever existed under the dominion of the Gods.
Part I.
AN EXAMINATION OF THEISM.
CHAPTER I.
WHAT IS GOD?
Soon after that famous Atheist, Charles Bradlaugh, entered the House of
Commons, it is said that a fellow member approached him with the remark,
"Good God, Bradlaugh, what does it matter whether there is a God or
not?" Bradlaugh's answer is not recorded, but one is impelled to open
the present examination of the belief in God, by putting the same
question in another form. Is the belief in God, as we are so often
assured, one of the most important questions that can engage the
attention of man? Under certain conditions one can conceive a rational
answer in the affirmative. Where the mental and social conditions are
such that men seriously believe the incidence of natural forces on
mankind to be determined by the direct action of "God," one can
appreciate right belief concerning him being treated as of first rate
importance. In such circumstances wrong ideas are the equivalent of
disaster. But we are not in that condition to-day. It is, indeed, common
ground with all educated men and women that natural happenings are
independent of divine control to at least the extent that natural forces
affect all alike, and without the least reference to religious beliefs.
Fire burns and water drowns, foods sustain and poisons kill, no matter
what our opinions on theology may be. In an earthquake or a war there is
no observable relation between casualties and religious opinions. We
are, in fact, told by theologians that it is folly to expect that there
should be. A particular providence is no longer in fashion; God, we are
told, works only through general laws, and that is only another way of
saying that our opinions about God have no direct or observable
influence on our well-being. It is a tacit admission that human welfare
depends upon our knowledge and manipulation of the forces by which we
are surrounded. There _may_ be a God behind these forces, but that
neither determines the extent of our knowledge of them or our power to
manipulate them. The belief in God becomes a matter of, at best,
secondary importance, and quite probably of no importance whatever.
But if that be so why bother about the belief? Is that not a reason for
leaving it alone and turning our attention to other matters? The answer
to that is that the belief in God is not of so detached a character as
this advice assumes. In the course of ages the belief in God has
acquired associations that give it the character of a highly obstructive
force. It has become so entangled with inculcated notions of right and
wrong that it is everywhere used as a buttress for institutions which
have either outgrown their utility, or are in need of serious
modification in the interests of the race. The opposition encountered in
any attempt to deal with marriage, divorce, or education, are examples
of the way in which religious ideas are permitted to interfere with
subjects that should be treated solely from the standpoint of social
utility. The course of human development has been such that religion has
hitherto occupied a commanding position in relation to social laws and
customs, with the result that it is often found difficult to improve
either until the obstructive influence of religious beliefs has been
dealt with.
It is not, then, because I believe the question of the existence of God
to be of intrinsic importance that an examination of its validity is
here undertaken. Its importance to-day is of a purely contingent
character. The valid ground for now discussing its truth is that it is
at present allowed to obstruct the practical conduct of life. And under
similar circumstances it would be important to investigate the
historical accuracy of Old Mother Hubbard or Jack and the Beanstalk. Any
belief, no matter what its nature, must be dealt with as a fact of some
social importance, so long as it is believed by large numbers to be
essential to the right ordering of life. Whether true or false, beliefs
are facts--mental and social facts, and the scheme of things which
leaves them out of account is making a blunder of the most serious kind.
Certainly, conditions were never before so favourable for the delivery
of a considered judgment on the question of the belief in God. On the
one side we have from natural science an account of the universe which
rules the operations of deity out of court. And on the other side we
have a knowledge of the mode of origin of the belief which should leave
us in no doubt as to its real value. We hope to show later that the
question of origin is really decisive; that in reaching conclusions
concerning the origin of the god-idea we are passing judgment as to its
value. That the masters of this form of investigation have not usually,
and in so many words, pushed their researches to their logical
conclusions is no reason why we should refrain from doing so. Facts are
in themselves of no great value. It is the conclusions to which they
point that are the important things.
If the conclusions to which we refer are sound, then the whole basis of
theism crumbles away. If we are to regard the god-idea as an evolution
which began in misunderstandings of nature that were rooted in the
ignorance of primitive man, it would seem clear that no matter how
refined or developed the idea may become, it can rest on no other or
sounder basis than that which is presented to us in the psychology of
primitive man. Each stage of theistic belief grows out of the preceding
stage, and if it can be shown that the beginning of this evolution arose
in a huge blunder I quite fail to see how any subsequent development can
convert this unmistakable blunder into a demonstrable truth. To take a
case in point. When it was shown that so far as witchcraft rested on
observed facts these could be explained on grounds other than those of
the malevolent activities of certain old women, the belief in witchcraft
was not "purified," neither did it advance to any so-called higher
stage; it was simply abandoned as a useless and mischievous explanation
of facts that could be otherwise accounted for. Are we logically
justified in dealing with the belief in God on any other principle? We
cannot logically discard the world of the savage and still retain his
interpretation of it. If the grounds upon which the savage constructed
his theory of the world, and from which grew all the ghosts and gods
with which he believed himself to be surrounded, if these grounds are
false, how can we still keep in substance to conclusions that are
admittedly based on false premises? We can say with tolerable certainty
that had primitive man known what we know about nature the gods would
never have been born. Civilised man does not discover gods, he discards
them. It was a profound remark of Feurbach's, that religion is
ultimately anthropology, and it is anthropology that gives to all forms
of theism the death blow.
In our own time, at least, it is not difficult to see that the word God
retains its influence with many because of the indefinite manner in
which it is used. It is never easy to say what a person has in his mind
when he uses the word. In most cases one would be safe in saying that
nothing at all is meant. It is just one of those "blessed" words where
the comfort felt in their use is proportionate to the lack of definite
meaning that accompanies them. A frank confession of ignorance is
something that most people heartily dislike, and where problems are
persistent and difficult of solution what most people are in search of
is a narcotic. That "God" is one of the most popular of narcotics will
be denied by none who study the psychology of the average man or woman.
When not used as a narcotic, "God" is brought into an argument as though
it stood for a term which carried a well defined and well understood
meaning. In work after work dealing with theism one looks in vain for
some definition of "God." All that one can do is to gather the author's
meaning from the course of his argument, and that is not always an easy
task. The truth is, of course, that instead of the word carrying with it
a generally understood meaning there is no word that is more loosely
used or which carries a greater variety of meanings. Its connotations
are endless, and range from the aggressively man-like deity of the
primitive savage up--or down--to the abstract force of the mathematical
physicist and the shadowy "Absolute" of the theologising metaphysician.
The consequence of this is to find commonly that while it is one kind of
a god that is being set up in argument, it is really another god that is
being defended and even believed in. When we find people talking of
entering into communion with God, or praying to God, it is quite certain
they do not conceive him as a mere mathematical abstraction, or as a
mere symbol of an unknown force. It is impossible to conceive any sane
man or woman extracting comfort from praying or talking to a god who
could not think, or feel, or hear. And if he possesses qualities that
the religious attitude implies, we endow him with all the attributes of
personality, and, be it noted, of human personality. Either one God is
believed in in fact while another is established in theory, or an
elaborate argument is presented which serves no other purpose than a
disguise for the fact that there is no genuine belief left.
An example of the misleading way in which words are used is supplied by
Sir Oliver Lodge, who for a man of science shows an amazing capacity for
making use of unscientific language. In his "Man and the Universe,"
discussing the attributes of deity, he says, "Let no worthy attribute be
denied to the deity. In anthropomorphism there are many errors, but
there is one truth. Whatever worthy attributes belong to man, be it
personality or any other, its existence in the universe is thereby
admitted; it belongs to the all." Putting on one side the fallacy
involved in speaking of attributes as though they were good or bad in
themselves, one wonders why Sir Oliver limits this inference to the
"worthy" attributes? Unworthy attributes are as real as worthy ones. If
honesty exists so does dishonesty. Kindness is as real as cruelty. And
if we must credit the deity with possessing all the good attributes, to
whom must we credit the bad ones? A little later Sir Oliver does admit
that we must credit the deity with the bad attributes also, but adds
that they are dying out. But as they are _part_ of the deity, their
decay must mean that the deity is also undergoing a process of change,
of education, and is as much subject to the law of growth as we are.
Surely that is not what people mean when they speak about God. A god who
is only a part of the cosmic process ceases to be a god in any
reasonable sense of the term.
Professor Mellone, in his "God and the World," says that the word God
"becomes a name for the infinite system of law regarded as a whole" (p.
122). If that were really all that was meant by the word the matter
would not be worth discussing. "God" as a symbol of a generalisation is
a mere name, and as such is as good as any other name. But, again, it is
plain that people mean more than that when they speak about God. If God
is a name for universal law, let any really religious man try the plan
of substituting in his prayers and in his thoughts the phrase "Universal
Law" for "God," and then see how long he will retain his religion. As
Mr. Balfour points out ("Theism and Humanism," p. 20), the god of
religion and the god of philosophy represent two distinct beings, and it
is hard to see how the two can be fused into one. The plain truth is
that it is impossible to now make the existence of the god of religion
reasonable, and the plan adopted is that of arguing for the existence of
something about which there is often no dispute, and then introducing as
the product of the argument something that has never been argued for at
all. It is the philosophic analogue of the hat and omelette trick.
In this connection some well considered words of Sir James Frazer are
well worth noting. He says:--
By a god I understand a superhuman and supernatural being, of a
spiritual and personal nature, who controls the world or some part
of it on the whole for good, and who is endowed with intellectual
faculties, moral feelings, and active powers, which we can only
conceive on the analogy of human faculties, feelings, and
activities, though we are bound to suppose that in the divine
nature they exist in an infinitely higher degree, than the
corresponding faculties, feelings, and activities of man. In short,
by a God I mean a beneficent supernatural spirit, the ruler of the
world or of some part of it, who resembles man in nature though he
excels him in knowledge, goodness, and power. This is, I think, the
sense in which the ordinary man speaks of a God, and I believe that
he is right in so doing. I am aware that it has been not unusual,
especially of late years, to apply the name of God to very
different conceptions, to empty it of all implications of
personality, and to reduce it to signifying something very large
and very vague, such as the Infinite or the Absolute (whatever
these hard words may signify) the great First Cause, the Universal
Substance, the stream of tendency by which all things seek to
fulfil the law of their being, and so forth. Now, without
expressing opinion as to the truth or falsehood of the views
implied by such applications of the name of God, I cannot but
regard them as illegitimate extensions of the term, in short, an
abuse of language, and I venture to protest against it in the
interest, not only of verbal accuracy, but of clear thinking,
because it is apt to conceal from ourselves and others a real and
very important change of thought; in particular it may lead many to
imagine that the persons who use the name of God in one or other of
these extended senses retain theological opinions which they may in
fact have long abandoned. Thus the misuse of the name of God may
resemble the stratagem in war of putting up dummies to make an
enemy imagine that a fort is still held long after it has been
abandoned by the garrison. (_The Belief in Immortality_; pp. 9-10.
Vol. I.).
This expression of opinion from an authoritative quarter is very much
needed. The fear of public opinion displayed by many "advanced" thinkers
is in this country one of the greatest obstacles to rapid advance. It is
simply deplorable to observe the trouble taken by some to coin new
names, or the illegitimate use made of old ones, for no other
discoverable reason than that of disguising from the world the fact that
the orthodox beliefs are no longer held. The need of to-day is not so
much liberal thought as strong and courageous thought; and one would
cheerfully hand back to orthodoxy a fairly large parcel of a certain
type of heretical thinker in exchange for a single one who used plain
language to express clear convictions.
What is it that the mass of believers have in their minds when they
speak of God? There can be no doubt but that what the plain man has
always understood by "God" is a person. Every book of religious devotion
implies this; every prayer that is offered takes it for granted that
_someone_ will listen, and probably grant the petition. God is personal,
God is just, God is beneficent, God is intelligent, these are
conceptions that are bound up with all the religions of the world, and
without which they would lack both significance and value. A very acute
theistic writer, Mr. W. H. Mallock, puts this quite plainly when he says
that the God of theism "is represented as revealing himself in the
universe, firstly, as the mind which animates and moves everything,
secondly, as a purposing mind which is infinitely wise and powerful, and
has created a perfect universe with a view to some perfect end; and
lastly, as an ethical mind which out of all the things created by it,
has selected men as the object of a preferential love. A personality
which thinks and wills and loves and hates. That is what mankind in the
mass have always meant by 'God.'"
Indeed, any other kind of God is inconceivable. Whatever may be the
metaphysical subtleties employed, we come ultimately to that. It is
this, the older and the vital conception that is being fought for. The
arguments for any other kind of existence are mere subterfuges. The
pleas for an "Absolute" or an "Unconditioned" are only used to buttress
the older conception, and never till the older one has lost its force.
The unconditioned God is argued for only that it may serve as the basis
for the belief in a personal one. What is proved is not what is asked
for; what is asked for is not what is proved. No wonder that so eminent
a writer as Mr. F. H. Bradley feels constrained to give these
verbalistic thimble riggers a smart rap over the knuckles, as in the
following passage:--
Most of those who insist on the "personality of God" are
intellectually dishonest. They desire one conclusion, and, to reach
it, they argue for another. But the second, if proved, is quite
different, and answers their purpose only because they obscure it
and confound it with the first.... The deity they want, is, of
course, finite, a person much like themselves, with thoughts and
feelings limited and mutable in the process of time.... And for
their purpose, what is not this is really nothing. (_Appearance and
Reality_; p. 532).
And it is really what people mean by God that is decisive. It is not at
all a question of what they might be made to mean, or what they ought to
mean. It is wholly a matter of what they _do_ mean. And to say that what
people intend to affirm in an expression of belief is not true, is to
say that the belief itself is false. If the God I believe in is a
delusion, then my God ceases to exist. True, I may if I think it worth
while acquire another one, but that will not revive the first. It is
what people believe that is the important question, not what some
ingenious speculator may succeed in making the belief stand for.
Honestly to be of service to theism the God established must be a
person. To be intelligible, having regard to the historical developments
of religion, the God proved must be a person. The relation demanded by
religion between man and God must be of a personal character. No man can
love a pure abstraction; he might as reasonably fall in love with a
triangle or profess devotion to the equator. The God of religion must be
a person, and it is precisely that, as a controlling force of the
universe, in which modern thought finds it more and more difficult to
believe, and which modern science decisively rejects. And in rejecting
this the death blow is given to those religious ideas, which however
disguised find their origin in the fear-stricken ignorance of the
primitive savage.