CONKLING DOWN AND OUT
1881
In the speakership contest of January, 1881, the anti-Conkling leaders
discovered a disposition to profit by the election of Garfield. They
wanted to learn their voting strength, and to encourage assemblymen to
oppose George H. Sharpe, the Stalwart candidate, the _Tribune_, in
double-leaded type, announced, apparently with authority, that the
President-elect would not allow them to suffer.[1732] This sounded a
trifle warlike. It also quickly enhanced the stress between the
opposing factions, for those who are themselves not averse to
wire-pulling are morbidly suspicious of intrigue in others.
[Footnote 1732: New York _Tribune_ (editorial), January 3, 1881.]
But nothing came of the _Tribune's_ announcement. Sharpe's creditable
service on Grant's staff, his cleverness as a Stalwart manager, and
his acceptability as a speaker of the preceding Assembly, brought him
troops of friends. Although making no pretensions to the gift of
oratory, he possessed qualities needed for oratorical success. He was
forceful, remarkably clear, with impressive manners and a winning
voice. As a campaign speaker few persons in the State excelled him.
Men, too, generally found him easy of approach and ready to listen. At
all events his tactful management won a majority of the Republican
assemblymen before the opposition got a candidate into the field.
Under these circumstances members did not fancy staking good committee
appointments against the uncertainty of Presidential favours, and in
the end Sharpe's election followed without dissent.
In the election of a United States senator to succeed Francis Kernan
on March 4, the Stalwarts did not find such smooth sailing. For
several years, ever since the gubernatorial nomination in 1876,
jealousy, accumulated resentment, and inevitable distrust had divided
them, but not until Thomas C. Platt of Owego and Richard Crowley of
Niagara announced their candidacy did the smouldering bitterness burst
into a blaze. Cornell and his friends promptly declared for Platt,
while Arthur, Sharpe, Thomas Murphy, and John F. Smyth, known as ultra
Conkling men, wheeled into line for Crowley. Conkling held aloof. He
probably preferred Levi P. Morton, although each candidate claimed to
be his preference. In the end Morton's name was tangled up in the
controversy, but he did not really get into it. Besides, a place in
the Cabinet seemed open to him.
At this time Cornell was at the height of his power. Prior to his
inauguration he had not stood for much in the way of statesmanship. He
was known principally as the maker and chauffeur of Conkling's
machine, which he subsequently turned over to Arthur, who came later
into the Conkling connection from the Morgan wing. Moreover, the
manner of his election, the loss of many thousand Republican votes,
and his reappointment of Smyth seriously discredited him. But friend
and foe admitted that he had shown real ability as governor. He had
about him no angles and no surprises. He exercised authority
cautiously, marshalled facts with skill, and presented clear and
enlightened reasons for his action. He seemed to be above rather than
below the level of his party, and his official colleagues, working in
harmony with his policies, found him honourable, if sometimes stubborn
and aggressive.
But in his relations to men as well as to policies he had betrayed a
disposition to change position. He did not attend the Chicago
convention. Nor did Arthur's nomination, brought about largely by
Sharpe's activity, particularly please him. While he behaved with
decorum and perhaps with loyalty, it was evident that if he did not
raise the standard of revolt, he had chosen to fight for his hand.
This became the more apparent as the senatorial contest progressed. A
grim darksomeness about the expression of his countenance showed that
he took a sullen satisfaction in humiliating those who had humiliated
him. It was deftly done, but in the result it left its impression.
Crowley, then in his forty-sixth year, was well equipped for the
Senate. As a forceful speaker he was an object of respect even by his
opponents. In whatever legislative body he appeared he ranked amongst
the foremost debaters, generally speaking with an enlightenment and a
moderation that did credit to his intellect and to the sweetness of
his nature. He had served four years in the State Senate, one term in
Congress, and eight years as United States attorney in the Northern
District, being justly distinguished as one of the able men of Western
New York. He was sadly handicapped, however, by the infirmity of his
backers. Sharpe excited the deepest resentment by withholding the
appointment of the Assembly committees;[1733] and Smyth and Murphy
represented all that was undesirable in politics.
[Footnote 1733: "Senator Woodin spoke of Truman G. Younglove, the only
speaker in the history of the State who had dared to hold back the
committees in order to influence a senatorial caucus, as a 'political
corpse,' and said that Sharpe would share his fate."--New York
_Tribune_, January 13, 1881.]
Cornell was fortunate in his candidate. Platt's cool, quiet methods
had aroused little antipathy, while around him gathered loyalty and
gratitude. Very early in the contest, too, it began to be whispered
that if elected he might act independently of Conkling. To think of a
light-weight sparring up to a recognised champion tickled the
imagination of the Independents who numbered about forty, of whom
Chauncey M. Depew was the choice of a majority.[1734] Ira Davenport of
Steuben, a State senator of decided character and strength, supported
his brother-in-law, Sherman S. Rogers of Erie, and others talked of
Vice-President Wheeler. George William Curtis argued that the aim of
the Independents should be to vote for the cause even if they voted
for different candidates, and thus show to the country and to Garfield
that a large and resolute opposition to the ruling organisation
existed in the party.[1735]
[Footnote 1734: "Blaine, representing Garfield, came to New York and
asked me to enter the contest for the purpose of securing the election
of a senator who would support the Administration. That was the reason
why I became a candidate."--Interview of Mr. Depew with the author,
February 19, 1909.]
[Footnote 1735: _Harper's Weekly_, February 5, 1881.]
On the other hand, Depew's friends thought it wiser to "split the
machine." It was a taking proposition. If the two senators, they
argued, differed upon questions of patronage, the one agreeing with
the President would undoubtedly prevail. Thus the Senator and the
Governor, backed by the patronage of the State and Federal
administrations, would control a machine of great possibilities.
Conkling appreciated the danger, and Warner Miller and William H.
Robertson approved the plan.
Miller was then in the prime of life. He combined the occupations of
manufacturer and farmer, evidenced marked capacity for business, and
gave substantial promise of growing leadership. From the schools of
Oswego he had entered Union College, and after teaching in Fort Edward
Collegiate Institute he became a soldier. Since 1874 he had been in
the Assembly and in Congress. He was fully six feet tall, well
proportioned, with a large head, a noticeably high forehead, a strong,
self-reliant, colourless face, and a resolute chin. A blond moustache
covered a firm mouth. He had the appearance of a man of reserve power,
and as a speaker, although without the gift of brilliantly phrased
sentences, he made a favourable impression. His easy, simple manner
added to the vigour and clearness of his words. Perhaps in the end he
fell short of realising the full measure of strength that his ardent
friends anticipated, for he possessed none of the characteristics of
the boss and seemed incapable of submitting to the daily drudgery that
political leadership demands. But for several years the reasonableness
of his opinions had an unmistakable influence upon the judgment of
men. Certainly, in 1881, his opinion greatly strengthened the Depew
scheme, and it soon became apparent that a sufficient number of
Independents could be relied upon to choose Platt. In the conference
that followed the latter promised to support the Garfield
administration. "Does that statement cover appointments?" asked
Woodin. Platt said it did. "Even if Judge Robertson's name should be
sent in?" insisted Woodin. Platt replied, "Yes."[1736] That settled it,
and Platt's nomination occurred on the first ballot.[1737] Among the
earliest to send him congratulations was Senator Conkling.
[Footnote 1736: Interview of Mr. Depew with the author, March 28, 1909.
See also New York _Tribune_, January 9, 1882. "Among others present at
the conference," added Depew, "were Webster Wagner, John Birdsall,
Dennis McCarthy, and William H. Robertson of the State Senate, James
W. Husted, and George Dawson of the Albany _Evening Journal_. Woodin
remarked, 'We can trust Platt, and when he's elected senator we shall
not need a step-ladder to reach his ear.'"]
[Footnote 1737: Total vote in caucus, 105. Necessary to a choice, 53.
Platt, 54; Crowley, 26; Rogers, 10; Wheeler, 10; Lapham, 4; Morton, 1.
The election, which occurred on January 18, resulted: Senate, Platt,
25; Kernan, 6; Assembly, Platt, 79, Kernan, 44.]
After the campaign of 1880 Conkling seemed to dismiss the feeling
exhibited toward Garfield at Chicago, and in February (1881), at the
invitation of the President-elect, he visited Mentor. The Senator
asked the appointment of Levi P. Morton as secretary of the treasury,
and Garfield consented to give him the Navy, or select Thomas L. James
for postmaster-general. "This conference was not wholly
satisfactory,"[1738] but Conkling's position at the inauguration
ceremonies, voluntarily taken directly behind Garfield while the
latter read his inaugural address, indicated a real friendship. His
motion in the Senate that James be confirmed as postmaster-general
without the usual reference to a committee seemed to support this
belief, an impression subsequently stimulated by the prompt
confirmation of William M. Evarts for commissioner to the
International Monetary Conference, Henry G. Pearson for postmaster of
New York, and Levi P. Morton for minister to France.[1739] Two weeks
later came a bunch of five Stalwarts.[1740] The next day (March 23)
Garfield nominated William H. Robertson for collector of customs at
New York and Edwin A. Merritt for consul-general to London. "That
evens things up," said Dennis McCarthy, the well-known Half-breed of
the State Senate. "This is a complete surprise," added Robertson. "To
my knowledge no one has solicited for me any place under Garfield. It
comes entirely unsought."[1741] It was no less a surprise to the
Stalwarts. Not a hint of it had been dropped by the President. "We had
been told only a few hours before," wrote Conkling, "that no removals
in the New York offices were soon to be made or even considered, and
had been requested to withhold the papers and suggestions bearing on
the subject until we had notice from the President of his readiness to
receive them."[1742] Indeed, the nomination came with such suddenness
that the action seemed to be hasty and ill considered.
[Footnote 1738: Alfred R. Conkling, _Life of Conkling_, p. 634.]
[Footnote 1739: Morton declined the navy portfolio, preferring the
mission to France.]
[Footnote 1740: Stewart L. Woodford, U.S. attorney, and Louis F. Payn,
U.S. marshal for the Southern District; Asa W. Tenney, U.S. attorney
for the Eastern District; Clinton D. MacDougall, U.S. marshal for the
Northern District; and John Tyler, collector of customs, Buffalo.
These were reappointments.]
[Footnote 1741: New York _Tribune_, March 24, 1881.]
[Footnote 1742: From Conkling's letter of resignation.--New York
_Tribune_, May 17, 1881.]
There is much literature on the subject. Reminiscences of public men
during the last decade have opened a flood of memories, some of them
giving specific statements from the principal actors. Blaine assured
George S. Boutwell that he had no knowledge of Robertson's nomination
until it had been made, and Garfield told Marshall Jewell that Blaine,
hearing of the nomination, came in very pale and much astonished.[1743]
Garfield wrote (May 29, 1881) Thomas M. Nichols, once his private
secretary, that "the attempt to shift the fight to Blaine's shoulders
is as weak as it is unjust. The fact is, no member of the Cabinet
behaves with more careful respect for the rights of his brother men
than Blaine. It should be understood that the Administration is not
meddling in New York politics. It only defends itself when
assailed."[1744] The President said to Conkling, declares Hoar, that he
desired to make one conspicuous appointment of a New York man who had
supported him against Grant, and that thereafter, upon consultation
with the two Senators, appointments should be made of fit men without
regard to factions. To this Conkling refused his consent, stoutly
objecting to Robertson's appointment to any important office in this
country. "Conkling's behaviour in the interview," said President
Garfield "was so insolent that it was difficult for him to control
himself and keep from ordering him out of his presence."[1745] Conkling
says the President, on the Sunday preceding the appointment, informed
him "that the collectorship of New York would be left for another
time."[1746] In a statement purporting to come from the President,
Jewell relates that when the five Stalwart nominations went to the
Senate, Garfield was immediately burdened with letters and despatches
in protest, coupled with the suggestion that everything had been
surrendered to Conkling, and that without delay or consultation he
sent in Robertson's name. "It was only an instance," says Boutwell,
"of General Garfield's impulsive and unreasoning submission to an
expression of public opinion, without waiting for evidence of the
nature and value of that opinion."[1747]
[Footnote 1743: Boutwell, _Reminiscences of Sixty Years_, Vol. 2, p.
274.]
[Footnote 1744: New York _Tribune_, January 7, 1882.]
[Footnote 1745: Hoar, _Autobiography_, Vol. 2, p. 57.]
[Footnote 1746: Boutwell, _Reminiscences_, Vol. 2, p. 273.]
[Footnote 1747: _Ibid._, p. 274.]
On the other hand, the country at large accepted it as a Blaine
triumph. Senators, especially those who had served in the House with
the President and his Secretary of State, had no doubt of it. Such a
tremendously bold act was entirely foreign to Garfield's character.
Nor could it have but one meaning. The man who had split the New York
delegation for Blaine was to have his reward and to occupy the place
of patronage and of power. More than that it was Blaine's long look
ahead. Such action required the highest order of political courage. It
opened an old quarrel, it invited opposition, it challenged to battle.
Men like Senator Frye of Maine, who had many times witnessed the
resolution and dominating fearlessness of Blaine, knew that it was his
act. "For sixteen years," said Frye, "the sting of Blaine's attack
kept Conkling unfriendly. Besides, he had no confidence in him.
Whenever reconciliation seemed imminent, it vanished like a
cloud-shadow. I could never unite them. Blaine was ready, but Conkling
would accept no advances. When Robertson's appointment came he knew as
well as I that it was the act of Blaine."[1748] Depew, with whom Blaine
had conferred, took the same view. On the day after the nomination was
sent in, Mrs. Blaine, rather exultingly and without any expression of
surprise, wrote her daughter of the incident. "Your father has just
gone to the Department. Did you notice the nominations sent in
yesterday? They mean business and strength."[1749]
[Footnote 1748: Conversation with the author, December 7, 1908.]
[Footnote 1749: Mrs. James G. Blaine, _Letters_ (March 24, 1881), Vol.
1, p. 197.]
Boutwell illustrates Conkling's lack of confidence in Blaine. After
the latter had become secretary of state he said to the Massachusetts
Senator that Conkling was the only man who had had three elections to
the Senate, and that he and his friends would be considered fairly in
the New York appointments. "When in conversation with Conkling, I
mentioned Blaine's remark, he said, 'Do you believe one word of that?'
I said, 'Yes, I believe Mr. Blaine.' He said with emphasis, 'I don't.'
Subsequent events strengthened Mr. Conkling in his opinion."[1750]
[Footnote 1750: _Reminiscences_, Vol. 2, p. 273.]
The cordial relations apparently existing until then between the
President and the Senator encouraged the hope that confirmation of
the nomination might not be opposed. Because of this feeling the New
York Legislature, by a formal resolution, endorsed it, and Republicans
generally spoke not unkindly of it. But Conkling, knowing that though
the voice was Garfield's, the hand was Blaine's, quickly precipitated
a contest in which the interest of the whole country centred. It
recalled the Arthur controversy, renewed the feverish energy of
Stalwart and Half-breed, and furnished glimpses of the dramatic
discord which stirred restlessly behind the curtains of Senate
secrecy. Under the rules of the Senate, Robertson's nomination went to
the Committee on Commerce, of which Conkling was chairman and in
control. Here the matter could be held in abeyance, at least until the
Stalwarts marshalled their influence to have it withdrawn. For this
purpose Vice-President Arthur and Postmaster-General James called at
the White House. Governor Cornell, through a personal friend, sent a
message to the President, declaring the nomination a great mistake and
urging its withdrawal.[1751] Other distinguished men, including Senator
Allison of Iowa, visited the President on a similar mission. When
these overtures failed compromises were suggested, such as making
Robertson a Federal judge, a district attorney, a foreign minister, or
the solicitor general.
[Footnote 1751: Alfred R. Conkling, _Life of Conkling_, p. 637.]
Meanwhile assuring messages and comforting letters from Blaine's New
York friends stimulated Garfield's courage. On March 27, four days
after the nomination, Whitelaw Reid, the accomplished editor of the
_Tribune_, telegraphed John Hay, in part, as follows: "From
indications here and at Albany we have concluded that the Conkling
plan is: First, to make tremendous pressure on the President for
withdrawal of Robertson's name under threats from Conkling and
persuasion from James. Second, if this fail, then to make their
indignation useful by extorting from the President, as a means of
placating them, the surveyorship and naval office. With these two they
think they could largely neutralise Robertson. Cornell is believed
willing to acquiesce in Robertson, hoping to get other offices.
"I wish to say to the President in my judgment this is the turning
point of his whole administration--the crisis of his fate. If he
surrenders now Conkling is president for the rest of the term and
Garfield becomes a laughing stock. On the other hand, he has only to
stand firm to succeed. With the unanimous action of the New York
Legislature, Conkling cannot make an effectual fight. That action came
solely from the belief that Garfield, unlike Hayes, meant to defend
his own administration. The Assembly is overwhelmingly Conkling, but
they did not dare go on the record against Robertson so long as they
thought the Administration meant business. Robertson should be held
firm. Boldness and tenacity now insure victory. The least wavering
would be fatal."[1752]
[Footnote 1752: For full text of telegram see New York _Tribune_,
January 7, 1882. This confidential despatch found its way into the
public press. "It must have been stolen from the wires," wrote Hay.
"Nobody but myself has ever seen it--not even Garfield. I read it to
him. It has been under lock and key ever since."--Mrs. James G.
Blaine, _Letters_, Vol. 1, p. 286.]
When Hay read this message to Garfield, the latter said, "They may
take him out of the Senate head first or feet first; I will never
withdraw him."[1753] That the President might not weaken, Depew and
other Independents spent much time in Washington during the
controversy. "The party standing of Blaine's New York supporters at
Chicago absolutely depended upon Robertson's confirmation," declared
Depew.[1754]
[Footnote 1753: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 1754: Conversation with the author, March 28, 1909.]
Conkling had not been idle. As usual he cast an anchor to the windward
by coquetting with Democratic senators and soothing his Republican
colleagues.[1755] He knew how to control in caucus as well as in
committee, and on May 2, the Republican senators appointed a Committee
of Safety, which recommended that a majority decide the order of
executive business including "uncontested nominations." These
nominations, it was explained, embraced such as were favourably
reported by a committee or accepted by the Republican senators of the
State from which the nominee hailed. In other words, the caucus action
practically notified the President that no nomination would be
confirmed that did not please a senator, if a Republican. To exclude
Robertson under such a rule it was only necessary that the New York
senators object to his confirmation. Immediately the press of the
country teemed with protests. The Constitution, it declared, imposed a
moral obligation upon senators to confirm a nomination which was not
personally unfit or improper, or which did not imperil the public
interest, and it was puerile for a majority to agree in advance to
refuse to consider any nomination to which any member, for any reason
whatever, saw fit to object. Such a rule substantially transferred the
Executive power to one branch of Congress, making the President the
agent of the Senate. It was "senatorial courtesy" run mad.
[Footnote 1755: "If any Democratic senator is thinking only of New York
politics, and of the mere party relations of the pending question of
Presidential nominations, the Democrats of New York must frankly tell
him that nothing but injury to the Democracy of New York has come or
can come of coalitions with Senator Conkling. The past is eloquent on
the subject. Whether set on foot by Mr. Tilden in 1873, or by Mr.
Kelly at a later date, Democratic coalitions with Mr. Conkling have
benefited only the Republicans. Mr. Tilden finally came to grief
through them, and so did Mr. Kelly; and, what is more important, so
did the Democratic party.... It is high time that the false lights
which Senator Conkling displayed to certain Democratic senators, and
with the help of whom the nominations of President Hayes were
thwarted, should be understood. The chequered career of Senator
Conkling should compel cautious people to inquire carefully into the
evidence for any declaration which may be made by him as to President
Garfield and his undertaking."--New York _World_, April 1, 1881.]
As the days passed senators exhibited, under pressure from the country
as well as from the White House, a growing desire to have the matter
settled, and as a final effort in the interest of harmony the
Committee of Safety itself called upon the President, proposing that
he withdraw Robertson's name and have the others confirmed. To this
Garfield emphatically declined to accede. A few days later (May 5)
Vice-President Arthur and Senator Platt suggested that he withdraw all
the New York nominations. The President replied that he would
willingly withdraw all except Robertson's, and if the latter failed an
entire new slate could then be made up. This did not satisfy, but
within an hour after his visitors had departed, the President, to
prevent the confirmation of some while Robertson's was left tied up in
committee, put his suggestion into a message, withdrawing the names of
the five Stalwarts. This was another surprise, more alarming than the
first, since it showed the Administration's readiness to fight.
Meantime the Republican majority exhibited signs of disintegration.
The session was running into hot weather, Democrats had demonstrated
their power to prevent a reorganisation of the Senate, and discord in
Republican States threatened disaster. Until recently Conkling had
felt sure of victory. But now, appreciating the delicacy of the
situation, he opened the caucus (May 9) with an earnest, conciliatory
speech. He disclaimed desiring any conflict with the President,
against whom he made no accusations of bad faith; described the
impracticability of his sustaining any relations with Robertson, in
whose way, however, he would place no obstacle to any office other
than that of collector; discussed the danger to which a lack of
political harmony would expose the party in New York; and in almost
pathetic tones urged that the courtesy of the Senate be not withheld
from him in this hour of his extreme need.
It was plain that he had won the sympathy of his colleagues, but
succeeding caucuses, now held daily, lined his pathway with portents
and warnings. The iron-clad rule ceased to be operative; a resolution
to postpone action until the next session avoided defeat because
hastily withdrawn; and a compromise, the last to be suggested,
proposing confirmation on condition that Robertson then decline the
office, met with no favour. It was plain that at last the stress had
reached a climax. Senators no longer exchanged their impressions, or
asked "How long?" or "What next?" In their opinion either Garfield or
Conkling must recede, and they had learned that the President would
not. Moreover, it was rumored, after the caucus of May 13, that
Conkling had talked harshly, with much of the temper of a spoiled
child. As senators separated on that eventful Friday they declared
without hesitation, though not without misgiving, that the last caucus
had been held and the last obstacle to Robertson's confirmation
removed.
The position of Platt had at last become intolerable. Mindful of the
promise to Depew and his friends he had tactfully and patiently sought
to avoid a contest by satisfactorily arranging matters between the
President and Conkling. Now the end of compromises had come and a vote
impended. At this critical if not desperate moment he suggested
resignation.[1756] The Legislature that chose him in January was still
in session, and the combined votes of the Stalwarts would be
sufficient to re-elect them. This would liberate him from a promise
and strengthen both with a legislative endorsement. It was neither an
intrepid nor an exalted proposition, but Conkling accepted it.
Perhaps his nature required a relief from its high-strung
irritability in some sort of violence, and resignation backed by the
assurance that he would soon be restored to office and to greater
power on the shoulders of the party offered the seductive form which
that violence could take.
[Footnote 1756: "I walked over to Conkling and said, 'I shall send my
resignation to Governor Cornell to-night.' Conkling turned to me and
replied: 'Don't be too hasty about this matter, young man.' We then
went to the rear of the Senate Chamber and talked it over. Conkling
insisted that we should wait, and fight it out in Committee. I
replied, 'We have been so humiliated that there is but one thing for
us to do--rebuke the President by immediately turning in our
resignations and then appeal to the Legislature to sustain us.' I
induced Conkling to join me in offering our joint resignations, and
that night the papers were forwarded to Cornell by special messenger."
Platt's Reminiscences.--_Cosmopolitan Magazine_, April, 1909, p. 516.
It was at this time that Platt's opponents gave him the sobriquet of
"Me Too," meaning that he merely followed Conkling's lead. This was
unjust to the junior Senator, who at least took the lead in suggesting
and insisting upon resigning.]
Before the Senate reconvened on Monday (May 16) the resignation of
Conkling and Platt was in the hands of Governor Cornell. It came with
the suddenness of Robertson's nomination. Neither Vice-President
Arthur shared their intention, nor did Cornell suspect it. The first
intimation came in two brief notes, read by the clerk, informing the
Senate of their action. But the crash--the consternation, if any were
anticipated, did not appear.[1757] No doubt many senators sincerely
regretted the manner of Conkling's going, but that all were weary of
his restless predominance soon became an open secret.[1758] Nor did his
reasons appeal to any one except as regarded his own personality and
power, since the Senator's statement showed a deliberate, personal
choice, not based on a question of public policy.
[Footnote 1757: "The sensational resignations of Conkling and Platt
produce no excitement here (Washington), and I have yet to hear one
criticism complimentary of Conkling, though I have seen all sorts of
people and of every shade of cowardice."--Mrs. James G. Blaine,
_Letters_ (May 17, 1881), Vol. 1, p. 199.
Robertson and Merritt were promptly and unanimously confirmed on May
18. Two days afterward the names of the five Stalwarts, which had been
withdrawn, were resubmitted, except those of Payn and Tyler.]
[Footnote 1758: "Conkling was unrelenting in his enmities. He used to
get angry with men simply because they voted against him on questions
in which he took an interest. Once he did not for months speak to
Justin S. Morrill, one of the wisest and kindliest of men, because of
his pique at one of Merrill's votes."--George F. Hoar, _Autobiography_,
Vol. 2, p. 55.]
Stripped of its rhetoric and historicity the letter of Conkling and
Platt presented but two causes of complaint, one that the President,
in withdrawing some of the New York nominations, tried to coerce the
Senate to vote for Robertson; second, that Robertson, in voting and
procuring others to vote against Grant at Chicago, was guilty of "a
dishonest and dishonourable act."[1759] The poverty of these reasons
excited more surprise than the folly of their resignation.[1760] Every
one knew that in urging senators to say by their vote whether William
H. Robertson was a fit person to be collector, the President kept
strictly within his constitutional prerogative, and that in
withdrawing the earlier nominations he exercised his undoubted right
to determine the order in which he should ask the Senate's advice.
Moreover, if any doubt ever existed as to Robertson's right to
represent the sentiment of his district instead of the decree of the
State convention, the national convention had settled it in his
favour.
[Footnote 1759: The full text of the letter is published in the New
York papers of May 17, 1881.]
[Footnote 1760: "I was very much surprised at Senator Conkling's
action," said Senator Frye of Maine, "because of Judge Robertson's
personal hostility to him and not on account of his lack of fitness.
During President Hayes' administration not an important appointment
was made in Maine to which Senators Blaine and Hamlin were not
bitterly opposed. One man was appointed after Mr. Blaine had stated
that he was probably the only prominent Republican in the State
personally hostile to him. Yet, with a single exception, all were
confirmed, notwithstanding the opposition of the Maine Senators. But
neither of them resigned. They were too good Republicans for
that."--New York _Tribune_, May 17, 1881.]
Conkling's friends are credited with having overborne his purpose,
expressed soon after the election of Garfield, to leave the Senate and
engage in the practice of his profession.[1761] But that such
intention did not influence his resignation was evidenced by the fact
that immediately afterward he bivouacked at Albany and sought a
re-election. With his faithful lieutenants he constantly conferred,
while the faithless ones, scarcely less conspicuous, who openly
refused their support, he stigmatised. From the first Cornell was an
object of distrust. He had wired Conkling advising Robertson's
confirmation, and the Senator crushed the telegram in his hand. This
put the Governor into the disloyal class.[1762] It added to Conkling's
irritation also that Cornell remained silent. The Governor's friends
expressed some surprise that the Senator did not suggest an interview.
It would have been much more surprising if he had, for it is doubtful
if Conkling ever suggested an interview in his life. On the other
hand, Cornell, unwilling to use the machinery of his great office to
force Conkling's return, did not care to approach the Senator. It was
not unknown, however, that he refused to become a candidate for United
States senator, and that, although ten or fifteen members continued to
vote for him, he steadily encouraged his Stalwart friends not to
desert Conkling.
[Footnote 1761: A.R. Conkling, _Life of Conkling_, p. 632.]
[Footnote 1762: Conkling spoke of Cornell as "The lizard on the
hill."]
Although the Legislature which elected Platt on January 18 was still
in session, the sentiment dominating it had radically changed. The
party was deeply stirred. The Senator's sudden resignation had added
to the indignation aroused by his opposition to the Administration,
and members had heard from their constituents. Besides, a once
powerful Senator was now a private citizen. At the outset Independents
and several Stalwarts refused to enter a caucus, and early in the
contest the Democrats, marshalled by Manning, refused to come to the
rescue. Thus, without organisation, Republicans began voting on May
31. Seven weeks and four days later (July 22), after fifty-six
ballots, their work was concluded. The first ballot marked the highest
score for Conkling and Platt, the former receiving 39 and the latter
29 out of 105 Republican votes.[1763] This severe comment upon their
course plainly reflected the general sentiment of the party. It showed
especially the dissatisfaction existing toward Conkling. Yet a few
Stalwarts remained steadfast to the end. On the morning of July 1,
when Platt, to the surprise of his friends, suddenly withdrew, he had
28 votes. On July 22 Conkling had the same.
[Footnote 1763: The ballot resulted as follows: To succeed Platt (long
term), Thomas C. Platt, 29; Chauncey M. Depew, 21; Alonzo B. Cornell,
12; Elbridge G. Lapham, 8; Warner Miller, 5; Richard Crowley, 3;
scattering, 25. Francis Kernan (Dem.), 54. Total, 157.
To succeed Conkling (short term), Roscoe Conkling, 39; William A.
Wheeler, 19; Alonzo B. Cornell, 9; Richard Crowley, 5; Warner Miller,
1; scattering 37. John C. Jacobs (Dem.), 53. Total, 159.]
The act of the assassin of President Garfield on the morning of July 2
had a visible effect upon the proceedings at Albany.[1764] Although
for a time conditions indicated that the distinguished sufferer might
recover, legislators evinced a great desire to conclude the
disagreeable work, and on July 5, sixty-six Republicans held a
conference. Up to this time Depew had been the favourite for the long
term, registering fifty-five votes on the fourteenth ballot (June 14),
but in the interest of harmony he now withdrew his name.[1765]
[Footnote 1764: "Suddenly the adherents of the murdered President saw
the powers of government about to be transferred to the leader of
their defeated adversaries, and that transfer effected by the act of
an assassin. Many of them could not instantly accept the truth that it
was the act solely of a half-crazed and disappointed seeker for
office; many of them questioned whether the men who were to profit by
the act were not the instigators of it."--From address of Elihu Root,
delivered at the unveiling of President Arthur's statue in Madison
Square, New York, June 13, 1899.]
[Footnote 1765: On June 9, S.H. Bradley of Cattaraugus, made a
personal explanation in the Assembly, charging Loren B. Sessions, of
the Senate, with offering him $2,000 to cast his vote for Depew.
Sessions denied the charge. Investigation proved nothing, and an
indictment, subsequently returned against Sessions, resulted in a
trial and an acquittal.]
This opened the way for Warner Miller, who received in caucus on the
fifth ballot sixty-two of the sixty-six votes cast for the long term.
By previous agreement a Stalwart was entitled to the short term, and
had Cornell allowed his Stalwart friends to enter the caucus he might
have had the nomination. But he would not oppose Conkling. Moreover,
the belief obtained that the Democrats and Stalwarts would yet unite
and adjourn the session without day, thus giving the Senator time to
elect other friends to a new Legislature, and the Governor would not
disturb this hallucination. With Cornell out of the way Elbridge G.
Lapham easily won the nomination on the second ballot. Lapham had been
the first to desert Conkling, who now exclaimed, not without the
bitter herb of truth: "That man must not reap the reward of his
perfidy."[1766]
[Footnote 1766: New York _Tribune_, July 7, 1881.]
The caucus did not at once bring union, but on July 12 Miller's vote
reached seventy; on the 15th it registered seventy-four; and on the
16th, with the help of Speaker Sharpe, who had encouraged Conkling's
going to Albany, Miller was elected.[1767] Lapham's vote, however,
hung fire until July 22, when, during a brief and most exciting
conference in the Assembly Chamber, State Senator Halbert, the
Conkling Gibraltar, exclaimed with the suddenness of a squall at sea:
"We must come together or the party is divided in the State. I am
willing to vote now."[1768] Reason and good nature being thus
restored, each Republican present rose and voted his choice, Lapham
receiving sixty-one, Conkling twenty-eight. In the general rejoicing
State Senator Pitts, a leader of the Independents, no doubt voiced the
feeling of all at that moment: "I am as happy as Mr. Halbert. This
nomination has been made good-naturedly. It is an augury of good
feeling in the future. New York proposes to stand by the Republican
administration. I hope we shall never hear more the words Stalwart,
Featherhead, Half-breed."[1769] When the joint convention again
reassembled the fifty-sixth ballot gave Elbridge G. Lapham ninety-two,
and Clarkson N. Potter, the new Democratic nominee, forty-two.[1770]
[Footnote 1767: "At a conference held on May 22, at the house of
Chester A. Arthur, No. 123 Lexington Avenue, the following persons
were present: Chester A. Arthur, Thomas C. Platt, Louis F. Payn,
Charles M. Denison, George H. Sharpe, John F. Smyth, A.B. Johnson, and
Roscoe Conkling. Each person was asked to pass judgment upon the
future course of the two Senators. Each one spoke in turn. The sense
of the meeting was that they should proceed to the State
capital."--A.R. Conkling, _Life of Conkling_, pp. 642-643.
"Payn warned both Conkling and Platt that they would be defeated.
Speaker Sharpe admonished Payn that he was wrong. Payn predicted that
while he and other friends were still battling for the organisation
Sharpe would desert them. Payn proved himself a prophet. Sharpe went
over to the opposition." Platt's Reminiscences.--_Cosmopolitan
Magazine_, April, 1909, p. 517.]
[Footnote 1768: New York papers of July 23.]
[Footnote 1769: New York _Tribune_, July 23.]
[Footnote 1770: The candidacy of John C. Jacobs had been the subject
of some criticism on the part of the Democrats because he was a member
of the Legislature, and on June 22, after the twenty-third ballot, he
withdrew. A caucus then substituted the name of Potter.]
For Conkling it was worse than defeat. The humiliation of having gone
to Albany, of being deserted by friend after friend, of enduring the
taunts of an inhospitable press, and, finally, of having his place
taken by one, who, in his opinion, had proven most faithless, was like
the torture of an unquenchable fire. Lord Randolph Churchill, after
his historic resignation as chancellor of the exchequer, declared that
he would not live it over again for a million a year. It is likewise a
matter of history that Senator Conkling never ceased to deplore his
mistake.[1771]
[Footnote 1771: Conkling at once resumed the practice of law in New
York City. The strain and exposure of making his way on foot through
the snowdrifts of the historic blizzard which visited that city in the
spring of 1888, resulted in an abscess in the inner ear, from which he
died on April 18. A bronze statue, erected in his memory, is located
in Madison Square.
"We have followed poor Conkling down to the gates of death and have
been truly sorry to see them close upon him. I have never heard your
father, in all the twenty-two years since he spoke hard words to him,
say a syllable which he need regret, but his deathbed seemed hardly
less inaccessible than his life."--Mrs. James G. Blaine, _Letters_,
Vol. 2, p. 203. Dated, San Remo, May 1, 1888. Addressed to Walker
Blaine.]