TILDEN ONE VOTE SHORT
1876
After the election in 1875 the eyes of the national Democracy turned
toward Tilden as its inevitable candidate for President. He had not
only beaten a Canal ring, strengthened by remnants of the old Tweed
ring, but he had carried the State against the energies of a fairly
united Republican party. Moreover, he had become, in the opinion of
his friends, the embodiment of administrative reform, although he
suffered the embarrassment of a statesman who is suspected, rightly or
wrongly, of a willingness to purchase reform at any price.[1503] To
prove his right to be transferred from Albany to Washington he now
made his message to the Legislature a treatise upon national affairs.
[Footnote 1503: Tilden's policy of pardoning members of the Tweed ring
had become intolerable. "On an average about nine out of ten men who
were confessedly guilty of stealing were accepted as witnesses against
the other one man, until the time came when there was but one man
against whom any testimony could be used, and it was not considered
wise to try him. It was a shameful condition of affairs."--John D.
Townsend, _New York in Bondage_, p. 141.]
Dwelling at length upon the financiering of the Federal Government,
Tilden sought to account for the financial depression, and in pointing
to a remedy he advocated the prompt resumption of specie payment,
criticised the dread of imaginary evils, encouraged economy in
legislation, and analysed the federal system of taxation and
expenditure. Furthermore, he sought to cut loose from the discredited
past of his party, and in paying high tribute to the patriotism of the
South, he expressed the hope that its acceptance of the results of the
war might end forever the retribution visited upon it by the standing
menace of military force.[1504]
[Footnote 1504: Tilden's _Public Writings and Speeches_, Vol. 2, pp.
237-295.]
The result at Cincinnati increased the necessity for nominating Tilden
at St. Louis, since Wheeler's popularity would materially assist in
replacing New York among reliable Republican States. Nevertheless, the
predatory class who had felt the weight of Tilden's heavy hand
fomented a most formidable opposition at the State convention.[1505]
John Kelly deeply sympathised with the movement. He resented the
rivalry and independence of the Sage of Gramercy Park, and he did not
disguise his hostility. But Kelly's immediate need centred in the
exclusion of the Morrissey delegation, and when the Tilden lieutenants
proscribed it, the way was smoothed for the Governor's unanimous
endorsement with the gag of unit rule.
[Footnote 1505: The Democratic State convention was held at Utica,
April 26, 1876.]
The admission of Kelly's delegates, however, did not close the mouths
of Tilden's opponents.[1506]. Organs of the Canal ring continued to
urge Seymour or Church for President, maintaining that the
convention's action did not bind the delegation. Church supported this
interpretation of the declaration.[1507] But it remained for the
_Express_, the authorised organ of Tammany, to stigmatise Tilden. With
cruel particularity it referred to his many-sided conduct as counsel
and director in connection with the foreclosure and reorganisation of
certain railroads in Illinois, reciting details of the affair in a
manner highly prejudicial to his integrity as a lawyer and his
reputation as a man of wealth. "Of the weak points in Mr. Tilden's
railroad record," the editor suggestively added, "we know more than we
care to publish."[1508] It doubled the severity of the blow because
suit had been instituted to compel Tilden to account for the proceeds
of large amounts of bonds and stock, and instead of meeting the
allegations promptly he had sought and obtained delay. This seemed to
give colour to the indictment.
[Footnote 1506: "It is natural enough that the canal ring and its
followers, Tammany and its adherents, and that sort of Democrats who
are commonly called Bourbons, should labour to defeat the nomination
for high office of the man who represents everything that they oppose,
and opposes everything that they represent; but it will be a most
discouraging thing to every person who hopes for good at the hands of
the Democratic party if such opposition is permitted to prevail in its
councils. He has put his principles in practice in the most fearless
and resolute manner, and has made himself especially obnoxious to his
opponents as their hostility to him clearly shows."--New York _Evening
Post_ (editorial by William Cullen Bryant), May 26, 1876.]
[Footnote 1507: New York _Tribune_, June 17.]
[Footnote 1508: New York _Evening Express_, June 23, 1876.]
At St. Louis Tilden's opponents, headed by John Kelly, Augustus
Schell, and Erastus Corning, soon wore these insinuations
threadbare.[1509] To their further declaration that in order to succeed
in November the Democracy must have one October State and that Tilden
could not carry Indiana, Dorsheimer and Bigelow, the Governor's
spokesmen, replied that New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut could
elect Tilden without Indiana. The colossal assurance of this answer
characterised the convention's confidence in Tilden's strength. It
possessed the South, the East, and the West. Hancock might be the
favourite in Pennsylvania, Parker in New Jersey, Bayard in Delaware,
Allen in Ohio, and Hendricks in Indiana, but as delegates entered the
convention city the dense Tilden sentiment smothered them. Even
scandal did not appreciably weaken it.
[Footnote 1509: The National Democratic convention assembled on June 27
and 28.]
There was nothing mysterious about this strength. Tilden represented
success. Without him disaster threatened--with him victory seemed
certain. His achievement in administrative reform exaggerated
Republican failure; his grasp upon New York, the most vital State of
the North, magnified Democratic strength; his leadership, based upon
ideas and organisation, dwarfed political rivals; his acute legal
mind, leading to the largest rewards in the realm of law, captivated
business men; and his wealth, amassed in the field of railroad
organisation and litigation, could fill Democracy's exchequer. Thus
Tilden, standing less on the Democratic platform than on his own
record, held the commanding position in his party, and the talk of his
unpopularity or how he obtained wealth seemed to make as little
impression as his professed devotion to the Wilmot Proviso in 1847, or
his departure for a season from a lifelong pro-slavery record to bear
a prominent part in the Barnburners' revolt of 1848. Indeed, so
certain was Tilden of success that he did not ask for advices until
after the nomination. James C. Carter of the New York bar, who
happened at the time to be with him respecting legal matters, wondered
at his unconcern. On their return from an evening drive Carter
ventured to suggest that he would find telegrams announcing his
nomination. "Not until half-past nine," Tilden replied.[1510]
[Footnote 1510: Bigelow, _Life of Tilden_, Vol. 1, p. 308.]
Nevertheless, the first call of States made the Tilden managers
shiver.[1511] Alabama divided its vote, Colorado caused a murmur of
disappointment, and the slump of Georgia and Illinois, with Missouri's
division, threatened them with heart-failure. The South wabbled, and
promised votes in the North found their way elsewhere. At the close of
the first roll-call Missouri asked if its vote could be changed, and
on receiving an affirmative answer, the Tilden men, pale with worried
excitement, awaited the result. A change to Hancock at that moment
would have been a serious calamity, for nearly one hundred votes
separated Tilden from the necessary two-thirds. When Missouri declared
for the New Yorker, however, the opportunity to turn the tide against
him was lost forever. The second ballot undoubtedly represented his
real strength.[1512] For second place Thomas A. Hendricks had no
opposition.
[Footnote 1511: Francis Kernan presented Tilden's name very
effectively.]
[Footnote 1512: First ballot. Necessary two-thirds, 492. Samuel J.
Tilden of New York, 404-1/2; Thomas A. Hendricks of Indiana, 133-1/2;
Winfield Scott Hancock of Pennsylvania, 75; William Allen of Ohio, 56;
Thomas F. Bayard of Delaware, 27; Joel Parker of New Jersey, 18.
Second ballot: Tilden, 535; Hendricks, 60; Hancock, 59; Allen, 54;
Bayard, 11; Parker, 18; Thurman of Ohio, 2.]
The platform, prepared under the eye of Tilden by Manton Marble, the
accomplished editor of the _World_, advocated reform as its keynote
and made historic its vituperative arraignment of the party in power.
On the vital question of the currency it demanded the repeal of the
resumption clause of the Act of 1875, denouncing it as an hindrance to
the resumption of specie payment. The Republicans, wishing to avoid
too sharp a conflict with the soft money sentiment of the West, had
pledged the fulfilment of the Public Credit Act,[1513] approved March
18, 1869, "by a continuous and steady progress to specie payments."
Both declarations savoured of indefiniteness, but Hayes, in his letter
of acceptance (July 8), added greatly to his reputation for firmness
and decision of character in supplying the needed directness by
demanding the resumption of specie payment. On the other hand,
Tilden's letter (July 31) weakened the country's respect for him.[1514]
He had no sympathy for soft money, but in supporting the demand for a
repeal of the resumption clause he urged, in a long, indefinite
communication, the importance of preparation for resumption, ignoring
the fact that the Act of 1875 anticipated such precaution. Although
less prolix in his treatment of civil service reform, he was no less
indefinite. After describing recognised evils he failed to indicate
any practical remedy beyond the "conviction that no reform will be
complete and permanent until the Chief Executive is constitutionally
disqualified for re-election."[1515] Speaking of the character of the
men holding office his use of the word "usufruct" led to the derisive
appellation of "Old Usufruct Tilden."[1516] On civil service reform
Hayes was more specific. He declared against the use of official
patronage in elections and pledged himself not to be a candidate for a
second term.[1517]
[Footnote 1513: This act terminates as follows: "And the United States
also solemnly pledges its faith to make provision at the earliest
practicable period for the redemption of the United States notes in
coin."]
[Footnote 1514: "Tilden's letter was a disappointment to those who had
studied his words and acts as Governor."--Rhodes, _History of the
United States_, Vol. 7, p. 216.]
[Footnote 1515: Appleton's _Cyclopædia_, 1876, p. 790.]
[Footnote 1516: "The public interest in an honest, skilful performance
of official trust must not be sacrificed to the usufruct of the
incumbents."--Appleton's _Cyclopædia_, 1876, p. 790.]
[Footnote 1517: _Ibid._, p. 783.]
If Conkling had been balked in his desire to nominate Cornell, Tilden
was not less baffled a week later in his effort to promote William
Dorsheimer, his special friend. His genius for organisation had
smoothed the way for harmony at Saratoga.[1518] Kelly and Morrissey
settled their differences in advance, the platform created no
discussion, and the appointment of electors-at-large provoked little
criticism; but when Tilden's lieutenants proposed Dorsheimer for
governor the convention revolted. It noisily demanded a Democrat, and
in the stampede that followed Clarkson N. Potter, backed by Tammany
and the Canal ring, rapidly accumulated strength despite Tilden's
personal opposition. To all of Tilden's friends vital objections
seemed to be raised. Dorsheimer could not command a solid Democratic
vote; Robinson favoured high canal tolls and cultivated Republican
affiliations; Manton Marble remained unpopular because the _World_
changed front in 1868; and Starbuck of Jefferson did not attract
Independents. For once Tilden had plainly been deceived as to his
strength. Furthermore, the convention, divided in its attention
between speeches for Potter and demands for Seymour, was beyond his
control. Nevertheless, as the delegates in their stentorian insistence
upon a "Democrat" became more and more furious for Seymour, the Tilden
managers, to head off the alarming sentiment for Potter, adroitly
increased the volume of the demand for the Oneidan. It was known that
Seymour had refused the use of his name. Telegrams to Kernan and
letters to the president of the convention alleged indisposition and
"obstacles which I cannot overcome."[1519] But the convention,
conscious that the former governor had before changed his mind under
similar circumstances, closed its ears to his entreaties, and amidst
the most vociferous cheering nominated him by acclamation. The next
morning, with equal unanimity, it renominated Dorsheimer for
lieutenant-governor.
[Footnote 1518: The Democratic State convention convened on August 30.]
[Footnote 1519: Utica _Herald_, August 31, 1876.]
A few days later Seymour, pleading mental inability to perform the
duties of the office, put himself out of the race.[1520] This gave
Tilden opportunity to re-form his lines, and upon the convention's
reassembling (September 13) Robinson easily won.[1521]
[Footnote 1520: For Seymour's letter, see New York papers of September
5.]
[Footnote 1521: The ballot stood: Potter, 106-1/2; Robinson, 192-1/2;
scattering, 59. Necessary to a choice, 191. Before its announcement
changes gave Robinson 243-1/2.
The ticket was as follows: Governor, Lucius Robinson, Chemung;
Lieutenant-Governor, William Dorsheimer, Erie; Court of Appeals,
Robert Earl, Herkimer; Canal Commissioner, Darius A. Ogden, Yates;
Prison Inspector, Robert H. Anderson, Kings.]
Democratic factions likewise buried their differences in New York
City, Kelly and Morrissey uniting upon Smith Ely for mayor. The
Republicans nominated John A. Dix. Thus was the municipal struggle in
the metropolis, for the first time in many years, confined within
strict party lines.[1522]
[Footnote 1522: On March 15, several disaffected Democrats met at
Syracuse and organised a Greenback party, which opposed the resumption
of specie payment and favoured legal tender notes as the standard of
value. A second convention, held in New York City on June 1, selected
four delegates-at-large to the Democratic national convention, and a
third, meeting at Albany on September 26, nominated Richard M. Griffin
for governor. Other State nominations were made by the Prohibitionists,
Albert J. Groo being selected for governor.]
The campaign, although a prolonged and intensely exciting one,
developed no striking incidents. Democratic orators repeated Marble's
rhetorical arraignment of the Republican party, and the Democratic
press iterated and reiterated its symmetrical, burning sentences.
Marble's platform, besides being the most vitriolic, had the
distinction of being the longest in the history of national
conventions. Copies of it printed in half a dozen languages seemed to
spring up as plentifully as weeds in a wheatfield. Every cross-roads
in the State became a centre for its distribution. It pilloried
Grant's administration, giving in chronological order a list of his
unwise acts, the names and sins of his unfaithful appointees, and a
series of reasons why Tilden, the Reformer, could alone restore the
Republic to its pristine purity. It was a dangerous document because
history substantially affirmed its statement of facts, while the
rhythm of its periods and the attractiveness of its typography invited
the reader.[1523]
[Footnote 1523: Appleton's _Cyclopædia_, 1876, pp. 785, 786.]
Conkling, because of ill-health, limited his activity in the canvass
to one address.[1524] It was calmer than usual, but it shone with
sparkles of sarcasm and bristled with covert allusions readily
understood. It was noticeable, too, that he made no reference to Hayes
or to Wheeler. Nevertheless, party associates from whom he had
radically differed pronounced it a model of partisan oratory and the
most conclusive review of the political situation. He admitted the
corruption indicated by Marble, attributing it chiefly to the war
which incited speculative passion in all the activities of life, its
ill consequences not being confined exclusively to public affairs. In
contrasting the management of the two parties, he disclosed under
Buchanan a loss on each thousand dollars collected and disbursed of
six dollars and ninety-eight cents against forty cents during Grant's
first term and twenty-six cents during the three years of his second,
while current expenses under Buchanan amounted to one dollar and
ninety cents per capita to one dollar and seventy cents under Grant.
In ten years, he added, $800,000,000 of the debt had been paid,
nearly $50,000,000 of interest saved yearly, and the taxes reduced
$262,000,000 per annum.
[Footnote 1524: Delivered at Utica, October 3. See New York papers,
October 4.]
Of civil service reform Conkling said nothing. He made a clear, sharp
issue on the resumption of specie payment, however, showing that the
demand for a repeal of the Act's most important feature was a bid for
the votes of soft-money advocates. The Southern question assumed even
greater importance. Tilden depended for success upon the Southern
States plus New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. This was
Dorsheimer's argument, put with characteristic grace and force at St.
Louis. The North had cause to fear, it was argued, if a solid South,
strengthened by States controlled by the great majorities in and about
New York City, could elect a President. The charge that Tilden
intended indemnifying the South and assuming the Confederate debt
increased the anxiety. Conkling's reference to the repayment of direct
taxes, the refund of the cotton tax, and the liquidation of Southern
claims mounted so high into the hundreds of millions that Tilden
deemed it prudent to issue a letter pledging an enforcement of the
Constitutional Amendments and resistance to such monetary demands.
Personal criticism of Tilden exploited his war record, his reputation
as a railroad wrecker, and his evasion of the income tax.[1525] The
accusation of "railroad wrecking" was scarcely sustained, but his
income tax was destined to bring him trouble. Nast kept his pencil
busy. One cartoon, displaying Tilden emptying a large barrel of
greenbacks into the ballot box, summed up the issues as follows: "The
shot-gun policy South, the barrel policy North;" "The solid South and
the solid Tammany;" "Tilden's war record--defeating the tax
collector." George William Curtis asserted that the Democrats of South
Carolina meant to carry the State for Tilden by means of "the shot
gun," declaring that "Jefferson Davis and the secessionists merely
endeavoured to enforce with bayonets the doctrines of Mr.
Tilden."[1526]
[Footnote 1525: It was claimed that in 1862 Tilden had a net income of
$89,000. He made oath to $7,118, and afterward acknowledged receiving
$20,000 in the Terre Haute Railroad case. He alleged that this covered
the work of several years. Moreover, that his income-producing
property was largely in railroad stocks, bonds, and other securities
on which the tax was deducted by the companies before the interest and
dividends were paid.--Bigelow, _Life of Tilden_, Vol. 2, p. 232; see
also, _Nation_, September 22, 1876.]
[Footnote 1526: _Harper's Weekly_, 1876, pp. 828, 885, 906, 907.]
Tilden displayed a stoical indifference to these personal attacks. He
made no speeches, he rarely exhibited himself to the public, and he
kept his own counsels. His adroit, mysterious movements recalled the
methods but not the conceit of Aaron Burr. Although Abram S. Hewitt,
chairman of the Democratic National Committee, managed the campaign
with skill, Tilden relied largely upon his own shrewdness, displacing
old leaders for new ones, and making it clear to the country that he
ranked with Martin Van Buren as a great political manager. As he swept
onward like a conquering Marlborough, inspiring his party with
confidence and his opponents with fear, events favoured his designs.
The Belknap exposures, the Whiskey ring suits, the Babcock trial,
alarming and disgusting the country, inclined public opinion toward a
change which was expressed in the word "reform." A combination of
propitious circumstances within the State, in nowise indebted to his
sagacity or assistance, also increased his strength. The collapse of
the Tweed and Canal rings justly gave him great prestige, but no
reason existed why the extinguishment of the State war debt and the
limitations of canal expenditures to canal revenues should add to his
laurels, for the canal amendment to the Constitution was passed and
the payment of the war debt practically accomplished before he took
office. Nevertheless, the resulting decrease of the State budget by
nearly one-half, being coincident with his term of office, added
prodigiously to his fame.[1527] Indeed, he seemed to be the darling of
Fortune, and on November 7, exactly according to his calculation, he
carried New York,[1528] New Jersey, Connecticut, and Indiana. But
Republicans claimed South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana.
[Footnote 1527: "The amount of the State tax for 1876 was
$8,529,174.32, against $14,206,680.61 in 1875, and $15,727,482.08 in
1874." Appleton's _Cyclopædia_, 1876, p. 598.]
[Footnote 1528: Tilden, plurality, 32,742; Robinson, 30,460. Groo,
total vote, 3,412 (Prohibitionist); Griffin, 1,436 (Greenback).
Congress, 17 Republicans, 16 Democrats. Assembly, 71 Republicans, 57
Democrats. Ely's majority for mayor of New York City, 53,517. Tilden's
majority in New York City, 53,682.
Republican losses occurred chiefly in the Hudson River and western
counties. Elbridge G. Spaulding of Buffalo, and Levi P. Morton of New
York, were defeated for Congress.]
In the historic dispute which led to a division of the solid South,
partisan papers revelled in threats, and rumours indicated danger of
mob violence. To prevent fraud prominent citizens in the North,
appointed to represent each political party, watched the canvassing
boards in the three disputed States, and although it subsequently
developed that distinguished New Yorkers resorted to bribery,[1529] the
legal canvassing boards finally certified the electoral votes to Hayes
and Wheeler. On December 6 the official count in all the States gave
Hayes 185 votes and Tilden 184. The Democrats, deeply disturbed by the
action of the Returning Boards, now displayed a temper that resembled
the spirit preceding the civil war. Threats were openly made that
Hayes should never be inaugurated. The Louisville _Courier Journal_
announced that "if they (our people) will rise in their might, and
will send 100,000 petitioners to Washington to present their memorial
in person, there will be no usurpation and no civil war."[1530] A
prominent ex-Confederate in Congress talked of 145,000 well
disciplined Southern troops who were ready to fight.[1531] Because the
President prudently strengthened the military forces about Washington
he was charged with the design of installing Hayes with the aid of the
army.
[Footnote 1529: Manton Marble visited Florida. On November 22, under
the _sobriquet_ "Moses," he telegraphed in cipher to William T.
Pelton, Tilden's nephew, then domiciled in Tilden's home at 15
Gramercy Park: "Have just received proposition to hand over a Tilden
decision of Board and certificate of Governor for $200,000." Pelton
thought it too much, and Marble again telegraphed that one Elector
could be secured for $50,000. Pelton replied that he "could not draw
until the vote of the Elector was received." On December 5, Marble
wired: "Proposition failed.... Tell Tilden to saddle Blackstone."
Smith M. Weed visited South Carolina. On November 16, without the use
of cipher or _sobriquet_, he telegraphed Henry Havermeyer: "Board
demand $75,000 for two or three electors." Later in the day he added:
"Looks now as though $75,000 would secure all seven votes." The next
day he wired: "Press everywhere. No certainty here. Simply a hope." On
November 18, he announced: "Majority of Board secured. Cost $80,000.
Send one parcel of $65,000; one of $10,000; one of $5,000. All to be
in $1000 or $500 bills. Have cash ready to reach Baltimore Sunday
night." Pelton met Weed at Baltimore without the money and both went
to New York to secure it. Meantime, the canvassing board reported in
favour of Hayes.
Pelton also corresponded with one J.N.H. Patrick, who telegraphed from
Oregon: "Must purchase Republican elector to recognise and act with
the Democrat, and secure vote to prevent trouble. Deposit $10,000 to
my credit." Pelton replied: "If you will make obligation contingent on
result in March it will be done." Patrick said fee could not be made
contingent, whereupon $8,000 was deposited on January 1, 1877, to his
credit, but too late to complete the transaction.
When these telegrams, translated by the New York _Tribune_, were
investigated by the Potter Congressional committee in January, 1879,
Marble testified that he transmitted them simply "as danger signals";
Weed admitted and attempted to justify; Pelton accepted the full
responsibility, intending, he said, to get the money of Edward Cooper;
Cooper testified that the telegram requesting $80,000 sent to
Baltimore was his first knowledge of Pelton's activity; that he
immediately informed Tilden, who recalled his nephew and put a stop to
negotiations. Tilden swore that "no offer, no negotiation in behalf of
any member of any Returning Board was ever entertained by me, or by my
authority, or with my sanction.... There never was a moment in which I
ever entertained any idea of seeking to obtain those certificates by
any venal inducement, any promise of money or office, to the men who
had them to grant or dispose of. My purpose on that subject was
perfectly distinct, invariable, and it was generally assumed by all my
friends without discussion. It may have sometimes been expressed and
whenever the slightest occasion arose for it to be discussed, it was
expressed. It was never deviated from in word or act."--Testimony in
relation to Cipher Telegraphic Dispatches, pp. 200-274; see also,
Bigelow's _Life of Tilden_, Vol. 2, pp. 180-223.]
[Footnote 1530: From an editorial signed by Henry Watterson, January 8,
1877.]
[Footnote 1531: Rhodes, _History of the United States_, Vol. 7, p.
243.]
On the other hand, Republicans believed Tilden endeavoured to buy the
presidency. Although nothing was then known of Marble's and Weed's
efforts to tamper with the canvassing boards of South Carolina and
Florida, the disposition to "steal" a vote in Oregon, which clearly
belonged to Hayes, deprived Tilden's cause of its moral weight.
Indeed, so strongly did sentiment run against him that the _Nation_
"lost nearly three thousand subscribers for refusing to believe that
Mr. Hayes could honourably accept the presidency."[1532]
[Footnote 1532: The _Nation_, June 25, 1885.]
When Congress opened the Democrats, being in control of the House,
desired to continue the joint rule of February, 1865, directing that
"no electoral vote objected to shall be counted except by the
concurrent votes of the two Houses." This would elect Tilden. On the
other hand, the Republicans, holding that the joint rule expired with
the Congress adopting it, insisted that, inasmuch as the canvass by
Congress at all previous elections had been confined exclusively to
opening the certificates of each State, sent to Washington under the
official seal of the respective governors, the Vice-President should
open and count the electoral votes and declare the result, the members
of the two Houses acting simply as witnesses. This would elect Hayes.
To many and especially to President Grant this controversy seemed full
of danger, to avert which if possible Congress adopted a resolution
providing for a committee of fourteen, equally divided between the
Senate and House, "to report without delay such a measure as may in
their judgment be best calculated to accomplish the desired
end."[1533] On January 18 (1877) this committee reported a bill
providing that where two or more returns had been received from a
State such returns should be referred to an Electoral Commission
composed of five senators, five members of the House, and five
justices of the Supreme Court, who should decide any question
submitted to it touching the return from any State, and that such
decision should stand unless rejected by the concurrent votes of the
two Houses. By tacit agreement the Senate was to name three
Republicans and two Democrats, and the House three Democrats and two
Republicans, while the Bill itself appointed Justices Clifford,
Miller, Field, and Strong, a majority of whom were authorised to
select a fifth justice.[1534]
[Footnote 1533: Upon this committee Conkling was substituted in place
of Logan, detained at home. Abram S. Hewitt was one of the House
appointees.]
[Footnote 1534: Clifford and Field were accounted Democrats, and Miller
and Strong, Republicans.]
When doubt as to the three Southern States precipitated itself into
the result of the election, Tilden exhibited characteristic diligence
and secrecy. He avoided public statements, but he scrutinised the
returns with the acumen exhibited in securing the Tweed evidence, and
left no flaw unchallenged in the title of his opponent. After the
action of the canvassing boards he contended that the joint rule of
1865 must govern, and in the study of the subject he devoted more than
a month to the preparation of a complete history of electoral counts,
showing it to have been the unbroken usage for Congress and not the
President of the Senate to count the vote.[1535] Moreover, early in the
session of Congress he prepared two resolutions which raised the
issue, and urged his friends in the leadership of the House to take no
further step until the great constitutional battle had been fought
along that line, assuring them of his readiness to accept all the
responsibility of the outcome. To appraise the country of the
strength of this position he also prepared an extended brief which
Governor Robinson incorporated as a part of his inaugural message on
January 1, 1877.[1536]
[Footnote 1535: Bigelow, _Life of Tilden_, Vol. 2, p. 60.]
[Footnote 1536: Bigelow, _Life of Tilden_, pp. 67-74.]
Tilden first learned of the proposed Electoral Commission Bill on
January 14. Abram S. Hewitt brought the information, saying that
Bayard and Thurman of the Senate, being absolutely committed to it,
would concur in reporting it whatever Tilden's action.[1537] Tilden,
resenting the secrecy of its preparation as unwise and essentially
undemocratic, declined to give it his approval.[1538] In his later
telegrams to Hewitt he expressed the belief that "We should stand on
the Constitution and the settled practice;" that "the other side,
having no way but by usurpation, will have greater troubles than we,
unless relieved by some agreement;" that "the only way of getting
accessions in the Senate is by the House standing firm;" that "we are
over-pressed by exaggerated fears;" and that "no information is here
which could justify an abandonment of the Constitution and practice of
the government, and of the rights of the two Houses and of the
people." To his friends who urged that time pressed, he exclaimed:
"There is time enough. It is a month before the count."
Representations of the danger of a collision with the Executive met
his scorn. "It is a panic of pacificators," he said. "Why surrender
before the battle for fear of having to surrender after the
battle?"[1539]
[Footnote 1537: Manton Marble to the New York _Sun_, August 5, 1878.]
[Footnote 1538: Bigelow, _Life of Tilden_, Vol. 2, p. 76.]
[Footnote 1539: _Ibid._, pp. 76, 79, 80.]
In view of his resentment of the secrecy which characterised the
preparation of the Electoral Commission Bill, one wonders that Tilden
made no appeal directly to the people, demanding that his party stand
firm to "the settled practice" and allow Republicans peaceably to
inaugurate Hayes "by usurpation" rather than "relieve them by some
agreement." His telegrams to congressmen could not be published, and
few if any one knew him as the author of the discussion in Robinson's
inaugural. The _Times_ thought "the old Governor's hand is to be seen
in the new Governor's message,"[1540] but the _Nation_ expressed doubt
about it.[1541] A ringing proclamation over his own signature, however,
would have been known before sunset to every Democratic voter in the
land. Blaine told Bigelow a year or two later that if the Democrats
had been firm, the Republicans would have backed down.[1542] Tilden's
silence certainly dampened his party's enthusiasm. It recalled, too,
his failure to assail the Tweed ring until the _Times'_ disclosure
made its destruction inevitable.
[Footnote 1540: New York _Times_, January 2, 1877.]
[Footnote 1541: January 4.]
[Footnote 1542: Bigelow, _Life of Tilden_, Vol. 2, p. 74, note.]
Bigelow, reflecting Tilden's thought, charged that in accepting the
plan of an Electoral Commission Thurman and Bayard were influenced by
presidential ambition, and that prominent congressmen could not regard
with satisfaction the triumph of a candidate who had been in nowise
indebted to them for his nomination or success at the polls.[1543] On
the other hand, Blaine says the Democrats favoured the Commission
because Davis, who affiliated with the Democratic party and had
preferred Tilden to Hayes, was to be chosen for the fifth justice. The
Maine statesman adds, without giving his authority, that Hewitt
advanced this as one of the arguments to induce Tilden to approve the
bill.[1544] In his history of the Hewitt-Tilden interview Marble makes
no mention of Davis' selection, nor does Bigelow refer to Tilden's
knowledge of it. Nevertheless, the strength disclosed for the bill
sustains Blaine's suggestion, since every Democrat of national
reputation in both Houses supported it. The measure passed the Senate
on January 24 and the House on the 26th,[1545] but an unlooked-for
event quickly destroyed Democratic calculations and expectations, for
on January 25, too late for the party to recede with dignity or with
honour, the Democrats of the Illinois Legislature elected Davis by two
majority to the United States Senate in place of John A. Logan.
Probably a greater surprise never occurred in American political
history. It gave Davis an opportunity, on the ground of obvious
impropriety, to avoid what he neither sought nor desired, and narrowed
the choice of a fifth justice to out-and-out Republicans, thus
settling the election of Hayes. "The drop in the countenance of Abram
S. Hewitt," said a writer who informed Tilden's representative of
Davis' transfer from the Supreme Court to the Senate, "made it plain
that he appreciated its full significance."[1546] Bigelow could not
understand why Davis did not serve on the Commission unless his
"declination was one of the conditions of his election," adding that
"it was supposed by many that Morton and others engineered the
agreement of Davis' appointment with full knowledge that he would not
serve."[1547] This cynical comment betrayed Tilden's knowledge of
"things hoped for," and accounts for his final acquiescence in the
Commission, since Davis and a certainty were far better than a fight
and possible failure.
[Footnote 1543: _Ibid._, p. 63.]
[Footnote 1544: Blaine, _Twenty Tears of Congress_, Vol. 2, p. 584.
Morrison of Illinois declared that Davis' "most intimate friends,
among whom I may count myself, don't know to-day whether he favored
Tilden or Hayes. He didn't vote at all."--_Century Magazine_, October,
1901, p. 928.]
[Footnote 1545: Senate: For, 26 Democrats, 21 Republicans; against, 16
Republicans, 1 Democrat. House: For, 160 Democrats, 31 Republicans;
against, 69 Republicans, 17 Democrats.]
[Footnote 1546: _Century Magazine_, October, 1901, p. 933.]
[Footnote 1547: Bigelow, _Life of Tilden_, Vol. 2, p. 64, note.]
Another dagger-thrust that penetrated the home in Gramercy Park was
Conkling's exclusion from the Electoral Commission. Of all the members
of the famous committee the Senator had borne the most useful part in
framing the measure, and his appointment to the Commission was
naturally expected to follow.[1548] His biographer states that he
declined to serve.[1549] "If this be correct," says Rhodes, "he shirked
a grave duty."[1550] Bigelow charges the omission to the Senator's
belief "that the vote of Louisiana rightfully belonged to Mr. Tilden,"
and volunteers the information "that Conkling had agreed to address
the Commission in opposition to its counting Louisiana for
Hayes."[1551] Conkling's absence from the Senate when the Louisiana
vote was taken corroborates Bigelow,[1552] and supports the general
opinion which obtained at the time, that the Republicans, suspecting
Conkling of believing Tilden entitled to the presidency, intentionally
ignored him in the make-up of the Commission.[1553] The reason for
Conkling's failure subsequently to address the Commission in
opposition to counting Louisiana for Hayes nowhere explicitly appears.
"Various explanations are in circulation," writes Bigelow, "but I have
not been able to determine which of them all had the demerit of
securing his silence."[1554]
[Footnote 1548: "General Grant sent for Senator Conkling, and said with
deep earnestness: 'This matter is a serious one, and the people feel
it very deeply. I think this Electoral Commission ought to be
appointed.' Conkling answered: 'Mr. President, Senator Morton' (who
was then the acknowledged leader of the Senate), 'is opposed to it and
opposed to your efforts; but if you wish the Commission carried, I can
help do it.' Grant said: 'I wish it done.'"--George W. Childs,
_Recollections_, pp. 79, 80.]
[Footnote 1549: Conkling, _Life of Conkling_, p. 521.]
[Footnote 1550: Rhodes, _History of the United States_, Vol. 7, p.
263.]
[Footnote 1551: Bigelow, _Life of Tilden_, Vol. 2, p. 84.]
[Footnote 1552: "In all his political official life the most important
vote which he [Conkling] has been or can be called upon to give--that
upon the Louisiana electoral question--he evaded."--_Harper's Weekly_,
February 8, 1879.]
[Footnote 1553: "He [Conkling] was at the time most suspected by the
Republicans, who feared that his admitted dislike to Hayes would cause
him to favour a bill which would secure the return of Tilden."--Thomas
V. Cooper and Hector T. Fenton, _American Politics_, p. 230; see also,
Rhodes, _History of the United States_, Vol. 7, p. 263.]
[Footnote 1554: Bigelow, _Life of Tilden_, Vol. 2, p. 84.
"Mr. Conkling felt that neither Mr. Tilden nor Mr. Hayes should be
inaugurated."--Conkling, _Life of Conkling_, p. 528.]