HOFFMAN DEFEATED, CONKLING PROMOTED
1866
The knowledge that Republicans, to overcome the President's vetoes,
must have a two-thirds majority in Congress, precipitated a State
campaign of unusual energy. The contest which began on April 9, when
Johnson disapproved the Civil Rights Bill, was intensified by the
Philadelphia convention and the President's "swing-around-the-circle;"
but the events that made men bitter and deeply in earnest were the
Memphis and New Orleans riots, in which one hundred and eighty negroes
were killed and only eleven of their assailants injured. To the North
this became an object-lesson, illustrating the insincerity of the
South's desire, expressed at Philadelphia, for reconciliation and
peace.
The Republican State convention, meeting at Syracuse on September 5,
echoed this sentiment. In the centre of the stage the Stars and
Stripes, gracefully festooned, formed a halo over the portrait of
Abraham Lincoln, while a Nast caricature of President Johnson betrayed
the contempt of the enthusiastic gathering. Weed and Raymond were
conspicuous by their absence. The Radicals made Charles H. Van Wyck
chairman, Lyman Tremaine president, George William Curtis chairman of
the committee on resolutions, and Horace Greeley the lion of the
convention. At the latter's appearance delegates leaped to their feet
and gave three rounds of vociferous cheers. The day's greatest
demonstration, however, occurred when the chairman, in his opening
speech, stigmatised the New York friends of the President.[1075] Van
Wyck prudently censored his bitterness from the press copy, but the
episode reflected the intense unpopularity of Seward, Weed, and
Raymond.
[Footnote 1075: New York _Tribune_, September 6, 1866.]
In the privacy of the club Seward's old-time champions had spoken of
"the decline of his abilities," "the loss of his wits," and "that
dry-rot of the mind's noble temper;" but now, in a crowded public
hall, they cheered any sentiment that charged a betrayal of trust and
the loss of principles. Of course Seward had not lost his principles,
nor betrayed his trust. He held the opinions then that he entertained
before the removal of the splints and bandages from the wounds
inflicted by the bowie-knife of the would-be assassin. He had been in
thorough accord with Lincoln's amnesty proclamation, issued in
December, 1863, as well as with his "Louisiana plan" of
reconstruction, and Johnson's proclamation and plan of reconstruction,
written under Seward's influence, did not differ materially. But
Seward's principles which rarely harmonised with those of the
Radicals, now became more conspicuous and sharply defined because of
the tactlessness and uncompromising spirit of Lincoln's successor.
Besides, he was held responsible for the President's follies. To a
convention filled with crutches, scarred faces, armless sleeves, and
representatives of Andersonville and Libby Prisons, such an attitude
seemed like a betrayal of his trust, and the resentment of the
delegates, perhaps, was not unnatural.
If Seward was discredited, Reuben E. Fenton was conspicuously trusted.
According to Andrew D. White, a prominent State senator of that day,
the Governor was not a star of the magnitude of his Republican
predecessors.[1076] Others probably held the same opinion. Fenton's
party, however, renominated him by acclamation, and then showed its
inconsistency by refusing a like honour to Thomas G. Alvord, the
lieutenant-governor. The service of the Onondaga Chief, as his friends
delighted to call him, had been as creditable if not as important as
the Governor's, but the brilliant gifts of Stewart L. Woodford, a
young soldier of patriotic impulses, attracted a large majority of the
convention.[1077] Up to that time, Woodford, then thirty years of age,
was the youngest man nominated for lieutenant-governor. He had made a
conspicuous sacrifice to become a soldier. In 1861 Lincoln appointed
him an assistant United States attorney, but the silenced guns of
Sumter inspired him to raise a company, and he marched away at its
head, leaving the civil office to another. Later he became commandant
of the city that sheltered the guns first trained upon the American
flag, and after his return, disciplined and saddened by scenes of
courage and sacrifice, the clarion notes of the young orator easily
commanded the emotions of his hearers. No one ever wearied when he
spoke. His lightest word, sent thrilling to the rim of a vast
audience, swayed it with the magic of control. He was not then at the
fulness of his power or reputation, but delegates had heard enough to
desire his presence in the important campaign of 1866, and to
stimulate his activity they made him a candidate.
[Footnote 1076: "There stood Fenton, marking the lowest point in the
choice of a State executive ever reached in our Commonwealth by the
Republican party."--_Autobiography_, Vol. 1, p. 131.]
[Footnote 1077: "The Republican ticket was as follows: Governor, Reuben
E. Fenton, Chautauqua; Lieutenant-Governor, Stewart L. Woodford,
Kings; Canal Commissioner, Stephen T. Hoyt, Steuben; Prison Inspector,
John Hammond, Essex."--New York _Tribune_, September 7, 1866.]
The platform declared that while the constitutional authority of the
Federal government cannot be impaired by the act of a State or its
people, a State may, by rebellion, so far rupture its relations to the
Union as to suspend its power to exercise the rights which it
possessed under the Constitution; that it belonged to the legislative
power of the government to determine at what time a State may safely
resume the exercise of its rights; and that the doctrine that such
State is itself to judge when it is in proper condition to resume its
place in the Union is false, as well as the other doctrine that the
President was alone sole judge of the period when such suspension
shall be at an end.
If these propositions created no surprise, the refusal squarely to
meet the suffrage issue created much adverse comment. One resolution
expressed a hope that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment would
tend to the equalisation of all political rights among citizens of the
Union, but although Greeley submitted a suffrage plank, as he did in
the preceding year, Curtis carefully avoided an expression favourable
even to the colored troops.
"Extreme opinions usually derive a certain amount of strength from
logical consistency," wrote Raymond. "Between the antecedent
proposition of an argument and its practical conclusion there is
ordinarily a connection which commends itself to the advocates of
principle. But the radicalism which proposes to reconstruct the Union
has not this recommendation. Its principles and its policy are not
more alike than fire and water. What it contends for theoretically it
surrenders practically."[1078] Although this was clearly a just
criticism, the radicalism of Congress showed more leniency in practice
than in theory. The Northern people themselves were not yet ready for
negro suffrage, and had the South promptly accepted the Fourteenth
Amendment and the congressional plan of reconstruction, it is doubtful
if the Fifteenth Amendment would have been heard of.
[Footnote 1078: New York _Times_ (editorial), September 7, 1866.]
Conservative Republicans, however, were too well satisfied with their
work at Philadelphia to appreciate this tendency of Congress. The
evidence of reconciliation had been spectacular, if not sincere, and
they believed public opinion was with them. The country, it was
argued, required peace; the people have made up their minds to have
peace; and to insure peace the Southern States must enjoy their
constitutional right to seats in Congress. "This is the one question
now before the country," said the _Post_; "and all men of every party
who desire the good of the country and can see what is immediately
necessary to produce this good, will unite to send to Congress only
men who will vote for the immediate admission of Southern
representatives."[1079] In the opinion of such journals the situation
presented a rare opportunity to the Democratic party. By becoming the
vehicle to bring real peace and good will to the country, it would not
only efface its questionable war record, but it could "spike the guns"
of the Radicals, control Congress, sustain the President, and carry
the Empire State. This was the hope of Raymond and of Weed, back of
whom, it was said, stood tens of thousands of Republicans.
[Footnote 1079: New York _Evening Post_, August 27, 1866.]
To aid in the accomplishment of this work, great reliance had been
placed upon the tour of the President. Raymond reluctantly admitted
that these anticipations were far from realised,[1080] although the
managers thought the tour through New York, where the President had
been fairly discreet, was of value in marshalling the sentiment of
Republicans. Besides, it seemed to them to show, in rural districts
and towns as well as in the commercial centres, a decided preference
for a policy aimed to effect the union of all the States according to
the Constitution.
[Footnote 1080: New York _Times_, September 7.]
To encourage the coöperation of Republicans, the Democrats, led by
Dean Richmond, agreed, temporarily at least, to merge their name and
organisation in that of the National Union party. This arrangement was
not easily accomplished. The _World_ hesitated and the _Leader_
ridiculed, but when the Democracy of the State approved, these
journals acquiesced.[1081] In obedience to this understanding the
Democratic State committee called a National Union State convention,
and invited all to participate who favoured the principles enunciated
by the Philadelphia convention. The obscuration of State policies and
partisan prejudices made this broad and patriotic overture, devoted
exclusively to a more perfect peace, sound as soft and winning as the
spider's invitation to the fly. "If the action of the convention is in
harmony with the spirit of the call," wrote Raymond, "it cannot fail
to command a large degree of popular support."[1082] As county
delegations equally divided between Republicans and Democrats arrived
at Albany on September 11, it was apparent that the invitation had
been accepted at its face value. Although no Republican of prominence
appeared save Thurlow Weed, many Republicans of repute in their
respective localities answered to the roll call. These men favoured
John A. Dix for governor. To them he stood distinctly for the specific
policy announced at Philadelphia. In his opening address at that
convention he had sounded the keynote, declaring a speedy restoration
of the Union by the admission of Southern representatives to Congress
a necessary condition of safe political and party action. Besides, Dix
had been a Democrat all his life, a devoted supporter of the
government during the war, and it was believed his career would
command the largest measure of public confidence in the present
emergency.
[Footnote 1081: Letter of Thurlow Weed, New York _Times_, October 9,
1866.]
[Footnote 1082: New York _Times_, September 10, 1866.]
This had been the opinion of Dean Richmond, whose death on August 27
deprived the convention of his distinguished leadership. This was also
the view of Edwards Pierrepont, then as afterward a powerful factor in
whatever circle he entered. Although a staunch Democrat, Pierrepont
had announced, at the historic meeting in Union Square on April 20,
1861, an unqualified devotion to the government, and had accepted,
with James T. Brady and Hamilton Fish, a place on the union defence
committee. Later, he served on a commission with Dix to try prisoners
of state, and in 1864 advocated the election of Lincoln. There was no
dough about Pierrepont. He had shown himself an embodied influence,
speaking with force, and usually with success. He possessed the grit
and the breadth of his ancestors, one of whom was a chief founder of
Yale College, and his presence in the State convention, although he
had not been at Philadelphia, encouraged the hope that it would
concentrate the conservative sentiment and strength of New York, and
restore Democracy to popular confidence. Stimulated by his
earnestness, the up-State delegates, when the convention opened, had
practically settled Dix's nomination.
There were other candidates. A few preferred Robert H. Pruyn of
Albany, a Republican of practical energy and large political
experience, and until lately minister to Italy, while others thought
well of Henry C. Murphy of Brooklyn, a Democrat and State senator of
recognised ability. But next to Dix the favourite was John T. Hoffman,
then mayor of New York. It had been many years since the Democrats of
the metropolis had had a State executive. Edwards Pierrepont said that
"no man in the convention was born when the last Democratic governor
was elected from New York or Brooklyn."[1083] This, of course, was
hyperbole, since Pierrepont himself could remember when, at the
opening of the Erie Canal, Governor DeWitt Clinton, amidst the roar of
artillery and the eloquence of many orators, passed through the locks
at Albany, uniting the waters of Lake Erie with those of the Hudson.
Perhaps the thought of Clinton, climbing from the mayoralty to the
more distinguished office of governor, added to the desire of Hoffman,
for although the latter's capacity was limited in comparison with the
astonishing versatility and mental activity of Clinton, he was not
without marked ability.
[Footnote 1083: New York _Times_, September 13, 1866.]
Hoffman's life had been full of sunshine and success. He was a
distinguished student at Union College, an excellent lawyer, an
effective speaker, and a superb gentleman. Slenderly but strongly
built, his square, firm chin and prominent features, relieved by large
brown eyes, quickly attracted attention as he appeared in public. "In
the winter of 1866," wrote Rhodes, "I used frequently to see him at an
early morning hour walking down Broadway on his way to the City Hall.
Tall and erect, under forty and in full mental and physical vigor, he
presented a distinguished appearance and was looked at with interest
as he passed with long elastic strides. He was regarded as one of the
coming men of the nation. He had the air of a very successful man who
is well satisfied with himself and confident that affairs in general
are working for his advantage."[1084]
[Footnote 1084: James F. Rhodes, _History of the United States_, Vol.
6, p. 401, note.]
Not always overstocked with eligibles whom it could admire and trust,
Tammany, proud of the young man's accomplishments, elected him in
1860, at the age of thirty-two, recorder of the city, the presiding
officer of what was then the principal criminal court. Here he
acquitted himself, especially in the draft riot of 1863, with such
credit that Republicans and Democrats united in re-electing him, and
in 1865, before the expiration of his second term as recorder, Tammany
made him mayor. It was a hard, close contest. Indeed, success could
not have come to Tammany without the aid of Hoffman's increasing
popularity. This office, however, plunged him at once into partisan
politics, and gave to his career an uncertain character, as if a turn
of chance would decide what path of political life he was next to
follow. Now, at the age of thirty-eight, Tammany proposed making him
governor.
But Hoffman represented neither the principles nor the purposes of the
Philadelphia convention. The success of that movement depended largely
upon the pre-eminent fitness of the men who led it. The question was,
would the State be safer in the hands of a well-known Democratic
statesman like Dix than in the control of Fenton and the Radicals? Dix
stood for everything honest and conservative. For more than three
decades his prudence had been indissolubly associated with the wise
discretion of William L. Marcy and Silas Wright, while Hoffman, the
exponent of unpurged Democracy, charged with promoting its welfare and
success, was the one man whom conservative Republicans wished to
avoid, and whom, in their forcible presentation of Dix, they were
driving out of the race.
Democratic leaders saw the situation with alarm. They had endorsed the
Philadelphia movement to get into power,--not to give it to Dix and
the Conservatives. The President's reconstruction policy, benefiting
their party in the South and thus strengthening it in national
elections, had been adopted with sincerity, but they did not seriously
propose to merge their organisation in the State with another, giving
it the reins and the whip. "The New York delegation to Philadelphia,"
said the _World_, "was appointed by a gathering of politicians at
Saratoga, who neither represented, had any authority to bind, nor made
any pretence of binding the Democratic organisation of the
State."[1085] Indeed, it was treated as a surprising revelation that
conservative Republicans and Dix Democrats should come to Albany with
such a notion. However, the Dix appeal, developing wonderful strength,
could not be reasoned with, and in their desperation the Democrats
sought an adjournment until the morrow. This the convention refused,
granting only a recess until four o'clock. In the meantime Dix's
chances strengthened. It was plain that his nomination, on lines
approved by Seward, meant a split in Republican ranks, and the
up-State delegates, fearing delay, stood for early action. Then came
the inevitable trick. On reassembling a motion to adjourn was voted
down three to one, but Sanford E. Church, the chairman, declaring it
carried, put on his hat and quickly left the hall. It was an audacious
proceeding. Two-thirds of the convention stood aghast, and Church, the
next morning, found it necessary to make an abject apology.
Nevertheless, his purpose had been accomplished. Adjournment gave
Tammany the time fiercely to assail Dix, who was now charged with
consigning Democrats to Fort Lafayette, suppressing Democratic
legislatures, and opposing Seymour in 1864. John Morrissey, the
pugilist and congressman, declared that Dix could not poll twenty
thousand votes in New York City. Meanwhile Democratic leaders, closing
the door against Weed and the Conservatives, quietly agreed upon
Hoffman. Had Dean Richmond lived a month longer this _coup d'état_
would probably not have occurred. In vigour of intellect, in terseness
of expression, and in grasp of questions presented for consideration,
Richmond was recognised as the first unofficial man in America, and he
had long thought it time for the Democratic party to get into step
with the progress of events.
[Footnote 1085: New York _World_, October 5, 1866.]
The next morning, as pre-arranged, Edwards Pierrepont took the floor,
and after characterising the assembly as a Democratic convention whose
programme had been settled in advance by Democrats, he formally and
apparently with the assent of Dix coolly withdrew the latter's name,
moving that the nomination of John T. Hoffman be made by
acclamation.[1086] This was carried with shouts of wild exultation.
Many Dix supporters, anticipating the outcome, had silently left the
hall, but enough remained to hear, with profound astonishment, the
confession of Pierrepont that he had united with Tammany for the
nomination of Hoffman before the meeting of the Philadelphia
convention. Why, then, it was asked, did he advocate Dix the day
before? and upon whose authority did he withdraw Dix's name? After
such an exposure it could not be said of Pierrepont that he was
without guile. "It was the occasion of especial surprise and regret,"
wrote Weed, "that even before the National Union State convention had
concluded its labours, Judge Pierrepont should have assumed that it
was a Democratic convention, and that its programme had been settled
in advance by Democrats. This was not less a surprise when I
remembered that on the day previous to that announcement, Judge
Pierrepont concurred fully with me in the opinion that the nomination
of General Dix for governor was expedient and desirable."[1087]
[Footnote 1086: The ticket was as follows: Governor, John T. Hoffman,
New York; Lieutenant-Governor, Robert H. Pruyn, Albany; Canal
Commissioner, William W. Wright; Prison Inspector, Frank B. Gallagher,
Erie.]
[Footnote 1087: New York _Times_, October 9, 1866.]
But the worst blow to a union of political interests was yet to come.
To afford the people safety in their persons, security in their
property, and honesty in the administration of their government, a
Republican Legislature had placed the affairs of New York City largely
in control of Boards and Commissions. Tammany naturally resented this
invasion of home rule, and after reaffirming the principles of the
Philadelphia movement, the convention declared that "recent
legislation at Albany has usurped a supreme yet fitful control of the
local affairs which counties and municipalities are entitled to
regulate."[1088] To Conservatives nothing could have been more
offensive than such a declaration. "There are thousands of
Republicans," said Raymond, "who long for a restoration of the Union
by the admission to their seats in Congress of loyal men from loyal
States, but who will be quite likely to prefer taking their chances of
securing this result from the action of the Republican party, modified
as it may be by reflection and moderate counsels, rather than seek it
in the way marked out for them by the Albany Democratic
convention."[1089]
[Footnote 1088: New York _Times_, September 13, 1866.]
[Footnote 1089: _Ibid._, September 17.]
Thus the clash began. Conservatives resented the evident intention of
the Democrats to strengthen their party at the expense of the
Philadelphia movement. "We desire to call special attention," said a
Buffalo paper, "to the necessity of carrying out in good faith the
understanding which was entered into at the Philadelphia convention
that all old party antecedents and future action should be merged in
the National Union organisation. It was not contemplated then, or
since, to strengthen the Democratic party by that movement, and any
effort in that direction now cannot fail to be mischievous."[1090]
Before the month of September expired Raymond warned the _World_ that
he was not pledged to the action of the Albany convention. "No
Republican went into it for any such purpose," he said. "No hint of
putting it to any such use was given in the call or in any of its
preliminary proceedings. The convention was called to give effect to
the principles and policy of the Philadelphia convention, and
Republicans who approved those principles concurred in the call. But
how did this give that convention the right to commit them in favour
of measures alien from its ostensible purpose, and at war with their
entire political action? It is utterly preposterous to suppose that
they can coöperate with the Democratic party in the accomplishment of
any such design."[1091]
[Footnote 1090: Buffalo _Commercial Advertiser_, September 14, 1866.]
[Footnote 1091: New York _Times_, September 27, 1866.]
Five days later Raymond announced his support of the Republican
ticket.[1092] It was significant of his sincerity that he declined to
run again for Congress. Thomas E. Stewart, a conservative Republican,
was easily elected in the Sixth District, and Raymond could have had
the same vote, but without "the approval of those who originally gave
me their suffrage," he said, "a seat in Congress ceases to have any
attraction. With the Democratic party, as it has been organised and
directed since the rebellion broke out, I have nothing in
common."[1093] It is impossible not to feel a high respect for the
manner in which Raymond, having come to this determination, at once
acted upon it. He resented no criticism; he allowed no gleam of
feeling to creep into his editorials. Few men could have avoided the
temptation to assume the tone of the wronged one who endures much and
will not complain. Instinctively, however, Raymond felt the bad taste
and unwisdom of such a style, and he joined heartily and
good-naturedly in the effort to elect Reuben E. Fenton.
[Footnote 1092: _Ibid._, October 2, 5.]
[Footnote 1093: _Ibid._, September 27.]
Thurlow Weed, on the other hand, remained a Conservative. Indeed, he
went a step farther in the way of irreconciliation, preferring Hoffman
and Tammany, he said, to "the reckless, red-radicalism which rules the
present Congress.... The men who now lead the radical crusade against
the President," he continued, explanatory of his course, "attempted
during the war to divide the North. That calamity was averted by the
firmness and patriotism of conservative Republicans. In 1864 the same
leaders, as hostile to Mr. Lincoln as they are to President Johnson,
attempted to defeat his election by a flank movement at Cleveland.
Mr. Greeley wrote private letters to prominent Republicans inviting
their coöperation in a scheme to defeat Mr. Lincoln's election. The
same leaders went to Washington last December with the deliberate
intention to quarrel with the President, who up to that day and hour
had followed in the footsteps of his illustrious predecessor. Their
denunciations have been systematic and fiendish. If, under a keen
sense of injustice, he has since erred in judgment or temper, none
will deny the sufficiency of the provocation. That it would have been
wiser, though less manly, to forbear, I admit. But no nature, merely
human, excepting, perhaps, that of Abraham Lincoln, can patiently
endure wanton public indignities and contumely."[1094]
[Footnote 1094: New York _Times_, October 9, 1866.]
After the October elections it became apparent that the North would
support Congress rather than the President. One cause of distrust was
the latter's replacement of Republican office-holders with men noted
for disloyalty during the war. Weed complained that the appointment of
an obnoxious postmaster in Brooklyn "has cost us thousands of votes in
that city."[1095] During the campaign Johnson removed twelve hundred
and eighty-three postmasters, and relatively as many custom-house
employés and internal revenue officers.[1096] Among the latter was
Philip Dorsheimer of Buffalo. Indeed, the sweep equalled the violent
action of the Council of Appointment in the days when DeWitt Clinton
and Ambrose Spencer, resenting opposition to Morgan Lewis, sent Peter
B. Porter to the political guillotine for supporting Aaron Burr. Such
wholesale removals, however, did not arrest the progress of the
Republican party. After Johnson's "swing around the circle,"
Conservatives were reduced to a few prominent men who could not
consistently retrace their steps, and to hungry office-holders who
were known as "the bread and butter brigade."[1097] The _Post_, a
loyal advocate of the President's policy, thought it a melancholy
reflection "That its most damaging opponent is the President, who
makes a judicious course so hateful to the people that no argument is
listened to, and no appeals to reason, to the Constitution, to common
sense, can gain a hearing."[1098] Henry Ward Beecher voiced a similar
lament. The great divine had suffered severe criticism for casting his
large influence on the side of Johnson, and he now saw success melting
away because of the President's vicious course. "Mr. Johnson just now
and for some time past," he wrote, "has been the greatest obstacle in
the way of his own views. The mere fact that he holds them is their
condemnation with a public utterly exasperated with his rudeness and
violence."[1099] A few weeks later the Brooklyn minister, tired of the
insincerity of the President and of his Philadelphia movement, opened
the campaign with a characteristic speech in support of the Republican
candidates.[1100]
[Footnote 1095: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 1096: The _Nation_, September 6, p. 191; September 27, p.
241.]
[Footnote 1097: New York _Tribune_, October 1, 1866.]
[Footnote 1098: New York _Evening Post_, September 11, 1866.]
[Footnote 1099: Extract from private letter, September 6, 1866.]
[Footnote 1100: New York _Tribune_, October 16, 1866.]
In animation, frequent meetings, and depth of interest, the campaign
resembled a Presidential contest. The issues were largely national. As
one of the disastrous results of Johnson's reconstruction policy,
Republicans pointed to the New Orleans and Memphis massacres,
intensified by the charge of the Southern loyalists that "more than a
thousand devoted Union citizens have been murdered in cold blood since
the surrender of Lee."[1101] The horrors of Andersonville, illuminated
by eye witnesses, and the delay to try Jefferson Davis, added to the
exasperation. On the other hand, Democrats traced Southern conditions
to opposition to the President's policy, charging Congress with a base
betrayal of the Constitution in requiring the late Confederate States
to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment as a condition precedent to the
admission of their representatives. The great debate attracted to the
rostrum the ablest and best known speakers. For the Republicans,
Roscoe Conkling, sounding the accepted keynote, now for the first
time made an extended tour of the State, speaking in fourteen towns
and cities. On the other hand, true to the traditions of his life,
John A. Dix threw his influence on the side of the President.
[Footnote 1101: _Ibid._, September 7.]
Hoffman, also, patiently traversed the State, discussing
constitutional and legal principles with the care of an able lawyer.
There was much in Hoffman himself to attract the enthusiasm of popular
assemblages. Kind and sympathetic, with a firm dignity that avoided
undue familiarity, he was irresistibly fascinating to men as he moved
among them. He had an attractive presence, a genial manner, and a good
name. He had, too, a peculiar capacity for understanding and pleasing
people, being liberal and spontaneous in his expressions of sympathy,
and apparently earnest in his attachment to principle. He was not an
orator. He lacked dash, brilliant rhetoric, and attractive figures of
speech. He rarely stirred the emotions. But he pleased people. They
felt themselves in the presence of one whom they could trust as well
as admire. The Democratic party wanted a new hero, and the favourite
young mayor seemed cut out to supply the want.
However, Hoffman did not escape the barbed criticism of the Republican
press. Raymond had spoken of his ability and purity, and of his course
during the war as patriotic.[1102] Weed, also, had said that "during
the rebellion he was loyal to the government and Union."[1103] To
overcome these certificates of character, the _Tribune_ declared that
"Saturn is not more hopelessly bound with rings than he. Rings of
councilmen, rings of aldermen, rings of railroad corporations, hold
him in their charmed circles, and would, if he were elected, use his
influence to plunder the treasury and the people."[1104] It also
charged him with being disloyal. In 1866 and for several years later
the standing of pronounced Copperheads was similar to that of Tories
after the Revolution, and it seriously crippled a candidate for office
to be classed among them. Moreover, it was easy to discredit a
Democrat's loyalty. To most members of the Union party the name itself
clothed a man with suspicion, and the slightest specification, like
the outcropping of a ledge of rocks, indicated that much more was
concealed than had been shown. On this theory, the Republican press,
deeming it desirable, if not absolutely essential, to put Hoffman into
the disloyal class, accepted the memory of men who heard him speak at
Sing Sing, his native town, in 1864. As they remembered, he had
declared that "Democrats only had gone to war;" that "volunteering
stopped when Lincoln declared for an abolition policy;" and that he
"would advise revolution and resistance to the government" if Lincoln
was elected without Tennessee being represented in the electoral
college.[1105] Other men told how "at one of the darkest periods of the
war, Hoffman urged an immediate sale of United States securities, then
under his control and held by the sinking fund of the city."[1106] In
the _Tribune's_ opinion such convenient recollections of unnamed and
unknown men made him a "Copperhead."[1107]
[Footnote 1102: New York _Times_, September 13, 1866.]
[Footnote 1103: _Ibid._, September 9.]
[Footnote 1104: New York _Tribune_, November 1, 1866.]
[Footnote 1105: New York _Tribune_, Oct. 5, 1866.]
[Footnote 1106: _Ibid._, Oct. 10.]
[Footnote 1107: _Ibid._]
Although New York indicated the same direction of the popular will
that had manifested itself in Pennsylvania and other October States,
the heavy and fraudulent registration in New York City encouraged the
belief that Tammany would overcome the up-State vote.[1108] However,
the pronounced antagonism to the President proved too serious a
handicap, and the Radicals, electing Fenton by 13,000 majority,[1109]
carried both branches of the Legislature, and twenty out of thirty-one
congressmen. It was regarded a great victory for Fenton, who was
really opposed by one of the most formidable combinations known to the
politics of the State. Besides the full strength of the Democratic
party, the combined liquor interest antagonised him, while the Weed
forces, backed by the Johnsonised federal officials, were not less
potent. Indeed, Seward publicly predicted Republican defeat by 40,000
majority.[1110]
[Footnote 1108: Gustavus Myers, _History of Tammany Hall_, p. 250.]
[Footnote 1109: Fenton, 366,315; Hoffman, 352,526.--_Civil List, State
of New York_, 1887, p. 166.]
[Footnote 1110: New York _Tribune_, January 18, 1869.]
The result also insured the election of a Republican to the United
States Senate to succeed Ira Harris on March 4, 1867. Candidates for
the high honour were numerous. Before the end of November Horace
Greeley, having suffered defeat for Congress in the Fourth District,
served notice of his desire.[1111] George William Curtis had a like
ambition. Lyman Tremaine, too, was willing. Charles J. Folger, the
strong man of the State Senate, belonged in the same class, and Ransom
Balcom of Binghamton, who had achieved an enviable reputation as a
Supreme Court judge, also had his friends. But the three men seriously
talked of were Ira Harris, Noah Davis, and Roscoe Conkling.
[Footnote 1111: _Ibid._, November 9, 1866.]
Harris had been something of a disappointment. He had performed the
duties of judge and legislator with marked ability, but in Washington,
instead of exercising an adequate influence on the floor of the
Senate, he contented himself with voting, performing committee work,
and attending to the personal wants of soldiers and other
constituents. President Lincoln, referring to the Senator's
persistency in pressing candidates for office, once said: "I never
think of going to sleep now without first looking under my bed to see
if Judge Harris is not there wanting something for somebody."[1112]
[Footnote 1112: Andrew D. White, _Autobiography_, Vol. 1, p. 134.]
Davis had been on the Supreme bench since 1857, and although he had
had little opportunity to develop statesmanship, his enthusiastic
devotion to the Union had discovered resources of argument and a
fearless independence which were destined to win him great fame in the
trial of William M. Tweed. People liked his nerve, believed in his
honesty, confided in his judgment, and revelled in the retorts that
leaped to his lips. There was no question, either, how he would stand
if called to vote upon the impeachment of the President, a proceeding
already outlined and practically determined upon by the majority in
Congress. This could not be said with confidence of Ira Harris.
Although his radicalism had stiffened as the time for a re-election
approached, he had not always been terribly in earnest. It was not his
nature to jump to the support of a measure that happened to please the
fancy of the moment. Yet his votes followed those of Senator
Fessenden, and his voice, if not strong in debate, expressed the
wisdom and judgment of a safe counsellor.
In the House of Representatives Conkling had displayed real ability.
Time had vindicated his reasons for demanding a bankrupt law, and his
voice, raised for economy in the public expense, had made him of
special service during the war. He voted to reduce the mileage of
congressmen, he opposed the creation of wide-open commissions, and he
aided in uncovering frauds in the recruiting service. In the darkest
hour of rebellion he approved Vallandigham's arrest and refused to
join a movement to displace Lincoln for another candidate. On his
return to Congress, after his defeat in 1862, he had passed to the
Committee on Ways and Means, and to the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction. Of the Radicals no one surpassed him in diligence and
energy. He voted to confiscate the property of rebels, he stood with
Stevens for disfranchising all persons who voluntarily adhered to the
late insurrection until July 4, 1870, and he would agree to no plan
that operated to disfranchise the coloured population. Indeed, to the
system of constructive legislation which represented the plan of
reconstruction devised by Congress, he practically devoted his time.
Of the New York delegation Conkling was admittedly the ablest speaker,
although in a House which numbered among its members James A.
Garfield, Thaddeus Stevens, and James G. Blaine, he was not an
admitted star of the first magnitude. Blaine's serious oratorical
castigation, administered after a display of offensive manners, had
disarmed him except in resentment.[1113] The _Times_ spoke of him as
of "secondary rank,"[1114] and the _Tribune_, the great organ of the
party, had declined to put upon him the seal of its approval. Besides,
his vanity and arrogance, although not yet a fruitful subject of the
comic literature of the day, disparaged almost as much as his
brilliant rhetoric exalted him. Careful observers, however, had not
failed to measure Conkling's ability. From Paris, William Cullen
Bryant wrote his friends to make every effort to nominate him, and
Parke Godwin extended the same quality of support.[1115] His recent
campaign, too, had made men proud of him. Although disaffected
Republicans sought to drive him from public life, and the _Tribune_
had withheld its encouragement, he gained a great triumph.
[Footnote 1113: "As to the gentleman's cruel sarcasm," said Blaine, "I
hope he will not be too severe. The contempt of that large-minded
gentleman is so wilting, his haughty disdain, his grandiloquent swell,
his majestic, supereminent, overpowering, turkey-gobbler strut has
been so crushing to myself and all the members of this House, that I
know it was an act of the greatest temerity for me to venture upon a
controversy with him." Referring to a comparison which had been made
of Conkling to Henry Winter Davis, Blaine continued: "The gentleman
took it seriously, and it has given his strut additional pomposity.
The resemblance is great; it is striking. Hyperion to a Satyr,
Thersites to Hercules, mud to marble, dunghill to diamond, a singed
cat to a Bengal tiger, a whining puppy to a roaring lion."--_Congressional
Globe_, April 20, 1866, Vol. 37, Part 3, p. 2298.
"I do not think Conkling was the equal in debate with Blaine."--George
F. Hoar, _Autobiography_, Vol. 2, p. 55. "Conkling was the more
dignified and commanding, but Blaine more aggravating and personal.
When Blaine likened Conkling to a strutting turkey-gobbler, the House
slightly hissed. But on the whole that debate was regarded as a
draw."--William M. Stewart, _Reminiscences_, p. 206.]
[Footnote 1114: New York _Times_, January 3, 1867.]
[Footnote 1115: A.R. Conkling, _Life of Conkling_, pp. 286-7.]
But men talked geography. Seward and Preston King had represented
western New York, and since Morgan had succeeded King, a western man,
it was argued, should succeed Harris. This strengthened Noah Davis.
Never in the history of the State, declared his friends, had a United
States senator been taken from territory west of Cayuga Bridge, a
section having over one million people, and giving in the recent
election 27,000 Republican majority. On this and the strength of their
candidate the western counties relied, with the further hope of
inheriting Harris' strength whenever it left him. On the other hand,
Harris sought support as the second choice of the Davis men. Greeley
never really got into the race. Organisation would probably not have
availed him, but after serving notice upon his friends that their
ardent and button-holing support would not be sanctioned by him, the
impression obtained that Greeley was as ridiculous as his letter.[1116]
When Lyman Tremaine withdrew from the contest he threw his influence
to Conkling. This jolted Harris. Then Andrew D. White changed from
Curtis to the Oneidan. Curtis understood the situation too well to
become active. "The only chance," he wrote, "is a bitter deadlock
between the three, or two, chiefs. The friends of Davis proposed to me
to make a combination against Conkling, the terms being the election
of whichever was stronger now,--Davis or me,--and the pledges of the
successful man to support the other two years hence. I declined
absolutely."[1117] As Harris weakened, Reuben E. Fenton, hopeful of
becoming Edwin D. Morgan's successor in 1869, restrained any rush to
Davis.
[Footnote 1116: New York _Tribune_, November 9, 1866.]
[Footnote 1117: Edward Cary, _Life of Curtis_, p. 193.]
The potential influence of Ellis H. Roberts, editor of the Utica
_Herald_, a paper of large circulation in northern and central New
York, proved of great assistance to Conkling. Roberts was of Welsh
origin, a scholar in politics, strong with the pen, and conspicuously
prominent in the discussion of economic issues. When in Congress
(1871-75) he served upon the Ways and Means Committee. In 1867 his
friends sent him to the Assembly especially to promote the election of
Utica's favourite son, and in his sincere, earnest efforts he very
nearly consolidated the Republican press of the State in Conkling's
behalf. During the week's fierce contest at Albany he marshalled his
forces with rare skill, not forgetting that vigilance brings
victory.[1118]
[Footnote 1118: Conkling and Roberts quarrelled in the early
seventies--the former, perhaps, unwilling to have two great men in
Oneida County--and Roberts was defeated for Congress in 1874. After
that the Utica _Herald_ became Conkling's bitterest enemy. See
interviews, New York _Herald_, November 9, 1877, and New York
_Tribune_, November 10, 1877.]
Thus the strife, without bitterness because free from factional
strife, remained for several days at white-heat. "On reaching here
Tuesday night," Conkling wrote his wife, "the crowd took and held
possession of me till about three o'clock the next morning. Hundreds
came and went, and until Thursday night this continued from early
morning to early morning again. The contest is a very curious and
complex one. Great sums of money are among the influences here. I have
resolutely put down my foot that no friend of mine, even without my
knowledge, shall pay a cent, upon any pretext nor in any strait, come
what will. If chosen, it will be by the men of character, and if
beaten this will be my consolation. The gamblers say that I can have
$200,000 here from New York in a moment if I choose, and that the
members are fools to elect me without it."[1119] As evidence of the
want of faith in legislative virtue, the _Times_ gave the answer of a
veteran lobbyist, who was asked respecting the chances of Freeman
Clarke. "Who's Clark?" he inquired. "Formerly the comptroller of the
currency," was the reply. "Oh, yes," said the lobbyist; "and if he
controlled the currency now, he would have a sure thing of it."[1120]
[Footnote 1119: A.R. Conkling, _Life of Roscoe Conkling_, pp. 286-287.]
[Footnote 1120: New York _Times_, January 4, 1867.]
Conkling's winning card was his forensic ability. In the United State
Senate, since the days of Seward, New York had been weak in debating
power, and the party's desire to be represented by one who could place
the Empire State in the front rank of influence appealed strongly to
many of the legislators. Andrew D. White, therefore, raised a
whirlwind of applause at the caucus when he declared, in seconding
Conkling's nomination, that what the Empire State wanted was not
judicial talent "but a voice."[1121]
[Footnote 1121: New York _Times_, January 10.]
Nevertheless, so evenly did the members divide that it took five
ballots to make a nomination. Conkling led on the first ballot and
Davis on the second. On the third, Conkling stood one ahead, and three
on the fourth, with Harris clinging to six votes. The disposition of
these six would make a senator, and by gaining them Conkling became
the nominee on the fifth ballot.[1122] Had they gone to Noah Davis,
Fenton's way to the Senate in 1869 must have been blocked. But the
Governor was watchful. At the critical moment on the last ballot, one
vote which had been twice thrown for Davis went back to Folger. The
Chautauquan did not propose to take any chances.
[Footnote 1122: The vote by ballots stood as follows:
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Conkling 33 39 45 53 59
Davis 30 41 44 50 49
Harris 32 24 18 6 --
Balcom 7 4 2 -- --
Greeley 6 -- -- -- --
Folger 1 1 -- -- 1
The Democratic caucus, held the same evening, nominated Henry C.
Murphy of Brooklyn, who received 25 votes to 21 for A. Oakey Hall of
New York.]