CHAPTER III

"THE MAD DESPERATION OF REACTION"

1862

Notwithstanding its confidence in General McClellan, whose success in

West Virginia had made him the successor of General Scott, giving him

command of all the United States forces, the North, by midsummer,

became profoundly discouraged. Many events contributed to it. The

defeat at Ball's Bluff on the Potomac, which Roscoe Conkling likened

to the battle of Cannæ, because "the very pride and flower of our

young men were among its victims,"[812] had been followed by

conspicuous incompetence at Manassas and humiliating failure on the

Peninsula. Moreover, financial difficulties increased the despondency.

At the outbreak of hostilities practical repudiation of Southern debts

had brought widespread disaster. "The fabric of New York's mercantile

prosperity," said the _Tribune_, "lies in ruins, beneath which ten

thousand fortunes are buried. Last fall the merchant was a capitalist;

to-day he is a bankrupt."[813] In September, 1861, these losses

aggregated $200,000,000.[814] Besides, the strain of raising sufficient

funds to meet government expenses had forced a suspension of specie

payment and driven people to refuse United States notes payable on

demand without interest. Meantime, the nation's expenses aggregated

$2,000,000 a day and the Treasury was empty. "I have been obliged,"

wrote the Secretary of the Treasury, "to draw for the last installment

of the November loan."[815]

[Footnote 812: _Congressional Globe_, January 6, 1862.]

[Footnote 813: New York _Tribune_, May 27, 1861.]

[Footnote 814: _Ibid._, September 18.]

[Footnote 815: Letter of Secretary Chase, dated February 3, 1862.--E.G.

Spaulding, _History of the Legal Tender_, p. 59.]

To meet this serious financial condition, Elbridge G. Spaulding of

Buffalo, then a member of Congress, had been designated to prepare an

emergency measure to avoid national bankruptcy. "We must have at least

$100,000,000 during the next three months," he wrote, on January 8,

1862, "or the government must stop payment."[816] Spaulding, then

fifty-two years of age, was president of a bank, a trained financier,

and already the possessor of a large fortune. Having served in the

Thirty-first Congress, he had returned in 1859, after an absence of

eight years, to remain four years longer. Strong, alert, and

sufficiently positive to be stubborn, he possessed the confidence of

Thaddeus Stevens, chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, who

approved his plan of issuing $100,000,000 legal-tender, non-interest

bearing treasury notes, exchangeable at par for six-twenty bonds.

Spaulding fully appreciated the objections to his policy, but the only

other course, he argued, was to sell bonds as in the war of 1812,

which, if placed at six percent interest, would not, in his opinion,

bring more than sixty cents--a ruinous method of conducting

hostilities. However, his plea of necessity found a divided committee

and in Roscoe Conkling a most formidable opponent, who attacked the

measure as unnecessary, extravagant, unsound, without precedent, of

doubtful constitutionality, and morally imperfect.[817]

[Footnote 816: Spaulding, _History of the Legal Tender_, p. 18.]

[Footnote 817: The bill escaped from the committee by one majority.]

It was in this debate that Conkling, adroitly choosing the right time

and the proper subject, impressed the country with his power as an

orator and his ability as a brilliant, resourceful debater, although,

perhaps, a destructive rather than constructive legislator. Nature had

lavished upon him superb gifts of mind and person. He was of

commanding, even magnificent presence, six feet three inches tall,

with regular features, lofty forehead, and piercing eyes,--blond and

gigantic as a viking. It was difficult, indeed, for a man so

superlatively handsome not to be vain, and the endeavour upon his part

to conceal the defect was not in evidence. Although an unpopular and

unruly schoolboy, who refused to go to college, he had received a good

education, learning much from a scholarly father, a college-bred man,

and an ornament to the United States District Court for more than a

quarter of a century. Moreover, from early youth Conkling had studied

elocution, training a strong, slightly musical voice, and learning the

use of secondary accents, the choice of words, the value of deliberate

speech, and the assumption of an impressive earnestness. In this

debate, too, he discovered the talent for ridicule and sarcasm that

distinguished him in later life, when he had grown less considerate of

the feelings of opponents, and indicated something of the

imperiousness and vanity which clouded an otherwise attractive manner.

As he stubbornly and eloquently contested the progress of the

legal-tender measure with forceful argument and a wealth of

information, Conkling seemed likely to deprive Spaulding of the title

of "father of the greenback" until the Secretary of the Treasury,

driven to desperation for want of money, reluctantly came to the

Congressman's rescue and forced the bill through Congress.[818] By

midsummer, however, gold had jumped to seventeen per cent., while the

cost of the war, augmented by a call for 300,000 three years' men and

by a draft of 300,000 nine months' militia, rested more heavily than

ever upon the country. Moreover, by September 1 McClellan had been

deprived of his command, the Army of the Potomac had suffered defeat

at the second battle of Bull Run, and Lee and Longstreet, with a

victorious army, were on their way to Maryland. The North stood

aghast!

[Footnote 818: On Spaulding's motion to close debate, Conkling demanded

tellers, and the motion was lost,--yeas, 52; nays, 62.--_Congressional

Globe_, February 5, 1862; _Ibid._, p. 618.]

Much more ominous than military disaster and financial embarrassment,

however, was the divisive sentiment over emancipation. Northern

armies, moving about in slave communities, necessarily acted as a

constant disintegrating force. Slaves gave soldiers aid and

information, and soldiers, stimulated by their natural hostility to

slave-owners, gave slaves protection and sympathy. Thus, very early in

the war, many men believed that rebellion and slavery were so

intertwined that both must be simultaneously overthrown. This

sentiment found expression in the Fremont proclamation, issued on

August 30, 1861, setting free all slaves owned by persons who aided

secession in the military department of Missouri. On the other hand,

the Government, seeking to avoid the slavery question, encouraged

military commanders to refuse refuge to the negroes within their

lines, and in modifying Fremont's order to conform to the Confiscation

Act of August 6, the President aroused a discussion characterised by

increasing acerbity, which divided the Republican party into Radicals

and Conservatives. The former, led by the _Tribune_, resented the

attitude of army officers, who, it charged, being notoriously in more

or less thorough sympathy with the inciting cause of rebellion, failed

to seize opportunities to strike at slavery. Among Radicals the belief

obtained that one half of the commanding generals desired to prosecute

the war so delicately that slavery should receive the least possible

harm, and in their comments in Congress and in the press they made no

concealment of their opinion, that such officers were much more

anxious to restore fugitive slaves to rebel owners than to make their

owners prisoners of war.[819] They were correspondingly flattering to

those generals who proclaimed abolition as an adjunct of the war.

Greeley's taunts had barbed points. "He is no extemporised soldier,

looking for a presidential nomination or seat in Congress," he said of

General Hunter, whose order had freed the slaves in South Carolina,

Georgia, and Florida. "He is neither a political or civil engineer,

but simply a patriot whose profession is war, and who does not

understand making war so as not to hurt your enemy."[820]

[Footnote 819: New York _Tribune_, July 30, 1862.]

[Footnote 820: _Ibid._, August 4.]

When the _Times_, an exponent of the Conservatives, defended the

Administration's policy with the declaration that slaves were used as

fast as obtained,[821] the _Tribune_ minimized the intelligence of its

editor. "Consider," it said, "the still unmodified order of McDowell,

issued a full year ago, forbidding the harbouring of negroes within

our lines. Consider Halleck's order, now nine months old and still

operative, forbidding negroes to come within our lines at all.

McClellan has issued a goodly number of orders and proclamations, but

not one of them offers protection and freedom to such slaves of rebels

as might see fit to claim them at his hands. His only order bearing

upon their condition and prospects is that which expelled the

Hutchinsons from his camp for the crime of singing anti-slavery

songs."[822]

[Footnote 821: New York _Times_, July 17, 1862.]

[Footnote 822: New York _Tribune_, July 19, 1862.]

The dominant sentiment in Congress reflected the feeling of the

Radicals, and under the pressure of McClellan's reverses before

Richmond, the House, on July 11, and the Senate on the following day,

passed the Confiscation Act, freeing forever the slaves of rebel

owners whenever within control of the Government. The Administration's

failure to enforce this act in the spirit and to the extent that

Congress intended, finally brought out the now historic "Prayer of

Twenty Millions"--an editorial signed by Horace Greeley and addressed

to Abraham Lincoln. It charged the President with being disastrously

remiss in the discharge of his official duty and unduly influenced by

the menaces of border slave State politicians. It declared that the

Union was suffering from timid counsels and mistaken deference to

rebel slavery; that all attempts to put down rebellion and save

slavery are preposterous and futile; and that every hour of obeisance

to slavery is an added hour of deepened peril to the Union. In

conclusion, he entreated the Chief Executive to render hearty and

unequivocal obedience to the law of the land.[823]

[Footnote 823: _Ibid._, August 20.

Lincoln's reply appeared in the _National Intelligencer_ of

Washington. He said in part: "I would save the Union. If there be

those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time

save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would

not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery,

I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to

save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I

could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if

I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I

could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would do

that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I

believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear

because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do

less whenever I believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall

do more when I shall believe doing more will help the cause."--_Lincoln's

Works_, Vol. 2, p. 227.]

Thus did Greeley devote his great powers to force Lincoln into

emancipation. It is impossible, even at this distance of time, to turn

the pages of his ponderous volumes without feeling the matchless force

of his energy, the strength of his masterly array of facts, his biting

sarcasm, his bold assumptions, and his clear, unadorned style. There

is about it all an impassioned conviction, as if he spoke because he

could not keep silent, making it impossible to avoid the belief that

the whole soul and conscience of the writer were in his work. Day

after day, with kaleidoscopic change, he marshalled arguments, facts,

and historical parallels, bearing down the reader's judgment as he

swept away like a great torrent the criticisms of himself and the

arguments of his opponents. Nothing apparently could withstand his

onslaught on slavery. With one dash of his pen he forged sentences

that, lance-like, found their way into every joint of the monster's

armour.

Greeley's criticism of the President and the army, however, gave his

enemies vantage ground for renewed attacks. Ever since he suggested,

at the beginning of hostilities, that the _Herald_ did not care which

flag floated over its office, James Gordon Bennett, possessing the

genuine newspaper genius, had daily evinced a deep, personal dislike

of the _Tribune's_ editor, and throughout the discussion of

emancipation, the _Herald_, in bitter editorials, kept its columns in

a glow, tantalising the _Tribune_ with a persistency that recalls

Cheetham's attacks upon Aaron Burr. The strategical advantage lay with

the _Herald_, since the initiative belonged to the _Tribune_, but the

latter had with it the preponderating sentiment of its party and the

growing influence of a war necessity. Greeley fought with a

broad-sword, swinging it with a vigorous and well-aimed effect, while

Bennett, with lighter weapon, pricked, stabbed, and cut. Never

inactive, the latter sought to aggravate and embitter. Greeley, on the

contrary, intent upon forcing the Administration to change its policy,

ignored his tormentor, until exasperation, like the gathering steam in

a geyser, drove him into further action. In this prolonged controversy

the _Tribune_ invariably referred to its adversary as "the _Herald_,"

but in the _Herald_, "Greeley," "old Greeley," "poor Greeley," "Mars

Greeley," "poor crazy Greeley," became synonyms for the editor of the

_Tribune_.

The fight of these able and conspicuous journals represented the

fierceness with which emancipation was pushed and opposed throughout

the State. Conservative men, therefore, realising the danger to which

a bitter campaign along strict party lines would subject the Union

cause, demanded that all parties rally to the support of the

Government with a candidate for governor devoted to conservative

principles and a vigorous prosecution of the war. Sentiment seemed to

point to John A. Dix as such a man. Though not distinguished as a

strategist or effective field officer, he possessed courage, caution,

and a desire to crush the rebellion. The policy of this movement,

embracing conservative Republicans and war Democrats, was urged by

Thurlow Weed, sanctioned by Seward, and heartily approved by John Van

Buren, who, since the beginning of hostilities, had avoided party

councils. The Constitutional Union party, composed of old line Whigs

who opposed emancipation,[824] proposed to lead this movement at its

convention, to be held at Troy on September 9, but at the appointed

time James Brooks, by prearrangement, appeared with a file of

instructed followers, captured the meeting, and gave Horatio Seymour

32 votes to 20 for Dix and 6 for Millard Fillmore. This unexpected

result made Seymour the candidate of the Democratic State convention

which met at Albany on the following day.

[Footnote 824: New York _Herald_, October 15, 1862.]

Seymour sincerely preferred another. Early in August he travelled from

Utica to Buffalo to resist the friendship and the arguments of Dean

Richmond. It cannot be said that he had outlived ambition. He

possessed wealth, he was advancing in his political career, and he

aspired to higher honours, but he did not desire to become governor

again, even though the party indicated a willingness to follow his

leadership and give him free rein to inaugurate such a policy as his

wisdom and conservatism might dictate. He clearly recognised the

difficulties in the way. He had taken ultra ground against the Federal

Administration, opposing emancipation, denouncing arbitrary arrests,

and expressing the belief that the North could not subjugate the

South; yet he would be powerless to give life to his own views, or to

modify Lincoln's proposed conduct of the war. The President, having

been elected to serve until March, 1865, would not tolerate

interference with his plans and purposes, so that an opposition

Governor, regardless of grievances or their cause, would be compelled

to furnish troops and to keep the peace. Hatred of conscription would

be no excuse for non-action in case of a draft riot, and indignation

over summary arrests could in nowise limit the exercise of such

arbitrary methods. To be governor under such conditions, therefore,

meant constant embarrassment, if not unceasing humiliation. These

reasons were carefully presented to Richmond. Moreover, Seymour was

conscious of inherent defects of temperament. He did not belong to the

class of politicians, described by Victor Hugo, who mistake a

weather-cock for a flag. He was a gentleman of culture, of public

experience, and of moral purpose, representing the best quality of his

party; but possessed of a sensitive and eager temper, he was too often

influenced by the men immediately about him, and too often inclined

to have about him men whose influence did not strengthen his own

better judgment.

Richmond knew of this weakness and regretted it, but the man of iron,

grasping the political situation with the shrewdness of a phenomenally

successful business man, wanted a candidate who could win. It was

plain to him that the Republican party, divided on the question of

emancipation and weakened by arbitrary arrests, a policy that many

people bitterly resented, could be beaten by a candidate who added

exceptional popularity to a promised support of the war and a vigorous

protest against government methods. Dix, he knew, would stand with the

President; Seymour would criticise, and with sureness of aim arouse

opposition. While Richmond, therefore, listened respectfully to

Seymour's reasons for declining the nomination, he was deaf to all

entreaty, insisting that as the party had honoured him when he wanted

office, he must now honour the party when it needed him. Besides, he

declared that Sanford E. Church, whom Seymour favoured, could not be

elected.[825] Having gained the Oneidan's consent, Richmond exercised

his adroit methods of packing conventions, and thus opened the way for

Seymour's unanimous nomination by making the Constitutional Union

convention the voice of one crying in the wilderness.

[Footnote 825: The author is indebted to Henry A. Richmond, son of Dean

Richmond, for this outline of Seymour's interview.]

To a majority of the Democratic party Seymour's selection appealed

with something of historic pride. It recalled other days in the

beginning of his career, and inspired the hope that the peace which

reigned in the fifties, and the power that the Democracy then wielded,

might, under his leadership, again return to bless their party by

checking a policy that was rapidly introducing a new order of things.

After his nomination, therefore, voices became hoarse with long

continued cheering. For a few minutes the assembly surrendered to the

noise and confusion which characterise a more modern convention, and

only the presence of the nominee and the announcement that he would

speak brought men to order.

Seymour, as was his custom, came carefully prepared. In his party he

now had no rival. Not since DeWitt Clinton crushed the Livingstons in

1807, and Martin Van Buren swept the State in 1828, did one man so

completely dominate a political organisation, and in his arraignment

of the Radicals he emulated the partisan rather than the patriot. He

spoke respectfully of the President, insisting that he should "be

treated with the respect due to his position as the representative of

the dignity and honor of the American people," and declaring that

"with all our powers of mind and person, we mean to support the

Constitution and uphold the Union;" but in his bitter denunciation of

the Administration he confused the general policy of conducting a war

with mistakes in awarding government contracts. To him an honest

difference of opinion upon constitutional questions was as corrupt and

reprehensible as dishonest practices in the departments at Washington.

He condemned emancipation as "a proposal for the butchery of women and

children, for scenes of lust and rapine, and of arson and murder,

which would invoke the interference of civilised Europe."[826]

[Footnote 826: Cook and Knox, _Public Record of Horatio Seymour_, pp.

45-58.]

The convention thought seriously of making this speech the party

platform. But A.P. Laning, declining to surrender the prerogative of

the resolutions committee, presented a brief statement of principles,

"pledging the Democracy to continue united in its support of the

Government, and to use all legitimate means to suppress rebellion,

restore the Union as it was, and maintain the Constitution as it is."

It also denounced "the illegal, unconstitutional, and arbitrary

arrests of citizens of the State as unjustifiable," declaring such

arrests a usurpation and a crime, and insisting upon the liberty of

speech and the freedom of the press.[827]

[Footnote 827: The ticket nominated was as follows: Governor, Horatio

Seymour of Oneida; Lieutenant-Governor, David E. Floyd Jones of

Queens; Canal Commissioner, William I. Skinner of Herkimer; Prison

Inspector, Gaylord J. Clark of Niagara; Clerk of Appeals, Fred A.

Tallmadge of New York.]

The speech of Seymour, as displeasing to many War Democrats as it was

satisfactory to the Peace faction, at once aroused conservative

Republicans, and Weed and Raymond, backed by Seward, favored the

policy of nominating John A. Dix. Seward had distinguished himself as

one of the more conservative members of the Cabinet. After settling

into the belief that Lincoln "is the best of us"[828] his ambition

centered in the support of the President, and whatever aid he could

render in helping the country to a better understanding of the

Administration's aims and wishes was generously if not always adroitly

performed. He did not oppose the abolition of slavery. On the

contrary, his clear discernment exhibited its certain destruction if

the rebellion continued; but he opposed blending emancipation with a

prosecution of the war, preferring to meet the former as the necessity

for it arose rather than precipitate an academic discussion which

would divide Republicans and give the Democrats an issue.

[Footnote 828: Seward to his wife.--F.W. Seward, _Life of W.H. Seward_,

Vol. 2, p. 590.]

When Lincoln, on July 22, 1862, announced to his Cabinet a

determination to issue an emancipation proclamation, the Secretary

questioned its expediency only as to the time of its publication. "The

depression of the public mind consequent upon our repeated reverses,"

he said, "is so great that I fear the effect of so important a

step.... I suggest, sir, that you postpone its issue until you can

give it to the country supported by military success, instead of

issuing it, as would be the case now, upon the greatest disasters of

the war."[829] Seward's view was adopted, and in place of the

proclamation appeared the Executive Order of July 22, the

unenforcement of which Greeley had so fiercely criticised in his

"Prayer of Twenty Millions." Thurlow Weed, who, in June, had returned

from London heavily freighted with good results for the Union

accomplished by his influence with leading Englishmen, held the

opinion of Seward. Raymond had also made the _Times_ an able defender

of the President's policy, and although not violent in its opposition

to the attitude of the Radicals, it never ceased its efforts to

suppress agitation of the slavery question.

[Footnote 829: Frank B. Carpenter, _Six Months at the White House_, pp.

22, 23.]

In its purpose to nominate Dix the New York _Herald_ likewise bore a

conspicuous part. It had urged his selection upon the Democrats,

declaring him stronger than Seymour. It now urged him upon the

Republicans, insisting that he was stronger than Wadsworth.[830] This

was also the belief of Weed, whose sagacity as to the strength of

political leaders was rarely at fault.[831] On the contrary, Governor

Morgan expressed the opinion that "Wadsworth will be far more

available than any one yet mentioned as my successor."[832] Wadsworth's

service at the battle of Bull Run had been distinguished. "Gen.

McDowell told us on Monday," wrote Thurlow Weed, "that Major Wadsworth

rendered him the most important service before, during, and after

battle. From others we have learned that after resisting the stampede,

earnestly but ineffectually, he remained to the last moment aiding the

wounded and encouraging surgeons to remain on the field as many of

them did."[833] Wadsworth's subsequent insistence that the Army of the

Potomac, then commanded by McClellan, could easily crush the

Confederates, who, in his opinion, did not number over 50,000[834], had

again brought his name conspicuously before the country. Moreover,

since the 8th of March he had commanded the forces in and about

Washington, and had acted as Stanton's adviser in the conduct of the

war.

[Footnote 830: New York _Herald_, September 19 and October 15, 1862.]

[Footnote 831: Albany _Evening Journal_, November 6, 1862.]

[Footnote 832: T.W. Barnes, _Life of Thurlow Weed_, Vol. 2, p. 413.]

[Footnote 833: Albany _Evening Journal_, July 31, 1861.]

[Footnote 834: "This estimate was afterward verified as correct."--New

York _Tribune_, September 22, 1862.]

For twenty years Wadsworth had not been a stranger to the people of

New York. His vigorous defence of Silas Wright gave him a warm place

in the hearts of Barnburners, and his name, after the formation of the

Republican party, became a household word among members of that young

organisation. Besides, his neighbours had exploited his character for

generosity. The story of the tenant who got a receipt for rent and one

hundred dollars in money because the accidental killing of his oxen in

the midst of harvest had diminished his earning capacity, seemed to be

only one of many similar acts. In 1847 his farm had furnished a

thousand bushels of corn to starving Ireland. Moreover, he had endowed

institutions of learning, founded school libraries, and turned the

houses of tenants into homes of college students. But the Radicals'

real reason for making him their candidate was his "recognition of the

truth that slavery is the implacable enemy of our National life, and

that the Union can only be saved by grappling directly and boldly with

its deadly foe."[835]

[Footnote 835: New York _Tribune_, September 22, 1862.]

Prompted by this motive his supporters used all the methods known to

managing politicians to secure a majority of the delegates. Lincoln's

emancipation proclamation, published on September 23, five days after

the battle of Antietam, greatly strengthened them. They hailed the

event as their victory. It gave substance, too, to the Wadsworth

platform that "the Union must crush out slavery, or slavery will

destroy the Union." Reinforced by such an unexpected ally, it was well

understood before the day of the convention that in spite of the

appeals of Weed and Raymond, and of the wishes of Seward and the

President, the choice of the Radicals would be nominated. Wadsworth

was not averse. He had an itching for public life. In 1856 his

stubborn play for governor and his later contest for a seat in the

United States Senate had characterised him as an office-seeker. But

whether running for office himself, or helping some one else, he was

a fighter whom an opponent had reason to fear.

The Republican Union convention, as it was called, assembled at

Syracuse on September 25. Henry J. Raymond became its president, and

with characteristic directness made a vigorous reply to Seymour,

declaring that "Jefferson Davis himself could not have planned a

speech better calculated, under all the circumstances of the case, to

promote his end to embarrass the Government of the United States and

strengthen the hands of those who are striving for its overthrow."[836]

Then William Curtis Noyes read a letter from Governor Morgan declining

renomination.[837] The Governor had made a creditable executive,

winning the respect of conservatives in both parties, and although the

rule against a third term had become firmly established in a State

that had tolerated it but once since the days of Tompkins and DeWitt

Clinton, the propriety of making a further exception appealed to the

public with manifest approval. "But this," Weed said, "did not suit

the _Tribune_ and a class of politicians with whom it sympathised.

They demanded a candidate with whom abolition is the paramount

consideration."[838] Morgan's letter created a ripple of applause,

after which the presentation of Wadsworth's name aroused an enthusiasm

of longer duration than had existed at Albany. Nevertheless, Charles

G. Myers of St. Lawrence did not hesitate to speak for "a more

available candidate at the present time." Then, raising his voice

above the whisperings of dissent, he named John A. Dix, "who, while

Seymour was howling for peace and compromise," said the speaker,

"ordered the first man shot that hauled down the American flag."

Raymond, in his speech earlier in the afternoon, had quoted the

historic despatch in a well-balanced sentence, with the accent and

inflection of a trained orator; but in giving it an idiomatic,

thrilling ring in contrast with Seymour's record, Myers suddenly threw

the convention into wild, continued cheering, until it seemed as if

the noise of a moment before would be exceeded by the genuine and

involuntary outburst of patriotic emotion. A single ballot, however,

giving Wadsworth an overwhelming majority, showed that the Radicals

owned the convention.[839]

[Footnote 836: New York _Times_, September 25, 1862.]

[Footnote 837: "Though we met Governor Morgan repeatedly during the

summer, he never hinted that he expected or desired to be again a

candidate."--New York _Tribune_, December 12, 1862.]

[Footnote 838: Albany _Evening Journal_, December 10, 1862.]

[Footnote 839: The vote resulted as follows: Wadsworth, 234; Dix, 110;

Lyman Tremaine, 33; Dickinson, 2.

The ticket was as follows: Governor, James S. Wadsworth of Genesee;

Lieutenant-Governor, Lyman Tremaine of Albany; Canal Commissioner,

Oliver Ladue of Herkimer; Prison Inspector, Andreas Willman of New

York; Clerk of Appeals, Charles Hughes of Washington.]

Parke Godwin of Queens, from the committee on resolutions, presented

the platform. Among other issues it urged the most vigorous

prosecution of the war; hailed, with the profoundest satisfaction, the

emancipation proclamation; and expressed pride in the knowledge that

the Republic's only enemies "are the savages of the West, the rebels

of the South, their sympathisers and supporters of the North, and the

despots of Europe."

The campaign opened with unexampled bitterness. Seymour's convention

speech inflamed the Republican party, and its press, recalling his

address at the Peace convention in January, 1861, seemed to uncork its

pent-up indignation. The _Tribune_ pronounced him a "consummate

demagogue," "radically dishonest," and the author of sentiments that

"will be read throughout the rebel States with unalloyed delight,"

since "their whole drift tends to encourage treason and paralyse the

arm of those who strike for the Union."[840] It disclosed Seymour's

intimate relations with "Vallandigham and the school of Democrats who

do not disguise their sympathy with traitors nor their hostility to

war," and predicted "that, if elected, Jeff Davis will regard his

success as a triumph."[841] Odious comparisons also became frequent.

Wadsworth at Bull Run was contrasted with Seymour's prediction that

the Union's foes could not be subdued.[842] Seymour's supporters, it

was said, believed in recognising the independence of the South, or in

a restored Union with slavery conserved, while Wadsworth's champions

thought rebellion a wicked and wanton conspiracy against human

liberty, to be crushed by the most effective measures.[843] Raymond

declared that "every vote given for Wadsworth is a vote for loyalty,

and every vote given for Seymour is a vote for treason."[844]

[Footnote 840: New York _Tribune_, September 17, 1862.]

[Footnote 841: New York _Tribune_, Oct. 8, 1862.]

[Footnote 842: _Ibid._, Oct. 9.]

[Footnote 843: _Ibid._, Oct. 24.]

[Footnote 844: New York _Herald_, Oct. 9, 1862.]

To these thrusts the Democratic press replied with no less acrimony,

speaking of Wadsworth as "a malignant, abolition disorganiser," whose

service in the field was "very brief," whose command in Washington was

"behind fortifications," and whose capacity was "limited to attacks

upon his superior officers."[845] The _Herald_ declared him "as arrant

an aristocrat as any Southern rebel. The slave-holder," it said, "lives

upon his plantation, which his ancestors begged, cheated, or stole

from the Indians. Wadsworth lives upon his immense Genesee farms,

which his ancestors obtained from the Indians in precisely the same

way. The slave-holder has a number of negroes who raise crops for him,

and whom he clothes, feeds, and lodges. Wadsworth has a number of

labourers on his farms, who support him by raising his crops or paying

him rent. The slave-holder, having an independent fortune and nothing

to do, joins the army, or runs for office. Wadsworth, in exactly the

same circumstances, does exactly the same thing. Wadsworth, therefore,

is quite as much an aristocrat as the slave-holder, and cares quite as

much for himself and quite as little for the people."[846] Democrats

everywhere endeavoured to limit the issue to the two opposing

candidates, claiming that Seymour, in conjunction with all

conservative men, stood for a vigorous prosecution of the war to save

the Union, while Wadsworth, desiring its prosecution for the

destruction of slavery, believed the Union of secondary consideration.

[Footnote 845: _Ibid._, Sept. 26.]

[Footnote 846: _Ibid._, Oct. 1.]

Campaign oratory, no longer softened by the absence of strict party

lines, throbbed feverishly with passion and ugly epithet. The

strategical advantage lay with Seymour, who made two speeches. Dean

Richmond, alarmed at the growing strength of the war spirit, urged him

to put more "powder" into his Brooklyn address than he used at the

ratification meeting, held in New York City on October 13; but he

declined to cater "to war Democrats," contenting himself with an

amplification of his convention speech. "God knows I love my country,"

he said; "I would count my life as nothing, if I could but save the

nation's life." He resented with much feeling Raymond's electioneering

statement that a vote for him was one for treason.[847] "Recognising at

this moment as we do," he continued, "that the destinies, the honour,

and the glory of our country hang poised upon the conflict in the

battlefield, we tender to the Government no conditional support" to

put down "this wicked and mighty rebellion." Once, briefly, and

without bitterness, he referred to the emancipation proclamation, but

he again bitterly arraigned the Administration for its infractions of

the Constitution, its deception as to the strength of the South, and

the corruption in its departments.

[Footnote 847: New York _Herald_, October 8 and 9, 1862.]

Seymour's admirers manifested his tendencies more emphatically than he

did himself, until denunciation of treason and insistence upon a

vigorous prosecution of the war yielded to an indictment of the

Radicals. The shibboleth of these declaimers was arbitrary arrests.

Two days after the edict of emancipation (September 24) the President

issued a proclamation ordering the arrest, without benefit of _habeas

corpus_, of all who "discouraged enlistments," or were guilty of "any

disloyal practice" which afforded "aid and comfort to the rebels."[848]

This gave rise to an opinion that he intended to "suppress free

discussion of political subjects,"[849] and every orator warned the

people that Wadsworth's election meant the arrest and imprisonment of

his political opponents. "If chosen governor," said the _Herald_, "he

will have his adversaries consigned to dungeons and their property

seized and confiscated under the act of Congress."[850] In accepting an

invitation to speak at Rome, John Van Buren, quick to see the humour

of the situation as well as the vulnerable point of the Radicals,

telegraphed that he would "arrive at two o'clock--if not in Fort

Lafayette."[851]

[Footnote 848: _Lincoln's Works_, Vol. 2, p. 239.]

[Footnote 849: Benjamin E. Curtis, _Pamphlet on Executive Power_.]

[Footnote 850: New York _Herald_, October 4, 1862.]

[Footnote 851: _Ibid._, October 24.]

To the delight of audiences John Van Buren, after two years of

political inactivity, broke his silence. He had earnestly and perhaps

sincerely advocated the nomination of John A. Dix, but after Seymour's

selection he again joined the ranks of the Softs and took the stump.

Among other appointments he spoke with Seymour at the New York

ratification meeting, and again at the Brooklyn rally on October 22.

Something remained of the old-time vigour of the professional

gladiator, but compared with his Barnburner work he seemed what Byron

called "an extinct volcano." He ran too heedlessly into a bitter

criticism of Wadsworth, based upon an alleged conversation he could

not substantiate, and into an acrimonious attack upon Lincoln's

conduct of the war, predicated upon a private letter of General Scott,

the possession of which he did not satisfactorily account for. The

_Tribune_, referring to his campaign as "a rhetorical spree," called

him a "buffoon," a "political harlequin," a "repeater of mouldy

jokes,"[852] and in bitter terms denounced his "low comedy performance

at Tammany," his "double-shuffle dancing at Mozart Hall," his

possession of a letter "by dishonourable means for a dishonourable

purpose," and his wide-sweeping statements "which gentlemen over their

own signatures pronounced lies."[853] It was not a performance to be

proud of, and although Van Buren succeeded in stirring up the

advertising sensations which he craved, he did not escape without

wounds that left deep scars. "Prince John makes a statement," says the

_Herald_, "accusing Charles King of slandering the wife of Andrew

Jackson; King retorts by calling the Prince a liar; the poets of the

_Post_ take up the case and broadly hint that the Prince's private

history shows that he has not lived the life of a saint; the Prince

replies that he has half a mind to walk into the private antecedents

of Wadsworth, which, it is said, would disclose some scenes

exceedingly rich; while certain other Democrats, indignant at

Raymond's accusations of treason against Seymour, threaten to reveal

his individual history, hinting, by the way, that it would show him to

have been heretofore a follower of that fussy philosopher of the

twelfth century, Abelard--not in philosophy, however, but in

sentiment, romance, and some other things."[854]

[Footnote 852: New York _Tribune_, October 28, 1862.]

[Footnote 853: _Ibid._, October 30.]

[Footnote 854: New York _Herald_, October 29, 1862.]

Wherever Van Buren spoke Daniel S. Dickinson followed. His admirers,

the most extreme Radicals, cheered his speeches wildly, their fun

relieving the prosaic rigour of an issue that to one side seemed

forced by Northern treachery, to the other to threaten the gravest

peril to the country. It is difficult to exaggerate the tension. Party

violence ran high and the result seemed in doubt. Finally,

conservatives appealed to both candidates to retire in favour of John

A. Dix,[855] and on October 20 an organisation, styling itself the

Federal Union, notified the General that its central committee had

nominated him for governor, and that a State Convention, called to

meet at Cooper Institute on the 28th, would ratify the nomination. To

this summons, Dix, without declining a nomination, replied from

Maryland that he could not leave his duties "to be drawn into any

party strife."[856] This settled the question of a compromise

candidate.

[Footnote 855: _Ibid._, October 15 and 17.]

[Footnote 856: Morgan Dix, _Memoirs of John A. Dix_, Vol. 2, pp.

51-52.]

Elections in the October States did not encourage the Radicals.

Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana voiced the sentiments of the

opposition, defeating Galusha A. Grow, speaker of the House, and

seriously threatening the Radical majority in Congress. This

retrogression, accounted for by the absence of soldiers who could not

vote,[857] suggested trouble in New York, and to offset the influence

of the Seymour rally in Brooklyn a great audience at Cooper Institute

listened to a brief letter from the Secretary of State, and to a

speech from Wadsworth. Seward did not encourage the soldier candidate.

The rankling recollection of Wadsworth's opposition at Chicago in 1860

stifled party pride as well as patriotism, and although the _Herald_

thought it "brilliant and sarcastic," it emphasised Wadsworth's

subsequent statement that "Seward was dead against me throughout the

campaign."[858]

[Footnote 857: New York _Tribune_, October 17, 1862. See other views:

New York _Herald_, October 17, 18, 19.]

[Footnote 858: Henry B. Stanton, _Random Recollections_, p. 216.]

Wadsworth's canvass was confined to a single speech. He had been

absent from the State fifteen months, and although not continuously at

the front there was something inexcusably ungenerous in the taunts of

his opponents that he had served "behind fortifications." His superb

conduct at Bull Run entitled him to better treatment. But his party

was wholly devoted to him, and "amid a hurricane of approbation"[859]

he mingled censure of Seymour with praise of Lincoln, and the

experience of a brave soldier with bitter criticism of an unpatriotic

press. It was not the work of a trained public speaker. It lacked

poise, phrase, and deliberation. But what it wanted in manner it made

up in fire and directness, giving an emotional and loyal audience

abundant opportunity to explode into long-continued cheering.

Thoughtful men who were not in any sense political partisans gave

careful heed to his words. He stood for achievement. He brought the

great struggle nearer home, and men listened as to one with a message

from the field of patriotic sacrifices. The radical newspapers broke

into a chorus of applause. The Radicals themselves were delighted. The

air rung with praises of the courage and spirit of their candidate,

and if here and there the faint voice of a Conservative suggested that

emancipation was premature and arbitrary arrests were unnecessary, a

shout of offended patriotism drowned the ignoble utterance.

[Footnote 859: New York _Tribune_, October 31, 1862.]

Wadsworth and his party were too much absorbed in the zeal of their

cause not to run counter to the prejudices of men less earnest and

less self-forgetting. In a contest of such bitterness they were

certain to make enemies, whose hostilities would be subtle and

enduring, and the October elections showed that the inevitable

reaction was setting in. Military failure and increasing debt made the

avowed policy of emancipation more offensive. People were getting

tired of bold action without achievement in the field, and every

opponent of the Administration became a threnodist. However,

independent papers which strongly favoured Seymour believed in

Wadsworth's success. "Seymour's antecedents are against him," said the

_Herald_. "Wadsworth, radical as he is, will be preferred by the

people to a Democrat who is believed to be in favour of stopping the

war; because, whatever Wadsworth's ideas about the negro may be, they

are only as dust in the balance compared with his hearty and earnest

support of the war and the Administration."[860] This was the belief

of the Radicals,[861] and upon them the news of Seymour's election by

over 10,000 majority fell with a sickening thud.[862] Raymond declared

it "a vote of want of confidence in the President;"[863] Wadsworth

thought Seward did it;[864] Weed suggested that Wadsworth held "too

extreme party views;"[865] and Greeley insisted that it was "a gang of

corrupt Republican politicians, who, failing to rule the nominating

convention, took revenge on its patriotic candidate by secretly

supporting the Democratic nominee."[866] But the dominant reason was

what George William Curtis called "the mad desperation of

reaction,"[867] which showed its influence in other States as well as

in New York. That Wadsworth's personality had little, if anything, to

do with his overthrow was further evidenced by results in

congressional districts, the Democrats carrying seventeen out of

thirty-one. Even Francis Kernan carried the Oneida district against

Conkling. The latter was undoubtedly embarrassed by personal enemies

who controlled the Welsh vote, but the real cause of his defeat was

military disasters, financial embarrassments, and the emancipation

proclamation. "All our reverses, our despondence, our despairs," said

Curtis, "bring us to the inevitable issue, shall not the blacks strike

for their freedom?"[868]

[Footnote 860: New York _Herald_, October 17, 1862.]

[Footnote 861: New York _Tribune_, Nov. 6.]

[Footnote 862: "Seymour, 307,063; Wadsworth, 296,492."--_Ibid._,

November 24.]

[Footnote 863: New York _Times_, November 7.]

[Footnote 864: Henry B. Stanton, _Random Recollections_, p. 216.]

[Footnote 865: Albany _Evening Journal_, Nov. 6.]

[Footnote 866: New York _Tribune_, Nov. 5.]

[Footnote 867: Cary, _Life of Curtis_, p. 161.]

[Footnote 868: _Ibid._, p. 161.]

A Political History of the State of New York, Volumes 1-3 · 第 3 / 38 章