CHAPTER III

THE PHILOSOPHIC GROUP

The Philosophic Group of oriental tales is in number far smaller and in

literary value far more considerable than the Moralistic. Here, again,

Addison was the guide, using several oriental stories to illustrate

philosophical ideas and composing one famous oriental tale, or rather

sketch, _The Vision of Mirza_.[130] The _Vision_ is so familiar and so

accessible that any detailed account of it would be superfluous. Mirza,

from the topmost pinnacle of the high hills of Bagdad, beholds

multitudes passing over the bridge of life, which spans a part of the

great tide of eternity. Sooner or later all fall from the bridge and are

borne out into the thick mist toward either the islands of the blest or

the dark clouds beyond the rock of adamant. By means of this vision,

Mirza realizes the vicissitudes of life, the certainty of death, the

consolation of faith, and the mystery enveloping man’s existence. It is

Addison’s way of saying “From the great deep to the great deep he

goes.”[131]. The form of the _Vision_ is simplicity and clearness

itself. The language, lucid and direct, displays Addison’s

characteristic restraint in the use of oriental ornament and imagery.

The literary value of _The Vision of Mirza_ as an oriental tale lies

less in the specific detail of oriental colouring than in the general

impression of beauty and of awe. “But instead of the rolling tide, the

arched bridge, and the happy islands, I saw nothing but the long hollow

valley of Bagdat, with oxen, sheep, and camels, grazing upon the sides

of it,”—a serene English valley, orientalized only by the name _Bagdat_

and the presence of the camels. And yet, if the oriental elements were

cut away from _The Vision of Mirza_, the picturesque attributes of the

central metaphor, the bridge of human life, would go, for they are drawn

from the Mahometan tradition of the bridge “Al Sirát,” laid across hell,

“finer than a hair and sharper than the edge of a sword,” over which the

souls of men pass,—the good to the Mahometan paradise, the wicked to

hell, which is encircled by a wall of adamant. Moreover, the quiet,

cumulative force of one slight stroke of oriental imagery after another

produces a sense of remoteness and stimulates the imagination,

especially when the phrases echo Biblical cadences and thus attain an

added solemnity. “‘Surely,’ said I, ‘man is but a shadow and life a

dream....’ ‘The valley that thou seest,’ said he, ‘is the vale of

misery, and the tide of water that thou seest, is part of the great tide

of eternity....’ ‘I wished for the wings of an eagle that I might fly

away to those happy seats; but the genius told me there was no passage

to them except through the gates of death.’”

The other philosophic oriental tales in the Addisonian periodicals

illustrate various themes: the transitoriness of life, the subjectivity

of time, personal identity, and so on. Frequent phrases suggest that in

oriental thought and imagery what appealed most forcibly to Addison’s

reverent nature was “likeness to those beautiful metaphors in

scripture.”[132] One brief story is told by him to illustrate the figure

“where life is termed a pilgrimage, and those who pass through it are

called strangers and sojourners upon earth,” and to conclude an essay on

the value of contemplating the transitoriness of human life. A dervish

mistakes a palace for an inn, and when the king asks an explanation,

replies by a series of questions leading up to an admirable climax.

“‘Sir,’ says the Dervish, ‘give me leave to ask your Majesty a question

or two. Who were the persons that lodged in this house when it was first

built?’ The King replied, his ancestors. ‘And who,’ says the Dervish,

‘was the last person that lodged here?’ The King replied, his father.

‘And who is it,’ says the Dervish, ‘that lodges here at present?’ The

King told him that it was he himself. ‘And who,’ says the Dervish, ‘will

be here after you?’ The King answered, the young Prince, his son. ‘Ah,

Sir,’ said the Dervish, ‘a house that changes its inhabitants so often

and receives such a perpetual succession of guests, is not a Palace, but

a Caravansary.’”[133] The oriental colouring here is slightly stronger

than in _The Vision of Mirza_. The dervish, “traveling through Tartary,”

arrived “at the town of Balk, ... laid down his wallet and spread his

carpet in order to repose himself upon it, after the manner of Eastern

nations.” The notion of the subjectivity of time as set forth by Locke

is exemplified in the account of Mahomet’s journey to the seven heavens

in the twinkling of an eye,[134] as well as by the adventures of the

Sultan of Egypt.[134] The latter story, drawn from the _Turkish Tales_,

is interestingly told, though shorn of most of its picturesque details.

From the _Persian Tales_ an unknown contributor to the _Spectator_ takes

the story of _Fadlallah and Zemroude_, and introduces it by a quotation

from “Mr. Locke” on personal identity and by these remarks: “I was

mightily pleased by a story in some measure applicable to this piece of

philosophy, which I read the other day in the _Persian Tales_, as they

are lately very well translated by Mr. Philips ... these stories are

writ after the Eastern manner, but somewhat more correct.”[135] The

writer chastens the style of his quotation still further by eliminating

many of the imaginative elements for the sake of the “piece of

philosophy.” The idea of perpetual suspense is illustrated by reference

not only to the mediæval ass between two bundles of hay but also to

Mahomet’s coffin suspended in midair by magnets.[136] The misery and

ingratitude of humanity is shown by a vision.[137] The conception of the

development of philosophy and virtue in a man on a desert island, guided

by “the pure light and universal benevolence of nature,”[138] is given

as a quotation from an Arabian author. It calls to mind Mrs. Behn’s

_Oroonoko_ and his successor, the “natural man” of the eighteenth

century. In all these narratives or fragments of narratives the tone is

speculative rather than directly didactic, but all except _Fadlallah and

Zemroude_ are used to point a moral. With one exception, all the

philosophical and moral ideas in the twenty-nine oriental tales found in

these early periodicals, from the opening number of the _Tatler_, in

1709, to the last issue of the _Freeholder_, in 1716, are either

noticeably English in character or else universal ideas, common to

English and oriental thought. The one exception[139] is the doctrine of

transmigration of souls, which has been attributed to oriental

philosophy. Yet this doctrine is Pythagorean as well as oriental, and

the ultimate source, though possibly oriental, is unknown. In general

the philosophizing in the periodicals is along the lines of universal

thought, expressed in a thoroughly English and Addisonian manner.

In the philosophic as in the moralistic tales the most famous of

Addison’s successors was Dr. Johnson. As suggested above,[140] the

difference in temperament between the two men is clearly reflected in

their periodicals. Addison’s lighter touch and buoyant spirit are

replaced in the _Rambler_ and the _Idler_ by Johnson’s heavier style and

more uniformly serious purpose. And yet the _Rambler_ and its imitators

have much in common with the earlier group. The similarity is especially

noticeable in those parts of Johnson’s work that are deliberate and

conscious imitations. Addison had used the oriental tale among other

devices to convey instruction under the guise of amusement; Johnson did

likewise. The story of _Ortogrul of Basra_[141] distinctly recalls

Addison’s oriental tales. The scene is laid in Bagdad, and the narrative

opens with an account of Ortogrul wandering in “the tranquillity of

meditation” along the streets. He is taught the value of slow and

constant industry by a dream, in which, like Mirza, he beholds a vision

from a hilltop. The genius in _Mirza_ is replaced by the father of

Ortogrul, who directs the latter’s gaze to an ineffectual torrent and to

a slow but sure “rivulet,” and points the moral. For local colour in

these tales Johnson is satisfied with vague allusions such as that to

the vizier’s return from the divan to spacious apartments in his palace,

hung with golden tapestry and carpeted with silk. Dates, places, and

oriental customs are likewise indistinct. “In the reign of Zenghis Can,”

“Samarcand,” “Arabia,” “the emirs and viziers, the sons of valour and of

wisdom, that stand at the corners of the Indian throne, to assist the

Councils,”—such brief references suffice for Johnson’s purpose. Like

Addison, too, Johnson feels that an oriental tale demands elevated and

dignified diction, Biblical imagery, and the abstract, general term

instead of the concrete.

But there the likeness ends, for Johnson’s early oriental tales, far

more than any of his other writings, are embellished with peculiarly

Johnsonian Latin derivatives and resounding antitheses. Sometimes the

style gains by these means the added force and dignity purposed by the

author. “In the height of my power, I said to defamation, who will hear

thee? and to artifice, what canst thou perform?”... “The clouds of

sorrow gathered round his head.” But often this attempt at rhetorical

ornamentation results in bombast and unintentional humour: “The curls of

beauty fell from his head;” “the voracious grave is howling for its

prey;” “he practised the smile of universal courtesy;” “a frigorific

torpor encroaches upon my veins.” In _Ortogrul_, Johnson goes even to

this extreme in describing the rich vizier’s life: “The dishes of Luxury

cover his table, the voice of Harmony lulls him in his bowers; he

breathes the fragrance of the groves of Java, and sleeps upon the down

of the cygnets of Ganges.” Grandiloquence of this sort takes the place

of detail in description. When Johnson wishes to depict an Eastern

princess, he portrays her “sitting on a throne, attired in the robe of

royalty, and shining with the jewels of Golconda; command sparkled in

her eyes and dignity towered on her forehead.” Such a description is

eminently in keeping with Johnson’s didactic purpose. Didactic in the

_Rambler_ Johnson always is. “Instruction,” in Boswell’s words, “is the

predominant purpose of the _Rambler_,”[142]—instruction, whether

directly inculcating morality, as in the moralistic tales, or indirectly

setting forth some philosophic idea connected with human conduct, as in

the six so-called philosophic tales. Yet, even in the latter group,

Johnson’s speculation is always concerned with questions of vital

interest to mankind, and hence in the deepest sense moral questions. In

all of his fiction, moralistic teachings are present, whether explicit

or implicit, although less prominent than the philosophic ideas.

Frequently pompous in diction and artificial in manner, these stories,

nevertheless, do not lack a certain impressive simplicity in their

presentation of various aspects of Johnson’s earnest philosophy of life.

His convictions of the vanity of accumulating riches, expecting

gratitude, seeking happiness, desiring fame, forming a definite plan for

one’s life, are all found here and are all variations on his favourite

theme: the vanity of human wishes. But, even in these short stories,

Johnson reveals two other equally characteristic aspects of his

philosophy: religious faith, and brave insistence on duty. _Nouradin the

Merchant and his son Almamoulin_, which forms the whole of the

_Rambler_, No. 120, is prefaced by quotations on virtue, and teaches the

vanity of gathering riches. _Morad the son of Hanuth and his son

Abonzaid_[143] sets forth the vanity of labours that wish to be rewarded

by gratitude, and concludes that the only satisfactory aim of life is to

please God. _Seged, Lord of Ethiopia, and his efforts to be happy_,[144]

is obviously an earlier draft of _Rasselas_.[145] Seged, having

fulfilled all his duties as king, determined to retire for ten days from

the cares of state, in order to be happy for that short interval. He

commanded “the house of pleasure built in an island of the Lake Dambia,

to be prepared,” and endeavoured to gratify every desire. But the first

day there were so many pleasures to choose from that the day slipped by

without a choice; and the other days were marred by accidents, a bad

dream, tyranny, envy among those whom he sought to please, by the memory

of a defeat, and finally by the death of his daughter. Hence the king

concluded: “Let no man ever presume to say, ‘This day shall be a day of

happiness.’” The narrative is better than in the other tales; it

possesses more unity and more interest. The oriental setting is slight,

the descriptions are vague, and emphasis is thrown upon the unadorned

theme. The strength of the story lies in the force of this theme and the

sympathetic account of Seged’s successive feelings. It is interesting to

find Johnson meditating on these questions seven years before writing

_Rasselas_. Two other tales, published after _Rasselas_, treat of

similar ideas. _Gelalledin_[146] is like a part of the story of Imlac in

_Rasselas_. Gelalledin, the learned youth, refused a professor’s chair

in hopes of returning to his native city “to dazzle and instruct,” but

when he returned, was unnoticed and ignored. _Omar, Son of Hassan_,[147]

the good and wise servant of the caliph, tells the plan he made in youth

for his life: ten years study; ten years travel; marriage, and

retirement from court. But he “trifled away the years of improvement,”

and each part of his plan was frustrated. Terrestrial happiness is

short, and it is vanity to plan life according to one’s wishes,—surely

an echo of the theme of _Rasselas_.

The imitators of Johnson apparently found it easier to write moralistic

than philosophic tales. At least this is true of the editor of the

_Adventurer_, who was so voluminous a moralist. Only one of his stories,

_Almet the Dervise_,[148] can be called philosophic, and even here the

author moralizes throughout. The title given the essay is _The Value of

Life fixed by Hope and Fear and therefore dependent upon the Will: an

Eastern story_. Almet is taught by an angel, who shows him in a vision a

fair landscape and an “austere” scene and comments on them. Like

Johnson, Hawkesworth employs oriental colouring sparingly. He exerts his

imagination upon the picture of the dervish Almet watching the sacred

lamp in the sepulcher of the prophet and, after the angel has vanished,

finding himself at the temple porch in the serene twilight. One other

imitation of Johnson’s philosophic tales is Goldsmith’s _Asem, an

Eastern Tale: or a vindication of the wisdom of Providence in the moral

government of the world_.[149] Asem is taught by the customary vision

and Genius. Goldsmith’s fancy, not content with the conventional

introduction, pictures the Genius walking over the lake and guiding Asem

to a beautiful country beneath its depths. The lucid style and the

occasional satire, characteristic of the author, serve to distinguish

this sketch from those of his predecessors.

We have spoken of the development of the philosophic oriental tale from

Addison’s _Vision of Mirza_ on through Johnson’s work in the _Rambler_

and the _Idler_ to Hawkesworth’s and Goldsmith’s imitations. There

remain to be considered the translations from Voltaire, especially

_Zadig_, and the most important philosophical oriental tale of the

period, Johnson’s _Rasselas_. But before examining these books, which

carry on the philosophizing tendency to its culmination, it may be well

to mention two works, somewhat apart from the general current, yet

warranting a brief digression.

One is a pseudo-translation: _The Bonze, or Chinese Anchorite_;[150] the

other, a genuine translation from the Arabic, _The Life of Hai Ebn

Yokdhan_. The full title of the latter reads:[151] _The Improvement of

Human Reason, Exhibited in the Life of Hai Ebn Yokdhan: Written in

Arabick above 500 years ago, by Abu Jaafar Ebn Tophail, In which is

demonstrated, By what Methods one may, by the meer Light of Nature,

attain the Knowledg of things Natural and Supernatural; more

particularly the Knowledg of God, and the Affairs of another Life,

Illustrated with proper Figures. Newly Translated from the Original

Arabick, by Simon Ockley, A. M. Vicar of Swavesey in Cambridgshire. With

an Appendix, In which the Possibility of Man’s attaining the True

Knowledge of God, and Things necessary to Salvation, without

Instruction, is briefly consider’d_. London ... 1708. The bookseller’s

preface to the reader summarizes the author’s purpose and outlines the

story with sufficient clearness: “The Design of the Author (who was a

Mahometan Philosopher) is to shew how Humane Reason may, by Observation

and Experience, arrive at the Knowledge of Natural Things, and from

thence to Supernatural; particularly the Knowledge of God and a Future

State. And in order to [do] this, he supposes a Person brought up by

himself, where he was altogether destitute of any Instruction, but what

he could get from his own Observation. He lays the scene in some

Fortunate Island, situate under the Equinoctial; where he supposes this

Philosopher, either to have been bred (according to _Avicen’s_

Hypothesis, who conceiv’d a Possibility of a Man’s being form’d by the

Influence of the Planets upon Matter rightly disposed) without either

Father or Mother; or else expos’d in his Infancy, and providentially

suckled by a Roe. Not that our Author believ’d any such matter, but only

having design’d to contrive a convenient place for his Philosopher, so

as to leave him to Reason by himself, and make his Observations without

any Guide.... Then he shews by what Steps ... he advanc’d ... till at

last he perceived the Necessity of acknowledging an Infinite, Eternal,

Wise Creator, and also the Immateriality and Immortality of his own

Soul, and that its Happiness consisted only in a continued Conjunction

with this supream Being.” The bookseller continues with a comment to

which the reader will assent: “The Matter of this Book is curious.” One

interesting description of the solitary hero’s method of making himself

comfortable on the island recalls _Robinson Crusoe_, and as this book

appeared only eleven years before _Crusoe_, the passage may possibly

have been seen by Defoe. Hai Ebn Yokdhan, by the time he was twenty-one

years old, “had made abundance of pretty Contrivances. He made himself

both Cloaths and Shoes of the Skins of such Wild Beasts as he had

dissected. His thread was made of Hair, and of the Bark of ...

Plants.... He made awls of sharp Thorns.... He learn’d the Art of

Building from the Observations he made upon the Swallows Nests....

He ... made a Door ... of Canes twisted together ... etc.”[152] One

other passage of interest is the account of his mystical trance.[153] He

prepared himself by abstinence and by “Imitation of the Heavenly Bodies”

in three respects, first in exercising beneficence toward animals and

plants, second in keeping himself “clear, bright, and pure” like the

light, third in “practising a circular motion” until dizziness weakened

his bodily faculties and purified his spirit.[154] By such means and by

constant meditation, he at last attained to the sight of perfect vision

in the highest sphere. There he beheld the reflection of the divine

glory, the perfection of beauty, splendour, and joy; and after that, the

successive reflections of the divine essence in the other heavenly

spheres. Thus he came to realize the dependence of all created things on

the “one, true, necessary, self-existent” First Cause: and saw that this

world followed “the Divine World as a Shadow does the Body.” The story

concludes with an account of the friendship formed by the philosopher

with a holy man who came to the island, and of their “serving God ...

till they died.” In addition to the slight resemblance to _Robinson

Crusoe_ noted above, the book possesses interest as a link between the

work of seventeenth-century orientalists like Dr. Pococke[155] and the

oriental tales of our period; and also as an example of the exaltation

of the “natural man” found earlier in _Oroonoko_ and later in the works

of Rousseau.

_The Bonze_ is more curious but less valuable. It is an odd medley of

moralistic and philosophic rhapsodies on all sorts of subjects,—the

Trinity, Lucifer, Adam’s fall,—combined with sentimental and coarse

love-tales concerning the Chinese prince Zangola’s transmigrations, and

recounted in a vision to the sage Confuciango. The style is so atrocious

as to be amusing, _e.g._ the “gay pomposity” of the peacock’s “beauteous

tail,” “horrific scenes,” “old dreadful tygers” [_sic_], the “elegance

of heaven,” and “the hideous tenebrosity of hell.” “Elegance” of every

kind is frequent. “Never before was my heart susceptible of such elegant

feelings.” “Methought mortality fell from me like the catterpiller’s

[_sic_] form, when he becomes invested with elegance, and shaking his

golden wings, disdaining earth, he flies exulting towards heaven.” But

when the writer goes so far as to describe “a sunrise, orientally

decorated,” one is irresistibly reminded of Fielding’s cheerful parodies

of flamboyant preambles in, for example, the opening paragraph of Chap.

II., Book IV., of _Tom Jones_: “A short hint of what we can do in the

sublime, and a description of Miss Sophia Western.” _The Bonze_ in

extravagance thus occupies a unique, if insignificant, place among the

philosophic tales. Like them it discusses questions such as the origin

of evil and the search for happiness, attempts but little local colour,

and regards the East as “romantic” and “barbaric,”—words at that time

almost synonymous. “He received me in as kind a manner as it is possible

for a mere barbarian.” “There was a romantic palace in the free taste of

China, which, tied to no partial rules, admitted all the beauties of

architecture.” The attitude of the writer is one of apologetic

admiration of objects and ideas so foreign to eighteenth-century

standards. But _The Bonze_, despite its aim to “mingle instruction with

delight in hope to gain the smile of approbation,” stands at one side in

any general view of the philosophic oriental tale, and serves to bring

into greater prominence the real value of such works as Voltaire’s

_Zadig_ and Johnson’s _Rasselas_.

In France, the _Conte Philosophique_, founded by Voltaire, had been one

of the most notable imitations of the genuine oriental tale. In 1749,

only a year after the first complete French edition appeared,

_Zadig_[156] was translated into English. The popularity it attained in

England was due in part to the fact that one of its chapters, _The

Hermit_, was based on the poem by Thomas Parnell,[157] in part to the

fame of Voltaire, and chiefly to the character of the book itself.

Abounding in wit, humour, and philosophy,—qualities enhanced by

Voltaire’s keen and brilliant style,—_Zadig_ has a permanent value,

visible even through the medium of translation. There is a slight but

sufficiently firm thread of story,—the love of Zadig for the queen,—and

on this are strung Zadig’s separate and vari-coloured adventures. The

discovery of the king’s lost palfrey by circumstantial evidence, Zadig’s

pretense at worshiping candles to rebuke his idolatrous master, the

frustrated attempt of Zadig’s affectionate wife to cut off his nose, his

rescue from death by a parrot’s finding his verses, the fantastic scene

of the maidens in a meadow searching for a basilisk,—such incidents are

cleverly told, and even in the English version show something of the wit

of the original French. The main story has a good climax and a happy

dénouement. Voltaire’s clever manipulation of oriental colouring

apparently contributed not a little to the immediate popularity of both

the French and the English versions. By the time _Zadig_ appeared,[158]

the European critic of manners and thought in the disguise of an

Oriental had become a conventional type in the oriental tale.[159]

_Zadig_ is a variant on the theme of the _Lettres Persanes_. Voltaire is

a more subtle satirist in that he does not locate his Oriental in Paris,

but in Babylon. Hence, like Swift’s satires, Voltaire’s criticisms of

European customs, because ostensibly remote and not aimed at Europe, are

the more penetrating. “That show of insignificant words which in Babylon

they called polite conversation.”... “They would not suffer him to open

his mouth in his own vindication. His pocket-book was sufficient

evidence against him. So strict were the Babylonish laws.” Zadig is, of

course, Voltaire himself, and the other characters with fanciful

“oriental” names—Arimanzes, Astarte, Seloc—are said to be Voltaire’s

court enemies and friends. Like the similar device in the pastoral, this

gave piquancy to the narrative. Voltaire’s twofold aim, to be the

entertaining story-teller and the satirical philosopher, is discernible

on every page, and his light and facile use of oriental setting is not

unlike Goldsmith’s in _The Citizen of the World_. He lays the scene in

Babylon or Egypt, the Indies or Memphis, and mentions Siberia and

Scythia to add to the sense of remoteness. His characters wear turbans

and sandals, travel on the “swiftest dromedaries” and camels, are sold

as slaves to an Arab merchant, are threatened with the bowstring and

poisoned cup. The “fair coquet” insists that the old and gouty chief

Magus shall “dance a saraband” before her, and the beautiful Almona is

rescued from the suttee by the ability of Zadig. Besides such references

to Eastern customs, there are quotations of proverbs and of Zoroastrian

precepts, and various references to religious beliefs and observances,

_e.g._ the bridge of death, the angel Azrael, Oromazdes, and temple

worship. Chap. XI., _The Evening’s Entertainment_, treats of ideas found

also in Voltaire’s _Fragments historiques sur l’Inde_: the worship of

one God under the symbol of fire by the ancient Persians; of one supreme

Deity under various symbols by the Egyptians, etc. A heated discussion

takes place between an Egyptian, an Indian, a Greek, and others as to

the superior claims of their respective religions. They are finally

brought by Zadig’s sense and tact to acknowledge that, in truth, they

all worship the Supreme Creator as behind and above all symbols.[160] By

this mockery of oriental fanaticism, Voltaire is actually satirizing

European bigotry and unreason. In a similar manner he strikes at the

metaphysicians. Zadig “was well instructed in the science of the ancient

Chaldeans ... and understood as much of metaphysics as any that have

lived after him,—that is to say, he knew very little about it.” And,

aiming ostensibly at the mercenary selfishness of the Babylonian

courtiers, Voltaire hits the sycophants of the French court. The king

ordered Zadig’s fine of four hundred ounces to be restored to him.

“Agreeable to his Majesty’s commands, the clerk of the court, the

tipstaffs, and the other petty officers, waited on Zadig ... to refund

the four hundred ounces of gold; modestly reserving only three hundred

and ninety ounces, to defray the fees of the court and other expenses.”

The inconsistency of the oriental freebooter who thought it wrong for

the rich, but quite right for himself, to get and keep wealth, might

easily have found a parallel in France. “I was distracted to see” (he

says) “in a wide world which ought to be divided fairly among mankind,

that Fate had reserved so small a portion for me.” Other themes

illustrated are the misery caused by tyrants; the injustice of the

social structure; the fickleness of women who protest too much; and

above all the question of the part played in human life by destiny,—the

apparent supremacy of Chance, and the real supremacy of a foreknowing

and overruling Providence. Zadig’s adventures hinge upon trivial

happenings, and hence he doubts Providence, until the angel, disguised

as a hermit, teaches him.[161] We have spoken of Voltaire’s facile use

of oriental colouring. But in _Zadig_ few figures of speech occur. On

one occasion Zadig addresses the judges as “glorious stars of justice,”

and “mirrors of equity.” Such figures, however, are rare, a fact the

more remarkable since Voltaire considered the immoderate use of metaphor

one of the chief characteristics of oriental writing,[162] and another

instance of the way in which he subordinated the oriental setting to his

serious purpose.

Besides _Zadig_, several other _contes philosophiques_ by Voltaire were

early translated into English. In the majority of them, literary and

social satire predominates over philosophical speculation, and therefore

these tales may best be classified among the Satiric Group in Chap. IV.

But in two, though satire is present, speculation is predominant: _The

World as it Goes_, (1754)[163] and _The Good Bramin_ (1763).[164] Both

are brief. The latter is a sketch of a good Bramin who had studied much

and, in his own estimation, learned nothing. Hence he was unhappy, yet

he preferred his condition to that of an old woman, who lived near him,

contented because ignorant. In conclusion the author states that he has

been unable to find any philosopher who would accept happiness on the

terms of being ignorant. All men seem to set a greater value on reason

than on happiness. Is not that folly? _The World as it Goes_ is an

account of a visit to Persepolis, _i.e._ Paris, by Babouc the Scythian,

sent by the genie Ithuriel to observe the inhabitants in order to assist

Ithuriel in deciding whether or not to destroy Persepolis. Babouc

observed soldiers, church-goers, lawyers, merchants, magi, men of

letters, and women. In each group he found both good and bad qualities

so mingled that he wavered back and forth in his judgment, and finally

grew fond of a city, “the inhabitants of which were polite, affable, and

beneficent, though fickle, slanderous, and vain.” When obliged to report

to the angel, he presented him with a little statue made of base metals,

gold, and jewels. “Wilt thou break,” said he to Ithuriel, “this pretty

statue because it is not wholly composed of gold and diamonds?” Ithuriel

understood, and resolved to spare the city and to leave “the world as it

goes.” “For,” he said, “if all is not well, all is passable.” Except for

these _contes_ by Voltaire, no philosophic oriental tales of any

importance were translated from the French. The current tended, in fact,

the other way. English tales, both moralistic and philosophic, were

translated and adapted for use in _Les Mercures de France_.

Of the philosophic oriental tales composed in English, _Rasselas_

(1759),[165] the most important, remains to be discussed. The

culmination of the fiction in the _Rambler_ and the _Idler_, this brief

sketch may be regarded as the best type of the serious English oriental

tale. Written immediately after the death of Johnson’s mother, it

expresses the substance of the author’s somber philosophy of life.

Though darkened by his immediate grief, the philosophy is essentially

the same as that revealed in his conversations and his verse. The theme

of the tale can hardly be stated in a better phrase than “The Vanity of

Human Wishes.” Rasselas, confined in the Happy Valley all the days of

his youth, realizes that the gratification of desire does not confer

lasting happiness; and, with his sister Nekayah and two other

companions, escapes into the world only to discover unhappiness

everywhere. Unable to obtain even his wish to govern a little kingdom

beneficently, he resolves to return to Abyssinia. In sight of this

conclusion, the princess Nekayah significantly declares: “The choice of

life is become less important. I hope hereafter to think only on the

choice of eternity.”

The story is broken by continual philosophizing, or rather the

philosophizing—to the author more important—is held together by the

slender thread of narrative. Serious and leisurely conversations held by

Rasselas with his companions turn upon the problems of government; the

characteristics of melancholia; the mysterious causes of good and evil;

the immortality of the soul; and, most frequently, the impossibility of

attaining happiness. One of the chief reasons for discontent is the lack

of free choice. “Very few ... live by choice. Every man is placed in his

present condition by causes which acted without his foresight and with

which he did not always willingly coöperate; and therefore you will

rarely meet one who does not think the lot of his neighbours better than

his own.” Each endeavour of Rasselas to find a happy man is

unsuccessful. “The young men of spirit and gaiety,” whose only business

is pleasure, are not happy; shepherds in the much-praised pastoral life

and courtiers in gay society are envious and discontented; hermits are

at heart unhappy, and so are the sages who trust in empty and eloquent

commonplaces on the superiority of reason; men who advise living

“according to nature” attain only a false content. “Marriage has many

pains, but celibacy has no pleasures;” old age is darkened by loneliness

and disappointed hopes; happiness itself is the cause of keenest misery

to the man who has loved and lost a friend, and “human life is

everywhere a state in which much is to be endured and little to be

enjoyed.”

The mitigating circumstance which affords this little enjoyment is the

power of man to attain knowledge and to retain integrity. An educated

intellect and a quiet conscience go far, in Johnson’s estimation,

towards winning serenity and patience. “Knowledge” includes poetry; the

poet Imlac is a man of learning, a scholar; and poetry is “considered as

the highest learning and regarded with a veneration....” The poet should

educate himself by study and by observation until he is able to fulfil

his function “as the interpreter of nature and the legislator of

mankind, ... presiding over the thoughts and manners of future

generations, ... a being superior to time and place.” To Johnson,

thoroughly convinced that life ought to be viewed from the moralistic

side, knowledge is valuable only when ideas are applied to life, and his

philosophizing continually verges towards the dividing line between

speculation and conduct. He rebukes those who, while “making the choice

of life,” “neglect to live”; those who, like Rasselas, pass “four months

in resolving to lose no more time in idle resolves”; he inculcates

employment as the best cure for sorrow; perseverance, courage, and

honesty as essentials of character; and concludes that “all that virtue

can afford is quietness of conscience and a steady prospect of a happier

state; this may enable us to endure calamity with patience, but remember

that patience must suppose pain.”

This fundamental characteristic of Johnson’s philosophy of life—the

sense of the consolation offered to man in the midst of mystery and

unhappiness by virtue, by knowledge, and by faith in a future

existence—renders interesting a comparison of _Rasselas_ and

_Candide_.[166] The two _contes philosophiques_ were published almost

simultaneously,[167] and show striking points of similarity and of

difference. Johnson’s reverent manner, for instance, is opposed to

Voltaire’s habitual mockery; yet Johnson sometimes satirizes shams with

savage irony, and Voltaire, underneath his mockery, has an honest

reverence for the truth. Both are absolutely independent and fearless in

facing intellectual or philosophic problems.

The themes of _Rasselas_ and _Candide_ are strikingly similar. In this

enigmatical world, says Voltaire, which is full of unhappiness due to

misfortune and crime, optimism is false and futile. Candide spends his

sheltered youth in a castle which he is taught to believe blindly is the

most magnificent of all castles in the best of all possible worlds,—an

environment of ideas as artificial as the Happy Valley is for Rasselas,

and affording an equally sharp contrast to the real life outside. For

the Happy Valley, if we look for the meaning of Johnson’s allegory,

signifies the environment, whether inherited or self-made, of the

extreme optimist. Rasselas has the optimistic temperament, hopeful,

charitable, saying confidently: “Surely happiness is somewhere to be

found.” The other inhabitants of the Happy Valley, who enter it

voluntarily and can never leave it, may be likened to optimists like Dr.

Pangloss, Candide’s base and foolish tutor, whose blindness is the

darker because self-imposed,—none so blind as those who will not see.

Gradually the conviction is borne in upon Rasselas that every search for

happiness is futile, and his efforts end in a “conclusion in which

nothing is concluded.” The disillusionment of Candide, less profound

than that of Rasselas, is more bitter because based on intimate and

vivid experiences of crime and horrors.

_Rasselas_ is Voltairean not only in general theme but also in several

specific ideas. Johnson treats with keen satire the philosopher who

“looked round him with a placid air and enjoyed the consciousness of his

own beneficence,” after exhorting men to “live according to nature.”

Rasselas respectfully asked him to define his terms, whereupon he

enlarged as follows: “‘To live according to nature is to act always with

due regard to the fitness arising from the relations ... of cause and

effects; to concur with the great ... scheme of universal felicity; to

coöperate with the general disposition and tendency of the present

system of things.’ The prince found that this was one of the sages whom

he should understand less as he heard him longer. He therefore bowed and

was silent; and the philosopher, supposing him satisfied, and the rest

vanquished, rose up and departed with the air of a man that had

coöperated with the present system.” The irony of Voltaire finds an echo

in Imlac’s words: “learning from the sailors the art of navigation,

which I have never practised, and ... forming schemes for my conduct in

different situations, in not one of which I have ever been placed.”

There is obvious satire too in the account of the eminent mechanist who

discoursed learnedly upon the art of flying. But his flying machine

refused to fly and he promptly dropped into the lake, from which “the

prince drew him to land half dead with terror and vexation.”[168]

Johnson’s “wise and happy man,” who talks nobly about fortitude, but who

is unable to sustain the loss of his daughter, resembles the philosopher

in Voltaire’s sketch, _Les deux Consolés_, who seeks to solace a lady’s

grief by eloquence and refuses to be similarly comforted upon the death

of his son. Imlac’s encomium upon the busy and cheerful monastic life

has been compared with the close of _Candide_. There the hero meets a

contentedly ignorant old man whose entire life is employed in

cultivating his garden, and who thus escapes from ennui, vice, and want.

Candide is profoundly impressed, and brushes aside the grandiloquence of

Pangloss with the significant reply: “Cela est bien dit, ... mais il

faut cultiver notre jardin.” This is Voltaire’s last word in _Candide_,

and, like Johnson’s comment upon the return of Rasselas to Abyssinia, is

“a conclusion in which nothing is concluded.” Thus the similarity of

incidents and ideas brings us back to the deeper analogy between the

themes: the disillusionment of the optimist who has been brought up in

unreality.

All this similarity is, however, counterbalanced by an utter

dissimilarity of treatment. A consideration of Voltaire’s artistic

method throws Johnson’s concept of an oriental tale into bolder relief,

with the high lights on those elements that he considered of prime

importance. Voltaire enjoyed telling the story for the sake of the

story, and delighted in the means he took to make blind optimism

ridiculous, wit and keen satire, vivid description and incident, clever

characterization,—in short, an artistic use of the concrete. _Candide_

has been called “the wittiest book of the eighteenth century,” and wit

is a characteristic as far removed as possible from the seriousness of

_Rasselas_. To Johnson the story was a means to an end,—a frame

necessary to hold together and enhance the thought,—hence the simpler

the frame the better. In _Candide_ the story is interpenetrated with the

theme, but not borne down by it. Candide, like Rasselas, is searching

for happiness; but unlike Johnson’s hero, he desires not happiness in

the abstract,—a philosophical possibility,—but pleasure in the concrete

form of his mistress. He travels far and wide, in hopeful anticipation;

but when he finds her at last, she is no longer fair or lovable, and his

marriage with her is perfunctory and joyless,—a concrete, Voltairean

expression of the idea that happiness attained is often no happiness,

but vanishes in one’s grasp like the apples of dust.

The scenes of Voltaire’s tale, moreover, are not laid in remote

Abyssinia, but chiefly in Europe, with an excursion to “El Dorado” in

the New World, an impossible and comfortable Utopia, the memory of which

serves to embitter Candide’s distress during his subsequent misfortunes.

The Europe of the tale is clearly the Europe of Voltaire’s own day:

there are obvious allusions to contemporary events, such as the

execution of the innocent English admiral Byng in 1757, an excellent

opportunity for Voltaire’s famous gibe at the English: “Dans ce pays-ci

il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les

autres.” The characters also are more individualized than in _Rasselas_,

and scenes like the visit to the blasé Venetian senator Pococurante

(Chap. XXV.)[169] are brilliantly depicted. Throughout the entire story

one definite incident follows another, good and bad, but never

indifferent; until a general effect of rich complexity, of rapid

movement—not unlike that of _Gil Blas_—is attained. In the last analysis

what more striking contrast to this work of Voltaire, the consummate

artist and keen satirist, than _Rasselas_, the profoundly philosophical

tale of Johnson the moralist? Voltaire’s keen wit and brilliant mockery

is indeed exhilarating after the slow and ponderous progress of

Johnson’s thought; but, on the other hand, after the atmosphere of

turmoil, excitement, and repulsive crime in _Candide_, the clear and

pure air of _Rasselas_ affords a welcome relief. In the remote regions

of Johnson’s imaginary Abyssinia and Egypt, events are of minor

importance; the quiet, even advance of speculation concerning truth is

Johnson’s chief interest. There is no emphasis on any incident that

might distract the attention,—in fact the only noticeable events are the

flight from the Happy Valley and the adventure of Pekuah. Neither is

there any emphasis on description; the Happy Valley is depicted in the

most general terms; it might be any valley anywhere. Similarly, in

describing the Lady Pekuah in the Arab’s tent, or Rasselas in Cairo, or

the pyramids of Egypt,—in each case Johnson abstains from the concrete

and prefers the general term. Again, as to time and place he is vague.

His scene is laid far from contemporary Europe. “Rasselas was the fourth

son of the mighty emperor, in whose dominions the Father of Waters

begins his course, whose bounty ... scatters over half the world the

harvests of Egypt.” In fact Johnson’s method of orientalizing his tale

was extremely simple. “Imlac in _Rasselas_,” he says, “I spelt with a

_c_ at the end, because it is less like English, which should always

have the Saxon _k_ added to the _c_.”[170] Eastern localities are only

occasionally mentioned, and always in a thoroughly Johnsonian manner:

“Agra, the capital of Indostan, the city in which the Great Mogul

resides;” “Persia, where I saw many remains of ancient magnificence, and

observed many new accommodations of life.” But there is no local colour,

even in the account of Imlac’s journey with the caravan to the Red Sea,

or of the Arab bandits who demanded ransom for the Lady Pekuah, or of

the story-telling in the cool of the day. The language, clear and often

simple, always dignified and powerful, sometimes pompous, is seldom

orientalized by the introduction of figures such as “the frown of

power,” “the eye of wisdom,” “the waves of violence,” “the rocks of

treachery.” Unobstructed by imagery, it reflects Johnson’s clear and

serious thought. The Happy Valley, as a central concept, is as simple as

the bridge in _The Vision of Mirza_; indeed, Johnson’s treatment of

imaginative elements in general is like Addison’s. Rasselas, like Mirza,

is so generalized as to be “Everyman,” lacking the specific traits of a

living individual and in so far resembling characters in other oriental

tales. Yet the earnestness and dignity of the author raise _Rasselas_

above the average oriental tale. Both theme and treatment compel

attention, and like music, may be interpreted by each reader for

himself. To a man of Johnson’s temperament, habitually threatened by

melancholy, the brighter side of life was invisible; such facts as

abiding joy, enduring content, true happiness, were beyond his field of

vision. Consequently _Rasselas_ shows only the shadows of the picture,

and is, in so far, untrue to life as a whole. But the truth that Johnson

saw, he faced unflinchingly and depicted powerfully, and by this truth,

so depicted, _Rasselas_ still lives. Emphasis on philosophizing rather

than on narrative; creation of a setting faint in colour; intentional

vagueness regarding character, time, and place, result in a strong

impression of remoteness. The Abyssinia and Cairo of _Rasselas_ are

far-away and shadowy places, in which shadowy people move; but the

questions raised, the grief expressed, come home to whoever “hath kept

watch o’er man’s mortality,” and, like Johnson, perplexed by

“the mystery, ...

the heavy and the weary weight

Of all this unintelligible world,”

has taken refuge in “learning,” “integrity,” and “faith.” These are the

realities behind the shadows in _Rasselas_,—realities which gain from

the vagueness and remoteness of setting a heightened effect of

universality.

The Oriental tale in England in the eighteenth century · 第 3 / 6 章