M. Jonnart celebrated his triumph with yet another proclamation by
which he assured the Greek people that the "guaranteeing" Powers were
there to restore Constitutional Verity and the regular working of
constitutional institutions; that all reprisals against Greeks, to
whatever party they might belong, would be ruthlessly repressed; that
the liberty of everybody would be safeguarded; that the "protecting"
Powers, respectful of the people's sovereignty, had no intention of
imposing a mobilization upon it.[1]
The sincerity of these professions was soon brought to the test. While
penning them, M. Jonnart had before him two lists of persons marked
down for reprisals. The first contained thirty victims, foremost among
them M. Gounaris, General Dousmanis, and Colonel Metaxas--M. Streit had
anticipated his doom by accompanying his sovereign into exile; these
were deported to Corsica. The second list comprised one hundred and
thirty persons--two ex-Premiers, MM. Skouloudis and Lambros, six
ex-Ministers of State, one General, one Admiral, other officers of high
rank, lawyers, publicists--who were to be placed under surveillance.
The King's three brothers--Princes Nicholas, Andrew, and
Christopher--were banished with their families to Switzerland. In
addition, certain individuals of lower class who had participated in
the events of 1 and 2 December, and whose culpability was vouched for
by the French Secret Service, were to be arrested and brought to
book.[2]
M. Jonnart, forbidden by his diplomatic art from meddling openly in the
internal affairs of the country, caused this _épuration_ to be carried
out through M. Zaimis. It was hard for the poor Premier to expel
fellow-citizens {201} who had occupied eminent positions and with whom
he had been in close relations--not to mention the flagrant illegality
of such a proceeding.[3] But how could he hope to argue successfully
against a man who, under the appearances of a scrupulous conscience,
recognized no law? So it came that, after a long interview on board
the _Justice_ (16 June), M. Zaimis fell in with M. Jonnart's wish.[4]
This rapid fulfilment of the "no reprisals" pledge was declared
necessary to make Athens safe for the Allies.[5] It certainly was
indispensable to make it safe for M. Venizelos, whose immediate return,
by a modification of the original plan, had been resolved upon. The
French, finding things composed into tranquility much sooner than they
anticipated, saw no cause for delay. Was it not a fact that whenever
the High Commissioner visited the capital, he met with nothing but
respect, sympathy, and cries of "_Vive la France_"?[6] It was: in all
ages, from the time of the Roman Consul Flamininus onwards, there have
been found Greeks loving liberators more than liberty.
But M. Venizelos knew better. Whilst at Salonica, he used to assure
his Western friends that "the great majority at Athens remained
Venizelist. If proof be desired, it is only necessary to organize a
referendum, subject, of course, to guarantees of impartiality. Let the
King and his satellites be put aside for the moment, let controllers be
appointed from all countries . . . and let the people be asked to vote
freely. . . . I am sure of a great majority. Let them take me at my
word!" [7] When, however, the King and his satellites were about to be
put aside, M. Venizelos, as we have seen, had stipulated for some
months of delay; and now that they had been put aside, he still felt
that the partial _épuration_ did not suffice for his safety. No doubt,
the bayonets which had pulled the King down were able to set him up.
But M. Venizelos, for reasons both personal and patriotic, shrank from
leaning on foreign bayonets more than was unavoidable. He had no
desire to justify the nickname, bestowed upon him months ago, {202} of
"Archisenegalesos" ("Chief of the Senegalese")--an epithet conveying
the suggestion that he aimed at turning Greece into a dependency of
France. M. Jonnart seemed to share this laudable delicacy.[8]
General Sarrail, however, cared nothing for appearances, but itched to
get M. Venizelos out of Salonica at the earliest possible moment. His
first favourable impression of the Cretan as "somebody" had not
survived closer acquaintance. He considered him wanting in courage.
He had no patience with his hesitations. He felt, in short, no more
respect for him than men usually feel for their tools; and since he had
never learned to put any restraint on his tongue, he expressed his
opinion of this "ex-revolutionary transformed into a Government man"
freely. The Greek was too discreet to say what he thought of the
Frenchman; but as he was not less vain and domineering, their
intercourse at Salonica had been the reverse of harmonious.[9] Thus
the Leader of the Liberals found himself prodded back to the city from
which he had been prodded nine months before.
He arrived on board a French warship off the Piraeus on 21 June. But
he gave out that he did not intend to come to Athens, or to call
himself to power. An agreement, he said, had been reached between M.
Jonnart and M. Zaimis to the effect that a mixed Ministerial Commission
should be formed to negotiate the unification of the country.[10] That
was true. With his usual sense of propriety, the High Commissioner
would not dream of usurping the place of the acknowledged chiefs of the
Greek people. It was for them to take the initiative. The
"guaranteeing" Powers which he represented respected the national will
too much to dictate the terms of the fusion between the two sections
into which Greece had been so unfortunately divided. Therefore, he
invited the heads of the two Governments, M. Zaimis and M. Venizelos,
to enter into direct conversations: he offering to act as a simple
{203} adviser, mediator, at most arbitrator. Both seized on the
invitation.[11]
The main question had already been settled between M. Jonnart and M.
Venizelos: the latter should return to power at once. But, legally he
could only return by a parliamentary election, and, as he could not
hope for a majority, neither he nor M. Jonnart wanted an election. It
was accordingly decided that, since no reliance could be placed on the
popular will of the present, an appeal should be made to the popular
will of the past: the Chamber of 13 June, 1915, in which M. Venizelos
had a majority, should be recalled to life, on the ground that its
dissolution, in their opinion, was illegal. This decision--so well
calculated to preserve externals with all the reverence which
expediency permitted--was, on 24 June, formally conveyed by the High
Commissioner to M. Zaimis, who, doing what was expected of him,
tendered his resignation. The High Commissioner thanked him and
promptly obtained from King Alexander a declaration that he was ready
to entrust the Government to M. Venizelos, who only asked for a delay
of two days to fetch his Cabinet from Salonica.[12]
Meanwhile, the news that M. Venizelos was coming had spread, and the
return at that delicate moment of the yacht _Sphacteria_ which had
carried King Constantine away added fuel to the flame. In the evening
(24 June), the crew of the boat, joined by students and reservists,
paraded the streets with a portrait of the King and cried "Long live
Constantine!" The column of demonstrators grew as it went along--the
police being unable or unwilling to check it. Without a doubt, M.
Venizelos was right: the _épuration_ of the capital had not gone far
enough. To prevent surprises, General Regnault, commander of the
landing forces, immediately took the measures which he had carefully
planned in advance. By dawn of 25 June, French troops with artillery
had occupied all the heights round the town: they were to stay there as
long as M. Venizelos wanted them--and, perhaps, even longer.[13]
{204}
Under such conditions the People's Chosen formed his Ministry (26
June), and nerved himself to face the people. Every preparation for
his entry into the capital had been made. Nothing remained but to fix
the hour. But this he evaded doing in a manner which puzzled and
exasperated the French General. It was the goal towards which they had
moved steadily and methodically, step tracing step, through so many
weary months--the crown of their joint adventure. Why, then, did he
not seize it? Why did he shrink from possession? What did he mean by
it? The General did not know. But he felt that it would not do. "M.
le President," he said to him, incisively, "Here you are in power; it
is up to you to assume the responsibility. I have the force in my
hands, and it is my business to secure your installation in Athens.
But I must have your instructions. Tell me what measures you want me
to take." The request was a command. M. Venizelos thanked the General
effusively, pressing his hands. "After all," he said, "it is certain
that people will always say that I did not return to Athens but with
the support of the Allies." Finally it was arranged that he should
land in the forenoon of 27 June. An ordeal which could not be avoided
ought not to be postponed.
At the appointed hour the French troops entered Athens with their
machine-guns and occupied the principal points along the route by which
M. Venizelos was to proceed, while the vicinity of the Royal Palace
where he was to take the oath of office and the interior of it were
watched by 400 Cretan gendarmes, his faithful bodyguard, come from
Salonica. Notwithstanding all these precautions, M. Venizelos and his
Ministers, modestly averse from exposing themselves to the enthusiasm
of their fellow-citizens, motored at top speed straight to the Palace,
eschewing the central thoroughfares, and thence to the Hotel Grande
Bretagne, in the corridors of which also Cretan stalwarts mounted
guard. Thanks to this vigilance, as General Regnault observes, the
assassins whom the Premier and his friends feared to see rise from
every street corner, and even in the passages of the Palace and hotel,
had not materialized. But M. Venizelos, where his own life was
concerned, took no chances: a Cretan regiment {205} from Salonica
landed that afternoon to replace the foreign battalions.[14]
Towards evening a demonstration organized in the square before the
hotel gave M. Venizelos an opportunity of appearing on the balcony and
making an eloquent speech. He reminded his hearers how the last
warning he had addressed to King Constantine from the balcony of his
house ten months ago had been disregarded, and how, in consequence, the
part of the nation still healthy had risen to save the rest. The cure
thus begun would go on until it had wrought out its accomplishment. In
due time a Constituent Assembly would be elected to revise the
Constitution so as to place beyond peradventure the sovereignty of the
people. Meanwhile, the national system had been singularly enfeebled
and corrupted by the late autocratic regime: the public services did
not do their work as they ought; impurities had crept into the blood;
the body politic needed purging. He would put all this right. He
would restore the system to vigorous activity. Every impurity would be
cleansed from it, and pure, refreshed blood would circulate all over
the body politic, giving health to every fibre of the State. As to
matters external, he thought it needless to say that the place of
Greece was by the side of the Powers who fought for democracy.[15]
The next two days saw this programme at work.
A rupture of relations with the Central Empires, to be followed by a
mobilization, marked the end of Greek neutrality. King Alexander, as
yet a novice in statecraft, expressed surprise at the inconsistency
between these acts and the repeated assurances given to the Greek
people. He was told that the accession of M. Venizelos could mean
nothing else but war: his Majesty knew it: having accepted Venizelos,
he must accept his foreign policy.[16]
Not less was the young king's shock at another act of the new
Government--the suspension, by a Royal Decree, of the irremovability of
judges which is expressly guaranteed by the Constitution. "They
accused my father of {206} violating the Constitution," he said to M.
Jonnart, "and the first thing they ask me to do is to violate it." So
acute an interpreter of Constitutional Law could have small difficulty
in disposing of these scruples. He explained to the young monarch that
he could sign the decree without any compunction: the Constituent
Assembly which would be elected by and by to revise the Constitution
would legitimatize everything. He went on to give him a little, simple
lecture on the elements of Constitutional Verity, its theory and its
practice: "In a short time," he concluded suavely, "Your Majesty will
know on this subject as much as any of your Ministers,"--whenever he
experienced the need of further instruction, he only had to call the
High Commissioner, who promised to come and solve his perplexities in a
trice.[17]
The soundness of the instruction might be questionable. But the source
from which it came gave it unquestionable weight.
By the time M. Jonnart left Athens (7 July), he had every reason to
feel gratified at the complete success of his efforts. France's
protégé was installed at the head of the Hellenic Nation, ready to lead
it forth by her side; the regular working of Constitutional
institutions was assured; and the foundations of a democratic
government were well and truly laid. In all history it would be
difficult to find a more signal instance of brute force and bad faith
triumphing in the name of Law and Verity.
[1] Reuter, Athens, 16 June, 1917; Jonnart, pp. 137-40.
[2] Jonnart, pp. 147-51, 179-80.
[3] See Art. 4 of the Greek Constitution.
[4] Jonnart, p. 147.
[5] _Ibid_, p. 160.
[6] _Ibid_, p. 170.
[7] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917, p. 327.
[8] Jonnart, p. 159.
[9] Sarrail, pp. 102, 153, 234-5. One of their quarrels arose from the
fact that General Sarrail claimed entire jurisdiction over the
inhabitants of the country, many of whom he had deported to France as
suspects and refused to give them up to the courts competent to deal
with them.
[10] Reuter, Athens, 21 June, 1917.
[11] Jonnart, p. 161.
[12] Jonnart, pp. 162-73, 180-1.
[13] Jonnart, pp. 176-8, 199-201. The Italians, who had stepped into
Epirus, only evacuated it when they made sure that their allies were
quitting Thessaly and Attica.
[14] Regnault, pp. 100-2; Jonnart, p. 184; The _Morning Post_, 29 June,
1917.
[15] Jonnart, pp. 185-90.
[16] _Ibid_, pp.191-3, 195-6.
[17] Jonnart, pp. 194-5.
{207}