A momentous question--upon the answer to which depended, among other
things, the fate of Greece during the War--confronted the Allies as
soon as they realized that their Balkan campaign had come to an
untimely beginning.
The dispatch of troops to Macedonia originally was based on the
agreement that M. Venizelos would get Greece to join. Once M.
Venizelos failed to do so, the plan fell to the ground. Again, the
object of the expedition was to rescue Servia; and Servia being already
conquered, the expedition had no longer any purpose. Such were the
views of the British Government, and similar views were held in France
by many, including M. Delcassé, who resigned when Bulgaria's
"defection" sounded the knell of his Balkan policy. But other French
statesmen, with M. Briand at their head, saw in Macedonia a field which
promised great glory and gain, if only the noble British nation could
be brought to understand that there were interests and sentiments at
stake higher than agreements.[1]
The process involved some talking: "I have had my interview with Briand
and Gallieni," wrote Lord Kitchener to the Prime Minister. "As regards
Salonica it is very difficult to get in a word; they were both full of
the necessity of pushing in troops, and would not think of coming out.
They simply sweep all military difficulties and dangers aside, and go
on political lines--such as saving a remnant of Serbs, bringing Greece
in, and inducing Rumania to join." [2]
Other conferences followed, at all of which the French spoke so loudly
that the noble British nation could not possibly help hearing--_la
noble nation britannique n'est pas restée sourde_. The truth is,
France was set on what {77} M. Delcassé now called the _mirage
balkanique_, partly from considerations of a domestic nature, chiefly
for reasons connected with the future balance of power in the Near
East--and England could not leave her there alone. So the "_nous
resterons_" policy prevailed; and the continued presence of
Franco-British forces on Greek soil led, as it was bound to do, to
abnormal relations with the Greek Government.
The wish of the Allies was to obtain from Greece full licence for the
safe accommodation and the operations of their troops; while it was the
earnest endeavour of Greece not to let her complaisance towards one
group of belligerents compromise her in the eyes of the other. The
little kingdom found itself between two clashing forces: the one
triumphant on land, the other dominating the sea. But of the two the
German peril was the more imminent. The Kaiser's legions were at
Monastir--any act that might be construed as a breach of neutrality
would bring them in a month to Athens.
M. Skouloudis--a stately octogenarian who, after refusing three times
the Premiership, had assumed power in this crisis at the King's
insistent desire because, as he said, he considered it his duty so to
do--took up the only attitude that could have been expected in the
circumstances: the attitude that was dictated by the instinct of
self-preservation.
Unlike M. Venizelos, whose mind revolved constantly about war at all
hazards: unlike other statesmen who regarded war as an eventuality to
be accepted or declined according as conditions might be favourable or
unfavourable, M. Skouloudis seemed resolutely to eliminate war from his
thoughts.
On taking office he gave the Entente Powers "most categorical
assurances of a steady determination to carry on the policy of
neutrality in the form of most sincere benevolence towards them. The
new Ministry," he added, "adopts M. Zaimis's repeated declarations of
Greece's friendly attitude towards the Allied armies at Salonica, and
is sufficiently sensible of her true interests and of her debt to them
not to deviate for the whole world from this course, and hopes that the
friendly sentiments of those Powers towards Greece will never be
influenced by false {78} and malicious rumours deliberately put into
circulation with the object of cooling the good relations between
them." To Servia also he expressed "in the most categorical terms
sentiments of sincere friendship and a steady determination to continue
affording her every facility and support consistent with our vital
interests." [3]
But at the same time, when told by the Servian Minister that a Servian
army might probably, pressed by the enemy, enter Greek territory, he
replied that he wished and hoped such a thing would not happen--that
Greece might not find herself under the very unpleasant necessity of
applying the Hague Rules regarding the disarmament of a belligerent
taking refuge in neutral territory. And he repeated this statement to
the French Minister, adding, in answer to a question. What would
Greece do if the Allied forces retired into Greek territory? that it
would be necessary to apply the Hague Rules, but that he hoped very
much the contingency would not present itself. On being reminded of
the assurances given by his predecessor that no material pressure would
ever be exerted on the Allied forces, he replied that the Hellenic
Government nowise proposed to go back on those assurances, and hoped
that the Powers, taking into consideration the irreproachable attitude
of Greece, would be pleased to relieve her of complications and find a
solution safeguarding all interests concerned.[4]
The solution he hinted at was that the Allies should re-embark; in
which case Greece was prepared to protect the parting guests "even by
her own forces, so as to afford them the most absolute security." [5]
But, as nothing was farther from their thoughts, his explanation did
not satisfy the Allies. M. Skouloudis was therefore obliged to give
their representatives again and again to understand that in no case
would the Hellenic Government think of exerting the least pressure, and
that, if he had alluded to the Rules regarding neutrality, he had done
so because such ought to be the official language of a State which was
and wished to remain neutral. But from the very first he had clearly
indicated that Greece did not mean to apply those Rules: she would
confine {79} herself to a mere reminder of international principles
without in any way seeking to enforce respect for them. Greece being
and wishing to remain neutral, could not speak officially as if she
were not, nor trumpet abroad the assurances which she had not ceased
giving the Entente Powers. Surely they must perceive the most delicate
position in which Greece stood between the two belligerent groups, and,
given that they did not dispute, nor could dispute, her right to remain
neutral, it was reasonable and just that they should accept the natural
consequences and not demand from her impossibilities.[6]
The Entente Powers could not, of course, deny the reasonableness of
this plea; but neither could they ignore the inconveniences to
themselves that would arise from its frank recognition. Between their
base at Salonica and the troops which had advanced to Krivolak
interposed several Greek army corps; at Salonica also Greek camps lay
among the Franco-British camps scattered round the town: these
conditions impeded organized operations. General Sarrail, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Allies, had nothing but praise for the
courtesy of the Greek authorities, both civil and military. Yet not a
day passed without incidents. He complained that obstacles were placed
in his action through a multitude of secondary details: the
Municipality claimed duties; the Railway Service did not assist as
liberally as could be wished in the work of getting off the stores
which arrived at the port. It was necessary that the Greek troops
should be moved out of the Allies' way and leave them in full control:
privileges which no State could voluntarily grant and remain neutral;
which no army could forgo and work efficiently. So the General, while
confessing that "we often place them in a difficult position by
demanding permissions which their virtual neutrality cannot allow them
to give," impressed on the Entente Governments the need of taking
strong measures with the Greeks.[6]
Germany would have proceeded to deeds without wasting words--beyond a
casual "Necessity knows no law." But nations fighting for noble ideals
could not imitate Germany's cynicism. A case had to be made out to
{80} justify coercion. It was. Greece did not really wish to remain
neutral. Misled by a Germanophile Court, she only waited for a chance
of joining the enemy--of stabbing the Allies in the back. When this
amazing theory--widely popularized by the French and English Press--was
hinted to M. Rallis by "Our Special Correspondent," on 18 November, the
Greek Minister could hardly credit his collocutor's sanity: "It is
mad!" he cried out. "It is senseless to imagine such a thing--when you
could have the guns of your fleet levelled on our cities!" The answer,
however--an answer the conclusiveness of which a glance at the map is
enough to demonstrate to the dimmest intelligence--fell upon
deliberately deaf ears. The very journal which in one page recorded
it, in another wrote: "Bulgaria has gone; Greece is trembling in the
balance. Only a display of overwhelming force on our part can hold her
steady and prevent the accession of another 500,000 men to the enemy's
strength."
That the publicists who argued thus and who, to give to their argument
greater cogency, generously added to the Greek army some 200,000 men,
were persuaded by their own reasoning, it is hard to believe without
libelling human sense. Apart from the ocular refutation supplied by
the map, what had Greece to gain by siding with the enemies of the
Entente? That she would lose all her islands, have her coast towns
pulverized and her population starved, was certain. What she could get
in return, it needed a very robust imagination to suggest. The only
countries at whose cost the Hellenic Kingdom could possibly compensate
itself for these inevitable sacrifices were Turkey and Bulgaria; and
those countries were Germany's allies. A moment's reflection raises a
number of equally unanswerable questions: If the Greeks wanted to join
Germany, why did they not do so when the Kaiser invited them at the
very beginning of the War? Why did they not resist the landing of the
Allies? Why did they not attack them when they had them at their
mercy: 60,000 French and British, with the Germans and the Bulgars in
front of them, and 150,000 Greeks between them and Salonica?[8]
{81}
In this connexion the evidence of an eminent English soldier and an
eminent French statesman who visited Athens at that time to study the
situation on the spot may be cited. To each King Constantine and M.
Skouloudis, in the course of lengthy interviews, declared that the
Allied forces had nothing to fear in Greece. Each was convinced of
their sincerity, and of the true motives of their attitude: "They
both," reported Lord Kitchener, "seem very determined to stick to their
neutrality." Likewise General Dousmanis, Chief of the General Staff,
and Colonel Metaxas, who were represented to the Entente publics as
Germanophile pedants, satisfied Lord Kitchener of their genuine concern
about the British sphere in the East, and startled him by pressing upon
him a plan of action "almost exactly the same as detailed in my
telegrams, and based their conclusions on the same argument almost word
for word. They emphatically stated that there was no other way of
preventing the accomplishment of the German project." [9] M. Denys
Cochin even went so far as to publish to the whole world that the
suspicions entertained against King Constantine had no other source
than party rancour.[10]
For the rest, a striking proof that the Entente Powers themselves did
not believe the story of the Greek Government's hostile intentions is
afforded by the fact that, instead of demanding, they deprecated the
disbandment of the Greek army. When Lord Kitchener saw M. Skouloudis,
the latter said that the Allies' mistrust might well force Greece to
consider whether it would not be better for her to demobilize, leaving
to them all responsibility for the consequences. Lord Kitchener, in
the presence of the British Minister, replied that, "as to some partial
demobilization, it was for Greece to decide according to her interests,
but he did not think a general demobilization advisable." And again, a
little later on, when {82} M. Skouloudis, irritated by a fresh
exhibition of mistrust, told the French Minister that, in face of such
a state of things, nothing was left for his unhappy country but to
order at once a general demobilization, and let the Entente Powers do
what they liked to her, M. Guillemin cried out, "Ah, no. I am
decidedly against demobilization." Naturally: "the Greek Army," said
Sir Thomas Cuninghame, the British Military Attaché, to General
Moschopoulos. Military Governor of Salonica, "saves and secures the
flanks and rear of the Allies." [11]
However, the story served the purpose of supplying a pretext for
pressure. All ships carrying foodstuffs and other commodities were
held up. In addition, Milo--an island not far from Athens--was
occupied, and the Allied Fleet was ordered to be ready, in case things
should be pushed to extremes, to open war on Greek commerce, to destroy
the Greek Fleet, and to bombard Athens, _en respectant les monuments
anciens_.[12]
Fortunately, the occasion for extreme measures, by which even the
ancient ruins might have suffered, did not arise. General Sarrail, who
at first urged that the naval demonstration against Athens should be
proceeded with immediately, on second thoughts, prompted by nervousness
as to the safety of his troops, deprecated such action. At the same
time, M. Skouloudis, alarmed by the blockade--Greece never has more
than a very limited food reserve--invited the Allies to state their
demands, saying that he would accede to them if it was possible to do
so.[13]
Whereupon the Allies, "ever animated by the most benevolent intentions
towards Greece, and anxious that the equivocal situation in which
events had placed her towards them should come to an end and their
relations be re-established on a basis of mutual and lasting
confidence," demanded first of all a formal assurance that in no
circumstances would the Greek troops attempt to disarm or intern the
retiring Allied troops, but that the policy of benevolent neutrality
promised would be maintained with all its consequences. They disavowed
any wish or intention to compel the Hellenic Government to {83}
participate in the European War from which it had declared that it
meant to hold aloof. But it was a vital necessity for them not to let
it in any way hinder the freedom of their movements on land or sea, or
compromise the security of their troops throughout the field of their
operations. They therefore must be assured that they will obtain,
according to the promise already given by M. Zaimis, all the facilities
which they might require, notably in the port of Salonica and on the
roads and railways. It was understood that the Entente Powers would
restore in full at the end of the War all the parts of Greek territory
which they might be obliged to occupy during the hostilities, and that
they would duly pay indemnities for all damage caused by the
occupation.[14]
M. Skouloudis, after thanking the Entente Powers for the benevolent
intentions with which they declared themselves to be animated towards
Greece, willingly repeated the assurances he had so many times already
given, that the Greek troops would in no circumstances seek to disarm
or intern the Allied troops, and that the Greek Government in its
relations with the Entente Powers would in everything hold fast to its
policy of benevolent neutrality. He once more noted the reiterated
disavowal by the Allied Governments of any wish or intention to force
Greece into the War, and on his part disavowed any wish or intention to
hinder in any way the freedom of their movements on land or sea, or to
compromise in any way the security of their troops. The Hellenic
Government had always kept the promises made by M. Zaimis to the very
utmost of its ability, and had no difficulty in renewing the assurance
that the Allied Governments would continue to receive all the
facilities their troops might require in the port of Salonica, and on
the roads and railways.[15]
These prefatory amenities led on 10 December to a detailed Agreement,
the Greek Government promising to move its troops out of the way and
"not to oppose by force the construction of defensive works or the
occupation of fortified points," but reserving to itself the right to
protest {84} against such operations "energetically and seriously, not
as a mere form"--a right which the Allies easily conceded[16]--and
emphatically declaring that "should the Allied troops by their
movements bring the war into Greek territory, the Greek troops would
withdraw so as to leave the field free to the two parties to settle
their differences."
The Entente Ministers expressed their satisfaction, and M. Skouloudis
expressed the hope that their Governments, convinced at last of the
Greek Government's sincerity, would not only drop coercion, but comply
with its request for financial and commercial facilities. They
promised that all difficulties would disappear as soon as the military
authorities on the spot had given effect to the agreement; and the
French Minister repeated his Government's declaration that it would be
happy to accord Greece all financial and commercial facilities as soon
as the situation cleared.[17]
[1] _Journal Officiel_, pp. 61, 70, 75-8.
[2] Sir George Arthur's _Life of Lord Kitchener_. Vol. III. p. 261.
[3] _White Book_, Nos. 47, 48, 49.
[4] Skouloudis's _Apantesis_, pp. 43-5.
[5] _White Book_, No. 52.
[6] _White Book_, No. 51.
[7] Sarrail, pp. 311-12; _Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III, p. 198.
[8] Those were the figures on 17 Nov.--_Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III,
p. 199. I have only seen an answer to the second of the above
questions: it is from M. Venizelos, and it is: "absent-mindedness":
"Why did not the General Staff do this, since it was to Germany's
interest that the Anglo-French should not land? Because, immersed in
politics, it no longer took account of military matters!"--Orations, p.
140.
[9] _Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III, pp. 202-3.
[10] See interview with M. Denys Cochin at Messina, in the _Daily
Mail_, 29 Nov., 1915. Cp. _Le Temps_, 25 Nov.
[11] Skouloudis, _Apantesis_, pp. 4-5; _Semeioseis_, p. 46.
[12] _Journal Officiel_, pp. 71-2.
[13] _Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III, p. 199-203.
[14] Communication by the Entente Ministers, Athens, 10/23 Nov., 1915.
[15] Skouloudis to Entente Ministers, Athens, 11/24 Nov., 1915.
[16] "_Le Gouvernement Grec se réservait de protester; nous nous
réservions de ne pas répondre_. (_Rires_)." M. Briand in the _Journal
Officiel_, p. 72.
[17] _White Book_, No. 54.
{85}