The question, then, "Doth Job fear God for nought?" sending a flash of

penetrating light back on Israel's history, and especially on the

glowing pictures of prosperity in Solomon's time, compelling all to look

to the foundation and motives of their faith, marks a most important era

in Hebrew thought. It is, we may say, the first note of a piercing

strain which thrills on to the present time. Taking rise here, the

spirit of inquiry and self-examination has already sifted religious

belief and separated much of the chaff from the wheat. Yet not all. The

comfort and hope of believers are not yet lifted above the reach of

Satan's javelin. While salvation is thought of mainly as self-enjoyment,

can we say that the purity of religion is assured? When happiness is

promised as the result of faith, whether happiness now, or hereafter in

heavenly glory, the whole fabric of religion is built on a foundation

insecure, because it may be apart from truth, holiness, and virtue. It

does not avail to say that holiness is happiness, and so introduce

personal craving under cover of the finest spiritual idea. To grant that

happiness is in any sense the distinctive issue of faith and

faithfulness, to keep happiness in view in submitting to the restraints

and bearing the burdens of religion, is to build the highest and best on

the shifting sand of personal taste and craving. Make happiness that for

which the believer is to endure and strive, allow the sense of personal

comfort and immunity from change to enter into his picture of the reward

he may expect, and the question returns, Doth this man serve God for

nought? Life is not happiness, and the gift of God is everlasting life.

Only when we keep to this supreme word in the teaching of Christ, and

seek the fulness and liberty and purity of life, apart from that

happiness which is at bottom the satisfaction of predominant desires,

shall we escape from the constantly recurring doubt that threatens to

undermine and destroy our faith.

If we look further, we find that the very error which has so long

impoverished religion prevails in philanthropy and politics, prevails

there at the present time to an alarming extent. The favourite aim of

social meliorists is to secure happiness for all. While life is the

main thing, everywhere and always, strength and breadth and nobleness

of life, their dream is to make the warfare and service of man upon

the earth so easy that he shall have no need for earnest personal

endeavour. He is to serve for happiness, and have no service to do

that may even in the time of his probation interfere with happiness.

The pity bestowed on those who toil and endure in great cities and on

bleak hillsides is that they fail of happiness. Persons who have no

conception that vigour and endurance are spiritually profitable, and

others who once knew but have forgotten the benefits of vigour and the

gains of endurance, would undo the very order and discipline of God.

Are human beings to be encouraged to seek happiness, taught to doubt

God because they have little pleasure, given to understand that those

who enjoy have the best of the universe, and that they must be lifted

up to this level or lose all? Then the sweeping condemnation will hang

over the world that it is following a new god and has said farewell to

the stern Lord of Providence.

Much may be justly said in condemnation of the jealous, critical

spirit of the Adversary. Yet it remains true that his criticism

expresses what would be a fair charge against men who passed this

stage of existence without full trial. And the Almighty is represented

as confirming this when He puts Job into the hands of Satan. He has

challenged the Adversary, opening the question of man's fidelity and

sincerity. He knows what will result. It is not the will of some

eternal Satan that is the motive, but the will of God. The Adversary's

scornful question is woven into God's wise ordinance, and made to

subserve a purpose which completely transcends the base hope involved

in it. The life of Job has not yet had the difficult and strenuous

probation necessary to assured faith, or rather to the consciousness

of a faith immovably rooted in God. It would be utterly inconsistent

with the Divine wisdom to suppose God led on and beguiled by the sneer

of His own creature to do what was needless or unfair, or indeed in

any sense opposed to His own plan for His creation. And we shall find

that throughout the book it is assumed by Job, implied by the author,

that what is done is really the doing of God Himself. The Satan of

this Divine poem remains altogether subsidiary as an agent. He may

propose, but God disposes. He may pride himself on the keenness of his

intellect; but wisdom, compared to which his subtlety is mere

blundering, orders the movement of events for good and holy ends.

The Adversary makes his proposal: "Put forth now Thine hand, and touch

all that he hath, and he will bid Thee farewell." He does not propose to

make use of sensual temptation. The only method of trial he ventures to

suggest is deprivation of the prosperity for which he believes Job has

served God. He takes on him to indicate what the Almighty may do,

acknowledging that the Divine power, and not his, must bring into Job's

life those losses and troubles that are to test his faith.

After all some may ask, Is not Satan endeavouring to tempt the Almighty?

And if it were true that the prosperous condition of Job, or any man,

implies God's entire satisfaction with his faith and dutifulness and

with his character as a man, if, further, it must be taken as true that

sorrow and loss are evil, then this proposal of the Satan is a

temptation. It is not so in reality, for "God cannot be tempted to

evil." No creature could approach His holiness with a temptation. But

Satan's intention is to move God. He considers success and happiness to

be intrinsically good, and poverty and bereavement to be intrinsically

evil. That is to say, we have here the spirit of unfaith endeavouring to

destroy God as well as man. For the sake of truth professedly, for his

own pride of will really, he would arrest the righteousness and grace of

the Divine. He would unmake God and orphan man. The scheme is futile of

course. God can allow his proposal, and be no less the Infinitely

generous, wise, and true. The Satan shall have his desire; but not a

shadow shall fall on the ineffable glory.

At this point, however, we must pause. The question that has just

arisen can only be answered after a survey of human life in its

relation to God, and especially after an examination of the meaning of

the term _evil_ as applied to our experiences. We have certain clear

principles to begin with: that "God cannot be tempted with evil, and

He Himself tempteth no man"; that all God does must show not less

beneficence, not less love, but more as the days go by. These

principles will have to be vindicated when we proceed to consider the

losses, what may be called the disasters that follow each other in

quick succession and threaten to crush the life they try.

Meanwhile, casting a glance at those happy dwellings in the land of Uz,

we see all going on as before, no mind darkened by the shadow that is

gathering, or in the least aware of the controversy in heaven so full of

moment to the family circle. The pathetic ignorance, the blessed

ignorance in which a man may live hangs upon the picture. The cheerful

bustle of the homestead goes on, the feasts and sacrifices, diligent

labour rewarded with the produce of fields, the wine and oil of

vineyards and olive gardens, fleeces of the flock and milk of the kine.

IV.

_THE SHADOW OF GOD'S HAND._

CHAP. i. 13-22.

Coming now to the sudden and terrible changes which are to prove the

faithfulness of the servant of God, we must not fail to observe that

in the development of the drama the trial of Job personally is the

sole consideration. No account is taken of the character of those who,

being connected with his fortunes and happiness, are now to be swept

away that he may suffer. To trace their history and vindicate Divine

righteousness in reference to each of them is not within the scope of

the poem. A typical man is taken as hero, and we may say the

discussion covers the fate of all who suffer, although attention is

fixed on him alone.

The writer is dealing with a story of patriarchal life, and himself is

touched with the Semitic way of thinking. A certain disregard of the

subordinate human characters must not be reckoned strange. His

thoughts, far-reaching as they are, run in a channel very different

from ours. The world of his book is that of family and clan ideas. The

author saw more than any man of his time; but he could not see all

that engages modern speculation. Besides, the glory of God is the

dominant idea of the poem; not men's right to joy, or peace, or even

life; but God's right to be wholly Himself and greatly true. In the

light of this high thought we must be content to have the story of one

soul traced with such fulness as might be compassed, the others left

practically untouched. If the sufferings of the man whom God approves

can be explained in harmony with the glory of Divine justice, then

the sudden calamities that fall upon his servants and children will

also be explained. For, although death is in a sense an ultimate

thing, and loss and affliction, however great, do not mean so much as

death; yet, on the other hand, to die is the common lot, and the quick

stroke appears merciful in comparison with Job's dreadful experiences.

Those who are killed by lightning or by the sword do but swiftly and

without protracted pain fall into the hands of God. We need not

conclude that the writer means us to regard the sons and daughters of

Job and his servants as mere chattels, like the camels and sheep,

although the people of the desert would have so regarded them. But the

main question presses; the range of the discussion must be limited;

and the tradition which forms the basis of the poem is followed by the

author whenever it supplies the elements of his inquiry.

We have entirely refused the supposition that the Almighty forgot His

righteousness and grace in putting the wealth and happiness of Job

into the hands of Satan. The trials we now see falling one after the

other are not sent because the Adversary has suggested them, but

because it is right and wise, for the glory of God and for the

perfecting of faith, that Job should suffer them. What is God's doing

is not in this case nor in any case evil. He cannot wrong His servant

that glory may come to Himself.

And just here arises a problem which enters into all religious

thought, the wrong solution of which depraves many a philosophy, while

the right understanding of it sheds a flood of light on our life in

this world. A thousand tongues, Christian, non-Christian, and

neo-Christian, affirm that life is for enjoyment. What gives enjoyment

is declared to be good, what gives most enjoyment is reckoned best,

and all that makes for pain and suffering is held to be evil. It is

allowed that pain endured now may bring pleasure hereafter, and that

for the sake of future gain a little discomfort may be chosen. But it

is evil nevertheless. One doing his best for men would be expected to

give them happiness at once and, throughout life, as much of it as

possible. If he inflicted pain in order to enhance pleasure by and by,

he would have to do so within the strictest limits. Whatever reduces

the strength of the body, the capacity of the body for enjoyment and

the delight of the mind accompanying the body's vigour, is declared

bad, and to do anything which has this effect is to do evil or wrong.

Such is the ethic of the philosophy finally and powerfully stated by

Mr. Spencer. It has penetrated as widely as he could wish; it

underlies volumes of Christian sermons and semi-Christian schemes. If

it be true, then the Almighty of the Book of Job, bringing affliction,

sorrow, and pain upon His servant, is a cruel enemy of man, to be

hated, not revered. This matter needs to be considered at some length.

The notion that pain is evil, that he who suffers is placed at moral

disadvantage, appears very plainly in the old belief that those

conditions and surroundings of our life which minister to enjoyment

are the proofs of the goodness of God on which reliance must be placed

so far as nature and providence testify of Him. Pain and sorrow, it

was held, need to be accounted for by human sin or otherwise; but we

know that God is good because there is enjoyment in the life He gives.

Paley, for example, says that the proof of the Divine _goodness_ rests

upon contrivances everywhere to be seen for the purpose of giving us

pleasure. He tells us that, when God created the human species,

"either He wished them happiness, or He wished them misery, or He was

indifferent and unconcerned about either"; and he goes on to prove

that it must be our happiness He desired, for, otherwise, wishing our

misery, "He might have made everything we tasted, bitter; everything

we saw, loathsome; everything we touched, a sting; every smell, a

stench; and every sound, a discord:" while, if He had been indifferent

about our happiness we must impute all enjoyment we have "to our good

fortune," that is, to bare chance, an impossible supposition. Paley's

further survey of life leads to the conclusion that God has it as His

chief aim to make His creatures happy and, in the circumstances, does

the best He can for them, better far than they are commonly disposed

to think. The agreement of this position with that of Spencer lies in

the presupposition that goodness can be proved only by arrangements

for giving pleasure. If God is good for this reason, what follows when

He appoints pain, especially pain that brings no enjoyment in the long

run? Either He is not altogether "good" or He is not all-powerful.

The author of the Book of Job does not enter into the problem of pain

and affliction with the same deliberate attempt to exhaust the subject

as Paley has made; but he has the problem before him. And in

considering the trial of Job as an example of the suffering and sorrow

of man in this world of change, we find a strong ray of light thrown

upon the darkness. The picture is a Rembrandt; and where the radiance

falls all is sharp and bright. But the shadows are deep; and we must

seek, if possible, to make out what lies in those shadows. We shall

not understand the Book of Job, nor form a just opinion of the

author's inspiration, nor shall we understand the Bible as a whole,

unless we reach a point of view clear of the mistakes that stultify

the reasoning of Paley and plunge the mind of Spencer, who refuses to

be called a materialist, into the utter darkness of materialism.

* * * * *

Now, as to enjoyment, we have the capacity for it, and it flows to us

from many external objects as well as from the operation of our own

minds and the putting forth of energy. It is in the scheme of things

ordained by God that His creatures shall enjoy. On the other hand,

trouble, sorrow, loss, bodily and mental pain, are also in the scheme

of things. They are provided for in numberless ways--in the play of

natural forces causing injuries, dangers from which we cannot escape;

in the limitations of our power; in the antagonisms and

disappointments of existence; in disease and death. They are provided

for by the very laws that bring pleasure, made inevitable under the

same Divine ordinance. Some say it detracts from the goodness of God

to admit that as He appoints means of enjoyment so He also provides

for pain and sorrow and makes these inseparable from life. And this

opinion runs into the extreme dogmatic assertion that "good," by which

we are to understand _happiness_,

"Shall fall

At last far off, at last to all."

Many hold this to be necessary to the vindication of God's goodness.

But the source of the whole confusion lies here, that we prejudge the

question by calling pain evil. The light-giving truth for modern

perplexity is that pain and loss are not _evil_, are in no sense

_evil_.

Because we desire happiness and dislike pain, we must not conclude

that pain is bad and that, when any one suffers, it is because he or

another has done wrong. There is the mistake that vitiates theological

thought, making men run to the extreme either of denying God

altogether because there is suffering in the world, or of framing a

rose-water eschatology. Pain is one thing, moral evil is quite another

thing. He who suffers is not necessarily a wrong-doer; and when,

through the laws of nature, God inflicts pain, there is no evil nor

anything approaching wrong. In Scripture, indeed, pain and evil are

apparently identified. "Shall we receive good at the hands of God, and

shall we not receive evil?" "Is there evil in the city, and the Lord

hath not done it?" "Thus saith the Lord, Behold I will bring upon

Judah, and upon all the inhabitants of Jerusalem, all the evil that I

have pronounced against them." In these and many other passages the

very thing seems to be meant which has just been denied, for evil and

suffering appear to be made identical. But human language is not a

perfect instrument of thought, any more than thought is a perfect

channel of truth. One word has to do duty in different senses. Moral

evil, wrongness, on the one hand; bodily pain, the misery of loss and

defeat, on the other hand--both are represented by one Hebrew word

[רַע--root meaning, _displeased_]. In the following passages, where

moral evil is clearly meant, it occurs just as in those previously

quoted: "Wash you, make you clean, cease to do evil, learn to do

well"; "The face of the Lord is against them that do evil." The

different meanings which one Hebrew word may bear are not generally

confused in translation. In this case, however, the confusion has

entered into the most modern language. From a highly esteemed thinker

the following sentence may be quoted by way of example: "The other

religions did not feel evil like Israel; it did not stand in such

complete antagonism to their idea of the Supreme, the Creator and

Sovereign of man, nor in such absolute contradiction to their notion

of what ought to be; and so they either reconciled themselves as best

they could to the evil that was necessary, or invented means by which

men could escape from it by escaping from existence." The singular

misapprehension of Divine providence which underlies a statement like

this can only be got rid of by recognising that enjoyment and

suffering are not the good and evil of life, that both of them stand

quite apart from what is intrinsically good and bad in a moral sense,

and that they are simply means to an end in the providence of God.

It is not difficult, of course, to see how the idea of pain and the idea

of moral evil have been linked together. It is by the thought that

suffering is punishment for evil done; and that the suffering is

therefore itself evil. Pain was simply penalty inflicted by an offended

heavenly power. The evil of a man's doings came back to him, made itself

felt in his suffering. This was the explanation of all that was

unpleasant, disastrous and vexing in the lot of man. He would enjoy

always, it was conceived, if wrong-doing or failure in duty to the

higher powers did not kindle divine anger against him. True, the

wrong-doing might not be his own. The son might suffer for the parent's

fault. Iniquity might be remembered to children's children and fall

terribly on those who had not themselves transgressed. The fates pursued

the descendants of an impious man. But wrong done somewhere, rebellion

of some one against a divinity, was always the antecedent of pain and

sorrow and disaster. And as the other religions thought, so, in this

matter, did that of Israel. To the Hebrew the deep conviction of this,

as Dr. Fairbairn has said, made poverty and disease peculiarly

abhorrent. In Psalm lxxxix. the prosperity of David is depicted, and

Jehovah speaks of the covenant that must be kept: "If his children

forsake my law, and walk not in my judgments; ... then will I visit

their transgression with the rod, and their iniquity with stripes." The

trouble has fallen, and out of the depth of it, attributing to past sin

all defeat and disaster from which the people suffer--the breaking down

of the hedges, curtailment of the vigour of youth, overthrow in war--the

psalmist cries, "How long, O Lord, wilt Thou hide Thyself for ever? How

long shall Thy wrath burn like fire? O remember how short my time is:

for what vanity hast Thou created all the children of men?" There is

here no thought that anything painful or afflictive could manifest the

fatherhood of God; it must proceed from His anger, and force the mind

back upon the memory of sin, some transgression that has caused the

Almighty to suspend His kindness for a time.

Here it was the author of Job found the thought of his people. With

this he had to harmonise the other beliefs--peculiarly theirs--that

the lovingkindness of the Lord is over all His works, that God who is

supremely good cannot inflict moral injury on any of His covenanted

servants. And the difficulty he felt survives. The questions are still

urged: Is not pain bound up with wrong-doing? Is not suffering the

mark of God's displeasure? Are they not evil, therefore? And, on the

other hand, Is not enjoyment appointed to him who does right? Does not

the whole scheme of Divine providence, as the Bible sets it forth,

including the prospect it opens into the eternal future, associate

happiness with well-doing and pain with evil-doing? We desire

enjoyment, and cannot help desiring it. We dislike pain, disease, and

all that limits our capacity for pleasure. Is it not in accordance

with this that Christ appears as the Giver of light and peace and joy

to the race of men?

These questions look difficult enough. Let us attempt to answer them.

Pleasure and pain, happiness and suffering, are elements of creaturely

experience appointed by God. The right use of them makes life, the wrong

use of them mars it. They are ordained, all of them in equal degree, to

a good end; for all that God does is done in perfect love as well as in

perfect justice. It is no more wonderful that a good man should suffer

than that a bad man should suffer; for the good man, the man who

believes in God and therefore in goodness, making a right use of

suffering, will gain by it in the true sense; he will reach a deeper and

nobler life. It is no more wonderful that a bad man, one who disbelieves

in God and therefore in goodness, should be happy than that a good man

should be happy, the happiness being God's appointed means for both to

reach a higher life. The main element of this higher life is vigour, but

not of the body. The Divine purpose is _spiritual_ evolution. That

gratification of the sensuous side of our nature for which physical

health and a well-knit organism are indispensable--paramount in the

pleasure-philosophy--is not neglected, but is made subordinate in the

Divine culture of life. The grace of God aims at the life of the

spirit--power to love, to follow righteousness, to dare for justice'

sake, to seek and grasp the true, to sympathise with men and bear with

them, to bless them that curse, to suffer and be strong. To promote this

vitality all God appoints is fitted--pain as well as pleasure, adversity

as well as prosperity, sorrow as well as joy, defeat as well as success.

We wonder that suffering is so often the result of imprudence. On the

ordinary theory the fact is inexplicable, for imprudence has no dark

colour of ethical faultiness. He who by an error of judgment plunges

himself and his family into what appears irretrievable disaster, may, by

all reckoning, be almost blameless in character. If suffering is held to

be penal, no reference to the general sin of humanity will account for

the result. But the reason is plain. The suffering is disciplinary. The

nobler life at which Divine providence aims must be sagacious no less

than pure, guided by sound reason no less than right feeling.

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