CONCLUSIONS REACHED
We may now state in order certain definite conclusions which appear to
follow from the arguments urged above:--
1.--It is to be expected that during the next thirty years, a period
less than that which has elapsed since the Franco-German War, the
scientific knowledge of the means of carrying on offensive warfare will
have made such advances and become so generally applied, that, if
another world war breaks out, not only will material damage be caused
which can never be repaired, but the best part of the human race will
either be destroyed or suffer deterioration as disastrous as complete
destruction, and that this result will be accompanied by appalling
misery.
2.--Unless there is a real assurance of peace, even if actual war does
not break out, the maintenance of armaments and the preparation for war
would place a burden which would be absolutely intolerable on the
leading nations of mankind.
3.--Owing to the close connection through modern means of communication
between one nation and another and the way in which their interests are
interlocked, a war between two States is liable to develop into a world
war. If one nation endeavours to promote its interests by imposing its
will by force on another, the other nations must either stand by while
the injury is done, in which case it is almost certain that the injury
will be repeated by subsequent attacks on some of them, or the nations
must league themselves together to prevent aggression and the assertion
of the claim to ascendancy.
4.--The complete defeat of Germany, and the punishment thereby
inflicted on the German rulers and the people who have supported them,
will be the best vindication of the principles of international justice
possible, and will operate as a sanction for international morality and
a warning against future aggressions or claims to dominate put forward
by Germany or any other State.
5.--The defeat of Germany in the present War, followed by subsequent
pressure on Germany through economic boycott or else by a clearly proved
change in the principles and aims of the German nation, accompanied by a
definite repudiation of the persons and the policy and organisation
which have led to the War, is absolutely essential for the future peace
of the world.
6.--The formation of a League of Nations willing to bind themselves
together for common objects, of which the prevention of war is the most
important, may not only be the most effective way of securing peace but
also provide a means for the consideration and adoption of measures
intended for the common welfare of all. Such a League may, probably
must, come into existence, and its aims and methods be formulated,
before Germany and her Allies could be admitted to it; but as soon as
Germany and her Allies can give adequate assurances that they will adopt
and be bound by the principles laid down as the foundation of the
League, they should be admitted to it. Until this is possible the League
must partake of the nature of a defensive alliance rather than of a
world-wide league of peace.
7.--Whether any definite sanction for enforcing the principles on which
the League is founded and the stipulations which it contains can be
imposed or not, the League may be of great value by giving the weight of
international opinion expressly to those principles. Public opinion of
the nations so expressed might often be effective even though not
enforced by a definite sanction.
8.--Of the two definite sanctions proposed, namely, (_a_) the so-called
"economic boycott" and (_b_) the use of the naval and military forces of
the leagued States or of certain States selected from them by
arrangement, the economic boycott which can readily be applied by all
members of the League alike, and that without keeping up any large
armaments, is likely to be effective and is free from the most serious
objections against the other sanction suggested.
9.--So many difficulties would arise in fixing the terms of any
stipulations as to the employment of military and naval forces to carry
into effect the requirements of the League, that to make such provisions
a necessary preliminary condition to the existence of the League from
the outset might indefinitely delay the formation of such a League, and,
further, the discussion of such terms would be likely to lead to
friction. The obligation imposed on certain States might involve a very
heavy burden, first, in keeping up armaments and possibly, later, in
actually going to war. Such stipulations, for reasons above stated and
illustrated, might place the leading powers in a position of great
embarrassment, and might actually themselves become the cause of serious
wars.
10.--The practice of making Secret Treaties by which the Sovereigns, the
Foreign Ministers, or the diplomatists of any nation can bind it ought
to be discontinued. The experience of the action of this country as well
as of others during the present War, as well as before it, supports this
conclusion. Negotiations must no doubt be carried on through the
ordinary diplomatic channels, but before a complete and binding
agreement is entered into, the duly constituted representatives of the
popular will should know and give their sanction to what is being done.
On the other hand, for unauthorised persons or any self-constituted
bodies or conferences to attempt to pre-judge such questions and to
carry on negotiations either with regular or irregular representatives
of other nations is pernicious. Such action is likely both to lead to
confusion and to hamper the action of the authorised representatives of
the nation, and is really opposed to sound principles of democracy,
which must be based on the duly expressed will of the nation as a whole,
and not of any section.
11.--Much may be done in settling the terms of peace after the War by
acting so as to remove probable causes of war in the future. The
adoption of some of the methods used in the past, as, for example, at
the Congress at Vienna, is sure to lead to future difficulties. Terms of
peace should not be matters for the kind of bargaining between the
powerful States by which one gives up something in consideration of
another giving up something else in exchange, and the contracting
parties treat smaller States or weaker nations as "pawns" in the game.
Each territory about which any question arises, each subject which has
to be dealt with, should be treated independently in accordance with the
requirements of justice, and especially having regard to the welfare of
the people most directly affected by it. No claim, for example, on the
part of Germany to be compensated for evacuating and making reparation
to Belgium by having some advantage in some other part of the world
should be entertained for a moment. To do so would be equivalent to
bargaining with a criminal as to the compensation to be paid to him for
giving up what he has acquired by his crimes. It is, however, legitimate
in considering the question of self-determination by the people of any
territory to consider how far such people have established or can
establish a peaceful and orderly government, and how far the
arrangements to be made as regards any country or district will affect
the safety of contiguous countries or may give rise to future disputes
and really be productive of war.
12.--Whether a League is established or not, treaties for submitting
disputes to arbitration, and if possible to tribunals permanently
constituted, will still be valuable in the future as in the past. The
decisions of regular tribunals composed of impartial persons who inspire
respect will gradually form a body of customary law, and be precedents
guiding action in the future. The attempt of Germany to override not
only precedents but also express agreements with regard to the conduct
of war, if it fails, does not discredit the value of such attempts as
were made at The Hague to embody in definite form the international law
on the subjects with which they endeavoured to deal. A careful revision
of the provisions agreed to at The Hague in light of subsequent
knowledge is desirable. They only become a dead letter if one nation
utterly disregards them and does so without incurring a penalty in some
form.
13.--It is not desirable to attempt to go into exact detail in all the
arrangements so made. For example, the attempt to enumerate a list of
articles which are to be deemed contraband, as was tried in the
Declaration of London, has led to preposterous results. Articles which
at one time were of no use in war have become, through the advance in
scientific knowledge, the material for making the most deadly and most
cruel instruments in the course of the present War.
14.--An attempt must be made to secure at least partial disarmament.
Provision as to the disarmament of Germany should be one of the terms of
peace. The extent and character of any arrangements as to general
disarmament require separate and detailed consideration. It would
naturally be one of the subjects to be discussed by any League which may
be formed. It is well to note from the outset (a) that a fleet is
essential to the British Empire for purely defensive purposes, and for
maintaining connection between the different parts of the Empire, but a
great reduction in the size of the fleet may be possible by arrangement.
The Allied Powers will recognise that it was the existence of the
British fleet that saved them from defeat, and in some cases from utter
destruction. (6) That for a nation to train its citizens as a defensive
force on the Swiss model may actually tend to preserve peace, and also
have a very useful influence on the morale of a nation. A defensive
force of this kind would not have the character or the aims which make
a great professional army a menace to peace.
15.--Lastly, it is undesirable and would be futile to attempt to set up
a "supernational sovereign authority." The scope of any League--its
powers and its objects--should be clearly defined, and the independent
sovereign States should bind themselves, as contracting parties, to
carry out the terms agreed, and all should agree beforehand as to the
steps they would take to prevent or to punish any violation of those
terms.