The Army of Italy--Tactics of Buonaparte--Battle of Monte
Notte--Battle of Millesimo--Battle of Mondovi--Armistice of
Cherasco--Close of the Campaign of Piedmont--Peace granted to
Sardinia.
Buonaparte at the age of twenty-six assumed the command of the army of
Italy; exulting in the knowledge that, if he should conquer, the honour
would be all his own. He had worked for others at Toulon, at the Col di
Tende, at Saorgio: even in the affair of the Sections the first command
had been nominally in the hands of Barras. Henceforth he was to have no
rivals within the camp. "In three months," said he, "I shall be either
at Milan or at Paris." He had already expressed the same feeling in a
still nobler form. "You are too young," said one of the Directors,
hesitating about his appointment as general. "In a year," answered
Napoleon, "I shall be either old or dead."
He found the army in numbers about 50,000; but wretchedly deficient in
cavalry, in stores of every kind,[8] in clothing and even in food; and
watched by an enemy greatly more numerous. It was under such
circumstances that he at once avowed the daring scheme of forcing a
passage to Italy, and converting the richest territory of the enemy
himself into the theatre of the war. "Soldiers," said he, "you are
hungry and naked; the Republic owes you much, but she has not the means
to pay her debts. I am come to lead you into the most fertile plains
that the sun beholds. Rich provinces, opulent towns, all shall be at
your disposal. Soldiers! with such a prospect before you, can you fail
in courage and constancy?" This was his first address to his army. The
sinking hearts of the men beat high with hope and confidence when they
heard the voice of the young and fearless leader; and Augereau, Massena,
Serrurier, Joubert, Lannes--distinguished officers might themselves
have aspired to the chief command--felt, from the moment they began to
understand his character and system, that the true road to glory would
be to follow the star of Napoleon.
He perceived that the time was come for turning a new leaf in the
history of war. With such numbers of troops as the infant Republic could
afford him, he saw that no considerable advantages could be obtained
against the vast and highly-disciplined armies of Austria and her
allies, unless the established rules and etiquettes of strategy were
abandoned. It was only by such rapidity of motion as should utterly
transcend the suspicion of his adversaries, that he could hope to
concentrate the whole pith and energy of a small force upon some one
point of a much greater force opposed to it, and thus _rob_ them
(according to his own favourite phrase) of the victory. To effect such
rapid marches, it was necessary that the soldiery should make up their
minds to consider tents and baggage as idle luxuries; and that, instead
of a long and complicated chain of reserves and stores, they should dare
to rely wholly for the means of subsistence on the resources of the
countries into which their leader might conduct them. They must be
contented to conquer at whatever hazard; to consider no sacrifices or
hardships as worthy of a thought. The risk of destroying the character
and discipline of the men, by accustoming them to pillage, was obvious.
Buonaparte trusted to victory, the high natural spirit of the nation,
and the influence of his own genius, for the means of avoiding this
danger; and many years, it must be admitted, elapsed, before he found
much reason personally to repent of the system which he adopted. Against
the enemies of the Republic its success was splendid, even beyond his
hopes.
The objects of the approaching expedition were three: first, to compel
the King of Sardinia, who had already lost Savoy and Nice, but still
maintained a powerful army on the frontiers of Piedmont, to abandon the
alliance of Austria: secondly, to compel the Emperor, by a bold invasion
of Lombardy, to make such exertions in that quarter as might weaken
those armies which had so long hovered on the Rhine; and, if possible,
to stir up the Italian subjects of that crown to adopt the revolutionary
system and emancipate themselves for ever from its yoke. The third
object, though more distant, was not less important. The influence of
the Romish Church was considered by the Directory as the chief, though
secret, support of the cause of royalism within their own territory; and
to reduce the Vatican into insignificance, or at least force it to
submission and quiescence, appeared indispensable to the internal
tranquillity of France. The Revolutionary Government, besides this
general cause of hatred and suspicion, had a distinct injury to avenge.
Their agent, Basseville, had three years before been assassinated in a
popular tumult at Rome: the Papal troops had not interfered to protect
him, nor the Pope to punish his murderers; and the haughty Republic
considered this as an insult which could only be washed out with a sea
of blood.
Napoleon's plan for gaining access to the fair regions of Italy differed
from that of all former conquerors: they had uniformly penetrated the
Alps at some point or other of that mighty range of mountains: he judged
that the same end might be accomplished more easily by advancing along
the narrow strip of comparatively level country which intervenes between
those enormous barriers and the Mediterranean Sea, and forcing a passage
at the point where the last of the Alps melt, as it were, into the first
and lowest of the Apennine range. No sooner did he begin to concentrate
his troops towards this region, than the Austrian general, Beaulieu,
took measures for protecting Genoa, and the entrance of Italy. He
himself took post with one column of his army at Voltri, a town within
ten miles of Genoa: he placed D'Argenteau with another Austrian column
at Monte Notte, a strong height further to the westward; and the
Sardinians, under Colli, occupied Ceva--which thus formed the extreme
right of the whole line of the allied army. The French could not advance
towards Genoa but by confronting some one of the three armies thus
strongly posted, and sufficiently, as Beaulieu supposed, in
communication with each other.
It was now that Buonaparte made his first effort to baffle the science
of those who fancied there was nothing new to be done in warfare. On the
10th of April, D'Argenteau came down upon Monte Notte, and attacked some
French redoubts, in front of that mountain and the villages which bear
its name, at Montelegino. At the same time General Cervoni and the
French van were attacked by Beaulieu near Voltri, and compelled to
retreat. The determined valour of Colonel Rampon, who commanded at
Montelegino, held D'Argenteau at bay during the 10th and 11th: and
Buonaparte, contenting himself with watching Beaulieu, determined to
strike his effectual blow at the centre of the enemy's line. During the
night of the 11th various columns were marched upon Montelegino, that of
Cervoni and that of Laharpe from the van of the French line, those of
Augereau and Massena from its rear. On the morning of the 12th,
D'Argenteau, preparing to renew his attack on the redoubts of
Montelegino, found he had no longer Rampon only and his brave band to
deal with; that French columns were in his rear, on his flank, and drawn
up also behind the works at Montelegino; in a word, that he was
surrounded. He was compelled to retreat among the mountains; he left his
colours and cannon behind him, 1000 killed, and 2000 prisoners. The
centre of the allied army had been utterly routed, before either the
Commander-in-Chief at the left, or General Colli at the right of the
line, had any notion that a battle was going on.
Such was the battle of Monte Notte, the first of Napoleon's fields.
Beaulieu, in order that he might re-establish his communication with
Colli (much endangered by the defeat of D'Argenteau) was obliged to
retreat upon Dego; the Sardinian, with the same purpose in view, fell
back also, and took post at Millesimo; while D'Argenteau was striving to
re-organise his dispirited troops in the difficult country between. It
was their object to keep fast in these positions until succours could
come up from Lombardy; but Napoleon had no mind to give them such
respite.
The very next day after this victory he commanded a general assault on
the Austrian line. Augereau, with a fresh division, marched at the left
upon Millesimo; Massena led the centre towards Dego; and Laharpe, with
the French right wing, manoeuvred to turn the left flank of Beaulieu.
Augereau rushed upon the outposts of Millesimo, seized and retained the
gorge which defends that place, and cut off Provera with two thousand
Austrians, who occupied an eminence called Cossaria, from the main body
of Colli's army. Next morning Buonaparte himself arrived at that scene
of the operations. He forced Colli to accept battle, utterly broke and
scattered him, and Provera, thus abandoned, was obliged to yield at
discretion.
Meanwhile Massena on the same day had assaulted the heights of Biastro,
and carrying them at the point of the bayonet, cut off Beaulieu's
communication with Colli; then Laparpe came in front and in flank also
upon the village of Dego, and after a most desperate conflict, drove the
Austrian commander-in-chief from his post. From this moment Colli and
Beaulieu were entirely separated. After the affairs of Dego and
Millesimo, the former retreated in disorder upon Ceva; the latter, hotly
pursued, upon Aqui; Colli, of course, being eager to cover Turin, while
the Austrian had his anxious thoughts already upon Milan. Colli was
again defeated at Mondovi in his disastrous retreat; he there lost his
cannon, his baggage, and the best part of his troops. The Sardinian army
might be said to be annihilated. The conqueror took possession of
Cherasco, within 10 miles of Turin, and there dictated the terms on
which the King of Sardinia was to be permitted to retain any shadow of
sovereign power.
Thus, in less than a month, did Napoleon lay the gates of Italy open
before him. He had defeated in three battles forces much superior to his
own; inflicted on them in killed, wounded and prisoners, a loss of
25,000 men; taken eighty guns and twenty-one standards; reduced the
Austrians to inaction; utterly destroyed the Sardinian king's army; and
lastly, wrested from his hands Coni and Tortona, the two great
fortresses called "the keys of the Alps,"--and indeed, except Turin
itself, every place of any consequence in his dominions. This
unfortunate prince did not long survive such humiliation. He was
father-in-law to both of the brothers of Louis XVI., and, considering
their cause and his own dignity as equally at an end, died of a broken
heart, within a few days after he had signed the treaty of Cherasco.
Buonaparte meanwhile had paused for a moment to consolidate his columns
on the heights, from which the vast plain of Lombardy, rich and
cultivated like a garden, and watered with innumerable fertilising
streams, lay at length within the full view of his victorious soldiery.
"Hannibal forced the Alps," said he gaily, as he now looked back on
those stupendous barriers, "and we have turned them."
"Hitherto" (he thus addressed his troops) "you have been fighting for
barren rocks, memorable for your valour, but useless to your country;
but now your exploits equal those of the armies of Holland and the
Rhine. You were utterly destitute, and you have supplied all your wants.
You have gained battles without cannon, passed rivers without bridges,
performed forced marches without shoes, bivouacked without strong
liquors, and often without bread. None but republican phalanxes,
soldiers of liberty, could have endured such things. Thanks for your
perseverance! But, soldiers, you have done nothing--for there remains
much to do. Milan is not yet ours. The ashes of the conquerors of
Tarquin are still trampled by the assassins of Basseville."
The consummate genius of this brief campaign could not be disputed; and
the modest language of the young general's despatches to the Directory,
lent additional grace to his fame. At this time the name of Buonaparte
was spotless: and the eyes of all Europe were fixed in admiration on his
career.
[Footnote 8: Berthier used to keep, as a curiosity, a general order, by
which three louis-d'or were granted as a great supply to each general of
division, dated on the very day of the victory at Albegna.]