Produced by David Widger
SUPERNATURAL RELIGION:
AN INQUIRY THE REALITY OF DIVINE REVELATION
By Walter Richard Cassels
In Three Volumes: Vol. I.
Complete Edition.
Carefully Revised.
London:
Longmans, Green, And Co.,
1879.
PG EDITOR'S NOTE: This file has been provided with an image of the
original scan for each page which is linked to the page number in the
html file. Nearly every page in the text has many Greek passages which
have been indicated where they occur by [------] as have many complex
tables; these passages may be viewed in the page images. Some of the
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taken up with complex footnotes in English, Greek and Hebrew. The reader
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PREFACE TO THE COMPLETE EDITION
In preparing a complete edition of this work, I have revised it
throughout. I have not hesitated to make any alterations, omissions or
additions which seemed to me likely to improve it. I have endeavoured as
much as possible to avoid presenting openings for side issues, and, with
this object, I have softened statements which, however sustainable in
themselves, might give rise to discussions apart from the direct purpose
of the Inquiry. Wherever my argument has appeared to me either involved
or insufficiently expressed I have as freely recast it as my limits
permitted, and I have in several parts introduced new data discovered
or elaborated since the work was first written, or which I may then have
overlooked.
In one instance only has any alteration been requisite which demands
special mention here. Since the sixth edition was published, I have been
convinced that Marcion's Gospel was based upon our third Synoptic, and I
have accordingly so far modified my results. It may not be unnecessary,
however, plainly to repeat that, with this exception, which is not
of material consequence, my convictions not only remain fundamentally
unchanged, but have been confirmed and strengthened both by thorough
reconsideration of my own argument, and by careful attention to the
replies made by able official apologists. As regards the philosophical
and other objections to miracles, their cogency is so fully recognized
that Bampton Lecturers and eminent Churchmen practically abandon
miracles as evidence, and press upon their brethren the necessity of
reconstructing the Christian argument The necessity of reconstruction
is indeed apparent, but the materials have not yet been made manifest.
Meanwhile, such apologists have been forced virtually to repudiate the
great Christian representatives who have hitherto defended the Faith.
The case may fairly be considered desperate when the crew throw their
officers overboard by way of lightening the ship. The historical
argument is not in a better position. The learned professors and critics
who have undertaken to deal with it do not even pretend, except perhaps
in the case of Papias, to do more than assert the anonymous use of the
Gospels by some of the Fathers, and their consequent existence; but,
if this were established, what support could that give to the record
of miracles? As for Papias, with his Hebrew Matthew and fragmentary
indirect Mark, even if secured as a solitary witness to the composition
of two Gospels, he would prove but a fatal friend to the apologetic
cause.
The "Conclusions" have been almost entirely rewritten. This was
essential to the finished work; but it was further necessary in order
more adequately to convey my own views, and to withdraw expressions
regarding the Unknowable, hitherto used from consideration for prevalent
ideas and feelings, which I now recognize to have been too definite and
calculated to mislead.
PREFACE TO THE SIXTH EDITION.
This work has scarcely yet been twelve months before the public,
but both in this country, and in America and elsewhere, it has been
subjected to such wide and searching criticism by writers of all shades
of opinion, that I may perhaps be permitted to make a few remarks, and
to review some of my Reviewers. I must first, however, beg leave to
express my gratitude to that large majority of my critics who have
bestowed generous commendation upon the work, and liberally encouraged
its completion. I have to thank others, who, differing totally from my
conclusions, have nevertheless temperately argued against them, for
the courtesy with which they have treated an opponent whose views must
necessarily have offended them, and I can only say that, whilst such
a course has commanded my unfeigned respect, it has certainly not
diminished the attention with which I have followed their arguments.
There are two serious misapprehensions of the purpose and line of
argument of this work which I desire to correct. Some critics have
objected that, if I had succeeded in establishing the proposition
advanced in the first part, the second and third parts need not have
been written: in fact, that the historical argument against miracles is
only necessary in consequence of the failure of the philosophical. Now
I contend that the historical is the necessary complement of the
philosophical argument, and that both are equally requisite to
completeness in dealing with the subject. The preliminary affirmation
is not that miracles are impossible, but that they are antecedently
incredible. The counter allegation is that, although miracles may be
antecedently incredible, they nevertheless actually took place. It
is, therefore, necessary, not only to establish the antecedent
incredibility, but to examine the validity of the allegation that
certain miracles occurred, and this involves the historical inquiry into
the evidence for the Gospels which occupies the second and third parts.
Indeed, many will not acknowledge the case to be complete until other
witnesses are questioned in a succeeding volume.
The view I have taken is clearly supported by Mr. Mill. In his recently
published "Essays on Religion," he directly replies to the question
whether any evidence can suffice to prove a Divine Revelation, and
defines what the nature and amount of that evidence must be. He shows
that internal evidences, that is to say, the indications which the
Revelation itself is thought to furnish of its divine origin, can only
be negative. The bad moral character of the doctrines of an alleged
Revelation, he considers, may be good reason for rejecting it, "but the
excellence of their morality can never entitle us to ascribe to them a
supernatural origin: for we cannot have conclusive reason for believing
that the human faculties were incompetent to find out moral doctrines of
which the human faculties can perceive and recognise the excellence. A
Revelation, therefore," he decides, "cannot be proved divine unless by
external evidence; that is, by the exhibition of supernatural facts."(1)
He maintains that it is possible to prove the reality of a supernatural
fact if it actually occurred; and after showing the great preponderance
of evidence against miracles, or their antecedent incredibility, he
proceeds: "Against this weight of negative evidence we have to set such
positive evidence as is produced in attestation of exceptions; in other
words, the positive evidences of miracles"(2) This is precisely what I
have done. In order to show that Mr. Mill's estimate of the nature of
this positive evidence for miracles does not essentially differ from the
results of this work, the following lines may be quoted:--
"But the evidence of miracles, at least to Protestant Christians, is
not, in our day, of this cogent description. It is not the evidence
of our senses, but of witnesses, and even this not at first hand, but
resting on the attestation of books and traditions. And even in the case
of the original eye-witnesses, the supernatural facts asserted on their
alleged testimony, are not of the transcendent character supposed in our
example, about the nature of which, or the impossibility of their having
had a natural origin, there could be little room for doubt. On the
contrary, the recorded miracles are, in the first place, generally such
as it would have been extremely difficult to verify as matters of fact,
and in the next place, are hardly ever beyond the possibility of having
been brought about by human means or by the spontaneous agencies of
nature."
The second point to which I desire to refer is a statement which has
frequently been made that, in the second and third parts, I endeavour to
prove that the four canonical Gospels were not written until the end of
the second century. This error is of course closely connected with that
which has just been discussed, but it is difficult to understand how any
one who had taken the slightest trouble to ascertain the nature of the
argument, and to state it fairly, could have fallen into it. The fact
is that no attempt is made to prove anything with regard to the Gospels.
The evidence for them is merely examined, and it is found that, so far
from their affording
{viii}
sufficient testimony to warrant belief in the actual occurrence of
miracles declared to be antecedently incredible, there is not a certain
trace even of the existence of the Gospels for a century and a half
after those miracles are alleged to have occurred, and nothing whatever
to attest their authenticity and truth. This is a very different thing
from an endeavour to establish some special theory of my own, and it is
because this line of argument has not been understood, that some critics
have expressed surprise at the decisive rejection of mere conjectures
and possibilities as evidence. In a case of such importance, no
testimony which is not clear and indubitable could be of any value, but
the evidence producible for the canonical Gospels falls very far
short even of ordinary requirements, and in relation to miracles it is
scarcely deserving of serious consideration.
It has been argued that, even if there be no evidence for our special
gospels, I admit that gospels very similar must early have been in
existence, and that these equally represent the same prevailing belief
as the canonical Gospels: consequently that I merely change, without
shaking, the witnesses. Those who advance this argument, however,
totally overlook the fact that it is not the reality of the
superstitious belief which is in question, but the reality of the
miracles, and the sufficiency of the witnesses to establish them. What
such objectors urge practically amounts to this: that we should believe
in the actual occurrence of certain miracles contradictory to all
experience, out of a mass of false miracles which are reported but
never really took place, because some unknown persons in an ignorant
and superstitious age, who give no evidence of personal knowledge, or of
careful investigation, have written an account of them, and other
{ix}
persons, equally ignorant and superstitious, have believed them. I
venture to say that no one who advances the argument to which I am
referring can have realized the nature of the question at issue, and the
relation of miracles to the order of nature.
The last of these general objections to which I need now refer is the
statement, that the difficulty with regard to the Gospels commences
precisely where my examination ends, and that I am bound to explain
how, if no trace of their existence is previously discoverable, the
four Gospels are suddenly found in general circulation at the end of the
second century, and quoted as authoritative documents by such writers
as Irenaeus. My reply is that it is totally unnecessary for me to account
for this. No one acquainted with the history of pseudonymic literature
in the second century, and with the rapid circulation and ready
acceptance of spurious works tending to edification, could for a moment
regard the canonical position of any Gospel at the end of that century
either as evidence of its authenticity or early origin. That which
concerns us chiefly is not evidence regarding the end of the second but
the beginning of the first century. Even if we took the statements of
Irenaeus, and later Fathers like the Alexandrian Clement, Tertullian,
and Origen, about the Gospels, they are absolutely without value except
as personal opinion at a late date, for which no sufficient grounds are
shown. Of the earlier history of those Gospels there is not a distinct
trace, except of a nature which altogether discredits them as witnesses
for miracles.
After having carefully weighed the arguments which have been advanced
against this work, I venture to express strengthened conviction of the
truth of its conclusions.
{x}
The best and most powerful reasons which able divines and apologists
have been able to bring forward against its main argument have, I
submit, not only failed to shake it, but have, by inference, shown it
to be unassailable. Very many of those who have professedly advanced
against the citadel itself have practically attacked nothing but some
outlying fort, which was scarcely worth defence, whilst others, who
have seriously attempted an assault, have shown that the Church has no
artillery capable of making a practicable breach in the rationalistic
stronghold. I say this solely in reference to the argument which I have
taken upon myself to represent, and in no sense of my own individual
share in its maintenance.
I must now address myself more particularly to two of my critics who,
with great ability and learning, have subjected this work to the most
elaborate and microscopic criticism of which personal earnestness and
official zeal are capable. I am sincerely obliged to Professor Lightfoot
and Dr. Westcott for the minute attention they have bestowed upon my
book. I had myself directly attacked the views of Dr. Westcott, and of
course could only expect him to do his best or his worst against me in
reply; and I am not surprised at the vigour with which Dr. Lightfoot has
assailed a work so opposed to principles which he himself holds sacred,
although I may be permitted to express my regret that he has not done
so in a spirit more worthy of the cause which he defends. In spite of
hostile criticism of very unusual minuteness and ability, no flaw or
error has been pointed out which in the slightest degree affects my
main argument, and I consider that every point yet objected to by Dr.
Lightfoot, or indicated by Dr.
{xi}
Westcott, might be withdrawn without at all weakening my position. These
objections, I may say, refer solely to details, and only follow side
issues, but the attack, if impotent against the main position, has
in many cases been insidiously directed against notes and passing
references, and a plentiful sprinkling of such words as "misstatements"
and "misrepresentations" along the line may have given it a formidable
appearance, and malicious effect, which render it worth while once for
all to meet it in detail.
The first point (1) to which I shall refer is an elaborate argument
by Dr. Lightfoot regarding the "Silence of Eusebius." (2) I had called
attention to the importance of considering the silence of the Fathers,
under certain conditions;(3) and I might, omitting his curious
limitation, adopt Dr. Lightfoot's opening comment upon this as
singularly descriptive of the state of the case: "In one province more
especially, relating to the external evidences for the Gospels, silence
occupies a prominent place." Dr. Lightfoot proposes to interrogate this
"mysterious oracle," and he considers that "the response elicited
will not be at all ambiguous." I might again agree with him, but that
unambiguous response can scarcely be pronounced very satisfactory for
the Gospels. Such silence may be very eloquent, but after all it is only
the eloquence of--silence. I have not yet met with the argument anywhere
that, because none of the early Fathers quote our Canonical Gospels, or
say anything with regard to them, the fact is unambiguous
{xii}
evidence that they were well acquainted with them, and considered them
apostolic and authoritative. Dr. Lightfoot's argument from Silence is,
for the present at least, limited to Eusebius.
The point on which the argument turns is this: After examining the whole
of the extant writings of the early Fathers, and finding them a complete
blank as regards the canonical Gospels, if, by their use of apocryphal
works and other indications they are not evidence against them, I
supplement this, in the case of Hegesippus,
Papias, and Dionysius of Corinth, by the inference that, as Eusebius
does not state that their lost works contained any evidence for the
Gospels, they actually did not contain any. But before proceeding to
discuss the point, it is necessary that a proper estimate should be
formed of its importance to the main argument of my work. The evident
labour which Professor Lightfoot has expended upon the preparation of
his attack, the space devoted to it, and his own express words, would
naturally lead most readers to suppose that it has almost a vital
bearing upon my conclusions. Dr. Lightfoot says, after quoting the
passages in which I appeal to the silence of Eusebius:
"This indeed is the fundamental assumption which lies at the basis of
his reasoning; and the reader will not need to be reminded how much of
the argument falls to pieces, if this basis should prove to be unsound.
A wise master-builder would therefore have looked to his foundations
first, and assured himself of their strength, before he piled up his
fabric to this height. This our author has altogether neglected to do."
(1)
Towards the close of his article, after triumphantly expressing his
belief that his "main conclusions are irrefragable," he further says:
{xiii}
"If they are, then the reader will not fail to see how large a part of
the argument in 'Supernatural Religion' has crumbled to pieces." (1)
I do not doubt that Dr. Lightfoot sincerely believes this, but he must
allow me to say that he is thoroughly mistaken in his estimate of
the importance of the point, and that, as regards this work, the
representations made in the above passages are a very strange
exaggeration. I am unfortunately too familiar, in connection with
criticism on this book, with instances of vast expenditure of time and
strength in attacking points to which I attach no importance whatever,
and which in themselves have scarcely any value. When writers, after
an amount of demonstration which must have conveyed the impression that
vital interests were at stake, have, at least in their own opinion,
proved that I have omitted to dot an "i," cross a "t," or insert an
inverted comma, they have really left the question precisely where it
was. Now, in the present instance, the whole extent of the argument
which is based upon the silence of Eusebius is an inference regarding
some lost works of three writers only, which might altogether be
withdrawn without affecting the case. The object of my investigation is
to discover what evidence actually exists in the works of early writers
regarding our Gospels. In the fragments which remain of the works of
three writers, Hegesippus, Papias, and Dionysius of Corinth, I do
not find any evidence of acquaintance with these Gospels,--the works
mentioned by Papias being, I contend, different from the existing
Gospels attributed to Matthew and Mark. Whether I am right or not in
this does not affect the present discussion. It is an unquestioned fact
that Eusebius does not mention that the lost works of these
{xiv}
writers contained any reference to, or information about, the Gospels,
nor have we any statement from any other author to that effect. The
objection of Dr. Lightfoot is limited to a denial that the silence of
Eusebius warrants the inference that, because he does not state that
these writers made quotations from or references to undisputed canonical
books, the lost works did not contain any; it does not, however, extend
to interesting information regarding those books, which he admits it was
the purpose of Eusebius to record. To give Dr. Lightfoot's statements,
which I am examining, the fullest possible support, however, suppose
that I abandon Eusebius altogether, and do not draw any inference of any
kind from him beyond his positive statements, how would my case
stand? Simply as complete as it well could be: Hegesippus, Papias, and
Dionysius do not furnish any evidence in favour of the Gospels. The
reader, therefore, will not fail to see how serious a misstatement
Dr. Lightfoot has made, and how little the argument of "Supernatural
Religion" would be affected even if he established much more than he has
attempted to do.
We may now proceed to consider Dr. Lightfoot's argument itself. He
carefully and distinctly defines what he understands to be the declared
intention of Eusebius in composing his history, as regards the mention
or use of the disputed and undisputed canonical books in the writings of
the Fathers, and in order to do him full justice I will quote his words,
merely taking the liberty, for facility of reference, of dividing his
statement into three paragraphs. He says:
"Eusebius therefore proposes to treat these two classes of writings in
two different ways. This is the cardinal point of the passage.
{xv}
(1) Of the Antilegomena he pledges himself to record when any ancient
writer employs any book belonging to their class [--Greek--];
(2) but as regards the undisputed Canonical books he only professes
to mention them, when such a writer has something to tell about them
[--Greek--]. Any anecdote of interest respecting them, as also respecting
the others [--Greek--], will be recorded.
(3) But in their case he nowhere leads us to expect that he will allude
to mere quotations however numerous and however precise."(1)
In order to dispose of the only one of these points upon which we can
differ, I will first refer to the third. Did Eusebius intend to point
out mere quotations of the books which he considered undisputed"? As
a matter of fact, he actually did point such out in the case of the 1st
Epistle of Peter and 1st Epistle of John, which he repeatedly and in the
most emphatic manner declared to be undisputed.(2) This is admitted by
Dr. Lightfoot. That he omitted to mention a reference to the Epistle to
the Corinthians in the Epistle of Clement of Rome, or the reference by
Theophilus to the Gospel of John, and other supposed quotations, might
be set down as much to oversight as intention. On the other hand, that
he did mention disputed books is evidence only that he not only pledged
himself to do so, but actually fulfilled his promise. Although much
might be said upon this point, therefore, I consider it of so little
importance that I do not intend to waste time in minutely discussing it.
If my assertions with regard to the silence of Eusebius likewise include
the supposition that he proposed to mention mere quotations of the
"undisputed" books, they are so far from limited to this very subsidiary
testimony that I
2 I regret very much that some ambiguity in my language (S.
R., i. p. 483) should have misled, and given Dr. Lightfoot
much trouble. I used the word "quotation" in the sense of a
use of the Epistle of Peter, and not in reference to any one
sentence in Polycarp. I trust that in this edition I have
made my meaning clear.
{xvi}
should have no reluctance in waiving it altogether. Even if the most
distinct quotations of this kind had occurred in the lost works of the
three writers in question, they could have proved nothing beyond the
mere existence of the book quoted, at the time that work was written,
but would have done nothing to establish its authenticity and
trustworthiness. In the evidential destitution of the Gospels,
apologists would thankfully have received even such vague indications,
indeed there is scarcely any other evidence, but something much more
definite is required to establish the reality of miracles and Divine
Revelation. If this point be, for the sake of argument, set aside,
what is the position? We are not entitled to infer that there were no
quotations from the Gospels in the works of Hegesippus, Papias, and
Dionysius of Corinth, because Eusebius does not record them; but, on the
other hand, we are still less entitled to infer that there were any.
The only inference which I care to draw from the silence of Eusebius is
precisely that which Dr. Lightfoot admits that, both from his promise
and practice, I am entitled to deduce: when any ancient writer "has
something to _tell about_" the Gospels, "any _anecdote_ of interest
respecting them," Eusebius will record it. This is the only information
of the slightest value to this work which could be looked for in these
writers. So far, therefore, from producing the destructive effect upon
some of the arguments of "Supernatural Religion," upon which he somewhat
prematurely congratulates himself, Dr. Lightfoot's elaborate and learned
article on the silence of Eusebius supports them in the most conclusive
manner.
{xvii}
Before proceeding to speak more directly of the three writers under
discussion, it may be well to glance a little at the procedure of
Eusebius, and note, for those who care to go more closely into the
matter, how he fulfils his promise to record what the Fathers have to
tell about the Gospels. I may mention, in the first place, that Eusebius
states what he himself knows of the composition of the Gospels and
other canonical works.(1) Upon two occasions he quotes the account which
Clement of Alexandria gives of the composition of Mark's Gospel, and
also cites his statements regarding the other Gospels.(2) In like manner
he records the information, such as it is, which Irenaeus has to impart
about the four Gospels and other works,(3) and what Origen has to say
concerning them.(4) Interrogating extant works, we find in fact that
Eusebius does not neglect to quote anything useful or interesting
regarding these books from early writers. Dr. Lightfoot says that
Eusebius "restricts himself to the narrowest limits which justice to his
subject will allow," and he illustrates this by the case of Irenaeus. He
says: "Though he (Eusebius) gives the principal passage in this author
relating to the Four Gospels (Irenaeus, Ady. ILer. iii. 1, 1) he omits
to mention others which contain interesting statements directly or
indirectly affecting the question, e.g. that St. John wrote his Gospel
to counteract the errors of Cerinthus and the Nicolaitans (Irenaeus,
Adv. Haer. iii. 11, 1)." I must explain, however, that the "interesting
statement" omitted, which is not in the context of the part quoted, is
not advanced as information derived from any authority, but only in the
course of argument, and there is nothing to distinguish it from mere
personal opinion, so that on this ground Eusebius may well have passed
it over. Dr. Lightfoot farther says: "Thus too when he quotes a few
lines alluding to the unanimous tradition of the Asiatic Elders who were
acquainted with St. John,(6) he omits the context, from which we find
that this tradition had an important bearing on the authenticity of
the fourth Gospel, for it declared that Christ's ministry extended much
beyond a single year, thus confirming the obvious chronology of the
Fourth Gospel against the apparent chronology of the Synoptists."(7)
Nothing, however, could be further from the desire or intention of
Eusebius than to represent any discordance between the Gospels, or to
support the one at the expense of the others. On the contrary, he
enters into an elaborate explanation in order to show that there is no
discrepancy between them, affirming, and supporting his view by singular
quotations, that it was evidently the intention of the three Synoptists
only to write the doings of the Lord for one year after
{xviii}
the imprisonment of John the Baptist, and that John, having the other
Gospels before him, wrote an account of the period not embraced by the
other evangelists.(1) Moreover, the extraordinary assertions of Irenaeus
not only contradict the Synoptics, but also the Fourth Gospel, and
Eusebius certainly could not have felt much inclination to quote such
opinions, even although Irenaeus seemed to base them upon traditions
handed down by the Presbyters who were acquainted with John.
It being then admitted that Eusebius not only pledges himself to record
when any ancient writer has something to "tell about" the undisputed
canonical books, but that, judged by the test of extant writings which
we can examine, he actually does so, let us sec the conclusions which we
are entitled to draw in the case of the only three writers with regard
to whom I have inferred anything from the "silence of Eusebius."
I need scarcely repeat that Eusebius held Hegesippus in very high
estimation. He refers to him very frequently, and he clearly shows that
he not only valued, but was intimately acquainted with, his writings.
Eusebius quotes from the work of Hegesippus a very long account of the
martyrdom of James;(2) he refers to Hegesippus as his authority for
the statement that Simeon was a cousin [--Greek--] of Jesus, Cleophas his
father being, according to that author, the brother of Joseph;(3)
he confirms a passage in the Epistle of Clement by reference to
Hegesippus;(4) he quotes from Hegesippus a story regarding some members
of the family of Jesus, of the race of David, who were brought before
Domitian;(5) he cites his narrative of the martyrdom of Simeon, together
with other matters concerning the early Church;(6) in another place he
gives a laudatory account of Hegesippus and his writings;(7) shortly
after, he refers to the
{xix}
statement of Hegesippus that he was in Rome until the episcopate of
Eleutherus,(1) and further speaks in praise of his work, mentions his
observation on the Epistle of Clement, and quotes his remarks about the
Church in Corinth, the succession of Roman bishops, the general state of
the Church, the rise of heresies, and other matters.(3) I mention these
numerous references to Hegesippus as I have noticed them in turning over
the pages of Eusebius, but others may very probably have escaped me.
Eusebius fulfils his pledge, and states what disputed works were used by
Hegesippus and what he said about them, and one of these was the Gospel
according to the Hebrews. He does not, however, record a single remark
of any kind regarding our Gospels, and the legitimate inference, and it
is the only one I care to draw, is, that Hegesippus did not say anything
about them. I may simply add that, as Eusebius quotes the account of
Matthew and Mark from Papias, a man of whom he expresses something like
contempt, and again refers to him in confirmation of the statement of
the Alexandrian Clement regarding the composition of Mark's Gospel,(3)
it would be against all reason, as well as opposed to his pledge and
general practice, to suppose that Eusebius would have omitted to record
any information given by Hegesippus, a writer with whom he was so well
acquainted, and of whom he speaks with so much respect.
I have said that Eusebius would more particularly have quoted anything
with regard to the Fourth Gospel, and for those who care to go more
closely into the point my reasons may be briefly given. No one can read
Eusebius attentively without noting the peculiar care with which he
speaks of John and his writings, and the substantially apologetic tone
which he adopts in regard to them. Apart from any doubts expressed
{xx}
regarding the Gospel itself, the controversy as to the authenticity of
the Apocalypse and second and third Epistles called by his name, with
which Eusebius was so well acquainted, and the critical dilemma as to
the impossibility of the same John having written both the Gospel and
Apocalypse, regarding which he so fully quotes the argument of Dionysius
of Alexandria,(1) evidently made him peculiarly interested in the
subject, and his attention to the fourth Gospel was certainly not
diminished by his recognition of the essential difference between that
work and the three Synoptics. The first occasion on which he speaks of
John, he records the tradition that he was banished to Patmos during
the persecution under Domitian, and refers to the Apocalypse. He quotes
Irenaeus in support of this tradition, and the composition of the work at
the close of Domitian's reign.(3) He goes on to speak of the persecution
under Domitian, and quotes Hegesippus as to a command given by that
Emperor to slay all the posterity of David,(3) as also Tertullian's
account,(4) winding up his extracts from the historians of the time by
the statement that, after Nerva succeeded Domitian, and the Senate had
revoked the cruel decrees of the latter, the Apostle John returned from
exile in Patmos and, according to ecclesiastical tradition, settled
at Ephesus.(5) He states that John, the beloved disciple, apostle and
evangelist, governed the Churches of Asia after the death of Domitian
and his return from Patmos, and that he was still living when Trajan
succeeded Nerva, and for the truth of this he quotes passages from
Iremeus and Clement of Alexandria.(6) He then gives an account of
the writings of John, and whilst asserting that the Gospel must be
universally acknowledged as genuine, he says that it is rightly put
last in order amongst the four, of the composition of which he gives an
elaborate description. It is not necessary to quote his account of the
fourth Gospel and of the occasion of its composition, which he states
to have been John's receiving the other three Gospels, and, whilst
admitting their truth, perceiving that they did not contain a narrative
of the earlier history of Christ. For this reason, being entreated to
do so, he wrote an account of the doings of Jesus before the Baptist was
cast into prison. After some very extraordinary reasoning, Eusebius says
that no one who carefully considers the points he mentions can think
that the Gospels are at variance with each other, and he conjectures
that John probably omitted the genealogies because Matthew and Luke
had given them.(7) Without further anticipating what I have to say when
speaking of Papias, it is clear, I think, that Eusebius, being aware
of, and interested in, the peculiar difficulties connected with the
writings attributed to John, not to put a still stronger case, and
quoting traditions from later and consequently less weighty authorities,
would certainly have recorded with more special readiness any
information on the subject given by Hegesippus, whom he so frequently
lays under contribution, had his writings contained any.
{xxi}
In regard to Papias the case is still clearer. We find that Eusebius
quotes his account of the composition of Gospels by Matthew and Mark,(1)
although he had already given a closely similar narrative regarding Mark
from Clement of Alexandria, and appealed to Papias in confirmation of
it. Is it either possible or permissible to suppose that, had Papias
known anything of the other two Gospels, he would not have inquired
about them from the Presbyters and recorded their information? And is
it either possible or permissible to suppose that if Papias had recorded
any similar information regarding the composition of the third and
fourth Gospels, Eusebius would have omitted to quote it? Certainly not;
and Dr. Lightfoot's article proves it. Eusebius had not only pledged
himself to give such information, and does so in every case which we can
test, but he fulfils it by actually quoting what Papias had to say about
the Gospels. Even if he had been careless, his very reference to the
first two Gospels must have reminded him of the claims of the rest.
There are, however, special reasons which render it still more certain
that had Papias had anything to tell about the Fourth Gospel,--and if
there was a Fourth Gospel in his knowledge he must have had something
to tell about it,--Eusebius would have recorded it. The first quotation
which he makes from Papias is the passage in which the Bishop of
Hierapolis states the interest with which he had inquired about the
words of the Presbyters, "what John or Matthew or what any other of the
disciples of the Lord said, and what Aristion and the Presbyter John,
disciples of the Lord,
1 I am much obliged to Dr. Lightfoot for calling my
attention to the accidental insertion of the words "and
the Apocalypse" (S. E. i. p. 433). This was a mere slip
of the pen, of which no use is made, and the error is
effectually corrected by my own distinct statements. VOL. I.
{xxii}
say."(l) Eusebius observes, and particularly points out, that the name
of John is twice mentioned in the passage, the former, mentioned with
Peter, James, and Matthew, and other Apostles, evidently being, he
thinks, the Evangelist, and the latter being clearly distinguished by
the designation of Presbyter. Eusebius states that this proves the truth
of the assertion that there were two men of the name of John in Asia,
and that two tombs were still shown at Ephesus bearing the name of John.
Eusebius then proceeds to argue that probably the second of the two
Johns, if not the first, was the man who saw the Revelation. What an
occasion for quoting any information bearing at all on the subject from
Papias, who had questioned those who had been acquainted with both!
His attention is so pointedly turned to John at the very moment when
he makes his quotations regarding Matthew and Mark, that I am fully
warranted, both by the conclusions of Dr. Lightfoot and the peculiar
circumstances of the case, in affirming that the silence of Eusebius
proves that Papias said nothing about either the third or fourth
Gospels.
I need not go on to discuss Dionysius of Corinth, for the same reasoning
equally applies to his case. I have, therefore, only a very few more
words to say on the subject of Eusebius. Not content with what he
intended to be destructive criticism, Dr. Lightfoot valiantly proceeds
to the constructive and, "as a sober deduction from facts," makes
the following statement, which he prints in italics: _"The silence of
Eusebius_ respecting early witnesses to the Fourth Gospel is an evidence
in its favour."(2) Now, interpreted even by the rules laid down
(xxiii)
by Dr. Lightfoot himself, what does this silence really mean? It means,
not that the early writers about whom he is supposed to be silent are
witnesses about anything connected with the Fourth Gospel, but simply
that if Eusebius noticed and did not record the mere use of that Gospel
by any one, he thereby indicates that he himself, in the fourth century,
classed it amongst the undisputed books, the mere use of which he does
not undertake to mention. The value of his opinion at so late a date is
very small.
Professor Lightfoot next makes a vehement attack upon me in connection
with "The Ignatian Epistles,"(1) which is equally abortive and limited
to details. I do not intend to complain of the spirit in which the
article is written, nor of its unfairness. On the whole I think that
readers may safely be left to judge of the tone in which a controversy
is carried on. Unfortunately, however, the perpetual accusation of
mis-statement brought against me in this article, and based upon minute
criticism into which few care to follow, is apt to leave the impression
that it is well-founded, for there is the very natural feeling in most
right minds that no one would recklessly scatter such insinuations. It
is this which alone makes such an attack dangerous. Now in a work like
this, dealing with so many details, it must be obvious that it is not
possible altogether to escape errors. A critic or opponent is of course
entitled to point these out, although, if he be high-minded or even
alive to his own interests, I scarcely think that he will do so in a
spirit of unfair detraction. But in doing this a writer is bound to be
accurate, for if he be liberal of such accusations
{xxiv}
and it can be shown that his charges are unfounded, they recoil with
double force upon himself. I propose, therefore, as it is impossible for
me to reply to all such attacks, to follow Professor Lightfoot and Dr.
Westcott with some minuteness in their discussion of my treatment of the
Ignatian Epistles, and once for all to show the grave mis-statements to
which they commit themselves.
Dr. Lightfoot does not ignore the character of the discussion upon which
he enters, but it will be seen that his appreciation of its difficulty
by no means inspires him with charitable emotions. He says: "The
Ignatian question is the most perplexing which confronts the student
of earlier Christian history. The literature is voluminous; the
considerations involved are very wide, very varied, and very intricate.
A writer, therefore, may well be pardoned if he betrays a want of
familiarity with this subject But in this case the reader naturally
expects that the opinions at which he has arrived will be stated with
some diffidence."(1) My critic objects that I express my opinions with
decision. I shall hereafter justify this decision, but I would here
point out that the very reasons which render it difficult for Dr.
Lightfoot to form a final and decisive judgment on the question make it
easy for me. It requires but little logical perception to recognize that
Epistles, the authenticity of which it is so difficult to establish,
cannot have much influence as testimony for the Gospels. The statement
just quoted, however, is made the base of the attack, and war is
declared in the following terms:--
{xxv}
"The reader is naturally led to think that a writer would not use such
very decided language unless he had obtained a thorough mastery of his
subject; and when he finds the notes thronged with references to the
most recondite sources of information, he at once credits the author
with an 'exhaustive' knowledge of the literature bearing upon it. It
becomes important therefore to inquire whether the writer shows that
accurate acquaintance with the subject, which justifies us in attaching
weight to his dicta as distinguished from his arguments."(l)
This sentence shows the scope of the discussion. My dicta, however, play
a very subordinate part throughout, and even if no weight be attached to
them, and I have never desired that any should be, my argument would not
be in the least degree affected.
The first point attacked, like most of those subsequently assailed, is
one of mere critical history. I wrote: "The strongest internal, as well
as other evidence, into which space forbids our going in detail, has led
(1) the majority of critics to recognize the Syriac version as the most
genuine form of the letters of Ignatius extant, and (2) this is admitted
by most of those who nevertheless deny the authenticity of any of the
epistles."(2)
Upon this Dr. Lightfoot remarks:--
"No statement could be more erroneous as a summary of the results of the
Ignatian controversy since the publication of the Syriac epistles than
this."(1)
It will be admitted that this is pretty "decided language" for one
who is preaching "diffidence." When we come to details, however, Dr.
Lightfoot admits: "Those who maintain the genuineness of the Ignatian
Epistles in one or other of the two forms, may be said to be almost
evenly divided on this question of priority." He seems to consider
that he sufficiently shows this when he mentions five or six critics on
either side; but even
{xxvi}
on this modified interpretation of my statement its correctness may
be literally maintained. To the five names quoted as recognizing the
priority of the Syriac Epistles may be added those of Milman, Boehringer,
De Pressense, and Dr. Tregelles, which immediately occur to me. But I
must ask upon what ground he limits my remark to those who absolutely
admit the genuineness? I certainly do not so limit it, but affirm that a
majority prefer the three Curetonian Epistles, and that this majority
is made up partly of those who, denying the authenticity of any of the
letters, still consider the Syriac the purest and least adulterated form
of the Epistles. This will be evident to any one who reads the context.
With regard to the latter (2) part of the sentence, I will at once say
that "most" is a slip of the pen for "many," which I correct in this
edition. Many of those who deny or do not admit the authenticity prefer
the Curetonian version. The Tubingen school are not unanimous on
the point, and there are critics who do not belong to it. Bleek, for
instance, who does not commit himself to belief, considers the priority
of the Curetonian "im hoechsten Grade wahrscheinlich.,, Volkmar, Lipsius,
and Rumpf prefer them. Dr. Light-foot says:--
"The case of Lipsius is especially instructive, as illustrating this
point. Having at one time maintained the priority and genuineness of
the Curetonian letters, he has lately, if I rightly understand him,
retracted his former opinion on both questions alike."(2)
Dr. Lightfoot, however, has not rightly understood him. Lipsius has only
withdrawn his opinion that the Syriac letters are authentic, but
whilst now asserting that in all their forms the Ignatian Epistles are
spurious, he still
{xxvii}
maintains the priority of the Curetonian version. He first announced
this change of view emphatically in 1873, when he added: "An dem
relativ grossern Alter der syrischen Textgestalt gegenuber der kuerzeren
griechischen
halte ich ubrigens nach wie vor fest"(1) In the very paper to which Dr.
Lightfoot refers Lipsius also again says quite distinctly: "Ich bin
noch jetzt ueberzeugt, dass der Syrer in zahlreichen Fallen den relativ
urspruenglichsten Text bewahrt hat (vgl. meine Nachweise in Niedner's
Zeitschr. S. 15fl)."(2) With regard to the whole of this (2) point, it
must be remembered that the only matter in question is simply a shade
of opinion amongst critics who deny the authenticity of the Ignatian
Epistles in all forms.
Dr. Lightfoot, however, goes on "to throw some light on this point" by
analysing my "general statement of the course of opinion on this subject
given in an earlier passage."(3) The "light" which he throws seems to
pass through so peculiar a medium, that I should be much rather tempted
to call it darkness. I beg the reader to favour me with his attention to
this matter, for here commences a serious attack upon the accuracy of
my notes and statements, which is singularly full of error and
misrepresentation. The general statement referred to and quoted is as
follows:--
"Those three Syriac epistles hive been subjected to the severest
scrutiny, and many of the ablest critics have pronounced them to be the
only authentic Epistles of Ignatius, whilst others, who do not admit
that even these are genuine letters emanating from Ignatius, still
prefer them to the version of seven Greek epistles, and consider them
the most ancient form of the letters which we possess.(1) As early as
the sixteenth century, however, the strongest doubts were expressed
regarding the authenticity
{xxviii}
of any of the epistles ascribed to Ignatius. The Magdeburg Centuriators
first attacked them, and Calvin declared (p. 260) them to be
spurious,(1) an opinion fully shared by Chemnitz, Dallseus, and others,
and similar doubts, more or less definite, were expressed throughout
the seventeenth century,(2) and onward to comparatively recent times,(3)
although the means of forming a judgment were not then so complete as
now. That the epistles were interpolated there was no doubt. Fuller
examination and more comprehensive knowledge of the subject have
confirmed earlier doubts, and a large mass of critics recognize that the
authenticity of none of these epistles can be established, and that they
can only be considered later and spurious compositions.(4)"(1)
In the first note (1) on p. 259 I referred to Bunsen, Bleek, Boehringer,
Cureton, Ewald, Lipsius, Milman, Ritschl, and Weiss, and Dr. Lightfoot
proceeds to analyze my statements as follows: and I at once put his
explanation and my text in parallel columns, italicising parts of both
to call more immediate attention to the point:--
The Text. Many of the ablest critics have pronounced them to be the only
authentic Epistles of Ignatius, whilst others who do not admit that even
these are genuine letters emanating from Ignatius, still prefer them to
the version of seven Greek Epistles, and consider them the most ancient
form of the letters which we possess.(1)
Dr. Lightfoot's Statement.
"These references, it will be observed, are given to illustrate more
immediately, though perhaps not solely, the statement that writers
'who do not admit that even these (the Curetonian Epistles) are genuine
letters emanating from Ignatius, still prefer them to the version of
seven Greek Epistles, and consider them the most ancient form of the
letters which we possess.'"(2)
It must be evident to any one who reads the context(3) that in this
sentence I am stating opinions expressed in favour of the Curetonian
Epistles, and that the note, which is naturally put at the end of that
sentence, must be intended to represent this favourable opinion, whether
of those who absolutely maintain the authenticity or
{xxix}
merely the relative priority. Dr. Lightfoot quietly suppresses, in his
comments, the main statement of the text which the note illustrates, and
then "throws light" upon the point by the following remarks:--
Dr. Lightfoot's Statement:
"The reader, therefore, will hardly be prepared to hear that not one
of these nine writers condemns the Ignatian letters as spurious. Bleek
alone leaves the matter in some uncertainty while inclining to Bunsen's
view; the other eight distinctly maintain the genuineness of the
Curetonian letters."'
The Truth:
Cureton, Bunsen, Boehringer, Ewald, Milman, Ritschl, and Weiss maintain
both the priority and genuineness of the Syriac Epistles. Bleek will not
commit himself to a distinct recognition of the letters in any form. Of
the Vossian Epistles, he says: "Aber auch die Echtheit dieser Recension
ist keineswegs sicher." He considers the priority of the Curetonian "in
the highest degree probable."
Lipsius rejects all the Epistles, as I have already said, but maintains
the priority of the Syriac.
Dr. Lightfoot's statement, therefore, is a total misrepresentation of
the facts, and of that mischievous kind which does most subtle injury.
Not one reader in twenty would take the trouble to investigate, but
would receive from such positive assertions an impression that my note
was totally wrong, when in fact it is literally correct.
Continuing his analysis, Dr. Lightfoot fights almost every inch of the
ground in the very same style. He cannot contradict my statement that
so early as the sixteenth century the strongest doubts were expressed
regarding the authenticity of any of the Epistles ascribed
1 "Contemporary Beview," February, 1875, p. 342. In a note Dr. Lightfoot
states that my references to Lipsius are to his earlier works, where he
still maintains the priority and genuineness of the Curetonian Epistles.
Certainly they are so, but in the right place, two pages farther on, I
refer to the writings in which he rejects the authenticity, whilst still
maintaining his previous view of the priority of these letters
{xxx}
to Ignatius, and that the Magdeburg Centuriators attacked them, and
Calvin declared them to be spurious,(1) but Dr. Lightfoot says: "The
criticisms of Calvin more especially refer to those passages which were
found in the Long Recension alone."(2) Of course only the Long Recension
was at that time known. Rivet replies to Campianus that Calvin's
objections were not against Ignatius but the Jesuits who had corrupted
him.(3) This is the usual retort theological, but as I have quoted the
words of Calvin the reader may judge for himself. Dr. Lightfoot then
says:
"The clause which follows contains a direct misstatement. Chemnitz did
not folly share the opinion that they were spurious; on the contrary, he
quotes them several times as authoritative; but he says that they 'seem
to have been altered in many places to strengthen the position of the
Papal power, do.' "(4)
Pearson's statement here quoted must be received with reserve, for
Chemnitz rather speaks sarcastically of those who quote these Epistles
as evidence. In treating them as ancient documents or speaking of parts
of them with respect, Chemnitz does nothing more than the Magdeburg
Centuriators, but this is a very different thing from directly ascribing
them to Ignatius himself. The Epistles in the "Long Recension" were
before Chemnitz both in the Latin and Greek forms. He says of them:
".... et multas habent non contemnendas sententias, presertim sicut
Graece leguntur. Admixta vero sunt et alia non pauca, quae profecto non
referunt gravitatem Apostolicam.
1 Calvin's expressions are: Nihil moniis illis, quro sub
Ignatii nomine editae sunt, putidius. Quo minus tolerabilis
est eorum impudentia, qui talibus larvis ad fallendum se
instruunt. Inst. Chr. Bel. i. 13, p39.
{xxxi}
Adulteratas enim jam esse illas epistolas, vel inde colligitur." He
then shows that quotations in ancient writers purporting to be taken
from the Epistles of Ignatius are not found in these extant epistles at
all, and says: "De Epistolis igitur illis Ignatii, quae nunc ejus titulo
feruntur, merito dubitamus: transformatse enim videntur in multis locis,
ad stabiliendum statum regni Pontificii."(l) Even when he speaks in
favour of them he "damns them with faint praise." The whole of the
discussion turns upon the word "fully", and is an instance of the
minute criticism of my critic, who evidently is not directly acquainted
with Chemnitz. A shade more or less of doubt or certainty in conveying
the impression received from the words of a writer is scarcely worth
much indignation.
Dr. Lightfoot makes a very detailed attack upon my next two notes,
and here again I must closely follow him. My note (2) p. 260 reads as
follows:--
"2 By Bochartus, Aubertin, Blondel, Basnage, Casaubon, Cocus, Humfrey,
Rivetus, Salmasius, Socinus (Faustus), Parker, Petau, &c; &c.; cf.
Jacobson, Patr. Apost., i. p. jolt.; Cureton Vindiciae Ignatianae, 1846,
appendix."
Upon this Dr. Lightfoot makes the following preliminary remarks:
"But the most important point of all is the purpose for which they are
quoted. 'Similar doubts' could only, I think, be interpreted from the
context as doubts 'regarding the authenticity of any of the Epistles
ascribed to Ignatius.'"(2)
As Dr. Lightfoot, in the first sentence just quoted, recognizes what
is "the most important point of all," it is a pity that, throughout
the whole of the subsequent analysis of the references in question, he
persistently ignores my
{xxxii}
very careful definition of "the purpose for which they are quoted." It
is difficult, without entering into minute classifications, accurately
to represent in a few words the opinions of a great number of writers,
and briefly convey a fair idea of the course of critical judgment.
Desirous, therefore, of embracing a large class,--for both this note and
the next, with mere difference of epoch, illustrate the same statement
in the text,--and not to overstate the case on my own side, I used what
seemed to me a very moderate phrase, decreasing the force of the
opinion of those who positively rejected the Epistles, and not unfairly
representing the hesitation of those who did not fully accept them.
I said, then, in guarded terms,--and I italicise the part which Dr.
Lightfoot chooses to suppress,--that "similar _doubts, more or less
definite_," were expressed by the writers referred to.
Dr. Lightfoot admits that Bochart directly condemns one Epistle, and
would probably have condemned the rest also; that Aubertin, Blondel,
Basnage, R. Parker, and Saumaise actually rejected all; and that Cook
pronounces them "either supposititious or shamefully corrupted." So
far, therefore, there can be no dispute. I will now take the rest in
succession. Dr. Lightfoot says that Humfrey "considers that they have
been interpolated and mutilated, but he believes them genuine in the
main." Dr. Google has so completely warped the statement in the text,
that he seems to demand nothing short of a total condemnation of the
Epistles in the note, but had I intended to say that Humfrey and all of
these writers definitely rejected the whole of the Epistles I should not
have limited myself to merely saying that they expressed "doubts more
or less definite," which Humfrey does. Dr. Lightfoot says that Socinus
"denounces corruptions and
{xxxiii}
anachronisms, but so far as I can see does not question a nucleus of
genuine matter." His very denunciations, however, are certainly the
expression of "doubts, more or less definite." "Casaubon, so far from
rejecting them altogether," Dr. Lightfoot says, "promises to defend the
antiquity of some of the Epistles with new arguments." But I have never
affirmed that he "rejected them altogether." Casaubon died before he
fulfilled the promise referred to, so that we cannot determine what
arguments he might have used. I must point out, however, that the
antiquity does not necessarily involve the authenticity of a document.
With regard to Rivet the case is different I had overlooked the fact
that in a subsequent edition of the work referred to, after receiving
Archbishop Ushers edition of the Short Recension, he had given his
adhesion to "that form of the Epistles."(1) This fact is also mentioned
by Pearson, and I ought to have observed it.(2) Petau, the last of the
writers referred to, says: "Equidem haud abnuerim epistolas illius varie
interpolatas et quibusdam additis mutatas, ac depravatas fuisse: turn
aliquas esse supposititias: verum nullas omnino ab Ignatio Epistolas
esse scriptas, id vero nimium temere affirmari sentio." He then goes
on to mention the recent publication of the Vossian Epistles and the
version of Usher, and the learned Jesuit Father has no more decided
opinion to express than: "ut haec prudens, ac justa suspicio sit, illas
esse genuinas Ignatii epistolas, quas antiquorum consensus illustribus
testimoniis commendatas ac approbatas reliquit"(3)
The next note (3), p. 260, was only separated from the
{xxxiv}
preceding for convenience of reference, and Dr. Lightfoot quotes and
comments upon it as follows:
"The next note, p. 260, is as follows:--(See scanned page. Ed.)
The brackets are not the author's, but my own.
This is doubtless one of those exhibitions of learning which have made
such a deep impression on the reviewers. Certainly, as it stands, this
note suggests a thorough acquaintance with all the by-paths of the
Ignatian literature, and seems to represent the gleanings of many years'
reading. It is important to observe, however, that every one of these
references, except those which I have included in brackets, is given in
the appendix to Cureton's _Vindicia Ignatianae_, where the passages are
quoted in full. Thus two-thirds of this elaborate note might have been
compiled in ten minutes. Our author has here and there transposed
the order of the quotations, and confused it by so doing, for it is
chronological in Cureton. But what purpose was served by thus importing
into his notes a mass of borrowed and unsorted references? And, if he
thought fit to do so, why was the key-reference to Cureton buried among
the rest, so that it stands in immediate connection with some additional
references on which it has no bearing?"(1)
I do not see any special virtue in the amount of time which might
suffice, under some circumstances, to compile a note, although it is
here advanced as an important
{xxxv}
point to observe, but I call attention to the unfair spirit in which
Dr. Lightfoot's criticisms are made. I ask every just-minded reader to
consider what right any critic has to insinuate, if not directly to
say, that, because some of the references in a note are also given by
Cureton, I simply took them from him, and thus "imported into my notes a
mass of borrowed and unsorted references," and further to insinuate
that I "here and there transposed the order" apparently to conceal
the source? This is a kind of criticism which I very gladly relinquish
entirely to my high-minded and reverend opponent. Now, as full
quotations are given in Cureton's appendix, I should have been perfectly
entitled to take references from it, had I pleased, and for the
convenience of many readers I distinctly indicate Cureton's work, in the
note, as a source to be compared. The fact is, however, that I did not
take the references from Cureton, but in every case derived them from
the works themselves, and if the note "seems to represent the gleanings
of many years' reading," it certainly does not misrepresent the fact,
for I took the trouble to make myself acquainted with the "by-paths of
Ignatian literature." Now in analysing the references in this note it
must be borne in mind that they illustrate the statement that "_doubts,
more or less definite_" continued to be expressed regarding the Ignatian
Epistles. I am much obliged to Dr. Lightfoot for drawing my attention to
Wotton. His name is the first in the note, and it unfortunately was the
last in a list on another point in my note-book, immediately preceding
this one, and was by mistake included in it. I also frankly give up
Weismann, whose doubts I find I had exaggerated, and proceed to examine
Dr. Lightfoot's further statements. He says that Thiersch
{xxxvi}
uses the Curetonian as genuine, and that his only doubt is whether
he ought not to accept the Vossian. Thiersch, however, admits that he
cannot quote either the seven or the three Epistles as genuine. He says
distinctly: "These three Syriac Epistles lie under the suspicion that
they are not an older text, but merely an epitome of the seven, for the
other notes found in the same MS. seem to be excerpts. But on the other
hand, the doubts regarding the genuineness of the seven Epistles, in the
form in which they are known since Usher's time, are not yet entirely
removed. For no MS. has yet been found which contains _only_ the seven
Epistles attested by Eusebius, a MS. such as lay before Eusebius."(1)
Thiersch, therefore, does express "doubts, more or less definite." Dr.
Light-foot then continues: "Of the rest a considerable number, as, for
instance, Lardner, Beausobre, Schroeckh, Griesbach,
Kestner, Neander, and Baumgarten-Crusius, _with different degrees of
certainty or uncertainty_, pronounce themselves in favour of a genuine
nucleus."(2) The words which I have italicised are a mere paraphrase of
my words descriptive of the doubts entertained. I must point out that
a leaning towards belief in a genuine "nucleus" on the part of some of
these writers, by no means excludes the expression of "_doubts, more or
less definite_," which is all I quote them for. I will take each name in
order.
_Lardner_ says: "But whether the smaller (Vossian Epistles) themselves
are the genuine writings of Ignatius, bishop of Antioch, is a question
that has been much disputed, and has employed the pens of the ablest
critics. And whatever positiveness some may have
{xxxvii}
shown on either side, I must own I have found it a very difficult
question." The opinion which he expresses finally is merely: "it appears
to me _probable_, that they are _for the main_ the genuine epistles
of Ignatius." _Beausobre_ says: "Je ne veux, ni defendre, ni combattre
l'authenticite' des _Lettres de St. Ignace_. Si elles ne sont pas
veritables, elles ne laissent pas d'etre fort anciennes; et l'opinion,
qui me paroit la plus raisonnable, est que les plus pures ont ete
inter-poises."
_Schroeckh_ says that along with the favourable considerations for
the shorter (Vossian) Epistles "many doubts arise which make them
suspicious." He proceeds to point out many grave difficulties, and
anachronisms which cast doubt both on individual epistles and upon the
whole, and he remarks that a very common way of evading these and
other difficulties is to affirm that all the passages which cannot be
reconciled with the mode of thought of Ignatius are interpolations of
a later time. He concludes with the pertinent observation: "However
probable this is, it nevertheless remains as difficult to prove which
are the interpolated passages." In fact it would be difficult to point
out any writer who more thoroughly doubts, without definitely rejecting,
all the Epistles.
_Grtesbach_ and _Kestner_ both express "doubts more or less definite,"
but to make sufficient extracts to illustrate this would occupy too much
space.
_Neander_.--Dr. Lightfoot has been misled by the short extract from the
English translation of the first
{xxxviii}
edition of Neander's History given by Cureton in his Appendix, has not
attended to the brief German quotation from the second edition, and has
not examined the original at all, or he would have seen that, so far
from pronouncing "in favour of a genuine nucleus," Neander might well
have been classed by me amongst those who distinctly reject the Ignatian
Epistles, instead of being moderately quoted amongst those who merely
express doubt. Neander says: "As the account of the martyrdom of
Ignatius is very suspicious, so also the Epistles which suppose the
correctness of this suspicious legend, do not bear throughout the
impress of a distinct individuality, and of a man of that time who is
addressing his last words to the communities. A hierarchical purpose
is not to be mistaken." In an earlier part of the work he still more
emphatically says that, "in the so-called Ignatian Epistles," he
recognizes a decided "design" (absichtlichkeit) and then he continues:
"as the tradition regarding the journey of Ignatius to Rome, there to
be cast to the wild beasts, seems to me for the above-mentioned reasons
very suspicious, his Epistles, which pre-suppose the truth of this
tradition, can no longer inspire me with faith in their
authenticity." He goes on to state additional grounds for disbelief.
_Baumgarten-Crusius_ stated in one place, in regard to the seven
Epistles, that it is no longer possible to ascertain how much of the
extant may have formed part of the original Epistles, and in a note he
excepts only the passages quoted by the Fathers.
{xxxix}
He seems to agree with Semler and others that the two Recensions are
probably the result of manipulations of the original, the shorter form
being more in ecclesiastical, the longer in dogmatic interest. Some
years later he remarked that inquiries into the Epistles, although
not yet concluded, had rather tended towards the earlier view that the
Shorter Recension was more original than the Long, but that even the
shorter may have suffered, if not from manipulations (Ueberarbeitungen)
from interpolations. This very cautious statement, it will be observed,
is wholly relative, and does not in the least modify the previous
conclusion that the original material of the letters cannot be
ascertained.
Dr. Lightfoot's objections regarding these seven writers are thoroughly
unfounded, and in most cases glaringly erroneous.
1 Dr. Lightfoot doubts, and a large mass of critics
recognize _that the authenticity of none_ of these Epistles
_can be established_ and that they can only be considered
later and spurious compositions."
He proceeds to the next "note (4)" with the same unhesitating vigour,
and characterizes it as "equally unfortunate." Wherever it has been
possible, Dr. Light-foot has succeeded in misrepresenting the "purpose"
of my notes, although he has recognized how important it is to ascertain
this correctly, and in this instance he has done so again. I will put my
text and his explanation, upon the basis of which he analyses the
note, in juxtaposition, italicising part of my own statement which he
altogether disregards:--
"Further examination and more References to twenty authorities
comprehensive knowledge of the are then given, as belonging to the
subject have confirmed earlier a large mass of critics who recognize
{xl}
that the Ignatian Epistles, 'can only be considered later and spurious
compositions.'"(1)
There are here, in order to embrace a number of references, two
approximate states of opinion represented: the first, which leaves the
Epistles in permanent doubt, as sufficient evidence is not forthcoming
to establish their authenticity; and the second, which positively
pronounces them to be spurious. Out of the twenty authorities referred
to, Dr. Lightfoot objects to six as contradictory or not confirming what
he states to be the purpose of the note. He seems to consider that a
reservation for the possibility of a genuine substratum which cannot be
defined invalidates my reference. I maintain, however, that it does not.
It is quite possible to consider that the authenticity of the extant,
letters cannot be established without denying that there may have been
some original nucleus upon which these actual documents may have been
based. I will analyse the six references.
Bleek.--Dr. Lightfoot says: "Of these Bleek (already cited in a previous
note) expresses no definite opinion."
Dr. Lightfoot omits to mention that I do not refer to Bleek directly,
but by "Cf." merely request consideration of his opinions. I
have already partly stated Bleek's view. After pointing out some
difficulties, he says generally: "It comes to this, that the origin of
the Ignatian Epistles themselves is still very doubtful." He refuses
{xli}
to make use of a passage because it is only found in the Long Recension,
and another which occurs in the Shorter Recension he does not consider
evidence, because, first, he says, "The authenticity of this Recension
also is by no means certain," and, next, the Cureton Epistles discredit
the others. "Whether this Recension (the Curetonian) is more original
than the shorter Greek is certainly not altogether certain, but.... in
the highest degree probable." In another place he refuses to make use
of reminiscences in the "Ignatian Epistles," "because it is still very
doubtful how the case stands as regards the authenticity and integrity
of these Ignatian Epistles themselves, in the different Recensions
in which we possess them."(1) In fact he did not consider that their
authenticity could be established. I do not, however, include him here
at all.
_Gfroerer_.--Dr. Lightfoot, again, omits to state that I do not cite this
writer like the others, but by a "Cf." merely suggest a reference to his
remarks.
_Harless_, according to Dr. Lightfoot, "avows that he must 'decidedly
reject with the most considerable critics of older and more recent
times' the opinion maintained by certain persons that the Epistles
are 'altogether spurious,' and proceeds to treat a passage as genuine
because it stands in the Vossian letters as well as in the Long
Recension."
This is a mistake. Harless quotes a passage in connection with Paul's
Epistle to the Ephesians with the distinct remark: "In this case the
disadvantage of the uncertainty regarding the Recensions is in
{xlii}
part removed through the circumstance that both Recensions have
the passage." He recognizes that the completeness of the proof that
ecclesiastical tradition goes back beyond the time of Marcion is
somewhat wanting from the uncertainty regarding the text of Ignatius. He
did not in fact venture to consider the Ignatian Epistles evidence even
for the first half of the second century.
_Schliemann_, Dr. Lightfoot states, "says that 'the external testimonies
oblige him to recognize a genuine substratum,' though he is not
satisfied with either existing recension."
Now what Schliemann says is this: "Certainly neither the Shorter and
still less the Longer Recension in which we possess these Epistles can
lay claim to authenticity. Only if we must, nevertheless, without doubt
suppose a genuine substratum," &c. In a note he adds: "The external
testimonies oblige me to recognize a genuine substratum--Poly-carp
already speaks of the same in Ch. xiii. of his Epistle. But that in
their present form they do not proceed from Ignatius the contents
sufficiently show."
_Hase_, according to Dr. Lightfoot, "commits himself to no opinion."
If he does not deliberately and directly do so, he indicates what that
opinion is with sufficient clearness. The Long Recension, he says, bears
the marks of later manipulation, and excites suspicion of an invention
in favour of Episcopacy, and the shorter text is not fully attested
either. The Curetonian Epistles with the shortest and least hierarchical
text give the impression of being an epitome. "But
{xliii}
even if no authentic kernel lay at the basis of these Epistles, yet
they would be a significant document at latest out of the middle of the
second century." These last words are a clear admission of his opinion
that the authenticity cannot be established. _Lechler_ candidly
confesses that he commenced with a prejudice in favour of the
authenticity of the Epistles in the Shorter Recension, but on reading
them through, he says that an impression unfavourable to their
authenticity was produced upon him which he had not been able to shake
off. He proceeds to point out their internal improbability, and other
difficulties connected with the supposed journey, which make it "still
more improbable that Ignatius himself can really have written these
Epistles in this situation." Lechler does not consider that the
Curetonian Epistles strengthen the case; and although he admits that
he cannot congratulate himself on the possession of "certainty and
cheerfulness of conviction" of the inauthenticity of the Ignatian
Epistles, he at least very clearly justifies the affirmation that the
authenticity cannot be established.
Now what has been the result of this minute and prejudiced attack upon
my notes? Out of nearly seventy critics and writers in connection with
what is admitted to be one of the most intricate questions of Christian
literature, it appears that--much to my regret--I have inserted one
name totally by accident, overlooked that the doubts of another had
been removed by the subsequent publication of the Short Recension and
consequently
{xliv}
erroneously classed him, and I withdraw a third whose doubts I consider
that I have overrated. Mistakes to this extent in dealing with such
a mass of references, or a difference of a shade more or less in the
representation of critical opinions, not always clearly expressed, may,
I hope, be excusable, and I can only say that I am only too glad to
correct such errors. On the other hand, a critic who attacks such
references, in such a tone, and with such wholesale accusations of
"misstatement" and "misrepresentation," was bound to be accurate, and I
have shown that Dr. Lightfoot is not only inaccurate in matters of fact,
but unfair in his statements of my purpose. I am happy, however, to be
able to make use of his own words and say: "I may perhaps have fallen
into some errors of detail, though I have endeavoured to avoid them, but
the main conclusions are, I believe, irrefragable."(l)
There are further misstatements made by Dr. Lightfoot to which I
must briefly refer before turning to other matters. He says, with
unhesitating boldness:--
One highly important omission is significant. There is no mention, from
first to last, of the Armenian version. Now it happens that this version
(so far as regards the documentary evidence) _has been felt to be the
key to the position, and around it the battle has raged fiercely since
its publication_. One who (like our author) maintains the priority
of the Curetonian letters, was especially bound to give it some
consideration, for it furnishes the most formidable argument to his
opponents. This version was given to the world by Petermann in 1849,
the same year in which Cureton's later work, the _Corpus Ignatianum_,
appeared, and therefore was unknown to him. Its _bearing occupies a
more or less prominent place in all, or nearly all, the writers who have
specially discussed the Ignatian question during the last quarter of a
century. This is true of Lipsius and Weiss and Hilgenfeld and Uhlhom,
whom he cites, not less than of Merx and Denzinger and Zahn, whom he
neglects to cite_.
Now first as regards the facts. I do not maintain the 1 "Contemporary
Review," February, 1875, p. 183.
{xlv}
priority of the Curetonian Epistles in this book myself, indeed I
express no personal opinion whatever regarding them which is not
contained in that general declaration of belief, the decision of which
excites the wrath of my diffident critic, that the Epistles in no form
have "any value as evidence for an earlier period than the end of the
second or beginning of the third century, even if they have any value at
all." I merely represent the opinion of others regarding those Epistles.
Dr. Lightfoot very greatly exaggerates the importance attached to the
Armenian version, and I call special attention to the passages in the
above quotation which I have taken the liberty of italicising. I venture
to say emphatically that, so far from being considered the "key of
the position," this version has, with some exceptions, played a most
subordinate and insignificant part in the controversy, and as Dr.
Lightfoot has expressly mentioned certain writers, I will state how the
case stands with regard to them. Weiss, Lipsius, Uhlhorn, Merx, and Zahn
certainly "more or less prominently" deal with them. Denzinger, however,
only refers to Petermann's publication, which appeared while his own
_brochure_ was passing through the press, in a short note at the end,
and in again writing on the Ignatian question, two years after,(1)
he does not even allude to the Armenian version. Beyond the barest
historical reference to Petermann's work, Hilgenfeld does not discuss
the Armenian version at all So much for the writers actually mentioned
by Dr. Lightfoot.
As for "the writers who have specially discussed the Ignatian question
during the last quarter of a century": Cureton apparently did not
think it worth while to add anything regarding the Armenian version of
Petermann
{xlvi}
after its appearance; Bunsen refutes Petermann's arguments in a few
pages of his "Hippolytus";(1) Baur, who wrote against Bunsen and the
Curetonian letters, and, according to Dr. Lightfoot's representation,
should have found this "the most formidable argument" against them,
does not anywhere, subsequent to their publication, even allude to the
Armenian Epistles; Ewald, in a note of a couple of lines,(2) refers to
Petermann's Epistles as identical with a post-Eusebian manipulated form
of the Epistles which he mentions in a sentence in his text; Dressel
devotes a few unfavourable lines to them;(3) Hefele(4) supports them at
somewhat greater length; but Bleek, Volkmar, Tischendorf, Bohringer,
Scholten, and others have not thought them worthy of special notice, at
any rate none of these nor any other writers of any weight have, so far
as I am aware, introduced them into the controversy at all.
The argument itself did not seem to me of sufficient importance to
introduce into a discussion already too long and complicated, and I
refer the reader to Bunsen's reply to it, from which, however, I may
quote the following lines:
"But it appears to me scarcely serious to say: there are the Seven
Letters in Armenian, and I maintain, they prove that Coreton's text is
an incomplete extract, because, I think, I have found some Syriac idioms
in the Armenian text! Well, if that is not a joke, it simply proves,
according to ordinary logic, that the Seven Letters must have once been
translated into Syriac. But how can it prove that the Greek original of
{xlvii}
this supposed Syriac version is the genuine text, and not an
interpolated and partially forged one?" (l)
Dr. Lightfoot blames me for omitting to introduce this argument, on
the ground that "a discussion which, while assuming the priority of the
Curetonian letters, ignores this version altogether, has omitted a vital
problem of which it was bound to give an account" Now all this is
sheer misrepresentation. I do not assume the priority of the Curetonian
Epistles, and I examine all the passages contained in the seven Greek
Epistles which have any bearing upon our Gospels.
Passing on to another point, I say:
"Seven Epistles have been selected out of fifteen extant, all equally
purporting to be by Ignatius, simply because only that number were
mentioned by Eusebius."(2)
Another passage is also quoted by Dr. Lightfoot, which will be found
a little further on, where it is taken for facility of reference. Upon
this he writes as follows:
This attempt to confound the seven Epistles mentioned by Eusebius with
the other confessedly spurious Epistles, as if they presented themselves
to us with the same credentials, ignores all the important facts bearing
on the question. (1). Theodoret, a century after Eusebius, betrays no
knowledge of any other Epistles, and there is no distinct trace of the
use of the confessedly spurious Epistles till late in the sixth century
at the earliest. (2). The confessedly spurious Epistles differ widely
in style from the seven Epistles, and betray the same hand which
interpolated the seven Epistles. In other words, they clearly formed
part of the Long Recension in the first instance. (3). They abound in
anachronisms which point to an age later than Eusebius, as the date of
their composition.(3)
Although I do not really say in the above that no other pleas are
advanced in favour of the seven Epistles,
{xlviii}
I contend that, reduced to its simplest form, the argument for that
special number rests mainly, if not altogether, upon their mention by
Eusebius. The very first reason (1) advanced by Dr. Lightfoot to refute
me is a practical admission of the correctness of my statement, for the
eight Epistles are put out of court because even Theodoret, a century
after Eusebius, does not betray any knowledge of them, but the "silence
of Eusebius," the earlier witness, is infinitely more important, and
it merely receives some increase of significance from the silence of
Theodoret. Suppose, however, that Eusebius had referred to any of them,
how changed their position would have been! The Epistles referred to
would have attained the exceptional distinction which his mention has
conferred upon the rest The fact is, moreover, that, throughout the
controversy, the two divisions of Epistles are commonly designated
the "prae-" and "post-Eusebian," making him the turning-point of the
controversy. Indeed, further on, Dr. Lightfoot himself admits: "The
testimony of Eusebius first differentiates them."(1) The argument (2
and 3) that the eight rejected Epistles betray anachronisms and
interpolations, is no refutation of my statement, for the same
accusation is brought by the majority of critics against the Vossian
Epistles.
The fourth and last argument seems more directly addressed to a second
paragraph quoted by Dr. Lightfoot, to which I refer above, and which I
have reserved till now as it requires more detailed notice. It is this:
"It is a total mistake to suppose that the seven Epistles mentioned by
Eusebius have been transmitted to us in any special way. These Epistles
are mixed up in the Medicean and corresponding ancient Latin MSS. with
the other eight Epistles, universally pronounced to be spurious, without
distinction of any kind, and all have equal honour."(2)
{xlix}
I will at once give Dr. Lightfoot's comment on this, in contrast
with the statement of a writer equally distinguished for learning and
orthodoxy--Dr. Tregelles:
Dr. Lightfoot. (4). "It is not strictly true that the seven Epistles are
mixed up with the confessedly spurious Epistles. In the Greek and Latin
MSS., as also in the Armenian version, the spurious Epistles come after
the others; and this circumstance, combined with the facts already
mentioned, plainly shows that they were a later addition, borrowed from
the Long Recension to complete the body of Ignatian letters."(1)
Dr. Tregelles. "It is a mistake to speak of seven Ignatian Epistles in
Greek having been transmitted to us, for no such seven exist, except
through their having been selected by editors from the Medicean MS.
which contains so much that is confessedly spurious;--a fact which some
who imagine a diplomatic transmission of seven have overlooked."(2)
I will further quote the words of Cureton, for as Dr. Lightfoot advances
nothing but assertions, it is well to meet him with the testimony of
others rather than the mere reiteration of my own statement Cureton
says:
"Again, there is another circumstance which will naturally lead us
to look with some suspicion upon the recension of the Epistles of St.
Ignatius, as exhibited in the Medicean MS., and in the ancient Latin
version corresponding with it, which is, that the Epistles presumed to
be the genuine production of that holy Martyr are mixed up with others,
which are almost universally allowed to be spurious. Both in the Greek
and Latin MSS. all these are placed upon the same footing, and no
distinction is drawn between them; and the only ground which has
hitherto been a Note to "Home's Int. to the Holy Scriptures," 12th ed.,
1869, iv. p. 332, note 1. The italics are in the original.
1 "Contemporary Beview," February, 1875, p. 347. Dr.
Lightfoot makes the following important admission in a note:
"The Roman Epistle indeed has been separated from its
companions, and is embedded in the Martyrology which stands
at the end of this collection in the Latin Version, where
doubtless it stood also in the Greek, before the MS. of this
latter was mutilated. Otherwise the Vossian Epistles come
together, and are followed by the confessedly spurious
Epistles in the Greek and Latin MSS. In the Armenian all the
Vossian Epistles are together, and the confessedly spurious
Epistles follow. See Zahn, Ignatius von Antiochien, p. 111."
{l}
assumed for their separation has been the specification of some of them
by Eusebius and his omission of any mention of the others."'
"The external evidence from the testimony of manuscripts in favour
of the rejected Greek Epistles, with the exception of that to the
Philip-pians, is certainly greater than that in favour of those which
have been received.' They are found in all the manuscripts, both Greek
and Latin, in the same form; while the others exhibit two distinct and
very different recensions, if we except the Epistle to Polycarp, in
which the variations are very few. Of these two recensions the shorter
has been most generally received: the circumstance of its being shorter
seems much to have influenced its reception; and the text of the
Medicean Codex and of the two copies of the corresponding Latin version
belonging to Cains College, Cambridge, and Corpus Christi College,
Oxford, has been adopted.... In all these there is no distinction
whatever drawn between the former and latter Epistles: all are placed
upon the same basis; and there is no ground whatever to conclude either
that the arranger of the Greek recension or the translator of the Latin
version esteemed one to be better or more genuine than another. Nor
can any prejudice result to the Epistles to the Tarsians, to the
Antiochians, and to Hero, from the circumstance of their being placed
after the others in the collection; for they are evidently arranged in
chronological order, and rank after the rest as having been written from
Philippi, at which place Ignatius is said to have arrived after he had
despatched the previous Letters. So far, therefore, as the evidence of
all the existing copies, Latin as well as Greek, of both the recensions
is to be considered, it is certainly in favour of the rejected Epistles,
rather than of those which have been retained." (2)
Proceeding from counter-statements to actual facts, I will very briefly
show the order in which these Epistles have been found in some of the
principal MSS. One of the earliest published was the ancient Latin
version of eleven Epistles edited by J. Faber Stapulensis in 1498, which
was at least quoted in the ninth century, and which in the subjoined
table I shall mark A,(3) and which also exhibits the order of Cod. Vat
859, assigned to the eleventh century.(4) The next (B) is a Greek MS.
edited by Valentinus Pacaeus in 1557,(5) and the order at
{li}
the same time represents that of the Cod. Pal. 150.(1) The third (C)
is the ancient Latin translation, referred to above, published by
Archbishop Usher.(2) The fourth (D) is the celebrated Medicean MS.
assigned to the eleventh century, and published by Vossiusin 1646.(3)
This also represents the order of the Cod. Casanatensis G. V. 14.(4)
I italicise the rejected Epistles: (See scanned page in the html file,
Ed.)
I have given the order in MSS. containing the "Long Recension" as well
as the Vossian, because, however much some may desire to exclude them,
the variety of arrangement is notable, and presents features which have
an undeniable bearing upon this question. Taking the Vossian MS., it is
obvious that, without any distinction whatever between the genuine and
the spurious, it contains
{lii}
three of the false Epistles, and _does not contain the so-called genuine
Epistle to the Romans at all_. The Epistle to the Romans, in fact, is,
to use Dr. Lightfoot's own expression, "embedded in the Martyrology,"
which is as spurious as any of the epistles. This circumstance alone
would justify the assertion which Dr. Lightfoot contradicts.
I must now, in order finally to dispose of this matter of notes, turn
for a short time to consider objections raised by Dr. Westcott. Whilst
I have to thank him for greater courtesy, I regret that I must point out
serious errors into which he has fallen in his statements regarding my
references which, as matters of fact, admit of practical test. Before
proceeding to them I may make one or two general observations. Dr.
Westcott says:
"I may perhaps express my surprise that a writer who is quite capable of
thinking for himself should have considered it worth his while to burden
his pages with lists of names and writings, arranged, for the most part,
alphabetically, which have in very many cases no value whatever for a
scholar, while they can only oppress the general reader with a vague
feeling that all 'profound' critics are on one side. The questions to
be discussed must be decided by evidence and by argument and not by
authority."(1)
Now the fact is that hitherto, in England, argument and evidence have
almost been ignored in connection with the great question discussed in
this work, and it has practically been decided by the authority of
the Church, rendered doubly potent by force of habit and transmitted
reverence. The orthodox works usually written on the subject have, to a
very great extent, suppressed the objections raised by a mass of learned
and independent critics, or treated them as insignificant, and worthy of
little more than a passing word of pious indignation. At the same time,
therefore, that I endeavour, to
{liii}
the best of my ability, to decide these questions by evidence and
argument, in opposition to mere ecclesiastical authority, I refer
readers desirous of further pursuing the subject to works where they may
find them dis-. cussed. I must be permitted to add, that I do not
consider I uselessly burden my pages by references to critics who confirm
the views in the text or discuss them, for it is right that earnest
thinkers should be told the state of opinion, and recognize that belief
is not so easy and matter of course a thing as they have been led to
suppose, or the unanimity quite so complete as English divines have
often seemed to represent it Dr. Westcott, however, omits to state that
I as persistently refer to writers who oppose, as to those who favour,
my own conclusions.
Dr. Westcott proceeds to make the accusation which I now desire to
investigate. He says:
"Writers are quoted as holding on independent grounds an opinion which
is involved in their characteristic assumptions. And more than this, the
references are not unfrequently actually misleading. One example will
show that I do not speak too strongly."(l)
Dr. Westcott has scrutinized this work with great minuteness, and, as I
shall presently explain, he has selected his example with evident care.
The idea of illustrating the vast mass of references in these volumes
by a single instance is somewhat startling, but to insinuate that a
supposed contradiction pointed out in one note runs through the whole
work, as he does, if I rightly understand his subsequent expressions,
is scarcely worthy of Dr. Westcott, although I am sure he does not mean
to be unfair. The example selected is as follows:
"It has been demonstrated that Ignatius was not sent to Rome at all, but
suffered martyrdom in Antioch itself on the 2()th December, a.d. 115
{liv}
when he was condemned to be cast to wild beasts in the amphitheatre, in
consequence of the fanatical excitement produced by the earthquake which
took place on the 13th of that month.4"' The references in support
of these statements are the following: 8 Baur, Urspr. d. Epiec.Tub.
Zeitschr. f.Theol. 1838, H. 3, p. 155 anm.; Bretschneider, Probabilia,
&c, p. 185; Bleek, Einl.N. T., p. 144; Guericke, H*bucht Kt #., i p.
148; Hagenbach, K. G., i. p. 113 f.; Davidson, Introd. N. T.,i. p. 19;
Mayerhoff, Eitll. petr. Schr., p. 79; Scholten, Die Sit. Zeugnisse, p.
40, p. 50 f.; Volkmar, Der Ursprung, p. 52; R'buch Einl. Apocr., i. p.
121 f., p. 136.
4 Volkmar, Wuch Einl. Apocr., i. p. 121 ff., 136 f.; Der Ursprung, p.
52 ff.; Baur, Ursp. d. Episc. Tub. Zeitschr. f. Th. 1838, H. 3, p. 149
f.; Gesch. chr. Kirehe, 1863, i. p. 440, anm. 1.; Davidson, Introd. N.
T., Lp. 19; Scholten, Die Hit. Zeugnisse, p. 51 f.; cf. Francke, Zur
Gesch. Trojans, u. s. w. 1840, p. 253 f.; Hilgenfeld, Die ap. Vster, p.
214.
Upon this Dr. Westcott remarks:
"Such an array of authorities, drawn from different schools, cannot but
appear overwhelming; and the fact that about half of them are quoted
twice over emphasizes the implied precision of their testimony as to the
two points affirmed."
Dr. Westcott, however, has either overlooked or omitted to state the
fact that, although some of the writers are quoted twice, the two notes
differ in almost every particular, many of the names in note 3 being
absent from note 4, other names being inserted in the latter which do
not appear in the former, an alteration being in most cases made in the
place referred to, and the order in which the authorities are placed
being significantly varied. For instance, in note 3 the reference to
Volkmar is the last, but it is the first in note 4; whilst a similar
transposition of order takes place in his works, and alterations in
the pages. The references in note 3, in fact, are given for the date
occurring in the course of the sentence, whilst those in note 4, placed
at the end, are intended to support the whole statement which is
{lv}
made. I must, however, explain an omission, which is pretty obvious,
but which I regret may have misled Dr. Westcott in regard to note 3,
although it does not affect note 4. Headers are probably aware that
there has been, amongst other points, a difference of opinion not only
as to the place, but also the date of the martyrdom of Ignatius. I
have in every other case carefully stated the question of date, and my
omission in this instance is, I think, the only exception in the book.
The fact is, that I had originally in the text the words which I now add
to the note: "The martyrdom has been variously dated about a.d. 107, or
a.d. 115-116, but whether assigning the event to Home or to Antioch
a majority of critics of all shades of opinion have adopted the later
date." Thinking it unnecessary, under the circumstances, to burden the
text with this, I removed it with the design of putting the statement
at the head of note 3, with reference to "a.d. 115" in the text, but
unfortunately an interruption at the time prevented the completion of
this intention, as well.as the addition of some fuller references to the
writers quoted, which had been omitted, and the point, to my infinite
regret, was overlooked. The whole of the authorities in note 3,
therefore, do not support the apparent statement of martyrdom in
Antioch, although they all confirm the date, for which I really referred
to them. With this explanation, and marking the omitted references(1)
by placing them within brackets, I proceed to analyze the two notes in
contrast with Dr. Westcott's statements.
1 These consist only of an additional page of Baur's work
first quoted, and a reference to another of his works quoted
in the second note, but accidentally left out of the note 3.
{lvi}
See page scan, Ed.
{lvii}
See page scan, Ed.
{lviii}
See page scan, Ed.
{lix}
It will thus be seen that the whole of these authorities confirm the
later date assigned to the martyrdom, and that Baur, in the note in
which Dr. Westcott finds "nothing in any way bearing upon the history
except a passing supposition," really advances a weighty argument for
it and against the earlier date, and as Dr. Westcott considers, rightly,
that argument should decide everything, I am surprised that he has
not perceived the propriety of my referring to arguments as well as
statements of evidence.
To sum up the opinions expressed, I may state that whilst all the nine
writers support the later date, for which purpose they were quoted,
three of them (Bleek, Guericke, and Mayerhoff) ascribe the martyrdom
to Rome, one (Brctschneider) mentions no place, one (Hagenbach) is
doubtful, but leans to Antioch, and the other four declare for the
martyrdom in Antioch. Nothing, however, could show more conclusively the
purpose of note 3, which I have explained, than this very contradiction,
and the fact that I claim for the general statement in the text,
regarding the martyrdom in Antioch itself in opposition to the legend of
the journey to and death in Rome, only the authorities in note 4,
which I shall now proceed to analyse in contrast with Dr. Westcott's
statements, and here 1 beg the favour of the readers attention.
(See page scans, lix to lxii Ed.)
{lxiii}
At the close of this analysis Dr. Westcott sums up the result as
follows:
"In this case, therefore, again, Volkmar alone offers any arguments
in support of the statement in the text; and the final result of the
references is, that the alleged 'demonstration' is, at the most, what
Scholten calls 'a not groundless conjecture.'"(3)
3 On the Canon, Preface 4th ed. p. xxiv. Dr. Westcott adds,
in a note, "It may be worth while to add that in spite of
the profuse display of learning in connexion with Ignatius,
I do not see even in the second edition any reference to the
full and elaborate work of Zahn." I might reply to this that
my MS. had left my hands before Zahn's work had reached
England, but, moreover, the work contains nothing new to
which reference was necessary.
{lxiv}
It is scarcely possible to imagine a more complete misrepresentation of
the fact than the statement that "Volkmar alone offers any arguments in
support of the statement in the text," and it is incomprehensible upon
any ordinary theory. My mere sketch cannot possibly convey an adequate
idea of the elaborate arguments of Volkmar, Baur, and Hilgenfeld, but
I hope to state their main features, a few pages on. With regard to Dr.
Westcott's remark on the "alleged 'demonstration,'" it must be evident
that when a writer states anything to be "demonstrated" he expresses his
own belief. It is impossible to secure absolute unanimity of opinion,
and the only question in such a case is whether I refer to writers, in
connection with the circumstances which I affirm to be demonstrated,
who advance arguments and evidence bearing upon it. A critic is quite
at liberty to say that the arguments are insufficient, but he is not at
liberty to deny that there are any arguments at all when the elaborate
reasoning of men like Volkmar, Baur and Hilgenfeld is referred to.
Therefore, when he goes on to say:
"It seems quite needless to multiply comments on these results. Any one
who will candidly consider this analysis will, I believe, agree with
me in thinking that such a style of annotation, which runs through the
whole work, is justly characterized as frivolous and misleading."(1)
Dr. Westcott must excuse my retorting that, not my annotation, but his
own criticism of it, endorsed by Professor Lightfoot, is "frivolous and
misleading," and I venture to hope that this analysis, tedious as it has
been, may once for all establish the propriety and substantial accuracy
of my references.
As Dr. Westcott does not advance any further arguments
{lxv}
of his own in regard to the Ignatian controversy, I may now return to
Dr. Lightfoot, and complete my reply to his objections; but I must do so
with extreme brevity, as I have already devoted too much space to
this subject, and must now come to a close. To the argument that it is
impossible to suppose that soldiers such as the "ten leopards" described
in the Epistles would allow a prisoner, condemned to wild beasts for
professing Christianity, deliberately to write long epistles at every
stage of his journey, promulgating the very doctrines for which he was
condemned, as well as to hold the freest intercourse with deputations
from the various churches, Dr. Lightfoot advances arguments, derived
from Zahn, regarding the Roman procedure in cases that are said to be
"known." These cases, however, are neither analogous, nor have they the
force which is assumed. That Christians imprisoned for their religious
belief should receive their nourishment, while in prison, from friends,
is anything but extraordinary, and that bribes should secure access to
them in many cases, and some mitigation of suffering, is possible. The
case of Ignatius, however, is very different. If the meaning of [--Greek--]
be that, although receiving bribes, the "ten leopards" only became more
cruel, the very reverse of the leniency and mild treatment ascribed
to the Roman procedure is described by the writer himself as actually
taking place, and certainly nothing approaching a parallel to the
correspondence of pseudo-Ignatius can be pointed out in any known
instance. The case of Saturus and Perpetua, even if true, is no
confirmation, the circumstances being very different; (l) but in
{lxvi}
fact there is no evidence whatever that the extant history was written
by either of them,(1) but on the contrary, I maintain, every reason to
believe that it was not.
Dr. Lightfoot advances the instance of Paul as a case in point of a
Christian prisoner treated with great consideration, and who "writes
letters freely, receives visits from his friends, communicates with
churches and individuals as he desires."(2) It is scarcely possible
to imagine two cases more dissimilar than those of pseudo-Ignatius and
Paul, as narrated in the "Acts of the Apostles," although doubtless
the story of the former has been framed upon some of the lines of the
latter. Whilst Ignatius is condemned to be cast to the wild beasts as a
Christian, Paul is not condemned at all, but stands in the position of
a Roman citizen, rescued from infuriated Jews (xxiii. 27), repeatedly
declared by his judges to have done nothing worthy of death or of bonds
(xxv. 25, xxvi. 31), and who might have been set at liberty but that he
had appealed to Caesar (xxv. 11 f., xxvi. 32). His position was one which
secured the sympathy of the Roman soldiers. Ignatius 'fights with
beasts from Syria even unto Rome,' and is cruelly treated by his
"ten leopards," but Paul is represented as receiving very different
treatment. Felix commands that his own people should be allowed to come
and minister to him (xxiv. 23), and when the voyage is commenced it is
said that Julius, who had charge of Paul, treated him courteously, and
gave him liberty to go to see his friends at Sidon (xxvii. 3). At Rome
he was allowed to live by himself with a single soldier to guard him
(xxviii. 16), and he continued for two years in his own hired house.
{lxvii}
These circumstances are totally different from those under which the
Epistles of Ignatius are said to have been written.
"But the most powerful testimony," Dr. Lightfoot goes on to say, "is
derived from the representations of a heathen writer."(1) The case of
Peregrinus, to which he refers, seems to me even more unfortunate than
that of Paul. Of Peregrinus himself, historically, we really know little
or nothing, for the account of Lucian is scarcely received as serious
by any one. Lucian narrates that this Peregrinus Proteus, a cynic
philosopher, having been guilty of parricide and other crimes, found
it convenient to leave his own country. In the course of his travels he
fell in with Christians and learnt their doctrines, and, according to
Lucian, the Christians soon were mere children in his hands, so that
he became in his own person "prophet, high-priest, and ruler of a
synagogue," and further "they spoke of him as a god, used him as a
law-giver, and elected him their chief man."(2) After a time he was put
in prison for his new faith, which Lucian says was a real service to him
afterwards in his impostures. During the time he was in prison, he is
said to have received those services from Christians which Dr. Lightfoot
quotes. Peregrinus was afterwards set at liberty by the Governor of
Syria, who loved philosophy,(3) and travelled about living in great
comfort at the expense of the Christians, until at last they quarrelled
in consequence, Lucian thinks, of his eating some forbidden food.
Finally, Peregrinus ended his career by throwing himself into the flames
of a funeral pile during the Olympian games. An earthquake is said to
have taken
{lxviii}
place at the time; a vulture flew out from the pile crying out with
a human voice; and shortly after Peregrinus rose again and appeared
clothed in white raiment unhurt by the fire.
Now this writing, of which I have given the barest sketch, is a direct
satire upon Christians, or even, as Baur affirms, "a parody of the
history of Jesus."(1) There are no means of ascertaining that any of
the events of the Christian career of Peregrinus were true, but it is
obvious that, Lucian's policy was to exaggerate the facility of access
to prisoners, as well as the assiduity and attention of the Christians
to Peregrinus, the ease with which they were duped being the chief point
of the satire.
There is another circumstance which must be mentioned. Lucian's account
of Peregrinus is claimed by supporters of the Ignatian Epistles as
evidence for them.(2) "The singular correspondence in this narrative
with the account of Ignatius, combined with some striking coincidences
of expression," they argue, show "that Lucian was acquainted with the
Ignatian history, if not with the Ignatian letters." These are the
words of Dr. Lightfoot, although he guards himself, in referring to this
argument, by the words: "if it be true," and does not express his own
opinion; but he goes on to say: "At all events it is conclusive for the
matter in hand, as showing that Christian prisoners were treated in the
very way described in these epistles."(3) On the contrary, it is in no
case conclusive of anything. If it were true that Lucian employed, as
the basis of his satire, the Ignatian Epistles and Martyrology,
{lxix}
it is clear that his narrative cannot be used as independent testimony
for the truth of the statements regarding the treatment of Christian
prisoners. On the other hand, as this cannot be shown, his story remains
a mere satire with very little historical value. Apart from all this,
however, the case of Peregrinus, a man confined in prison for a short
time, under a favourable governor, and not pursued with any severity, is
no parallel to that of Ignatius condemned _ad bestias_ and, according
to his own express statement, cruelly treated by the "ten leopards"; and
further the liberty of pseudo-Ignatius must greatly have exceeded all
that is said of Peregrinus, if he was able to write such epistles, and
hold such free intercourse as they represent.
I will now, in the briefest manner possible, indicate the arguments
of the writers referred to in the note(l) attacked by Dr. Westcott,
in which he cannot find any relevancy, but which, in my opinion,
demonstrate that Ignatius was not sent to Rome at all, but suffered
martyrdom in Antioch itself. The reader who wishes to go minutely into
the matter must be good enough to consult the writers there cited, and
I will only sketch the case here, without specifically indicating
the source of each argument. Where I add any particulars I will, when
necessary, give my authorities. The Ignatian Epistles and martyrologies
set forth that, during a general persecution of Christians, in Syria
at least, Ignatius was condemned by Trajan, when he wintered in Antioch
during the Parthian War, to be taken to Rome and cast to wild beasts in
the amphitheatre. Instead of being sent to Rome by the short sea voyage,
he is represented as taken thither by the long and incomparably more
difficult land route. The ten soldiers who
{lxx}
guard him are described by himself as only rendered more cruel by the
presents made to them to secure kind treatment for him, so that not in
the amphitheatre only, but all the way from Syria to Rome, by night
and day, by sea and land, he "fights with beasts." Notwithstanding
this severity, the Martyr freely receives deputations from the various
Churches, who, far from being molested, are able to have constant
intercourse with him, and even to accompany him in his journey. He not
only converses with these freely, but he is represented as writing long
Epistles to the various Churches which, instead of containing the last
exhortations and farewell words which might be considered natural
from the expectant martyr, are filled with advanced views of Church
government, and the dignity of the episcopate. These circumstances, at
the outset, excite grave suspicions of the truth of the documents, and
of the story which they set forth. When we inquire whether the alleged
facts of the case are supported by historical data, the reply is
emphatically adverse. All that is known of the treatment of Christians
during the reign of Trajan, as well as of the character of the Emperor,
is opposed to the supposition that Ignatius could have been condemned
by Trajan himself, or even by a provincial governor, to be taken to Rome
and there cast to the beasts. It is well known that under Trajan there
was no general persecution of Christians, although there may have been
instances in which prominent members of the body were either punished or
fell victims to popular fury and superstition.(1)
1 Dean Milman says: "Trajan, indeed, is absolved, at least by the
almost general voice of antiquity, from the crime of persecuting the
Christians." In a note, he adds: "Excepting of Ignatius, probably of
Simeon of Jerusalem, there is no authentic martyrdom in the reign of
Trajan."--Hist, of Christianity, 1867, ii. p. 103.
{lxxi}
An instance of this kind was the martyrdom of Simeon, Bishop of
Jerusalem, reported by Hegesippus. He was not condemned _ad bestias_,
however, and much less deported to Rome for the purpose. Why should
Ignatius have been so exceptionally treated? In fact, even during the
persecutions under Marcus Aurelius, although Christians in Syria were
frequently enough cast to the beasts, there is no instance recorded in
which any one condemned to this fate was sent to Rome. Such a sentence
is quite at variance with the clement character of Trajan and his
principles of government. Neander, in a passage quoted by Baur, says:
"As he (Trajan), like Pliny, considered Christianity mere fanaticism, he
also probably thought that if severity were combined with clemency, if
too much noise were not made about it, the open demonstration not left
unpunished but also minds not stirred up by persecution, the fanatical
enthusiasm would most easily cool down, and the matter by degrees come
to an end."(1) This was certainly the policy which mainly characterized
his reign. Now not only would such a severe sentence have been contrary
to such principles, but the agitation excited would have been enormously
increased by sending the martyr a long journey by land through Asia, and
allowing him to pass through some of the principal cities, hold constant
intercourse with the various Christian communities, and address long
epistles to them. With the fervid desire for martyrdom then prevalent,
such a journey would have been a triumphal progress, spreading
everywhere excitement and enthusiasm. It may not be out of place, as an
indication of the results of impartial examination, to
{lxxii}
point out that Neander's inability to accept the Ignatian epistles
largely rests on his disbelief of the whole tradition of this sentence
and martyr-journey. "We do not recognize the Emperor Trajan in this
narrative," (the martyrology) he says, "therefore cannot but doubt
every thing which is related by this document, as well as that, during
this reign, Christians can have been cast to the wild beasts."(1)
If, for a moment, we suppose that, instead of being condemned by Trajan
himself, Ignatius received his sentence from a provincial governor, the
story does not gain greater probability. It is not credible that such an
official would have ventured to act so much in opposition to the spirit
of the Emperor's government Besides, if such a governor did pronounce
so severe a sentence, why did he not execute it in Antioch? Why send
the prisoner to Rome? By doing so he made all the more conspicuous a
severity which was not likely to be pleasing to the clement Trajan. The
cruelty which dictated a condemnation _ad bestias_ would have been more
gratified by execution on the spot, and there is besides no instance
known, even during the following general persecution, of Christians
being sent for execution in Rome. The transport to Rome is in no case
credible, and the utmost that can be admitted is, that Ignatius, like
Simeon of Jerusalem, may have been condemned to death during this reign,
more especially if the event be associated with some sudden outbreak of
superstitious fury against the Christians, to which the martyr may at
once have fallen a victim. We are not without indications of such a
cause operating in the case of Ignatius.
{lxxiii}
It is generally admitted that the date of Trajan's visit to Antioch is
a.d. 115, when he wintered there during the Parthian War. An earthquake
occurred on the 13th December of that year, which was well calculated
to excite popular superstition. It may not be out of place to quote here
the account of the earthquake given by Dean Milmau, who, although he
mentions a different date, and adheres to the martyrdom in Rome, still
associates the condemnation of Ignatius with the earthquake. He says:
"Nevertheless, at that time there were circumstances which account
with singular likelihood for that sudden outburst of persecution in
Antioch.... At this very time an earthquake, more than usually terrible
and destructive, shook the cities of the East. Antioch suffered its most
appalling ravages--Antioch, crowded with the legionaries prepared for
the Emperor's invasion of the East, with ambassadors and tributary kings
from all parts of the East. The city shook through all its streets;
houses, palaces, theatres, temples fell crashing down. Many were killed:
the Consul Pedo died of his hurts. The Emperor himself hardly escaped
through a window, and took refuge in the Circus, where he passed some
days in the open air. Whence this terrible blow but from the wrath of
the Gods, who must be appeased by unusual sacrifices? This was towards
the end of January; early in February the Christian Bishop, Ignatius,
was arrested. We know how, during this century, at every period of
public calamity, whatever that calamity might be, the cry of the
panic-stricken Heathens was, 'The Christians to the lions!' It may be
that, in Trajan's humanity, in order to prevent a general massacre by
the infuriated populace, or to give greater solemnity to the sacrifice,
the execution was ordered to
{lxxiv}
take place, not in Antioch, but in Rome."(1) I contend that these
reasons, on the contrary, render execution in Antioch infinitely more
probable. To continue, however: the earthquake occurred on the 13th, and
the martyrdom of Ignatius took place on the 20th December, just a
week after the earthquake. His remains, as we know from Chrysostom
and others, were, as an actual fact, interred at Antioch. The natural
inference is that the martyrdom, the only part of the Ignatian story
which is credible, occurred not in Rome but in Antioch itself, in
consequence of the superstitious fury against the [--Greek--] aroused by
the earthquake.
I will now go more into the details of the brief statements I have just
made, and here we come for the first time to John Malalas. In the
first place he mentions the occurrence of the earthquake on the 13 th
December. I will quote Dr. Lightfoot's own rendering of his further
important statement. He says:
"The words of John Malalas are:
'The same king Trajan was residing in the same city (Antioch) when the
visitation of God (i.e. the earthquake) occurred. And at that time the
holy Ignatius, the bishop of the city of Antioch, was martyred (or bore
testimony), [--Greek--] before him [--Greek--]; for he was exasperated against
him, because he reviled him.'"(2)
Dr. Lightfoot endeavours in every way to discredit this statement. He
argues that Malalas tells foolish stories about other matters, and,
therefore, is not to be believed here; but so simple a piece of
information may well be correctly conveyed by a writer who elsewhere
may record stupid traditions.(3) If the narrative of foolish stories and
fabulous traditions is to exclude belief in everything else stated by
those who relate them, the
{lxxv}
whole of the Fathers are disposed of at one fell swoop, for they all
do so. Dr. Lightfoot also asserts that the theory of the cause of the
martyrdom advanced by Volkmar "receives no countenance from the story
of Malalas, who gives a wholly different reason--the irritating language
used to the emperor."(l) On the other hand, it in no way contradicts it,
for Ignatius can only have "reviled" Trajan when brought before him, and
his being taken before him may well have been caused by the fury excited
by the earthquake, even if the language of the Bishop influenced his
condemnation; the whole statement of Malalas is in perfect harmony with
the theory in its details, and in the main, of course, directly supports
it. Then Dr. Lightfoot actually makes use of the following extraordinary
argument:
"But it may be worth while adding that the error of Malalas is capable
of easy explanation. He has probably misinterpreted some earlier
authority, whose language lent itself to misinterpretation. The words
[--Greek--], which were afterwards used especially of martyrdom, had in the
earlier ages a wider sense, including other modes of witnessing to
the faith: the expression [--Greek--] again is ambiguous and might denote
either 'during the reign of Trajan,' or 'in the presence of Trajan.'
A blundering writer like Malalas might have stumbled over either
expression."(2)
This is a favourite device. In case his abuse of poor Malalas should not
sufficiently discredit him, Dr. Lightfoot attempts to explain away his
language. It would be difficult indeed to show that the words [--Greek--],
already used in that sense in the New Testament, were not, at the date
at which any record of the martyrdom of Ignatius which Malalas could
have had before him was written, employed to express martyrdom, when
applied to such a case, as Dr. Lightfoot indeed has in the
{lxxvi}
first instance rendered the phrase. Even Zahn, whom Dr. Lightfoot so
implicitly follows, emphatically decides against him on both points.
"The [--Greek--] together with [--Greek--] can only signify 'coram Trajano'
('in the presence of Trajan'), and [--Greek--] only the execution."(1) Let
any one simply read over Dr. Lightfoot's own rendering, which I have
quoted above, and he will see that such quibbles are excluded, and that,
on the contrary, Malalas seems excellently well and directly to have
interpreted his earlier authority.
That the statement of Malalas does not agree with the reports of the
Fathers is no real objection, for we have good reason to believe that
none of them had information from any other source than the Ignatian
Epistles themselves, or tradition. Eusebius evidently had not. Irenaeus,
Origen, and some later Fathers tell us nothing about him. Jerome and
Chrysostom clearly take their accounts from these sources. Malalas
is the first who, by his variation, proves that he had another and
different authority before him, and in abandoning the martyr-journey to
Rome, his account has infinitely greater apparent probability. Malalas
lived at Antioch, which adds some weight to his statement. It is
objected that so also did Chrysostom, and at an earlier period, and yet
he repeats the Roman story. This, however, is no valid argument against
Malalas. Chrysostom was too good a churchman to doubt the story of
Epistles so much tending to edification, which were in wide circulation,
and had been quoted by earlier Fathers. It is in no way surprising that,
some two centuries and a half after the martyrdom, he should quietly
have accepted the representations of the Epistles purporting to have
been
{lxxvii}
written by the martyr himself, and that their story should have shaped
the prevailing tradition.
The remains of Ignatius, as we are informed by Chrysostom and Jerome,
long remained interred in the cemetery of Antioch, but finally,--in the
time of Theodosius, it is said,--were translated with great pomp
and ceremony to a building which,--such is the irony of events,--had
previously been a Temple of Fortune. The story told, of course, is that
the relics of the martyr had been carefully collected in the Coliseum
and carried from Rome to Antioch. After reposing there for some
centuries, the relics, which are said to have been transported from Rome
to Antioch, were, about the seventh century, carried back from Antioch
to Rome.(1) The natural and more simple conclusion is that, instead of
this double translation, the bones of Ignatius had always remained in
Antioch, where he had suffered martyrdom, and the tradition that
they had been brought back from Rome was merely the explanation which
reconciled the fact of their actually being in Antioch with the legend
of the Ignatian Epistles.
The 20th of December is the date assigned to the death of Ignatius
in the Martyrology,(2) and Zahn admits that this interpretation is
undeniable.(3) Moreover, the anniversary of his death was celebrated
on that day in the Greek Churches and throughout the East. In the Latin
Church it is kept on the 1st of February. There can be little doubt that
this was the day of the translation of the relics to Rome, and this was
evidently the
1 I need not refer to the statement of Nicephorus that these
relics were first brought from Rome to Constantinople and
afterwards translated to Antioch.
{lxxviii}
view of Ruinart, who, although he could not positively contradict the
views of his own Church, says: "Ignatii festum Graeci vigesima die
mensis Decembris celebrant, quo ipsum passum fuisse Acta testantur;
Latini vero die prima Februarii, an ob aliquam sacrarum ejus
reli-quiarum translationem? plures enim fuisse constat."(1) Zahn(2)
states that the Feast of the translation in later calendars was
celebrated on the 29th January, and he points out the evident ignorance
which prevailed in the West regarding Ignatius.(3)
On the one hand, therefore, all the historical data which we possess
regarding the reign and character of Trajan discredit the story that
Ignatius was sent to Rme to be exposed to beasts in the Coliseum; and
all the positive evidence which exists, independent of the Epistles
themselves, tends to establish the fact that he suffered martyrdom in
Antioch itself. On the other hand, all the evidence which is offered
for the statement that Ignatius was sent to Rme is more or less directly
based upon the representations of the letters, the authenticity of which
is in discussion, and it is surrounded with improbabilities of every
kind. And what is the value of any evidence emanating from the Ignatian
Epistles and martyrologies? There are three martyrologies which, as
Ewald says, are "the one more fabulous than the other." There are
fifteen Epistles all equally purporting to be by
{xxix}
Ignatius, and most of them handed down together in MSS., without any
distinction. Three of these, in Latin only, are universally rejected, as
are also other five Epistles, of which there are Greek, Latin, and other
versions. Of the remaining seven there are two forms, one called the
Long Recension and another shorter, known as the Vossian Epistles. The
former is almost unanimously rejected as shamefully interpolated and
falsified; and a majority of critics assert that the text of the Vossian
Epistles is likewise very impure. Besides these there is a still shorter
version of three Epistles only, the Cure-tonian, which many able critics
declare to be the only genuine letters of Ignatius, whilst a still
greater number, both from internal and external reasons, deny the
authenticity of the Epistles in any form. The second and third centuries
teem with pseudonymic literature, but I venture to say that pious fraud
has never been more busy and conspicuous than in dealing with the Martyr
of Antioch. The mere statement of the simple and acknowledged facts
regarding the Ignatian Epistles is ample justification of the assertion,
which so mightily offends Dr. Lightfoot, that "the whole of the Ignatian
literature is a mass of falsification and fraud." Even my indignant
critic himself has not ventured to use as genuine more than the three
short Syriac letters(1) out of this mass of forgery which he rebukes me
for holding so cheap. Documents which lie under such grave and permanent
suspicion cannot prove anything. As I have shown, however, the Vossian
Epistles, whatever the value of their testimony, so far from supporting
the claims advanced in favour of our Gospels, rather discredit them.
{lxxx}
I have now minutely followed Professor Lightfoot and Dr. Westcott in
their attacks upon me in connection with Eusebius and the Ignatian
Epistles, and I trust that I have shown once for all that the charges
of "misrepresentation" and "misstatement" so lightly and liberally
advanced, far from being well-founded, recoil upon themselves. It is
impossible in a work like this, dealing with such voluminous materials,
to escape errors of detail, as both of these gentlemen bear witness, but
I have at least conscientiously endeavoured to be fair, and I venture
to think that few writers have ever more fully laid before readers the
actual means of judging of the accuracy of every statement which has
been made.
Before closing, I must say a few words regarding another of my critics,
who is, however, of a very different order. My system of criticism is
naturally uncongenial to Mr. Matthew Arnold, but while he says so with
characteristic vigour, he likewise speaks of this work with equally
characteristic generosity, and I cordially thank him. I could only be
classed by mistake amongst the "objectors" to "Literature and Dogma,"
and however different may be the procedure in "Supernatural Religion,"
there is fundamental agreement between the two works, and the one may be
considered the complement of the other. Some one must do the "pounding,"
if religion is to be a matter of belief and not of mere shifty opinion.
We really address two distinct classes of readers. The reader who "has
read _and accepted_" Mr. Matthew Arnold's "half dozen lines about the
composition of the Gospels," and his "half dozen pages about miracles,"
may in one sense be "just in the same position as when he has read "the
whole of this work,(1) but
{lxxxi}
I have written for those who do not accept them, and who,--as I think
rightly,--distrust the conclusions merely forced upon them by ordinary
"reflection and experience," and in such important matters demand
evidence of a much more tangible kind. I would put it to Mr. Arnold
whether, in seeming to depreciate any attempt to systematize and carry
to logical conclusions the whole argument regarding the reality of
Miracles and Divine Revelation, he does not do himself injustice, and
enunciate a dangerous doctrine. No doubt his own clear insight and wide
culture have enabled him to discern truth more surely, and with
less apparent effort, than most of those whom he addresses, but in
encouraging, as he thus practically does, the adoption by others
of religious views with very little trouble or thought, which have
certainly cost himself years of training and study, he both cheapens his
own intellectual labour, and advocates a superficiality which already
has too many attractions. Whether he address readers whose belief is
already established, or those who are ready to accept it second hand
from himself, it seems to me that no work should be unwelcome which
supplies evidence of the results, which it has suited his own immediate
purpose merely to assume.
Mr. Matthew Arnold objects that my book leaves the reader "with the
feeling that the Bible stands before him like a fair tree all stripped,
torn and defaced, not at all like a tree whose leaves are for the
healing of the nations,"(1) but if this be the case, I submit that it
is a necessary process through which the Bible must go, before it can
be successfully transplanted into that healthy soil, in which alone its
leaves can truly be for the 44 Contemporary Boviow," October, 1874, p.
798.
{lxxxii}
healing of any one. Under such circumstances, destructive must precede
constructive criticism. It is only when we clearly recognize that the
Bible is not the "word of God" that we can worthily honour and "enjoy"
it as the word of Man. Mr. Matthew Arnold finely says, with regard
to what Jesus said and did, that: "his reporters were incapable of
rendering it, he was so much above them"; and he rightly considers that
the governing idea of our criticism of the four Evangelists should be
"to make out what in their report of Jesus, is Jesus, and what is the
reporters." I hold, however, that it is only after such an examination
as I have endeavoured to carry out, and which for the time must seem
hard and wanting in sympathetic appreciation, that most persons educated
in Christendom can rightly put any such governing idea into practice. It
is only when we are entitled to reject the theory of miraculous Divine
Revelation that the Bible attains its full beauty, losing the blots
and anomalies which it presented in its former character, and acquiring
wondrous significance as the expression of the hopes and aspirations of
humanity, from which every man may learn wisdom and derive inspiration.
The value of such a Book seems to me indestructible. I heartily
sympathise with Mr. Arnold's desire to secure due appreciation for the
venerable volume, of the beauty of which he has so fine and delicate a
perception. A truer insight into its meaning may certainly be imparted
by such eloquent and appreciating criticism, and no one is a better
judge than Mr. Matthew Arnold of the necessity to plead for the Book,
with those who are inclined thoughtlessly to reject it along with the
errors which have grown with and been based upon it. But, in the end,
every man who
{lxxxiii}
has a mind and a heart must love and honour the Bible, and he who has
neither is beyond the reach of persuasion.
This work has been revised throughout.(1) It was, as I stated at
the time, originally carried through the press under very great
difficulties, and the revision of details, upon which I had counted, was
not only prevented, but, beyond a careful revision of the First Part
for the second edition, circumstances have until now even prevented my
seriously reading through the work since it has been in print. To those
who have been good enough to call my attention to errors, or to suggest
improvements, I return very sincere thanks. In making this revision I
have endeavoured to modify unimportant points, in some of which I
have been misunderstood, so as to avoid as far as possible raising
difficulties, or inviting discussion without real bearing upon the main
argument. As I know the alacrity with which some critics seize upon
such points as serious concessions, I beg leave to say that I have not
altered anything from change of opinion. I trust that greater clearness
and accuracy may have been secured.
March 15th, 1875.
1 It is right to mention that, whilst I have examined a
great many of the references, I have not had time to verify
them all.
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.
The present work is the result of many years of earnest and serious
investigation, undertaken in the first instance for the regulation
of personal belief, and now published as a contribution towards the
establishment of Truth in the minds of others who are seeking for it.
The author's main object has been conscientiously and fully to state the
facts of the case, to make no assertions the grounds for which are not
clearly given, and as far as possible to place before the reader the
materials from which a judgment may be intelligently formed regarding
the important subject discussed.
The great Teacher is reported to have said: "Be ye approved
money-changers," wisely discerning the gold of Truth, and no man need
hesitate honestly to test its reality, and unflinchingly to reject base
counterfeits. It is obvious that the most indispensable requisite in
regard to Religion is that it should be true. No specious hopes or
flattering promises can have the slightest value unless they be
genuine and based upon substantial realities. Fear of the results of
investigation, therefore, should deter no man, for the issue in any case
is gain: emancipation from delusion, or increase of assurance. It is
poor honour to sequester a creed from healthy handling, or to shrink
from the serious examination of its doctrines. That which is true in
Religion cannot be shaken; that which is false no one can desire to
preserve.
{lxxxvi}
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.
The Author has taken advantage of the issue of a second edition to
revise this work. He has re-written portions of the first part, and
otherwise re-arranged it. He hopes that the argument has thus been made
more clear and consecutive.
INTRODUCTION.
Theoretically, the duty of adequate inquiry into the truth of any
statement of serious importance before believing it is universally
admitted. Practically, no duty is more universally neglected. This is
more especially the case in regard to Religion, in which our concern is
so great, yet the credentials of which so few personally examine. The
difficulty of such an investigation and the inability of most men to
pursue it, whether from want of opportunity or want of knowledge, are no
doubt the chief reasons for this neglect; but another, and scarcely less
potent, obstacle has probably been the odium which has been attached
to any doubt regarding the dominant religion, as well as the serious,
though covert, discouragement of the Church to all critical examination
of the title-deeds of Christianity. The spirit of doubt, if not of
intelligent inquiry, has, however, of late years become too strong for
repression, and, at the present day, the pertinency of the question of a
German writer: "Are we still Christians?" receives unconscious
{xcii}
illustration from many a popular pulpit, and many a social discussion.
The prevalent characteristic of popular theology in England, at this
time, may be said to be a tendency to eliminate from Christianity, with
thoughtless dexterity, every supernatural element which does not quite
accord with current opinion, and yet to ignore the fact that, in so
doing, ecclesiastical Christianity has practically been altogether
abandoned. This tendency is fostered with profoundly illogical zeal by
many distinguished men within the Church itself, who endeavour to arrest
for a moment the pursuing wolves of doubt and unbelief which press upon
it, by practically throwing to them, scrap by scrap, the very doctrines
which constitute the claims of Christianity to be regarded as a Divine
Revelation at all. The moral Christianity which they hope to preserve,
noble though it be, has not one feature left to distinguish it as a
miraculously communicated religion.
Christianity itself distinctly pretends to be a direct Divine Revelation
of truths beyond the natural attainment of the human intellect. To
submit the doctrines thus revealed, therefore, to criticism, and to clip
and prune them down to the standard of human reason, whilst at the
same time their supernatural character is maintained, is an obvious
absurdity. Christianity must either be recognized to be a Divine
Revelation beyond man's criticism, and in that case its doctrines must
be received even though Reason cannot be satisfied, or the claims of
Christianity to be such a Divine Revelation must be disallowed, in which
case it becomes the legitimate subject of criticism like every other
human system. One or other of these alternatives must be adopted, but to
{xciii}
assert that Christianity is Divine, and yet to deal with it as human, is
illogical and wrong.
When we consider the vast importance of the interests involved,
therefore, it must be apparent that there can be no more urgent problem
for humanity to solve than the question: Is Christianity a supernatural
Divine Revelation or not? To this we may demand a clear and decisive
answer. The evidence must be of no uncertain character which can warrant
our abandoning the guidance of Reason, and blindly accepting doctrines
which, if not supernatural truths, must be rejected by the human
intellect as monstrous delusions. We propose in this work to seek a
conclusive answer to this momentous question.
It appears to us that at no time has such an investigation been more
requisite. The results of scientific inquiry and of Biblical criticism
have created wide-spread doubt regarding the most material part of
Christianity considered as a Divine Revelation. The mass of intelligent
men in England are halting between two opinions, and standing in what
seems to us the most unsatisfactory position conceivable: they abandon,
before a kind of vague and indefinite, if irresistible, conviction, some
of the most central supernatural doctrines of Christianity; they try to
spiritualize or dilute the rest into a form which does not shock their
reason; and yet they cling to the delusion, that they still retain the
consolation and the hope of truths which, if not divinely revealed, are
mere human speculation regarding matters beyond reason. They have, in
fact, as little warrant to abandon the one part as they have to retain
the other. They build their house upon the sand, and the waves which
have already carried away so much may any day engulf the rest. At the
same time, amid this general eclipse of faith, many
{xciv}
an earnest mind, eagerly seeking for truth, endures much bitter
pain,--unable to believe--unable freely to reject--and yet without the
means of securing any clear and intelligent reply to the inquiry: "What
is truth?" Any distinct assurance, whatever its nature, based upon solid
grounds, would be preferable to such a state of doubt and hesitation.
Once persuaded that we have attained truth, there can be no permanent
regret for vanished illusions.
We must, however, by careful and impartial investigation, acquire the
right to our belief, whatever it may be, and not float like a mere waif
into the nearest haven. Flippant unbelief is much worse than earnest
credulity. The time is ripe for arriving at a definite conviction as to
the character of Christianity. There is no lack of materials for a final
decision, although hitherto they have been beyond the reach of most
English readers, and a careful and honest examination of the subject,
even if it be not final, cannot fail to contribute towards a result more
satisfactory than the generally vague and illogical religious opinion
of the present day. Even true conclusions which are arrived at either
accidentally or by wrong methods are dangerous. The current which by
good fortune led to-day to truth may to-morrow waft us to falsehood.
That such an investigation cannot, even at the present time, be carried
on in England without incurring much enmity and opposition need
scarcely be remarked, however loudly the duty and liberty of inquiry be
theoretically proclaimed, and the reason is obvious.
If we look at the singular diversity of views entertained, not only with
regard to the doctrines, but also to the evidences, of Christianity, we
cannot but be struck by the helpless position in which Divine Revelation
is now placed.
{xcv}
Orthodox Christians at the present day may be divided into two broad
classes, one of which professes to base the Church upon the Bible, and
the other the Bible upon the Church. The one party assert that the Bible
is fully and absolutely inspired, that it contains God's revelation to
man, and that it is the only and sufficient ground for all religious
belief; and they maintain that its authenticity is proved by the most
ample and irrefragable external as well as internal evidence. What then
must be the feeling of any ordinary mind on hearing, on the other
hand, that men of undoubted piety and learning, as well as unquestioned
orthodoxy, within the Church of England, admit that the Bible is totally
without literary or historical evidence, and cannot for a moment be
upheld upon any such grounds as the revealed word of God; that none of
the great doctrines of ecclesiastical Christianity can be deduced
from the Bible alone;(1) and that, "if it be impossible to accept
the literary method of dealing with Holy Scripture, the usual mode of
arguing the truth of Revelation, _ab extra_, merely from what are called
'Evidences'--whether of Miracles done or Prophecies uttered thousands of
years ago,--must also be insufficient."?(2) It cannot be much comfort
to be assured by them that, notwithstanding this absence of external
and internal evidence, this Revelation stands upon the sure basis of the
inspiration of a Church, which has so little ground in history for any
claim to infallibility. The unsupported testimony of a Church which in
every age has vehemently maintained errors and denounced truths which
are now universally recognized is no
{xcvi}
sufficient guarantee of Divine Revelation. Obviously, there is no ground
for accepting from a fallible Church and fallacious tradition doctrines
which, avowedly, are beyond the criterion of reason, and therefore
require miraculous evidence.
With belief based upon such uncertain grounds, and with such vital
difference of views regarding evidence, it is not surprising that
ecclesiastical Christianity has felt its own weakness, and entrenched
itself against the assaults of investigation. It is not strange that
intellectual vigour in any direction should, almost unconsciously, have
been regarded as dangerous to the repose and authority of the Church,
and that, instead of being welcomed as a virtue, religious inquiry
has almost been repelled as a crime. Such inquiry, however, cannot be
suppressed. Mere scientific questions may be regarded with apathy by
those who do not feel their personal bearing. It may possibly seem
to some a matter of little practical importance to them to determine
whether the earth revolves round the sun, or the sun round the earth;
but no earnest mind can fail to perceive the immense personal importance
of Truth in regard to Religion--the necessity of investigating, before
accepting, dogmas, the right interpretation of which is represented as
necessary to salvation,--and the clear duty, before abandoning reason
for faith, to exercise reason, in order that faith may not be mere
credulity. As Bacon remarked, the injunction: "Hold fast that which is
good," must always be preceded by the maxim: "Prove all things." Even
Archbishop Trench has said: "Credulity is as real, if not so great, a
sin as unbelief," applying the observation to the duty of demanding a
"sign" from any one professing to be the utterer of a revelation: "Else
might he lightly
{xcvii}
be persuaded to receive that as from God, which, indeed, was only the
word of man."(1) The acceptance of any revelation or dogma, however
apparently true in itself, without "sign"--without evidence satisfying
the reason, is absolute credulity. Even the most thorough advocate of
Faith must recognise that reason must be its basis, and that faith can
only legitimately commence where reason fails. The appeal is first to
reason if afterwards to faith, and no man pretending to intellectual
conscience can overlook the primary claim of reason. If it is to be
more than a mere question of priority of presentation whether we are
to accept Buddhism, Christianity, or Mahometanism, we must strictly and
fearlessly examine the evidence upon which they profess to stand. The
neglect of examination can never advance truth, as the severest scrutiny
can never retard it, but belief without discrimination can only foster
ignorance and superstition.
It was in this conviction that the following inquiry into the reality
of Divine Revelation was originally undertaken, and that others should
enter upon it. An able writer, who will not be suspected of exaggeration
on this subject, has said: "The majority of mankind, perhaps, owe their
belief rather to the outward influence of custom and education, than to
any strong principle of faith within; and it is to be feared that many
if they came to perceive how wonderful what they believed was, would
not find their belief so easy, and so matter-of-course a thing as they
appear to find it."(2) To no earnest mind can such inquiry be otherwise
than a serious and often a
{xcviii}
painful task, but, dismissing preconceived ideas and preferences derived
from habit and education, and seeking only the Truth, holding it,
whatever it may be, to be the only object worthy of desire, or capable
of satisfying a rational mind, the quest cannot but end in peace and
satisfaction. In such an investigation, however, to quote words of
Archbishop Whately: "It makes all the difference in the world whether
we place Truth in the first place or in the second place."--for if Truth
acquired do not compensate for every pet illusion dispelled, the path is
thorny indeed, although it must still be faithfully trodden.
AN INQUIRY INTO THE REALITY OF DIVINE REVELATION.
PART I.
CHAPTER I. MIRACLES IN RELATION TO CHRISTIANITY
At the very outset of inquiry into the origin and true character
of Christianity we are brought face to face with the Supernatural.
Christianity professes to be a Divine Revelation of truths which the
human intellect could not otherwise have discovered. It is not a form of
religion developed by the wisdom of man and appealing to his reason,
but a system miraculously communicated to the human race, the central
doctrines of which are either superhuman or untenable. If the truths
said to be revealed were either of an ordinary character or naturally
attainable they would at once discredit the claim to a Divine origin.
No one could maintain that a system discoverable by Reason would be
supernaturally communicated. The whole argument for Christianity turns
upon the necessity of such a Revelation and the consequent probability
that it would be made.
{2}
There is nothing singular, it may be remarked, in the claim of
Christianity to be a direct Revelation from God. With the exception
of the religions of Greece and Rome, which, however, also had their
subsidiary supposition of divine inspiration, there has scarcely been
any system of Religion which has not been proclaimed to the world as
a direct divine communication. Long before Christianity claimed this
character, the religions of India had anticipated the idea. To quote the
words of an accomplished scholar:--"According to the orthodox views of
Indian theologians, not a single line of the Veda was the work of human
authors. The whole Veda is in some way or other the work of the Deity;
and even those who received it were not supposed to be ordinary mortals,
but beings raised above the level of common humanity, and less liable,
therefore, to error in the reception of revealed truth."(1) The same
origin is claimed for the religion of Zoroaster, whose doctrines, beyond
doubt, exercised great influence at least upon later Jewish theology,
and whose Magian followers are appropriately introduced beside the
cradle of Jesus, as the first to do honour to the birth of Christianity.
In the same way Mahomet announced his religion as directly communicated
from heaven.
Christianity, however, as a religion professing to be divinely revealed,
is not only supernatural in origin and doctrine, but its claim to
acceptance is necessarily based upon supernatural evidence; for it is
obvious that truths which require to be miraculously communicated do
not come within the range of our intellect, and cannot, therefore, be
intelligently received upon internal testimony. "And, certainly," says
a recent able Bampton Lecturer, "if it was the will of God to give a
revelation, there are
{3}
plain and obvious reasons for asserting that miracles are necessary as
the guarantee and voucher for that revelation. A revelation is, properly
speaking, such only by virtue of telling us something which we could not
know without it. But how do we know that that communication of what
is undiscoverable by human reason is true? Our reason cannot prove the
truth of it, for it is by the very supposition beyond our reason. There
must be, then, some note or sign to certify to it and distinguish it
as a true communication from God, which note can be nothing else than a
miracle."(1) In another place the same Lecturer stigmatizes the belief
of the Mahometan "as in its very principle irrational," because he
accepts the account which Mahomet gave of himself, without supernatural
evidence.(2) The belief of the Christian is contrasted with it as
rational, "because the Christian believes in a supernatural
dispensation upon the proper evidence of such a dispensation, viz., the
miraculous."(3) Mahomet is reproached with having "an utterly barbarous
idea of evidence, and a total miscalculation of the claims of reason,"
because he did not consider miraculous evidence necessary to attest a
supernatural dispensation;" whereas the Gospel is adapted to perpetuity
for this cause especially, with others, that it was founded upon a true
calculation, and a foresight of the permanent need of evidence; our Lord
admitting the inadequacy of His own mere word, and the necessity of
a rational guarantee to His revelation of His own nature and
commission."(4)
{4}
The spontaneous offer of miraculous evidence, indeed, has always
been advanced as a special characteristic of Christianity, logically
entitling it to acceptance in contradistinction to all other religions.
"It is an acknowledged historical fact," says Bishop Butler, "that
Christianity offered itself to the world, and demanded to be received,
upon the allegation, i. e,, as unbelievers would speak, upon the
pretence, of miracles, publicly wrought to attest the truth of it in
such an age;... and Christianity, including the dispensation of the Old
Testament, seems distinguished by this from all other religions."(1)
Most of the great English divines have clearly recognized and asserted
the necessity of supernatural evidence to establish the reality of
a supernatural revelation. Bishop Butler affirms miracles and the
completion of prophecy to be the "direct and fundamental proofs" of
Christianity.(2) Elsewhere he says: "The notion of a miracle, considered
as a proof of a divine mission, has been stated with great exactness by
divines, and is, I think, sufficiently understood by every one. There
are also invisible miracles, the Incarnation of Christ, for instance,
which, being secret, cannot be alleged as a proof of such a mission; but
require themselves to be proved by visible miracles. Revelation itself,
too, is miraculous; and miracles are the proof of it."(3) Paley states
the case with equal clearness: "In what way can a revelation be made but
by miracles? In none which we are able to conceive."(4) His argument in
fact is founded upon the principle that: "nothing but miracles
{5}
could decide the authority" of Christianity.(1) In another work he
asserts that no man can prove a future retribution, but the teacher
"who testifies by miracles that his doctrine comes from God."(2) Bishop
Atterbury, again, referring to the principal doctrines of ecclesiastical
Christianity, says: "It is this kind of Truth that God is properly said
to reveal; Truths, of which, unless revealed, we should have always
continued ignorant; and 'tis in order only to prove these Truths to have
been really revealed, that we affirm Miracles to be Necessary."(3)
Dr. Heurtley, the Margaret Professor of Divinity in the University of
Oxford, after pointing out that the doctrines taught as the Christian
Revelation are such as could not by any possibility have been attained
by the unassisted human reason, and that, consequently, it is reasonable
that they should be attested by miracles, continues: "Indeed, it seems
inconceivable how without miracles--including prophecy in the notion
of a miracle--it could sufficiently have commended itself to men's
belief? Who would believe, or would be justified in believing, the
great facts which constitute its substance on the _ipse dixit_ of an
unaccredited teacher? and how, except by miracles, could the first
teacher be accredited? Paley, then, was fully warranted in the
assertion.... that 'we cannot conceive a revelation'--such a revelation
of course as Christianity professes to be, a revelation of truths which
transcend man's ability to discover,--' to be
{6}
substantiated without miracles.' Other credentials, it is true, might
be exhibited _in addition_ to miracles,--and such it would be natural
to look for,--but it seems impossible that miracles could be dispensed
with."(1) Dr. Mansel, the late Dean of St. Paul's, bears similar
testimony: "A teacher who proclaims himself to be specially sent by God,
and whose teaching is to be received on the authority of that mission,
must, from the nature of the case, establish his claim by proofs
of another kind than those which merely evince his human wisdom or
goodness. A superhuman authority needs to be substantiated by superhuman
evidence; and what is superhuman is miraculous."(2)
Dr. J. H. Newman, in discussing the idea and scope of miracles, says: "A
Revelation, that is, a direct message from God to man, itself bears in
some degree a miraculous character;... And as a Revelation itself, so
again the evidences of a Revelation may all more or less be considered
miraculous.... It might even be said that, strictly speaking, no
evidence of a Revelation is conceivable which does not partake of the
character of a Miracle; since nothing but a display of power over the
existing system of things can attest the immediate presence of Him by
whom it was originally established."(3)
Dr. Mozley has stated in still stronger terms the necessity that
Christianity should be authenticated by the evidence of miracles. He
supposes the case that a person of evident integrity and loftiness of
character had appeared, eighteen centuries ago, announcing himself as
pre-existent from all eternity, the Son of God, Maker
{7}
of the world, who had come down from heaven and assumed the form and
nature of man in order to be the Lamb of God that taketh away the sins
of the world, and so on, enumerating other doctrines of Christianity.
Dr. Mozley then asks: "What would be the inevitable conclusion of sober
reason respecting that person? The necessary conclusion of sober
reason respecting that person would be that he was disordered in his
understanding... By no rational being could a just and benevolent life
be accepted as proof of such astonishing announcements. Miracles are the
necessary complement, then, of the truth of such announcements, which,
without them, are purposeless and abortive, the unfinished fragments of
a design which is nothing unless it is the whole. They are necessary to
the justification of such announcements, which indeed, unless they
are supernatural truths, are the wildest delusions."(1) He, therefore,
concludes that: "Christianity cannot be maintained as a revelation
undiscoverable by human reason, a revelation of a supernatural scheme
for man's salvation, without the evidence of miracles."(2)
In all points, Christianity is emphatically a Supernatural Religion
claiming to be divine in its origin, superhuman in its essence and
miraculous in its evidence. It cannot be accepted without an absolute
belief in Miracles, and those who profess to hold the religion whilst
they discredit its supernatural elements--and they are many at the
present day--have widely seceded from ecclesiastical Christianity.
Miracles, it is true, are external to Christianity in so far as they
are evidential, but inasmuch as it is admitted that miracles alone can
attest the reality of Divine Revelation they are still inseparable
{8}
from it; and as the contents of the Revelation are so to say more
miraculous than its attesting miracles, the supernatural enters into the
very substance of Christianity and cannot be eliminated. It is obvious,
therefore, that the reality of miracles is the vital point in the
investigation which we have undertaken. If the reality of miracles
cannot be established, Christianity loses the only evidence by which
its truth can be sufficiently attested. If miracles be incredible the
supernatural Revelation and its miraculous evidence must together be
rejected.
This fact is thoroughly recognized by the ablest Christian divines. Dean
Mansel, speaking of the position of miracles in regard to Christianity,
says: "The question, however, assumes a very different character when it
relates, not to the comparative importance of miracles as evidences, but
to their reality as facts, and as facts of a supernatural kind. For if
this is denied, the denial does not merely remove one of the supports of
a faith which may yet rest securely on other grounds. On the contrary,
the whole system of Christian belief with its evidences... all
Christianity in short, so far as it has any title to that name, so far
as it has any special relation to the person or the teaching of Christ,
is overthrown at the same time."(1) A little further on he says: "If
there be one fact recorded in Scripture which is entitled, in the
fullest sense of the word, to the name of a Miracle, the Resurrection of
Christ is that fact. Here, at least, is an instance in which the
entire Christian faith must stand or fall with our belief in the
supernatural."(2) He, therefore, properly repudiates the view, "which
represents the question of the possibility
{9}
of miracles as one which merely affects the _external accessories_
of Christianity, leaving the _essential doctrines_ untouched."(1) Dr.
Mozley in a similar manner argues the inseparable union of miracles
with the Christian faith. "Indeed not only are miracles _conjoined_ with
doctrine in Christianity, but miracles are inserted _in_ the doctrine
and are part of its contents. A man cannot state his belief as a
Christian in the terms of the Apostles' Creed without asserting them.
Can the doctrine of our Lord's Incarnation be disjoined from one
physical miracle? Can the doctrine of His justification of us and
intercession for us, be disjoined from another?... If a miracle is
incorporated as an article in a creed, that article of the creed, the
miracle, and the proof of it by a miracle, are all one thing. The great
miracles, therefore, upon the evidence of which the Christian scheme
rested, being thus inserted in the Christian Creed, the belief in the
Creed was of itself the belief in the miraculous evidence of it.... Thus
miracles and the supernatural contents of Christianity must stand or
fall together."(2) Dr. Heurtley, referring to the discussion of the
reality of miracles, exclaims: "It is not too much to say, therefore,
that the question is vital as regards Christianity."(3) Canon Westcott
not less emphatically makes the same statement. "It is evident," he
says, "that if the claim to be a miraculous religion is essentially
incredible apostolic Christianity is simply false.... The essence of
Christianity lies in a miracle; and if it can be shown that a miracle is
either impossible or incredible, all further inquiry into the details of
its history is superfluous
{10}
in a religious point of view."(1) Similarly, a recent Hulsean lecturer,
Dr. Farrar, has said: "However skilfully the modern ingenuity of
semi-belief may have tampered with supernatural interpositions, it is
clear to every honest and unsophisticated mind that, if miracles be
incredible, Christianity is false. If Christ wrought no miracles,
then the Gospels are untrustworthy;... If the Resurrection be merely
a spiritual idea, or a mythicized hallucination, then our religion has
been founded on an error...." (2)
It has been necessary clearly to point out this indissoluble connection
between ecclesiastical Christianity and the supernatural, in order
that the paramount importance of the question as to the credibility of
miracles should be duly appreciated. Our inquiry into the reality
of Divine Revelation, then, whether we consider its contents or its
evidence, practically reduces itself to the very simple issue: Are
miracles antecedently credible? Did they ever really take place? We do
not intend to confine ourselves merely to a discussion of the abstract
question, but shall also endeavour to form a correct estimate of the
value of the specific allegations which are advanced.
2.
Having then ascertained that miracles are absolutely necessary to attest
the reality of Divine Revelation we may proceed to examine them
more closely, and for the present we shall confine ourselves to the
representations of these phenomena which are given in the Bible.
Throughout the Old Testament the doctrine is inculcated
{11}
that supernatural communications must have supernatural attestation. God
is described as arming his servants with power to perform wonders, in
order that they may thus be accredited as his special messengers.
The Patriarchs and the people of Israel generally are represented as
demanding "a sign" of the reality of communications said to come from
God, without which, we are led to suppose, they not only would not
have believed, but would have been justified in disbelieving, that the
message actually came from him. Thus Gideon(1) asks for a sign that
the Lord talked with him, and Hezekiah(2) demands proof of the truth of
Isaiah's prophecy that he should be restored to health. It is, however,
unnecessary to refer to instances, for it may be affirmed that upon all
occasions miraculous evidence of an alleged divine mission is stated to
have been required and accorded.
The startling information is at the same time given, however, that
miracles may be wrought to attest what is false as well as to accredit
what is true. In one place,(3) it is declared that if a prophet actually
gives a sign or wonder and it comes to pass, but teaches the people,
on the strength of it, to follow other gods, they are not to hearken
to him, and the prophet is to be put to death. The false miracle is,
here,(4) attributed to God himself: "For the Lord your God proveth you,
to know whether ye love the Lord your God with all your heart and with
all your soul." In the book of the Prophet Ezekiel, the case is stated
in a still stronger way, and God is represented as directly deceiving
the prophet: "And if the prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a
thing, I the Lord have deceived that prophet, and I will
{12}
stretch out my hand upon him, and will destroy him from the midst of my
people Israel."(1) God, in fact, is represented as exerting his almighty
power to deceive a man and then as destroying him for being deceived. In
the same spirit is the passage(2) in which Micaiah describes the Lord as
putting a lying spirit into the mouths of the prophets who incited Ahab
to go to Ramoth-Gilead. Elsewhere,(3) and notably in the New Testament,
we find an ascription of real signs and wonders to another power than
God. Jesus himself is represented as warning his disciples against false
prophets, who work signs and wonders: "Many will say to me in that day,
Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name? and in thy name cast out
devils? and in thy name done many wonderful works?" of whom he should
say: "I never knew you; depart from me, ye that work iniquity."(4) And
again in another place: "For false prophets shall arise, and shall
work signs and wonders [--Greek--] to seduce, if it were possible, the
elect."(5) Also, when the Pharisees accuse him of casting out devils
by Beelzebub the prince of the devils, Jesus asks: "By whom do your
children cast them out?"(6) a reply which would lose all its point if
they were not admitted to be able to cast out devils. In another passage
John is described as saying: "Master, we saw one casting out devils
in thy name, who followeth not us, and we forbad him."(7) Without
multiplying instances, however, there can be no doubt of the fact
{13}
that the reality of false miracles and lying wonders is admitted in the
Bible.
The obvious deduction from this representation of miracles is that
the source and purpose of such supernatural phenomena must always
be exceedingly uncertain.(1) Their evidential value is, therefore,
profoundly affected, "it being," as Dr. Newman has said of ambiguous
miracles, "antecedently improbable that the Almighty should rest the
credit of His Revelation upon events which but obscurely implied His
immediate presence."(2) As it is affirmed that other supernatural beings
exist, as well as an assumed Personal God, by whose agency miracles are
performed, it is impossible to argue with reason that such phenomena are
at any time specially due to the intervention of the Deity. Dr. Newman
recognizes this, but passes over the difficulty with masterly lightness
of touch. After advancing the singular argument that our knowledge of
spirits is only derived from Scripture, and that their existence cannot
be deduced from nature, whilst he asserts that the being of a God--a
Personal God be it remembered--can be so discovered, and that,
therefore, miracles can only properly be attributed to him, he proceeds:
"Still it may be necessary to show that on our own principles we are
not open to inconsistency. That is, it has been questioned whether,
in admitting the existence and power of Spirits on the authority of
Revelation, we are not in danger of
{14}
invalidating the evidence upon which that authority rests. For the
cogency of the argument for Miracles depends on the assumption, that
interruptions in the course of nature must ultimately proceed from God;
which is not true, if they may be effected by other beings without His
sanction. And it must be conceded, that, explicit as Scripture is in
considering Miracles as signs of divine agency, it still does seem to
give created Spirits some power of working them; and even, in its
most literal sense, intimates the possibility of their working them in
opposition to the true doctrine. (Deut. xiii. 1-3; Matt. xxiv. 24; 2
Thess. ii. 9-ll.)"(1) Dr. Newman repudiates the attempts of various
writers to overcome this difficulty by making a distinction between
great miracles and small, many miracles and few, or by referring to the
nature of the doctrine attested in order to determine the author of the
miracle, or by denying the power of spirits altogether, and explaining
away Scripture statements of demoniacal possession and the narrative
of the Lord's Temptation. "Without having recourse to any of these
dangerous modes of answering the objection," he says, "it may be
sufficient to reply, that, since, agreeably to the antecedent sentiment
of reason, God has adopted miracles as the seal of a divine message, we
believe He will never suffer them to be so counterfeited as to deceive
the humble inquirer."(2) This is the only reply which even so powerful
a reasoner as Dr. Newman can give to an objection based on distinct
statements of Scripture itself. He cannot deny the validity of the
objection, he can only hope or believe in spite of it Personal belief
independent of evidence is the most common and the weakest of arguments;
at the
{15}
best it is prejudice masked in the garb of Reason. It is perfectly clear
that miracles being thus acknowledged to be common both to God and to
other spirits they cannot be considered a distinctive attestation of
divine intervention; and, as Spinoza finely argued, not even the mere
existence of God can be inferred from them; for as a miracle is a
limited act, and never expresses more than a certain and limited power,
it is certain that we cannot from such an effect, conclude even the
existence of a cause whose power is infinite.(1)
This dual character obviously leads to many difficulties in defining the
evidential function and force of miracles, and we may best appreciate
the dilemma which is involved by continuing to follow the statements and
arguments of divines themselves. To the question whether miracles are
absolutely to command the obedience of those in whose sight they
are performed, and whether, upon their attestation, the doer and his
doctrine are to be accepted as of God, Archbishop Trench unhesitatingly
replies: "It cannot be so, for side by side with the miracles which
serve for the furthering of the kingdom of God runs another line of
wonders, the counter-workings of him who is ever the ape of the Most
High."(2) The deduction is absolutely logical and cannot be denied.
"This fact," he says, "that the kingdom of lies has its wonders no less
than the kingdom of truth, is itself sufficient evidence that miracles
cannot be appealed
{16}
to absolutely and finally, in proof of the doctrine which the worker of
them proclaims." This being the case, it is important to discover how
miracles perform their function as the indispensable evidence for a
Divine Revelation, for with this disability they do not seem to possess
much potentiality. Archbishop Trench, then, offers the following
definition of the function of miracles: "A miracle does not prove the
truth of a doctrine, or the divine mission of him that brings it to
pass. That which alone it claims for him at the first is a right to be
listened to: it puts him in the alternative of being from heaven or from
hell. The doctrine must first commend itself to the conscience as being
_good_, and only then can the miracle seal it as _divine_. But the first
appeal is from the doctrine to the conscience, to the moral nature of
man."(1) Under certain circumstances, he maintains, their evidence
is utterly to be rejected. "But the purpose of the miracle," he says,
"being, as we have seen, to confirm that which is good, so, upon the
other hand, where the mind and conscience witness against the doctrine,
not all the miracles in the world have a right to demand submission to
the word which they seal. On the contrary, the great act of faith
{17}
is to believe, against, and in despite of them all, in what God has
revealed to, and implanted in the soul of the holy and the true; not to
believe another Gospel, though an Angel from heaven, or one transformed
into such, should bring it (Deut. xiii. 3; Gal. i. 8); and instead of
compelling assent, miracles are then rather warnings to us that we keep
aloof, for they tell us that not merely lies are here, for to that the
conscience bore witness already, but that he who utters them is more
than a common deceiver, is eminently 'a liar and an Anti-christ,'
a false prophet, --standing in more immediate connection than other
deceived and evil men to the kingdom of darkness, so that Satan has
given him his power (Rev. xiii. 2), is using him to be an especial
organ of his, and to do a special work for him."(1) And he lays down the
distinct principle that: "The miracle must witness for itself, and the
doctrine must witness for itself, and then, and then only, the first is
capable of witnessing for the second."(2)
These opinions are not peculiar to the Archbishop of Dublin, but are
generally held by divines, although Dr. Trench expresses them with
unusual absence of reserve. Dr. Mozley emphatically affirms the same
doctrine when he says: "A miracle cannot oblige us to accept any
doctrine which is contrary to our moral nature, or to a fundamental
principle of religion."(3) Dr. Mansel speaks to the same effect: "If a
teacher claiming to work miracles proclaims doctrines contradictory to
previously established truths, whether to the conclusions of natural
religion or to the teaching of a former revelation, such a contradiction
is allowed even by the most zealous defenders of the evidential value of
miracles, to
{18}
invalidate the authority of the teacher. But the right conclusion from
this admission is not that true miracles are invalid as evidences, but
that the supposed miracles in this case are not true miracles at all;
i. e., are not the effects of Divine power, but of human deception or
of some other agency."(1) A passage from a letter written by Dr. Arnold
which is quoted by Dr. Trench in support of his views, both illustrates
the doctrine and the necessity which has led to its adoption: "You
complain," says Dr. Arnold, writing to Dr. Hawkins, "of those persons
who judge of a revelation not by its evidence, but by its substance. It
has always seemed to me that its substance is a most essential part of
its evidence; and that miracles wrought in favour of what was foolish or
wicked would only prove Manicheism. We are so perfectly ignorant of the
unseen world, that the character of any supernatural power can only be
judged by the moral character of the statements which it sanctions.
Thus only can we tell whether it be a revelation from God or from the
Devil."(2) In another place Dr. Arnold declares: "Miracles must not be
allowed to overrule the Gospel; for it is only through our belief in the
Gospel that we accord our belief to them."(3)
{19}
It is obvious that the mutual dependence which is thus established
between miracles and the doctrines in connection with which they are
wrought destroys the evidential force of miracles, and that the first
and the final appeal is made to reason. The doctrine in fact proves the
miracle instead of the miracle attesting the doctrine. Divines of course
attempt to deny this, but no other deduction from their own statements
is logically possible. Miracles, according to Scripture itself, are
producible by various supernatural beings and may be Satanic as well as
Divine; man, on the other hand, is so ignorant of the unseen world that
avowedly he cannot, from the miracle itself, determine the agent by whom
it was performed;(l) the miracle, therefore, has no intrinsic evidential
value. How, then, according to divines, does it attain any potentiality?
Only through a favourable decision on the part of Reason or the "moral
nature in man" regarding the
{20}
character of the doctrine. The result of the appeal to Reason respecting
the morality and credibility of the doctrine determines the evidential
status of the miracle. The doctrine, therefore, is the real criterion
of the miracle which, without it, is necessarily an object of doubt and
suspicion.
We have already casually referred to Dr. Newman's view of such a
relation between Miracle and doctrine, but may here more fully quote his
suggestive remarks. "Others by referring to the nature of the doctrine
attested," he says, "in order to determine the author of the miracle,
have exposed themselves to the plausible charge of adducing, first the
miracle to attest the divinity of the doctrine, and then the doctrine to
prove the divinity of the Miracle."(1) This argument he characterizes as
one of the "dangerous modes" of removing a difficulty, although he does
not himself point out a safer, and, in a note, he adds: "There is an
appearance of doing honour to the Christian doctrines in representing
them as _intrinsically_ credible, which leads many into supporting
opinions which, carried to their full extent, supersede the need of
Miracles altogether. It must be recollected, too, that they who are
allowed to praise have the privilege of finding fault, and may reject,
according to their _a priori_ notions, as well as receive. Doubtless
the divinity of a clearly immoral doctrine could not be evidenced by
Miracles; for our belief in the moral attributes of God is much stronger
than our conviction of the negative proposition, that none but He can
interfere with the system of nature.(3) But there is always
{21}
the danger of extending this admission beyond its proper limits, of
supposing ourselves adequate judges of the _tendency_ of doctrines; and,
because unassisted Reason informs us what is moral and immoral in
our own case, of attempting to decide on the abstract morality of
actions;... These remarks are in nowise inconsistent with using (as
was done in a former section) our actual knowledge of God's attributes,
obtained from a survey of nature and human affairs, in determining the
probability of certain professed Miracles having proceeded from Him. It
is one thing to infer from the experience of life, another to imagine
the character of God from the gratuitous conceptions of our own
minds."(1) Although Dr. Newman apparently fails to perceive that he
himself thus makes reason the criterion of miracles and therefore incurs
the condemnation with which our quotation opens, the very indecision of
his argument illustrates the dilemma in which divines are placed. Dr.
Mozley, however, still more directly condemns the principle which we
are discussing--that the doctrine must be the criterion of the
miracle--although he also, as we have purposes for which it never was
intended, and is unfitted. To rationalise in matters of Revelation is to
make our reason the standard and measure of the doctrines revealed;
to stipulate that those doctrines should be such as to carry with them
their own justification; to reject them, if they come in collision with
our existing opinions or habits of thought, or are with difficulty
harmonised with our existing stock of knowledge" (Essays, Crit. and
Hist., 1872, vol. i. p. 31); and a little further on: "A like desire of
judging for one's self is discernible in the original fall of man. Eve
did not believe the Tempter any more than God's word, till she perceived
"the fruit was good for food '" (76., p. 33). Dr. Newman, of course,
wishes to limit his principle precisely to suit his own convenience,
but in permitting the rejection of a supposed Revelation in spite
of miracles, on the ground of our disapproval of its morality, it is
obvious that the doctrine is substantially made the final criterion of
the miracle.
{22}
seen, elsewhere substantially affirms it. He says: "The position that
the revelation proves the miracles, and not the miracles the revelation,
admits of a good qualified meaning; but taken literally, it is a double
offence against the rule, that things are properly proved by the proper
proof of them; for a supernatural fact _is_ the proper proof of a
supernatural doctrine; while a supernatural doctrine, on the other hand,
is certainly _not_ the proper proof of a supernatural fact"(1)
This statement is obviously true, but it is equally undeniable that,
their origin being uncertain, miracles have no distinctive evidential
force. How far, then, we may inquire in order thoroughly to understand
the position, can doctrines prove the reality of miracles or determine
the agency by which they are performed? In the case of moral truths
within the limits of reason, it is evident that doctrines which are
in accordance with our ideas of what is good and right do not require
miraculous evidence at all. They can secure acceptance by their own
merits alone. At the same time it is universally admitted that the
truth or goodness of a doctrine is in itself no proof that it emanates
directly from God, and consequently the most obvious wisdom and beauty
in the doctrine could not attest the divine origin of a miracle. Such
truths, however, have no proper connection with revelation at all.
"_These_ truths," to quote the words of Bishop Atterbury, "were of
themselves sufficiently obvious and plain, and needed not a Divine
Testimony to make them plainer. But the Truths which are necessary in
this Manner to be attested, are those which are of Positive Institution;
those, which if God had not pleased to reveal them, Human Reason could
not
{23}
have discovered; and those, which, even now they are revealed, Human
Reason cannot fully account for, and perfectly comprehend."(1) How is
it possible then that Reason or "the moral nature in man" can approve as
good, or appreciate the fitness of, doctrines which in their very nature
are beyond the criterion of reason?(2) What reply, for instance, can
reason give to any appeal to it regarding the doctrine of the Trinity
or of the Incarnation? If doctrines the truth and goodness of which
are apparent do not afford any evidence of Divine Revelation, how can
doctrines which Reason can neither discover nor comprehend attest the
Divine origin of miracles? Dr. Mozley clearly recognizes that they
cannot do so. "The proof of a revelation," he says, and we may add, "the
proof of a miracle--itself a species of revelation--which is contained
in the substance of a revelation has this inherent check or limit in it:
viz. that it cannot reach to what is undiscoverable by reason. Internal
evidence is itself an appeal to reason, because at every step the test
is our own appreciation of such and such an idea or doctrine, our own
perception of its fitness; but human reason cannot in the nature of
the case prove that which, by the very hypothesis, lies beyond human
reason."(3) It naturally follows that no doctrine which lies beyond
reason, and therefore requires the attestation of miracles, can possibly
afford that indication of the source and reality of miracles which is
necessary to endow them with evidential value, and the supernatural
doctrine must, therefore, be rejected in the absence of miraculous
evidence of a decisive character.
{24}
Canon Mozley labours earnestly, but unsuccessfully, to restore to
Miracles as evidence some part of that potentiality of which these
unfortunate limitations have deprived them. Whilst on the one hand he
says: "We must admit, indeed, an inherent modification in the function
of a miracle as an instrument of proof,"(1) he argues that this is only
a limitation, and no disproof of it, and he contends that: "The
evidence of miracles is not negatived because it has conditions."(2)
His reasoning, however, is purely apologetic, and attempts by the unreal
analogy of supposed limitations of natural principles and evidence to
excuse the disqualifying limitation of the supernatural. He is quite
conscious of the serious difficulty of the position: "The question," he
says, "may at first sight create a dilemma--If a miracle is nugatory on
the side of one doctrine, what cogency has it on the side of another? Is
it legitimate to accept its evidence when we please, and reject it when
we please?" The only reply he seems able to give to these very pertinent
questions is the remark which immediately follows them: "But in truth a
miracle is never without an argumentative force, although that force may
be counterbalanced."(3) In other words a miracle is always an argument
although it is often a bad one. It is scarcely necessary to go to the
supernatural for bad arguments.
It might naturally be expected that the miraculous evidence selected to
accredit a Divine Revelation should possess certain unique and marked
characteristics. It must, at least, be clearly distinctive of Divine
power, and exclusively associated with Divine truth. It is inconceivable
that the Deity, deigning thus to attest
{25}
the reality of a communication from himself of truths beyond the
criterion of reason, should not make the evidence simple and complete,
because, the doctrines proper to such a revelation not being appreciable
from internal evidence, it is obvious that the external testimony for
them--if it is to be of any use--must be unmistakable and decisive. The
evidence which is actually produced, however, so far from satisfying
these legitimate anticipations, lacks every one of the qualifications
which reason antecedently declares to be necessary. Miracles are not
distinctive of Divine power but are common to Satan, and they are
admitted to be performed in support of falsehood as well as in the
service of truth. They bear, indeed, so little upon them the impress
of their origin and true character, that they arc dependent for their
recognition upon our judgment of the very doctrines to attest which they
are said to have been designed.
Even taking the representation of miracles, therefore, which divines
themselves give, they are utterly incompetent to perform their
contemplated functions. If they are superhuman they are not
super-satanic, and there is no sense in which they can be considered
miraculously evidential of anything. To argue, as theologians do, that
the ambiguity of their testimony is deliberately intended as a trial
of our faith is absurd, for Reason being unable to judge of the nature
either of supernatural fact or supernatural doctrine, it would be mere
folly and injustice to subject to such a test beings avowedly incapable
of sustaining it. Whilst it is absolutely necessary, then, that a Divine
Revelation should be attested by miraculous evidence to justify our
believing it the testimony so called seems in all respects
{26}
unworthy of the name, and presents anomalies much more suggestive of
human invention than Divine originality. We are, in fact, prepared even
by the Scriptural account of miracles to expect that further examination
will supply an explanation of such phenomena which will wholly remove
them from the region of the supernatural.
{27}