Mr. Wordsworth, in his person, is above the middle size, with marked

features, and an air somewhat stately and Quixotic. He reminds one of

some of Holbein's heads, grave, saturnine, with a slight indication of

sly humour, kept under by the manners of the age or by the pretensions

of the person. He has a peculiar sweetness in his smile, and great depth

and manliness and a rugged harmony, in the tones of his voice. His

manner of reading his own poetry is particularly imposing; and in his

favourite passages his eye beams with preternatural lustre, and the

meaning labours slowly up from his swelling breast. No one who has seen

him at these moments could go away with an impression that he was a "man

of no mark or likelihood." Perhaps the comment of his face and voice is

necessary to convey a full idea of his poetry. His language may not be

intelligible, but his manner is not to be mistaken. It is clear that

he is either mad or inspired. In company, even in a _tête-à-tête_, Mr.

Wordsworth is often silent, indolent, and reserved. If he is become

verbose and oracular of late years, he was not so in his better days.

He threw out a bold or an indifferent remark without either effort or

pretension, and relapsed into musing again. He shone most (because he

seemed most roused and animated) in reciting his own poetry, or in

talking about it. He sometimes gave striking views of his feelings and

trains of association in composing certain passages; or if one did

not always understand his distinctions, still there was no want of

interest--there was a latent meaning worth inquiring into, like a vein

of ore that one Cannot exactly hit upon at the moment, but of which

there are sure indications. His standard of poetry is high and severe,

almost to exclusiveness. He admits of nothing below, scarcely of any

thing above himself. It is fine to hear him talk of the way in which

certain subjects should have been treated by eminent poets, according to

his notions of the art. Thus he finds fault with Dryden's description of

Bacchus in the _Alexander's Feast_, as if he were a mere good-looking

youth, or boon companion--

"Flushed with a purple grace,

He shews his honest face"--

instead of representing the God returning from the conquest of India,

crowned with vine-leaves, and drawn by panthers, and followed by troops

of satyrs, of wild men and animals that he had tamed. You would thank,

in hearing him speak on this subject, that you saw Titian's picture of

the meeting of _Bacchus and Ariadne_--so classic were his conceptions,

so glowing his style. Milton is his great idol, and he sometimes dares

to compare himself with him. His Sonnets, indeed, have something of the

same high-raised tone and prophetic spirit. Chaucer is another prime

favourite of his, and he has been at the pains to modernise some of the

Canterbury Tales. Those persons who look upon Mr. Wordsworth as a merely

puerile writer, must be rather at a loss to account for his strong

predilection for such geniuses as Dante and Michael Angelo. We do not

think our author has any very cordial sympathy with Shakespear. How

should he? Shakespear was the least of an egotist of any body in the

world. He does not much relish the variety and scope of dramatic

composition. "He hates those interlocutions between Lucius and Caius."

Yet Mr. Wordsworth himself wrote a tragedy when he was young; and we

have heard the following energetic lines quoted from it, as put into the

mouth of a person smit with remorse for some rash crime:

----"Action is momentary,

The motion of a muscle this way or that;

Suffering is long, obscure, and infinite!"

Perhaps for want of light and shade, and the unshackled spirit of the

drama, this performance was never brought forward. Our critic has a

great dislike to Gray, and a fondness for Thomson and Collins. It is

mortifying to hear him speak of Pope and Dryden, whom, because they have

been supposed to have all the possible excellences of poetry, he will

allow to have none. Nothing, however, can be fairer, or more amusing,

than the way in which he sometimes exposes the unmeaning verbiage of

modern poetry. Thus, in the beginning of Dr. Johnson's _Vanity of Human

Wishes_--

"Let observation with extensive view

Survey mankind from China to Peru"--

he says there is a total want of imagination accompanying the words,

the same idea is repeated three times under the disguise of a different

phraseology: it comes to this--"let _observation_, with extensive

_observation, observe_ mankind;" or take away the first line, and the

second,

"Survey mankind from China to Peru,"

literally conveys the whole. Mr. Wordsworth is, we must say, a perfect

Drawcansir as to prose writers. He complains of the dry reasoners and

matter-of-fact people for their want of _passion_; and he is jealous of

the rhetorical declaimers and rhapsodists as trenching on the province

of poetry. He condemns all French writers (as well of poetry as prose)

in the lump. His list in this way is indeed small. He approves of

Walton's Angler, Paley, and some other writers of an inoffensive modesty

of pretension. He also likes books of voyages and travels, and Robinson

Crusoe. In art, he greatly esteems Bewick's wood-cuts, and Waterloo's

sylvan etchings. But he sometimes takes a higher tone, and gives his

mind fair play. We have known him enlarge with a noble intelligence and

enthusiasm on Nicolas Poussin's fine landscape-compositions, pointing

out the unity of design that pervades them, the superintending mind,

the imaginative principle that brings all to bear on the same end;

and declaring he would not give a rush for any landscape that did not

express the time of day, the climate, the period of the world it was

meant to illustrate, or had not this character of _wholeness_ in it. His

eye also does justice to Rembrandt's fine and masterly effects. In the

way in which that artist works something out of nothing, and transforms

the stump of a tree, a common figure into an _ideal_ object, by the

gorgeous light and shade thrown upon it, he perceives an analogy to his

own mode of investing the minute details of nature with an atmosphere

of sentiment; and in pronouncing Rembrandt to be a man of genius, feels

that he strengthens his own claim to the title. It has been said of

Mr. Wordsworth, that "he hates conchology, that he hates the Venus of

Medicis." But these, we hope, are mere epigrams and _jeux-d'esprit_, as

far from truth as they are free from malice; a sort of running satire or

critical clenches--

"Where one for sense and one for rhyme

Is quite sufficient at one time."

We think, however, that if Mr. Wordsworth had been a more liberal and

candid critic, he would have been a more sterling writer. If a greater

number of sources of pleasure had been open to him, he would have

communicated pleasure to the world more frequently. Had he been less

fastidious in pronouncing sentence on the works of others, his own would

have been received more favourably, and treated more leniently.

The current of his feelings is deep, but narrow; the range of his

understanding is lofty and aspiring rather than discursive. The force,

the originality, the absolute truth and identity with which he feels

some things, makes him indifferent to so many others. The simplicity and

enthusiasm of his feelings, with respect to nature, renders him bigotted

and intolerant in his judgments of men and things. But it happens to

him, as to others, that his strength lies in his weakness; and perhaps

we have no right to complain. We might get rid of the cynic and the

egotist, and find in his stead a common-place man. We should "take the

good the Gods provide us:" a fine and original vein of poetry is not

one of their most contemptible gifts, and the rest is scarcely worth

thinking of, except as it may be a mortification to those who expect

perfection from human nature; or who have been idle enough at some

period of their lives, to deify men of genius as possessing claims above

it. But this is a chord that jars, and we shall not dwell upon it.

Lord Byron we have called, according to the old proverb, "the spoiled

child of fortune:" Mr. Wordsworth might plead, in mitigation of some

peculiarities, that he is "the spoiled child of disappointment." We are

convinced, if he had been early a popular poet, he would have borne his

honours meekly, and would have been a person of great _bonhommie_ and

frankness of disposition. But the sense of injustice and of undeserved

ridicule sours the temper and narrows the views. To have produced works

of genius, and to find them neglected or treated with scorn, is one of

the heaviest trials of human patience. We exaggerate our own merits when

they are denied by others, and are apt to grudge and cavil at every

particle of praise bestowed on those to whom we feel a conscious

superiority. In mere self-defence we turn against the world, when it

turns against us; brood over the undeserved slights we receive; and thus

the genial current of the soul is stopped, or vents itself in effusions

of petulance and self-conceit. Mr. Wordsworth has thought too much of

contemporary critics and criticism; and less than he ought of the award

of posterity, and of the opinion, we do not say of private friends, but

of those who were made so by their admiration of his genius. He did not

court popularity by a conformity to established models, and he ought

not to have been surprised that his originality was not understood as a

matter of course. He has _gnawed too much on the bridle_; and has often

thrown out crusts to the critics, in mere defiance or as a point of

honour when he was challenged, which otherwise his own good sense would

have withheld. We suspect that Mr. Wordsworth's feelings are a little

morbid in this respect, or that he resents censure more than he is

gratified by praise. Otherwise, the tide has turned much in his favour

of late years--he has a large body of determined partisans--and is at

present sufficiently in request with the public to save or relieve him

from the last necessity to which a man of genius can be reduced--that

of becoming the God of his own idolatry!

* * * * *

MR. MALTHUS.

Mr. Malthus may be considered as one of those rare and fortunate writers

who have attained a _scientific_ reputation in questions of moral and

political philosophy. His name undoubtedly stands very high in the

present age, and will in all probability go down to posterity with more

or less of renown or obloquy. It was said by a person well qualified

to judge both from strength and candour of mind, that "it would take

a thousand years at least to answer his work on Population." He has

certainly thrown a new light on that question, and changed the aspect of

political economy in a decided and material point of view--whether he

has not also endeavoured to spread a gloom over the hopes and more

sanguine speculations of man, and to cast a slur upon the face of

nature, is another question. There is this to be said for Mr. Malthus,

that in speaking of him, one knows what one is talking about. He is

something beyond a mere name--one has not to _beat the bush_ about his

talents, his attainments, his vast reputation, and leave off without

knowing what it all amounts to--he is not one of those great men, who

set themselves off and strut and fret an hour upon the stage, during a

day-dream of popularity, with the ornaments and jewels borrowed from the

common stock, to which nothing but their vanity and presumption gives

them the least individual claim--he has dug into the mine of truth, and

brought up ore mixed with dross! In weighing his merits we come at once

to the question of what he has done or failed to do. It is a specific

claim that he sets up. When we speak of Mr. Malthus, we mean the _Essay

on Population_; and when we mention the Essay on Population, we mean

a distinct leading proposition, that stands out intelligibly from all

trashy pretence, and is a ground on which to fix the levers that may

move the world, backwards or forwards. He has not left opinion where

he found it; he has advanced or given it a wrong bias, or thrown a

stumbling-block in its way. In a word, his name is not stuck, like so

many others, in the firmament of reputation, nobody knows why, inscribed

in great letters, and with a transparency of TALENTS, GENIUS, LEARNING

blazing round it--it is tantamount to an idea, it is identified with

a principle, it means that _the population cannot go on perpetually

increasing without pressing on the limits of the means of subsistence,

and that a check of some kind or other must, sooner or later, be opposed

to it_. This is the essence of the doctrine which Mr. Malthus has been

the first to bring into general notice, and as we think, to establish

beyond the fear of contradiction. Admitting then as we do the prominence

and the value of his claims to public attention, it yet remains a

question, how far those claims are (as to the talent displayed in them)

strictly original; how far (as to the logical accuracy with which he has

treated the subject) he has introduced foreign and doubtful matter

into it; and how far (as to the spirit in which he has conducted his

inquiries, and applied a general principle to particular objects) he has

only drawn fair and inevitable conclusions from it, or endeavoured to

tamper with and wrest it to sinister and servile purposes. A writer who

shrinks from following up a well-founded principle into its untoward

consequences from timidity or false delicacy, is not worthy of the

name of a philosopher: a writer who assumes the garb of candour and an

inflexible love of truth to garble and pervert it, to crouch to power

and pander to prejudice, deserves a worse title than that of a sophist!

Mr. Malthus's first octavo volume on this subject (published in the year

1798) was intended as an answer to Mr. Godwin's _Enquiry concerning

Political Justice_. It was well got up for the purpose, and had an

immediate effect. It was what in the language of the ring is called _a

facer_. It made Mr. Godwin and the other advocates of Modern Philosophy

look about them. It may be almost doubted whether Mr. Malthus was in the

first instance serious in many things that he threw out, or whether he

did not hazard the whole as an amusing and extreme paradox, which might

puzzle the reader as it had done himself in an idle moment, but to which

no practical consequence whatever could attach. This state of mind would

probably continue till the irritation of enemies and the encouragement

of friends convinced him that what he had at first exhibited as an idle

fancy was in fact a very valuable discovery, or "like the toad ugly and

venomous, had yet a precious jewel in its head." Such a supposition

would at least account for some things in the original Essay, which

scarcely any writer would venture upon, except as professed exercises of

ingenuity, and which have been since in part retracted. But a wrong

bias was thus given, and the author's theory was thus rendered warped,

disjointed, and sophistical from the very outset.

Nothing could in fact be more illogical (not to say absurd) than the

whole of Mr. Malthus's reasoning applied as an answer (_par excellence_)

to Mr. Godwin's book, or to the theories of other Utopian philosophers.

Mr. Godwin was not singular, but was kept in countenance by many

authorities, both ancient and modern, in supposing a state of society

possible in which the passions and wills of individuals would be

conformed to the general good, in which the knowledge of the best means

of promoting human welfare and the desire of contributing to it

would banish vice and misery from the world, and in which, the

stumbling-blocks of ignorance, of selfishness, and the indulgence of

gross appetite being removed, all things would move on by the mere

impulse of wisdom and virtue, to still higher and higher degrees of

perfection and happiness. Compared with the lamentable and gross

deficiencies of existing institutions, such a view of futurity as barely

possible could not fail to allure the gaze and tempt the aspiring

thoughts of the philanthropist and the philosopher: the hopes and the

imaginations of speculative men could not but rush forward into this

ideal world as into a _vacuum_ of good; and from "the mighty stream of

tendency" (as Mr. Wordsworth in the cant of the day calls it,) there was

danger that the proud monuments of time-hallowed institutions, that the

strong-holds of power and corruption, that "the Corinthian capitals of

polished society," with the base and pediments, might be overthrown

and swept away as by a hurricane. There were not wanting persons whose

ignorance, whose fears, whose pride, or whose prejudices contemplated

such an alternative with horror; and who would naturally feel no small

obligation to the man who should relieve their apprehensions from the

stunning roar of this mighty change of opinion that thundered at a

distance, and should be able, by some logical apparatus or unexpected

turn of the argument, to prevent the vessel of the state from being

hurried forward with the progress of improvement, and dashed in pieces

down the tremendous precipice of human perfectibility. Then comes Mr.

Malthus forward with the geometrical and arithmetical ratios in his

hands, and holds them out to his affrighted contemporaries as the only

means of salvation. "For" (so argued the author of the Essay) "let the

principles of Mr. Godwin's Enquiry and of other similar works be carried

literally and completely into effect; let every corruption and abuse of

power be entirely got rid of; let virtue, knowledge, and civilization

be advanced to the greatest height that these visionary reformers would

suppose; let the passions and appetites be subjected to the utmost

control of reason and influence of public opinion: grant them, in

a word, all that they ask, and the more completely their views are

realized, the sooner will they be overthrown again, and the more

inevitable and fatal will be the catastrophe. For the principle of

population will still prevail, and from the comfort, ease, and plenty

that will abound, will receive an increasing force and _impetus_; the

number of mouths to be fed will have no limit, but the food that is to

supply them cannot keep pace with the demand for it; we must come to a

stop somewhere, even though each square yard, by extreme improvements in

cultivation, could maintain its man: in this state of things there

will be no remedy, the wholesome checks of vice and misery (which have

hitherto kept this principle within bounds) will have been done away;

the voice of reason will be unheard; the passions only will bear

sway; famine, distress, havoc, and dismay will spread around; hatred,

violence, war, and bloodshed will be the infallible consequence, and

from the pinnacle of happiness, peace, refinement, and social advantage,

we shall be hurled once more into a profounder abyss of misery, want,

and barbarism than ever, by the sole operation of the principle of

population!"--Such is a brief abstract of the argument of the Essay.

Can any thing be less conclusive, a more complete fallacy and _petitio

principii_? Mr. Malthus concedes, he assumes a state of perfectibility,

such as his opponents imagined, in which the general good is to obtain

the entire mastery of individual interests, and reason of gross

appetites and passions; and then he argues that such a perfect structure

of society will fall by its own weight, or rather be undermined by the

principle of population, because in the highest possible state of the

subjugation of the passions to reason, they will be absolutely lawless

and unchecked, and because as men become enlightened, quick sighted

and public-spirited, they will shew themselves utterly blind to the

consequences of their actions, utterly indifferent to their own

well-being and that of all succeeding generations, whose fate is placed

in their hands. This we conceive to be the boldest paralogism that ever

was offered to the world, or palmed upon willing credulity. Against

whatever other scheme of reform this objection might be valid, the

one it was brought expressly to overturn was impregnable against it,

invulnerable to its slightest graze. Say that the Utopian reasoners are

visionaries, unfounded; that the state of virtue and knowledge they

suppose, in which reason shall have become all-in-all, can never take

place, that it is inconsistent with the nature of man and with all

experience, well and good--but to say that society will have attained

this high and "palmy state," that reason will have become the master-

key to all our motives, and that when arrived at its greatest power it

will cease to act at all, but will fall down dead, inert, and senseless

before the principle of population, is an opinion which one would

think few people would choose to advance or assent to, without strong

inducements for maintaining or believing it.

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