But heroes on paper might degenerate into vagabonds in practice,

Corinnas into courtezans. Thus a refined and permanent individual

attachment is intended to supply the place and avoid the inconveniences

of marriage; but vows of eternal constancy, without church security, are

found to be fragile. A member of the _ideal_ and perfect commonwealth of

letters lends another a hundred pounds for immediate and pressing use;

and when he applies for it again, the borrower has still more need of it

than he, and retains it for his own especial, which is tantamount to the

public good. The Exchequer of pure reason, like that of the State, never

refunds. The political as well as the religious fanatic appeals from

the over-weening opinion and claims of others to the highest and most

impartial tribunal, namely, his own breast. Two persons agree to

live together in Chambers on principles of pure equality and mutual

assistance--but when it comes to the push, one of them finds that the

other always insists on his fetching water from the pump in Hare-court,

and cleaning his shoes for him. A modest assurance was not the least

indispensable virtue in the new perfectibility code; and it was hence

discovered to be a scheme, like other schemes where there are all prizes

and no blanks, for the accommodation of the enterprizing and cunning, at

the expence of the credulous and honest. This broke up the system, and

left no good odour behind it! Reason has become a sort of bye-word, and

philosophy has "fallen first into a fasting, then into a sadness,

then into a decline, and last, into the dissolution of which we all

complain!" This is a worse error than the former: we may be said to have

"lost the immortal part of ourselves, and what remains is beastly!"

The point of view from which this matter may be fairly considered, is

two-fold, and may be stated thus:--In the first place, it by no means

follows, because reason is found not to be the only infallible or safe

rule of conduct, that it is no rule at all; or that we are to discard it

altogether with derision and ignominy. On the contrary, if not the sole,

it is the principal ground of action; it is "the guide, the stay and

anchor of our purest thoughts, and soul of all our moral being." In

proportion as we strengthen and expand this principle, and bring our

affections and subordinate, but perhaps more powerful motives of action

into harmony with it, it will not admit of a doubt that we advance to

the goal of perfection, and answer the ends of our creation, those ends

which not only morality enjoins, but which religion sanctions. If with

the utmost stretch of reason, man cannot (as some seemed inclined to

suppose) soar up to the God, and quit the ground of human frailty, yet,

stripped wholly of it, he sinks at once into the brute. If it cannot

stand alone, in its naked simplicity, but requires other props to

buttress it up, or ornaments to set it off; yet without it the moral

structure would fall flat and dishonoured to the ground. Private reason

is that which raises the individual above his mere animal instincts,

appetites and passions: public reason in its gradual progress separates

the savage from the civilized state. Without the one, men would resemble

wild beasts in their dens; without the other, they would be speedily

converted into hordes of barbarians or banditti. Sir Walter Scott, in

his zeal to restore the spirit of loyalty, of passive obedience and

non-resistance as an acknowledgment for his having been created a

Baronet by a Prince of the House of Brunswick, may think it a fine thing

to return in imagination to the good old times, "when in Auvergne

alone, there were three hundred nobles whose most ordinary actions were

robbery, rape, and murder," when the castle of each Norman baron was

a strong hold from which the lordly proprietor issued to oppress and

plunder the neighbouring districts, and when the Saxon peasantry

were treated by their gay and gallant tyrants as a herd of loathsome

swine--but for our own parts we beg to be excused; we had rather live

in the same age with the author of Waverley and Blackwood's Magazine.

Reason is the meter and alnager in civil intercourse, by which each

person's upstart and contradictory pretensions are weighed and approved

or found wanting, and without which it could not subsist, any more than

traffic or the exchange of commodities could be carried on without

weights and measures. It is the medium of knowledge, and the polisher of

manners, by creating common interests and ideas. Or in the words of a

contemporary writer, "Reason is the queen of the moral world, the soul

of the universe, the lamp of human life, the pillar of society, the

foundation of law, the beacon of nations, the golden chain let down from

heaven, which links all accountable and all intelligent natures in one

common system--and in the vain strife between fanatic innovation and

fanatic prejudice, we are exhorted to dethrone this queen of the world,

to blot out this light of the mind, to deface this fair column, to break

in pieces this golden chain! We are to discard and throw from us with

loud taunts and bitter execrations that reason, which has been the lofty

theme of the philosopher, the poet, the moralist, and the divine, whose

name was not first named to be abused by the enthusiasts of the French

Revolution, or to be blasphemed by the madder enthusiasts, the advocates

of Divine Right, but which is coeval with, and inseparable from the

nature and faculties of man--is the image of his Maker stamped upon him

at his birth, the understanding breathed into him with the breath of

life, and in the participation and improvement of which alone he is

raised above the brute creation and his own physical nature!"--The

overstrained and ridiculous pretensions of monks and ascetics were never

thought to justify a return to unbridled licence of manners, or the

throwing aside of all decency. The hypocrisy, cruelty, and fanaticism,

often attendant on peculiar professions of sanctity, have not banished

the name of religion from the world. Neither can "the unreasonableness

of the reason" of some modern sciolists "so unreason our reason," as to

debar us of the benefit of this principle in future, or to disfranchise

us of the highest privilege of our nature. In the second place, if it is

admitted that Reason alone is not the sole and self-sufficient ground of

morals, it is to Mr. Godwin that we are indebted for having settled the

point. No one denied or distrusted this principle (before his time) as

the absolute judge and interpreter in all questions of difficulty;

and if this is no longer the case, it is because he has taken this

principle, and followed it into its remotest consequences with more

keenness of eye and steadiness of hand than any other expounder of

ethics. His grand work is (at least) an _experimentum crucis_ to shew

the weak sides and imperfections of human reason as the sole law of

human action. By overshooting the mark, or by "flying an eagle flight,

forth and right on," he has pointed out the limit or line of separation,

between what is practicable and what is barely conceivable--by imposing

impossible tasks on the naked strength of the will, he has discovered

how far it is or is not in our power to dispense with the illusions of

sense, to resist the calls of affection, to emancipate ourselves from

the force of habit; and thus, though he has not said it himself, has

enabled others to say to the towering aspirations after good, and to the

over-bearing pride of human intellect--"Thus far shalt thou come, and no

farther!" Captain Parry would be thought to have rendered a service

to navigation and his country, no less by proving that there is no

North-West Passage, than if he had ascertained that there is one: so Mr.

Godwin has rendered an essential service to moral science, by attempting

(in vain) to pass the Arctic Circle and Frozen Regions, where the

understanding is no longer warmed by the affections, nor fanned by the

breeze of fancy! This is the effect of all bold, original, and powerful

thinking, that it either discovers the truth, or detects where error

lies; and the only crime with which Mr. Godwin can be charged as a

political and moral reasoner is, that he has displayed a more ardent

spirit, and a more independent activity of thought than others, in

establishing the fallacy (if fallacy it be) of an old popular prejudice

that _the Just and True were one_, by "championing it to the Outrance,"

and in the final result placing the Gothic structure of human virtue

on an humbler, but a wider and safer foundation than it had hitherto

occupied in the volumes and systems of the learned. Mr. Godwin is an

inventor in the regions of romance, as well as a skilful and hardy

explorer of those of moral truth. _Caleb Williams_ and _St. Leon_ are

two of the most splendid and impressive works of the imagination that

have appeared in our times. It is not merely that these novels are very

well for a philosopher to have produced--they are admirable and complete

in themselves, and would not lead you to suppose that the author, who is

so entirely at home in human character and dramatic situation, had ever

dabbled in logic or metaphysics. The first of these, particularly, is

a master-piece, both as to invention and execution. The romantic and

chivalrous principle of the love of personal fame is embodied in the

finest possible manner in the character of Falkland;[B] as in Caleb

Williams (who is not the first, but the second character in the piece)

we see the very demon of curiosity personified. Perhaps the art with

which these two characters are contrived to relieve and set off each

other, has never been surpassed in any work of fiction, with the

exception of the immortal satire of Cervantes. The restless and

inquisitive spirit of Caleb Williams, in search and in possession of

his patron's fatal secret, haunts the latter like a second conscience,

plants stings in his tortured mind, fans the flame of his jealous

ambition, struggling with agonized remorse; and the hapless but

noble-minded Falkland at length falls a martyr to the persecution of

that morbid and overpowering interest, of which his mingled virtues and

vices have rendered him the object. We conceive no one ever began Caleb

Williams that did not read it through: no one that ever read it could

possibly forget it, or speak of it after any length of time, but with an

impression as if the events and feelings had been personal to himself.

This is the case also with the story of St. Leon, which, with less

dramatic interest and intensity of purpose, is set off by a more

gorgeous and flowing eloquence, and by a crown of preternatural imagery,

that waves over it like a palm-tree! It is the beauty and the charm of

Mr. Godwin's descriptions that the reader identifies himself with the

author; and the secret of this is, that the author has identified

himself with his personages. Indeed, he has created them. They are the

proper issue of his brain, lawfully begot, not foundlings, nor the

"bastards of his art." He is not an indifferent, callous spectator of

the scenes which he himself pourtrays, but without seeming to feel them.

There is no look of patch-work and plagiarism, the beggarly copiousness

of borrowed wealth; no tracery-work from worm-eaten manuscripts, from

forgotten chronicles, nor piecing out of vague traditions with fragments

and snatches of old ballads, so that the result resembles a gaudy,

staring transparency, in which you cannot distinguish the daubing of the

painter from the light that shines through the flimsy colours and gives

them brilliancy. Here all is clearly made out with strokes of the

pencil, by fair, not by factitious means. Our author takes a given

subject from nature or from books, and then fills it up with the ardent

workings of his own mind, with the teeming and audible pulses of his own

heart. The effect is entire and satisfactory in proportion. The work

(so to speak) and the author are one. We are not puzzled to decide upon

their respective pretensions. In reading Mr. Godwin's novels, we know

what share of merit the author has in them. In reading the _Scotch

Novels_, we are perpetually embarrassed in asking ourselves this

question; and perhaps it is not altogether a false modesty that prevents

the editor from putting his name in the title-page--he is (for any thing

we know to the contrary) only a more voluminous sort of Allen-a-Dale.

At least, we may claim this advantage for the English author, that the

chains with which he rivets our attention are forged out of his own

thoughts, link by link, blow for blow, with glowing enthusiasm: we see

the genuine ore melted in the furnace of fervid feeling, and moulded

into stately and _ideal_ forms; and this is so far better than peeping

into an old iron shop, or pilfering from a dealer in marine stores!

There is one drawback, however, attending this mode of proceeding, which

attaches generally, indeed, to all originality of composition; namely,

that it has a tendency to a certain degree of monotony. He who draws

upon his own resources, easily comes to an end of his wealth. Mr.

Godwin, in all his writings, dwells upon one idea or exclusive view of a

subject, aggrandises a sentiment, exaggerates a character, or pushes an

argument to extremes, and makes up by the force of style and continuity

of feeling for what he wants in variety of incident or ease of manner.

This necessary defect is observable in his best works, and is still more

so in Fleetwood and Mandeville; the one of which, compared with his more

admired performances, is mawkish, and the other morbid. Mr. Godwin is

also an essayist, an historian--in short, what is he not, that belongs

to the character of an indefatigable and accomplished author? His _Life

of Chaucer_ would have given celebrity to any man of letters possessed

of three thousand a year, with leisure to write quartos: as the legal

acuteness displayed in his _Remarks on Judge Eyre's Charge to the

Jury_ would have raised any briefless barrister to the height of his

profession. This temporary effusion did more--it gave a turn to the

trials for high treason in the year 1794, and possibly saved the lives

of twelve innocent individuals, marked out as political victims to the

Moloch of Legitimacy, which then skulked behind a British throne,

and had not yet dared to stalk forth (as it has done since) from its

lurking-place, in the face of day, to brave the opinion of the world. If

it had then glutted its maw with its intended prey (the sharpness of Mr.

Godwin's pen cut the legal cords with which it was attempted to bind

them), it might have done so sooner, and with more lasting effect. The

world do not know (and we are not sure but the intelligence may startle

Mr. Godwin himself), that he is the author of a volume of Sermons, and

of a Life of Chatham.[C]

Mr. Fawcett (an old friend and fellow-student of our author, and who

always spoke of his writings with admiration, tinctured with wonder)

used to mention a circumstance with respect to the last-mentioned work,

which may throw some light on the history and progress of Mr. Godwin's

mind. He was anxious to make his biographical account as complete as

he could, and applied for this purpose to many of his acquaintance to

furnish him with anecdotes or to suggest criticisms. Amongst others Mr.

Fawcett repeated to him what he thought a striking passage in a speech

on _General Warrants_ delivered by Lord Chatham, at which he (Mr.

Fawcett) had been present. "Every man's house" (said this emphatic

thinker and speaker) "has been called his castle. And why is it called

his castle? Is it because it is defended by a wall, because it is

surrounded with a moat? No, it may be nothing more than a straw-built

shed. It may be open to all the elements: the wind may enter in, the

rain may enter in--but the king _cannot_ enter in!" His friend thought

that the point was here palpable enough: but when he came to read the

printed volume, he found it thus _transposed_: "Every man's house is his

castle. And why is it called so? Is it because it is defended by a wall,

because it is surrounded with a moat? No, it may be nothing more than a

straw-built shed. It may be exposed to all the elements: the rain may

enter into it, _all the winds of Heaven may whistle round it_, but the

king cannot, &c." This was what Fawcett called a defect of _natural

imagination_. He at the same time admitted that Mr. Godwin had improved

his native sterility in this respect; or atoned for it by incessant

activity of mind and by accumulated stores of thought and powers of

language. In fact, his _forte_ is not the spontaneous, but the voluntary

exercise of talent. He fixes his ambition on a high point of excellence,

and spares no pains or time in attaining it. He has less of the

appearance of a man of genius, than any one who has given such decided

and ample proofs of it. He is ready only on reflection: dangerous only

at the rebound. He gathers himself up, and strains every nerve and

faculty with deliberate aim to some heroic and dazzling atchievement of

intellect: but he must make a career before he flings himself, armed,

upon the enemy, or he is sure to be unhorsed. Or he resembles an

eight-day clock that must be wound up long before it can strike.

Therefore, his powers of conversation are but limited. He has neither

acuteness of remark, nor a flow of language, both which might be

expected from his writings, as these are no less distinguished by a

sustained and impassioned tone of declamation than by novelty of opinion

or brilliant tracks of invention. In company, Horne Tooke used to make

a mere child of him--or of any man! Mr. Godwin liked this treatment[D],

and indeed it is his foible to fawn on those who use him _cavalierly_,

and to be cavalier to those who express an undue or unqualified

admiration of him. He looks up with unfeigned respect to acknowledged

reputation (but then it must be very well ascertained before he admits

it)--and has a favourite hypothesis that Understanding and Virtue are

the same thing. Mr. Godwin possesses a high degree of philosophical

candour, and studiously paid the homage of his pen and person to Mr.

Malthus, Sir James Macintosh, and Dr. Parr, for their unsparing attacks

on him; but woe to any poor devil who had the hardihood to defend him

against them! In private, the author of _Political Justice_ at one

time reminded those who knew him of the metaphysician engrafted on

the Dissenting Minister. There was a dictatorial, captious, quibbling

pettiness of manner. He lost this with the first blush and awkwardness

of popularity, which surprised him in the retirement of his study;

and he has since, with the wear and tear of society, from being too

pragmatical, become somewhat too careless. He is, at present, as easy as

an old glove. Perhaps there is a little attention to effect in this,

and he wishes to appear a foil to himself. His best moments are with an

intimate acquaintance or two, when he gossips in a fine vein about old

authors, Clarendon's _History of the Rebellion_, or Burnet's _History of

his own Times_; and you perceive by your host's talk, as by the taste

of seasoned wine, that he has a _cellarage_ in his understanding! Mr.

Godwin also has a correct _acquired_ taste in poetry and the drama. He

relishes Donne and Ben Jonson, and recites a passage from either with an

agreeable mixture of pedantry and _bonhommie_. He is not one of those

who do not grow wiser with opportunity and reflection: he changes his

opinions, and changes them for the better. The alteration of his taste

in poetry, from an exclusive admiration of the age of Queen Anne to an

almost equally exclusive one of that of Elizabeth, is, we suspect, owing

to Mr. Coleridge, who some twenty years ago, threw a great stone into

the standing pool of criticism, which splashed some persons with the

mud, but which gave a motion to the surface and a reverberation to the

neighbouring echoes, which has not since subsided. In common company,

Mr. Godwin either goes to sleep himself, or sets others to sleep. He is

at present engaged in a History of the Commonwealth of England.--_Esto

perpetua!_ In size Mr. Godwin is below the common stature, nor is his

deportment graceful or animated. His face is, however, fine, with an

expression of placid temper and recondite thought. He is not unlike the

common portraits of Locke. There is a very admirable likeness of him by

Mr. Northcote, which with a more heroic and dignified air, only does

justice to the profound sagacity and benevolent aspirations of our

author's mind. Mr. Godwin has kept the best company of his time, but he

has survived most of the celebrated persons with whom he lived in habits

of intimacy. He speaks of them with enthusiasm and with discrimination;

and sometimes dwells with peculiar delight on a day passed at John

Kemble's in company with Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Curran, Mrs. Wolstonecraft

and Mrs. Inchbald, when the conversation took a most animated turn

and the subject was of Love. Of all these our author is the only one

remaining. Frail tenure, on which human life and genius are lent us for

a while to improve or to enjoy!

[Footnote A: Shaftesbury made this an objection to Christianity, which

was answered by Foster, Leland, and other eminent divines, on the

ground that Christianity had a higher object in view, namely, general

philanthropy.]

[Footnote B: Mr. Fuseli used to object to this striking delineation a

want of historical correctness, inasmuch as the animating principle of

the true chivalrous character was the sense of honour, not the mere

regard to, or saving of, appearances. This, we think, must be an

hypercriticism, from all we remember of books of chivalry and heroes of

romance.]

[Footnote C: We had forgotten the tragedies of Antonio and Ferdinand.

Peace be with their _manes_!]

[Footnote D: To be sure, it was redeemed by a high respect, and by some

magnificent compliments. Once in particular, at his own table, after a

good deal of _badinage_ and cross-questioning about his being the author

of the Reply to Judge Eyre's Charge, on Mr. Godwin's acknowledging that

he was, Mr. Tooke said, "Come here then,"--and when his guest went round

to his chair, he took his hand, and pressed it to his lips, saying--"I

can do no less for the hand that saved my life!"]

* * * * *

MR. COLERIDGE.

The present is an age of talkers, and not of doers; and the reason is,

that the world is growing old. We are so far advanced in the Arts and

Sciences, that we live in retrospect, and doat on past atchievements.

The accumulation of knowledge has been so great, that we are lost in

wonder at the height it has reached, instead of attempting to climb

or add to it; while the variety of objects distracts and dazzles the

looker-on. What _niche_ remains unoccupied? What path untried? What is

the use of doing anything, unless we could do better than all those who

have gone before us? What hope is there of this? We are like those who

have been to see some noble monument of art, who are content to admire

without thinking of rivalling it; or like guests after a feast,

who praise the hospitality of the donor "and thank the bounteous

Pan"--perhaps carrying away some trifling fragments; or like the

spectators of a mighty battle, who still hear its sound afar off, and

the clashing of armour and the neighing of the war-horse and the shout

of victory is in their ears, like the rushing of innumerable waters!

Mr. Coleridge has "a mind reflecting ages past:" his voice is like

the echo of the congregated roar of the "dark rearward and abyss" of

thought. He who has seen a mouldering tower by the side of a chrystal

lake, hid by the mist, but glittering in the wave below, may conceive

the dim, gleaming, uncertain intelligence of his eye: he who has marked

the evening clouds uprolled (a world of vapours), has seen the picture

of his mind, unearthly, unsubstantial, with gorgeous tints and

ever-varying forms--

"That which was now a horse, even with a thought

The rack dislimns, and makes it indistinct

As water is in water."

Our author's mind is (as he himself might express it) _tangential_.

There is no subject on which he has not touched, none on which he has

rested. With an understanding fertile, subtle, expansive, "quick,

forgetive, apprehensive," beyond all living precedent, few traces of it

will perhaps remain. He lends himself to all impressions alike; he gives

up his mind and liberty of thought to none. He is a general lover of art

and science, and wedded to no one in particular. He pursues knowledge as

a mistress, with outstretched hands and winged speed; but as he is

about to embrace her, his Daphne turns--alas! not to a laurel! Hardly a

speculation has been left on record from the earliest time, but it is

loosely folded up in Mr. Coleridge's memory, like a rich, but somewhat

tattered piece of tapestry; we might add (with more seeming than real

extravagance), that scarce a thought can pass through the mind of man,

but its sound has at some time or other passed over his head with

rustling pinions. On whatever question or author you speak, he is

prepared to take up the theme with advantage--from Peter Abelard down

to Thomas Moore, from the subtlest metaphysics to the politics of the

_Courier_. There is no man of genius, in whose praise he descants, but

the critic seems to stand above the author, and "what in him is weak, to

strengthen, what is low, to raise and support:" nor is there any work of

genius that does not come out of his hands like an Illuminated Missal,

sparkling even in its defects. If Mr. Coleridge had not been the most

impressive talker of his age, he would probably have been the finest

writer; but he lays down his pen to make sure of an auditor, and

mortgages the admiration of posterity for the stare of an idler. If he

had not been a poet, he would have been a powerful logician; if he had

not dipped his wing in the Unitarian controversy, he might have soared

to the very summit of fancy. But in writing verse, he is trying

to subject the Muse to _transcendental_ theories: in his abstract

reasoning, he misses his way by strewing it with flowers. All that he

has done of moment, he had done twenty years ago: since then, he may be

said to have lived on the sound of his own voice. Mr. Coleridge is too

rich in intellectual wealth, to need to task himself to any drudgery: he

has only to draw the sliders of his imagination, and a thousand subjects

expand before him, startling him with their brilliancy, or losing

themselves in endless obscurity--

"And by the force of blear illusion,

They draw him on to his confusion."

What is the little he could add to the stock, compared with the

countless stores that lie about him, that he should stoop to pick up a

name, or to polish an idle fancy? He walks abroad in the majesty of an

universal understanding, eyeing the "rich strond," or golden sky above

him, and "goes sounding on his way," in eloquent accents, uncompelled

and free!

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