Chapter 1.1 the important and intimate causal connection between these

two sections of the science of evolution--between the evolution of the

individual and that of his ancestors. We have formulated this

connection in the biogenetic law; the shorter evolution, that of the

individual, or ontogenesis, is a rapid and summary repetition, a

condensed recapitulation, of the larger evolution, or that of the

species. In this principle we express all the essential points

relating to the causes of evolution; and we shall seek throughout this

work to confirm this principle and lend it the support of facts. When

we look to its CAUSAL significance, perhaps it would be better to

formulate the biogenetic law thus: "The evolution of the species and

the stem (phylon) shows us, in the physiological functions of heredity

and adaptation, the conditioning causes on which the evolution of the

individual depends"; or, more briefly: "Phylogenesis is the mechanical

cause of ontogenesis."

But before we examine the great achievement by which Darwin revealed

the causes of evolution to us, we must glance at the efforts of

earlier scientists to attain this object. Our historical inquiry into

these will be even shorter than that into the work done in the field

of ontogeny. We have very few names to consider here. At the head of

them we find the great French naturalist, Jean Lamarck, who first

established evolution as a scientific theory in 1809. Even before his

time, however, the chief philosopher, Kant, and the chief poet,

Goethe, of Germany had occupied themselves with the subject. But their

efforts passed almost without recognition in the eighteenth century. A

"philosophy of nature" did not arise until the beginning of the

nineteenth century. In the whole of the time before this no one had

ventured to raise seriously the question of the origin of species,

which is the culminating point of phylogeny. On all sides it was

regarded as an insoluble enigma.

The whole science of the evolution of man and the other animals is

intimately connected with the question of the nature of species, or

with the problem of the origin of the various animals which we group

together under the name of species. Thus the definition of the species

becomes important. It is well known that this definition was given by

Linne, who, in his famous Systema Naturae (1735), was the first to

classify and name the various groups of animals and plants, and drew

up an orderly scheme of the species then known. Since that time

"species" has been the most important and indispensable idea in

descriptive natural history, in zoological and botanical

classification; although there have been endless controversies as to

its real meaning.

What, then, is this "organic species"? Linne himself appealed directly

to the Mosaic narrative; he believed that, as it is stated in Genesis,

one pair of each species of animals and plants was created in the

beginning, and that all the individuals of each species are the

descendants of these created couples. As for the hermaphrodites

(organisms that have male and female organs in one being), he thought

it sufficed to assume the creation of one sole individual, since this

would be fully competent to propagate its species. Further developing

these mystic ideas, Linne went on to borrow from Genesis the account

of the deluge and of Noah's ark as a ground for a science of the

geographical and topographical distribution of organisms. He accepted

the story that all the plants, animals, and men on the earth were

swept away in a universal deluge, except the couples preserved with

Noah in the ark, and ultimately landed on Mount Ararat. This mountain

seemed to Linne particularly suitable for the landing, as it reaches a

height of more than 16,000 feet, and thus provides in its higher zones

the several climates demanded by the various species of animals and

plants: the animals that were accustomed to a cold climate could

remain at the summit; those used to a warm climate could descend to

the foot; and those requiring a temperate climate could remain

half-way down. From this point the re-population of the earth with

animals and plants could proceed.

It was impossible to have any scientific notion of the method of

evolution in Linne's time, as one of the chief sources of information,

paleontology, was still wholly unknown. This science of the fossil

remains of extinct animals and plants is very closely bound up with

the whole question of evolution. It is impossible to explain the

origin of living organisms without appealing to it. But this science

did not rise until a much later date. The real founder of scientific

paleontology was Georges Cuvier, the most distinguished zoologist who,

after Linne, worked at the classification of the animal world, and

effected a complete revolution in systematic zoology at the beginning

of the nineteenth century. In regard to the nature of the species he

associated himself with Linne and the Mosaic story of creation, though

this was more difficult for him with his acquaintance with fossil

remains. He clearly showed that a number of quite different animal

populations have lived on the earth; and he claimed that we must

distinguish a number of stages in the history of our planet, each of

which was characterised by a special population of animals and plants.

These successive populations were, he said, quite independent of each

other, and therefore the supernatural creative act, which was demanded

as the origin of the animals and plants by the dominant creed, must

have been repeated several times. In this way a whole series of

different creative periods must have succeeded each other; and in

connection with these he had to assume that stupendous revolutions or

cataclysms--something like the legendary deluge--must have taken place

repeatedly. Cuvier was all the more interested in these catastrophes

or cataclysms as geology was just beginning to assert itself, and

great progress was being made in our knowledge of the structure and

formation of the earth's crust. The various strata of the crust were

being carefully examined, especially by the famous geologist Werner

and his school, and the fossils found in them were being classified;

and these researches also seemed to point to a variety of creative

periods. In each period the earth's crust, composed of the various

strata, seemed to be differently constituted, just like the population

of animals and plants that then lived on it. Cuvier combined this

notion with the results of his own paleontological and zoological

research; and in his effort to get a consistent view of the whole

process of the earth's history he came to form the theory which is

known as "the catastrophic theory," or the theory of terrestrial

revolutions. According to this theory, there have been a series of

mighty cataclysms on the earth, and these have suddenly destroyed the

whole animal and plant population then living on it; after each

cataclysm there was a fresh creation of living things throughout the

earth. As this creation could not be explained by natural laws, it was

necessary to appeal to an intervention on the part of the Creator.

This catastrophic theory, which Cuvier described in a special work,

was soon generally accepted, and retained its position in biology for

half a century.

However, Cuvier's theory was completely overthrown sixty years ago by

the geologists, led by Charles Lyell, the most distinguished worker in

this field of science. Lyell proved in his famous Principles of

Geology (1830) that the theory was false, in so far as it concerned

the crust of the earth; that it was totally unnecessary to bring in

supernatural agencies or general catastrophes in order to explain the

structure and formation of the mountains; and that we can explain them

by the familiar agencies which are at work to-day in altering and

reconstructing the surface of the earth. These causes are--the action

of the atmosphere and water in its various forms (snow, ice, fog,

rain, the wear of the river, and the stormy ocean), and the volcanic

action which is exerted by the molten central mass. Lyell convincingly

proved that these natural causes are quite adequate to explain every

feature in the build and formation of the crust. Hence Cuvier's theory

of cataclysms was very soon driven out of the province of geology,

though it remained for another thirty years in undisputed authority in

biology. All the zoologists and botanists who gave any thought to the

question of the origin of organisms adhered to Cuvier's erroneous idea

of revolutions and new creations.

In order to illustrate the complete stagnancy of biology from 1830 to

1859 on the question of the origin of the various species of animals

and plants, I may say, from my own experience, that during the whole

of my university studies I never heard a single word said about this

most important problem of the science. I was fortunate enough at that

time (1852 to 1857) to have the most distinguished masters for every

branch of biological science. Not one of them ever mentioned this

question of the origin of species. Not a word was ever said about the

earlier efforts to understand the formation of living things, nor

about Lamarck's Philosophie Zoologique which had made a fresh attack

on the problem in 1809. Hence it is easy to understand the enormous

opposition that Darwin encountered when he took up the question for

the first time. His views seemed to float in the air, without a single

previous effort to support them. The whole question of the formation

of living things was considered by biologists, until 1859, as

pertaining to the province of religion and transcendentalism; even in

speculative philosophy, in which the question had been approached from

various sides, no one had ventured to give it serious treatment. This

was due to the dualistic system of Immanuel Kant, who taught a natural

system of evolution as far as the inorganic world was concerned; but,

on the whole, adopted a supernaturalist system as regards the origin

of living things. He even went so far as to say: "It is quite certain

that we cannot even satisfactorily understand, much less explain, the

nature of an organism and its internal forces on purely mechanical

principles; it is so certain, indeed, that we may confidently say: 'It

is absurd for a man to imagine even that some day a Newton will arise

who will explain the origin of a single blade of grass by natural laws

not controlled by design'--such a hope is entirely forbidden us." In

these words Kant definitely adopts the dualistic and teleological

point of view for biological science.

Nevertheless, Kant deserted this point of view at times, particularly

in several remarkable passages which I have dealt with at length in my

Natural History of Creation (chapter 5), where he expresses himself in

the opposite, or monistic, sense. In fact, these passages would

justify one, as I showed, in claiming his support for the theory of

evolution. However, these monistic passages are only stray gleams of

light; as a rule, Kant adheres in biology to the obscure dualistic

ideas, according to which the forces at work in inorganic nature are

quite different from those of the organic world. This dualistic system

prevails in academic philosophy to-day--most of our philosophers still

regarding these two provinces as totally distinct. They put, on the

one side, the inorganic or "lifeless" world, in which there are at

work only mechanical laws, acting necessarily and without design; and,

on the other, the province of organic nature, in which none of the

phenomena can be properly understood, either as regards their inner

nature or their origin, except in the light of preconceived design,

carried out by final or purposive causes.

The prevalence of this unfortunate dualistic prejudice prevented the

problem of the origin of species, and the connected question of the

origin of man, from being regarded by the bulk of people as a

scientific question at all until 1859. Nevertheless, a few

distinguished students, free from the current prejudice, began, at the

commencement of the nineteenth century, to make a serious attack on

the problem. The merit of this attaches particularly to what is known

as "the older school of natural philosophy," which has been so much

misrepresented, and which included Jean Lamarck, Buffon, Geoffroy St.

Hilaire, and Blainville in France; Wolfgang Goethe, Reinhold

Treviranus, Schelling, and Lorentz Oken in Germany [and Erasmus Darwin

in England].

The gifted natural philosopher who treated this difficult question

with the greatest sagacity and comprehensiveness was Jean Lamarck. He

was born at Bazentin, in Picardy, on August 1st, 1744; he was the son

of a clergyman, and was destined for the Church. But he turned to seek

glory in the army, and eventually devoted himself to science.

His Philosophie Zoologique was the first scientific attempt to sketch

the real course of the origin of species, the first "natural history

of creation" of plants, animals, and men. But, as in the case of

Wolff's book, this remarkably able work had no influence whatever;

neither one nor the other could obtain any recognition from their

prejudiced contemporaries. No man of science was stimulated to take an

interest in the work, and to develop the germs it contained of the

most important biological truths. The most distinguished botanists and

zoologists entirely rejected it, and did not even deign to reply to

it. Cuvier, who lived and worked in the same city, has not thought fit

to devote a single syllable to this great achievement in his memoir on

progress in the sciences, in which the pettiest observations found a

place. In short, Lamarck's Philosophie Zoologique shared the fate of

Wolff's theory of development, and was for half a century ignored and

neglected. The German scientists, especially Oken and Goethe, who were

occupied with similar speculations at the same time, seem to have

known nothing about Lamarck's work. If they had known it, they would

have been greatly helped by it, and might have carried the theory of

evolution much farther than they found it possible to do.

To give an idea of the great importance of the Philosophie Zoologique,

I will briefly explain Lamarck's leading thought. He held that there

was no essential difference between living and lifeless beings. Nature

is one united and connected system of phenomena; and the forces which

fashion the lifeless bodies are the only ones at work in the kingdom

of living things. We have, therefore, to use the same method of

investigation and explanation in both provinces. Life is only a

physical phenomenon. All the plants and animals, with man at their

head, are to be explained, in structure and life, by mechanical or

efficient causes, without any appeal to final causes, just as in the

case of minerals and other inorganic bodies. This applies equally to

the origin of the various species. We must not assume any original

creation, or repeated creations (as in Cuvier's theory), to explain

this, but a natural, continuous, and necessary evolution. The whole

evolutionary process has been uninterrupted. All the different kinds

of animals and plants which we see to-day, or that have ever lived,

have descended in a natural way from earlier and different species;

all come from one common stock, or from a few common ancestors. These

remote ancestors must have been quite simple organisms of the lowest

type, arising by spontaneous generation from inorganic matter. The

succeeding species have been constantly modified by adaptation to

their varying environment (especially by use and habit), and have

transmitted their modifications to their successors by heredity.

Lamarck was the first to formulate as a scientific theory the natural

origin of living things, including man, and to push the theory to its

extreme conclusions--the rise of the earliest organisms by spontaneous

generation (or abiogenesis) and the descent of man from the nearest

related mammal, the ape. He sought to explain this last point, which

is of especial interest to us here, by the same agencies which he

found at work in the natural origin of the plant and animal species.

He considered use and habit (adaptation) on the one hand, and heredity

on the other, to be the chief of these agencies. The most important

modifications of the organs of plants and animals are due, in his

opinion, to the function of these very organs, or to the use or disuse

of them. To give a few examples, the woodpecker and the humming-bird

have got their peculiarly long tongues from the habit of extracting

their food with their tongues from deep and narrow folds or canals;

the frog has developed the web between his toes by his own swimming;

the giraffe has lengthened his neck by stretching up to the higher

branches of trees, and so on. It is quite certain that this use or

disuse of organs is a most important factor in organic development,

but it is not sufficient to explain the origin of species.

To adaptation we must add heredity as the second and not less

important agency, as Lamarck perfectly recognised. He said that the

modification of the organs in any one individual by use or disuse was

slight, but that it was increased by accumulation in passing by

heredity from generation to generation. But he missed altogether the

principle which Darwin afterwards found to be the chief factor in the

theory of transformation--namely, the principle of natural selection

in the struggle for existence. It was partly owing to his failure to

detect this supremely important element, and partly to the poor

condition of all biological science at the time, that Lamarck did not

succeed in establishing more firmly his theory of the common descent

of man and the other animals.

Independently of Lamarck, the older German school of natural

philosophy, especially Reinhold Treviranus, in his Biologie (1802),

and Lorentz Oken, in his Naturphilosophie (1809), turned its attention

to the problem of evolution about the end of the eighteenth and

beginning of the nineteenth century. I have described its work in my

History of Creation (chapter 4). Here I can only deal with the

brilliant genius whose evolutionary ideas are of special interest--the

greatest of German poets, Wolfgang Goethe. With his keen eye for the

beauties of nature, and his profound insight into its life, Goethe was

early attracted to the study of various natural sciences. It was the

favourite occupation of his leisure hours throughout life. He gave

particular and protracted attention to the theory of colours. But the

most valuable of his scientific studies are those which relate to that

"living, glorious, precious thing," the organism. He made profound

research into the science of structures or morphology (morphae =

forms). Here, with the aid of comparative anatomy, he obtained the

most brilliant results, and went far in advance of his time. I may

mention, in particular, his vertebral theory of the skull, his

discovery of the pineal gland in man, his system of the metamorphosis

of plants, etc. These morphological studies led Goethe on to research

into the formation and modification of organic structures which we

must count as the first germ of the science of evolution. He

approaches so near to the theory of descent that we must regard him,

after Lamarck, as one of its earliest founders. It is true that he

never formulated a complete scientific theory of evolution, but we

find a number of remarkable suggestions of it in his splendid

miscellaneous essays on morphology. Some of them are really among the

very basic ideas of the science of evolution. He says, for instance

(1807): "When we compare plants and animals in their most rudimentary

forms, it is almost impossible to distinguish between them. But we may

say that the plants and animals, beginning with an almost inseparable

closeness, gradually advance along two divergent lines, until the

plant at last grows in the solid, enduring tree and the animal attains

in man to the highest degree of mobility and freedom." That Goethe was

not merely speaking in a poetical, but in a literal genealogical,

sense of this close affinity of organic forms is clear from other

remarkable passages in which he treats of their variety in outward

form and unity in internal structure. He believes that every living

thing has arisen by the interaction of two opposing formative forces

or impulses. The internal or "centripetal" force, the type or "impulse

to specification," seeks to maintain the constancy of the specific

forms in the succession of generations: this is heredity. The external

or "centrifugal" force, the element of variation or "impulse to

metamorphosis," is continually modifying the species by changing their

environment: this is adaptation. In these significant conceptions

Goethe approaches very close to a recognition of the two great

mechanical factors which we now assign as the chief causes of the

formation of species.

However, in order to appreciate Goethe's views on morphology, one must

associate his decidedly monistic conception of nature with his

pantheistic philosophy. The warm and keen interest with which he

followed, in his last years, the controversies of contemporary French

scientists, and especially the struggle between Cuvier and Geoffroy

St. Hilaire (see chapter 4 of The History of Creation), is very

characteristic. It is also necessary to be familiar with his style and

general tenour of thought in order to appreciate rightly the many

allusions to evolution found in his writings. Otherwise, one is apt to

make serious errors.

He approached so close, at the end of the eighteenth century, to the

principles of the science of evolution that he may well be described

as the first forerunner of Darwin, although he did not go so far as to

formulate evolution as a scientific system, as Lamarck did.

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