warlike, but have little political organization. Although they
are Moslems, they have, by an ingenious use of Moslem law about
pious gifts for charitable uses, preserved their own ancient
mores about women's property, against the Moslem law. A bride, on
leaving her home, is lifted on her mule by a negro, if there is
one in the village. There is great rejoicing at the birth of a
boy, and the mother is congratulated and decorated. When a girl
is born there is silence. A man is fined if he slaughters an
animal and eats meat except on a market day, because it would
pain his neighbors to see him eat meat when they could not get
it.[1585] The Kabyles have very strict rules as to sex propriety
and decency of language. Any violation of propriety in the
presence of a woman, or of a man accompanied by one of his female
relatives, calls for especial punishment. The presence of a woman
protects her husband from violence by a creditor, and in general
imposes peace and decorum.[1586] As a mark of respect for a man
with whom she is talking, a Tuareg woman will turn her back to
him, or draw a fold of her garment over her mouth.[1587] The
Kalmucks consider that a man without his girdle is in extreme
undress. He never shows himself before old people without his
girdle.[1588]
+485. Hindoo ritual of the toilet, etc.+ According to ancient Hindoo
custom, younger brothers should in all matters yield to elder
brothers.[1589] Brahmins use only the left hand for all acts of the
bodily toilet. They have a very elaborate ritual for all such acts, and
consider their houses defiled by the presence of Europeans who do not
observe any such ritual. They remove shoes on entering a house on
account of the impurity of leather.[1590] It is not good manners amongst
them to address the women of the house, or to ask for them. If a woman
takes a man's arm in public she is supposed to be his mistress.
Gallantry is never displayed. A wife would resent it as disrespectful,
fit only for a woman of another grade. Only courtesans, dancers, and
harlots are taught to read, sing, or dance. An honest woman would be
ashamed to know how to read. Brahmins regard the use of the pocket
handkerchief with the same disgust which a European feels for the Hindoo
use of the fingers which European laborers practice. Hindoos clean the
teeth with a fresh twig every day, and are horrified that Europeans do
it with a brush made of the hair of an animal, and do it frequently with
the same brush. There are days on which one must not brush the teeth on
pain of hell. "Saliva is of all things the most utterly
polluting."[1591] For a woman to have to part with her hair is one of
the greatest of degradations and the most terrible of all trials. Hindoo
women never use false hair if they lose their own.[1592] Women are safe
and are treated with respect in public. The honor of a Hindoo requires
that he look no higher than the ankles of a passing woman.[1593] He must
not touch a woman. If many men and women meet, for instance in
traveling, they may lie down side by side to sleep without
impropriety.[1594] Not one man in a hundred in India ever tasted liquor,
"but a Hindoo beggar may not eat bread made with yeast or baked by any
but Hindoos of his own or a better caste."[1595] The Angharmi of
northeastern India consider it a reproach for a woman to bear a child
before her hair is long enough to be tied behind. Until marriage the
women shave the head. Spouses are therefore separated for a year after
marriage.[1596]
Modern Egyptians think it improper for a man to "describe the features
or person of a female (as that she has a straight nose or large eyes) to
one of his own sex, by whom it is unlawful that she should be
seen."[1597] Modern Sicilian peasants at their balls dance in couples of
men and couples of women, "such an idea as a man putting his arm around
a woman's waist in a waltz being considered indecent."[1598]
+486. Greek rules of propriety.+ Nausikaa disregarded the lack of dress
of the shipwrecked when they needed help, but she had a complete code of
propriety and good manners with which she compelled them to
comply.[1599] In the Greek tragedies modest and proper behavior for
women is characterized by reserve, retirement, reluctance. They ought
not to talk publicly with young men or to expose themselves to the gaze
of men. They may not run out into the street with hair and dress
disordered, or roam about the country, or run to look at sights.
Clytemnestra told Iphigenia to be reserved with Achilles if she could be
so and win her point, but to win her point. Iphigenia considered it a
cause of shame to her that her proposed marriage was broken off.
+487. Erasmus's rules.+ Erasmus wrote a book of manners for a youth, his
pupil. He said that the teeth should be cleaned, but that it was girlish
to whiten them with powder. He thought it excessive to rinse the mouth
more frequently than once in the morning. He thought it lazy and
thieflike to go with one's hands behind one's back. It was not
well-mannered to sit or stand with one hand in the other, although some
thought it soldierly.[1600]
+488. Eating.+ Special occasion for rules of propriety is offered
by eating. In Melanesia and Polynesia men and their wives remain
in a great measure strangers to each other. They lead separate
lives. Women have their lodgings, meals, work, and property
separate.[1601] Perhaps it is a consequence that the rule
becomes established that men and women should never see each
other eat.[1602] The Varua of Central Africa put a cloth before
the face while drinking, in order not to be seen, especially by
any woman.[1603] On Tanna (New Hebrides) a woman may not see a
man drink _kava_.[1604] A man on the Andaman Islands may not eat
with any women except those of his own household, until he is
old. The unmarried of each sex eat by themselves.[1605] Amongst
the old Semites it was not the custom for a man to eat with his
wife and children. In northern Arabia "no woman will eat before
men." Some Southern Arabs "would rather die than accept food at
the hands of a woman."[1606] There is also a widespread notion
that one should not be seen to eat by anybody. The Bakairi are
ashamed to see or to be seen eating.[1607] In northern Abyssinia
people when eating are concealed. At a wedding feast the guests
break up into little groups of four to six, who eat separately,
each group covered by a sheet.[1608] The king of Loango covers
his mouth with a garment to eat or drink, in order to keep up an
ancient rule that no one may see him eat or drink.[1609] The
Sudanese think that disease or death would follow if any one
should see them take food.[1610] No Hindoos like to be looked at
while eating. "I never once saw a single Hindoo, except of the
lowest caste, either preparing or eating cooked food of any
kind."[1611] If a man of inferior caste enters the kitchen where
food is being prepared all must be thrown away. If food thus
contaminated was eaten it would taint the souls as well as the
bodies of the eaters, and would cost long and painful expiation.
Schwaner[1612] reports that the Dyaks withdrew "modestly" when he
was about to eat. That the cycle of variation may be complete, we
find one case of people (Kafans) who may not take food or drink
without the presence of a legal witness, an adult of the same
people duly authorized. The chief has a slave who discharges the
duty of witness. He must be called at night if the chief has to
take medicine. A stranger must conform to the rule. Spouses must
eat and drink together, from the same dish or cup. To violate
this rule is a reason for divorce.[1613] The best explanation of
the rules about eating in private is the fear of the evil eye,
i.e. the envious or admiring eye of a hungry man, which would
bewitch the food.
+489. Kissing.+ Kissing is another occasion for special rules of
propriety. In China and Japan kissing is regarded with disgust. It is
unknown amongst Polynesians, Malays, negroes, and Indians of South
America.[1614] They rub noses, or bite, or smell, instead. It is said of
a Samoan girl, also, that she "looks upon kissing with disgust."[1615]
So far apart may human beings be racewise in their judgment of what is
pleasant or disgusting! In Europe, in the Middle Ages, the custom of
kissing was very extended. Newcomers were saluted with kisses; also
partners in the dance. A bishop kissed the wife of Rudolf of Hapsburg
when receiving her, but he was banished until Rudolf died.[1616] From a
fifteenth-century sermon it is learned that a young lady of rank in
France, at that time, would rise in the midst of divine service,
incommoding everybody, in order to kiss on the mouth a cavalier who
entered the church at that time.[1617] The custom of kissing became more
general in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but discussion about
it shows that there was some doubt whether it was expedient. "The mores
won a victory over philosophy."[1618] In modern times Europeans have
taught half-civilized and barbarian peoples the custom of kissing. The
Hottentots, for instance, in their zeal to imitate Europeans, have
adopted this custom.[1619]
+490. Politeness, etiquette, manners.+ Politeness, courtesy, and good
manners are usages, but they rise to the level of the mores when they
become a part of the character of a people, for then they produce
characteristic traits which affect all societal relations.[1620]
Uncivilized people often pay punctilious attention to rules of etiquette
about salutations, visits, meetings, the aged, etc. As all their rules
are imperative and admit of no discussion or exception, they constitute
a social ritual which may educate in certain sentiments, although it is
by no means sure to do so. The functions of politeness and etiquette
exist in order to make things go smoothly in all social contact.
Orientals have very thorough training in this department. They have
systems of good manners which have been practiced for thousands of
years. The Chinese Li-ki ("Ritual of Propriety") dates from the
beginning of the Christian era. It is an elaborate text-book of correct
conduct in all affairs of life. It is of universal application, except
for details of the mode of life in China, and it shows the value of such
a code and the use of the habits it inculcates. Chinese and Japanese are
well-disciplined people in all the matters of conduct and social contact
which are controlled by the mores.
From this point on it will be noticed that the codes to be mentioned are
further removed from the sex mores.
+491. Good manners.+ The Andamanese of all classes show great
consideration for the very young, weak, aged, or helpless.[1621] A white
man gave liquor to a native man on the Chittagong hills. The latter
insisted on giving some of it to the women first, but they required much
urging before they would take it.[1622] The Samoans have very polished
manners. They had a court language.[1623] The Betsileo on Madagascar
have a careful etiquette about the houses of their chiefs, about proper
conduct in those houses, and about the utensils there; also words are
reserved for chiefs which others may not utter.[1624] In East Africa any
violation of etiquette towards a chief is summarily and severely
punished, sometimes by death.[1625] Many an A-Sande has lost a finger or
his life for an innocent word spoken to the wife of a chief.[1626] The
Tunguses of Siberia have so much habitual politeness that Wrangell
called them "the French of the tundra."[1627] The Yakuts think it bad
manners to give a big piece of meat to a poor guest and a little piece
to a rich one. Good breeding, according to their code, calls for the
opposite conduct.[1628] A Fuegian husband, giving an order to his wife,
out of courtesy tells her to give the order to some one else, although
there is no one else.[1629] Amongst North American Indians the modes of
sitting or squatting for each sex are strictly prescribed.[1630] Sapper
says of the Central American Indians that when the white man asks a
question he often gets no answer because he has neglected something
required by etiquette. He once on a journey asked a Kekchi Indian to ask
the way of an Indian whom they saw coming. This was improper, because
not any one in the company might ask that question, according to Kekchi
etiquette, but only the leader of the company.[1631] Schweinfurth[1632]
rates the Dinka above Turks and Arabs in respect to table manners and
decorum of eating. All recline on the ground around a bowl of food, each
with a gourd cup in his hand, but they manage this primitive arrangement
with constant care for propriety.
+492. Etiquette of salutation, etc.+ The modes of expressing good will
and the etiquette of meeting or visiting would be another large section
under this head. What things are possible is shown by the report that a
Tibetan host at a feast "expressed his respect for us and his
appreciation of our remarks by rising to his feet and extending his
tongue at full length."[1633]
+493. Literature of manners and etiquette.+ Denecke[1634] is able to
trace an indigenous cultivation of good manners by literature from the
eleventh century, when there was taught courtesy to women, although not
the woman cult of a later time. He mentions a series of books down to
the nineteenth century, which inculcated good manners according to the
changing notions and standards of the times. In the second half of the
thirteenth century it was taught in von Lichtenstein's _Frauenbuch_, a
manual of manners and morals for women, that a woman should not salute a
knight at his approach lest he infer favor. She was to be covered like a
nun; she did not share in banquets and did not kiss guests whom she
received; she shunned outside festivities and kept a good name. Knights
then neglected women because they cared only for rude pleasures, drink,
and hunting. Later, rules were made for the conduct of men.[1635] The
history of manners shows that what was inculcated in books never became
real practice. The conquest of the art of eating with propriety was
accomplished by the introduction of forks. Before that the bread was a
tool with which to eat, and it required cultivated skill to handle it
properly. Salt and mustard still presented problems,--knife or fingers?
Each one brought his own knife.
+494. Honor, seemliness, common sense, conscience.+ Honor, common sense,
seemliness, and conscience seem to belong to the individual domain. They
are reactions produced in the individual by the societal environment.
Honor is the sentiment of what one owes to one's self. It is an
individual prerogative, and an ultimate individual standard. Seemliness
is conduct which befits one's character and standards. Common sense, in
the current view, is a natural gift and universal outfit. As to honor
and seemliness, the popular view seems to be that each one has a
fountain of inspiration in himself to furnish him with guidance.
Conscience might be added as another natural or supernatural "voice,"
intuition, and part of the original outfit of all human beings as such.
If these notions could be verified, and if they proved true, no
discussion of them would be in place here, but as to honor it is a
well-known and undisputed fact that societies have set codes of honor
and standards of it which were arbitrary, irrational, and both
individually and socially inexpedient, as ample experiment has proved.
These codes have been and are imperative, and they have been accepted
and obeyed by great groups of men who, in their own judgment, did not
believe them sound. Those codes came out of the folkways of the time and
place. Then comes the question whether it is not always so. Is honor, in
any case, anything but the code of one's duty to himself which he has
accepted from the group in which he was educated? Family, class,
religious sect, school, occupation, enter into the social environment.
In every environment there is a standard of honor. When a man thinks
that he is acting most independently, on his personal prerogative, he is
at best only balancing against each other the different codes in which
he has been educated, e.g. that of the trades union against that of the
Sunday school, or of the school against that of the family. What we
think "natural" and universal, and to which we attribute an objective
reality, is the sum of traits whose origin is so remote, and which we
share with so many, that we do not know when or how we took them up, and
we can remember no rational selection by which we adopted them. The same
is true of common sense. It is the stock of ways of looking at things
which we acquired unconsciously by suggestion from the environment in
which we grew up. Some have more common sense than others, because they
are more docile to suggestion, or have been taught to make judgments by
people who were strong and wise. Conscience also seems best explained as
a sum of principles of action which have in one's character the most
original, remote, undisputed, and authoritative position, and to which
questions of doubt are habitually referred. If these views are accepted,
we have in honor, common sense, and conscience other phenomena of the
folkways, and the notions of eternal truths of philosophy or ethics,
derived from somewhere outside of men and their struggles to live well
under the conditions of earth, must be abandoned as myths.
+495. Seemliness.+ Honor, common sense, and conscience can never be
predicated of groups except by a figure of speech. The case with
seemliness is different. That also is an individual trait. It is lighter
and less definable than honor and propriety. The individual alone must
decide what it is fitting for him to do or refuse to do. He will get his
standards for this decision from his nearest social environment.
Seemliness, however, can be predicated of a society. A civilized state
may act in a seemly or unseemly manner, that is, in a way worthy of its
history and character, or the contrary. Also the people of a group, in
their unorganized acts, can obey unworthy motives and yield to impulses,
groupwise, which are beneath the level of culture which they really have
obtained, or belong to policies which are narrower than those by which
they pretend to act.
+496. Cases of unseemliness.+ The Assyrians were fierce, cruel,
bloodthirsty, and pitiless. They have left, cut in the hardest
stone,--it must have been by immense labor,--pictures of cruel tortures
and executions and of immense slaughters. A king is represented putting
out the eyes of prisoners. What the pictures reveal is the lust of
conquest, the delights of revenge, and the ecstasy of tyranny. After
Assurbanipal took Susa he broke open the tombs of the old heroes of
Elam, who had in their day defeated the Assyrians. He desecrated the
tombs, insulted the monuments, and carried the bones away to Nineveh. It
was believed that the ghosts of these dead heroes would suffer the
captivity inflicted on their bones, and sacrifices were made to them
just sufficient to prolong their existence and suffering. This policy
was pursued with all the ingenious refinements which the dogmas
suggested, in order to glut the vengeance of the Assyrian king.[1636]
The Babylonians were peaceful and industrial, but the Persians combined
with great luxury and licentiousness a fiendish ingenuity in torture and
painful modes of execution. It is very interesting to notice in Homer
criticism of conduct from the standpoint of taste and judgment as to
what is seemly.[1637] Homer thought it unseemly for Achilles to drag the
corpse of Hector behind his chariot. He says that the gods thought so
too.[1638] He disapproved of the sacrifice of twelve Trojan youths on
the pyre of Patroclus.[1639] In the poems there are recorded many
unseemly acts. Achilles spurned the prayer of Hector that his body might
be redeemed, and wished that he could eat part of the body of his
conquered foe. The Greeks mutilated the corpse with their weapons.[1640]
Agamemnon and Ajax Oileus cut off the heads of the slain.[1641] Odysseus
ordered twelve maidens who had been friends to the suitors to be put to
the sword. Telemachus hanged them. Melantheus, who had traitorously
taken the suitors' side, was mutilated alive, member by member.[1642]
Odysseus tells Eurykleia that it is a cruel sin to exult over a dead
enemy, but the heroes often did it. This doctrine expresses the better
sense of the age, but a doctrine which was beyond their self-control
when their passions were aroused. The Olympian household must be taken
to represent the society of the time, especially if we throw out the
stories of the violations of the sex taboo which were often myths of
nature processes or survivals of earlier mores. The Olympian gods show
no dignity, magnanimity, or moral earnestness. They entertain mean
sentiments of jealousy, envy, offended vanity, resentment, and rancor.
They are divided by enmities and feuds. The females are frivolous and
shallow; their fathers and husbands are often angry with them for
levity, folly, disobedience, and self-will; but they have to remember
that the goddesses are females and make the best of it with a groan and
a laugh. The gods have great weakness for feminine grace and charm. They
make allowances for the women, pet them, and despise them. There is some
recognition of a possibly nobler relation of men to women, but it is
only a transitory ideal. The goddesses get into difficulties by their
intrigues and follies, but they avail themselves to the utmost of their
feminine privileges to escape the penalties. They fool the gods. It
reminds us of a modern French novel. We meet with the same sentiments,
maxims, and philosophy. What were the gods for? They were superfluous
and useless, or mischievous, but theology taught that they kept the
whole thing going. They dealt meanly with men. Athena took the form of
Deïphobus in order to persuade Hector to meet Achilles and be
killed.[1643] They sent dreams to men to mislead them. What can men do
against that? They mixed in the fights of men, but availed themselves of
their godship, if things went against them, and especially in order to
get revenge for defeat. There was no chivalry or nobility of mind or
behavior. It is plain that the gods are not idealized men. They are
worse than the men. Von der March[1644] has collected evidence that the
heroes were savage, cruel, cowardly, venal, rancorous, vain, and lacking
in fortitude, when compared with German epic heroes. It is far more
important to notice that this evidence proves that the Greeks did not
have, and therefore could not ascribe to the gods, a standard of
seemliness above what these traits of the picture disclose. Since that
is so, it follows that the standard of what is fit, seemly, becoming,
good form, is a function of the folkways, or rather of class ways, since
it is only selected classes who cultivate seemliness. Seemliness is a
light, remote, and less important form of propriety. It is a matter of
taste, and taste is cultivated by the folkways.
+497. Greek tragedies and notions of seemliness.+ We think it unseemly
to criticise the ways of Divine Providence, and we refrain from it,
whatever we may think. Since Christianity is no longer imposed by pains
and penalties, we think it unseemly to assail Christianity in the
interest of a negative or destructive philosophy. The Greeks of the
fifth century B.C. had not these notions. They upbraided the gods for
their ways to men and for their vices. The antagonisms of the mores were
antagonisms of gods. In the _Eumenides_ the most tragic consequences
follow from the antagonism of the mores of the mother and father family.
The Furies do not insist on the duty of Orestes to kill his mother, in
blood revenge for the murder of his father, because they belong to the
old system, in which the son was of the mother's blood; but Apollo, the
god of the new system, orders it. A new doctrine of procreation has to
be promulgated. "The mother does not procreate the son; she only bears
and cherishes the awakened life." [Here we see how the doctrines are
invented afterwards to fit the exigencies of new folkways.] Orestes
obeys Apollo and is a victim. Since the command comes from a god, how
shall the man not obey? To us it is a simple case of a common tragedy,
that an individual is the victim of a great social movement. In the
_Herakleidæ_, Alcmena urges that a war captive be slain. The king of
Athens forbids that any one be slain who was taken alive. The former
prevailed. The Athenian doctrine was new and high and not yet current.
In the _Ion_ Ion tells Zeus and Poseidon that if they paid the penalties
of all their adulteries they would empty their temple treasuries. They
act wrongly when they do not observe due measure in their pursuit of
pleasure. It is not fair to call men wicked when they imitate the gods.
Let the evil examples be blamed. In the _Andromache_ horror is expressed
of the folkways of the barbarians, in which incest is not prevented. In
the _Medea_ Jason, who is a scoundrel and a cur, prates to Medea about
her gain in coming to Greece: "Thou hast learned what justice means, and
how to live by law, not by the dictates of brute force." She had not
learned it at all--quite the contrary. In the _Hekuba_ it is said to be
a disgrace to murder guests in Greece, and in _Iphigenia amongst the
Taurians_ the same doctrine is stated when Greeks are to be the victims
of the contrary rule. "Barbarian" was a cultural category. To be Greek
was to have city life with market place, gymnastic training, and a share
in the games.[1645] These were arbitrary marks of superiority such as
the members of an esoteric corporation always love, but the time came
when the Greek history contained so many shameful things that the Greeks
ceased to talk of the contrast with barbarians. It was proposed to
Pausanias that he should repay on the corpse of Mardonius the insults
inflicted by Xerxes on the body of Leonidas. He indignantly
refused.[1646] The old laws of war put the life and property of the
vanquished, and their wives and children, at the mercy of the
conquerors, but the Greeks, when the Peloponnesian war began, felt the
shame of this law as between Greeks. Therefore they sinned against their
own better feeling when in that war they enslaved and slaughtered the
vanquished. That they knew better is shown by the conduct of the
Athenians towards Mytilene, in 427. At first all adult males were
sentenced to death, and the women and children to slavery, but later
this sentence was revoked. Cases also occurred in which the law of war
was not followed, but the conquered were spared. By retaliation they
inflamed their own passions and went on from bad to worse until there
was a revulsion of pure shame. Lysander put to death three thousand
Athenians, captives, after the battle of Ægospotami, as reprisals for
the barbarities executed by the Athenians against Sparta and her allies.
The allies wanted to exercise war law on Athens, but Sparta would not
consent. To her then belongs the honor of fixing a new precedent. It was
her duty to do so after the act of Lysander. Beloch thinks that science
made the greater humanity of the fourth century.[1647] It is more
probable that it was due to a perception of the horror and shame of the
other course. The parties in the cities, in the later centuries, were
also guilty of excess, rancorous passion, revenge, and oppression. These
cases come under the head of unseemliness in so far as they show a lack
of sense of where to stop. That sense, especially in the political acts
of democracies, must be a resultant, in the minds of men of the most
numerous classes, from the spirit and temper of the folkways.
+498. Seemliness in the Middle Ages.+ In the Middle Ages very great
attention was given to seemliness in the private conduct of individuals.
Moderation especially was to be cultivated. Women were put under minute
rules of dress, posture, walk, language, tone of voice, and attitude.
The guiding spirit of the regulations was restraint and limit.[1648]
Public life, however, was characterized by great unseemliness, and the
examples of it are especially valuable because they show how necessary a
sense of seemliness is to prevent great evils, although the virtue
itself is vague and refined, and entirely beyond the field of positive
cultivation by education or law. When the crusaders captured Mohammedan
cities they showed savage ferocity. A case is recorded of a quarrel
between a man of rank and a cook. The former proceeded to very extreme
measures, and the cook, since he was a cook, could get no redress or
attention.[1649] In the fifteenth century a rage for indecent conduct
arose. The type which the Germans call the _Grobian_ was affected.
Rudeness of manners in eating, dancing, etc., was cultivated as a pose.
This fashion lasted for more than a century. In 1570 a society was
formed of twenty-seven members, who swore to be nasty, not to wash or
pray, and to practice blasphemy, etc. When drunk such persons committed
great breaches of order, decency, etc.[1650]
+499. Unseemly debate.+ The folkways of the Middle Ages were fantastic
and extravagant. The people had their chief interest in the future
world, about which there could be no reality. They lived in a world of
phantasms. The phantasms were dictated to them upon authority in the
shape of dogmas of world philosophy and precepts of conduct. In
discussing the world philosophy and its application they attained to
extremes of animosity and ferocity. Whether Jesus and his apostles lived
in voluntary beggary; whether any part of the blood of Jesus remained on
earth; whether the dead went at once, or only at the judgment day, into
the presence of God,--are specimens of the questions they debated. The
unseemliness was in the mode of discussion, not in the absurdity of the
subject. They all went into the debate understanding that the defeated
or weaker party was to be burned. That was the rule of the game. All the
strife of sects and parties was carried on in unseemly ways and with
scandalous incidents. The lack of control, measure, due limit, was due
to the lack of reality. Torture, persecution, violent measures, would
all have been impossible if there had been a sense of seemliness. The
punishments, executions, and public amusements grossly outraged any
human and civilized taste. The treatment of the Templars, although it
was no doubt good statecraft to abolish the order, was a scandalous
outrage. In the face of Christendom torture was used to extort the
evidence which was wanted to destroy the order, without regard to truth
and justice.[1651] The crusades were extravagant and fantastic, and were
attended by incidents of shameful excess, gross selfishness, venality,
and bad faith. It is one of the most amazing facts about witch
persecutions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that jurists did
not see the unseemliness of their acts compared with the civilization of
the period and the character claimed by their states. How was it
possible for grave, learned, and honest men to go on torturing and
burning miserable old women? It is not until the end of the seventeenth
century that we hear of sheriffs in England who refused to burn witches.
One of the most unseemly incidents in history is the execution of
Damiens for attempting to kill Louis XV. The authorities of the first
state in Christendom multiplied tortures of the extremest kind, and
caused them to be executed in public on the culprit. The treatment of
the Tories in the American Revolution was unseemly. It left a deep stain
on our history.
+500. Unseemliness of lynching, torture, etc.+ It is an unseemly thing
and unworthy of our age and civilization that persons should be lynched
for alleged crime, without the trial and proof which our institutions
provide for. The arguments in defense of lynching (except on the
frontier, where civil institutions do not yet exist) never touch on this
point. It is unseemly that any one should be burned at the stake in a
modern civilized state. It is nothing to the purpose to show what a
wicked wretch the victim was. Burning alive has long been thrown out of
the folkways of our ancestors. The objection to reviving it is not an
apology for the bad men or a denial of their wickedness: it is the
goodness of the lynchers. They fall below what they owe to themselves.
Torture has also long been thrown out of our folkways. It might have
been believed a few years ago that torture could not be employed under
the jurisdiction of the United States, and that, if it was employed,
there would be a unanimous outburst of indignant reprobation against
those who had so disgraced us. When torture was employed in the
Philippines no such outburst occurred. The facts and the judgment upon
them were easily suppressed. The recognition of Panama was unseemly. It
was unworthy of the United States. It was defended and justified by the
argument that we got something which we very earnestly wanted.
+501. Good taste.+ Finally we may notice here also the matter of taste.
Good taste is the most subtle of all the codes of judgment which are
cultivated by the mores. What we now consider good taste was violated in
the dramas of the Greeks and Romans. This is entirely aside from
obscenity or vulgarity. For instance, it does not appear that the author
of the _Medea_ appreciated the dastardly conduct of Jason. De
Julleville[1652] says that in the thirteenth century no one knew the
distinction between good and bad taste. The assertion is fully
justified. The mediæval people may have had good taste in architecture,
stained glass, and hammered iron (as we are told), but their literature,
administration of justice, and politics show that they lacked good
taste, and also the case shows what a high protection against folly and
error good taste is. This last office it shares with the sense of humor.
The sports of that age were cruel. People found fun in the sufferings of
the weak under derision and abuse. "The Middle Ages did not shrink from
presenting as funny situations which were painful or atrocious, the
horror of which we to-day could not endure." Although the age was full
of religiosity, the extravagances of which ought to have been restrained
by good taste, if it had existed, there was, on the other hand, no true
reverence for what were "sacred things." The churches were put to uses
which would to-day be considered improper. Parodies and caricatures of
ecclesiastical persons, institutions, and ritual called out no
remonstrance. Mock sermons were a favorite form of monologue in a
theatrical entertainment. In a morality produced late in the fifteenth
century, called _Les Blasphémateurs_, the actors tortured and wounded
the figure on a crucifix. The Virgin and two angels came down to catch
in a cup the blood which miraculously flowed from the body, but the
actors kept on. "The hideous scene is interminable." Personalities were
employed beyond all decent toleration, not only in theological disputes,
but in political conflicts of all kinds. Of course the fanaticism of the
age accounts for the extravagance of the acts and doctrines, and good
taste seems to be only a trivial defense against fanaticism, but good
taste consists largely in a sense of due limits, and if there had been a
good code of social usage tempered by taste, it would have prevented
many of the greatest scandals in the history, especially the church
history, of the period. Buffoons had a share in the great "moralities,"
although they did not have a rôle in the action. Their function was to
interject comical comments from time to time. The comments aimed to be
witty, but were generally gross, coarse, and obscene. Late in the
fifteenth century, in France, a buffoon recited a prelude containing
licentious jests to an edifying morality called _Charity_.[1653]
+502. Whence good taste is derived.+ Good taste is a more delicate and
refined philosophy of action than any which have been mentioned above.
It would escape from any attempt to formulate it, more completely than
propriety or politeness. It floats in the ways of the group, and is
absorbed by those who grow up in it. It is a product of breeding. We
have a well-worn saying that there is no disputing about it. That is
true, but for equal reason there is no disputing about decency,
propriety, obscenity, or sex taboo. Good taste is a product of the
group. It is absorbed from the group. Like honor, however, it calls for
an individual reaction of assent and dissent, and becomes an individual
trait or possession in the form which it ultimately takes.
+503. The great variety in the codes.+ All the topics which have been
treated in this chapter are branches or outreachings of the social code.
They show how deep is the interest of human beings in the sex taboo, and
in the self-perpetuation of society. Men have always tried, and are
trying still, to solve the problem of well living in this respect. The
men, the women, the children, and the society have joint and several
interests, and the complication is great. At the present time
population, race, marriage, childbirth, and the education of children
present us our greatest problems and most unfathomable mysteries. All
the contradictory usages of chastity, decency, propriety, etc., have
their sense in some assumed relation to the welfare of society. To some
extent they have come out of caprice, but chiefly they have issued from
experience of good and ill, and are due to efforts to live well. Thus we
may discern in them policies and philosophies, but they never proceed to
form any such generalities as do rationally adopted motives. There is
logic in the folkways, but never rationality. Given the premises, in a
notion of kin, for instance, and the deductions are made directly and
generally correctly, but the premises could never be verified, and they
were oftener false than true. Each group took its own way, making its
own assumptions, and following its own logic. So there was great variety
and discord in their policies and philosophies, but within the area of a
custom, during its dominion, its authority is absolute; and hence,
although the usages are infinitely various, directly contradictory, and
mutually abominable, they are, within their area of dominion, of equal
value and force, and they are the standards of what is true and right.
The groups have often tried to convert each other by argument and
reason. They have never succeeded. Each one's reasons are the tradition
which it has received from its ancestors. That does not admit of
argument. Each tries to convince the other by going outside of the
tradition to some philosophic standard of truth. Then the tradition is
left in full force. Shocking as it must be to any group to be told that
there is no rational ground for any one of them to convert another group
to its mores (because this seems to imply, although it does not, that
their folkways are not better than those of other groups), yet this must
be said, for it is true. By experience and science the nations which by
name are Christian have reached ways which are better fitted, on the
whole, for well living than those of the Mohammedan nations, although
this superiority is not by any means so complete and sweeping as current
opinion in Christian countries believes. If Christians and Mohammedans
come together and argue, they never make the slightest impression on
each other. During the crusades, in Andalusia, and in cities of the near
East where they live side by side, they have come to peace, mutual
respect, and mutual influence. Syncretism begins. There is giving and
taking. In Egypt at present the Moslems see the power of the English to
carry on industry, commerce, and government, and this observation
produces effect on the folkways. That is the chief way in which folkways
are modified or borrowed. It was by this process that Greeks and Romans
influenced the folkways of barbarians, and that white men have
influenced those of negroes, Indians, Polynesians, Japanese, etc.
+504. Morals and deportment.+ Different groups and different ages have
differed much in the place in the social codes in which certain subjects
have been placed; that is, for instance, as to whether the treatment of
women by men should be put under morals, or under manners, or under good
taste; whether public exhibitions deserved more attention than
deportment, etc. For instance: "There is hardly a word, in the
instructions of Plutarch, upon schools and schooling, but he alludes
casually to the strange scenes which boys were allowed to
witness,--criminals dressed up with robes and crowns, and presently
stripped and publicly tortured; paintings of subjects so objectionable
that we should carefully explain to the child the distinction between
art as such and art as a vehicle of morals. On the other hand,
deportment was strictly watched: for example, it was the rule not to use
the left hand unless it were to hold bread at dinner, while other food
was taken with the right; to walk in the street without looking up; to
touch salt fish with one finger; fresh fish, bread, and meat, with two;
to scratch yourself thus; to fold your cloak thus."[1654]
+505. The relation of the social codes to philosophy and religion.+
Amongst the widest differences of opinion would be that on the question
whether the social codes issue out of and are enthused by philosophy or
religion. We are told that "for most men, actions stand in no necessary
connection with any theoretical convictions of theirs, but are, on the
contrary, independent of the same, and are dominated by inherited and
acquired motives."[1655] Why is this not true? Also, "the antagonism
between the principles of our religion and our actual behavior, even of
the faithful, as well as the great difference in the ethical views of
different peoples who profess the same religion, sufficiently proves
that the motives of our acts, and our judgments on the acts of others,
proceed primarily from practical life [i.e. from the current mores], and
that what we believe has comparatively little influence on our acts and
judgments."[1656] Religion and philosophy are components of the mores,
but not by any means sources or regulators of them.
+506. Rudeck's conclusions.+ A recent German writer on the history of
public morality[1657] says of the moral development of the German people
that one cannot bear to contemplate it, because the people face the
facts with absolute indifference. There is not a trace of moral
initiative or of moral consciousness. Existing morality presents itself
to us as a purely accidental product of forces which act without sense
or intelligence. We can find all kinds of forces in history except
ethical forces. Those are entirely wanting. There is no development, for
development means the unfolding and growth of a germ according to the
elements which it contains. The people allow all kinds of mores to be
forced on them by the work of their own hands, that is, by the economic
and political arrangements which they have adopted. The German people
has no subjective notion of public morality and no ethical ideal for
public morality. They distinguish only between good and bad mores
(_Sitten und Unsitten_), without regard to their origin.
+507.+ Rudeck's book is really a chapter in the history of the mores.
The above are the conclusions which seem to be forced upon him, but he
recoils from them in dismay. The conclusions are unquestionably correct.
They are exactly what the history teaches. They ought to be accepted and
used for profit. The fact that people are indifferent to the history of
their own mores is a primary fact. We can only accept it and learn from
it. It shows us the immense error of that current social discussion
which consists in bringing "ethical" notions to the criticism of facts.
The ethical notions are figments of speculation. Criticism of the mores
is like criticising one's ancestors for the physique one has inherited,
or one's children for being, in body and mind, one's children. If it is
true of the German people that there is no moral initiative or
consciousness in their tone and attitude towards their mores, they are
to be congratulated, for they have kept out one great influx of
subjective and dogmatic mischief. Other nations have a "nonconformist
conscience" or a party of "great moral ideas," which can be caught by a
phrase, or stampeded by a catching watchword with a "moral" suggestion.
"Existing morality _does_ present itself as a purely accidental [i.e.
not to be investigated] product of forces which act without sense or
intelligence," but the product is in no true sense accidental. It is
true that there are no ethical forces in history. Let us recognize the
fact and its consequences. Some philosophers make great efforts to
interpret ethical forces into history, but they play with words. There
is no development of the mores along any lines of logical or other
sequence. The mores shift in endless readjustment of the modes of
behavior, effort, and thinking, so as to reach the greatest advantage
under the conditions. "The people allow all kinds of mores to be forced
on them by the work of their own hands," that is, by the economic and
political arrangements which have been unconsciously forced on them by
their instinctive efforts to live well. That is just what they do, and
that is the way in which mores come to be. "The German people has no
subjective notion of public morality and no ethical ideal for public
morality." Nor has any other people. A people sometimes adopts an ideal
of national vanity, which includes ambition, but an ethical ideal no
group ever has. If it pretended to have one it would be a humbug. That
is why the introduction of "moral ideas" into politics serves the most
immoral purposes and plays into the hands of the most immoral men. All
ethics grow out of the mores and are a part of them. That is why the
ethics never can be antecedent to the mores, and cannot be in a causal
or productive relation to them. "The German people distinguishes only
between customs and abuses [_Sitten und Unsitten_] without regard to
their origin." They are quite right to do so, because the origin is only
a matter for historians. For the masses the mores are facts. They use
them and they testify that they are conducive to well living (_Sitten_),
or the contrary (_Unsitten_). The men, women, and children who compose a
society at any time are the unconscious depositaries and transmitters of
the mores. They inherited them without knowing it; they are molding them
unconsciously; they will transmit them involuntarily. The people cannot
make the mores. They are made by them. Yet the group is at once makers
and made. Each one may put into the group life as much as he can, but
the group will give back to him order and determination from which he
cannot escape. The mores grow as they must grow under the conditions.
They are products of the effort of each to live as well as he can, and
they are coercions which hold and control each in his efforts to live
well. It is idle to try to get outside of this operation in order to
tell which part of it comes first and makes the other. "Our age presents
us the incredible spectacle that the dependence of the higher social
culture on the economic development is not only clearly recognized by
social science, but is proclaimed as the ideal." Social science does not
proclaim this as an ideal. It does not deal in ideals. It accepts the
dependence of culture on economic development as a fact. In fact, Rudeck
is not justified in saying (p. 426) that "culture is the unity of the
moral will in all the life phenomena of a people," and that "that people
alone is a culture people which sets before itself, as the purpose of
its entire existence, the production of the greatest possible amount of
specified moral qualities." These are notions of culture and of a
culture people which an ethical philosopher might think it fine should
be. Rudeck has just found that no such things ever have existed in
Germany; yet Germany possesses culture and the Germans are a culture
people. He is really complaining that these fine ethical notions have
never had any place in history. Such being the case, the true inference
would be that they are unrealities and ought to be discarded altogether.
Rudeck can find, in the eighteenth century, only one act of the state
which had an improving effect on "external morals." That was the
abolition of obscene playing cards, and this improving effect was not
won intentionally, but as an incidental consequence of a tax which was
imposed for revenue. The case is interesting and instructive. It is thus
alone that the state acts. It needs revenue and lays a tax. Other
consequences follow. Sometimes "moral" consequences follow. The Methuen
treaty caused Englishmen to drink port instead of claret for a hundred
and fifty years, to the great increase of gout and drunkenness. The
statesman might well be appalled if he should realize that he probably
never can lay a tax without effects on industry, health, education,
morals, and religion which he cannot foresee and cannot control. In the
case of the cards, the consequence was favorable to good morals. That
consequence was the purest accident. The state went on its way and got
its revenue. The people met the effect through the mores and made the
best of it, just as they did with the effects of the Methuen treaty. The
cases are useful for a statesman to consider, when he needs to get
revenue and the question by what taxes to get it is yet in his mind and
_before_ him. When he has decided and acted it remains only to take the
consequences, for, through the mores, they will enter into the web of
life which the people are weaving and must endure. That web contains
all the follies and errors, just as well as all the wisdom and all the
achievements, of the past. The whole inheritance passes on together,
including all the luck.
[1380] Ammianus Marcellinus, XXVIII, 4.
[1381] Darmstetter, _Zend-Avesta_, I, 100.
[1382] Marsden, _Sumatra_, 52.
[1383] Curr, _Austr. Race_, I, 109.
[1384] _Borneo's Wester-Afdeeling_, 251.
[1385] JAI, XII, 94, 135.
[1386] Schultz, _D. L._, 283.
[1387] Sieroshevski, _Yakuty_ (_Polish_), 342.
[1388] Holm, _Angmagslikerne_, 54.
[1389] Fritsch, _Eingeb. Süd-Afr._, 444.
[1390] _Amer. Antiq._, XXIV, 77.
[1391] _Une Femme chez les Sahariennes._
[1392] Bancroft, _Races of the Pacific_, I, 123; II, 676.
[1393] Kubary, _Soc. Einricht. der Pelauer_, 51, 55, 91.
[1394] _Palau_, 65, 324.
[1395] Cf. Christian, _Caroline Isl._, 290.
[1396] JAI, XV, 8; _U. S. Nat. Mus._, 1888, 339.
[1397] Duveyrier, _Touaregs du Nord_, 340, 429.
[1398] Rubruck, _Eastern Parts_, 79, Rockhill's note.
[1399] Sprenger, _Geographie Arabiens_, 97.
[1400] Probably 31° E. 13½° N.
[1401] Wilson and Felkin, _Uganda and Sudan_, II, 309.
[1402] _On Tranquil._, 17.
[1403] _Nich. Ethics._, IV, 9.
[1404] _Ethik_, 127.
[1405] _Umschau_, VI, 52, after Haeckel, _Aus Insulinde_.
[1406] Goodrich-Frear, _Inner Jerusalem_, 257.
[1407] _Il._, XIV, 179; cf. _Od._, XVI, 416; XVIII, 210.
[1408] Vambery, _Sittenbilder aus dem Morgenlande_, 49.
[1409] Duveyrier, _Les Touaregs du Nord_, 391.
[1410] _Une Femme chez les Sahariennes_, 310.
[1411] _Berl. Mus._, 1888, 199.
[1412] Nieuwenhuis, _In Centraal Borneo_, I, 48.
[1413] Zimmer, _Altind. Leben_, 196.
[1414] Wellhausen, _Skizzen und Vorarbeiten_, III, 194.
[1415] Herodotus, I, 100.
[1416] Ratzel, _Hist. of Mankind_, II, 444.
[1417] Von Kremer, _Kulturgesch. des Orients_, II, 247, 250, 269.
[1418] _De Civilit. Morum Pueril._, I, 3, 9, 10.
[1419] Genesis iii. 7.
[1420] _Berl. Mus._, 1888, 431; cf. 191, 192, 195; also _Globus_,
LXXV, 6; Ratzel, _Völkerkunde_, I, 225, 298; _Berl. Mus._, II,
Plates II, III, XIII, XIV; Hutchinson, _Living Races_, 59; _Jhrb.
d. Dtschen Archeolog. Instit._, 1886, 295.
[1421] Waitz (_Anthrop._, VI, 567 ff.) gives a number of cases
from the islands of the Pacific.
[1422] _Globus_, LXXIX, 197.
[1423] Krieger, _Neu Guinea_, 373.
[1424] No ethnographic evidence is known to exist to prove that
there is an original sentiment of disgust in regard to the organs
(Ellis, "Evolution of Modesty," _Psychol. Rev._, VI, 134).
[1425] _Anthrop._, VI, 575-576.
[1426] Budge, _Gods of the Egyptians_, II, 284.
[1427] Roth, _Queensland Aborig._, 114.
[1428] JAI, XXIII, 368.
[1429] _Berl. Mus._, 1888, 173.
[1430] Holm, _Angmagslikerne_, Plates VII, XX, XXII.
[1431] _Afr. Cent._, 155.
[1432] Fritsch, _Eingeb. Süd-Afr._, 230, 311, 349.
[1433] _N. S. Amer. Anthrop._, II, 470.
[1434] Sieroshevski, _Yakuty_ (_russ._), 562, 570.
[1435] Weinhold, _D. F._, I, 164.
[1436] _U. S. Nat. Mus._, 1888, 257.
[1437] _Races of Man_, 172.
[1438] _Illustrations of China_, II, No. 39.
[1439] Lane, _Mod. Egyptians_, I, 69, 266.
[1440] JAI, XIV, 123.
[1441] _Ztsft. für Ethnol._, XXVIII, 170.
[1442] _Berl. Mus._, 1888, 65.
[1443] Lewin, _Wild Races of S. E. India_, 87.
[1444] _Austral. Bush_, 350.
[1445] Johnston, _Uganda Protect._, 765.
[1446] _Deipnosophists_, XII, 14.
[1447] _Austral. Race_, 99, 183.
[1448] _Uganda and Sudan_, I, 223.
[1449] JAI, XIII, 290.
[1450] Spencer and Gillen, _Cent. Austral._, 471.
[1451] Finsch, _Ethnol. Erfahr._, I, 92; II, 298.
[1452] Semper, _Palau Ins._, 68.
[1453] Ling Roth, _Sarawak_, I, 133.
[1454] JAI, XXIV, 292.
[1455] _Afr. Cent._, 55, 264.
[1456] _Sahara and Sudan_, II, 590.
[1457] Johnston, _Uganda Protect._, 37, 114, 642, 685.
[1458] _Ibid._, 728, 730.
[1459] _Papuas_, 169.
[1460] Puini, _Origine della Civiltà_, 147.
[1461] _Globus_, LXXVI, 306.
[1462] Vannutelli e Citerni, _L'Omo_, 294, 305.
[1463] Fritsch, _Eingeb. Süd-Afr._, 59.
[1464] _Globus_, LXXXV, 73, 311.
[1465] Holub, _Sieben Jahre in Süd-Afr._, II, 293.
[1466] Wilson and Felkin, _Uganda and Sudan_, II, 53.
[1467] Ratzel, _Hist. of Mankind_, II, 469.
[1468] Ling Roth, _Tasmanians_, 21, 144.
[1469] JAI, XXI, 200.
[1470] _Berl. Mus._, 1885, 60.
[1471] Codrington, _Melanesians_, 321.
[1472] _Berl. Mus._, 1888, 193.
[1473] W. R. Smith, _Relig. of Semites_, 437. Whatever the
purpose of the loin cloth of the ancient Egyptians may have been,
it cannot have been decency. The monuments show men at work with
the loin cloth turned hindside foremost as if to save it from
wear (Meyer, _Egypt_, II, 116).
[1474] _Globus_, LXXVIII, 5.
[1475] Brunache, _Afr. Cent._, 207.
[1476] Johnston, _Uganda Protect._, 781.
[1477] Johnston, _Uganda Protect_, 853.
[1478] _Ibid._, 220.
[1479] Wilson and Felkin, _Uganda and Sudan_, II, 49, 96.
[1480] E.g. JAI, XXIV, 255, 281.
[1481] Spix and Martius, _Brasilien_, 1224; Martius, _Ethnog.
Brasil._, 388.
[1482] Schweinfurth, _Heart of Afr._, II, 104.
[1483] _Globus_, LXXXVIII, 89.
[1484] Schweinfurth, _Heart of Afr._, I, 152.
[1485] _South Africa_, II, 590.
[1486] Bock, _Reis in Borneo_, 78.
[1487] JAI, XIX, 391.
[1488] JAI, XXVIII, 208.
[1489] Paulitschke, _Ethnog. N. O. Afr._, I, 80.
[1490] Schmidt, _Ceylon_, 37.
[1491] _Gli Amori degli Uomini_, 40.
[1492] _Madras Gov. Mus._, II, 198.
[1493] _Ztsft. für Ethnol._, XIV, (181).
[1494] Baelz in _Ztsft. für Ethnol._, XXXIII, 178.
[1495] _Vererbung und Auslese_, 281.
[1496] Humbert, _Japan_, 269.
[1497] _Ibid._, 295, 334.
[1498] _Japan_, 13.
[1499] _Pacific Tales_, 276.
[1500] JAI, XXVI, 394.
[1501] Finsch, _Ethnol. Erfahr._, III, 26.
[1502] Schweinfurth, _Heart of Afr._, II, 98.
[1503] _Century Mag._, January, 1904.
[1504] JAI, XII, 135.
[1505] _Reisen in Siberien_, IV, 1429.
[1506] Holm, _Angmagslikerne_, 34, 50-56, 112, 117, 162.
[1507] _Scribner's Mag._, February, 1895.
[1508] _Bur. Ethnol._, V, 479.
[1509] Ratzel, _Völkerkunde_, II, 663.
[1510] _Globus_, LXXVIII, 272.
[1511] JAI, XXVII, 410.
[1512] Pereiro, _La Isla de Ponape_, 112.
[1513] _Reis in Borneo_, 39.
[1514] Powers, _Calif. Indians_, 55.
[1515] _Smithson. Rep._, 1885, Part II, 86.
[1516] _Hinduism_, 219.
[1517] Weinhold, _D. F._, II, 259; Schultz, _Höf. Leben_, II,
168.
[1518] Scherr, _D. F. W._, I, 191.
[1519] Lund, _Norges Historie_, II, 246, 380.
[1520] Scherr, _D. F. W._, I, 191.
[1521] Weinhold, _D. F._, II, 115.
[1522] D'Aussy, _Fabliaux_, IV, passim.
[1523] Weinhold, _D. F._, II, 114.
[1524] Lecky, _Eur. Morals_, II, 311.
[1525] Hefele, _Conciliengesch._, III, 310.
[1526] Weinhold, _D. F._, II, 117.
[1527] Prutz, _Kulturgesch. der Kreuzzüge_, 528 note.
[1528] Zappert in _Arch. für Kunde der Oester. Gesch.-Quellen_,
XXI, 41, 82, 132.
[1529] The queen of Charles VII of France (1422-1461) said that
she owned but two chemises of linen (Clement, _Jacques Coeur_,
246).
[1530] _Oeffentl. Sittlichkeit_, 399.
[1531] Schultz, _D. L._, 136.
[1532] Dulaure, _Hist. de Paris_, 268; Schultz, _D. L._, 277,
283; cf. Janssen, VIII, 391.
[1533] Coryate's _Crudities_, II, 244.
[1534] _Finska Kranier_, 118.
[1535] D'Ancona, _Origine del Teatro in Italia_ (1st ed.), I,
213, 218, 280, 375.
[1536] Herodotus, I, 10.
[1537] Lucius, _Essenismus_, 62, 68.
[1538] Grupp, _Kulturgesch. der Röm. Kaiserzeit_, I, 24; cf. sec.
211.
[1539] _Siberien i Vore Dage_, 146.
[1540] Hearn, _Japan_, 188-200.
[1541] Cf. sec. 462.
[1542] _Berl. Mus._, 1888, 199, 302.
[1543] Nieuwenhuis, _Centraal Borneo_, I, 146.
[1544] Erman, _Aegypten_, I, 223.
[1545] _Jhrb. des Dtschen Archaeolog. Instit._, 1886, 260; _Arch.
für Anthrop._, XXIX, 136.
[1546] On the connection of these see Bethe, _Gesch. des Theaters
im Alt._, 299 ff.
[1547] Reich, _Der Mimus_, I, 17, 29, 58, 93, 95, 258, 321, 496,
498, 626, 691, 733.
[1548] Burckhardt, _Arabic Proverbs_, 115.
[1549] Stieda, _Infibulation_, 23, 25, 36, 40, 44, 56, 66.
[1550] Reich, 503.
[1551] W. R. Smith, _Relig. of the Semites_, 457.
[1552] _Griech. Lit. in der Alexandrinerzeit_, II, 574.
[1553] W. R. Smith, _Relig. of the Semites_, 457.
[1554] _Bull., Soc. d'Anthrop. de Paris_, 1904, 404.
[1555] _Od._, VIII, 332.
[1556] _Il._, XIV, 334.
[1557] _Od._, III, 464; IV, 49; VI, 15, 109, 276; Keller, _Hom.
Soc._, 209.
[1558] _Od._, VI, 136.
[1559] JAI, XXIV, 444.
[1560] _Bur. Eth._, III, 365.
[1561] _Smithson. Rep._, 1885, Part II, 457.
[1562] _Afrika_, III, 633.
[1563] Burrows, _Land of Pygmies_, 85.
[1564] JAI, XII, 355.
[1565] Bishop, _Korea_, 341.
[1566] _Globus_, LXXVIII, 263.
[1567] _Ibid._, LXXXII, 192 ff.
[1568] JAI, XI, 199.
[1569] Pischon, _Einfluss des Islam_, 17.
[1570] Kubary, _Soc. Einrichtungen der Pelauer_, 73, 90.
[1571] Pfeil, _Aus der Südsee_, 48, 74.
[1572] _Globus_, LXXXVII, 129, 130.
[1573] Darinsky in _Ztsft. für vergleich. Rechtswssnsft._, XIV,
189.
[1574] _Russ. Ethnog._ (_russ._), 219, 225, 291, 340, 355, 358.
[1575] Von Kremer, _Kulturgesch. des Orients_, II, 250.
[1576] _Ibid._, 215.
[1577] Exod. iii. 5; Josh. v. 15.
[1578] _Relig. of the Semites_, 453.
[1579] Sura XXIV.
[1580] Tornauw, _Mosl. Recht._, 86.
[1581] Burckhardt, _Arabic Proverbs_, 1.
[1582] _Sittenbilder aus dem Morgenlande_, 16.
[1583] _The Churchman_, September 2, 1905, 343.
[1584] Goodrich-Frear, _Inner Jerusalem_, 57.
[1585] This explanation is no doubt a product of later
rationalization. The rule is a very ancient Semitic one, due to
the old connection between sacrifice and commensality. W. Rob.
Smith, _Relig. of the Semites_, 283.
[1586] Hanoteau et Letourneux, _La Kabylie_, II, and III, 190,
237, 240.
[1587] Duveyrier, _Les Touaregs du Nord_, 430.
[1588] _Russ. Ethnog._ (_russ._), II, 445.
[1589] Holtzmann, _Ind. Sagen_, II, 267.
[1590] Monier-Williams, _Brahmanism and Hinduism_, 396.
[1591] _Ibid._, 376.
[1592] _Ibid._, 375.
[1593] Nivedita, _Web of Indian Life_, 14.
[1594] Dubois, _Moeurs de l'Inde_ (1825), II, 280, 329, 332,
334, 441, 476, 480.
[1595] Nivedita, _Web of Indian Life_, 11.
[1596] JAI, XXVII, 27.
[1597] Lane, _Mod. Egyptians_, I, 265.
[1598] Alec-Tweedie, _Sunny Sicily_, 265.
[1599] _Od._, VI, 285.
[1600] _De Civilitate Morum Puerilium_, I, 1, 3, 5, 52, 54.
[1601] JAI, XXIV, 231.
[1602] Crawley gives a list of cases (JAI, XXIV, 435).
[1603] _Ibid._, 433.
[1604]_ Austral. Assoc. Adv. Sci._, 1892, 660.
[1605] JAI, XII, 344.
[1606] W.R. Smith, _Relig. of the Semites_, 279.
[1607] _Berl. Mus._, 1888, 66.
[1608] Bent, _Ethiopia_, 32.
[1609] Bastian, _Loango-Küste_, I, 262.
[1610] Junker, _Afrika_, I, 156.
[1611] Monier-Williams, _Brahmanism and Hinduism_, 128.
[1612] _Borneo_, II, 168.
[1613] Paulitschke, _Ethnog. N.O. Afr._, I, 248.
[1614] Martius, _Ethnog. Brasil._, 96.
[1615] Becke, _Pacific Tales_, 179.
[1616] Denecke, _Anstandsgefühl in Deutschland_, VII.
[1617] Lenient, _La Satire en France au M. A._, 310.
[1618] De Maulde la Clavière, _Femmes de la Renaissance_, 320.
[1619] _Globus_, LXXXV, 80.
[1620] See Mallory in _Amer. Anthrop._, III, 201.
[1621] JAI, XII, 93.
[1622] Lewin, _Races of S. E. India_, 311.
[1623] _Austral. Assoc. Adv. Sci._, 1892, 630.
[1624] JAI, XXI, 223.
[1625] _Ibid._, XXII, 119.
[1626] Junker, _Afr._, II, 481.
[1627] Hiekisch, _Tungusen_, 68.
[1628] Sieroshevski, _Yakuty_, (_russ._), I, 440.
[1629] _Scribner's Mag._, February, 1895.
[1630] _Globus_, LXXIII, 253.
[1631] _Globus_, LXXXVII, 128.
[1632] _Heart of Africa_, I, 157.
[1633] _Century Mag._, January, 1904.
[1634] _Anstandesgefühl in Deutschland._
[1635] Denecke, XII.
[1636] Maspero, _Peuples de l'Orient_, III, 436-439.
[1637] Professor Keller calls my attention to a number of words
used by Homer to subject conduct to this test of seemliness. It
seems to be for him the standard of right.
[1638] _Il._, XXII, 395; XXIV, 51.
[1639] _Ibid._, XXIII, 164.
[1640] _Ibid._, XXII, 338.
[1641] _Ibid._, XI, 147; XIII, 102.
[1642] _Od._, XXII, 441, 447.
[1643] _Il._, XXII, 226.
[1644] _Völkerideale_, I, Chap. I.
[1645] Burckhardt, _Griech. Kulturgesch._, I, 314.
[1646] Herodotus, IX, 78.
[1647] Beloch, _Griech. Kulturgesch._, I, 470, 594; II, 103, 107,
364, 441.
[1648] Weinhold, _D. F._, I, 159-168.
[1649] Schultz, _Höf. Leben_, II, 448.
[1650] Denecke, _Anstandsgefühl in Deutschland_, XXI.
[1651] Lea, _Inquis._, III, 238, 260, 319; Schotmüller, _Der
Untergang des Templer-Ordens_, I, 625.
[1652] _Comédie en France au M. A._, 21.
[1653] De Julleville, 21, 74, 86, 89, 107, 304.
[1654] Mahaffy, _The Greek World under Roman Sway_, 324.
[1655] Schultze-Gävernitz in Ammon, _Gesellschaftsordnung_, 117.
[1656] Schallmeyer, _Vererbung und Auslese_, 231.
[1657] Rudeck, _Gesch. der Oeffentl. Sittlichkeit in
Deutschland_, 422.