SOCIETAL SELECTION
Social selection by the mores.--Instrumentalities of
suggestion.--Symbols, pictures, etc.--Apparatus of
suggestion.--Watchwords, catchwords.--"Slave," "democracy."--
Epithets.--Phrases.--Pathos.--Pathos is unfavorable to
truth.--Analysis and verification as tests.--Humanity.--
Selection by distinction.--Aristocracies.--Fashion.--
Conventionalization.--Uncivilized fashions.--Ideals of
beauty.--Fashion in other things than dress.--Miscellaneous
fashions.--All deformations by fashion are irrational.--Satires
on fashion.--Fashion in faiths and ideals.--Fashion is not
trivial, not subject to argument.--Remoter effects of fashion.--
Slang and expletives.--Poses, fads, and cant.--Illustrations.--
Heroes, scapegoats, and butts.--Caricature.--Relation of fads,
etc., to mores.--Ideals.--Ideals of beauty.--The
man-as-he-should-be.--The standard type of man.--Who does the
thinking?--The gentleman.--Standards set by taboos.--Crimes.--
Criminal law.--Mass phenomena of fear and hope.--Manias,
delusions.--Monstrous mass phenomena.--Gregariousness in the
Middle Ages.--The mendicant orders.--Other mendicants.--
Popular mania for poverty and beggary.--Delusions.--Manias and
suggestion.--Power of the crowd over the individual.--
Discipline by pain.--The mediæval church operated societal
selection.--The mediæval church.--Sacerdotal celibacy.--The
masses wanted clerical celibacy.--Abelard.--The selection of
sacerdotal celibacy.--How the church operated selection.--Mores
and morals; social code.--Orthodoxy; treatment of dissent;
selection by torture.--Execution by burning.--Burning in North
American colonies.--Solidarity in penalty for fault of one.--
Torture in the ancient states.--Torture in the Roman empire.--
Jewish and Christian universality; who persecutes whom?--The
ordeal.--Irrationality of torture.--Inquisitorial procedure
from Roman law.--Bishops as inquisitors.--Definition of
heretic.--The Albigenses.--Persecution was popular.--Theory of
persecution.--Duties laid on the civil authority.--Public
opinion as to the burning of heretics.--The shares of the church
and the masses.--The church uses its power for selfish
aggrandizement.--The inquisition took shape slowly.--Frederick
II and his code.--Formative legislation.--Dungeons.--The
yellow crosses.--Confiscation.--Operation of the inquisition.--
Success of the inquisition.--Torture in civil and ecclesiastical
trials.--The selection accomplished.--Torture in England.--The
Spanish inquisition.--The inquisition in Venice.--The use of
the inquisition for political and personal purposes.--Stages of
the selection by murder.
+170. Social selection by the mores.+ The most important fact about the
mores is their dominion over the individual. Arising he knows not whence
or how, they meet his opening mind in earliest childhood, give him his
outfit of ideas, faiths, and tastes, and lead him into prescribed mental
processes. They bring to him codes of action, standards, and rules of
ethics. They have a model of the man-as-he-should-be to which they mold
him, in spite of himself and without his knowledge. If he submits and
consents, he is taken up and may attain great social success. If he
resists and dissents, he is thrown out and may be trodden under foot.
The mores are therefore an engine of social selection. Their coercion of
the individual is the mode in which they operate the selection, and the
details of the process deserve study. Some folkways exercise an unknown
and unintelligent selection. Infanticide does this (Chapter VII).
Slavery always exerts a very powerful selection, both physical and
social (Chapter VI).
+171. Instrumentalities of suggestion.+ Suggestion is exerted in the
mores by a number of instrumentalities, all of which have their origin
in the mores, and may only extend to all what some have thought and
felt, or may (at a later stage) be used with set intention to act
suggestively in extending certain mores.
Myths, legends, fables, and mythology spread notions through a group,
and from generation to generation, until the notions become components
of the mores, being interwoven with the folkways. Epic poems have
powerfully influenced the mores. They present types of heroic actions
and character which serve as models to the young. The _Iliad_ and
_Odyssey_ became text-books for the instruction of Greek youth. They set
notions of heroism and duty, and furnished all Greeks with a common
stock of narratives, ideas, and ideals, and with sentiments which
everybody knew and which could be rearoused by an allusion. Everybody
was expected to produce the same reaction under the allusion. Perhaps
that was a conventional assumption, and the reaction in thought and
feeling may have been only conventional in many cases, but the
suggestion did not fail of its effect even then. Later, when the ideals
of epic heroism and of the old respect for the gods were popularly
rejected and derided, this renunciation of the old stock of common ideas
and faiths marked a decline in the morale of the nation. It is a very
important question: What is the effect of conventional humbug in the
mores of a people, which is suggested to the young as solemn and sacred,
and which they have to find out and reject later in life? The
_Mahabharata_, the _Kalevala_, the _Edda_, the _Nibelungen Noth_, are
other examples of popular epics which had great influence on the mores
for centuries. Such poems present models of action and principle, but it
is inevitable that a later time will not appreciate them and will turn
them to ridicule, or will make of them only poses and affectations. The
former is the effect most likely to be produced on the masses, the
latter on the cultured classes. In the Greco-Roman world, at the
beginning of the Christian era, various philosophic sects tried to
restore and renew the ideals of Greek heroism, virtue, and religious
faith, so far as they seemed to have permanent ethical value. The
popular mores were never touched by this effort. In fact, it is
impossible for us to know whether the writings of Seneca, Plutarch,
Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, and Pliny represent to us the real rules of
life of those men, or are only a literary pose. In the Renaissance, and
since then, men educated in the classics have been influenced by them in
regard to their standards of noble and praiseworthy character, and of
what should be cultivated in thought and conduct. Such men have had a
common stock of quotations, of accepted views in life philosophy, and of
current ethical opinions. This stock, however, has been common to the
members of the technical guild of the learned. It has never affected the
masses. Amongst Protestants the Bible has, in the last four hundred
years, furnished a common stock of history and anecdote, and has also
furnished phrases and current quotations familiar to all classes. It has
furnished codes and standards which none dared to disavow, and the
suggestion of which has been overpowering. The effect on popular mores
has been very great.
+172. Symbols, pictures.+ Before the ability to read became general art
was employed in the form of symbols to carry suggestion. Symbolic acts
were employed in trade and contracts, in marriage and religion. For us
writing has taken the place of symbols as a means of suggestion. Symbols
do not appeal to us. They are not in our habits. Illustrative pictures
influence us. The introduction of them into daily newspapers is an
important development of the arts of suggestion. Mediæval art in colored
glass, carving, sculpture, and pictures reveals the grossness and crass
simplicity of the mediæval imagination, but also its childish
originality and directness. No doubt it was on account of these latter
characteristics that it had such suggestive power. It was graphic. It
stimulated and inflamed the kind of imagination which produced it. It
found its subjects in heaven, hell, demons, torture, and the scriptural
incidents which contained any horrible, fantastic, or grotesque
elements. The crucifix represented a man dying in the agony of torture,
and it was the chief symbol of the religion. The suggestion in all this
art produced barbaric passion and sensuality. Any one who, in childhood,
had in his hands one of the old Bibles illustrated by wood cuts knows
what power the cuts had to determine the concept which was formed from
the text, and which has persisted through life, in spite of later
instruction.
+173. Apparatus of suggestion.+ In modern times the apparatus of
suggestion is in language, not in pictures, carvings, morality plays, or
other visible products of art. Watchwords, catchwords, phrases, and
epithets are the modern instrumentalities. There are words which are
used currently as if their meaning was perfectly simple, clear, and
unambiguous, which are not defined at all. "Democracy," the "People,"
"Wall Street," "Slave," "Americanism," are examples. These words have
been called "symbols." They might better be called "tokens." They are
like token coins. They "pass"; that is their most noteworthy
characteristic. They are familiar, unquestioned, popular, and they are
always current above their value. They always reveal the invincible
tendency of the masses to mythologize. They are personified and a
superhuman energy is attributed to them. "Democracy" is not treated as a
parallel word to aristocracy, theocracy, autocracy, etc., but as a
Power from some outside origin, which brings into human affairs an
inspiration and energy of its own. The "People" is not the population,
but a creation of mythology, to which inherent faculties and capacities
are ascribed beyond what can be verified within experience. "Wall
Street" takes the place which used to be assigned to the devil. What is
that "Wall Street" which is currently spoken of by editors and public
men as thinking, wanting, working for, certain things? There is a
collective interest which is so designated which is real, but the
popular notion under "Wall Street" is unanalyzed. It is a phantasm or a
myth. In all these cases there is a tyranny in the term. Who dare
criticise democracy or the people? Who dare put himself on the side of
Wall Street? The tyranny is greatest in regard to "American" and
"Americanism." Who dare say that he is not "American"? Who dare
repudiate what is declared to be "Americanism"? It follows that if
anything is base and bogus it is always labeled "American." If a thing
is to be recommended which cannot be justified, it is put under
"Americanism." Who does not shudder at the fear of being called
"unpatriotic"? and to repudiate what any one chooses to call "American"
is to be unpatriotic. If there is any document of Americanism, it is the
Declaration of Independence. Those who have Americanism especially in
charge have repudiated the doctrine that "governments derive their just
powers from the consent of the governed," because it stood in the way of
what they wanted to do. They denounce those who cling to the doctrine as
un-American. Then we see what Americanism and patriotism are. They are
the duty laid upon us all to applaud, follow, and obey whatever a ruling
clique of newspapers and politicians chooses to say or wants to do.
"England" has always been, amongst us, a kind of counter token, or token
of things to be resisted and repudiated. The "symbols," or "tokens,"
always have this utility for suggestion. They carry a coercion with them
and overwhelm people who are not trained to verify assertions and
dissect fallacies.
+174. Watchwords, catchwords.+ A watchword sums up one policy,
doctrine, view, or phase of a subject. It may be legitimate and useful,
but a watchword easily changes its meaning and takes up foreign
connotations or fallacious suggestions. Critical analysis is required to
detect and exclude the fallacy. Catchwords are acutely adapted to
stimulate desires. In the presidential campaign of 1900 we saw a
catchword deliberately invented,--"the full dinner pail." Such an
invention turns suggestion into an art. Socialism, as a subject of
popular agitation, consists almost altogether of watchwords, catchwords,
and phrases of suggestion: "the boon of nature," "the banquet of life,"
"the disinherited," "the submerged tenth," "the mine to the miner,"
"restore the land to the landless." Trades unionism consists almost
entirely, on its philosophical side, of suggestive watchwords and
phrases. It is said that "labor" creates all value. This is not true,
but the fallacy is complete when labor is taken in the sense of
"laborers," collectively and technically so called,--an abuse of
language which is now current. To say that wage-earners create all value
is to assert a proposition from which numerous and weighty consequences
follow as to rights and interests. "The interest of one is the interest
of all" is a principle which is as good for a band of robbers as for a
union of any other kind. "Making work" by not producing is the greatest
industrial fallacy possible.
+175. Slave, democracy.+ Since "democratic" is now a word to conjure
with, we hear of democracy in industry, banking, education, science,
etc., where the word is destitute of meaning or is fallacious. It is
used to prejudice the discussion. Since the abolition of slavery the
word "slave" has become a token. In current discussions we hear of "rent
slaves," "wages slavery," "debt slavery," "marriage slavery," etc. These
words bear witness to great confusion and error in the popular notions
of what freedom is and can be. For negroes emancipation contained a
great disillusion. They had to learn what being "free" did not mean.
Debt slavery is the oldest kind of slavery except war captivity. A man
in debt is not free. A man who has made a contract is not free. A man
who has contracted duties and obligations as husband and father, or has
been born into them as citizen, son, brother, etc., is not free. Can we
imagine ourselves "free" from the conditions of human life? Does it do
any good to stigmatize the case as "wages slavery," when what it means
is that a man is under a necessity to earn his living? It would be a
grand reform in the mores if the masses should learn to turn away in
contempt from all this rhetoric.
+176. Epithets.+ Works of fiction have furnished the language with
epithets for types of individuals (sec. 622). Don Quixote, Faust, Punch,
Reinecke Fuchs, Br'er Rabbit, Falstaff, Bottom, and many from Dickens
(Pickwick, Pecksniff, Podsnap, Turveydrop, Uriah Heep) are examples. The
words are like coins. They condense ideas and produce classes. They
economize language. They also produce summary criticisms and definition
of types by societal selection. All the reading classes get the use of
common epithets, and the usage passes to other classes in time. The
coercion of an epithet of contempt or disapproval is something which it
requires great moral courage to endure.
+177. Phrases.+ The educated classes are victims of the phrase. Phrases
are rhetorical flourishes adapted to the pet notions of the time. They
are artifices of suggestion. They are the same old tricks of the
medicine man adapted to an age of literature and common schools. Instead
of a rattle or a drum the operator talks about "destiny" and "duty," or
molds into easy phrases the sentiments which are popular. It is only a
difference of method. Solemnity, unction, and rhetorical skill are
needed. Often the phrases embody only visionary generalities.
"Citizenship," "publicity," "public policy," "restraint of trade," "he
who holds the sea will hold the land," "trade follows the flag," "the
dollar of the fathers," "the key of the Pacific," "peace with honor,"
are some of the recent coinages or recoinages. Phrases have great power
when they are antithetical or alliterative. Some opponents of the silver
proposition were quite perplexed by the saying: "The white man with the
yellow metal is beaten by the yellow man with the white metal." In 1844
the alliterative watchword "Fifty-four forty or fight" nearly provoked a
war. If it had been "Forty-nine thirty or fight," that would not have
had nearly so great effect. The "Cape to Cairo" railroad is another case
of alliteration. Humanitarianism has permeated our mores and has been a
fountain of phrases. Forty years ago the phrase "enthusiasm of humanity"
was invented. It inspired a school of sentimental philosophizing about
social relations, which has been carried on by phrase making: "the
dignity of labor," "the nobility of humanity," "a man is not a ware,"
"an existence worthy of humanity," "a living wage." "Humanity" in modern
languages is generally used in two senses: (_a_) the human race, (_b_)
the sympathetic sentiment between man and man. This ambiguity enters
into all the phrases which are humanitarian.
+178. Pathos.+ Suggestion is powerfully aided by _pathos_, in the
original Greek sense of the word. Pathos is the glamour of sentiment
which grows up around the pet notion of an age and people, and which
protects it from criticism. The Greeks, in the fourth century before
Christ, cherished pathos in regard to tyrannicide. Tyrants were bosses,
produced by democracy in towns, but hated by democrats. Tyrannicides
were surrounded with a halo of heroism and popular admiration.[373]
Something of the same sentiment was revived in the sixteenth century,
when it appeared that a tyrant was any ruler whose politics one did not
like. It cost several rulers their lives. Pathos was a large element in
the notions of woman and knighthood (twelfth and thirteenth centuries),
of the church (thirteenth century), of the Holy Sepulcher (eleventh and
twelfth centuries). In the thirteenth century there was a large element
of pathos in the glorification of poverty. A great deal of pathos has
been expended on the history and institutions of Greece and Rome in
modern times. Classical studies still depend largely on it for their
prestige. There is a pathos of democracy in the United States. In all
English-speaking countries marriage is an object of pathos. The pathos
is cultivated by poetry and novels. Humanitarianism is nourished by
pathos and it stimulates pathos. The "poor" and the "laborers" are
objects of pathos, on account of which these terms, in literature, refer
to a conventional and unreal concept. Consequently there is no honest
discussion of any topic which concerns the poor or laborers. Some people
make opposition to alcohol an object of pathos.
+179. Pathos is unfavorable to truth.+ Whenever pathos is in play the
subject is privileged. It is regarded with a kind of affection, and is
protected from severe examination. It is made holy or sacred. The thing
is cherished with such a preëstablished preference and faith that it is
thought wrong to verify it. Pathos, therefore, is unfavorable to truth.
It has always been an element in religion. It is an element now in
patriotism, and in regard to the history of one's own country. The
coercion of pathos on the individual comes in popular disapproval of
truth-telling about the matter in question. The toleration for forgery
and fraud in the Christian church until modern times, which to modern
people seems so shocking and inexplicable, was chiefly due to pathos
about religion and the church. If a forgery would help the church or
religion, any one who opposed it would seem to be an enemy of religion
and the church and willing to violate the pathos which surrounded them.
+180. The value of analysis and verification as tests.+ In all the cases
of the use of catchwords, watchwords, and phrases, the stereotyped forms
of language seem to convey thought, especially ascertained truth, and
they do it in a way to preclude verification. It is absolutely essential
to correct thinking and successful discussion to reject stereotyped
forms, and to insist on analysis and verification. Evidently all forms
of suggestion tend to create an atmosphere of delusion. Pathos increases
the atmosphere of delusion. It introduces elements which corrupt the
judgment. In effect, it continues the old notion that there are edifying
falsehoods and useful deceits. The masses always infuse a large
emotional element into all their likes and dislikes, approval and
disapproval. Hence, in time, they surround what they accept with pathos
which it is hard to break through.
+181. Humanity.+ The standard of humanity or of decent behavior,
especially towards the weak or those persons who may be at one's mercy,
or animals, is entirely in the mores of the group and time. To the
Gauchos of Uruguay "inhumanity and love of bloodshed become second
nature." Their customs of treating beasts habituate them to bloodshed.
"They are callous to the sight of blood and suffering and come to
positively enjoy it." They have no affection for their horses and dogs.
They murder for plunder.[374] It is very rarely that we meet with such a
description as that of any people. Polynesians were bloodthirsty and
cruel, perhaps because they had no chase of wild animals in which to
expend their energies.[375] North American Indians could invent
frightful tortures, but they were not bloodthirsty. They were not
humane. Suffering did not revolt them. Schomburgk[376] tells a story of
an Indian who became enraged at his wife because she groaned with
toothache. He cut down her hammock and caused her to fall so that she
suffered a dislocation of the arm. A European witness went to the chief
with a report and remonstrance, but the chief was astonished that any
one should take any notice of such an incident. The Assyrians cut in
stone representations of flaying, impaling, etc., and of a king with his
own royal hands putting out the eyes of prisoners. The Egyptians
represented kings slaying men (national enemies) in masses. The Romans
enjoyed bloodshed and the sight of suffering.[377] The Middle Ages
reveled in cruelty to men and beasts. It is in the Middle Ages that we
could find the nearest parallels to the Gauchos above. None of these
people felt that repulsive revolt of the whole nature at inhumanity
which characterizes modern cultivated people. The horrors have all
receded out of our experience, and almost out of our knowledge. The line
of familiarity is set far off. Therefore a little thing in the way of
inhumanity is strange and exerts its full repulsive effect. Things
happen, however, which show us that human nature is not changed, and
that the brute in it may awake again at any time. It is all a question
of time, custom, and occasion, and the individual is coerced to adopt
the mores as to these matters which are then and there current.
+182. Selection by distinction.+ One of the leading modes by which the
group exercises selection of its adopted type on the individual is by
distinction. Distinction is selection. It appeals to vanity. It acts in
two ways and has two opposite effects. One likes to be separated from
the crowd by what is admired, and dislikes to be distinguished for what
is not admired. Cases occur in which the noteworthy person is not sure
whether he ought to be proud or ashamed of that for which he is
distinguished. When a society gives titles, decorations, and rewards for
acts, it stimulates what it rewards and causes new cases of it. The
operation of selection is direct and rational. The cases in which the
application of distinction is irrational show most clearly its selective
effect. School-teachers are familiar with the fact that children will
imitate a peculiarity of one which marks him out from all the rest, even
if it is a deformity or defect. Why then wonder that barbarian mothers
try to deform their babies towards an adopted type of bodily perfection
which is not rationally preferable? A lady of my acquaintance showed me
one of her dolls which had wire attachments on its legs in imitation of
those worn by children for orthopedic effect. She explained that when
she was a child, another child who had soft bones or weak ankles, and
who wore irons for them, was brought into her group of playmates. They
all admired and envied her, and all wished that they had weak bones so
that they could wear irons. This lady made wire attachments for her doll
that it might reach the highest standard.
+183. Aristocracies.+ All aristocracies are groups of those who are
distinguished, at the time, for the possession of those things which are
admired or approved, and which give superiority in the struggle for
existence or in social power. In the higher civilization, until modern
times, the possession of land was the only social power which would
raise a man above sordid cares and enable him to plan his life as he
chose. By talent an income could be won which would give the same
advantage, but not with the same security of permanence and
independence. The fields for talent were war, civil administration, and
religion, the last including all mental activity. Men of talent had to
win their place by craft and charlatanism (sorcery, astrology,
therapeutics). Their position never was independent, except in church
establishments. They had to win recognition from warriors and
landowners, and they became comrades and allies of the latter. Merchants
and bankers were the aristocracy at Carthage, Venice, Florence, and
Genoa, and in the Hansa. Talented military men were aristocrats under
Napoleon, courtiers were such under Louis XIV, and ecclesiastics at
Rome. Since the fourteenth century capital has become a new and the
greatest and indispensable social power. Those who, at any time, have
the then most important social power in their hands are courted and
flattered, envied and served, by the rest. They make an aristocracy. The
aristocrats are the distinguished ones, and their existence and
recognition give direction to social ambition. Of course this acts
selectively to call out what is most advantageous and most valued in the
society.
+184.+ There are a number of mass phenomena which are on a lower grade
than the mores, lacking the elements of truth and right with respect to
welfare, which illustrate still further and more obviously the coercion
of all mass movements over the individual. These are fashion, poses,
fads, and affectations.
+185. Fashion.+ Fashion in dress has covered both absurdities and
indecencies with the ægis of custom. From the beginning of the
fourteenth century laws appear against indecent dress. What nobles
invented, generally in order to give especial zest to the costume of a
special occasion, that burghers and later peasants imitated and made
common.[378] In the fifteenth century the man's hose fitted the legs and
hips tightly. The latchet was of a different color, and was decorated
and stuffed as if to exaggerate still further the indecent obtrusiveness
of it.[379] Schultz[380] says that the pictures which we have do not
show the full indecency of the dress against which the clergy and
moralists of the fifteenth century uttered denunciations, but only those
forms which were considered decent, that is, those which were within the
limits which custom at the time had established. At the same time women
began to uncover the neck and bosom. The extent to which this may be
carried is always controlled by fashion and the mores. Puritans and
Quakers attempted to restrict it entirely, and to so construct the
dress, by a neckerchief or attachment to the bodice, that the shape of
the bust should be entirely concealed. The mores rejected this rule as
excessive. In spite of all the eloquence of the moral preachers, that
form of dress which shows neck and bosom has become established, only
that it is specialized for full dress and covered by conventionalization.
+186. Conventionalization.+ Conventionalization also comes into play to
cover the dress of the ballet or burlesque opera and the bathing dress.
Conventionalization always includes strict specification and limits of
time, place, and occasion, beyond which the same dress would become
vicious. Amongst Moslems and Orientals this conventionalization as to
dress has never been introduced. We are familiar with the fact that when
a fashion has been introduced and has become common our eye is formed to
it, and no one looks "right" or stylish who does not conform to it. We
also know that after the fashion has changed things in the discarded
fashion look dowdy and rustic. No one can resist these impressions, try
as he may. This fact, in the experience of everybody, gives us an
example of the power of current custom over the individual. While a
fashion reigns its tendency is to greater and greater extravagance in
order to produce the desired and admired effect. Then the toleration for
any questionable element in the fashion is extended and the extension is
unnoticed. If a woman of 1860, in the dress of her time, were to meet a
woman of 1906, in the dress of her time, each would be amazed at the
indecency of the dress of the other. No dress ever was more, or more
justly, denounced for ugliness, inconvenience, and indecency than the
crinoline, but all the women from 1855 to 1865, including some of the
sweetest who ever lived, wore it. No inference whatever as to their
taste or character would be justified. There never is any rational
judgment in the fashion of dress. No criticism can reach it. In a few
cases we know what actress or princess started a certain fashion, but in
the great majority of cases we do not know whence it came or who was
responsible for it. We all have to obey it. We hardly ever have any
chance to answer back. Its all-sufficient sanction is that "everybody
wears it," or wears it _so_. Evidently this is only a special
application to dress of a general usage--conventionalization.
+187. Uncivilized fashions.+ Those "good old times" of simplicity and
common sense in dress must be sought in the time anterior to waistband
and apron. All the barbarians and savages were guilty of folly,
frivolity, and self-deformation in the service of fashion. They found an
ideal somewhere which they wanted to attain, or they wanted to be
distinguished, that is, raised out of the commonplace and universal. At
one stage distinction comes from being in the fashion in a high and
marked degree. Also each one flees the distinction of being out of the
fashion, which would not draw admiration. At another stage distinction
comes from starting a new fashion. This may be done by an ornament, if
it is well selected so that it will "take."[381] Beads have been a
fashionable ornament from the days of savagery until to-day. An Indian
woman in Florida "had six quarts (probably a peck) of the beads gathered
about her neck, hanging down her back, down upon her breasts, filling
the space under her chin, and covering her neck up to her ears. It was
an effort for her to move her head. She, however, was only a little, if
any, better off in her possessions than most of the others. Others were
about equally burdened. Even girl babies are favored by their proud
mammas with a varying quantity of the coveted neckwear. The cumbersome
beads are said to be worn by night as well as by day."[382] "A woman
sometimes hangs a weight of over five pounds around her neck, for
besides the ordinary necklaces the northern women wear one or more large
white, polished shells, which are brought from the western coast and
which weigh from half a pound upward."[383] "Fashions change in
Bechuanaland; one year the women all wear blue beads, but perhaps the
next (and just when a trader has laid in a supply of blue beads) they
refuse to wear any color but yellow. At the time of writing [1886] the
men wore small black pot hats, but several years ago they had used huge
felt hats, like that of Rip Van Winkle, and as a consequence the stores
are full of those unsalable ones."[384]
+188. Fashion in ethnography.+ The Carib women in Surinam think that
large calves of the leg are a beauty. Therefore they bind the leg above
the ankle to make the calves larger. They begin the treatment on
children.[385] Some Australian mothers press down their babies' noses.
"They laugh at the sharp noses of Europeans, and call them tomahawk
noses, preferring their own style."[386] The presence of two races side
by side calls attention to the characteristic differences. Race vanity
then produces an effort to emphasize the race characteristics. Samoan
mothers want the noses and foreheads of their babies to be flat, and
they squeeze them with their hands accordingly.[387] The "Papuan ideal
of female beauty has a big nose, big breasts, and a dark-brown, smooth
skin."[388] To-day the Papuans all smoke white clay pipes. Four weeks
later no one will smoke a white pipe. All want brown ones. Still four
weeks later no one wants any pipe at all. All run around with red
umbrellas.[389] On the Solomon Islands sometimes they want plain pipes;
then again, pipes with a ship or anchor carved on them; again, pipes
with a knob. Women wear great weights of metal as rings for
ornament.[390] The Galla women wear rings to the weight of four or six
pounds.[391] Tylor[392] says that an African belle wears big copper
rings which become hot in the sun, so that the lady has to have an
attendant, whose duty it is to cool them down by wetting them. The queen
of the Wavunias on the Congo wore a brass collar around her neck, which
weighed from sixteen to twenty pounds. She had to lie down once in a
while to rest.[393] The Herero wear iron which in the dry climate
retains luster. The women wear bracelets and leglets, and iron beads
from the size of a pea to that of a potato. They carry weights up to
thirty-five pounds and are forced to walk with a slow, dragging step
which is considered aristocratic. Iron is rare and worth more than
silver.[394] Livingstone says that in Balonda poorer people imitate the
step of those who carry big weights of ornament, although they are
wearing but a few ounces.[395] Some women of the Dinka carry fifty
pounds of iron. The rings on legs and arms clank like the fetters of
slaves. The men wear massive ivory rings on the upper arm. The rich
cover the whole arm. The men also wear leather bracelets and
necklaces.[396] In Behar, Hindostan, the women wear brass rings on their
legs. "One of these is heavy, nearly a foot broad, and serrated all
around the edges. It can only be put on the legs by a blacksmith, who
fits it on the legs of the women with his hammer, while they writhe upon
the ground in pain." Women of the milkman caste wear bangles of bell
metal, often up to the elbow. "The greater the number of bangles, the
more beautiful the wearer is considered."[397] The satirist could easily
show that all these details are shown now in our fashions.
+189. Ideals of beauty.+ In Melanesia a girdle ten centimeters wide is
worn, drawn as tight as possible. One cut from the body of a man
twenty-seven years old measured only sixty-five centimeters.[398] The
women of the Barito valley wear the _sarong_ around the thighs so tight
that it restricts the steps and produces a mincing gait which they think
beautiful.[399] The Rukuyenn of Guiana have an ideal of female beauty
which is marked by a large abdomen. They wind the abdomen with many
girdles to make it appear large. "The women of the Payaguas, in
Paraguay, from youth up, elongate the breasts, and they continue this
after they are mothers by means of bandages."[400] The southern Arabs
drop hot grease from a candle on a bride's fingers, and then plaster the
fingers with henna. Then the grease is taken off, and light-colored
spots (if possible, regular) are left where it was, while the rest of
the skin is colored brown by the henna. They put on the bride seventeen
garments, a silk one and a muslin one alternately; then a mantle over
all, and a rug on the mantle, and all possible ornaments.[401] Flinders
Petrie thinks that we must recognize a principle of "racial taste,"
"which belongs to each people as much as their language, which may be
borrowed like languages from one race by another, but which survives
changes and long eclipses even more than language."[402] The cases given
show that ideals of beauty are somehow formed, which call for a
deformation of the human body. The foreheads are flattened, the lips
enlarged, the ears drawn down, the skull forced into a sugar-loaf shape,
the nose flattened, etc., to try to reach a form approved by fashion.
There is an ideal of beauty behind the fashion, a selected type of
superiority, which must be assumed as the purpose of the fashion.
+190. Fashion in other things than dress.+ As will appear below, fashion
controls many things besides dress. It governs the forms of utensils,
weapons, canoes and boats, tools, etc., amongst savages. In the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries there was a fashionable attitude or
pose in standing for women, in which the abdomen was thrown forward. It
is often seen in pictures and portraits.[403] It is inelegant and
destitute of meaning. The Venetians were luxurious and frivolous,
jealous and distrustful of women, and fond of pleasure and fashion. From
the end of the sixteenth century a shopkeeper in the Merceria adopted a
custom of showing the new fashions of Paris on Ascension Day by means of
a life-size doll dressed in them.[404] The Venetian women of that period
wore patins, shoes with blocks underneath, some of which were two feet
high. The women were unable to walk without a maid on each side to
support them.[405] Yriarte thinks that these patins were due to the
policy of the husbands. When an ambassador, in conversation with the
doge and his counselors, said that shoes would be far more convenient, a
counselor replied, "Only too convenient! Only too much so!" Under the
French Directory, a _demi-terme_ was the name of a framework worn by
women to look as if they would soon be mothers.[406] Thirty years ago
"poufs" were worn to enlarge the dress on the hips at the side. The
"Grecian bend," stooping forward, was an attitude both in walking and
standing. Then followed the bustle. Later, the contour was closely
fitted by the dress. No one thought that the human figure would be
improved if changed as the dress made it appear to be. No fashion was
adopted because it would have an indecent effect. The point for our
purpose is that women wore dresses of the appointed shape because
everybody did so, and for no other reason, being unconscious of the
effect.
Erasmus, in his colloquy on the Franciscans, makes one of the characters
say: "I think that the whole matter of dress depends upon custom and the
opinions which are current." He refers to some unnamed place where
adulterers, after conviction, are never allowed to uncover the private
parts, and says, "Custom has made it, for them, the greatest of all
punishments." "The fact is that nothing is so ridiculous that usage may
not make it pass."
Fashion has controlled the mode of dressing the hair and deforming the
body. It has determined what animals, or what special race of an animal
species, should be petted. It controls music and literature, so that a
composer, poet, or novelist is the rage or is forgotten. In mediæval
literature the modes of allegory were highly esteemed and very commonly
used. The writers described war and battles over and over again, and
paid little attention to nature. In fact, natural background, geography,
and meteorology were made as conventional as stage scenery, and were
treated as of no interest and little importance. Modern taste for
reality and for the natural details throws this mediæval characteristic
by contrast into strong relief.
+191. Miscellaneous fashions.+ Fashion rules in architecture. In the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England, English Renaissance and
Gothic were regarded as barbaric, and palladian was admired. In France
the preference was for rococo and Mansard forms. At the present time the
English Renaissance and Gothic are in favor again, and palladian is
regarded with disfavor. Painting and sculpture undergo variations of
fashion as to standards and methods. The same is true of literature.
Poetry and novels follow phases of fashion. A successful novel makes
imitations and sets a fashion for a time. Types of heroes and ideals of
character come and go by fashion. The type of the man-as-he-should-be
varies by fashion, and this type exerts a great selection in the
education of the young. Educational methods run through fashions. Fads
in methods of teaching arise, are advocated with great emphasis, have
their run, decline, and disappear. There are fashions of standing,
walking, sitting, gesture, language (slang, expletives), pronunciation,
key of the voice, inflection, and sentence accent; fashions in shaking
hands, dancing, eating and drinking, showing respect, visiting, foods,
hours of meals, and deportment. When snuff was taken attitudes and
gestures in taking it were cultivated which were thought stylish.
Fashion determines what type of female beauty is at a time
preferred,--plump or _svelte_, blond or brunette, large or petite,
red-haired or black-haired. When was that "simple time of our fathers"
when people were too sensible to care for fashions? It certainly was
before the Pharaohs and perhaps before the glacial epoch. Isaiah (iii.
16) rebukes the follies of fashion. Chrysostom preached to the early
church against tricks and manners of gesture and walk which had been
learned in the theater. Since literature has existed moralists have
satirized fashion. Galton has noticed what any one may verify,--that old
portraits show "indisputable signs of one predominant type of face
supplanting another." "If we may believe caricaturists, the fleshiness
and obesity of many English men and women in the earlier years of this
century [nineteenth] must have been prodigious."[407] Part of this
phenomenon may be due to the fashion of painting. The portrait painter
warps all his subjects toward the current standard of "good looks," but
it is more probable that there is a true play of variation.
Platycnemism and the pierced olecranon run in groups for a time. Then
they run out. There are fashions in disease, as if fashion were really
in nature. This goes beyond the limits of our definition, but the rise
and passing away of variations in breeding plants and animals, and
perhaps in men, suggests that fashion may be an analogous play of
experiment, half caprice, half earnest, whose utility lies in selection.
If there was no reaching out after novelty except upon rational
determination, the case would be very different from what it is when
variation brings spontaneous suggestions. Our present modes of dress
(aside from the variations imposed by fashion) are the resultant of all
the fashions of the last two thousand years.
+192. All deformations by fashion are irrational.+ There is no guarantee
that fashions will serve expediency. Deformations of the skull may not
be harmful; they are not useful. The block inserted in the lip
interferes with eating and speaking. It alters the language. Saliva
cannot be retained, and flows over it. To those who are outside the
fashion it is extremely ugly and disgusting. To those inside the fashion
it is a standard of beauty and a badge of dignity and tribal position.
All fashions tend to extravagance because the senses become accustomed
to them, and it is necessary, in order to renew the impression of
distinction, to exaggerate. The extravagances of fashion run through all
grades of civilization. They show that fashion, coming from the whole to
the individual, adds nothing to the sense, judgment, or taste of the
latter, but imposes on him a coercion to conform. He who dissents is
thought rustic and boorish. He is more or less severely boycotted, which
means not only that he is made to suffer, but that he loses important
advantages and hurts his interests.
+193. Satires on fashion.+ Forty years ago a lady who swung her arms as
she walked was considered strong-minded. A lady who was young when the
present queen of England introduced the fashion of brushing up the hair
and uncovering the ears says that it seemed indecent. Fashion is
stronger than autocracy. Nicholas I of Russia disapproved of late hours
and ordered that court balls should be commenced early that they might
be finished early. He found himself almost alone until eleven o'clock,
and had to give up his reform.[408] In the height of the crinoline
fashion Leech published in _Punch_ a picture of two maiden ladies who
"think crinoline a preposterous and extravagant invention and appear at
a party in a simple and elegant attire." The shocked horror of the
bystanders is perfect, but the two ladies would to-day be quite in the
fashion. Du Maurier published in _Punch_ a skit in which a little girl
asked her mother how Eve knew, the first time that she saw Cain as a
baby, that he was not ugly. This is a very clever hit at the origin of
conventions. There was when Cain was born no established convention that
all babies are pretty.
+194. Fashion in faiths and ideals.+ There are also fashions in trading,
banking, political devices, traveling, inn keeping, book making, shows,
amusements, flowers, fancywork, carriages, gardens, and games. There
seem to be fashions in logic and reasoning. Arguments which are accepted
as convincing at one time have no effect at another (sec. 227, n. 4).
For centuries western Europe accepted the argument for the necessity of
torture in the administration of justice as convincing. At different
periods the satisfaction in allegory as a valid method of interpretation
has been manifested and the taste for allegory in the arts has appeared.
Philosophy goes through a cycle of forms by fashion. Even mathematics
and science do the same, both as to method and as to concepts. That is
why "methodology" is eternal. Mediæval "realism" ruled all thought for
centuries, and its dominion is yet by no means broken. It prevails in
political philosophy now. Nominalism is the philosophy of modern
thought. Scholasticism held all the mental outfit of the learned. Thomas
Aquinas summed up all that man knows or needs to know. A modern man
finds it hard to hold his own attention throughout a page of it, even
for historical purposes. "Phlogiston" and "vortices" had their day and
are forgotten. Eighteenth-century deism and nineteenth-century
rationalism interest nobody any more. Eighteenth-century economists
argued in favor of stimulating population in order to make wages low,
and thereby win in international competition. They never had a
compunction or a doubt about this argument. No wonder it has been
asserted that all truth, except that which is mathematically
demonstrable, is only a function of the age. When the earth is
underpopulated and there is an economic demand for men, democracy is
inevitable. That state of things cannot be permanent. Therefore
democracy cannot last. It contains no absolute and "eternal" truth.
While it lasts a certain set of political notions and devices are in
fashion. Certain moral standards go with them. Evolution is now accepted
as a final fact in regard to organic phenomena. A philosophy of nature
is derived from it. Is it only a fashion,--a phase of thought? For to
all but a very few such a philosophy has no guarantee except that it is
current. All accept it because all accept it, and for no other reason.
Narrower philosophies become the fashion in classes, coteries, and
cliques. They are really affectations of something which wins prestige
and comes to be a badge of culture or other superiority. A few are
distinguished because they know Greek, or because they are
"freethinkers," or because they are ritualists, or because they profess
a certain cultus in art, or because they are disciples of Ruskin,
Eastlake, Carlyle, Emerson, Browning, Tolstoi, or Nietsche, and
cultivate the ideas and practices which these men have advocated as true
and wise. Often such fashions of thought or art pass from a narrow
coterie to a wider class, and sometimes they permeate the mores and
influence an age. When men believed in witches they did so because
everybody did. When the belief in witches was given up it was because a
few men set the fashion, and it was no longer "enlightened" to believe
in them.
+195. Fashion not trivial; not subject to argument.+ Fashion is by no
means trivial. It is a form of the dominance of the group over the
individual, and it is quite as often harmful as beneficial. There is no
arguing with the fashion. In the case of dress we can sometimes tell
what princess or actress started the fashion, and we sometimes know, in
the case of ideas, who set them afloat. Generally, however, it is not
known who started a fashion in dress. The authority of fashion is
imperative as to everything which it touches. The sanctions are ridicule
and powerlessness. The dissenter hurts himself; he never affects the
fashion. No woman, whatever her age or position or her opinion about the
crinoline fashion, could avoid wearing one. No effort to introduce a
fashion of "rational dress" for women has ever yet succeeded. An artist,
novelist, poet, or playwright of a school which is out of fashion fails
and is lost. An opponent of the notions which are current can get no
hearing. The fashion, therefore, operates a selection in which success
and merit are often divorced from each other, but the selection is
pitiless. The canons of criticism are set by fashion. It follows that
there is no rational effect of fashion. There was a rule in goblinism:
Say naught but good of the dead. The rule was dictated by fear that the
ghost would be angry and return to avenge the dead. The rule has come
down to us and is an imperative one. Eulogies on the dead are,
therefore, conventional falsehoods. It is quite impossible for any one
to depart from the fashion. The principle is in fashion that one should
take the side of the weaker party in a contest. This principle has no
rational ground at all. There is simply a slight probability that the
stronger will be in the wrong. Fashion requires that we should all
affect nonpartisanship in discussion, although it is absurd to do so. Of
course these weighty rules on important matters go over into the mores,
but they are fashions because they are arbitrary, have no rational
grounds, cannot be put to any test, and have no sanction except that
everybody submits to them.
+196. Remoter effects of fashion.+ The selective effect of fashion, in
spite of its irrationality and independently of the goodness or badness
of its effect on interests, is a reflection on the intelligence of men.
It accounts for many heterogeneous phenomena in society. The fashions
influence the mores. They can make a thing modest or immodest, proper or
improper, and, if they last long enough, they affect the sense and the
standards of modesty and propriety. Fashions of banking and trading
affect standards of honesty, or definitions of cheating and gambling.
Public shows, dances, punishments, and executions affect, in time,
standards of decency, taste in amusement, sentiments of humanity, views
as to what is interesting and attractive. Methods of argument which are
fashionable may train people to flippancy, sophistry, levity of mind,
and may destroy the power to think and reason correctly. Scherr[409]
says that fashion served as a means to transfer to Germany the
depravation of morals which had corrupted the Latin nations in the
sixteenth century. Fashions now spread through all civilized nations by
contact and contagion. They are spread by literature.
+197. Slang and expletives.+ Slang and expletives are fashions in
language. Expletives are of all grades from simple interjections to the
strongest profanity. Many expletives are ancient religious formulas of
objurgation, obsecration, asseveration, anathema, etc. They express a
desire to curse or bless, invite or repel. Where the original sense is
lost they sink into interjections, the whole sense of which is in the
accent. Their use rises and falls with fashion in nations, classes,
groups, and families, and it controls the habits of individuals. Whether
certain persons use a pious dialect, a learned (pedantic) dialect, a
gambler's slang, a phraseology of excessive adjectives and silly
expletives, or profane expressions, oaths, and phrases which abuse
sacred things, depends on birth and training. In this sense each dialect
is the language for each group and corresponds to the mores of the
group. There may be some psychology of expletives,[410] but they seem to
be accounted for, like slang, by the expediency of expression, which is
the purpose of all language. There is a need for expression which will
win attention and impress the memory. A strong expletive shocks an
opponent, or it is an instinctive reaction on a situation which
threatens the well-being of the speaker. It is a vent to emotion which
gives relief from it when other relief is not possible. This last is one
of the chief useful reasons for expletives. However, even then they are
a vicious habit, for stronger and stronger expressions are required to
win the same subjective effects. Old expressions lose force. Slang is
the new coinage. The mintage is often graphic and droll; it is also
often stupid and vulgar. A selection goes on. Some of it is rejected and
some enters into the language. Expletives also go out of fashion. The
strain for effect can be satisfied only by constantly greater and
greater excess. It becomes a bad personal habit to use grotesque and
extravagant expressions. Slang and expletives destroy the power of clear
and cogent expression in speech or writing; and they must affect powers
of thinking. Although slang is a new coinage which reinvigorates the
language, the fashion of slang and expletives must be rated, like the
fashion of using tobacco and alcohol, as at best a form of play, a habit
and custom which springs from no need and conduces to no interest. The
acts result in an idle satisfaction of the doer, and the good or ill
effects all fall within his own organism. The prevalence of such
fashions in a society becomes a fact of its mores, for there will be
rational effects on interests. The selective effect of them is in the
resistance to the fashions or subjection to them. They are only to a
limited extent enforced by social sanctions. There is personal liberty
in regard to them. Resistance depends on independent judgment and
self-control, and produces independence and self-control; that is, it
affects character. Groups are differentiated inside the society of those
who resist and those who do not, and the effect on the mores (character
of the group) results. The selective effects appear in the competition
of life between the two groups.
+198. Poses, fads, and cant.+ When fashion seizes upon an idea or usage
and elevates it to a feature of a society at a period, it is, as was
said above, affected by those who cannot attain to the real type and who
exaggerate its external forms. The humanism of the Renaissance produced
an affectation of learning, dilettante interest in collecting
manuscripts, and zeal for style which was genuine in scholars, but was
an affectation of the followers. There was also an affectation of pagan
philosophy and of alienation from Christianity. The euphuists in England
in the sixteenth century, the _précieuses_ of Molière's time, the
_illuminati_ of the eighteenth century, are instances of groups of
people who took up a whim and exaggerated conduct of a certain type,
practicing an affectation. There are poses which are practiced as a
fashion for a time. Fads get currency. Dandyism, athleticism, pedantry
of various kinds, reforms of various kinds, movements, causes, and
questions are phenomena of fads around which groups cluster, formed of
persons who have a common taste and sentiment. Poses go with them. Poses
are also affected by those who select a type of character which is
approved. The dandy has had a score of slang names within two centuries
corresponding to varieties of the pose and dress which he affected. He
has now given way to the athlete, who is quite a different type. The
Byronic pose prevailed for a generation. Goethe's Werther inspired a
pose. They would both now be ridiculed. Favorite heroes in novels have
often set a pose. Carlyle inspired a literary pose ("hatred of shams,"
etc.). He and Ruskin set a certain cant afloat, for every fad and pose
which pretends to be sober and earnest must have a cant. Zola,
D'Annunzio, Wagner, Ibsen, Gorky, Tolstoi, Sudermann, are men who have
operated suggestion on the public mind of our time. They get a response
from a certain number who thus cluster into a self-selected union of
sympathy and propagate the cult of a view of life. Gloom and savagery,
passion and crime, luxury and lust, romance and adventure, adultery and
divorce, self-indulgence and cynicism, the reality of foulness and
decay, are so suggested as to become centers on which receptive minds
will organize and congenial ones will combine in sympathy. It is the
effect of a great and active literature of belles-lettres, which is
practically current throughout the civilized world, to multiply these
sects of sentimental philosophy, with the fads and poses which
correspond, and to provide them with appropriate cant. The cant of the
voluptuary, the cynical egoist, the friend of humanity, and all the rest
is just as distinct as that of the religious sectarian. Each of the
little groups operates its own selection, but each is small. They
interfere with and neutralize each other, but a general drift may be
imparted by them to the mores. Our age is optimistic by virtue of the
economic opportunities, power, and prosperity which it enjoys. The
writers above mentioned are all pessimistic. They do not affect the age
except upon the surface, by entertaining it, but they disturb its moral
philosophy, they confuse its standards and codes, and they corrupt its
tastes. They set fashions in literature which the writers of the second
class imitate. In general, they relax the inhibitions which have come
down to us in our mores without giving by suggestion an independence of
character which would replace the traditions by sound judgments. Their
influence will be greater when it has been diluted so as to reach the
great mass. It hardly can be worse than that of the literature which is
now used by that class.
+199. Illustrations.+ In the later days of Greece the study of Homer
became an affectation. Dio Chrysostom tells of a visit he made to a
colony on the Borysthenes, in which nearly all could read the _Iliad_,
and heard it more willingly than anything else.[411] The Athenians,
especially the gilded youth, affected Spartan manners and ways. The
dandies went about with uncut hair, unwashed hands, and they practiced
fist-fights. They were as proud of torn ears as German students are of
cuts on their faces.[412] The religious and social reforms of Augustus
were a pose. They lacked sincerity and were adopted for a political
purpose. Men took them up who did not conform their own conduct to them.
Hence a "general social falsehood" was the result.[413] In the fourth
and fifth centuries all the well-to-do classes spent their time in
making imitations of the ancient literature and philosophy. They tried
to imitate Seneca and Pliny, writing compositions and letters, and
pursuing a mode of life which they supposed the men of the period of
glory had lived.[414] The French of the fifteenth century had the
greatest fear of ridicule; the Italians feared most that they might
appear to be simpletons.[415] In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
the "chevaliers transis" wore furs in summer and summer mantles in
winter. They meant to prove that "love suffices for everything."[416]
Old pictures of the sixteenth century show that it was considered modest
to squint. A Spaniard thought that it showed friendship for any one to
squint at him. It was also considered a sign of probity to have the lips
primly closed and drawn.[417] The Italian _cicisbeo_ in the seventeenth
century was a _cavalier servente_, who attended a married lady. Such men
practiced extravagances and affectations, and are generally described as
effeminate.[418]
+200. Heroes, scapegoats and butts, caricature.+ Fashion sets, for any
group at any time, its pet likes and dislikes. The mass must have its
heroes, but also its victims and scapegoats and the butts of its
ridicule. Caricature is futile when it is destitute of point. The test
of it lies in the popular response which shows whether it has touched
the core of the thing or not. When it can do this it reveals the real
truth about the thing better than a volume of argument could do it.
Sometimes a popular conviction is produced by a single incident which is
a very important societal fact. The voyage of the Oregon from the
Pacific (1898) convinced the American people that they must cut a canal
through the isthmus. Probably this conviction was a _non sequitur_, but
argument cannot overcome it, and it will control action with all the
financial and other consequences which must ensue. A satire, an epigram,
or a caricature may suffice to produce such a conviction.
+201. Caricature.+ The mere rhetorical form may have the greatest
importance. A caricature often stings national vanity. A state may be
represented as afraid, as having "backed down," as having appeared
ridiculous. Group vanity is often a stronger motive than personal
vanity, and the desire to gratify it will prove stronger than any
rational conviction.
+202. Relation of fads, etc., to mores.+ Thus the vanities, desires,
prejudices, faiths, likes, and dislikes, which pervade a society, coerce
dissenters and become stronger and stronger mass phenomena. They then
affect interests. Then they wind strands of influence and control around
individuals and demand sacrifices. In their combination they weave webs
of action which constitute life and history. The selection which they
exert, drawing in some and repelling others, produces results on the
societal fabric of a later time. The consequences react on character,
moral tone, life philosophy, ethical principles, and ruling sentiments.
Thus they affect the mores, or even enter into them. The whole is handed
on to the rising generation to be their outfit of knowledge, faith, and
policy, and their rules of duty and well living.
+203. Ideals.+ An ideal is entirely unscientific. It is a phantasm which
has little or no connection with fact. Ideals are very often formed in
the effort to escape from the hard task of dealing with facts, which is
the function of science and art. There is no process by which to reach
an ideal. There are no tests by which to verify it. It is therefore
impossible to frame a proposition about an ideal which can be proved or
disproved. It follows that the use of ideals is to be strictly limited
to proper cases, and that the attempt to use ideals in social discussion
does not deserve serious consideration. An ideal differs from a model in
that the model is deduced from reality but within the bounds of reality.
It is subject to approved methods of attainment and realization. An
ideal also differs from a standard, for a standard must be real.
+204. When ideals may be used.+ What are the proper cases for the use of
ideals? Ideals can be useful when they are formed in the imagination of
the person who is to realize them by his own exertions, for then the
ideal and the programme of action are in the same consciousness, and
therefore the defects of an ideal are reduced or removed. Ideals are
useful (_a_) in homiletics, which are chiefly occupied with attempts at
suggestion. In limited cases a preacher or teacher can suggest ideals
which, if apprehended and adopted, become types toward which young
persons may train themselves. Even then these cases merge in the next
class. (_b_) Ideals are useful in self-education. The idea is then taken
up from books or from admired persons by suggestion and imitation, or
from autosuggestion, but generally from a combination of the two. An
ideal from autosuggestion produces enthusiasm. The fantastic character
of the ideal, if the person is young, is unimportant. His will is
enlisted to work for it. He can constantly compare the ideal with his
experience. The ideal is at last shorn down to reality and merges in
sober plans of effort. (_c_) A far larger field for ideals is afforded
by vanity. As vanity is itself a subjective affection, but one which can
be awakened only in society, it uses the imagination to suppose cases,
plan unlimited schemes, devise types of self-decoration and dreams of
superiority, distinction, power, success, and glory. The creations are
all phantasms. The ends are all ideals. These ideals may not be
extravagant. Vanity generally creates them by raising to a higher pitch
some treatment of the body or dress, some admired trait of character,
some action which has won glory, or given pleasure and won applause.
This whole field for ideals is largely influenced by suggestion from the
current tastes and fashionable standards in the group, but
autosuggestion is also very active in it. (_d_) Ideals also find a great
field in marriage. In this case ideals of happiness have powerfully
affected the institution at all its stages. Experience of marriage has
been partly pleasant and partly the contrary. The experience has
stimulated the reflection: How blessed it would be if only this or that
unpleasant detail could be corrected! This has led to idealization or
the imaginative conception of a modified institution. Our novels now
sometimes aid in this idealization. Men loved their daughters with
zealous and protective affection long before they loved their wives. The
father's love reached out to follow his daughter into matrimony and to
secure for her some stipulations which should free wedlock for her from
pain or care which other wives had to endure. These stipulations were
always guided by idealization. The rich and great were first able to
realize the modifications. These then passed into fashion, custom, and
the mores, and the institution was perfected and refined by them.
+205. Ideals of beauty.+ The educated ideals under the second and third
of the above heads become mass phenomena under the influence of fashion,
when they control many or all. Ideal types of beauty are adopted by a
group. Uncivilized people adopt such types of bodily beauty (sec. 189).
The origin of them is unknown. A Samoan mother presses her thumb on the
nose of her baby to flatten it.[419] An Indian mother puts a board on
the forehead of her baby to make it recede. Teeth are knocked out, or
filed into prescribed shapes, or blackened. The skin is painted, cut
into scars, or tattooed. Goblinism may have furnished the original
motives for some deformations, but the natural physical features of the
group which distinguish it from others, or the features produced by
goblinistic usages, come to be the standard of beauty for the group.
Those features are accentuated and exaggerated by the deformations which
are practiced. The aim is at an ideal perfection of physical beauty. All
fashion in dress has the same philosophy. In other cases, also, it seems
that fashion is pursuing a fleeting and impossible ideal of perfect
beauty, style, grace, dexterity, etc., which shall give distinction and
superiority or impose subjection.
+206. The man-as-he-should-be.+ Group ideals may be types of character.
In the Old Testament the ideal type is the "just man," who conformed to
ritual standards at all points. A Moslem is a man who is "faithful" to
Islam, which is self-surrender to the Omnipotent One.[420] The type of
the perfect man-as-he-should-be in the Mahabharata is one who will give
his all to a Brahmin. The god Siva, disguised as a Brahmin, came to a
hero. He ordered the hero to kill his own son and serve his corpse for
the Brahmin to eat. The hero obeyed at once. The Brahmin set the hero's
buildings on fire, but the latter served the dish without heeding the
fire. The Brahmin ordered him to eat of the dish. He prepared to obey,
but was excused from this trial. He had triumphantly stood the test.
There was nothing he would not do for a Brahmin.[421] The poem also
contains a type of female perfection in person and character,--Savitri.
[422] The Greeks had many standards of personal excellence and social
worth which entered to some extent into their mores. The ideal types
were noble and refined. They have affected the mores of the class
educated in the "humanities" since the Renaissance. They have never been
truly incorporated in the mores of any society. _Olbos_ was wealth, with
grace, opulence, elegance, and generosity, and so wealth when not sordid
or arrogant, the opposite of plutocratic. _Arete_ was capacity,
capability, and practical efficiency,--executive ability. _Aidos_ was
the opposite of "cheek." _Sophrosyne_ was continence, self-control.
_Kalokagathie_ contained notions of economic, æsthetic, and moral good,
fused into a single concept.[423] The _eleutheros_ was the gentleman
endowed with all admirable qualities.[424] The Greeks proved that people
could sink very low while talking very nobly. The ideals were in the
literature, not in the mores. "Their predisposition, their will, and
their fate formed a consistent whole, and their decline was a
consequence of the social and political life which they lived."[425] In
the sixth and seventh centuries A.D. the man-as-he-should-be was
religious,--a hermit or a monk. In any case he was an ascetic. In
Charlemagne's time the preferred type was changed. It became the warrior
and knight, and led up to chivalry. A new poetry flourished to develop
and propagate the new ideal. In mediæval society there were strongly
defined ideals of the man-as-he-should-be. _Milte_ was generosity of
heart and mind. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries it was the noble
desire of the lord to share all he had with his retainers, which desire
called out their devotion to him.[426] The minstrels meant by it
lavishness of gifts to themselves. _Maze_ was the cardinal virtue. It
meant observation of the limits in all actions and manifestations of
feeling, the opposite of excess and extravagance.[427] The church taught
admiration of arbitrary ideals of ecclesiastical virtues. The ideals
were ascetic. They seem to have been derived from the fathers of the
fourth and fifth centuries, but they offer an example of borrowed and
adopted ideals which were fully incorporated in the popular mores. The
age accepted ascetic standards of goodness and character. The religious
classes and the lay classes did not fall under the same standards of
conduct and duty. It was the business of the former to live by the full
standard. All classes, however, accepted the standards as valid, and the
layman conformed to them at times, or as far as worldly life would
permit. Elizabeth of Thuringia seems to be the ideal of the married
woman, but her saintliness interfered with her other duties, and even
her own time does not seem to have been sure in its judgment of her.
That she was flogged is a fact which has many relations to her character
and her age.[428] All admired men who practiced asceticism and
self-discipline. The types of the age were knightliness and saintliness.
They were both highly elaborated. The knightly type began to develop in
the time of Charlemagne and ran through the crusades. It contained
grotesque and absurd elements. The story of the crusades is a criticism
upon it. The knight was a fantastic person, who might do isolated deeds
of valor, but who could not make a plan, work persistently to a purpose,
coöperate with others, or either enforce or submit to discipline. Both
the knight and the saint were ideal types which exerted a controlling
power of selection through centuries.
+207. The standard type of man.+ Is the ideal of the man-as-he-should-be
to be found, for us, in the "common man," or in the highest product of
our culture? That is a most vital question for any society. It includes
the question whether the society has a discord in itself as to its own
ideal of the type of men it wants to produce. In the upper strata of the
masses, amongst the educated, industrious, sober-minded people of good
incomes, there exists the best family life. The children live constantly
with their parents, and the latter watch over the health, manners, and
morals of the children unceasingly from birth to maturity. The same
parents make great sacrifices for the education of their children,
although the class, as a class, has means to secure what is necessary
without hard sacrifice. The point is that they value education highly
and get it. We also multiply educational institutions. We feel sure that
all this is good work. The churches and all good literature constantly
inculcate good manners and morals according to the standards in the
present mores. Here is a set of objects to be prized and worked for in
families, schools, self-education, literature, and art, which go to the
production of a type of men as the highest product of our civilization.
Then suddenly we are told that the common man is wise beyond all the
philosophers. The man on the curbstone is the arbiter of our destinies,
and the standard man. "Culture" is derided and sneered at. This latter
view has great popularity. It brings up a serious question: whether we
are spoiling our children by educating them. Are we spoiling them for
political power? Are we putting them under disabilities for public
influence? It is related of an English statesman, that when asked by an
American mother whether she should send her son to Oxford, he replied:
"Why send him to Oxford? Send him to Washington, where he will learn
democracy. That is what he will need to know." Certainly it behooves us
to know whether we are spoiling our sons by sending them to the
universities, and whether we ought not rather to send them to Tammany
Hall. Either on one side or the other there is a great mass of empty
phrases and false but inflated rhetoric.
+208. Who does the thinking?+ The notion that "the group thinks"
deserves to be put by the side of the great freaks of philosophy which
have been put forth from age to age. Only the élite of any society, in
any age, think, and the world's thinking is carried on by them by the
transplanting of ideas from mind to mind, under the stress and strain of
clashing argument and tugging debate. If the group thinks, then thought
costs nothing, but in truth thought costs beyond everything else, for
thousands search and talk while only one finds; when he finds something,
a step is won and all begins over again. If this is so, it ought to be
universally known and recognized. All the mores would then conform to
it.
+209. The gentleman.+ In modern English-speaking society the "gentleman"
is the name for the man-as-he-should-be. The type is not fixed and the
definition is not established. It is a collective and social ideal.
Gentlemen are a group in society who have selected a code and standard
of conduct as most conducive to prosperous and pleasant social
relations. Therefore manners are an essential element in the type. A
gentleman is one who has been educated to conform to the type, and that
he has the _cachet_ is indicated by his admission to the group. Novels
develop and transmit the ideal; clubs are the tribunal of it. It is a
floating notion which varies with the mores. The modern reader finds
very few cases in Greek literature of what he can recognize as
gentlemen. Orestes in the _Electra_ of Euripides opens the discussion of
what makes the worth of a man, but after saying that it is not wealth or
poverty, and not valor in war, he flinches the question and says that it
is better to leave it untouched. The peasant, married to Electra,
certainly acts the gentleman. He also says of Orestes and Pylades, that
if they really are as noble as they seem, they will be as well satisfied
with humble fare as with grand fare. A gentleman of a century ago would
not be approved now. A gentleman of to-day in the society of a century
ago would be thought to have rowdy manners. Artificial manners are not
in the taste of our time; athletics are. The "gentleman" always tends to
an arbitrary definition. It appears now that he must have some skill at
sports and games. The selective force of the social type of the
gentleman is obvious in our own society. The sentiment _noblesse oblige_
was once the name for the coercive force exerted on a noble by the code
of his class. Now that fixed classes are gone and the gentleman is only
defined by the usage and taste of an informal class, it is a term for
the duties which go with social superiority of any kind, so far as those
duties are prescribed and sanctioned by public opinion.
+210. Social standard set by taboos.+ It may be still more important to
notice that the standard social type is defined by taboos with only
social sanctions. The negative side of _noblesse oblige_ is more
important than the positive. A gentleman is under more restraints than a
non-gentleman. In the eighteenth century he patronized cockfights and
prize fights, and he could get drunk, gamble, tell falsehoods, and
deceive women without losing caste. He now finds that _noblesse oblige_
forbids all these things, and that it puts him under disabilities in
politics and business.
A society exerts a positive selection on individuals by its definition
of crimes and by its criminal jurisprudence. The taboos are turned into
laws and are enforced by positive penalties.
+211. Crimes.+ The number and variety of crimes depends on the positive
action of the state. What things are crimes in a state, therefore,
indicates what the ruling authority desires to prevent. The motives have
often been entirely selfish on the part of a king or a ruling caste, or
they were dictated by a desire to further the vanity of such persons. By
judicial precedent at Rome it was made a crime to beat a slave, or to
undress near a statue of the emperor, or to carry a coin bearing his
image into a latrine or a lupanar.[429] Xiphilin, in his epitome of the
history of Dio Cassius, inserts a story that, in the reign of Domitian,
a woman was executed for undressing near the statue of that
emperor.[430] The notions in the mores of what ought to be prevented
have been very variable and arbitrary. Juvenal denounces a consul who
while in office drove his own chariot, although by night.[431] Seneca
was shocked at the criminal luxury of putting snow in wine.[432] Pliny
is equally shocked at the fashion of wearing gold rings.[433] Lecky,
after citing these cases, refers to the denunciations uttered by the
church fathers against women who wore false hair. Painting the face is
an old fault of women, against which moral teachers of all ages have
thundered. Very recently, amongst us, clergymen have denounced women for
not wearing bonnets in church, because Paul said that she "dishonoreth
her head, for that is even all one as if she were shaven."[434] These
were not indeed cases of crimes, but of alleged vices or sins. In
sumptuary laws we have cases of legislation which made fashions crimes.
In the eighteenth century there was little legislation against brothels,
drinking places, or gambling houses. We make it a crime to sell rum, but
not to drink it. On the other hand, until recently commercial
transactions and the lending of money for interest were so restricted
in accordance with ethical and economic faiths that they were environed
by crimes which are now obsolete. Heresy and sorcery were once very
great crimes. Witchcraft and usury were abominable crimes.
+212. Criminal law.+ In the original administration of justice it
appears that there was only one punishment for the violation of taboo,
sin and crime being coincident: that was death. Then, in cases,
banishment was substituted for death, although this was only a change in
form, since a banished man could not exist alone. In either case the
selection was of the simplest kind. The society extruded from itself one
who violated its rules. This is the fundamental sense of all
punishments, like execution, transportation, or imprisonment, which
remove the culprit from the society, permanently or for a time. Other
punishments contained originally a large element of vengeance, vengeance
being a primary impulse of great force to satisfy those whom the crimes
injured and to deter others from the same crime. The administration of
justice, therefore, bore witness to the judgment of the society as to
what conduct and character should be selected for preservation or caused
to cease. In all modern states the power to make acts crimes has been
abused, and the motive of punishment has been so lost that we wrangle as
to what it is. The ruling coterie uses the power to make things crimes
to serve its own interests. Protectionists make it criminal to import
goods. Governments do the same to further their fiscal purposes. They
also make it criminal to immigrate or emigrate, or to coin money, even
of full weight and fineness, or to carry letters and parcels. In England
it is made a crime to violate railroad regulations. In some cases
regulations for barber shops are enforced by making violations crimes.
Generally, sanitary rules are so enforced. In the latest case it has
been made a crime to spit in public places. The criminal law expresses
the mores of the time when they have reached very concrete and definite
formulæ of prohibition. Perhaps the administration of it expresses the
mores still more clearly. It is now recognized as true that frightful
penalties do not exert a proportionately deterrent effect. Our mores do
not permit us to inflict pain in order to compel men to confess, or to
put them in solitary confinement in dark and loathsome dungeons, or to
let our prisons become sinks of vice and misery or schools of crime. The
selective effect of punishment is the one which we seem to aim at,
although not very intelligently.
+213. Mass phenomena of fear and hope.+ Manias and delusions are mental
phenomena, but they are social. They are diseases of the mind, but they
are epidemic. They are contagious, not as cholera is contagious, but
contact with others is essential to them. They are mass phenomena.[435]
Some great hope (the good to be obtained by taking the heads of murdered
men or from appeasing the gods by sacrificing one's children) or some
great fear (drought, failure of food, purgatory), if common to the
whole, makes them adopt any suggestion of a means to realize the hope or
avert the feared calamity. Often there is no such quasi-rational reason
for common action. Hysteria, especially amongst women and children,
produces manias of falsehood, deceit (fasting women), trances, and
witchcraft. In mediæval convents sometimes half the inmates were
afflicted at the same time. Nervous depression and irritation produced
physical acts of relief. One irritated another, and one surpassed
another, until there was a catastrophe for the group.[436] Religious
enthusiasm has produced innumerable manias and delusions. Mediæval
Christianity, Mohammedanism, Persia, and modern Russia furnish cases.
Martyrdom proves nothing with regard to the truth or value of a
religion. All the sects have had martyrs. Martyrdom, even under torture,
has been sought, under the influence of religious enthusiasm, not only
by Christians[437] but by Donatists,[438] Manichæans, and other most
abominated heretics. Even the Adamites produced martyrs who went
joyously to death.[439] Quakers really provoked their own martyrdom in
early New England.
+214. Manias, delusions.+ The phenomena of manias, popular delusions,
group hallucinations, self-immolation, etc., show the possibilities of
mental contagion in a group. They are responses to hope or fear which
affect large numbers at the same time. They are often produced by
public calamities, or other ills of life. Those who suffer feel
themselves selected as victims, and they ask, Who has done this to us,
and why? Often people who are not victims interpret a natural incident
by egoistic reference. This is done not on account of the destruction
wrought by an earthquake or a tornado, but from pure terror at what is
not understood, e.g. an eclipse.[440] Pilgrimages and crusades were
cases of mania and delusion. The element of delusion was in the notion
of high merit which could be won in pursuing the crusades. Very often
manias and delusions are pure products of fashion, as in the case of the
children's crusades, when the children caught the infection of the
crusades, but did not know what they were doing, or why, and rushed on
their own destruction. Often manias are logical deductions from notions
(especially religious notions) which have been suggested, as in the case
of the flagellants. It is the ills of life which drive people to such
deductions, and they bear witness to excessive nervous excitement. The
mediæval dancing mania was more purely nervous. The demonism and
demonology of the Middle Ages was a fertile source for such deductions,
which went far to produce the witchcraft mania. The demonistic notions
taught by the church furnished popular deductions, which the church took
up and reduced to dogmatic form, and returned as such to the masses.
Thus the notions of sorcery, heresy, and witchcraft were developed.
+215. Monstrous mass phenomena of mediæval society.+ There must have
been a deep and strong anthropological reason for the development of
monstrous social phenomena in mediæval society. The Latin world was
disintegrated to its first elements between the sixth century and the
tenth. Such a dissolution of society abolished the inherited mores with
all their restraints and inhibitions, and left society to the control of
fierce barbaric, that is physical, forces. At the same period the Latin
world absorbed hordes of barbarians who were still on a low nomadic
warrior stage of civilization, and who adopted the ruins of Roman
culture without assimilating them. The Christian church contributed
crass superstitions about the other world and the relations of this
world to it. The product was the Merovingian and Carlovingian history.
Passion, sensuality, ferocity, superstitious ignorance, and fear
characterized the age. It is supposed that western Europe was
overpopulated and that the crusades operated a beneficial reduction of
numbers.[441] These facts may account for the gigantic mass phenomena in
the early Middle Ages. Every sentiment was extravagant. Men were under
some mighty gregarious instinct which drove them to act in masses, and
they passed from one great passion or enthusiastic impulse to another at
very short intervals. The passions of hatred and revenge were
manifested, upon occasion, to the extremity of fiendishness. Nothing
which the mind could conceive of seemed to be renounced as excessive
(Clement V, John XXII). Gregory IX pursued the heretics and the emperor
with an absorption of his whole being and a rancor which we cannot
understand. Poverty was elevated into a noble virtue and a transcendent
merit.[442] This was the height of ascetic absurdity, since poverty is
only want, and the next step would be a cult of suicide. The mendicant
orders fought each other malignantly. Every difference of opinion made a
war of extermination. Civil contests were carried on with extravagant
ferocity as to the means used and as to the exultation of success or the
penalty of failure. What was lacking was discipline. There was no
authority or doctrine which could set limits to private passion. Life
was held cheap. The gallows and the pit were in use all the time. The
most marked product of invention was instruments of torture. Men and
women were burned to death for frivolous reasons. Punishments taught
people to gloat over suffering. Torture was inflicted as idly as we take
testimony. With all this went deep faith in the efficacy of ritual and
great other-worldliness, that is, immediate apprehension of the other
world in this one. All the mores were adjusted to these features of
faith and practice. It all proceeded out of the masses of the people.
The church was borne along like a chip on the tide. The church hung back
from the crusades until the depth of the popular interest had been
tested. Then the crusades were declared to be the "will of God." This
gave their own idea back again to the masses with the approval of the
societal authority. The masses insisted on having acts and apparatus
provided by which to satisfy their application of dogma. The power of
the keys and the treasure of salvation were provided accordingly. The
souls of the people were torn by the antagonism between the wild
passions of the age and the ecclesiastical restraints on conduct. They
feared the wrath of God and hell to come. The ritual and sacramental
system furnished a remedy. The flagellants were a phenomenon of
seething, popular passion, outside of the church and unapproved by its
authority. Antony of Padua ([Symbol: cross] 1231) started the movement
by his sermons on repentance and the wrath of God. Processions of
weeping, praying, self-scourging, and half-naked penitents appeared in
the streets of all the towns of Christendom. "Nearly all enemies made
friends. Usurers and robbers made haste to restore ill-gotten goods, and
other vicious men confessed and renounced vanity. Prisons were opened.
Prisoners were released. Exiles were allowed to return. Men and women
accomplished works of pity and holiness, as if they feared the
all-powerful God would consume them with fire from heaven."[443] This
movement was altogether popular. It broke out again in 1349, in
connection with the Black Death. Flagellation for thirty-three and a
half days was held to purge from all sin. This was heresy and the
flagellants were persecuted. The theory was a purely popular application
by the masses of the church doctrine of penance, outside of the church
system. It reappeared from time to time. The dancing mania began at
Aix-la-Chapelle in 1373 and lasted for several years.[444] It was an
outlet for high nervous tension under which the population was suffering
on account of great calamities, social distress, and superstitious
interpretations of the same. In short, the period was one of monstrous
phenomena, extravagant passions, and unreasonable acts.
+216. Gregariousness of the Middle Ages.+ "To estimate fully the force
of these popular ebullitions in the Middle Ages, we must bear in mind
the susceptibility of the people to contagious emotions and enthusiasms
of which we know little in our colder day. A trifle might start a
movement which the wisest could not explain nor the most powerful
restrain. It was during the preaching of this crusade [of 1208, against
the Albigenses] that villages and towns in Germany were filled with
women who, unable to expend their religious ardor in taking the cross,
stripped themselves naked and ran silently through the roads and
streets. Still more symptomatic of the diseased spirituality of the time
was the crusade of the children, which desolated thousands of homes.
From vast districts of territory, incited apparently by a simultaneous
and spontaneous impulse, crowds of children set forth, without leaders
or guides, in search of the Holy Land; and their only answer, when
questioned as to their object, was that they were going to Jerusalem.
Vainly did parents lock their children up; they would break loose and
disappear; and the few who eventually found their way home again could
give no reason for the overmastering longing which had carried them
away. Nor must we lose sight of other and less creditable springs of
action which brought to all crusades the vile, who came for license and
spoil, and the base, who sought the immunity conferred by the quality of
crusader."[445] "To comprehend fully the magnitude and influence of
these movements we must bear in mind the impressionable character of the
populations and their readiness to yield to contagious emotion. When we
are told that the Franciscan Berthold of Ratisbon frequently preached to
crowds of sixty thousand souls, we realize what power was lodged in the
hands of those who could reach masses so easily swayed and so full of
blind yearnings to escape from the ignoble life to which they were
condemned. How the slumbering souls were awakened is shown by the
successive waves of excitement which swept over one portion of Europe
after another about the middle of the thirteenth century. The dumb,
untutored minds began to ask whether an existence of hopeless and brutal
misery was all that was to be realized from the promises of the gospel.
The church had made no real effort at internal reform; it was still
grasping, covetous, licentious, and a strange desire for something--they
knew not exactly what--began to take possession of men's hearts and
spread like an epidemic from village to village and from land to
land."[446]
What we see here is the power of mere gregariousness, the impulse of
acting in a crowd, without knowledge or purpose. The mere sense of being
in the current movement, or "in the fashion," is a pleasure. When the
movement is great in its compass and the numbers involved there is an
exhilaration about being in it. If the notions by which it is enthused
are great, or holy and noble, in form and pretense, even if not really
so, it may become demonic, and it may accomplish incredible things. We
had a grand illustration of this at the outbreak of the Civil War, in
1861, both in the North and South. Dissent on both sides was overwhelmed
and all were swept away into the prevailing current.
+217. The mendicant orders.+ The mendicant orders responded to the
deepest popular faiths and highest standards of the thirteenth century.
Francis of Assisi ([Symbol: cross] 1226) took up the notion that it was
wrong to own property, or at least meritorious to renounce it, and
affirmed that Christ and his apostles repudiated all property and lived
on alms. The Timotheists of the fifth century had held this notion, but
were rated as heretics.[447] Poverty, for Francis, did not mean a little
property, but absolute rejection of all property. This was necessarily
only a pose. He had to use other men's property, the use being right.
Therefore he could only renounce productive labor. The popular religious
temper of the time revered simplicity, humility, self-denial, and
renunciation of "the world" as especially evangelical virtues. They were
thought to be summed up in poverty. That Francis was a hero of this type
of religion has been universally admitted. The virtues were just the
ones which the Roman court did not show. Jacques de Vitry, an
enthusiastic preacher against the Albigenses, went through Italy to
Palestine in 1216. He left a journal[448] in which he recorded his
sadness at observing that, at the papal court, all were busy with
secular affairs, kings and kingdoms, quarrels and lawsuits, so that it
was almost impossible to speak about spiritual matters. He greatly
admired the Franciscans, who were trying to renew primitive Christianity
and save souls, thus shaming the prelates, who were "dogs who do not
bark." The Count of Chiusi gave to Francis the mountain La Verna for
retirement and meditation. Armed men were necessary to take possession
of it against the beasts and robbers who had possession of it.[449]
Carmichael believes that Francis received the stigmata, which he
describes in detail. The Francis of tradition is a fabulous person,
created out of the pet ideas of his time.[450] The historical person was
a visionary. Dominic was a zealot. He wanted to convert all heretics by
preaching or other means.
+218. Other mendicant orders.+ De Vitry found Humiliati in
Lombardy, who were living by ideas like those of Francis. The
Augustinian hermits were founded in 1256, the Carmelites in 1245,
and the Servites, or Servants of Mary, about 1275.[451] These
were all mendicants, and they bear witness to the character of
the notions of the time about poverty. It was a mania, and is
fully expressed in the _Romaunt de la Rose_. Perhaps Francis did
not mean to "found an order." He wanted to live in a certain way
with a few friends. The spontaneous and very rapid spread of his
order proves that it was concordant with a great popular taste.
Francis was a dreamer and enthusiast, not a politician or
organizer at all. In his testament he says: "After the Lord had
given me care of the brethren, no one showed me what I ought to
do, but the Highest Himself revealed to me that I ought to live
according to the mode of the Holy Gospel." He was not thwarted
and subjugated by the curia during his life, but his ideals were
not maintained by the men in the order. The man who was later
pope Gregory IX aided him to organize the order and to make it
practically efficient, that is, to take the enthusiasm out of it
and make it practical.[452] The popes of the thirteenth century
approved. There was in the principles of the order an antagonism
to the church as it was, and also an antagonism to common sense.
The church authorities wanted to bring the order into practical
use, and suspected it of the heresies of Florus. It therefore
split into "conventuals," who conformed to the methods of
conventual life, and the "spirituals," who clung to the doctrines
and rules of the founder. The latter became "observantines"
(1368) and "recollects" (1487).[453] The two branches hated each
other and fought on all occasions. In 1275 the spirituals were
treated as heretics, imprisoned in chains, and forbidden the
sacrament.[454] John XXII condemned their doctrine as heretical.
This put the observantines in the same position as other
heretical sects. They must be rebels and heretics or give up
ideas which seemed to them the sum of all truth and wisdom.
Generally they clung to their ideas like the heretics.[455] One
of their heroes was Bernard Delicieux ([Symbol: cross] 1320), who
is celebrated as the only man who ever dared to resist the
Inquisition. He was tortured twice, and condemned to imprisonment
in chains on bread and water. He lived only a few months under
this punishment.[456] Out of admiration immense sums were given
to the mendicants, and they became notorious for avarice and
worldly self-seeking.[457] As early as 1257 Bonaventura, the head
of the order, reproached them with these faults.[458] "Some of
the venomous hatred expressed by the Italian satirists for the
two great orders of St. Francis and St. Dominic may perhaps be
due to an ancient grudge against them as a papal police founded
in the interests of orthodoxy, but the chief point aimed at is
the mixture of hypocrisy with immorality, which rendered them
odious to all classes of society."[459] "In general the
Franciscans seem to us far less orthodox than the Dominicans.
They issued from a popular movement which was irregular,
unecclesiastical, very little conformed to the ideas of the
hierarchy about discipline." "The followers of St. Francis
continued to contain ardent-minded men who maintained that the
Franciscan reform had not produced all its due results; that that
reform was superior to popes and to the dispensations issued at
Rome; that the appearance of the seraphic Francis was neither
more nor less than the advent of a new Christianity and a new
Christ, like in all respects to the first, but superior to it by
poverty. Therefore all the democratic and communistic movements
of later times,--the third order of St. Francis, the Beghards,
Lollards, Bisocs, Fraticelli, Spiritual Brethren, Humiliati, and
Poor Men of Lyons [Waldenses], who were exterminated by the state
and the prisons of the Dominicans, have their origin in the old
leaven of Katharism, Joachimism, and the eternal gospel."[460]
+219. Popular mania for poverty and beggary.+ The strength of the
mendicant orders was in their popularity. They reconquered for the
church the respect of the masses. Then they became the inquisitors, and
the abusers of power for their own interests, and fell into great
disfavor. Their history shows well the course of interaction between the
masses and the rulers, and the course of institutions born in popular
mores but abused to serve private interests. The mendicant orders
furnished the army of papal absolutism. The Roman Catholic writers say
that the popes saved the world from the despotism of emperors. What is
true is that the pope and the emperor contended for the mastery, and the
masses gave it to the pope. What the popes did with it we know. That is
history. What the emperors would have done with it is matter for
conjecture. It is very probable that they would have abused the power as
badly as the popes did, but conjectural history is idle.
+220. Delusions.+ Of popular delusions one of the most striking and
recurrent examples is the belief that new and despised religious sects,
which are forced to meet in private, practice obscene and abominable
orgies. The early Christians were accused of such rites, and they
charged dissenting sects with the same.[461] The Manichæans, Waldenses,
Huguenots, Puritans, Luciferans, Brothers of the Free Spirit, and so on
through the whole list of heretical sects, have been so charged. Lea, in
his History of the Inquisition, mentions over a dozen cases of such
charges, some of which were true. Nowadays the same assertions are made
against freemasons by Roman Catholics.[462] Jews are believed by the
peasants of eastern Europe to practice abominable rites in secret. The
idea that secret sects use the blood of people not of their sect,
especially of babies, in base rites is only a variant of the broad idea
about secret rites. It is sometimes said that the charges were invented
to make sects unpopular, but it is more probable that they arose from
the secrecy of the meetings only. Christians are so charged now in
China.[463] The story of the discovery of such misbehavior always
contains the same explanation--a husband followed his wife to the
meeting and saw the proceedings.[464]
+221. Manias need suggestion.+ Manias and delusions are like fashions
and fads in that they always seem to need a suggestion from some outside
source, and often it is impossible to find such a source. A strong
popular belief, like the belief in Satan and demons, furnishes a ground
for a general disposition to hold some other people responsible for all
the ills which befall one's self. Then the disposition to act cruelly
against the suspected person arises to a mental disease, and by
coöperation of others under the same aberration makes a mania.[465] The
explanation lies in autosuggestion or fixed ideas with the development
loosely ranged under hysteria, which is the contagious form of nervous
affection. The term "epidemic" can be applied only figuratively. "Mental
disease occurs only on the ground of a specific constitutional and
generally hereditary predisposition. It cannot therefore be spread
epidemically, any more than diabetes or gout."[466] The epidemic element
is due to hysterical imitation. In like manner, epidemics or manias of
suicide occur by imitation, e.g. amongst the Circumcellions, a
subdivision of the Donatists, in Africa, in the middle of the fourth
century A.D.[467] Cognate with this was the mania for martyrdom which it
required all the authority of the church to restrain.[468] Josephus[469]
says of the Galileans, followers of Judas of Galilee, that they were
famous for their indifference to death. Convents were often seats of
frightful epidemics of hysteria. The accepted religious notions
furnished a fruitful soil for it. To be possessed by devils was a
distinction, and vanity was drawn into play.[470] Autosuggestion was
shown by actions which were, or were supposed to be, the actions proper
for "possessed" people. Ascetic practices prepared the person to fall a
victim to the contagion of hysteria. The predisposition was also
cultivated by the religious ecstasies, the miracle and wonder faiths,
and the current superstitions. Then there was the fact which nearly any
one may have experienced, that an old and familiar story becomes mixed
with memory, so that he thinks that what he heard of happened to
himself. Untrained people also form strong convictions from notions
which have been long and firmly held without evidence, and they offer to
others the firmness of their own convictions as grounds for accepting
the same faith without proof. Ritual acts and ascetic observances which
others can see, also conduct and zeal in prayer or singing, and the
odors of incense, help this transfer of faith without or against proof.
These appeals to suggestibility all come under the head of drama.
Nowadays the novels with a tendency operate the same suggestion. A
favorite field for it is sociological doctrine. In this field it is a
favorite process to proceed by ideals, but ideals, as above shown (secs.
203, 204), are fantastic and easily degenerate into manias when they
become mass phenomena. Mariolatry, the near end of the world, the coming
of the Paraclete, are subjects of repeated manias, especially for minds
unsettled by excessive ascetic observances. It follows from all these
cases of mental aberration that the minds of the masses of a society
cannot be acted on by deliberation and critical investigation, or by the
weight of sound reasoning. There is a mysticism of democracy and a
transcendentalism of political philosophy in the masses to-day, which
can be operated on by the old methods of suggestion. The stock exchange
shows the possibility of suggestion. What one ought to do is to perceive
and hold fast to the truth, but also to know the delusion which the mass
are about to adopt; but it is only the most exceptional men who can hold
to a personal opinion against the opinion of the surrounding crowd.
+222. Power of the crowd over the individual.+ The manias and delusions
therefore dominate the individual like the fashions, fads, and
affectations. It is the power of the crowd over the individual which is
constant. The truth and justice of the popular opinion is of very
inferior importance. The manias and delusions also operate selection,
but not always in the same way, or in any way which can be defined. He
who resists a mania may be trodden under foot like any other heretic.
There occur cases, however, in which he wins by dissent. If he can
outlive the mania, he will probably gain at a later time, when its folly
is proved to all.
+223. Discipline by pain.+ He who wants to make another do something, or
to prevent him from doing something, may, if the former is the stronger,
connect act or omission with the infliction of pain. This is only an
imitation of nature, in which pain is a sanction and a deterrent. Family
and school discipline have always rested on this artificial use of pain.
It is, apparently, the most primary application of force or coercion. It
combines directly with vengeance, which is a primary passion of human
nature. Punishment is of this philosophy, for by punishment we furnish,
or add, a painful consequence to acts which we desire to restrain, in
the hope that the consequence will cause reflection and make the victim
desist. The punishment may be imprisonment (i.e. temporary exclusion
from the society), or fine, or scourging, or other painful treatment.
The sense of punishment is the same whether the punishment be physical
pain or other disagreeable experience. Although we have come to adopt
modern ideas about the infliction of physical pain in punishment, we
cannot depart far from its fundamental theory and motive. In the past,
physical pain has been employed also, in lynching and in regular
proceedings, to enforce conformity, and to suppress dissent from the
current mores of the society. The physical proceedings are measures to
produce conformity which differ from boycotting and other methods of
manifesting disapproval and inflicting unpopularity in that they are
positive and physical. Then the selection is positive and is pursued by
external and physical sanctions.
+224. The mediæval church operated societal selection.+ It is evident
that the mediæval church was a machine to exert societal selection. The
great reason for its strength as such is that it never made the mores of
the age; it proceeded out of them. It contributed, through a thousand
previous years, phantasms about the other world and dogmas about the
relation of this world to that one. These dogmas became mixed with all
the experience of life in the days of civic decline and misery, and
produced the mores of the tenth and eleventh centuries. All the great
doctrines then took on the form of manias or delusions. In the early
centuries of the Christian era "catholic" meant Christendom in its
entirety, in contrast with the separate congregations, so that the
concepts "all congregations" and the "universal church" are identical.
However, the church over the whole world was thought to have been
founded by the apostles, so that that only could be true which was found
everywhere in Christendom. So "catholic" came to have a pregnant
meaning, and got dogmatic and political connotations.[471] In the
eleventh century all Christendom was reduced to civic fragments in which
tyranny, oppression, and strife prevailed. It was not strange that
"catholicity" was revived as an idea of a peace pact by means of which
the church might unite Christendom into a peace group for the welfare of
mankind (sec. 14). This was a grand idea. If the Christian church had
devoted itself to the realization of it, by forms of constitutional
liberty, the history of the world would have been different. The church,
however, used "catholicity" as a name for universal submission to the
bishop of Rome and for hierarchical discipline, and used all means to
try to realize that conception. By the Inquisition and other apparatus
it attempted to enforce conformity to this idea, and exercised a
societal selection against all dissenters from it. The ecclesiastics of
Cluny, in the eleventh century, gave form to this high-church doctrine,
and they combined with it a rational effort to raise the clergy to honor
for learning and piety, as a necessary step for the success of their
church policy. The circumstances and ideas of the time gave to these
efforts the form of a struggle for a monarchical constitution of the
church. In the thirteenth century this monarchy came into collision with
the empire as the other aspirant to the rule of Christendom. Already the
papacy was losing moral hold on its subjects. The clergy were criticised
for worldliness, arrogance, and tyranny, and the antagonism of the
dynastic states, so far as they existed, found expression in popular
literature. Walter von der Vogelweide is regarded as a forerunner of the
Reformation on account of his bitter criticisms of the hierarchy.[472]
It is, however, very noteworthy that, in spite of the popular language
of the writers and their appeals to common experience, they did not
break the people away from their ecclesiastical allegiance, and also
that the church authorities paid little heed to the criticisms of these
persons. The miracle and moral plays were in the taste of the age
entirely. Besides being gross, they were irreligious and blasphemous.
Ecclesiastics tolerated them nevertheless.[473] The authorities moved
only when "the faith" was brought in question. "The faith," therefore,
acquired a technical signification of great importance. It was elevated
to the domain of sentiment and duty and surrounded with pathos (sec.
178), while its meaning was undefined. In time it came to mean obedience
to papal authority. Thus all the circumstances and streams of faith and
sentiment of the eleventh and twelfth centuries concentrated in the
hands of the hierarchy the control of society, because there was no
other organ to accept the deposit. The Cluny programme was a programme
of reform in the church such as everybody wanted. It gathered all "the
good men" in a common will and purpose. The ideals and the means were
selected, and the advocates of the same became the selected classes in
society. They remained such long after the movement was spent and lost,
but the notion remained that every good man, or would-be good man, ought
to stand with the church.
+225. The mediæval church.+ In the crusades the church went to war with
Islam, another aspirant to rule mankind. It undoubtedly drilled and
disciplined its own adherents by the crusades and thus confirmed its
power. It is also certain that the crusades were popular and only put
into effect the wish of the great body of Christians. It was the masses,
therefore, who made the mediæval church. It possessed a corporate
organization and hierarchy which was a body of personal interests, in
which ambition, cupidity, and love of power were awakened. The church
was venal, sensual, gross, and inhuman, because the mores of the age
were such. How could the church be other than the age was? Where was it
to find inspiration or illumination from without which should make
ecclesiastics anything but men of their age? The men of that age left on
record their testimony that the church was in no way better than the
society.[474] From the end of the twelfth century man after man and sect
after sect arose, whose inspiration was moral indignation at the vices
and abuses in the church. Wycliffe denied transubstantiation on
rationalistic grounds, but his work all consisted in criticism of
hierarchical abuses and of the principles which made the abuses
possible. The church never was on the level of the better mores of any
time. Every investigation which we make leads us not to the church as
the inspirer and leader, but to the dissenting apostles of
righteousness, to the great fluctuations in the mores (chivalry, woman
service, city growth, arts, and inventions), to the momentum of
interests, to the variations in the folkways which travel (crusades and
pilgrimages), commerce, industrial arts, money, credit, gunpowder, the
printing press, etc., produced.
+226. Sacerdotal celibacy.+ The church rode upon the tide and tried to
keep possession of the social power and use it for the interest of
ecclesiastics. Asceticism was in the mores. Everybody accepted the
ascetic standard of merit and holiness as correct and just, whether he
lived by it or not. Sacerdotal celibacy was a case of asceticism. Every
one knew that it had come about in church history and was not scriptural
or primitive. It was in the notions of the age that there were stages in
righteousness, and that religious persons were bound to live by higher
stages than persons not technically religious. Renunciation of sex was
higher righteousness than realization of sex, as is taught in the
seventh chapter of First Corinthians. This notion existed amongst
heathen and pagans. The priests in the Melkart temple at Gades (Cadiz)
were bound to celibacy.[475]