THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1690–1781)[36]
=The Emergence of the “New Man,”――Individualism.= In passing to this
period we should recall the two objects of interest that distinguish
modern from mediæval thought: the “new man” of modern Europe; and
the “new universe”――new in its geographical outlines and in its
intellectual materials. We have already found that the two hundred and
more years of the Renaissance, the first period of modern thought, was
absorbed in exploiting the second of these objects――the “new universe.”
In fact the “new man” had been so interested in the “new universe” that
he had not thought of studying himself. He had systematized the great
wealth of his acquisitions and had constructed great systems of science
and metaphysics.
This second period of modern thought――the Enlightenment――begins
when the “new man” turns away from his intellectual struggles with
his environment and attempts to understand his own nature. Thus the
more important of the two objects emerges last; and this turn to
self-reflection constitutes the century of the Enlightenment. The
Renaissance had been subjective and spectacular; the Enlightenment was
subjective and tragic. The mental activity of the Renaissance had been
vital, spontaneous, and unconscious, like the awakening from sleep;
that of the Enlightenment was self-conscious and attitudinizing.
The man of the Renaissance had been in love with nature; the man
of the Enlightenment was in love with himself. Like the Greek
Sophistic Illumination, which is its parallel in ancient history, the
Enlightenment turned away from cosmological and metaphysical problems.
On the other hand, the philosophy of the Enlightenment penetrated
all departments of life and found expression in practical questions.
Erdmann has well expressed the meaning of these nine decades of the
Enlightenment as “an effort to raise man, so far as he is a rational
individual, into a position of supremacy over everything.” It was
during this period, which we are now about to enter, that Herder
brought into currency in Germany the word “humanity.” In England the
same sentiment was uttered by Pope in 1732 in his _Essay on Man_:――
“Know then thyself, presume not God to scan;
The proper study of mankind is man.”
The Enlightenment marks, therefore, the rise of modern individualism;
and the concerns of the individual become the important object of
consideration. The novelty of the great discoveries and inventions of
the Renaissance had lost its lustre. The “new universe” had become old
and familiar, but through his accomplishments the “new man” had begun
to feel the strength of his liberated powers. For had not the wonderful
world of the Renaissance been his own accomplishment? Had not all its
notable constructions been the creations of his powers? The “struggle
of traditions” to revive antiquity and to incorporate the “new
universe” upon an old basis; the “strife of methods” to reorganize the
“new world” upon a new basis――revealed this great fact: that man has
“world wisdom.” Man in his supremacy occupies the entire foreground,
and interest in the “new universe” fades away. The “new universe” is
now seen in the light of one’s personal interests. Man is supreme,
and to his word there can be no exception. There is constant reference
during this time to the “light of reason”――to a bright inner,
rational illumination in contrast to the vagaries of mysticism and the
obscurities of dogmatism. The worship of genius arises and with it a
contempt for the unenlightened. “Thus would I speak, were I Christ,”
said Bahrdt. No wonder that Goethe described the Enlightenment as an
age of self-conceit!
=The Practical Presupposition of the Enlightenment――The Independence of
the Individual.= The “new man” emerged from the Renaissance as the most
important object of consideration, and during the Enlightenment there
was never the slightest question about his independence. The individual
became the original datum of this period into which we are now entering;
he was considered to be the only thing that is self-intelligible;
he was the starting-point from which all social relationships were
to be explained. Among the many problems that arose, the independent
existence of the individual remained unquestioned. It was the period
of “liberty, equality, and fraternity.” The problems were about the
relations of the individual; never about the individual himself,
for concerning the individual no problem could arise. The individual
rejoicing in the exuberance of his own powers, the “monad enjoying
himself,” dominated everything. The monadology of the Renaissance
became an atomism in the Enlightenment. The individual was the
practical assumption of the period.
=The Metaphysical Presupposition of the Enlightenment.= There was a
metaphysical background to this practical assumption of the individual.
This was the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter. Although the
eighteenth century despaired of a successful metaphysical construction
of the “new universe,” and although its attention was riveted on an
analysis of human relationships, it must not be supposed that the
period was without its metaphysical bias. Such is not the nature
of human history; and if an epoch refuses to discuss metaphysical
questions, it is because it assumes some metaphysics as true. The
assumption of the independent individual implies the independent
existence of matter. The Enlightenment assumed the Cartesian theory as
correct. While many were the polemics against metaphysical speculation,
the Cartesian dualism was nevertheless in control. Here within is the
independent existence of mind; and it would naturally follow that there
without is the equally independent existence of matter. The conception
might fade into a ghost-like dualism, as in Berkeley and Hume, but
the dualism never entirely vanished. This has since been known as
the philosophy of “common sense,” and is to-day the easy attitude of
those not interested in metaphysical discussions. “Common sense” means
the opinion of the majority as to truth. Most people to-day, as then,
accept without question some sort of dualism, usually the dualism of
mind and body.
=The Problems of the Enlightenment.= The area of inquiry was thus very
much restricted during this period. Nature lies beyond our ken. God is
still more incomprehensible. From the study of nature and God, let us
turn to a study of the problems of the inner life. Yet while the field
of study was restricted, the problems within it were multitudinous,
and there was an astonishing breadth and universality, a tenacity
of everything, a disdainfulness of nothing. Within its own field the
Enlightenment sought to systematize and to stand by any idea in spite
of all opposition. The imagination took bold flights and, from the
standpoint of the inner individual life, tried to transform its world.
Overloaded with ballast, it tried to reconcile the irreconcilable and
to overlook the brute facts of existence. The problems arise from an
age that is self-opinionated, self-tormenting, and subjective.
The problems of this age may be divided into two classes,――utilitarian
and critical,――both having reference to the individual man in his
relations. These include the problems of psychology, epistemology,
sociology, economics, politics, etc. There was, for example, the
problem of our knowledge of the external world, of the validity of
innate ideas as the basis of knowledge, of the rational basis of
religion. Thought was very alert at this time, as is always the case
in times of great individualism, and thought could move with great
rapidity over the wide range of such subjects.
(a) =Utilitarian Problems.= The Enlightenment was curious about
the interests, the happiness, and the many powers of the individual.
Empirical psychologists and brilliant ethical scholars appeared. How
much can man know, and what are the limits and extent of his knowledge?
The Rationalists of the Renaissance had accepted without question the
mediæval teaching that a group of our ideas is innate and therefore
God-given. The Middle Ages had been built up on revealed knowledge.
But to the thinkers of the Enlightenment the most important ideas――yea,
the only ideas of service to us――are those derived from experience. We
should be happier if we confined ourselves to the facts of every-day
life, and did not try to deal with things beyond experience. Let us
give metaphysical theories to the Churchman. Empirical psychology
thus took the place of metaphysics, and became known as philosophy.
It was the favorite science of the time, and the basis of ethics
and epistemology. Philosophy thus came out of the school, and
became a public utility. It was based, to be sure, upon theological
preconceptions, but it was to be put to the service of man. It was to
be an instrument of discovery as well as a means of grace. With this
psychological incentive great schools of moralists arose, especially in
England: studying morality as based on the intellect, on the feelings,
on authority, on the association of ideas.
Empirical psychology led to self-inspection, and this is the age
when self-inspection was universal. It is the age of the founding of
“societies for the observation of man.” It is the age of sentimental
diary writing. Rousseau wrote his autobiography in France, and it
was followed by a flood of autobiographies in Germany. Even memoirs
of such scoundrels as Laukhardt were written and read as matters of
public interest. Religion, too, took the form of personal experiences
and individual conversions; and the church was more interested in the
experiences of the saved than in the dogma of salvation. The Methodist
movement arose in England and spread over the continent and to America.
Individual opinions were more important than conventions; friendships
than marriage; societies than corporations. The historical was lost
to view because the personal and particular occupied the foreground.
Gibbon said, “All ideas were equally true in the eyes of the people,
equally false in the eyes of the philosophers, equally useful in the
eyes of the magistrates.”
(b) =Questions of Criticism.= In the second place, the Enlightenment
is a period of criticism and stands in contrast with the constructive
Rationalism of the Renaissance. From Locke’s invective against innate
ideas to Hume’s skepticism of the law of cause, from Voltaire’s
examination of the foundations of religion to Rousseau’s polemic
against society, the age was one of the criticism of authority.
The psychologists, moralists, deists, and sociologists were
revolutionists――all striking directly or indirectly at absolute
political sovereignty, against the theoretical dogmatism and the
ceremonious morality in which the Renaissance was complacent. The
revolution began in the realm of the intellect and spread to political
society. It was natural that the beginnings should be made in the
apparently harmless theoretical examination of the grounds of knowledge
and the principles of morality; but the outcome was a general sweep
of historical criticism, in which authority and science, the church,
the state, and education came under censure. The spirit of man was
impatient. Man became indifferent to “learning.” In contrast with
the Renaissance, this was a time when books were little read, proper
names infrequently appeared in writings, authorities were little cited.
Let man study himself if he would learn about history and understand
the world. Man stands above the scholar, the Christian, the German.
He is independent of tradition, and should substitute the useful for
the historical. Cosmopolitanism takes the place of patriotism. The
Enlightenment is practical and yet imaginative. Its criticism aims to
strip man of all his artificialities and to find his natural state. Its
emphasis is negative and destructive.
The revolt of the Enlightenment against the past appeared in remarkable
changes in the political map of Europe. Mediæval Europe was breaking
to pieces. The Renaissance had been a period of social absolutism in
which the despotic powers of Macchiavelli and Richelieu were typical
of its political life. In this period new-comers forced their way
into politics and the Enlightenment was marked by the rise of Russia,
Prussia, and the American colonies. France and Austria, representing
the past, were arrayed against England and Prussia, representing the
future of Europe. The conflict between them was that of the old idea
of military despotism, non-commerce, and non-toleration against the new
spirit of individual freedom. From the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to
the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) occurred many conflicts which presaged
the breaking down of the old boundaries. The old régime received its
death-blow at the hands of Frederick the Great in the Seven Years’ War;
and a half-century later (1806) the Holy Roman Empire came to an end.
In all countries there were vigorous political movements in support of
the rights of the individual. In England the House of Commons began to
rise to power and the colonies in America to assert their independence.
In France the Bourbon family was fast losing its grip, to be completely
overthrown in the French Revolution (1789). The current was entirely
in the same direction in Germany. This was the time of Adam Smith and
the rise of economic theories. It is a matter of no little significance
that this period from the point of view of philosophy begins with
Locke’s psychological _Essay_ and ends with Kant’s _Critique_; and from
the point of view of politics it begins with the Revolution of 1688
in England, and ends with a revolution in France and another in the
American colonies.
=A Comparison of the Enlightenment in England, France, and Germany.=
The individualism of the Enlightenment expressed itself as a
rationalism in Germany, as a sensationalism and deism in France, and as
a deism and an empiricism in England. Nevertheless all its phases may
be found in each one of these countries. The outcome of the movement
in the three countries is, however, very different. In England the
Enlightenment passed into a philosophical reaction in the so-called
Scottish School; in France, it resulted in a political revolution; in
Germany, it merged with a great literary movement and resulted in a
creative idealism.
=The Many Groups of Philosophers of the Enlightenment.= A comparison of
the lists of philosophers of this with those of other periods reveals
an extraordinary number of names. The Renaissance, for example, shows
about half as many names of consequence, although it is about twice
as long. The Enlightenment teems with philosophers, for its secular
life was permeated with the reflective spirit. The philosophers are
also often notable men, whose names are familiar to the modern reader.
Nevertheless the number of constructive philosophers was exceedingly
few. Only Locke, Berkeley, and Hume can be found whose importance
equals that of Bacon, Hobbes, Galileo, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz.
In personal talents and importance to their age the others seem to go
in groups or to be part of the secular spirit. On the whole the history
of the Enlightenment is that of social movements, and the philosophers
seem to be the exponents of such movements.
Some of these important groups are as follows:――
In England.
1. _Associationalist Psychologists_: Peter Brown (d. 1735), Hartley
(1704–1757), Search (1705–1774), Priestley (1733–1804), Tooke
(1736–1812), Erasmus Darwin (1731–1802), Thomas Brown (1778–1820).
2. _Moral Philosophers_: Shaftesbury (1671–1713); morality based on
intellect, Samuel Clarke (1675–1729); Wollaston (1659–1724); morality
based on feeling, Hutcheson (1694–1747); Home (1696–1782); Burke
(1730–1797); Ferguson (1724–1816); Adam Smith (1723–1790); morality
based on authority, Butler (1692–1752); Paley (1743–1805); ethics
based on associational psychology, Bentham (1748–1832); in an isolated
ethical position, Mandeville (1670–1733); the Platonist, Price
(1723–1791).
3. _The Deists_: Toland (1670–1722), Collins (1676–1729), Tindal
(1656–1733), Chubb (1679–1747), Morgan (d. 1743), Bolingbroke
(1678–1751).
4. _The Scottish School of Philosophy_: Thomas Reid (1710–1796), Oswald
(d. 1793), Beattie (d. 1805), Dugald Stewart (1753–1828).
In France.
1. _Skeptics_: Bayle (1647–1706), Voltaire (1694–1778), Maupertuis
(1698–1759), d’Alembert (1717–1783), Buffon (1707–1788), Robinet
(1735–1820).
2. _The Sensualists_: La Mettrie (1709–1751), Bonnet (1720–1793),
Condillac (1715–1780), Cabanis (1757–1808).
3. _The Encyclopædists_: Diderot (1713–1784), Voltaire, d’Alembert,
Rousseau (1712–1778), Turgot, Jaucourt, Duclos, Grimm (1723–1807),
Holbach (1723–1789), Helvetius (1715–1771).
4. _The Political Economists and Constitutionalists_: Montesquieu
(1689–1755), Quesnay, Turgot, Morelly, Mably.
5. _The Sentimentalist_: Rousseau (1712–1778), the most notable figure
of France during the Enlightenment.
6. _Philosophical Revolutionists_: St. Lambert (1716–1803), Volney
(1757–1820), Condorcet (1743–1794), Garat (1749–1833).
In Germany.
1. _Thomasius_ (1655–1728), the first of the Enlightenment.
2. _The Wolffians_: Wolff (1679–1754), Bilfinger, Knutzen (d. 1751),
Gottsched (1700–1766), Baumgarten (1714–1762).
3. _The Geometrical Method and its Opponents_: Hansch, Ploucquet,
Crousaz, Rüdiger (1671–1731), Crusius (1712–1775), Budde, Brucker,
Tiedemann, Lossius, Platner.
4. _The Psychologists and Related Philosophers_: Kruger, Hentsch, Weiss,
Irwing, Moritz (1757–1793), Basedow (1723–1790), Pestalozzi, and Sulzer.
5. _The Independent Philosophers_: Lambert (1728–1777), Tetens
(1736–1805).
6. _The Deists_: Schmidt, Semler (1725–1791), Reimarus (1699–1768),
Edelmann.
7. _The Pietists_: Spener (1635–1705), Francke (1663–1727), Arnold,
Dippel.
8. _The Popular Philosophers_: Mendelssohn (1729–1786), Nicolai
(1733–1811), Basedow, Abbt, Engel, Feder, Meiners, Garve.
9. _The Writer on Philosophical Religion_: Lessing (1729–1781).
10. _The Writer on Faith Philosophy_: Herder (1744–1803).
The philosophers of greatest importance in this period are given below.
To help the reader keep in mind contemporary philosophical influences
other names are given with them in a parallel table.
Bacon
1561
│ Hobbes
│ 1588
│ │ Descartes
│ │ 1596
1626 │ │
│ │ Spinoza Locke
│ ┼ 1632 1632
│ │ │ Newton │
│ │ │ 1642 ┼
│ │ │ │ Leibnitz │
│ 1650 │ │ 1646 │
│ 1677 │ │ │
1679 ┼ │ │ Wolff
│ │ │ 1679 Berkeley
│ │ │ │ Voltaire 1685
│ │ │ │ 1694 │
│ │ 1704 │ │ │
│ │ │ │ │ Hume
│ │ │ │ │ 1711 Rousseau
│ 1716 │ │ │ │ 1712
│ │ │ │ │ │ Lessing
1727 │ │ │ │ │ 1729
│ │ 1753 │ │ │
1754 │ │ │ │
│ 1776 │ │
1778 1778 │
1781
Illustration:
MAP SHOWING THE BIRTHPLACES OF SOME OF THE INFLUENTIAL
THINKERS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1690–1781)
(Note that the names of the philosophers are given in
brackets beneath the names of the towns and cities)